Safety Science 50 (2012) 1462–1471

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Safety Science
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ssci

Identifying crucial safety assessment criteria for passenger ferry services

Chin-Shan Lu a,⇑, Po-Hsing Tseng b,1
a
Department of Transportation and Communication Management Science, National Cheng Kung University, No. 1 University Road, Tainan City 701, Taiwan, ROC
b
Department of Logistics and Shipping Management, Kainan University, No. 1 Kainan Road, Taoyuan 33857, Taiwan, ROC

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: This study empirically identified crucial safety assessment criteria for enhancing ferry safety and com-
Received 17 September 2011 pare difference between ferry passengers’, ferry operators’, academics’ and ferry governors’ perceptions
Received in revised form 16 January 2012 of their level of importance in Taiwan. Exploratory factor analysis was subsequently conducted to sum-
Accepted 24 January 2012
marize the safety assessment items into underlying dimensions. Six dimensions were identified, namely:
Available online 13 March 2012
safety equipment, ship structure, ship documentation inspection, safety instructions, navigation and
communication, and crew members’ ability. Further analysis indicated that crew members’ ability was
Keywords:
the most important dimension in the passenger ferry context, followed by safety equipment, ship struc-
Safety assessment criteria
Passenger ferry services
ture, navigation and communication, ship documentation inspection, and safety instructions. Differences
Exploratory factor analysis between passengers’ academics’, ferry operations’ and ferry governors’ perceptions of the level impor-
tance of the safety assessment dimensions were found. Implications of the study findings for improving
the safety of passenger ferry services are discussed.
Ó 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction has contributed to a decrease in accidents as a result of human error

Passenger safety assessment is important for the maritime
industry (Lois et al., 2004). Previous catastrophes have resulted in
large numbers of fatalities; for example, the sinking of the Dona
Paz (a Philippine-registered passenger ferry) in 1987 resulted in
the loss of 4386 lives, and the foundering of the Estonia in 1994
resulted in 852 fatalities. Lawson (2005) reported that over 4000
people had died in ferry accidents between January 2000 and May
2004. According to a Maritime Knowledge Centre report (2008),
on average, 137 ships had put in total loss claims and 700 lives
had been lost in accidents per year between 2001 and 2007. Many
ferry accidents have occurred in coastal waters over the past few
years. For example, an Egyptian ferry sank in the red sea in February
2006 resulting in the deaths of 1000 passengers; more than 350
people were lost in December 2006 as the result of a ferry sinking
between Borneo and Java; and over 80 people downed in December
2009 when an overcrowded ferry capsized in Bangladesh. These
accidents highlight the importance of passenger safety assessment.
In 1995, in order to improve maritime safety, the Maritime Safety
Committee of the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
decided to adopt Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) and asked its
members to become involved in research on ship safety (Rosqvist
and Tuominen, 2004). Subsequent studies have suggested that FSA
⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +886 6 2757575x53243; fax: +886 6 2753882.
E-mail addresses: lucs@mail.ncku.edu.tw (C.-S. Lu), tzeng_ypo@yahoo.com.tw
(P.-H. Tseng).
1
Tel.: +886 3 3412500; fax: +886 3 3412361.
(Maritime and Coastguard Agency, 1996; Hee et al., 1999; Wang,
2001, 2002; Lois et al., 2004; Lu and Yang, 2011). FSA is an approach
to maritime safety which involves using risk and cost-benefit
assessment in the decision-making assessment in the decision-
making process. A formal ship safety assessment framework con-
sists of the following: the identification of hazards; the assessment
of risks associated with those hazards; ways of managing the risks
identified; cost-benefit assessment of the options; and deciding
on which options to select (Wang, 2001, 2002).
An assessment has been defined as a quantitative or qualitative
measure that is used to appraise an observed situation with a view
to improving it (Nardo et al., 2005). The assessment can be used for
monitoring performance, identifying trends, predicting problems,
assessing policy impact, prioritizing measures, and benchmarking
(Litman, 2007; Hermans et al., 2008). Ship safety assessment is
an approach that has attracted much attention in recent years,
since its aim is to reduce unsafe working conditions (Wang,
2001). Hee et al. (1999) proposed a Safety Management Assess-
ment System for identifying weaknesses in marine operations,
where Wang (2001) suggested a subjective safety-analysis-based
decision-making framework for formal ship safety assessment in
situations where a high level of uncertainty exists. Lois et al.
(2004) investigated the applicability of formal safety assessment
in the cruise ship industry utilizing a case study approach. Despite
the importance of safety assessment, a lack of reliable safety data
and recognition of the importance of safety assessment have been
two major problems in safety research (Wang et al., 2002).
Moreover, most previous studies on safety assessment have

