The Economics of Taxes On Sugar-Sweetened Beverages - A Review of The Effects On Prices, Sales, Cross-Border Shopping, and Consumption

NU39CH14_Cawley ARjats.
cls July 2, 2019 17:45
Annual Review of Nutrition

The Economics of Taxes on
Sugar-Sweetened Beverages:
A Review of the Effects on
Prices, Sales, Cross-Border
Annu. Rev. Nutr. 2019.39:317-338. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
Access provided by Universidad del Valle on 11/26/19. For personal use only.
Shopping, and Consumption

John Cawley,1,2 Anne Marie Thow,3 Katherine Wen,1
and David Frisvold4
1
Department of Policy Analysis and Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853,
USA; email: JHC38@cornell.edu, KJW229@cornell.edu
2
Department of Economics, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853, USA
3
Menzies Centre for Health Policy, University of Sydney, Sydney, New South Wales 2006,
Australia; email: annemarie.thow@sydney.edu.au
4
Department of Economics, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa 52242, USA;
email: david-frisvold@uiowa.edu
Annu. Rev. Nutr. 2019. 39:317–38 Keywords

First published as a Review in Advance on
SSB, sugar-sweetened beverages, tax, obesity, diabetes, price elasticity,
May 22, 2019
cross-border shopping
The Annual Review of Nutrition is online at
nutr.annualreviews.org Abstract
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-nutr-082018-
During the past decade, dozens of countries, regions, and cities have en-
124603
acted taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs). They have been primar-
Copyright © 2019 by Annual Reviews.
ily motivated by a desire to raise prices, reduce sales and consumption,
All rights reserved
improve population health, and raise revenue. This review outlines the
economic rationale for SSB taxes and illustrates their predicted effects. It
reviews the research on the effects of these taxes on retail prices, sales, cross-
border shopping, consumption, and product availability. The evidence indi-
cates that the amount by which taxes increase retail prices (also called the
pass-through of the tax) varies by jurisdiction, ranging from less than 50% to
100% of the tax. Sales tend to decrease significantly in the taxing jurisdiction,
although this seems to be partly offset by residents increasingly shopping
outside of the taxing jurisdiction (i.e., engaging in cross-border shopping).
317
NU39CH14_Cawley ARjats.cls July 2, 2019 17:45
Overall, taxes lower consumption of the taxed beverages by adults, although not for all types of
beverages or all groups of consumers. We conclude with suggestions for improving the design of
such taxes and directions for future research.
Contents
1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318
2. THE ECONOMICS OF TAXES ON SSBs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
2.1. The Economic Rationale for SSB Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
2.2. The Predicted Effects of SSB Taxes on Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
2.3. The Predicted Effects of SSB Taxes on Quantity Demanded and Sales
and Tax Revenues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323
2.4. Cross-Price Elasticities of Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323

2.5. The Regressivity of SSB Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323
3. THE ECONOMETRICS OF ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS
OF TAXES ON SSBs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
4. THE ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF TAXES ON SSBs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
4.1. Effects on Prices (also known as Pass-Through of the Tax
and Tax Incidence) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
4.2. Effects on Sales or Purchases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329
4.3. Effects on Cross-Border Shopping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330
4.4. Effects on Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
4.5. Product Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332
5. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE DESIGN
OF TAXES ON SSBs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
6. OVERALL SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334
7. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335
1. INTRODUCTION
Poor diet has contributed to high and rising rates of chronic disease worldwide. Between 1975 and
2014, the global prevalence of obesity rose from 3.2% to 10.8% among men and from 6.4% to
14.9% among women (43). In addition, from 1980 to 2014, the global prevalence of diabetes rose
from 4.3% to 9.0% among men and from 5.0% to 7.9% among women (44). The World Health
Organization (WHO), in its 2009 report Global Health Risks, estimated that high blood glucose was
the number three risk factor for preventable deaths worldwide, responsible for 3.4 million deaths
per year, and overweight and obesity were the number five risk factor for preventable deaths,
responsible for 2.8 million deaths annually (50).
This has led to a search for effective policies to improve diets and prevent and reduce obesity
and diabetes. Although obesity and diabetes are the result of overall diet, levels of physical activity,
and other factors—not the consumption of any single food—attention has focused on the role of
sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs).1 SSBs represent the top source of added sugars in the diet in
1 SSBs are usually defined as beverages to which caloric sweeteners are added by the manufacturer, which
include soft drinks, such as colas and sodas, fruit drinks, sport drinks, energy drinks, and sweetened teas. SSBs
318 Cawley et al.

