CHAPTER II.

THE LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.01 - A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact
in connection with his application for admission to the bar.
Rule 7.02 - A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the bar of any person known by him to
be unqualified in respect to character, education, or other relevant attribute.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND

CANDOR TOWARDS HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING
TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another
lawyer, however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to
those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

CANON 9 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.

Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law
may only be performed by a member of the bar in good standing.
Rule 9.02 - A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to
practice law, except:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latter's death, money shall
be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to persons specified in the agreement; or
(b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; or
(c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan even if the plan is based in
whole or in part, on a profit sharing agreement.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 6397

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE INTEGRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR, AND

APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR.

Section 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect
the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the
legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the bar to discharge its public responsibility
more effectively.

Section 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be
necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.
Section 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved: September 17, 1971

A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967

IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO.

FLORA QUINGWA complainant,
vs.
ARMANDO PUNO, respondent.

Domingo T. Zavalla for complainant.

Armando Puno for and in his own behalf as respondent.

REGALA, J.:

On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a
member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. In his answer, the respondent denied all the material
allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations therein do not constitute
grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court.

The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for investigation, report and recommendation.
Hearings were held by the then Solicitor Roman Cancino, Jr., during which the complainant, assisted by her
counsel, presented evidence both oral and documentary. The respondent, as well as his counsel, cross-examined
the complainant's witnesses. The respondent likewise testified. He denied having sexual intercourse with
complainant at the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, disclaimed the handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno"
appearing in the hotel register, and disowned Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child.

After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally charging respondent with immorality. The
complaint recites:

That on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora Quingwa and respondent Armando Puno were
engaged to be married, the said respondent invited the complainant to attend a movie but on their way
the respondent told the complainant that they take refreshment before going to the Lyric Theater; that
they proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel at R. Hidalgo, Manila; that while at the restaurant on the first
floor of the said Silver Moon Hotel, respondent proposed to complainant that they go to one of the
rooms upstairs assuring her that 'anyway we are getting married; that with reluctance and a feeling of
doubt engendered by love of respondent and the respondent's promise of marriage, complainant
acquiesced, and before they entered the hotel room respondent registered and signed the registry book as
'Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno; that after registering at the hotel, respondent shoved complainant inside the
room; that as soon as they were inside the room, someone locked the door from outside and respondent
proceeded to the bed and undressed himself; that complainant begged respondent not to molest her but
respondent insisted, telling her: 'anyway I have promised to marry you'; and respondent, still noticing the
reluctance of complainant to his overtures of love, again assured complainant that 'you better give up.
Anyway I promised that I will marry you'; that thereupon respondent pulled complainant to the bed,
removed her panty, and then placed himself on top of her and held her hands to keep her flat on the bed;
that when respondent was already on top of complainant the latter had no other recourse but to submit to
respondent's demand and two (2) sexual intercourse took place from 3:00 o'clock until 7:00 o'clock that
same evening when they left the hotel and proceeded to a birthday party together; that after the sexual
act with complainant on June 1, 1958, respondent repeatedly proposed to have some more but
 complainant refused telling that they had better wait until they were married; that after their said sexual
intimacy on June 1, 1958 and feeling that she was already on the family way, complainant repeatedly
implored respondent to comply with his promise of marriage but respondent refused to comply; that on
February 20, 1959, complainant gave birth to a child.

That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with the complainant through a promise of
marriage which he did not fulfill and has refused to fulfill up to the present constitute a conduct which
shows that respondent is devoid of the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all times is
expected of and must be possessed by members of the Philippine Bar.

The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the respondent.

A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on May 3, 1962. Thereupon, he answered the complaint on
June 9, 1962, again denying that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and that on the promise of
marriage, succeeded twice in having sexual intercourse with her. He, however, admitted that sometime in June,
1955, he and the complainant became sweethearts until November, 1955, when they broke off, following a
quarrel. He left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, to practice law. Without stating in his answer that he had the
intention of introducing additional evidence, respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed.

This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On the day of the hearing Solicitor Ceferino E.
Gaddi who appeared for the complainant submitted the case for decision without oral argument. There was no
appearance for the respondents.

Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his intention to present additional evidence in his
behalf is deemed a waiver of the right to present such evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, April
27, 1963), the evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his investigation, where respondent had an
opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examine the witnesses, may now be considered by this Court,
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court.

After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as stated in the complaint.

Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. She testified
that respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs.
A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. The hotel register of
the Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and Exh. B-2) shows that "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno" arrived at that hotel on June
1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed at 7:00 P.M.

Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5, 1958, when the latter went to Zamboanga
City. When she learned that respondent had left for Zamboanga City, she sent him a telegram sometime in
August of that year telling him that she was in trouble. Again she wrote him a letter in September and another
one in October of the same year, telling him that she was pregnant and she requested him to come. Receiving no
replies from respondent, she went to Zamboanga City in November, 1958, where she met the respondent and
asked him to comply with his promise to marry her.1äwphï1.ñët

Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that he and complainant met in
Zamboanga City in November, 1958. The fact that complainant sent him a telegram and letters was likewise
admitted in respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E), which was duly identified
by the respondent to be his.

Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternity and Children's Hospital. This is
supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate issued by the Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila,
and a certificate of admission of complainant to the Maternity and Children's Hospital issued by the medical
records clerk of the hospital.

To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter testified that
she gave money to the respondent whenever he asked from her. This was corroborated by the testimony of
Maria Jaca a witness for the complainant. Even respondent's letter dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E) shows that
he used to ask for money from the complainant.

The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant was subjected by the respondent himself failed to discredit
complainant's testimony.

In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, the respondent averred that he and complainant were
sweethearts up to November, 1955 only. The fact that they reconciled and were sweethearts in 1958 is
established by the testimony of Fara Santos, a witness of the complainant (pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.); respondent's
letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E); and respondent's own testimony (pp. 249 & 255,
t.s.n.)

Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of marriage
and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. (Cf. Tanjanco vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966) .

One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before the
Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old Rules of Court,
now section 2, Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the
practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. (Royong
vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, citing In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). When his integrity is
challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he
still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. Respondent
denied that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958,
but he did not present evidence to show where he was on that date. In the case of United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil.
303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:

An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty
he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he
owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardly indeed if he demand and
expect that same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by
reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help
himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him.

With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the complainant that
the allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member
of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the
statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the
general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers can not
be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the
office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567,
citing In re Smith [1906] 73 Kan 743; Balinon vs. de Leon Adm. Case No. 104, January 28, 1954; 50 O.G. 583;
Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December 28, 1956, 53 O.G. 627). As a matter of fact, "grossly
immoral conduct" is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment. (Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of
Court).
Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has,
thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of
this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of
morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:

... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit
or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to
uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the
administration of justice.

Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered stricken
off from the Roll of Attorneys.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

A. M. No. 2104 August 24, 1989

NARCISO MELENDREZ and ERLINDA DALMAN, complainants,

vs.
ATTY. REYNERIO I. DECENA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In a sworn complaint1 dated 25 September 1979, the spouses Erlinda Dalman and Narciso Melendrez charged
Reynerio I. Decena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with malpractice and breach of trust. The complainant
spouses alleged, among others, that respondent had, by means of fraud and deceit, taken advantage of their
precarious financial situation and his knowledge of the law to their prejudice, succeeded in divesting them of
their only residential lot in Pagadian City; that respondent, who was their counsel in an estafa case against one
Reynaldo Pineda, had compromised that case without their authority.

In his answer dated 18 March 1980, respondent denied all the charges levelled against him and prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint.

By resolution dated 14 April 1980, the administrative complaint was referred to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation.

Accordingly, the Solicitor General forthwith deputized the City Fiscal of Pagadian City, Jorge T. Almonte, to
conduct the necessary investigation, with instructions to submit thereafter this report and recommendation
thereon. Fiscal Almonte held several hearings on the administrative case until 15 July 1982, when he requested
the Solicitor General to release him from the duty of investigating the case.

On 10 September 1982, the Solicitor General granted Fiscal Almonte's request and in his stead appointed the
Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Sur, Pedro S. Jamero, who resumed hearings on 15 June 1983.

Respondent filed with this Court on 9 June 1987, a motion seeking to inhibit Fiscal Jamero from hearing the
case followed by an urgent motion for indefinite postponement of the investigation. Both motions were denied
by the Court in a Resolution dated 21 September 1987 with instructions to the Solicitor General to complete the
investigation of the administrative case and to render his report and recommendation thereon within thirty (30)
days from notice.

On 19 July 1988, the Solicitor General submitted his Report and Recommendation 2 dated 21 June 1988. In as
Report, after setting out the facts and proceedings held in the present case, the Solicitor General presented the
following:

FINDINGS

Complainants allege that on August 5, 1975, they obtained from respondent a loan of P 4,000.00.
This loan was secured by a real estate mortgage (Annex C, Complainants' Complaint, p. 16,
records).lâwphî1.ñèt In the said Real Estate Mortgage document, however, it was made to appear
that the amount borrowed by complainants was P5,000.00. Confronted by this discrepancy,
respondent assured complainants that said document was a mere formality, and upon such
assurance, complainants signed the same. The document was brought by complainant Narciso
Melendres to a Notary Public for notarization. After the same was notarized, he gave the
document to respondent. Despite the assurance, respondent exacted from complainants P500.00 a
month as payment for what is beyond dispute usurious interest on the P5,000.00 loan.
Complainants religiously paid the obviously usurious interest for three months: September,
October and November, 1975. Then they stopped paying due to financial reverses. In view of
their failure to pay said amounts as interest, respondent prepared a new document on May 7,
1976, a Real Estate Mortgage (Annex D, Complaint, p. 18, records) over the same lot 3125-C,
replacing the former real estate mortgage dated August 5, 1975, but this time the sum indicated
in said new contract of mortgage is P 10,000.00, purportedly with interest at 19% per annum. In
this new Real Estate Mortgage, a special power of attorney in favor of respondent was inserted,
authorizing him to sell the mortgaged property at public auction in the event complainants fail to
pay their obligation on or before May 30, 1976. Without explaining the provisions of the new
contract to complainants, respondent insisted that complainants sign the same, again upon the
assurance that the document was a mere formality. Unsuspecting of the motive of respondent,
complainants signed the document. Complainants Narciso Melendres again brought the same
document to a Notary Public for notarization. After the document was notarized, he brought the
same to respondent without getting a copy of it.

Complainants, relying on the assurance of the respondent that the second Real Estate Mortgage
was but a formality, neither bothered to ask from respondent the status of their lot nor tried to
pay their obligation. For their failure to pay the obligation, the respondent on October 12, 1976,
applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the second real estate mortgage (Exhibit 16,
Respondent's Position Paper). All the requirements of Act No. 3135, as amended, re extrajudicial
sale of mortgage were ostensibly complied with by respondent. Hence, finally, title was
transferred to him, and on June 20, 1979, respondent sold the involved property to Trinidad
Ylanan for P12,000.00.

When informed of the above by one Salud Australlado on the first week of March 1979 (see
Sworn Statement of complainant Narciso Melendres, p. 6, Folder No. 2 of case), and not having
known the legal implications of the provisions of the second Real Estate Mortgage which they
had executed, complainants could not believe that title to their lot had already been transferred to
respondent and that respondent had already sold the same to a third person.

Upon learning of the sale in March, 1979, complainants tried to raise the amount of P10,000.00
and went to respondent's house on May 30, 1979 to pay their obligation, hoping that they could
redeem their property, although three years had already lapsed from the date of the mortgage.
Respondent did not accept the proffered P10,000.00, but instead gave complainants a sheet of
paper (Annex B, Complainants' Position Paper), which indicated that the total indebtedness had
soared to P20,400.00. The computation was made in respondent's own handwriting.
Complainants went home with shattered hopes and with grief in their hearts. Hence, the instant
competent for disbarment against respondent filed on October 5, 1979.