0925-7535/$ - see front matter Ó 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2012.01.019
 C.-S. Lu, P.-H. Tseng / Safety Science 50 (2012) 1462–1471
examined it from a maritime agency perspective (Marine Safety
Agency, 1993; Maritime and Coastguard Agency, 1996; Wang,
2001, 2002; Lois et al., 2004), and the opinion of major stakehold-
ers in ferry services, i.e. passengers, operators and shipping aca-
demics, have rarely been considered.
Since ferry companies and passengers are main operators and
users, respectively, and ferry accidents can result in serious injuries
to passengers or even their death (Telley et al., 2006; Fabiano et al.,
2010), an understanding of stakeholders’ safety concerns can pro-
vide useful information for ferry operators and ferry governors to
establish criteria to enhance ship safety (Vanem and Ellis, 2010).
Safety assessment measurement is also problematic due to the
difficulty of assessing and measuring maritime accidents in differ-
ent types of ships and complex environments. Further, according to
the ACSNI Third Report (HSC, 1993), there is no single measure of
safety assessment or performance that is unambiguous and wholly
resistant to abuse. Therefore, the perceptions of stakeholders, such
as passengers and operators, can offer an alternatives means for
assessing safety on passenger ferry services (DeJoy, 1994;
Hofmann et al., 1995; Janssens et al., 1995). The subjective safety
assessments obtained can be combined and used to produce pre-
ferred design/operation criteria (Wang et al., 2002). Perceptual-
based measures have been recommended by several researchers
(Neal et al., 2000) and are used in this study.
This study investigates the safety assessment of ferry services
specifically in the Taiwan area. Taiwan is a country with small
archipelagic islands. The main islands are Penghu/Makung, Kinmen
(Quemoy), Matsu, Orchid Island (Lan Yu), Green Island (Lu Tao),
Hsiao Liuchiu and Wuchiu. (see Fig. 1). More than 23 million peo-
ple live in Taiwan and these small islands. Ferry and air transpor-
tation services are the main offshore transportation. According to
statistics published by Taiwan Ministry of Transportation and
Communication (2010), 1.03 million people travelled between
Taiwan and the archipelagic islands in 2009, and ferry services
accounted for 55.8% of the transportation market. Importantly,
despite the endeavors of ferry operators and the authorities to
emphasize the safety issue, ferry accidents have continued to
occur. For example, a ferry sank off Penghu in 1991, resulting in
18 deaths, a ferry collusion and fire off Chi-Jin in 2005 resulted
in injuries to 51 people, and four people lost their lives in a ferry
accident at Liuchiu in 2005.
Accordingly, the objectives of this study are to provide an
empirically validated approach to identify safety assessment crite-
ria in the passenger ferry service context and to ascertain whether
differences exist between the perceptions of passengers, academ-
ics, ferry operators and ferry governors. There are five sections in
this paper. Following the introduction, the next section reviews
previous research on safety assessment in the passenger ferry ser-
vices context. The third section describes the development of the
research instrument, study samples, and research methodology.
Section four presents the findings from descriptive statistics,
exploratory factor analysis, and confirmatory factor analysis con-
clusions drawn from the finding and their implications for ferry
safety are discussed in Section 5.
2. Safety assessment criteria
Based on prior safety assessment research (Marine Safety
Agency, 1993; Maritime and Coastguard Agency, 1996; Hee et al.,
1999; Wang, 2001, 2002; Wang et al., 2002) and IMO require-
ments, this study focused on six safety assessment criteria for
passenger ferry service: ship construction, shipping documenta-
tion, firefight equipment, rescue equipment, communication
equipment, safety education, and crew member ability. These six
criteria are described below.
1463
2.1. Ship construction
Ship construction failure is a major cause of loss of integrity of
the hall, leading to the loss of a ship and its passengers (Soares and
Teixeira, 2001; Wang, 2001; Tzannatos, 2005). Wang and Foinikis
(2001) examined four containership safety assessment criteria,
namely; the generic engineering and technical system, the generic
personnel sub-system, the generic operational and the managerial
infrastructure, and the generic environment of operation, whose
primary components can be summarized as: (1) structure, (2)
strength and stability, (3) cargo and ballast operations, (4) maneu-
verability, power and propulsion, and (5) the cargoes carried.
Wang et al. (2002) used the structural crashworthiness of a ship,
oil outflow performance, and residual strength of a damaged ship
to assess a ship’s performance in an accident. They found energy
dissipation, penetration depth, quantity of oil outflow and residual
hull girder strength to be important assessment factors. Perez-
Labajos (2008) also examined the structure of vessels and protec-
tive light elements to avoid collisions in the fishing context. Thus,
a ship’s construction should be one of the criteria for assessing pas-
senger ferry services’ safety.
2.2. Shipping documentation
Standard operating procedures and regulations are important
factors to increase ships’ safety operations (Macrae, 2009; Thai,
2009). According to the International Safety Management (ISM)
Code, a shipping company should establish and maintain proce-
dures to control all documents and data relevant to the safety
management system. These procedures should ensure that valid
documents are available at all relevant locations; and that changes
to documents are reviewed and approved by authorized personnel.
Further, documentation should be kept in a form that the shipping
company considers most effective and each ship should carry on
board all documentation relevant to that ship. The documentation
should include the ship’s certificate, the ship’s operating instruc-
tions, the crew members’ list, seafarers’ qualification certificate(s),
and repair and maintenance record. The inspection of these docu-
ments should be included in the safety assessment procedure.
2.3. Safety equipment
Insufficient fire protection and vessel instability are potentially
dangerous. Gossard (1995) found fire, collision and grounding to be
important factors in cruise ship safety assessment. A study by
Wang (2002) surveyed containership and fishing vessels using a
formal safety assessment method. He found fires and explosions
to be significant hazards and to have disastrous consequences in
offshore installations. Duz (2003) emphasized the importance of
fire fighting procedures on-board vessels. The procedures of fires
and explosions and emergency response regulations and equip-
ment are necessary to avoid accidents. Fire fighting equipment is
therefore important to ensure safety in passenger ferry operations.
2.4. Rescue equipment
The shortage of rescue equipment was one of the main factors
that led to 1517 people losing their lives when the Titanic sank
in 1912. The International convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SO-
LAS) states that before a ship leaves port and at all times during the
voyage, all life-saving appliances should be in working order and
ready for immediate use (Wonham et al., 2000). In order to ensure
passengers will be rescued in the case of a vessel accident, ferry
operators should ferry are equipped with sufficient lifeboats and
life jackets for passengers. Given its importance, the inspection of
1464 C.-S. Lu, P.-H. Tseng / Safety Science 50 (2012) 1462–1471

Fig. 1. Ferry services between Taiwan and small archipelagic islands under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China.