some countries (35). Greater consumption of SSBs is associated with weight gain and obesity, both
in adults and children (40). Because SSBs are fluids with simple carbohydrates and are metabolized
quickly, the mechanism of their association with weight gain may be that their consumption does
not invoke feelings of satiety and, thus, may result in higher overall calorie intake (35). SSBs also
contribute to a high glycemic load, which can result in insulin resistance and type 2 diabetes (39).
A meta-analysis estimated that consuming one to two servings per day of SSBs, relative to less than
1 serving per month, was associated with a 26% higher probability of developing type 2 diabetes
and a 20% higher probability of developing metabolic syndrome (38). The consumption of SSBs
is also associated with an elevated risk of dental cavities, and the American Academy of Pediatric
Dentistry recommends limiting children’s consumption of SSBs (2, 42). The consumption of SSBs
declined substantially in the United States during the past decade; from 2003 to 2014, the calories
consumed from SSBs declined by 41% for children and 26.3% for adults (7). However, the con-
sumption of added sugars remains approximately one-third higher than what is recommended by
the 2015–2020 Dietary Guidelines for Americans (7).
In response to these data, numerous medical and public health organizations have endorsed
taxes on SSBs, such as the American Public Health Association (3) and the British Medical Asso-
ciation (9). In 2016, WHO recommended taxes on SSBs as a key measure for addressing childhood
obesity (52).
During the past 10 years, dozens of countries, regions, and cities have enacted taxes on SSBs
(53). Supplemental Table 1 lists the taxes on SSBs worldwide and provides details on the im-
plementation date, magnitude of the tax, and the scope of beverages subject to the tax. The more
populous countries to enact such taxes include Chile, the Dominican Republic, Finland, France,
Hungary, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, South
Africa, Thailand, and the United Kingdom. Notably, SSB taxes have also been enacted by numer-
ous small Pacific Island nations that have some of the highest prevalences of obesity in the world:
Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Palau, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu. These countries are some
of the earliest to have enacted such taxes, such as French Polynesia in 2002, Palau in 2003, and
Samoa in 2008. Taxes have also been passed at the regional level, such as in Catalonia in Spain and
by the Navajo Nation in the United States, and by individual US cities, such as Albany, Berkeley,
Oakland, and San Francisco, California; Boulder, Colorado; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Seat-
tle, Washington.
These taxes generally apply to beverages with added sweeteners and no nutrients; thus, they
tend to apply to soda pop, sweetened tea, and sports drinks, but not to 100% juices (which have
no added sweeteners) or dairy-based beverages (which contain beneficial calcium and vitamins).
In most jurisdictions with such taxes, diet drinks are exempt; France and Philadelphia are two
exceptions that levy the tax on diet drinks as well. Alcoholic drinks, subject to a separate set of
taxes, are generally exempt from these beverage taxes.
In most cases, beverage taxes take the form of an excise tax, meaning that a fixed amount is
charged per unit of volume (e.g., 1 cent per ounce). In contrast, a handful of governments (e.g.,
Chile, Fiji, Thailand) impose taxes that are ad valorem, which take the form of a percentage of the
retail price (e.g., 10% of the price).
In this article, we review the economic theory and evidence regarding taxes on SSBs. In
Section 2, we review the economic theory relating to taxes on SSBs. In Section 3, we describe
the regression models commonly used to estimate the effects of such taxes and point out the as-
sumptions implicit in such models. In Section 4, we summarize the evidence on the effects of SSB
generally do not include diet (noncaloric) drinks, sweetened milk beverages, infant formula, or 100% fruit or
vegetable juices (3).
www.annualreviews.org • Taxing Sugar-Sweetened Beverages 319

taxes with regard to their impacts on retail prices, purchases, cross-border shopping, consumption,
and product availability. In Section 5, we offer suggestions for ways to improve the effectiveness
of taxes on SSBs and suggest directions for future research.
We focus on studies evaluating the effects of recent excise taxes on SSBs that were generally
enacted for public health reasons. We do not consider older, smaller sales taxes that were levied on
SSBs to generate revenue (19, 29). By focusing on implemented taxes, we set aside studies that sim-
ulated the potential effects of hypothetical taxes using models of consumer demand (e.g., 54, 55).
2. THE ECONOMICS OF TAXES ON SSBs