Respondent DENIES all the allegations of complainants. He maintains that what appears on the
two documents allegedly executed by complainants, i.e., that they obtained a loan of P5,000.00
on August 5, 1975 and another P10,000.00 on May 7,1976, is allegedly the truth, and claims that
he in truth delivered the alleged amount of P5,000.00 to complainants and not P4,000.00. With
respect to the second loan, respondent claims that he delivered to complainants P8,000.00, plus
the P2,000.00 loan previously extended [to] complainants [by] one Regino Villanueva, which
loan had been indorsed to respondent for collection, thus making a total of P10,000.00, as
appearing on said document. Respondent denies that he exacted usurious interest of 10% a
month or P500.00 from complainants. He asserts that the fact that complainants were able to
secure a loan from the Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA) only proves the truth of his
allegation that the title of the property, at the time complainants obtained a loan from IBAA on
April 1976, was clear of any encumbrance, since complainants had already paid the original loan
of P5,000.00 obtained from respondent; that complainants knew fully well all the conditions of
said mortgage; and that his acquisition of the property in question was in accordance with their
contract and the law on the matter. Thus, he denies that he has violated any right of the
complainants.

After weighing the evidence of both complainants and respondent, we find against respondent.

While complainants are correct in their claim that they actually obtained an actual cash of
P4,000.00, they are only partly correct in the claim that out of the P10,000.00 appearing in the
second Real Estate Mortgage, P6,000.00 was applied to interest considering that not all the
P6,000.00 but only P4,000.00 was applied to interest, computed as follows: the first loan of
P5,000.00 was supposedly due on August 31, 1975. Complainants paid 10% monthly interest or
P500.00 on September 30, 1975, October 31, 1975 and November 30, 1975. Consequently,
beginning December 31, 1975 up to May 31, 1976 (the date of the execution of the second Real
Estate Mortgage) a total of six (6) months lapsed. Six (6) months at P500.00 equals P 3,000.00,
which amount plus the P2,000.00 complainants' loan to one Engr. Villanueva (indorsed to
respondent for collection) totals P5,000.00. Adding this amount to the previous P5,000.00
indicated loan secured by the first mortgage results in P10,000.00, the amount appearing in the
second Real Estate Mortgage. Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 7. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an agreement have been reduced
to writing, it is to be considered as complaining all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, as
between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement
other than the contents of the writing, except in the following cases:

(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings;

(b) Where there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. The term "agreement" includes wills.

There is no dispute that the two documents denominated Real Estate Mortgages covering the
supposed original loan of P5,000.00 and the inflated P10,000.00, respectively, were voluntarily
signed by the complainants. The general rule is that when the parties have reduced their
agreement to writing, it is presumed that they have made the writing the only repository and
memorial of the truth, and whatever is not found in the writing must be understood to have been
waived and abandoned.

However, the rule is not absolute as it admits of some exceptions, as aforequoted. One of the
exceptions, that is, failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties, applies in this
case. From the facts obtaining in the case, it is clear that the complainants were induced to sign
the Real Estate Mortgage documents by the false and fraudulent representations of respondent
that each of the successive documents was a are formality.

While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate, respondent, being a lawyer, should
have at least explained to complainants the legal implications of the provisions of the real estate
mortgage, particularly the provision appointing him as the complainants' attorney-in-fact in the
event of default in payments on the part of complainants. While it may be conceded that it is
presumed that in practice the notary public apprises complainants of the legal implications of the
contract, it is of common knowledge that most notaries public do not go through the desired
practice. Respondent at least could have informed the complainants by sending a demand letter
to them to pay their obligation as otherwise he would proceed to sell the lot at public auction as
per their contract. This respondent failed to do, despite the fact that he knew fully wen that
complainants were trying their best to raise money to be able to pay their obligation to him, as
shown by the loan obtained by complainants from the IBAA on April 8, 1976. In this connection,
it may be stated that complainants, per advice of respondent himself, returned the proceeds of the
IBAA loan to the bank immediately on April 30, 1976, considering that the net proceeds of the
loan from said bank was only P4,300.00 and not enough to pay the indicated loan from
respondent of P5,000.00, which per computation of respondent would already have earned
interest of P2,500.00 for five (5) months (December 1975 to April, 1976).

Respondent claims that complainants had paid him the original loan of P5,000.00, and that this
was the reason why complainants were able to mortgage the lot to the bank free from any
encumbrance. This claim is incorrect. The reason why the title (T-2684) was free from any
encumbrance was simply because of the fact that the first Real Estate Mortgage for the indicated
loan of P5,000.00 (the actual amount was only P 4,000.00) had not been annotated at the back of
the title (see Annex B, p. 14, rec.).

Respondent also denies that complainants offered to him the amount of Pl0,000. 00 as payment
of the loan, alleging that if the offer were true, he could have readily accepted the same since he
sold the lot for almost the same amount, for only P12,000.00, a difference of a few thousand
pesos. Respondent's denial is spacious.

Indeed, complainants made the offer, but respondent refused the same for the simple reason that
the offer was made on May 30,1979, three (3) years after the execution of the mortgage on May
31, 1976. With its lapse of time, respondent demanded obviously the payment of the
accumulated substantial interest for three years, as shown by his own computation in as own
handwriting on a sheet of paper (Annex C, Complainants' Position Paper, Folder No.
2).lâwphî1.ñèt

In view of all the foregoing, the observation made by the Hearing Officer is worth quoting:

In the humble opinion of the undersigned the pivotal question with respect to this particular
charge is whose version is to be believed. Is it the version of the complainants or the version of
the respondent.
In resolving this issue the possible motive on the part of the complainants in filing the present
complaint against the respondent must be carefully examined and considered. At the beginning
there was a harmonious relationship between the complainants and the respondent so much so
that respondent was even engaged as counsel of the complainants and it is but human nature that
when respondent extended a loan to the complainants the latter would be grateful to the former.
However, in the case at bar, complainants filed a complaint against the respondent in spite of the
great disparity between the status of the complainants and the respondent. Admittedly,
respondent is in a better position financially, socially and intellectually. To the mind of the
undersigned, complainants were only compelled to file the above entitled complaint against the
respondent because they felt that they are so aggrieved of what the respondent has done to them.
It is for this reason therefore that the undersigned is inclined to believe the version of the
complainants rather than of the respondent. In addition thereto, the respondent as a lawyer could
really see to it that the transaction between the complainants and himself on papers appear legal
and in order. Besides, there is ample evidence in the records of its case that respondent is
actually engaged in lending money at least in a limited way and that the interest at the rate of ten
per cent a month is but common among money lenders during the time of the transactions in
question'

Going now into the second charge, complainants alleged that respondent, who was their counsel
(private prosecutor) in Criminal Case No. 734, for estafa, against accused Reynaldo Pineda,
compromised the case with the accused without their consent and received the amount of
P500.00 as advance payment for the amicable settlement, without however, giving to the
complainants the Id amount nor informing them of said settlement and payment.

Again, respondent denies the allegation and claims that the amicable settlement was with the
consent of complainant wife Erlinda Dalman Melendre[z].

We are inclined to believe the version of the complainants.

It is admitted that complainants were not interested in putting the accused Reynaldo Pineda to
jail but rather in merely recovering their money of P2,000.00. At this stage, relationship between
complainants and respondent was not yet strained, and respondent, as counsel of the
complainants in this case, knew that complainants were merely interested in said recovery.
Knowing this, respondent on his own volition talked to accused and tried to settle the case
amicably for P2,000.00. He accepted the amount of P500.00 as advance payment, being then the
only amount carried by the accused Pineda. A receipt was signed by both respondent and
accused Pineda (Annex M, p. 34, record). However, respondent did not inform complainants
about this advance payment, perhaps because he was still waiting for the completion of the
payment of P2,000.00 before turning over the whole amount to complainants.

At any rate, complainants saw accused Pineda give the abovementioned P500.00 to respondent,
but they were ashamed then to ask directly of respondent what the money was all about.

On June 27, 1979, barely a month after May 30, 1979, when the complainants had already lost
their trust and respect and/or confidence in respondent upon knowing what happened to their lot
and, more so, upon respondent's refusal to accept the Pl0,000.00 offered by complainants to
redeem the same, Narciso Melendre[z] saw the accused Pineda on his way home and confronted
him on the P500.00 that had been given to respondent. Accused then showed complainant
Melendres the receipt (Annex M, Id.) showing that the P500.00 was an advance payment for the
supposed settlement/dismissal of the case filed by complainants against him.
 Sensing or feeling that respondent was fooling them, complainants then filed a motion before the
court which was trying the criminal case and relieved respondent as their counsel.

The Investigating Fiscal, who heard the case and saw the demeanor of the witnesses in testifying,
had this to say:

With respect to the second charge, the fact that respondent received P500.00 from Reynaldo
Pineda is duly established. Both the complainants and the respondent agreed that the said amount
was given to the respondent in connection with a criminal case wherein the complainants were
the private offended parties: that Reynaldo Pineda is the accused and that the respondent is the
private prosecutor of the said case. The pivotal issue in this particular charge is whether the
respondent received the amount of P500.00 from Reynaldo Pineda as an advance payment of an
amicable settlement entered into by the complainants and the accused or the respondent received
said amount from the accused without the knowledge and consent of the complainants. If it is
true as alleged by the respondent that he only received it for and in behalf of the complainants as
advance payment of an amicable settlement why is it that the same was questioned by the
complainants? Why is it that it was not the complainants who signed the receipt for the said
amount? How come that as soon as complainants knew that the said amount was given to the
respondent, the former filed a motion in court to relieve respondent as their counsel on the
ground that they have lost faith and confidence on him? If it is really true that complainants have
knowledge and have consented to this amicable settlement they should be grateful to the efforts
of their private prosecutor yet the fact is that they resented the same and went to the extent of
disqualifying the respondent as their private prosecutor. Reynaldo Pineda himself executed an
affidavit belying the claim of the respondent.'

Clearly, the complained acts as described and levelled against respondent Decena are contrary
to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals for which he may be suspended. The moral turpitude
for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional or
non- professional attitude (Royong v. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859). The complained acts of respondent
imply something immoral in themselves, regardless of the fact whether they are punishable by
law. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute, fixes the moral turpitude
(Bartos vs. U.S. Dist. Court for District of Nebraska C.C.C. Neb] 19 F [2d] 722).

A parting comment.

All the above is not to say that complainants themselves are faultless.

Complainants should likewise be blamed for trusting the respondent too much. They did not
bother to keep a copy of the documents they executed and considering that they admitted they
did not understand the contents of the documents, they did not bother to have them explained by
another lawyer or by any knowledgeable person in their locality. Likewise, for a period of three
years, they did not bother to ask for respondent the status of their lot and/or their obligation to
him. Their complacency or apathy amounting almost to negligence contributed to the expedient
loss of their property thru the legal manuevers employed by respondent. Hence, respondent's
liability merits mitigation. (Emphasis supplied)

and made the following recommendation:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Reynerio I. Decena be suspended from

the practice of law for a period of five (5) years. 3
The Office of the Solicitor General, through Fiscals Almonte and Jamero, held several hearings during the
investigation of the present administrative case: City Fiscal Jorge T. Almonte was able to hold six (6) actual
hearings out of twenty-five (25) resettings 4 While only five (5) actual hearings, out of forty (40)
resettings 5 were held under Provincial Fiscal Pedro S. Jamero. In those hearings, the complainants presented a
number of witnesses who, after their direct testimony, were cross-examined by the counsel for respondent;
complainant Narciso Melendrez also testified and was accordingly cross-examined. Considering the long delay
incurred in the investigation of the administrative case and having been pressed by the Solicitor General
immediately to complete the investigation, Fiscal Jamero posed a change of procedure, from trial type
proceedings to requiring the parties to submit their respective position papers. The complainants immediately
filed their position paper which consisted of their separate sworn statements, (that of Narciso Melendrez was in
a question and answer form), their documentary exhibits and an affidavit of one Jeorge G. Santos. Respondent
also filed his counter-affidavit and affidavits of his witnesses, with several annexes in support thereof In the
healing of 28 October 1987, which had been set for the cross examination of the complainants and their
witnesses by respondent, the complainants refused to submit themselves to cross-examination on the ground
that the order of the hearing officer dated 17 December 1986 declaring respondent's right of cross examination
as having been waived, had become final and executory. Respondent questions now the evidentiary value of the
complainants' position paper, not having passed through any cross-examination and argues that the non-
submission of the complainants and their witnesses to cross-examination constitutes a denial of his right to due
process.