life-saving equipment should be included in the safety assess-
ments for passengers ferry services.
2.5. Communication equipment
Every ship has the potential to sink if communication equip-
ment is lacking. Thus, all ferries must be equipped with communi-
cation equipment in order to ensure rapid, automated alerting of
shore-based communication and rescue authorities, in addition
to ships in the immediate vicinity, in the event of a marine distress.
Communication equipment, such as a radar system, searchlight,
broadcasting system (e.g. VHP and SSB), sonic signaling device
and telemetry system, allows a ship’s positions to be monitored
throughout its voyage and should be regularly checked for working
order and crew members’ ability to operate it correctly (Wonham
et al., 2000).
2.6. Safety education
Safety education can enhance passengers’ safety awareness and
reduce injuries in an accident. Lois et al. (2004) suggested that
cruise ship staff should direct passengers to their cabin and then
give them safety information and a life jacket drill when getting
underway. As during an accident, the evacuation behavior on a
passenger ship is highly complex since it involves a large number
of people on an intricate moving platform. Normally, passengers
have very little knowledge and time to respond to vessel accidents
such as a collision, sinking or fire. In research into airline passenger
safety, Muir and Thomas (2004) found that increasing airline
passengers’ safety education increases the probability of their sur-
vival in an emergency. Christense (2005) indicated that educating
passengers about evacuations with infants and young children can
increase their response during an airplane accident. Chang and Liao
(2009) found that cabin safety knowledge positively affects airline
 C.-S. Lu, P.-H. Tseng / Safety Science 50 (2012) 1462–1471
Table 1
Previous research on safety assessment criteria.
Dimension Previous studies
1 Ship construction Gossard (1995), Wang and Foinikis (2001), Wang
(2002),
Lois et al. (2004), Tzannatos (2005), Perez-
Labajos (2008)
2 Shipping Macrae (2009), Thai (2009)
documentation
inspection
3 Safety equipment Wonham et al. (2000), Wang (2002), Duz (2003)
4 Communication Wonham et al. (2000)
equipment
5 Safety education Lois et al. (2004), Muir and Thomas (2004),
Christense (2005), Chang and Liao (2009)
6 Crew members’ Gossard (1995), Williamson et al.(1997), Lois
ability et al. (2004)
passenger behavior. Thus, safety education, such as the demonstra-
tion of rescue equipment and pointing out emergency exits, should
be a crucial criterion in safety assessment for passenger ferry
services.
2.7. Crew members ability
Gossard (1995) reported that when ships’ crew members have
responded professionally to accidents this has often prevented loss
of both the ship and lives. Williamson et al. (1997) indicated that a
crew’s emergency response behavior is an important factor for
improving maritime safety. Crew members’ ability refers to the
decision-making, judgment, knowledge, and communication to res-
cued passengers that are necessary in a maritime accident. Crew
members’ ability also infers to their knowledge of the rescue com-
munication system, the location of lifeboats and survival proce-
dures (Lois et al., 2004). It is an important aspect of safety
assessment on-board vessels. Six safety assessment criteria dis-
cussed above are shown in Table 1.
3. Methodology
3.1. Sample
This study sought to identify the relative importance of six
safety assessment criteria for passenger ferry services. The data
for the study were collected from a questionnaire survey. The
study sample comprised four ferry stakeholder categories: passen-
gers, ferry operators, ferry governors, and academics specializing in
the field of transportation and shipping at universities in Taiwan. A
questionnaire survey was sent to 30 ferry operators, 197 academ-
ics, and 22 ferry governors in March 2008. A survey was carried out
via face-to-face interviews with 243 passengers in the departure
hall of ferry harbors in Taiwan over a period of three days. The total
number of usable responses was 361 and the overall response rate
was 73.3% (10 ferry governors), 58.9% (119 academics), 45.5% (22
ferry governors) and 86.4% (210 passengers), respectively.
3.2. Measures
Measurement items in the questionnaire survey related to the
six safety assessment criteria discussed above which had been
based on IMO requirements and a review of the ship safety re-
search literature. The questionnaire design stages followed those
noted by Churchill (1991), while content validity was tested
through interviews with senior safety supervisors at Kaohsiung
harbor bureau, Taichung harbor bureau and Keelung harbor bu-
reau. Interviews resulted in minor modifications to the wording
1465
and examples provided in some measurement items, which were
finally accepted as possessing content validity. The final version
of the questionnaire consisted of 25 safety assessment items rela-
tive to six safety assessment criteria, namely: ship construction,
ship documentation, safety equipment, safety instruction, naviga-
tion and communication, and crew members’ ability. Respondents
were asked to indicate the level of importance they attached to
each safety assessment item on a five-point Likert scale where
1 = very unimportant, 2 = unimportant, 3 = neither important nor
important, 4 = important, and 5 = very important.
3.3. Research methods
Several research methods were used in this study. Descriptive
statistics and exploratory factor analysis was conducted in order
to identify and summarize a large number of safety assessment
attributes into a smaller, manageable set of underlying factors or
dimensions (Hair et al., 2006). A reliability test was conducted to as-
sess whether these safety dimensions were adequate. Confirmatory
factor analysis (CFA) was then conducted to verify measurement
models. This involved the use of structural equation modeling soft-
ware AMOS 6.0 to analyze measurement models, assess psychomet-
ric properties, and to specify relationships among the latent
variables and the proposed measures. Finally, ANOVA was used to
examine whether difference existed between passengers’, academ-
ics’, ferry passengers’ and ferry governors’ perceptions of the level of
importance of the safety assessment dimensions.
4. Results
4.1. Respondents’ profiles
Respondents’ profiles are presented in Table 2. The majority of
academic respondents (85.7%) had a Ph.D., while 14.3% had a Mas-
ter degree. Assistant professor was the main job position (38.7%),
followed by associate professor (32.8%), professor (17.6%) and lec-
turer (10.9%). Just over 40% of the employing firms of respondents
in the ferry operator category had more than 50 employees, while
9.1% had fewer than 20 employees. Ferry governor respondents
came from the Ministry of Transportation and Communication in
Taiwan. Fifty percentage were a vice director or above, where
30% and 20% were senior specialists and traffic engineers, respec-
tively. As for passenger respondents, 63.8% were aged 39 years or
below, 20% were between 31 and 40, and 16.2% were 41 years
old or above. Table 2 also shows that 35.7% of passenger respon-
dents worked in private enterprises, 30.5% were soldiers, 19.0%
were students, 8.1% were government servants, and 6.7% worked
in other occupations.
4.2. Importance of ferry safety assessment items
According to their mean scores for the level of importance of the
25 ferry safety assessment items, respondents’ perceptions ranged
from very unimportant (mean = 3.97) to very important (mean =
4.71) (see Table 3). The top five most important ferry safety assess-
ment items in respondents’ view were: ship construction, ship
repair and maintenance record, firefight facility (e.g. fire extin-
guisher), rescue equipment and emergency exit (their mean scores
were greater than 4.62). In contrast, the least important item was
navigation record, followed by notice of weather conditions,
instruction on how to use safety equipment, closed-circuit televi-
sion (CCTV), and safety video (their mean scores were lower than
4.23). In general, the results pointed to the importance of ship con-
dition are safety equipment from respondents’ perspective.
1466 C.-S. Lu, P.-H. Tseng / Safety Science 50 (2012) 1462–1471