2.1. The Economic Rationale for SSB Taxes
The economic rationale for government intervention is to fix market failures (see, for example, 12,
32). With respect to energy-dense, nutrient-poor foods and beverages such as SSBs, one relevant
market failure is external costs. External costs, sometimes called externalities, are costs imposed
on third parties through consumption or production. The consumption of energy-dense foods

may increase diabetes and obesity, and this imposes external costs on society because health-care
systems spend large amounts treating these conditions (see, for example, 17), and these costs are
passed on to society in the form of higher taxes (to fund public health insurance) and higher health
insurance premiums (to fund private group health insurance). An additional, and more controver-
sial, rationale for the taxes is to address internalities, the costs that consumers impose on them-
selves in the future through their behavior in the present (1, 33). If people have time-inconsistent
preferences, they may not be able to limit themselves to the intake that would maximize their
well-being, and they may be grateful for taxes that help them reduce their harmful consumption
(33).
One economic solution to the problem of externalities is to impose taxes on the goods that
are causing the externalities. In theory, one could tax people based on their amount of body fat,
on the logic that body fat causes costly obesity-related illnesses and diabetes. Another approach
would be to tax basic ingredients, such as sugar and fat, or a wide range of final food products that
are energy-dense but nutrient poor. However, the most common response has been to tax SSBs,
which is one, but not the only, energy-dense, nutrient-free food that contributes to obesity and
diabetes. In summary, there is an economic rationale for taxing energy-dense, nutrient-poor foods
and beverages (including SSBs), but taxing SSBs in isolation is a relatively narrow approach.
2.2. The Predicted Effects of SSB Taxes on Prices

Excise taxes on specific items do not necessarily raise retail prices by the exact amount of the tax.
Although policymakers and the media emphasize the party on whom the tax is levied, assuming
that it has implications for whoever pays the tax, it is well established that in a perfectly com-
petitive market, who actually pays the tax is determined by the relative elasticities of supply and
demand (see, for example, 30, 36). This is illustrated by Figures 1–3 (adapted with permission
from Reference 14, their appendix). Each of the three graphs illustrates the effect of a tax levied
on suppliers, which shifts the supply curve up. In Figure 1, demand is perfectly inelastic: People
demand the same quantity of SSBs at every price. In such a case, a tax is fully (100%) shifted to
consumers; because demand is insensitive to price, producers can pass the full tax on to consumers
without experiencing any decline in sales.
Figure 2 illustrates the opposite extreme. Demand is perfectly elastic, meaning that the quan-
tity demanded falls to zero if the price rises even slightly. This would be the case if, for example,
there existed perfect substitutes available at price Pt . In such a case, none of the tax would be
320 Cawley et al.

Price, P
Supply at time t + 1 =
Demand Supply (t) + tax
Supply at time t
Pt + 1
ΔP = tax
Pt
Quantity, Q
Qt = Qt + 1
Figure 1
Effect of a tax on prices when demand is perfectly inelastic. When demand is perfectly inelastic, or
insensitive to price, a tax is fully (100%) shifted to consumers; because demand is insensitive to price,
producers can pass the full tax on to consumers without experiencing any decline in sales. Adapted with
permission from Reference 14, courtesy of the Journal of Policy Analysis and Management.
shifted to consumers: Producers would end up paying all of the tax because they would lose all of
their sales if they raised their prices even a bit.
Figure 3 shows an intermediate case in which demand is imperfectly elastic and, thus, down-
ward sloping. This occurs when SSBs are not a necessity and the substitutes are either imperfect
Price, P
Supply (t) + tax
Supply at time t
Pt = Pt + 1 Demand
ΔP = 0
Quantity, Q
Qt + 1 Qt
Figure 2
Effect of a tax on prices when demand is perfectly elastic. When demand is perfectly elastic, or extremely
price sensitive, none of the tax is shifted to consumers: Producers end up paying all of the tax because they
would lose all of their sales if they raised their prices even slightly. Adapted with permission from Reference
14, courtesy of the Journal of Policy Analysis and Management.