We do not think respondent's right to confront the complainants and their witnesses against him has been
violated, Respondent in fact cross-examined complainant Narciso Melendrez and some of the witnesses which
complainants had presented earlier. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the record of the proceedings
shows that respondent had all the opportunity to cross-examine the other witnesses of the complainants (those
whose affidavits were attached to complainants' position paper) had he wanted to, but had forfeited such
opportunity by asking for numerous continuances which indicated a clear attempt on his part to delay the
investigation proceedings. Respondent had in fact requested a total of twenty three (23) resettings during the
investigation proceedings: he had eight (8) under Fiscal Almonte and fifteen (15) under Fiscal Jamero. There
were also instances where respondent asked for postponement and at the same time reset the hearing to a
specific date of his choice on which neither he nor as counsel would appear. That attitude of respondent
eventually led the hearing officer to declare his (respondent's) right to cross-examine the complainants and their
witnesses as having been waived in his order of 17 December 1986. Respondent can not now claim that he had
been deprived below of the opportunity to confront the complainants and their witnesses.

After carefully going through the record of the proceedings as well as the evidence presented by both parties,
we agree with the findings and conclusions of the Solicitor General.

The following acts of respondent:

1. making it appear on the 5 August 1975 real estate mortgage that the amount loaned to
complainants was P5,000.00 instead of P4,000.00;

2. exacting grossly unreasonable and usurious interest;

3. making it appear in the second real estate mortgage of 7 May 1976 that the loan extended to
complainants had escalated to P10,000.00;

4. failing to inform complainants of the import of the real mortgage documents and inducing
them to sign those documents with assurances that they were merely for purposes of "formality";

5. failing to demand or refraining from demanding payment from complainants before effecting
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property; and
 6. failing to inform or refraining from informing complainants that the real estate mortgage had
already been foreclosed and that complainants had a right to redeem the foreclosed property
within a certain period of time.

constitute deception and dishonesty and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. We agree with the Solicitor
General that the acts of respondent "imply something immoral in themselves regardless of whether they are
punishable by law" and that these acts constitute moral turpitude, being "contrary to justice, honesty, modesty
or good morals." The standard required from members of the Bar is not, of course, satisfied by conduct which
merely avoids collision with our criminal law. Even so, respondent's conduct, in fact, may be penalizable under
at least one penal statute — the anti-usury law.

The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his professional capacity, that is, done at a time
when he was counsel for the complainants in a criminal case for estafa against accused Reynaldo Pineda. There
are two (2) aspects to this charge: the first is that respondent Decena effected a compromise agreement
concerning the civil liability of accused Reynaldo Pineda without the consent and approval of the complainants;
the second is that, having received the amount of P500.00 as an advance payment on this "settlement," he failed
to inform complainants of that advance payment and moreover, did not turn over the P500.00 to the
complainants. The facts show that respondent "settled" the estafa case amicably for P2,000.00 without the
knowledge and consent of complainants. Respondent informed complainants of the amicable "settlement" and
of the P500.00 advance payment only after petitioner Narciso Melendrez had confronted him about these
matters. And respondent never did turn over to complainants the P500.00. Respondent is presumed to be aware
of the rule that lawyers cannot "without special authority, compromise their clients' litigation or receive
anything in discharge of a client's claim, but the full amount in cash.6 Respondent's failure to turn over to
complainants the amount given by accused Pineda as partial "settlement" of the estafa case underscores his lack
of honesty and candor in dealing with his clients.

Generally, a lawyer should not be suspended or disbarred for misconduct committed in his personal or non-
professional capacity. Where however, misconduct outside his professional dealings becomes so patent and so
gross as to demonstrate moral unfitness to remain in the legal profession, the Court must suspend or strike out
the lawyer's name from the Rollo of Attorneys. 7 The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he
shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to
the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law, in the exercise
of privileges of members of the Bar. Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer, although not related to the
discharge of professional duties as a member of the Bar, which puts his moral character in serious doubt,
renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law. 8

In the instant case, the exploitative deception exercised by respondent attorney upon the complainants in his
private transactions with them, and the exacting of unconscionable rates of interest, considered together with the
acts of professional misconduct committed by respondent attorney, compel this Court to the conviction that he
has lost that good moral character which is indispensable for continued membership in the Bar.

WHEREFORE, respondent Reynerio I. Decena is hereby DISBARRED and his name shall be stricken from the
Rollo of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Resolution be FURNISHED each to the Bar Confidant and spread on the
personal records of respondent attorney, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., in Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Grñ;no-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
 A.C. No. 2505 February 21, 1992

EVANGELINE LEDA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang's good moral
character, in two Complaints she had filed against him, one docketed as Bar Matter No. 78 instituted on 6
January 1982, and the present Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a Petition for Disbarment, filed on 14
February 1983.

It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted marriage at Tigbauan, Iloilo. The
marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of Tigbauan, was performed under Article 76 of the Civil
Code1 as one of exceptional character (Annex "A", Petition).

The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had finished his law studies
(began in l977), and had taken the Bar examinations (in 1981), allegedly to ensure a stable future for
them. Complainant admits, though, that they had not lived together as husband and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6
January 1982).

Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the Bar. In his application, he
declared that he was "single." He then passed the examinations but Complainant blocked him from taking his
Oath by instituting Bar Matter No. 78, claiming that Respondent had acted fraudulently in filling out his
application and, thus, was unworthy to take the lawyer's Oath for lack of good moral character. Complainant
also alleged that after Respondent's law studies, he became aloof and "abandoned" her (Petition, par. 5).

The Court deferred Respondent's Oath-taking and required him to answer the Complaint.

Respondent filed his "Explanation," dated 26 May 1982 which was received on 7 June 1982. Said
"Explanation" carries Complainant's conformity (Records, p. 6). Therein, he admitted that he was "legally
married" to Complainant on 3 October 1976 but that the marriage "was not as yet made and declared public" so
that he could proceed with his law studies and until after he could take the Bar examinations "in order to keep
stable our future." He also admitted having indicated that he was "single" in his application to take the Bar "for
reason that to my honest belief, I have still to declare my status as single since my marriage with the
complainant was not as yet made and declared public." He further averred that he and Complainant had
reconciled as shown by her conformity to the "Explanation," for which reason he prayed that the Complaint be
dismissed.

Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June 1982. Attached to it was Complainant's Affidavit of
Desistance, which stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose out of a misunderstanding and communication gap and
that she was refraining from pursuing her Complaint against Respondent.

Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed Bar Matter No. 78 and allowed Respondent
to take his Oath in a Resolution dated 20 August 1982.

On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Administrative Case, this time praying for Respondent's
disbarment based on the following grounds:
 a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage with me assuming
that our marriage is not valid, and making a mockery of our marriage institution.

b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already married in his
application to take the bar exam.

c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification he submitted to the
Supreme Court;

d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived me into signing of the affidavit
of desistance and the conformity to his explanation and later on the comment to his motion to
dismiss, when in truth and in fact he is not sincere, for he only befriended me to resume our
marriage and introduced me to his family, friends and relatives as his wife, for a bad motive that
is he wanted me to withdraw my complaint against him with the Supreme Court.

Attached to Complainant's Petition for Disbarment, as Annex "F," is an undated and unsigned letter addressed
to Complainant, allegedly written by Respondent after he had already taken his Oath stating, among others, that
while he was grateful for Complainant's help, he "could not force myself to be yours," did not love her anymore
and considered her only a friend. Their marriage contract was actually void for failure to comply with the
requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code, among them the minimum cohabitation for five (5) years before the
celebration of the marriage, an affidavit to that effect by the solemnizing officer, and that the parties must be at
least twenty-one (21) years of age, which they were not as they were both only twenty years old at the time. He
advised Complainant not to do anything more so as not to put her family name "in shame." As for him, he had
"attain(ed) my goal as a full-pledge (sic) professional and there is nothing you can do for it to take away from
me even (sic) you go to any court." According to Complainant, although the letter was unsigned, Respondent's
initials appear on the upper left-hand corner of the airmail envelope (Exh. "8-A-1").

Respondent denied emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that it is Complainant who has been
indulging in fantasy and fabrications.

In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers that he and Complainant had covenanted not to disclose
the marriage not because he wanted to finish his studies and take the Bar first but for the reason that said
marriage was void from the beginning in the absence of the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code that the
contracting parties shall have lived together as husband and wife for at least five (5) years before the date of the
marriage and that said parties shall state the same in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. He could not have abandoned Complainant because they had never lived together as husband
and wife. When he applied for the 1981 Bar examinations, he honestly believed that in the eyes of the law, he
was single.

On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor General submitted his Report, with the recommendation that
Respondent be exonerated from the charges against him since Complainant failed to attend the hearings and to
substantiate her charges but that he be reprimanded for making inconsistent and conflicting statements in the
various pleadings he had filed before this Court.

On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor General's Report to the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report
and recommendation. In an undated Report, the latter recommended the indefinite suspension of Respondent
until the status of his marriage is settled.

Upon the facts on Record even without testimonial evidence from Complainant, we find Respondent's lack of
good moral character sufficiently established.
Firstly, his declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he was "single"
was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith, for which he should be made
answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides: "A
lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a material fact in
connection with his application for admission to the bar." That false statement, if it had been known, would
have disqualified him outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of good moral
character.

Respondent's protestations that he had acted in good faith in declaring his status as "single" not only because of
his pact with Complainant to keep the marriage under wraps but also because that marriage to the Complainant
was void from the beginning, are mere afterthoughts absolutely wanting of merit. Respondent can not assume
that his marriage to Complainant is void. The presumption is that all the requisites and conditions of a marriage
of an exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil Code have been met and that the Judge's official duty
in connection therewith has been regularly performed.

Secondly, Respondent's conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various pleadings submitted in Bar
Matter No. 78 and in the case at bar is duplicitous and deplorable.

The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent had submitted an "Explanation," in paragraph 1, page
1 of which he admits having been "legally married" to Complainant. Yet, during the hearings before the
Solicitor General, he denied under oath that he had submitted any such pleading (t.s.n., p. 21) contending
instead that it is only the second page where his signature appears that he meant to admit and not the averments
on the first page which were merely of Complainant's own making (ibid., pp. 59-60). However, in his Comment
in this Administrative Case, he admits and makes reference to such "Explanation" (pars. 3[f]) and [g]; 4[b]).

Again, while in said "Explanation" he admitted having been "legally married" to Complainant (par. 1), in this
case, however, he denies the legality of the marriage and, instead, harps on its being void ab initio. He even
denies his signature in the marriage contract.

In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the fact of marriage was not to be made public so as to
allow him to finish his studies and take the Bar. In this case, however, he contends that the reason it was kept a
secret was because it was "not in order from the beginning."

Thirdly, Respondent denies that he had sent the unsigned letter (Annex "F," Petition) to Complainant. However,
its very tenor coincides with the reasons that he advances in his Comment why the marriage is void from the
beginning, that is, for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code.

Fourthly, the factual scenario gathered from the records shows that Respondent had reconciled with
Complainant and admitted the marriage to put a quick finish to Bar Matter No. 78 to enable him to take the
lawyer's Oath, which otherwise he would have been unable to do. But after he had done so and had become a
"full-pledge (sic) lawyer," he again refused to honor his marriage to Complainant.

Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to conflicting submissions before
this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in devious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his
purpose. In so doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that
"a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a
lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court
to be misled by any artifice." Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers
appearing and pleading before them (Chavez v. Viola, Adm. Case No. 2152, 19 April 1991, 196 SCRA
10). Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him not only as a member of
the Bar but also as an officer of the Court.
It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent
to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of
law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692). As so aptly put by Mr.
Justice George A. Malcolm: "As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to
practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be
entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil.
350 [1933]).

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy to continue to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law until further Orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.

Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal record as an attorney and served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Court Administrator who shall circulate the same to all Courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

[A.C. NO. 7136 : August 1, 2007]

JOSELANO GUEVARRA, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment1 before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli
Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."

In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:

He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced
respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary Ann") Tantoco with
whom he had three children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene had
been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss
you," or "Meet you at Megamall."

Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the
following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied
that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the second
occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.

On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which he saw her and
respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the
venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal
belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.

Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on its
face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to
Irene, reading:

My everdearest Irene,

By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer for you that
you may find meaning in what you're about to do.

Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience eternal pain?
Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a bigger plan for the two of
us?cralaw library

I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly possible to love you.
And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!

I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we spent
together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until the life in me is
gone and until we are together again.

Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always
remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS

. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!

BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!

I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE
YOU'LL BE!"2

Eternally yours,
NOLI

Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila
where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later
that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was
pregnant.

In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted letter
was handwritten.

On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:

14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended
social functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001, the couple attended the
launch of the "Wine All You Can" promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at
Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of the Manila Standard issue of 24 September
2001, on page 21. Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their picture was captioned: "Irene with
Sportscaster Noli Eala." A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the
original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their adulterous relationship" supplied), respondent, in
his ANSWER, stated:

4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in
paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was low profile and known
only to the immediate members of their respective families, and that Respondent, as far as the general public
was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)cralawlibrary

On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his apparent abandoning or neglecting of
his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership in the
bar. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of paper." Morally reprehensible
was his writing the love letter to complainant's bride on the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his
love for her "until we are together again," as now they are.6 (Underscoring supplied), respondent stated in his
ANSWER as follows:

5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding

his adulterous relationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to keep
his membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondent's relationship with Irene was not under
scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own family:

5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in fact
they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of Respondent's special friendship with Irene.

xxx

5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by calling the
institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter to
Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the
formality of the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution regards
marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2).9

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has
been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant's wife, he mocked the
institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's marriage, commits adultery with
his wife, and degrades the legal profession.10 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied), respondent, in his
ANSWER, stated:
7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason being that under
the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low profile special
relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral
conductas would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court.11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,12 alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene
named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father. Complainant attached to the Reply, as
Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth13 bearing Irene's signature and naming respondent as the father
of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.

Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS14 dated January 10, 2003 from
respondent in which he denied having "personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the
complainant's Reply."15 Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed by
complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery against
respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.

During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to Answer were
adopted as his testimony on direct examination.16 Respondent's counsel did not cross-examine complainant.17

After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven.

The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility reading:

Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring
supplied), and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
(Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006
briefly reading:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06

CBD Case No. 02-936

Joselano C. Guevarra v.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala

RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of
merit.20 (Italics and emphasis in the original)
Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 13922 of the
Rules of Court.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word
Resolution shows.

Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the present petition of complainant, that there is no evidence against
him.24 The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:

While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the news item published in
the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying on an
adulterous relationship with complainant's wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record which support the
accusation of complainant against respondent.

It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through counsel made the
following statements to wit: "Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship
with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship
was low profile and known only to immediate members of their respective families . . ., and Respondent
specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that under the
circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely personal and low profile relationship with
Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . ."

These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed a "special"
relationship between him and complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the Certificate of
Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H-1") sufficiently prove that there was indeed an
illicit relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of the child "Samantha". In the
Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that complainant's wife Irene supplied the
information that respondent was the father of the child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted his
special relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make any
misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be underscored that respondent has not
categorically denied that he is the father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.25 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)cralawlibrary

Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene,
"adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any married woman
who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her,
knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void."26 (Italics supplied) What
respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was "low profile and known only
to the immediate members of their respective families."

In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,

a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely
denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is
a form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind
favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the
pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so
qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied
while the fact itself is admitted.27 (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of Irene's daughter Samantha
Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent - a "lawyer," 38 years
old - as the child's father. And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired information on "DATE
AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the certificate28 with her
signature on the Marriage Certificate29 shows that they were affixed by one and the same person. Notatu
dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child.

Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003
Affidavit30 which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the Certificate of
Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old and a lawyer.31

Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven by more
than clearly preponderant evidence - that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible
than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other32 - which is the quantum of evidence
needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an
administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all that is
required.33 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was not, under
Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. ─ A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory
agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or
suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of
the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied), under scandalous
circumstances.34

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase
"grossly immoral conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances." Sexual intercourse under scandalous
circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:

ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have
sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her
in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

x x x x,
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman elsewhere.

"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be
characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances."35 The case at bar
involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial
whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v.
Rongcal:36

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant,
albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.

x x x

While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between
two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so
with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are
punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a bigamous marriage . .
. It is enough that the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on
an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard
for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and
undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him.39 (Underscoring
supplied

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law which goes:

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that
I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or
malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State.

In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision,
obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support."40
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03
of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law."

Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the IBP
Commissioner, filed a Manifestation41 on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainant's petition
for nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against respondent and
Irene "based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case," which was pending review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.

The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainant's Motion to Withdraw Petition
for Review reads:

Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the Petition for Review, we are
inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which
provides that "notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time
before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall stand as though no appeal has been
taken."42 (Emphasis supplied by complainant)

That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is immaterial. The
acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and void.43 As a lawyer, respondent should
be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven
otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.44 In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene
prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite respondent
himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his
unfitness to be a lawyer.

As for complainant's withdrawal of his Petition for Review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to
state that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ
had already promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon City
Prosecutor's Office of complainant's complaint for adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ
Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:

Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair estimation of the Department,
sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both respondents. Indeed, early
on, respondent Moje conceded to complainant that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala, and this
she did when complainant confronted her about Eala's frequent phone calls and text messages to her.
Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two occasions. Respondent Eala
never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married
to another woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual abandonment of their conjugal home, after complainant had once
more confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship involving both respondents. This
becomes all the more apparent by Moje's subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon
City, which was a few blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital vows with complainant.

It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since Eala's vehicle and that of Moje's
were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address whereas Eala asserts that
that was where he held office. The happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and Moje had decided
to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said address
appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout after her separation from
complainant. It was both respondent's love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out there bore
fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center.
What finally militates against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of the girl,
Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and
damning nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainant's supposed illegal procurement of
the birth certificate is most certainly beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in
any categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child Samantha Irene Louise Moje.45 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the
DOJ no choice but to grant complainant's motion to withdraw his Petition for Review . But even if respondent
and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in court, the same
would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.

Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative]
proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape
the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely
different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case47 (Italics in the original),

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48 held:

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they
may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath
of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of respondent in the
Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be
and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.

G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
 HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman ombudsman
under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

The following are the subjects of this Resolution:

1) a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar against public
respondent Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez, in connection with G.R. Nos. 79690-
707 and G.R. No. 80578. and 2) a Resolution of this Court dated 2 May 1988 requiring respondent Hon. Raul
Gonzalez to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative
sanctions for making certain public statements.

The pertinent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos.

12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) pending before the
Sandiganbayan. The Office of the Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary investigation and filed the criminal
informations in those cases (originally TBP Case No. 86-00778).

On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus
(G.R. Nos. 79690-707) naming as respondents both the Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez. Among
other things, petitioner assailed: (1) the 5 February 1987 Resolution 1 of the "Tanodbayan" recommending the
filing of criminal informations against petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in TBP Case No. 86-00778; and
(2) the 1 September 1987 Resolution 2 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and
1216312177 denying his Motion to Quash the criminal informations filed in those cases by the "Tanodbayan."
In this respect, petitioner alleged that respondent Gonzalez, as Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the 1987
Constitution, was no longer vested with power and authority independently to investigate and to institute
criminal cases for graft and corruption against public officials and employees, and hence that the informations
filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-12177 were all null and void.

On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution, which read:

G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan and Honorable
Raul M. Gonzalez, Claiming To Be and Acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution ).—Acting on the special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with urgent motion for preliminary elimination injunction,
the Court Resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to require the respondents to
COMMENT thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.

The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective

immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering respondent
Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from hearing and trying Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to
12161 and 12163 to 12177 insofar as petitioner Enrique Zaldivar is concerned and from hearing
and resolving the Special Prosecutor's motion to suspend dated September 3, 1987.

The parties later filed their respective pleadings.

Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second Petition for certiorari and Prohibition (G.R. No. 80578) on 19
November 1987, initially naming only Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as respondent. That Petition assailed the 24
September 1987 Resolution 3 of the "Tanodbayan" in TBP Case No. 87- 01304 recommending that additional
criminal charges for graft and corruption be filed against petitioner Zaldivar and five (5) other individuals. Once
again, petitioner raised the argument of the Tanodbayan's lack of authority under the 1987 Constitution to file
such criminal cases and to investigate the same. Petitioner also moved for the consolidation of that petition with
G.R. No. 79690-707.

In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, 4 this Court, without giving due course to the second petition: (1)
required respondent Gonzalez to submit a comment thereon: and (2) issued a temporary restraining order
"ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-
01394 ... and particularly, from filing the criminal information consequent thereof and from conducting
preliminary investigation therein." In a separate resolution of the same date, 5 G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R.
No. 80578 were ordered consolidated by the Court.

In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4) days prior to issuance by this Court of a temporary
restraining order in G.R. No. 80578, the Office of the Tanodbayan instituted Criminal Case No. 12570 6 with
the Sandiganbayan which issued on 23 November 1987 an Order of Arrest 7 for petitioner Zaldivar and his co-
accused in Criminal Case No. 12570. Upon Motion 8 of petitioner Zaldivar, this Court issued the following
Resolution on 8 December 1987:

G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan). The
motion filed by the Solicitor General for respondents for an extension of thirty (30) days from
the expiration of the original period within which to file comment on the petition for certiorari
and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order is
GRANTED.

Acting on the manifestation with motion to treat the Sandiganbayan as party-respondent, the
Court Resolved to (a) Consider IMPLEADED the Sandiganbayan as party respondent; and (b) In
pursuance of and supplementing the Temporary Restraining Order of November 24, 1987
"ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in TBP
Case No. 87-01304 entitled, "Commission on Audit vs. Gov. Enrique Zaldivar, et al." and
particularly, from filing the criminal information consequent thereof and from conducting
preliminary investigation therein" ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER effective
immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering respondents Hon. Raul
M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in Criminal Case
No. 12570, entitled, "People of the Philippines vs. Enrique M. Zaldivar, et al." and from
enforcing the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan in said case.

The Solicitor General filed a Comment 9 on the petition in G.R. No. 80578, and we required the petitioner to
submit a Reply 10 thereto.

On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to Cite in Contempt 11 directed at
respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited as bases the acts of respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the filing
of the information against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 12570 before the Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing
certain allegedly contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in G.R. No. 80578. In
respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to his Motion a photocopy of a news article, reproduced here in toto,
which appeared in the 30 November 1987 issue of the "Philippine Daily Globe:"

Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case

 TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday the Supreme Court order stopping
him from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar can aggravate the
thought that affluent persons "an prevent the progress of a trial."

What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich and
influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is difficult for an ordinary
litigant to get his petition to be given due course. Gonzalez told the Daily Globe in an exclusive
interview.

Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order '"eightens the people's apprehension over the justice
system in this country, especially because the people have been thinking that only the small fly
can get it while big fishes go scot-free."

Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the tribunal last week after Zaldivar petitioned the
court to stop the Tanodbayan from investigating graft cases filed against him.

Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his investigations because the latter wanted to
help promote the political fortunes of a friend from Antique, lawyer Bonifacio Alentajan.

Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped Gonzalez from investigating a graft charge
against the governor, and from instituting any complaint with the Sandiganbayan.

While President Aquino had been prodding me to prosecute graft cases even if they involve the
high and mighty, the Supreme Court had been restraining me. Gonzalez said.

In accordance with the President's order, Gonzalez said he had filed graft cases against two "very
powerful" officials of the Aquino government-Commissioner Quintin Doromal of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government and Secretary Jiamil I.M. Dianlan of the Office
of Muslim Affairs and Cultural Communities.

While I don't wish to discuss the merits of the Zaldivar petition before the Supreme Court, I am a
little bit disturbed that (the order) can aggravate the thinking of some people that affluent
persons can prevent the progress of a trial, he said.

He disclosed that he had a talk with the Chief Executive over the weekend and that while she
symphatizes with local officials who are charged in court during election time, 'She said that it
might be a disservice to the people and the voters who are entitled to know their candidates.

Gonzalez said that while some cases filed against local officials during election time could be
mere harassment suits, the Constitution makes it a right of every citizen to be informed of the
character of tile candidate, who should be subject to scrutiny. (Emphasis supplied)

Acting on petitioner's Motion to Cite in Contempt, the Court on 16 February 1988 required respondent
Gonzalez "to COMMENT on aforesaid Motion within ten (10) days from notice." 12 On 27 April 1988, the
Court rendered its Decision 13 (per curiam) in the Consolidated Petitions. The dispositive portion thereof read:

WHEREFORE, We hereby:

(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and hereby NULLIFY the
criminal informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan; and
 (2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from conducting investigations and
filing criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising the powers and functions of
the Ombudsman.