Table 2 (Churchill, 1991). After deleting one unimportant item (with a

Respondents’ profiles (N = 361). mean scores of less than 4.0). The item-total correlation of all the
Respondents’ profiles Frequency % other items ranged from 0.55 to 0.80.
Academics
Education level Ph.D. 102 85.7 4.4. Exploratory factor analysis
Master 17 14.3
Job title Professor 21 17.6 Exploratory factor analysis was conducted in order to gain a
Associate professor 39 32.8
Assistant professor 46 38.7
better understanding of the underlying structure of the data (Pitt
Lecturer 13 10.9 and Jeantrout, 1994). The ratio of sample size (361 respondents)
Ferry operators
to numbers of items exceeded the preferred 10:1 ratio recom-
Job title Vice president or higher 4 18.2 mended by Hair et al. (2006). The data were deemed appropriate
Manager 5 22.7 for analysis, according to the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin sampling ade-
Supervisor 6 27.3 quacy value of 0.886 (Hair et al., 2006). The Bartlett Test of Sphe-
Clerk 5 22.7
ricity was significant [v2 = 3615, P < 0.00], and well above the
Other 2 9.1
Number of employees 20 or less 2 9.1 recommended level. Eigenvalues greater than one was used to
21–50 11 50.0 determine the number of factors in each data set (Churchill,
51–80 6 27.3 1991). According to Hair et al. (2006), factor loading should be lar-
81 or more 3 13.6 ger than 0.5. The larger the absolute size of the factor loading, the
Ferry governors more important the loading is in interpreting the factor matrix. The
Job title Director/Deputy director 5 50.0 first analysis yielded a six-factor solution, which accounted for
Senior specialist 3 30.0
Traffic engineer 2 20.0
65.657% of the variance. However, the interpretability of this solu-
tion was rendered problematic due to three items being loaded on
Passenger
Age 30 or below 134 63.8
two factors, and their factor loading being less than 0.5. These
31–40 42 20.0 items, which were subsequently removed from further analysis,
41–50 16 7.6 were: insurance for passengers, limitation of passenger numbers,
51 years or above 18 8.6 and closed-circuit television (CCTV).
Occupation Private enterprise 75 35.7
Subsequent analysis of the 21 remaining items yielded six fac-
Soldier 64 30.5
Student 40 19.0 tors or dimensions, which accounted for approximately 69.35% of
Government servant 17 8.1 the total variance. A reliability test based on a Cronbach’s Alpha
Other 14 6.7 statistic was used to test whether these factors were consistent
and reliable. The reliability factor of each factor was well above
the value of 0.75, considered to indicate a satisfactory level of reli-
ability in basic research (Nunnally, 1978). The factors were labeled
Table 3
and are described below:
Respondents’ importance of safety assessment criteria.

Ranking Attributes Mean SD (1) Factor 1, safety equipment, consisted of four items: medical
1 Ship construction 4.71 0.53 equipment, alarm system, firefight facility (e.g. fire
2 Ship repair and maintenance record 4.69 0.61 extinguisher), and rescue equipment (e.g. life jacket and
3 Firefight facility (e.g. fire extinguisher) 4.67 0.52
lifeboat). Alarm system had the highest factor loading
4 Rescue equipment 4.66 0.53
5 Emergency exit 4.65 0.58 (=0.802) on this dimension and accounted for 13.33% of
6 Crew members’ knowledge of rescue procedures 4.62 0.59 the total variance.
7 Insurance for passengers 4.60 0.62 (2) Factor 2, ship structure, consisted of five items: watertight
8 Crew members’ ability to respond to an emergency 4.59 0.59 bulkhead, emergency exit, ship construction, environmental
9 Alarm system 4.59 0.61
10 Limitation of passenger numbers 4.58 0.63
sanitation, and safety signage. Emergency exit had highest
11 Watertight bulkhead 4.56 0.65 factor loading (=0.746) on this dimension and accounted
12 Radar system 4.51 0.63 for 13.31% of the total variance.
13 Safety signage 4.43 0.62 (3) Factor 3, shipping documentation inspection, consisted of
14 Broadcasting system (e.g. VHP and SSB) 4.42 0.65
four items: ship certificate, crew members’ certification,
15 Medical equipment 4.39 0.65
16 Crew members’ certification 4.35 0.73 navigation record, and ship repair and maintenance record.
17 Searchlights 4.34 0.69 Ship certificate had the highest factor loading (=0.881) on
18 Environmental sanitation 4.34 0.69 this dimension and accounted for 11.60% of the total
19 Ship certificate 4.34 0.74 variance.
20 Life jacket usage demonstration 4.23 0.74
21 Navigation record 4.19 0.76
(4) Factor 4, safety instruction, consisted of three items: notice
22 Notice of weather condition 4.19 0.77 of weather conditions, life jacket usage demonstration, and
23 Instructions on how to use safety equipment 4.17 0.68 instructions on how to use safety equipment. Life jacket
24 Closed-circuit television (CCTV) 4.04 0.75 usage demonstration had the highest factor loading on this
25 Safety video 3.97 0.75
dimension (=0.744) and accounted for 11.22% of the total
Note: The mean scores were based on a five-point scale (1 = very unimportant to variance.
5 = very important agree); SD = standard deviation. (5) Factor 5, navigation and communication, consisted of three
items: searchlights, radar system, and broadcasting system
4.3. Item-total correlation (e.g. VHP, SSB). Radar system had the highest factor loading
(=0.810) on this dimension and accounted for 10.54% of the
Item-total correlation was used to examine the correlation of an total variance.
item or indicator with the composite score of all items forming the (6) Factor 6, crew members’ ability, consisted of two items:
same set. Items from a given scale exhibiting item-total crew members’ ability to respond to an emergency, and
correlations less than 0.50 are usually candidates for elimination crew members’ knowledge of rescue procedures. Crew
 C.-S. Lu, P.-H. Tseng / Safety Science 50 (2012) 1462–1471 1467