Price, P
Supply (t) + tax
Supply at time t
Pt + 1
ΔP < tax
Pt
Demand
Quantity, Q
Qt + 1 Qt
Figure 3
Effect of a tax on prices when demand is imperfectly inelastic. When demand is imperfectly elastic, the tax is
partially, but less than fully, shifted to consumers. The price rises, but by less than the amount of the tax.
Adapted with permission from Reference 14, courtesy of the Journal of Policy Analysis and Management.
or available only at a nonzero time cost or higher monetary cost. In such a case, the tax is par-
tially, but less than fully, shifted to consumers. The price rises, but by less than the amount of the
tax.
So which of these cases seems most likely? It is highly unlikely that demand for SSBs is perfectly
inelastic (as in Figure 1); that would better describe a market for life-savings drugs. It is more
likely that the demand for SSBs is at least somewhat elastic; this would be the case if, for example,
people saw other untaxed drinks, such as bottled water or diet drinks, as substitutes for the SSBs
that are taxed. However, people may not consider these other drinks (even the diet version of their
favorite SSB) to be perfect substitutes for the taxed drinks. The most likely case may be the third
possibility (Figure 3): Demand is imperfectly elastic. In this case, some, but not all, of the tax will
be passed on to consumers in the form of higher retail prices.
The pass-through of the tax (i.e., the percentage of the tax that is passed on to consumers in
the form of higher prices) may vary across countries and cities because the shape of the demand
curve (i.e., the elasticity of demand) may vary based on local preferences for SSBs, income, and
the extent to which local residents consider untaxed beverages to be close substitutes for taxed
beverages. Also, the ease with which one can shop across a border—that is, easily buy beverages
outside the taxing jurisdiction and thus avoid the tax—will also make the demand curve more
elastic and reduce the extent to which the tax is passed on to consumers. For this reason, demand
may be more elastic when the taxing jurisdiction is a small city than when it is a geographically
large nation, simply because it is harder to cross a border to evade the tax in the latter. Countries
and cities may also differ in the shape of their supply curves (i.e., the elasticity of supply) for
SSBs based on the amount of competition among drink manufacturers and among retailers. In
imperfectly competitive markets, pass-through rates can exceed 100% (49). Because all of these
factors may differ across countries and cities, the same tax could have quite different impacts on
prices and sales in different places.
322 Cawley et al.

2.3. The Predicted Effects of SSB Taxes on Quantity Demanded and Sales
and Tax Revenues
The relative elasticities of supply and demand also have implications for how a tax affects the
quantity demanded and tax revenue. For example, in Figure 1, the tax does not reduce the quantity
demanded at all. Consumers are completely unresponsive to price, which allows producers to shift
all of the tax to consumers in the form of higher prices. Because consumers buy the same amount
after the tax as before the tax, the tax revenue can be substantial.
In contrast, if demand is completely elastic as in Figure 2, the quantity demanded drops con-
siderably as a result of the tax because consumers are extremely sensitive to price. It is important
to keep in mind that these graphs concern the local market for SSBs—that is, the market within
the taxing jurisdiction. If cross-border shopping is very easy, then the local market may resemble
Figure 2, with the tax resulting in a substantial drop in quantity demanded within the market;
what is not shown on the graph is the increased purchases made outside the market, which would
rise in this scenario. The worst-case scenario for a taxing authority would be that all consumers
switch to buying their beverages entirely outside the jurisdiction, resulting in zero tax revenue and
no change in consumption.
If demand is imperfectly elastic, as in Figure 3, the quantity demanded will fall somewhat, but
less than if demand was perfectly elastic. Tax revenues will be greater than if demand was perfectly
elastic (Figure 2) but less than if demand was perfectly inelastic (Figure 1).
2.4. Cross-Price Elasticities of Demand