SO ORDERED.

A Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed by respondent Gonzalez the next day, 28 April 1988. In his Motion,
respondent Gonzalez, after having argued the legal merits of his position, made the following statements totally
unrelated to any legal issue raised either in the Court's Decision or in his own Motion:

1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading member of the court ... and he was asked to
'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him;' "

2. That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal
disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;" and

3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the phone by a
leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against (two Members of the
Court)."

Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten notes 15 which he claimed were sent by "some
members of this Honorable Court, interceeding for cases pending before this office (i.e., the Tanodbayan)." He
either released his Motion for Reconsideration with facsimiles of said notes to the press or repeated to the press
the above extraneous statements: the metropolitan papers for the next several days carried long reports on those
statements and variations and embellishments thereof On 2 May 1988, the Court issued the following
Resolution in the Consolidated Petitions:

G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al. G.R. No. 80578
(Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, etc).

1. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Gonzalez under date of April
28, 1988, the Court Resolved to REQUIRE the petitioner to COMMENT thereon within ten (10)
days from notice hereof.

2. It appearing that respondent Raul M. Gonzalez has made public statements to the media which
not only deal with matters subjudice but also appear offensive to and disrespectful of the Court
and its individual members and calculated, directly or indirectly, to bring the Court into
disrepute, discredit and ridicule and to denigrate and degrade the administration of justice, the
Court Resolved to require respondent Gonzalez to explain in writing within ten (10) days from
notice hereof, why he should not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to
administrative sanctions for making such public statements reported in the media, among others,
in the issues of the "Daily Inquirer," the "Journal," the "Manila Times," the "Philippine Star," the
"Manila Chronicle" the "Daily Globe" and the "Manila Standard" of April 29 and 30, and May 1,
1988, to wit:

(a) That the Court resolution in question is merely "an offshoot of the position he had taken that
the SC Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by government prosecutors or
motivated by a desire to stop him 'from investigating cases against some of their proteges or
friends;"
 (b) That no less than six of the members of the Court "interceded for and on behalf of persons
with pending cases before the Tanodbayan," or sought "to pressure him to render decisions
favorable to their colleagues and friends;"

(c) That attempts were made to influence him to go slow on Zaldivar and not to be too hard on
him and to refrain from investigating the Commission on Audit report on illegal disbursements in
the Supreme Court because it will embarass the Court;

(d) That there were also attempts to cause the dismissal of cases against two Associate Justices;
and

(e) That the Court had dismissed judges' without rhyme or reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without
due process.

3. It further appearing that three (3) affidavits relative to the purpose of and circumstances
attendant upon the notes written to said public respondent by three (3) members of the Court
have since been submitted to the Court and now form part of its official records, the Court
further Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to ATTACH to this Resolution copies of said
sworn statements and the annexes thereto appended, and to DIRECT respondent Gonzalez also
to comment thereon within the same period of ten (10) days.

4. It finally appearing that notice of the Resolution of February 16, 1988 addressed to respondent
Gonzalez was misdelivered and therefore not served on him, the Court Resolved to require the
Clerk of Court to CAUSE SERVICE of said Resolution on the respondent and to REQUIRE the
latter to comply therewith.

Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court on 9 May 1988 an Omnibus Motion for Extension and
Inhibition 16 alleging, among other things: that the above quoted 2 May 1988 Resolution of the Court "appears
to have overturned that presumption [of innocence] against him:" and that "he gravely doubts whether that 'cold
neutrality [of an impartial judge] is still available to him" there being allegedly "at least 4 members of this
Tribunal who will not be able to sit in judgment with substantial sobriety and neutrality." Respondent Gonzalez
closed out his pleading with a prayer that the four (4) Members of the Court Identified and referred to there by
him inhibit themselves in the deliberation and resolution of the Motion to Cite in Contempt.

On 19 May 1988 17 after receipt of respondent's Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. 18 this Court in an
extended per curiam Resolution 19 denied the Motion and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. That
denial was made "final and immediately executory.

Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following pleadings of record:

1. Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to Inhibition 20 dated 23 May 1988;

2. Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedures to the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines 21 dated 20 May 1988

3. Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time to File Explanation Ex Abundante

Cautelam, 22 dated 26 May 1988;

4. Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion

(a) For Extension of Time

 (b) For Inhibition and

(c) For Transfer of Administrative Proceedings to the IBP, Under Rule 139-B 23 dated 4 June
1988 (with Annex "A;" 24 an anonymous letter dated 27 May 1988 from the alleged Concerned
Employees of the Supreme Court and addressed to respondent):

5. Ex-Parte Manifestation 25 dated 7 June 1988;

6. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration 26 1988; and

7. Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion 27 member 1988.

In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court quoted earlier, respondent Gonzalez submitted on
17 June 1988 an Answer with Explanation and Comment 28 offering respondent's legal arguments and defenses
against the contempt and disciplinary charges presently pending before this Court. Attached to that pleading as
Annex "A" thereof was respondent's own personal Explanation/Compliance 29 second explanation called
"Compliance," 30 with annexes, was also submitted by respondent on 22 July 1988.

II

We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the court and members of
the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary
authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court's constitutional mandate to
regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of
law. 31 Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over
members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of justice and essential to an
orderly discharge of judicial functions. 32 Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent power to punish for
contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including
lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the Court. 33 The power to punish for
contempt is "necessary for its own protection against an improper interference with the due administration of
justice," "(it) is not dependent upon the complaint of any of the parties litigant. 34

There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like that before us here; the
Court's inherent power to discipline attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary authority of the Court
over members of the Bar is broader than the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be
committee both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the contemnor is a
lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes professional misconduct which calls into play the
disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. 35 Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme Court's
disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not the misconduct with which the
respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of court does not
exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. 36 The disciplinary authority of the Court
over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not
merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and
responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to
obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct
calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of
the contempt power.

It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to punish for contempt or of the disciplinary authority
of the Court over members of the Bar, the Court is acting as offended party, prosecutor and arbiter at one and
the same time. Thus, in the present case, respondent Gonzalez first sought to get some members of the Court to
inhibit themselves in the resolution of this case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in
effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the issues involved in this proceeding and to
pass on responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent
cannot expect due process from this Court, that the Court has become incapable of judging him impartially and
fairly. Respondent Gonzalez misconceives the nature of the proceeding at bar as well as the function of the
members of the Court in such proceeding.

Respondent's contention is scarcely an original one. In In Re Almacen, 37 then Associate (later Chief) Justice
Fred Fruiz Castro had occasion to deal with this contention in the following lucid manner:

xxx xxx xxx

It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in the premises,
that, as Atty. Almacen would have it appear, the members of the Court are the 'complainants,
prosecutors and judges' all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension,
if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role
therein.

Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not—and does not involve—a trial of
an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not
being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there
is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio.
Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the property and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can
thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.

Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade
against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual
members thereof But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity
separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the
intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but only
as a duly constituted court. The distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. So
that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court
itself, not the individual members thereof—as well as the people themselves whose rights,
fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the
administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the
solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.

Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the
power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested
exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally
renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. So that even if it be conceded that the members
collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify
them from the exercise of the power because public policy demands that they, acting as a Court,
exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In
the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant,
prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
 xxx xxx xxx. 38

It should not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to disclaim any bias or prejudice against the
respondent that would prevent them from acting in accordance with the exacting requirements of their oaths of
office. It also appears to the Court that for all the members to inhibit themselves from sitting on this case is to
abdicate the responsibility with which the Constitution has burdened them. Reference of complaints against
attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the
Supreme Court; such reference to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly
not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where the
charge consists of acts done before the Supreme Court. There is no need for further investigation of facts in the
present case for it is not substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain
statements attributed to him. In any case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity to present his defense; his
defense is not that he did not make the statements ascribed to him but that those statements give rise to no
liability on his part, having been made in the exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which thus need to
be resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and the Court, not any other agency, is compelled to
resolve such issues.

III

It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent Gonzalez was saying in his statements set out
above. Respondent has not denied making the above statements; indeed, he acknowledges that the newspaper
reports of the statements attributed to him are substantially correct. 39

Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying, firstly, that the Supreme Court deliberately rendered an erroneous or
wrong decision when it rendered its per curiam Decision dated 27 April 1988 in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and
80578. That decision according to respondent Gonzalez, was issued as an act of retaliation by the Court against
him for the position he had taken "that the (Supreme Court) Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or
investigation by government prosecutors," and in order to stop respondent from investigating against "some of
(the) proteges or friends (of some Supreme Court Justices)." The Court cannot, of course, and will not debate
the correctness of its Decision of 27 April 1988 and of its Resolution dated 19 May 1988 (denying respondent
Gonzalez Motion for Reconsideration) in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. Respondent Gonzalez, and anyone
else for that matter, is free intellectually to accept or not to accept the reasoning of the Court set out in its per
curiam Decision and Resolution in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. This should not, however, obscure the
seriousness of the assault thus undertaken by respondent against the Court and the appalling implications of
such assault for the integrity of the system of administration of justice in our country. Respondent has said that
the Court rendered its Decision and Resolution without regard to the legal merits of the Zaldivar cases and had
used the judicial process to impose private punishment upon respondent for positions he had taken (unrelated to
the Zaldivar cases) in carrying out his duties. It is very difficult to imagine a more serious affront to, or a greater
outrage upon, the honour and dignity of this Court than this. Respondent's statement is also totally baseless.
Respondent's statements were made in complete disregard of the fact that his continuing authority to act
as Tanodbayan or Ombudsman after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, had been questioned before this
Court as early as 10 September 1987 in the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus filed against him
in these consolidated Petitions 40 that is, more than seven (7) months before the Court rendered its Decision.
Respondent also ignores the fact that one day later, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order effective
immediately ordering the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from hearing the criminal cases filed against
petitioner Zaldivar by respondent Gonzalez. Respondent also disregards the fact that on 24 November 1987,
upon the filing of a second Petition for certiorari for Prohibition by Mr. Zaldivar, the Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order this time requiring the respondent to cease and desist from further acting in TBP Case No.
87-0934. Thus, the decision finally reached by this Court in April 1988 on the constitutional law issue pending
before the Court for the preceding eight (8) months, could scarcely have been invented as a reprisal simply
against respondent.
A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against members of the Supreme Court is that they have
improperly Id pressured" him to render decisions favorable to their "colleagues and friends," including
dismissal of "cases" against two (2) members of the Court. This particularly deplorable charge too is entirely
baseless, as even a cursory examination of the contents of the handwritten notes of three (3) members of this
Court addressed to respondent (which respondent attached to his Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of
this Court of 27 April 1988 in the consolidated Petitions) win show. It is clear, and respondent Gonzalez does
not pretend otherwise, that the subject matters of the said notes had no relation at all to the issues in G.R. Nos.
79690-707 and 80578. This charge appears to have been made in order to try to impart some substance (at least
in the mind of respondent) to the first accusation made by respondent that the Court had deliberately rendered a
wrong decision to get even with respondent who had, with great fortitude, resisted "pressure" from some
members of the Court. Once again, in total effect, the statements made by respondent appear designed to cast
the Court into gross disrepute, and to cause among the general public scorn for and distrust in the Supreme
Court and, more generally, the judicial institutions of the Republic.

Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him from prosecuting "rich and powerful
persons," that the Court was in effect discrimination between the rich and powerful on the one hand and the
poor and defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich and powerful" accused persons to go "scot-free" while
presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and small offenders. This accusation can only be
regarded as calculated to present the Court in an extremely bad light. It may be seen as intended to foment
hatred against the Supreme Court; it is also suggestive of the divisive tactics of revolutionary class war.