members’ ability to respond to an emergency had the high- X1 1 e1

est factor loading (=0.831) on this dimension and accounted 1
1 e2
X2
for 9.32% of the total variance. Safety
1 e3
equipment X3
As indicated in Table 4, Factor 6, crew members’ ability had the X4 1 e4
highest mean (4.6), and this was perceived by respondent to be the
most important of these six factors. Crew members’ ability showed X5 1 e5

consequently be given priority when considering safety assess- 1 1 e6

X6
ment, especially in an emergency situation.
1 e7
Ship structure X7
1 e8
X8
4.5. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)
1 e9
X9
CFA was conducted to verify the six constructs in the measure- 1 e10
X 10
ment model, namely: 1
Ship 1 e11
Safety equipment, ship structure, ship documentation inspec- X 11
Documentation
tion, safety instructions, navigation and communication, and crew X 12 1 e12
Inspection
members’ ability. CFA allows tests to be conducted for unidimen- 1
X 13 e13
sionality, convergent validity, and divergent validity of the scales
employed in a study. Unidimensionality can be described as the 1
1 X 14 e14

existence of one construct (or latent variable) underlying a set of Safety 1

X 15 e15
items. One of the loadings in each construct can be set to a fixed Instructions
1
value of 1.0 in order to make the construct comparable (Koufteros, X 16 e16

1999). The path diagram presented in Fig. 2 shows a measurement 1

1 X 17 e17
model where the six latent constructs (safety equipment, ship
Navigation and 1
structure, ship documentation inspection, safety instructions, nav- X 18 e18
Communication
igation and communication, and crew members’ ability) consist of X 19 1 e19
their corresponding multiple indicators (measures or items).
Twenty-one observed variables were enclosed in squares. Four ob- 1 X 20 1 e20
Crew members
served variables (X1–X4) were loaded onto safety equipment; five ability 1
X 21 e21
observed variables (X5–X9) were loaded onto ship structure; four
observed variables (X10–X13) were loaded onto ship documenta- Fig. 2. Path diagram representing initial model. Note: X1–X21 are safety assess-
tion inspection; three observed variables (X14–X16) were loaded ment indicators; e1–e21 are error indicators.
onto safety instructions, three observed variables (X17–X19) were
loaded onto navigation and communication, and two observed
variables (X20–X21) were loaded onto crew members’ ability. 4.5.1. Standardized residuals
The statistics criteria for model modification decisions included According to Hair et al. (2006), standardized residuals with a va-
standardized residual covariances and model fit indices. lue larger than 2.58 or less than 2.58 are considered statistically

Table 4
Factor analysis to identify factors or dimensions underlying safety assessment criteria.

Items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6

X1 Medical equipment 0.623 0.353 0.043 0.373 0.098 0.009
X2 Alarm system 0.802 0.260 0.090 0.136 0.147 0.124
X3 Firefight facility (e.g. fire extinguisher) 0.780 0.215 0.181 0.102 0.218 0.190
X4 Rescue equipment (e.g. life jacket and lifeboat) 0.788 0.063 0.212 0.023 0.235 0.157
X5 Watertight bulkhead 0.232 0.565 0.197 0.153 0.158 0.163
X6 Emergency exit 0.147 0.746 0.113 0.028 0.181 0.288
X7 Ship construction 0.167 0.697 0.194 0.098 0.078 0.306
X8 Environmental sanitation 0.137 0.685 0.013 0.408 0.092 0.149
X9 Safety signage 0.211 0.601 0.089 0.399 0.095 0.013
X10 Ship certificate 0.123 0.023 0.881 0.028 0.009 0.106
X11 Crew members’ certification 0.224 0.100 0.855 0.080 0.019 0.051
X12 Navigation record 0.039 0.235 0.594 0.183 0.238 0.066
X13 Ship repair and maintenance record 0.204 0.348 0.575 0.126 0.293 0.078
X14 Notice of weather conditions 0.015 0.047 0.041 0.712 0.316 0.068
X15 Life jacket usage demonstration 0.200 0.122 0.134 0.744 0.112 0.254
X16 Instructions on how to use safety equipment 0.163 0.165 0.041 0.683 0.119 0.361
X17 Searchlights 0.261 0.195 0.070 0.185 0.642 0.195
X18 Radar system 0.218 0.114 0.122 0.111 0.810 0.160
X19 Broadcasting system (e.g. VHP, SSB) 0.145 0.144 0.115 0.279 0.778 0.047
X20 Crew members’ ability to respond to an emergency 0.177 0.175 0.076 0.235 0.173 0.831
X21 Crew members’ knowledge of rescue procedures 0.168 0.179 0.042 0.254 0.158 0.822
Eigenvalues 2.80 2.80 2.44 2.36 2.21 1.96
Percentage variance (%) 13.33 13.32 11.60 11.23 10.54 9.32
Accumulated percentage variance (%) 13.33 26.65 38.26 49.48 60.03 69.35
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.85 0.79 0.77 0.75 0.80 0.89
Mean 4.58 4.54 4.39 4.20 4.43 4.60
S.D. 0.58 0.62 0.71 0.73 0.66 0.59
1468 C.-S. Lu, P.-H. Tseng / Safety Science 50 (2012) 1462–1471