Taxes on SSBs may affect not only the demand for SSBs but also the demand for substitute or
complementary goods. From a public health perspective, not all possible substitution patterns
are equally attractive. Advocates of SSB taxes may hope that the tax encourages consumers to
switch to healthier options, such as bottled water. However, taxes may lead consumers of soda and
cola to switch to diet versions of the same brand, which typically remain untaxed. The relative
unhealthiness of diet SSBs is debatable (see, for example, 4, 41), but we assume that diet SSBs
are more healthy than their full-calorie versions but less healthy than water (although the reverse
may be true in areas with unsafe drinking water). Perhaps the least attractive substitution would
be an equally or even more unhealthy beverage that is exempt from the tax, such as alcoholic
beverages. In general, the narrower the tax, the greater the risk of unhealthy substitutions because
more unhealthy options will be untaxed. Examples of countries that instituted broader taxes with
less risk of unhealthy substitutions include Hungary, where the public health tax applies to the
salt, sugar, and caffeine content of various ready-to-eat foods; Mexico, which taxes high-calorie
foods such as chips and snacks, confectionary, and chocolate; and French Polynesia, which taxes a
wide range of foods that are high in sugar (see, for example, 48).
2.5. The Regressivity of SSB Taxes

One concern about any type of food tax is that it may be regressive—that is, it may fall more heavily
upon those with lower incomes. We examined this possibility using data from the Nielsen Con-
sumer Panels for 2004–2016 and restricted the sample to households with consistently available
data (defined as at least one purchase of any grocery item made in each month during the pre-
vious 12 months).2 Figure 4 depicts the average spending per person on carbonated soft drinks
2 The Nielsen Consumer Panel data come from participating shoppers who scan the bar codes of groceries
that they bring home. As a result, these data will not include individual servings of SSBs that people buy and
consume outside the home. As a result, the expenditures in the figure are undoubtedly underestimates.

20
50
Mean
Average annual expeditures per person ($)
95% confidence interval

Percent of sample 15
Average percent of sample

40
10
30
5
20
0
<5K 5,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 >100K
to to to to to to to to to to to to to to
7,999 9,999 11,999 14,999 19,999 24,999 29,999 34,999 39,999 44,999 49,999 59,999 69,999 99,999
Income group ($)
Figure 4
Expenditures on carbonated soft drinks per person, 2004–2016. The mean average spending per person on carbonated soft drinks by
household income category (blue line), the 95% confidence interval (shaded), and the percentage of the sample in each income category
(red line) are shown. Household income is available only by category, not by exact amount. The sample is restricted to households that
made at least one purchase of any grocery item in each month during the previous 12 months. Per capita expenditures on carbonated
soft drinks are significantly higher in the lower income categories than in the higher income categories, ranging from more than
$40.00/person annually in households earning $5,000–7,999 per year to less than half that (under $20.00/person annually) in
households earning more than $100,000 per year. The researchers’ own calculations are based in part on data from The Nielsen
Company (US) and marketing databases provided through the Nielsen data sets at the Kilts Center for Marketing at The University of
Chicago Booth School of Business. The conclusions drawn from the Nielsen Consumer Panels for 2004–2016 are those of the
researchers and do not reflect the views of Nielsen. Nielsen is not responsible for, had no role in, and was not involved in analyzing and
preparing the results reported herein.
by household income category (household income is available only in categories, not in exact
amounts). Per capita expenditures on carbonated soft drinks are significantly higher in the lower
income categories than in the higher income categories, ranging from more than $40.00/person
per year in households earning $5,000–7,999 per year to less than half that (under $20.00/person
per year) in households earning more than $100,000 per year.
However, even though expenditures on SSBs are higher in lower-income households, SSBs are
not a necessity: They are calorie-dense but generally nutrient free. Thus, we may not be concerned
if lower-income households dramatically reduce their purchases of SSBs as a result of the tax.
Moreover, diabetes and obesity are generally more prevalent among lower-income households, so
these households may reap more of the public health benefit of such a tax (see, for example, 25).
In addition, some jurisdictions address the potential regressivity of an SSB tax by earmarking the
revenue from the tax for programs that benefit lower-income communities. For example, revenue
from the beverage tax in Berkeley has been allocated to nutrition programs in public schools and
health-related programs conducted by community groups.
324 Cawley et al.