Respondent, finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly "dismissed judges 'without rhyme or reason' and
disbarred lawyers 'without due process.'" The Court notes that this last attack is not without relation to the other
statements made by respondent against the Court. The total picture that respondent clearly was trying to paint of
the Court is that of an "unjudicial" institution able and willing to render "clearly erroneous" decisions by way of
reprisal against its critics, as a body that acts arbitrarily and capriciously denying judges and lawyers due
process of law. Once again, the purport of respondent's attack against the Court as an institution unworthy of the
people's faith and trust, is unmistakable. Had respondent undertaken to examine the records 'of the two (2)
judges and the attorney he later Identified in one of his Explanations, he would have discovered that the
respondents in those administrative cases had ample opportunity to explain their side and submit evidence in
support thereof. 41 He would have also found that there were both strong reasons for and an insistent rhyme in
the disciplinary measures there administered by the Court in the continuing effort to strengthen the judiciary and
upgrade the membership of the Bar. It is appropriate to recall in this connection that due process as a
constitutional precept does not, always and in all situations, require the trial-type proceeding, 42 that the essence
of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may
have in support of one's defense. 43 "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be
heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. 44

As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the Court to explain why he should not be punished for
contempt and/or subjected to administrative discipline for making the statements adverted to above. In his
subsequent pleadings where he asked the full Court to inhibit itself and to transfer the administrative
proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent made, among others, the following allegations:

(a) That the Members of the Court "should inhibit [themselves] in the contempt and
administrative charges against the respondent, in the light of the manifest prejudice and anger
they hold against respondent as shown in the language of the resolution on the Motion for
Reconsideration;"

(b) That "the entire membership of the court has already lost that 'cold neutrality of an impartial
judge' [to] be able to allow fairness and due process in the contempt citation as well as in the
possible administrative charge;
 (c) That "respondent honestly feels that this court as angry and prejudiced as it is, respondent has
no china man's chance to get fair hearing in the contempt and possible administrative charges;"

(d) That one must consider "the milieu before this Tribunal with, perhaps passion and
obfuscation running riot;"

(e) That respondent, "after having been castigated with such venom by the entire Court in its
decision denying the Motion for Reconsideration, does not have confidence in the impartiality of
the entire Court" and that he "funds it extremely difficult to believe that the members of this
Tribunal can still act with unbiased demeanor towards him;" and

(f) That "the Tribunal is determined to disbar [respondent] without due process" and that a
specified Member of the Court "has been tasked to be the ponente, or at least prepare the
decision." (Underscoring in the original)

Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his statements earlier made, respondent sought to heap still
more opprobrium upon the Court, accusing it of being incapable of judging his acts and statements justly and
according to law. Once again, he paints this Court as a body not only capable of acting without regard to due
process but indeed determined so to act. A grand design to hold up this Court to public scorn and disrespect as
an unworthy tribunal, one obfuscated by passion and anger at respondent, emerges once more. It is very difficult
for members of this Court to understand how respondent Gonzalez could suppose that judges on the highest
tribunal of the land would be ready and willing to violate their most solemn oath of office merely to gratify any
imagined private feelings aroused by respondent. The universe of the Court revolves around the daily demands
of law and justice and duty, not around respondent nor any other person or group of persons.

Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez may reasonably be regarded by this Court as
contumacious or as warranting exercise of the disciplinary authority of this Court over members of the Bar, may
best be assayed by examining samples of the kinds of statements which have been held in our jurisdiction as
constituting contempt or otherwise warranting the exercise of the Court's authority.

1. In Montecillo v. Gica, 45 Atty. Quirico del Mar as counsel for Montecillo, who was accused in a slander case,
moved to reconsider a decision of the Court of Appeals in favor of the complainant with a veiled threat that he
should interpose his next appeal to the President of the Philippines. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he
referred to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment," and
"judgment rendered through negligence" and implied that the Court of Appeals had allowed itself to be
deceived. Atty. del Mar was held guilty of contempt of court by the Court of Appeals. He then sued the three (3)
justices of the Court of Appeals for damages before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, seeking to hold them
liable for their decision in the appealed slander case. This suit was terminated, however, by compromise
agreement after Atty. del Mar apologized to the Court of Appeals and the justices concerned and agreed to pay
moral damages to the justices. Atty. del Mar some time later filed with this Court a Petition for Review on
certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals in a slander case. This Court denied the Petition for Review.
Atty. del Mar then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and addressed a letter to the Clerk of the Supreme Court
asking for the names of the justices of this Court who had voted in favor of and those who had voted against his
Motion for Reconsideration. After his Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit, Atty. del Mar
filed a Manifestation in this Court saying:

I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with certified true
copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Court of
Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed against
the Justices supporting the same, civil and criminal suits as I did to the Justices of the Court of
Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for him the
decisions of the City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining
 a favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing to the people the corroding evils
extant in our Government, so that they may well know them and work for their extermination. (60
SCRA at 240;emphasis supplied)

Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be administratively dealt with for making the above
statements. In his additional explanation, Atty. del Mar made the following statements:

... Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government. It is this state of
things that convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils will be
fruitless and, as stated in my manifestation to you, I have already decided to retire from a life of
militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling up deficiencies. (60 SCRA at 242)

The Court suspended Atty. del Mar, "until further orders," from the practice of law saying:

... Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and injustice
allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as justification for his contemptuous
statements. In other words, he already assumed by his own contemptuous utterances that because
there is an alleged existence of rampant corruption, graft and injustice in and out of the
government, We, by Our act in G.R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters and those
allegedly committing injustice. We are at a complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's logic ...

xxx xxx xxx

To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the duty of
maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and
obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We
do remind them of said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A
lawyer must always remember that he is an officer of the court exercising a high privilege and
serving in the noble mission of administering justice.

xxx xxx xxx.

As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A G.R. No. 46504-R was based on
its evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn denied in G.R. No. L-36800
the petition for review on certiorari of the decision because We found no reason for disturbing
the appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of Appeals and this
Court exercised judicial discretion in a case under their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate
and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts
reconsider their respective stand in the decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his
client cannot be anything but pure contumely for aid tribunals.

It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Court of the land
when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the
integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his
allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in
disposing of the case of his client.

xxx xxx xxx

... To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose to enter this
profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and
 minds that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the courts of justice and its officers as a
fealty for the stability of our democratic institutions. (60 SCRA at 242-247: emphasis supplied)

2. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 46 four (4) members of the bar, acting as counsel for
MacArthur International Minerals Company were required by this Court to explain certain statements made in
MacArthur's third Motion for Reconsideration:

d. ...; and I the Supreme Court I has overlooked the applicable law due to the mis-representation
and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for
Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).

e. ... Never has any civilized democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the
"right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse
losses to the public, a government agency or just plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in the light
of our upbringing and schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable
Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute
manner. (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968). (31
SCRA at 6)

They were also asked to explain the statements made in their Motion to Inhibit filed on 21 September 1968
asking

Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves
from considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to
January 11, 1967. The motion charges "It that the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice
Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous
and illegal decision dated January 31, 1968" and the ex-parte preliminary injunction rendered in
the above-entitled case, the latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even before
the joining of an issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states [t]hat the son of the Honorable
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the Philippine
Government by the President a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in
this case. The appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of
Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and makes a number of
side comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968
decision. It enumerates "incidents" which, according to the motion, brought about respondent
MacArthur's belief that unjudicial prejudice had been caused it and that there was 'unjudicial
favoritism' in favor of 'petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party directly
benefited by the said decision
(31 SCRA at 6-7)

Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel for MacArthur and filed a fourth Motion for
Reconsideration without leave of court, which Motion contained the following paragraphs:

4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the
time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case—which condition is prohibited by the New
Rules of Court—Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices; who may take part—... . Only those
members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its
consideration and adjudication ... ." This requirement is especially significant in the present
instance because the member who penned the decision was the very member who was absent for
approximately four months or more. This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices
Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
 xxx xxx xxx

6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its quest for
justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft and
corruption of Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965, required by the
Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on
grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of property and/or to the United States
Government, either its executive or judicial branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of
respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government without either compensation
or due process of law and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all
aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to
more than fifty million dollars annually, until restitution or compensation is made.
(31 SCRA at 10-11)

Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez, held three (3)
attorneys guilty of contempt:

1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for reconsideration,
we, indeed, find language that is not to be expected of an officer of the courts. He pictures
petitioners as 'vulturous executives.' He speaks of this Court as a 'civilized, democratic tribunal,'
but by innuendo would suggest that it is not.

In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as 'false,
erroneous and illegal' in a presumptuous manner. He then charges that the ex parte preliminary
injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining
of an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for being interested in the
decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his brother is the vice president
of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, whose son was appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, 'a
significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President, a short time before the
decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered.' In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that 'it would seem
that the principles thus established [the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial
authority by the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself.' He puts forth the claim
that lesser and further removed conditions have been known to create favoritism, only to
conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief
Justice and Justice Castro would be less likely to engender favoritism and prejudice for or
against a particular cause or party.' Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice
Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect. He makes it plain
in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free from the
appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their
judgment. He points out that courts must be above suspicion at all times like Ceasar's wife,
warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to
happen in our country, 'although the process has already begun.

xxx xxx xxx

What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in law. The
slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts
aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition is also asked if, we repeated any other justices who
have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members
of any board-petitioner or their agents or principals, including the president.' The absurdity of
this posture is at once apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by the
 President and in that sense may be considered to have each received a favor from the President.
Should these justices inhibit themselves every time a case involving the Administration crops
up? Such a thought may not certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof would be to
paralyze the machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite
system of government operating in this country. Counsel is presumed to know this. But why the
unfounded charge? There is the not too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's
attorney to downgrade this Court.

The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such
disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of
faith, counsel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief.

xxx xxx xxx

The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. and
yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the
administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules against improper
conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is
guilty of contempt of court.

xxx xxx xxx

Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court and/or the
United States government. It must be remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was
still trying to overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so, unnecessary
statements were in ejected. More specifically, the motion announced that McArthur 'will
inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption of the Philippine government officials in the bidding
of May 12, 1965 ... to the World Court' and would invoke 'the Hickenlooper Amendment
requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar
price premium, amount to more than fifty million dollars annually ...

This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the blind of this Court to decide the case' in its favor.
A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in Meads return. There is a gross
inconsistency between the appeal and the move to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a
decision presupposes that a party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision.
And yet, it would appear that the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect
a change of the decision of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard explanation.

xxx xxx xxx

The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where infraction of ethics
meets with complacency rather than punishment. The people should not be given cause to break
faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a
court of justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to
think, is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of
justice. (31 SCRA at 13-23; emphasis supplied)

3. In In re Almacen, supra, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, in protest against what he asserted was "a great
injustice committed against his client by the Supreme Court," filed a Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate
of Title. He alleged that his client was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," and had become
"one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy," saying that "justice as administered by the present
members of the Supreme Court [was) not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." Atty. Almacen vowed to argue
the cause of his client "in the people's forum" so that "the people may know of this silent injustice committed by
this Court' and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed [may] never be repeated."
Atty. Almacen released to the press the contents of his Petition and on 26 September 1967, the "Manila Times"
published statements attributed to him as follows:

Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did not expose the
tribunal's 'unconstitutional and obnoxious' practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals
without any reason.

Because of the tribunal's 'short-cut justice.' Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to pay
P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.

xxx xxx xxx

There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, 'where our Supreme
Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of justice, who ignore without reason
their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.'

xxx xxx xxx

He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the
present members of the Supreme Court 'will become responsible to all cases brought to its
attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious
"lack of merit' or "denied resolutions. (31 SCRA at 565566; emphasis supplied)

Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against
him. His explanation, which in part read:

xxx xxx xxx

The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolized in paintings that can be found in all courts and
government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf
in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding, sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspire of our
beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeals has been DENIED,
not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above
statement. We only described the impersonal state of Things and nothing more.

xxx xxx xxx

As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for
which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what
has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed
sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self- sacrifice. If we have to
choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but
disregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of
this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter. (31 SCRA at 572; emphasis supplied)

was found by the Court to be "undignified and cynical" and rejected. The Court indefinitely suspended Almacen
from the practice of law holding, through Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, that Almacen had exceeded the
boundaries of "fair criticism."
4. In Paragas V. Cruz, 47 Counsel, whose Petition for Ceriorari ran was dismissed by this Court, made the
following statements in his Motion for Reconsideration:

The petitioner respectfully prays for a reconsideration of the resolution of this Honorable Court
dated April 20,1966 on the ground that it constitutes a violation of Section 14 of Rule 11 2 of the
Rules of Court promulgated by this very Hon. Supreme Court, and on the further ground that it is
likewise a violation of the most important right in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the
Philippines, a culpable violation which is a ground for impeachment.