significant at the 0.05 significance level. The standardized residual
values of the items (environmental sanitation, safety signage, nav-
igation record, and notice of weather conditions) exceeded 2.58 in
absolute terms. Several items were therefore not included in the
revised model. Some goodness-of-fit indices were used to assess
the fit and unidimensionality of the measurement model (Koufter-
os, 1999; Hair et al., 2006), namely: goodness-of-fit index (GFI),
comparative fit index (CFI), adjusted goodness-of-fit index (AGFI),
root mean square residual (RMSR), and root-mean-square-error
of approximation (RMSEA). The normed chi-square (v2/df) value
was 2.335, and the GFI and CFI value was 0.928 and 0.952, respec-
tively, above the recommended level of 0.9. The AGFI value was
0.894, which exceeded the recommended level of 0.8. The RMSR
and RMSEA value was 0.026 and 0.060, respectively, above their
respective recommended threshold level of 0.05 and 0.08. CFA of
the final model thus yielded an acceptable fit level and all item
loadings were significant (see Table 5).
4.5.2. Convergent validity
Convergent validity was established by examining significant
factor loadings on each construct. Convergent validity can be
tested by the t-value, which is the critical ratio (CR) in the AMOS
text output file. A t-value greater than 1.96 or less than 1.96 im-
plies statistical significance (Byrne, 2001). The CR values were sig-
nificant at the 0.05 level, and thus provided satisfactory evidence of
the convergent validity and unidimensionality of each construct
(Anderson and Gerbing, 1998).
4.5.3. Discriminant analysis
Discriminant validity was assessed by constraining the correla-
tion parameters between constructs to 1.0. The difference in the
Chi-square value between the constrained and unconstrained
model is significant, suggesting the achievement of discriminant
validity. Results indicated that the difference in v2 for the fixed
and free solutions was highly significant (i.e. the minimum v2
difference = 4.8, P < 0.01, df = 1). This provided evidence of discrim-
inant validity.
4.5.4. Composite reliability and variance extracted measures
Composite reliability provides a measure of the internal consis-
tency and homogeneity of the items comprising a scale (Churchill,
1991). The composite reliability value of safety equipment, ship
structure, ship documentation inspection, safety instructions,
navigation and communication, and crew members’ ability was
0.805, 0.753, 0.710, 0.752, 0.801 and 0.886, respectively. All values
exceeded the recommended level of 0.70 (Hair et al., 2006). The var-
iance extracted value is a complementary measure for the construct
reliability value (Koufteros, 1999). High variance extracted values
occur when the indicators are truly representative of the latent con-
struct. Results presented in Table 6 indicate that ship construction
had the lowest variance extracted value of 0.505, indicating that
50.5% of the variance in the specified indicators was accounted for
by this construct.
4.6. Differences in passengers’ academics’, ferry operators’ and ferry
governors’ perceived importance of ferry safety assessment criteria
and dimensions
To examine differences in passengers’, academics’, ferry opera-
tors’ and ferry governors’ perceived importance of ferry safety
assessment criteria, one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was
performed based on Scheffe tests (see Table 7). Nine safety assess-
ment criteria were found to significantly differ between the four
groups: medical equipment, rescue equipment, watertight bulk-
head, environmental sanitation, ship certificate, crew certification,
ship repair and maintenance record, notice of weather conditions,
and instructions on how to use safety equipment.
Table 7 shows that, for ferry operators, the top five most impor-
tance safety assessment criteria were rescue equipment, crew
members’ knowledge of rescue procedures, crew members’ ability
to an emergency, firefight facility, and emergency exit. For passen-
ger respondents, ship construction was the most important safety
assessment criterion, followed by ship repair and maintenance re-
cord, watertight bulkhead, emergency exit, and firefight facility
(their mean score were over 4.60). The most important safety

Table 5
Parameter estimate, standard errors, critical ratio, and R2.

Factors and scale items Unstandardized factor loading Completely standardized factor loading Standard errora (SE) Critical ratiob (CR) R2
Safety equipment
X1 1.000 0.657 _c _ 0.432
X2 1.189 0.828 0.090 13.237 0.686
X3 1.074 0.878 0.078 13.744 0.771
X4 0.947 0.763 0.076 12.431 0.583
Ship structure
X5 1.000 0.636 _ _ 0.405
X6 1.095 0.774 0.103 10.640 0.599
X7 0.914 0.715 0.089 10.259 0.511
Ship documentation inspection
X10 0.526 0.823 _ _ 0.677
X11 1.114 0.925 0.077 14.538 0.855
X13 1.000 0.523 0.053 9.985 0.273
Safety instructions
X15 1.000 0.764 _ _ 0.583
X16 0.966 0.795 0.085 11.375 0.632
Navigation and communication
X17 1.000 0.721 _ _ 0.520
X18 1.016 0.799 0.079 12.842 0.639
X19 0.993 0.751 0.080 12.379 0.564
Crew members’ ability
X20 1.000 0.902 _ _ 0.814
X21 0.969 0.882 0.056 17.265 0.778
a
SE is an estimation of the standard error of the covariance.
b
CR is the critical ratio obtained by dividing the estimate of the covariance by its standard error. A value exceeding 1.96 represents a level of significance of 0.05.
c
Indicates a parameter fixed at 1.0 in the original solution.
 C.-S. Lu, P.-H. Tseng / Safety Science 50 (2012) 1462–1471 1469

Table 6
Composite reliability and average variance extracted values.

Dimension Composite reliabilitya Average variance extractedb

Safety equipment 0.865 0.618
Ship structure 0.753 0.505
Ship documentation inspection 0.710 0.602
Safety instructions 0.752 0.608
Navigation and communication 0.801 0.574
Crew members’ ability 0.886 0.796
a
Composite reliability = (sum of standardized loadings)2/[(sum of standardized loadings)2 + (sum of indicator measure-
ment error)]. Indicator measurement error can be calculated as 1-(standardized loading)2.
b
Average variance extracted (AVE) = (sum of squared standardized loadings)/[(sum of squared standardized load-
ings) + (sum of indicator measurement error)]. Indicator measurement error can be calculated as 1-(standardized loading)2.