3. THE ECONOMETRICS OF ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS

OF TAXES ON SSBs
To date, many evaluations of SSB taxes have estimated difference-in-differences models using data
collected both before and during the tax, from those subject to the tax and a control group that
was not subject to it. The empirical models are typically of the form
Yit = α0 + α1 Postt + α2 Treatedi + α3 Treatedi ∗ Postt + α4 Xit + εit ,
where Y is an outcome of interest (such as prices, sales, or consumption); Post is an indicator vari-
able for whether the outcome is measured after the implementation of the tax as opposed to before;
Treated is an indicator variable for whether the individual lives in the treatment (tax-implementing)
area as opposed to a control (untaxed) area; and X is a vector of other control variables. The sub-
script i corresponds to individuals (or stores) and t to time periods. The parameter of interest,
coefficient α3 , represents the difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of the tax: It is the
change in outcomes that occurred from the time before to the time after the tax for the treatment
group relative to the control group.
In some cases, studies of SSB taxes have lacked a geographic control group. In such cases, one
is regressing Y on simply Post and assuming that the conditional change over time for the treated
group is an accurate estimate of the effect of the tax. The lack of a control group is a serious
limitation because it is not possible to control for any shocks to demand that may have occurred
around the same time as the tax. In the absence of high frequency data, it is difficult to control for
preexisting time trends in the outcome (which may be nonlinear). Some studies have used untaxed
beverages as controls, but this is problematic because consumers may switch from the taxed to the
untaxed beverages—that is, there may be spillover effects to the untaxed beverages.
The ideal control group is one that is a valid counterfactual for how those in the taxed ju-
risdiction would have behaved in the absence of the tax. In practice, studies have chosen either
geographically nearby control areas or more distant ones, and there is a trade-off associated with
this choice. Nearby controls may be more valid counterfactuals because they are more likely to
have experienced any unobserved shocks that occurred in the treatment area at around the same
time as the tax. In cities that implemented a tax after a long public debate, the debate itself may
affect demand independently of the tax, and nearby controls may be desirable because residents of
the control community may also have been exposed to the public debate, allowing researchers to
isolate the impact of the tax from that due to exposure to the debate. Another example is weather;
temperature influences the demand for beverages, and nearby control areas may experience more
similar weather than more-distant control areas. However, nearby controls may be affected by the
tax through cross-border shopping. For example, if residents of the treated city respond to the tax
by increasingly shopping in untaxed neighboring areas, then that could cause an increase in prices
in the neighboring area, which would lead to an underestimate of the impact of the tax on price
(because the price rises in both locations), and it could lead to an overestimate of the impact of
the tax on per-store sales (because sales fall in the treated area but rise in the control area).
Another challenge to such empirical models is to determine how to correctly calculate the
standard errors when the data are drawn from a limited number of areas and time periods (clusters).
For example, a study with one observation before the tax and one after, for numerous stores or
people in a treated city and a control city, is a case of two-by-two clustering; there are two time
periods and two geographic areas. Studies with no control group have only one geographic cluster.
The outcomes (whether prices, sales, or consumption) are likely correlated within areas, so it
is desirable to cluster by geography. Clustering the standard errors when there are only a few

clusters can result in degenerate standard errors (10, 24), so, instead, studies tend to cluster by
store (for store-level data) or individual (for individual-level data), but this may underestimate the
true standard errors.
4. THE ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF TAXES ON SSBs