... The rule of law in a democracy should always be upheld and protected by all means, because
the rule of law creates and preserves peace and order and gives satisfaction and contentment to
all concerned. But when the laws and the rules are violated, the victims resort, sometimes, to
armed force and to the ways of the cavemen We do not want Verzosa and Reyes repeated again
and again, killed in the premises of the Supreme Court and in those of the City Hall of
Manila. Educated people should keep their temper under control at all times! But justice should
be done to all concerned to perpetuate the very life of Democracy on the face of the earth. (14
SCRA at 810; emphasis supplied)

The Court considered the above statements as derogatory to the dignity of the Court and required counsel to
show cause why administrative action should not be taken against him. Counsel later explained that he had
merely related factual events (i.e., the killing of Verzosa and Reyes) and to express his desire to avoid repetition
of such acts. The Court, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, found these explanations unsatisfactory and the
above statements contumacious.

... The expressions contained in the motion for reconsideration ... are plainly contemptuous and
disrespectful, and reference to the recent killing of two employees is but a covert threat upon the
members of the Court. ... That such threats and disrespectful language contained in a pleading
filed in courts are constitutive of direct contempt has been repeatedly decided (Salcedo vs.
Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; People vs. Venturanza, 52 Off. Gaz. 769; Medina vs. Rivera, 66 Phil.
151; De Joya vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 1, 9785, September 19,1956; Sison vs.
Sandejas L- 9270, April 29,1959; Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86). What makes the present case
more deplorable is that the guilty party is a member of the bar; for, as remarked in People vs.
Carillo, 77 Phil. 580-

Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his cases with that courtesy all have
a right to expect. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice.

It in light and plausible that an attorney in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do
so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so, for
him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and
respect which the dignity of the courts require. (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, [In re Francisco], 61
Phil. 729)' (1 4 SCRA at 811-812; emphasis supplied)

5. In In re Sotto, 48 a newspaper reporter, Mr. Angel Parazo, invoking the Press Freedom Law, refused to
divulge the source of the news item which carried his by-line and was sent to jail for so refusing. Atty. Vicente
Sotto, a senator and author of said law, caused the publication of the following item in a number of daily
newspapers in Manila:

As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53), interpreted by the Supreme Court in
the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment,
 for his refusal to divulge the source of a news published in his paper, I regret to say that our
High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in
evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members. In the wake of
so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the
only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To
this effect, I announce that one of the first measures, which I will introduce in the coming
congressional sessions, will have as its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme
Court. As it is now constituted, the Supreme Court of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty
and democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: The Supreme
Court of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of
Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the
honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary. (82 Phil. at 597-598; emphasis supplied)

In finding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the
constitutional guarantee of free speech and in requiring him to show cause why he should not be
disbarred, the Court, through Mr. Justice Feria, said-

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so
many blunders and injustices that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party
knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose
favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend
necessarily to undermine the coincidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently to lower and degrade the administration of justice by
this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to
which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their
rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and
integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they
might be driven to take the law into their hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the
result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is
in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions,
which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation. (82 Phil. at 601-602;
emphasis supplied)

6. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 49 Atty. Vicente Francisco filed a Motion before the Supreme Court which
contained the following paragraph (in translation):

We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court,
denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the
rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in
the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our power in order
that this error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we should not
want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to
the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein
petitioner has been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this
honorable court and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same
time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and
his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of sakdalism and
make the public lose confidence in the administration of justice. (61 Phil. at 726; emphasis
supplied)
When required by the Court to show cause why he should not be declared in contempt, Atty. Francisco
responded by saying that it was not contempt to tell the truth. Examining the statements made above, the Court
held:

... [they] disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the
court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no
less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights of the parties, and of the
untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client, because the acts of outraging and mocking from which the
words 'outrage' and mockery' used therein are derived, means exactly the same as all these,
according to the Dictionary of the Spanish Language published by the Spanish Academy
(Dictionary of the Spanish Language, 15th ed., pages 132-513).

The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, for
many years a member of the Philippine bar, was neither justified nor in the least necessary,
because in order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied
upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said
motion were sufficient and the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason
and justice, it is highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and good practice can ever
sanction them by reason of their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a
serene and impartial judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions
submitted for resolution.

There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a
more or less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows the
course which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will
resort to the press for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of
which his client has been the victim; and because he states in a threatening manner with the
intention of predisposing the mind of the reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere
of prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of
that referred to in his motion to promote distrust in the administration of justice and increase the
proselytes of sakdalism a movement with seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of
which, as is of public knowledge, occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean
otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority thereof on the
part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so devoid of the
sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error
notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.

As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any
attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only
because it had conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158
and 160), of being what he now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St., Rep., 492,
669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the administration
of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many
cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark
called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief (61 Phil. at
727-728; emphasis supplied)

It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above discussed exhaust our case law on this matter. In the
following cases, among others, the Supreme Court punished for contempt or administratively disciplined
lawyers who had made statements not very different from those made in the cases discussed above:
 1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987);

2) Borromeo v. Court of appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978);

3) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441 (1967);

4) Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961);

5) De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, 99 Phil. 907 (1956);

6) People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211 (1956);

7) In re Suzano A. Velasquez, per curiam Resolution (unreported), Promulgated 29 April 1955;

8) Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950);

9) People v. Carillon, 77 Phil. 572 (1946);

10) Intestate Estate of Rosario 0lba; Contempt Proceedings against Antonio Franco, 67 Phil.
312 (1939); and

11) Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932).

Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the Court has in the past penalized as
contemptuous or as warranting application of disciplinary sanctions, this Court is compelled to hold that the
statements here made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the
disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Respondent's statements, especially the charge that the Court
deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decision in the Consolidated Petitions, necessarily implying that
the justices of this Court betrayed their oath of office, merely to wreak vengeance upon the respondent here,
constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the
Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country. That
respondent's baseless charges have had some impact outside the internal world of subjective intent, is clearly
demonstrated by the filing of a complaint for impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the then fourteen (14)
incumbent members of this Court, a complaint the centerpiece of which is a repetition of the appalling claim of
respondent that this Court deliberately rendered a wrong decision as an act of reprisal against the respondent.

IV

The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely exercising his constitutional right of free
speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of qualified privileged communications and fair criticism in the
public interest.

Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that
right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression,
like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted
to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental
public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.
There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the
protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a
functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent
institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put
it:

... A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to
a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a free society. The
freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom
may, if necessary be vindicated. And one of the potent means for assuring judges their
independence is a free press. 50

Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the following terms:

The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This constitutional right must
be protected in its fullest extent. The Court has heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard
for charges under the Libel Law which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall
continue in this chosen path. The liberty of the citizens must be preserved in all of its
completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizens should not be
confused with liberty ill its true sense. As important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled press
and the free exercise of the rights of the citizens is the maintenance of the independence of the
Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution
of the court adopted for good purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by subterranean
means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of confidential proceedings to the embarassment of the
parties and the courts. 51 (Emphasis supplied)

Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of the Court effectively to prevent and
control professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who are, first and foremost, indispensable participants in
the task of rendering justice to every man. Some courts have held, persuasively it appears to us, that a lawyer's
right of free expression may have to be more limited than that of a layman. 52

It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a
Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to this Court as the embodiment
and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of the respondent
"to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court' and "not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice 53 is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.

Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to criticize the rulings of this Court, to point out
where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. Once more, however, the right of criticism is not
unlimited. Its limits were marked out by Mr. Justice Castro in In re Almacen which are worth noting

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bonafide and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one
hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted
with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

xxx xxx xxx 54

(Emphasis supplied)
The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has criticized the Court; it is addressed rather
to the nature of that criticism or comment and the manner in which it was carried out.

Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The subjectivities of the respondent
are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He will not, however, be
allowed to disclaim the natural and plain import of his words and acts. 55 It is upon the other hand, not irrelevant
to point out that respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations and exhibited no repentance. 56

Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to the judiciary has been shown, and
points to the fact that this Court denied his Motion for Reconsideration of its per curiam Decision of 27 April
1988 and reiterated and amplified that Decision in its Resolution of 19 May 1988. In the first place, proof of
actual damage sustained by a court or the judiciary in general is not essential for a finding of contempt or for the
application of the disciplinary authority of the Court. Insofar as the Consolidated Petitions are concerned, this
Court after careful review of the bases of its 27 April 1988 Decision, denied respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration thereof and rejected the public pressures brought to bear upon this Court by the respondent
through his much publicized acts and statements for which he is here being required to account. Obstructing the
free and undisturbed resolution of a particular case is not the only species of injury that the Court has a right and
a duty to prevent and redress. What is at stake in cases of this kind is the integrity of the judicial institutions of
the country in general and of the Supreme Court in particular. Damage to such institutions might not be
quantifiable at a given moment in time but damage there will surely be if acts like those of respondent Gonzalez
are not effectively stopped and countered. The level of trust and confidence of the general public in the courts,
including the court of last resort, is not easily measured; but few will dispute that a high level of such trust and
confidence is critical for the stability of democratic government.

Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment for contempt is not the proper remedy in this case and
suggests that the members of this Court have recourse to libel suits against him. While the remedy of libel suits
by individual members of this Court may well be available against respondent Gonzalez, such is by no means
an exclusive remedy. Moreover, where, as in the instant case, it is not only the individual members of the Court
but the Court itself as an institution that has been falsely attacked, libel suits cannot be an adequate remedy. 57

The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross
misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the practice of law
indefinitely and until further orders from this Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman, the Secretary of Justice, the
Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.

Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE

RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,

vs.
 VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:

Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on
September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client
by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are
calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by
this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the
same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that
justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and
dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of
the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were
committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that

... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned
attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in
the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of
the noblest profession.

He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on September 26,
1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:

Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the

tribunal's "unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals
without any reason.

Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to pay
P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.

xxx xxx xxx

There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our Supreme
Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason
their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.

xxx xxx xxx

He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the
present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought to its
attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious
"lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)

Atty. Almacen's statement that

 ... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice,
who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution
with impunity

was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In
connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of offenses so
serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for
impeachment."

The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H.
Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered
judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days
later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the
motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18,
1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied
both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration,
Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required
registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court
on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966,
had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and
appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:

Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee praying that
the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court
RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the motion for
reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a
notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965),
which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was
perfected out of time.

Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At
the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this
Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration, thus:

Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement thereto of
the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the resolution of May
8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.

Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and that
of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June
24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states that
in the latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme
Court concerning the question raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine
laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.

There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.
 In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the appeal,
based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which was
much earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was
June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme
Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the main
decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio
presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26, 1962, one
of which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no
authority on the matter in issue.

Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute resolution
denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave
to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on
September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered
expunged from the records.

It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender
Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to — a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with
the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this
Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.

Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition until he shall
have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer. No word came
from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to
surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending
petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and
executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or
negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."

In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross misconduct, this
Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action
should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he asked for
permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an open and
public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from
notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident
submitted for decision." To this resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor
and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so
that this Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in
the event this Court has no time to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he
was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument.

His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being contrite
Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant
sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:

At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew: —

"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you judge,
you shall be judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall be measured to
you. But why dost thou see the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not
consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how can thou say to thy brother, "Let me
cast out the speck from thy eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy own eye?
 Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see
clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's eyes."

"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them: for
this is the Law and the Prophets."

xxx xxx xxx

Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his petition. On the
contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that
the underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the
entire Court, without justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a
member of the noble profession of law.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been asserted with
NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest
interest of justice that in the particular case of our client, the members have shown callousness to
our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...

xxx xxx xxx

To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity, fairness,
understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE, — what did we get
from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the
unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness
towards our particular case.

xxx xxx xxx

Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that notwithstanding the
violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural
things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good
faith.

Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY,
GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with
any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to face
you, he reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the
Philippines today, that even our own President, said: — "the story is current, though nebulous ,is
to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to
be before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that justice is a
commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines."

xxx xxx xxx

We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack the
decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled by force of
necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. We waited until this
 Court has performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their
duties. But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed finality on your judgment
against our client and sensing that you have not performed your duties with "circumspection,
carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to speak
the truth and his Constitutional right of free speech.

xxx xxx xxx

The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we sought to
be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .

xxx xxx xxx

What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling Madam Roland's
famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name", we may
dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE,
what injustices are committed in thy name."

xxx xxx xxx

We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who would correct
such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion must be
generated so as to curtail these abuses.

xxx xxx xxx

The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and
government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf
in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of our beggings,
supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has been DENIED, not one word
was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only
describe the. impersonal state of things and nothing more.

xxx xxx xxx

As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for
which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what
has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed
sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to
choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but
disregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of
this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.

But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied disrespect to
this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.

He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the
criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have been
asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given
this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the
facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a
terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and
ought never to have been lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand
critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari.

Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we would be
unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme
Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases
which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and
parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio
Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:

A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition different
reasons may read different justices to the same result ... .

Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for denying
petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons
for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court may be enabled to discharge
its indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control of the Court's business, in effect, within
the Court's discretion. During the last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases,
respectively, on their merits. For the same three terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260,
1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would not
be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that would
be required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons not
infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at a
particular time makes review undesirable.

Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court,
through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter. There, the
petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution.
Said Chief Justice Bengzon:

In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before; and we
held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above constitutional requirement.
They merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions
of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It
should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the
court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals'
opinion.

By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped the Court in alleviating its heavy
docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for
review are often merely ordered "dismissed".

We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have
had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this
Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this
Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is
implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites:

Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.—A review is not a matter of right but of
sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons
 therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion,
indicate the character of reasons which will be considered:

(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined
by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with the
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;

(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for the exercise of
the power of supervision.

Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings.
and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light
of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual course
of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There was,
therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.

As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew — or ought to have
known — that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not
only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the
time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila
Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:

The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15, Sections
4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the time, and place of
hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at least three days in advance. And
according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof
of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is nothing but a useless
piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v.
Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and
Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time
and place of hearing the Court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or
objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves
do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or opposition.

If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only himself to
blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of
right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he
made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he
took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would
thus appear that there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.

Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We know
that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a
meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not
only the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down.

Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right
is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a
lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation,6 because then
the court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official actions," said
the Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press and the people have the undoubted right to
comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must
answer for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion."

The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence and
honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have been loath to
inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such a case as this
where those who Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.

Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For
courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as
citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his
duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11

Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. 13 For
like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society,
nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.

Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that

An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the
administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and
respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been
encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .

Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the prosecution
of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he dissects with detachment the
doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the
doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman,
40 Am. Rep. 641:

No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or publication of
opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They
have the best opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant
attendance on the courts. ... To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under
liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge
or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to
be
entertained. ... .

Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to
consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable
for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a
citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).

Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become conversant with
the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no
other class has as great an interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench. (State Board
of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)

To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those in the
best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so
far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be
profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment.
His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and
more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with
all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the
respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain
towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but
for the maintenance of its supreme importance."

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take
upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the
Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor
in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive
conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647,
652)

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of
justice. Hence, in the — assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect are
enjoined to rein up their tempers.

The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it
may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline
and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the
effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal
appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful
submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his privilege.
And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some
such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a
court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the
temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26,
1967)

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a
mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or
in the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.

Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.

1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his
conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless
declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice
demands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties," adding that:

It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is beyond bona
fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which are
not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence in the judicial system as such. However, when
the likely impairment of the administration of justice the direct product of false and scandalous
accusations then the rule is otherwise.

2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet entitled
"JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed judicial error, of being so
prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of city
officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge
Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much
further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.

The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and besmirch the
court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.

3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension of an
attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial
office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used
his judicial office to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the court:

We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism members of
the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it
extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of baseless
insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v.
Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac.
220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for instance:

"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by an

attorney, directed against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a nature
as to justify the disbarment of its author."

Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than those made
by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which requires of those who are
permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest observance at all times of the
principles of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that
the public confidence in the due administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity and
usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.

4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman who had
been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a
threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The letter
began:

Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is protected from
the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such
drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go unchallenged,"
and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political manikins or appearances of
men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:

... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for serious
complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the
proper authorities, but the public interest and the administration of the law demand that the
courts should have the confidence and respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting language,
and offensive conduct toward the judges personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court,
which tend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their
integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate
and influence him in the discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of the unauthorized
suit, together with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the
court into disrepute with the public.

5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by corruption
and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had
criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct,
and was ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:

A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the court against
whose members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an
unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with the administration of justice. ...

Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary
proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen.
The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have reached final determination,
are not exempt from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only when an attorney
transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his
liberty of speech. We well understand that an independent bar, as well as independent court, is
always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.

6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an appellate
court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was taken. Such
action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding
that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse
caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said:

We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of criticising
the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and thereby
reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the impression that judicial action is
influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of this court, as well as every other
citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges to the authorities in whom is vested the
power to remove judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a
violation of his duties, or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly
administered the duties devolved upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if based upon
reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided against him,
or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts, or the reasons
announced for them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial officers in the performance of
their official duties, when the proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or motives are
criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in the
 administration of justice; and when such charges are made by officers of the courts, who are
bound by their duty to protect the administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is
guilty of professional misconduct.

7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:

I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary
observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were foreigners,
it might have been expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor against a widow
residing here.

The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:

... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and privileged
criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon the motives
and integrity of this court, and make out a prima facie case of improper conduct upon the part of
a lawyer who holds a license from this court and who is under oath to demean himself with all
good fidelity to the court as well as to his client.

The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.

8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an article in
which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the court of having
arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the
respondent for 30 days, saying that:

The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the public
good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the requirements of the law itself,
as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...

The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime importance
under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would concede for a moment
that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to public officials, whether he labors in a
judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served by denying this right of free speech to any
individual. But such right does not have as its corollary that members of the bar who are sworn
to act honestly and honorably both with their client and with the courts where justice is
administered, if administered at all, could ever properly serve their client or the public good by
designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by
members of the bar in such discussion is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less
impaired by a polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a community toward the
judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the confidence the
public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the
private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his strength and money to maintain the
judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the members of the bar the law itself demands
retribution — not the court.

9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a
pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,,"
"criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a
corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the
name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude should
be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal
letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity
of the said Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain appeals in which he had been attorney for
the defeated litigants. The letters were published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:

You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the burglar to his
plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or
umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short of
assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and faithlessness to
duty? If the state bar association, or a committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the
University Law School, aided by the researches of its hundreds of bright, active students, or if
any member of the court, or any other person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for
the decision, which shall not require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is
made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered its
opinion as follows:

The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in sending to
the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for the very
purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court; and the insult was so directed to the
Chief Justice personally because of acts done by him and his associates in their official capacity.
Such a communication, so made, could never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any
case would be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It
would not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or integrity.
Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any privilege which any
reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No
judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than by
methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written, however abusive, vile, or
indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress in any action triable by a
jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or libelous matter to the person defamed does
not constitute an actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these
respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from
his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different principles are
applicable thereto.

The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised the rights
of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to
which reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be
enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had
assumed as an officer of this court. When, however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief
Justice personally, he exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary,
willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers. "This
obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court,
but it includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward
the judges personally for their official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed.
646. And there appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved, between the
indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a personal
insult for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his
home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial
 acts addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we think entirely logical and well
sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case,
as has been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in actions
which are ended, it held that one might be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in
that case a commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the
power of any person," said the court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official
acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel the
judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame submission to the
indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of punishing the insult by taking the law
in his own hands? ... No high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under such
conditions."

That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes professional
delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly decided.
"An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter to the trial justice,
complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct
and will be disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87
The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter
case it appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City
Court of New York, in which it was stated, in reference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it
common sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such
conduct was not a contempt under the state, the matter should be "called to the attention of the
Supreme Court, which has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel
learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with
ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will not be
long before the general public may feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in like
manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the administration of
justice will fall into bad repute."

The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the same as
the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge,
which the latter received by due course of mail, at his home, while not holding court, and which
referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been
one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having
"willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby
breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the same principle, and in support of its
application to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364,
19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People
v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl.
134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.

Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to make it
our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to
others. ...

11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for publishing
a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of a gang that had
paralyzed him for two years.

12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the official acts
and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for criticising not only
the judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair
in his general conduct of a case.

13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases, criticising
the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed
disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer
was disbarred.

14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a period
of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross
moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he
expressed an intention to resign from the bar.

The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is
indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial
actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and
legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their
integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be
visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise
of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.

Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of counsel such
as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have generally been disposed
of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which, although resting on different bases and calculated to
attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices.

A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.

1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for reconsideration as
"absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of
the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although conceding that

It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do
so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him
to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect
which the dignity of the courts requires. The reason for this is that respect for the courts
guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be
resting on a very shaky foundation,

found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed

... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its
dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter
disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the untoward consequences, or with having
abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .

2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to, the
imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a
news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local newspaper a statement expressing his regret
"that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence
the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so
many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to
go much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant
peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable
times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and
glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in
then forthcoming session of Congress would have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme
Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free
speech, this Court declared:

But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the
respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was
then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only
intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next
Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the
number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the
Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to
influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the
administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court
for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the
administration. of justice ... .

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so
many blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of Que party
knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose
favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend
necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration of justice by
this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to
which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their
rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and
integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they
might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be
the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any
other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes
fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions,
which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that

... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct
and communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of
attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)

3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra, where
counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous
"erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our
condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice
Sanchez stressed:

As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for reconsideration,
implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this
Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes
 into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in
disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this
Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making any reference to and analysis
of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all
these is that this Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial
court, it has committed error and continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It
pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional
boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of this Court on the
jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much from
the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into question the capability of the members
— and some former members of this Court to render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields
a tone of sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction."

Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the interest of brevity, need not
now be reviewed in detail.

Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of them involved contumacious
statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective
mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a
court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to
sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called
upon to account were made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.

The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For
sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof, however,
came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the
majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete
disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, where
the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the
1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of the said
examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expressed by
Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that them may still be contempt by publication even
after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:

A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in

administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is
'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy
public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute,
constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in
the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-
important duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second
kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or
conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the
first there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no decision which might in
any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or
without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts
would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.

Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and actuations now
under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as
much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for such post
litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967,
we have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional
identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary
power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to
preserve its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this
inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of
this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a member whose
misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to
the office of an attorney.

Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty,
amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the
corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who have proved themselves
unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus —

The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and incidental
power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial
functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys
towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is without support in any
respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys to
practice and in this state that power is vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the exercise
of a sound judicial discretion to exclude them from practice. 23

This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy of their
confidence and respect. So much so that —

... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the
court which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of ministering within its
bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held that both the admission and
disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his
functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own
behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24

Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or incidental
power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25

Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment of whether
or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object of disciplinary
sanctions.

The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's part.
Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere offer, however,
he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious
tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive
home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim
at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not only blind
"but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal
talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time
branding its members as "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of
his client "in the people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a
calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to
make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he
rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the
Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose
disciplinary sanctions upon him.

The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself.
The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of
legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract
public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and
destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this
character and texture presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate
commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the
lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go
unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is
unavoidable.

We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other Government
entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the Court
must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this,
valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and
disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the
Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and infused by
philosophy. 26

It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as Atty.
Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled
up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of
the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.

Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely
civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial of an action or a suit, but is
rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment,
it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may
be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have
proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office
of an attorney. 29 In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.

Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court as
a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of
its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its
members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such
individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their
office. 30 So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court
itself, not the individual members thereof — as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and
properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened
by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal
fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit
persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it
cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that
even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not
and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power because public policy demands that they., acting as
a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end,
the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is
absolutely inexistent.

Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for
his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere suspension to total removal
or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course,
primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor
motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity
and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be
zealously maintained.

That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized.
However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would
accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of
some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate
and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that
suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither
manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension
should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are
empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even
without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a
person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and
effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown
by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that
suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he
is once again fit to resume the practice of law.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby,
suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.

Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of
Appeals for their information and guidance.

Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor JJ.,
concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.