assessment criterion for academic respondents was ship repair and
maintenance record, whereas for ferry governor respondents, the
most important safety assessment criterion was ship construction.
An analysis of the differences between ferry operators’, passen-
gers’, academics’, and ferry governors’ perceptions of the six safety
assessment dimensions identified from factor analysis was also
undertaken. Table 8 shows that ship structure, safety instruction
and crew members’ ability were found significantly differ among
the four groups at the 5% significance level. Crew members’ ability
(mean = 4.60) was viewed as the most important safety assessment
dimension by respondents, followed by safety equipment, ship
structure, navigation and communication, ship documentation
inspection, and safety instructions. Ferry operators had the highest
mean score for safety equipment and crew members’ ability, pas-
senger respondents had the highest mean score for ship structure
and safety instructions, and academics had the highest mean score
for ship documentation inspection and navigation and communica-
tion. Apart from the navigation and communication dimension, fer-
ry governor respondents had the lowest mean scores for the
remaining five safety assessment dimensions of the four groups. Ta-
ble 8 also shows that the difference in mean score between ferry
governor respondents and ferry operators for safety instruction,
safety equipment and ship structure dimensions was 0.53, 0.31,
and 0.28, respectively. These results suggest ferry governor respon-
dents attached lower importance to safety instructions, such as life
jacket usage and exit direction instruction than ferry operators.
Ferry operator and passenger respondents recognized the
importance of safety instructions (the mean score was over 4.2)
in ferry safety assessment. Ferry governors should also have recog-
nized the importance of safety instructions, such as demonstration
of life jacket and clear instruction on how to use safety equipment
and the emergence exit in passenger ferry services, since, for exam-
ple, the provision of sufficient life jackets has been shown to rescue
passengers’ and crew members’ lives in an accident situation
(Wonham et al., 2000).
The survey results also indicated that the difference between
passengers’ and ferry operators’ mean score for navigation and
communication was 0.19. This finding implies that navigation
and communication was less emphasized by passengers than ferry
operators. As regards the crew members’ ability dimension, there
was a difference of 0.21 between ferry operators’ and ferry gover-
nors’ mean score. This suggests that ferry operators viewed this
dimension as more important than ferry governors. In general,
the research findings indicate that ferry governors need to pay
more attention to safety training in order to improve crew mem-
bers’ emergency response behavior and increase passenger and

Table 7
Ferry operators’, passengers’, academics’, and ferry governors’ perceptions of the level of importance of ferry safety assessment criteria.

Criteria Ferry operator Passenger Academic Ferry governors F ratio

Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Medical equipment 4.50 0.51 4.44 0.65 4.34 0.64 3.80 0.63 3.58*
Alarm system 4.59 0.59 4.55 0.63 4.66 0.59 4.50 0.71 0.95
Firefight facility (e.g. fire extinguisher) 4.68 0.48 4.62 0.56 4.76 0.43 4.50 0.71 2.07
Rescue equipment 4.77 0.43 4.59 0.56 4.77 0.44 4.50 0.71 3.67*
Watertight bulkhead 4.41 0.50 4.62 0.60 4.54 0.71 3.90 0.74 4.57**
Emergency exit 4.64 0.58 4.62 0.62 4.71 0.51 4.50 0.53 0.94
Ship construction 4.59 0.67 4.67 0.56 4.81 0.42 4.80 0.42 2.27
Environmental sanitation 4.36 0.58 4.49 0.64 4.10 0.72 3.90 0.74 10.37**
Safety signage 4.50 0.60 4.42 0.62 4.45 0.61 4.00 0.82 1.75
Ship certificate 4.41 0.73 4.19 0.74 4.56 0.68 4.50 0.53 6.77**
Crew certification 4.36 0.73 4.27 0.76 4.50 0.66 4.20 0.63 2.71*
Navigation record 4.00 0.69 4.20 0.78 4.24 0.71 3.70 0.95 2.02
Ship repair and maintenance record 4.41 0.73 4.64 0.67 4.86 0.40 4.40 0.70 6.13**
Notice of weather conditions 4.23 0.69 4.39 0.68 3.86 0.82 3.60 0.70 16.03**
Life jacket usage demonstration 4.32 0.61 4.25 0.75 4.24 0.72 4.00 0.94 0.36
Instruction on how to use safety equipment 4.31 0.48 4.23 0.69 4.08 0.68 3.60 0.70 4.02**
Searchlights 4.45 0.67 4.30 0.72 4.40 0.64 4.30 0.48 0.67
Radar system 4.45 0.80 4.55 0.63 4.47 0.58 4.30 0.67 0.93
Broadcasting system (e.g. VHP, SSB) 4.32 0.72 4.41 0.69 4.45 0.58 4.40 0.70 0.30
Crew members’ ability to respond to an emergency 4.68 0.48 4.55 0.64 4.65 0.53 4.50 0.53 0.94
Crew members’ knowledge of rescue procedures 4.73 0.46 4.57 0.62 4.69 0.55 4.50 0.53 1.46

Note: The mean scores were based on a five-point scale (1 = very unimportant to 5 = very important agree); SD = standard deviation.
*
p < 0.05.
**
p < 0.01.
1470 C.-S. Lu, P.-H. Tseng / Safety Science 50 (2012) 1462–1471

Table 8
One-way ANOVA of differences between ferry operators’, passengers’, academics’, and ferry governors’ perceptions of the level of importance of the six ferry safety assessment
dimensions.

Safety assessment dimensions Groups Mean F ratio Comparison Scheffe test Mean difference
Ferry Passengers Academics Ferry A–B A–C A–D
operators governors
Safety equipment 4.64 (0.50) 4.55(0.60) 4.63 (0.53) 4.33 (0.69) 4.58 2.32 0.09 0.01 0.31
Ship structure 4.50 (0.59) 4.54 (0.61) 4.52 (0.59) 4.22 (0.65) 4.54 3.11* B>C>A>D (B,C) 0.04 0.02 0.28
Ship documentation inspection 4.30 (0.72) 4.33 (0.74) 4.54 (0.61) 4.20 (0.70) 4.39 2.32 0.03 0.24 0.10
Safety instructions 4.26 (0.59) 4.29 (0.71) 4.06 3.73 (0.78) 4.20 14.45** B>A>C>D (B, C), (B, D), 0.03 0.20 0.53
(0.74) (A, C), (A, D)
Navigation and Communication 4.41 (0.73) 4.22 (0.68) 4.44 4.33 (0.62) 4.43 0.28 0.19 0.03 0.08
(0.60)
**
Crew members’ ability 4.71 (0.47) 4.56 (0.63) 4.67 (0.54) 4.50 (0.53) 4.60 4.52 A>C>B>D (B, C) 0.15 0.04 0.21
*
p < 0.05.
**
p < 0.01.