Given the importance of a control group for eliminating time trends and unobserved shocks to
demand, which is of critical importance for accurately estimating the effect of SSB taxes, this
section primarily discusses results from studies that have had a geographic control group and, thus,
estimate models similar to the difference-in-differences model described in the previous section.
Unfortunately, most studies of national taxes have lacked a geographic control group. Given the
importance of understanding the effects of national taxes, we briefly discuss these studies despite
this limitation.
4.1. Effects on Prices (also known as Pass-Through of the Tax

and Tax Incidence)
In Supplemental Table 2, we describe studies that have estimated the impact of beverage taxes
on prices. These studies fall into two categories: (a) those that collected primary data on prices
from stores and (b) those that used secondary scanner data from retailers. Each of these types
of data has its strengths and limitations. In general, studies that collect primary data generally in-
clude information from a large number and variety of stores selling SSBs (including supermarkets,
convenience stores, gas stations, and pharmacies), but sales are not observed, price data are col-
lected on only a few dates, and data may not be collected for all types of beverages. Studies using
retailer scanner data observe prices for all beverages that were sold during the period they exam-
ine, observe a large number of dates, and have the ability to weight prices by sales, but typically
they include data for only a small number of stores, which tend to be large chain supermarkets
(i.e., not smaller or independently owned grocery stores or other types of retailers, such as conve-
nience stores at gas stations); thus, they are unrepresentative of the universe of locations that sell
SSBs.
Studies collecting primary data from stores have been conducted in Berkeley, Philadelphia,
Boulder, and Cook County, Illinois. Two such studies estimated the pass-through of the 1 cent
per ounce tax in Berkeley. Falbe et al. (27) collected data on the price of single-serving SSBs
from 26 stores in Berkeley as well as 45 stores in the control areas of San Francisco and Oakland.
Data were collected approximately 3–5 months prior to the tax and again 3 months after the tax.
The estimated pass-through of the tax varied by the specific item and category of beverage and
averaged 47% across all SSBs. Cawley & Frisvold (14) used a similar method, collecting data from
30 stores in Berkeley and 56 in the control city of San Francisco, and they collected prices for
single servings as well as larger sizes, such as 2-liter bottles and cases of cans. Data were collected
roughly 3 months before the tax and again 3 months after the tax. Across all brands and sizes, the
pass-through averaged 43.1%, and the confidence intervals were such that a 100% pass-through
of the tax can be ruled out.
One study estimated the pass-through of the beverage tax in Boulder, which is the highest in
the United States at 2 cents per ounce. Cawley et al. (13) examined primary data on prices collected
from visits to retailers and restaurants, both in the treated city of Boulder and in two control com-
munities: (a) Boulder county excluding the city of Boulder and (b) Fort Collins, Colorado, which
is 45 miles north of Boulder. Data were collected twice before the tax (at 4 months and 1 month
pretax) and twice after the tax (at 1 month and 4 months post-tax). Data were collected from an
326 Cawley et al.