ferry safety. Such attention is particularly important given that
crew members’ ability was perceived to be the most important
safety assessment dimension for passenger safety in the ferry ser-
vice context.
5. Conclusion and discussions
Given that fatalities arising from ferry accidents continue to oc-
cur, safety assessment criteria to improve ferry safety have become
increasingly important. Where several empirical studies of ship-
ping safety have been conducted in a specific area or country (Lois
et al., 2004; Lawson, 2005; Hetherington et al., 2006), research on
safety assessment criteria for passenger ferry services has been
minimal.
This study therefore sought to identify crucial safety assessment
criteria for enhancing ferry safety and compare difference between
ferry operators’, passengers’, academics’, and ferry governors’ per-
ceptions of their level of importance. Main findings of this study
based on a questionnaire survey conducted in Taiwan are summa-
rized below.
The five ferry safety assessment criteria considered to be most
important by respondents were ship construction, ship repair
and maintenance record, firefight facility (e.g. fire extinguisher),
rescue equipment and emergency exit. Thus, ferry operators and
ferry governors need to be especially aware of the importance of
these critical assessment criteria in ferry services when developing
their safety operations and policies.
Factor analysis was conducted in order to reduce the safety
assessment criteria into critical factors. Six were identified: safety
equipment, ship structure, ship documentation inspection, safety
instructions, navigation and communication, and crew members’
ability. Differences between passengers’, academics’, ferry opera-
tors’ and ferry governors’ perceptions of the level of importance
of the six factors were also examined. Results presented in Table
8 show that the level of importance attached to ship structure,
safety instructions, and crew members’ ability dimensions signifi-
cantly differed among the four stakeholder groups at the 5% signif-
icance level.
In general, this study found that ferry governors attached a
lower level of importance to safety equipment, ship structure, ship
documentation inspection, safety instructions, and crew members’
ability dimensions than the other stakeholder groups. This finding
suggests ferry governors need to attach a higher level of
importance to safety assessment criteria and consider the opinions
of ferry operators, passengers, and academics when formulating
safety policy. In addition, in order to more effectively develop
safety ferry services, this study’s findings indicate that ferry gover-
nors need to not only enhance crew members’ ability through bet-
ter and more frequent safety training, but also to increase their
knowledge of rescue procedures in order to enhance their ability
to respond to an emergency. The study findings also suggest that
ferry operators need to put greater emphasis on safety assessment
criteria, particularly safety equipment, ship structure, safety
instructions, ship documentation inspection, and navigation and
communication.
The study findings not only offer a current profile of safety
assessment criteria for ferry services, but also have implications
for a number of parties. Governors of ferry services can use the
study’s results to modify their current safety assessment criteria
to more accurately meet operators’ requirements. Moreover, in-
sights into differences between different stakeholders groups’ per-
ceptions of the level of importance of safety assessment criteria
may help ferry governors to better develop and evaluate safety
operations and policies. In addition, the list of twenty-one criteria
may help ferry governors and operators to identify and assess what
they should really be emphasizing to ensure passenger safety on
ferry service.
Several contributions are made by the study. First, it used a
‘‘perceptual measurement-individual attribute approach’’ to
evaluate the level of importance attached to safety attributes
(items), instead of a traditional checklist (yes/no). This helped to
more accurately achieve an understanding of the level of impor-
tance attached to safety assessment criteria and dimension in the
context of ferry services. Second, most previous studies of safety
assessment in the shipping industry have primarily focused on hu-
man factors (Hetherington et al., 2006; Macrae, 2009), and an eval-
uation of safety assessment criteria for ferry service has rarely been
conducted. This study demonstrated a helpful approach to compre-
hensively measure the level of importance attached to safety
assessment criteria and dimensions by four stakeholder groups.
The adoption of such safety assessment criteria for ferry service
should increase the effectiveness of safety audits and reduce acci-
dents. The safety assessment criteria and dimensions identified in
this study could be used as key safety performance indicators for
benchmarking purposes. For example, managers could use the
safety assessment criteria to further develop and improve safety
instructions and train crew members to more readily recognize
and rapidly respond to unsafe acts likely to cause an accident. Their
use could also strengthen management attitude to safety and lead
to higher safety commitment. Further, in order to increase effective
safety management, ferry operators should provide more safety
training program for crew member to acquire new safety skills
and a better understanding of how to conduct safety inspection.
Since this research found communication skill training to be
important, it should be provided to all crew members to increase
ferry passengers’ safety. As regard ferry governors, safety inspec-
tors and policy makers could use the results of this study in their
 C.-S. Lu, P.-H. Tseng / Safety Science 50 (2012) 1462–1471
safety assessment work to develop or amend safety regulations
and standard operating procedures. Improved policy implementa-
tion should help to reduce injuries to both passengers and crew
members arising from ferry accidents. This study results could also
enhance ferry governors’ safety attitude and thereby prevent fu-
ture accidents and reduce risk in the shipping industry.
Where there is a valuable study in the ferry safety assessment
field, it does, however, have several limitations. First, the research
scope of the study was limited to the ferry context in Taiwan, that
is, ferry transportation between Taiwan and its archipelagic is-
lands, thus was constrained by the small volume of vessel provid-
ing ferry services. Second, the number of ferry operators and
governors in Taiwan is limited, which resulted in a small number
of respondents in each of these two groups. Third, this study spe-
cifically focused on the passenger ferry services context. Future
studies could apply the critical safety assessment criteria identified
in this study to other transportation industry, such as airline, rail-
road or coach services. Despite its limitations, the study was
exploratory to identify critical safety assessment criteria and
dimensions and reveal the level of importance of four passenger
ferry services’ stakeholder groups. It also provides the basis for
future research in other transportation fields and other countries.
Finally, methodologically, a confirmatory factor analysis was ade-
quate to identify the key dimensions of safety assessment criteria
of ferry services. Possibly, other methods to assess the risks using
methods without quantitative approaches, such as the Analytic
Hierarchy Process (AHP) to examine the weight of the safety
assessment dimensions could usefully provide some aspects to
what is otherwise a purely subjective assessment (Quédraogo
et al., 2011). The approach helps to eliminate personal prejudices,
conflicting evidences, or error of judgment, which is commonplace
in subjective assessment procedures (Hafeez et al., 2002).
Acknowledgment
This research was sponsored by the National Science Council,
Taiwan, ROC under NSC 96-2415-H-006-005-MY3.
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