unusually large number of locations—more than 280 retailers and more than 340 restaurants—for
a wide variety of brands and sizes of beverages. At 4 months after implementation of the tax, the
pass-through in stores was roughly 79% across all SSBs and varied somewhat across store type. In
restaurants at 4 months after the tax, the pass-through was roughly 69%. This is the only study to
date to examine the impact of beverage taxes on prices in restaurants.
Two studies have estimated the pass-through of the beverage tax of 1.5 cents per ounce in
Philadelphia, which is a noteworthy tax because it is levied on diet as well as caloric SSBs. The
first study (18) examined the pass-through of the tax using the Philadelphia International Airport
as a natural experiment: Because the airport straddles the city border, the tax is levied in some ter-
minals but not others. The authors collected primary data on the prices of single-serving beverages
through visits to 21 stores on the taxed side and 10 stores on the control side of the airport, com-
paring only locations of chain stores found on both sides of the airport to ensure comparability.
Data were collected roughly 1 month before, 1 month after, and 2 months after implementation
of the tax. Estimates from difference-in-differences models indicated that the pass-through was
55% 2 months after implementation of the tax. However, there was evidence that some chains on
the control side used the tax as an opportunity to raise prices by an amount equal to the tax; a
single difference estimate of pass-through on the treated side was 93% after 2 months.
The second study in Philadelphia examined prices in stores throughout the city. Specifically,
Cawley et al. (15) collected price data on 38 taxed beverages from 64 stores in Philadelphia and 74
stores in nearby control communities, both 1–2 months before the tax and 11–12 months after the
tax. Estimates of difference-in-differences models indicated that the tax was fully passed through
to consumers.
One study collected primary data from stores to estimate the pass-through in Cook County,
Illinois. This tax was noteworthy for several reasons: (a) because of a rapid repeal it was in effect
for only about 4 months; (b) like Philadelphia’s tax, it also applied to diet beverages; (c) unlike
beverage taxes in other US cities, it was levied on consumers rather than distributors and, as a
result, it was not included in the shelf price but was instead added at the register, which may have
made it less salient to consumers and easier for producers to pass on. Leider et al. (37) collected
data on beverage prices in 61 stores in Cook County and 59 stores in the control community of
St. Louis City and County, Missouri, both 2–3 months before the tax and 3 months after the tax.
Results of difference-in-differences models indicate that the pass-through of the tax was complete:
roughly 100% for both SSBs and taxed diet beverages.
Three studies estimated the pass-through of SSB taxes using scanner data. All three examined
the tax in Berkeley, and all three are based on a small number of large supermarkets there. Silver
et al. (47) examined scanner data from two supermarket chains that had three stores in Berkeley
(representing one-third of the large supermarkets in that city) and six stores in adjacent control
cities, including San Francisco. The data span 26 months pretax and 12 months post-tax and in-
clude all brands and sizes of beverages stocked by the large supermarkets. There may be some
concern about selection bias in that the two chains willing to share their data with the researchers
may be ones that were complying with the intent of the tax to raise retail prices (8). In these
supermarket chains, and across all SSBs, 67% of the tax was passed on to consumers.
Rojas & Wang (46) estimated the pass-through of the Berkeley tax using Nielsen Retail Scan-
ner Data for 2014–2015. In general, the Nielsen data cover more than 30% of mass merchan-
dising sales volume, but they exclude some major vendors, such as Walmart (the largest grocery
store chain in the United States) and independent stores. It is not clear what percentage of stores
in Berkeley that sell SSBs or what percentage of the total sales volume of SSBs in that city are
included in the Nielsen data. Stores in the eight neighboring three-digit zip codes were used
as controls. The data included only 10 stores in Berkeley but 426 in the control communities.

Rojas & Wang estimated models using data at the UPC (universal product code) level, including
store and month. In three of their four model specifications, the estimated pass-through is not
statistically significant. In the fourth, it is estimated to be 24.4% across all SSBs.
Rojas & Wang (46) also studied the impact of a 2010 tax on SSBs in the state of Washington,
which was a small tax (1/6 of a cent per ounce) and also short lived, lasting only 5 months be-
fore it was repealed by ballot initiative. Their estimates, which use stores in Oregon as a control,
suggested that the tax was fully passed through to consumers in the form of higher retail prices.
The third study that estimated the pass-through of the Berkeley tax using scanner data was by
Bollinger & Sexton (8). Like Rojas & Wang (46), they examined the Nielsen Retail Scanner Data,
but for a longer period (2013–2015), and they put greater emphasis on using synthetic control
techniques to select a control group of stores outside of the San Francisco Bay Area and, in some
cases, even outside of California. Also, they examined data from only one national supermarket
chain (with one store in Berkeley) and one national pharmacy chain (with six stores in Berkeley).
Their difference-in-differences estimates implied that pass-through in the supermarket chain was
in the range of 18% to 25%, with fewer than one-half of SSBs rising in price after the tax. They
found no significant pass-through in the chain pharmacy.
Overall, the pass-through of taxes on SSBs varies by location. The numerous studies of the
Berkeley tax consistently found that pass-through was partial, even less than half. Fewer studies
have been conducted in other areas, but the evidence suggests that the pass-through was complete
in Philadelphia and Cook County and that the tax was mostly, but not completely, passed through
in Boulder. As described in Section 2.2, the pass-through of a tax will vary across cities based on
the relative price elasticities of supply and demand, which, in turn, are affected by factors such as
income, advertising, consumer preferences, and the competitiveness of the retail market.
Although studies with no geographic control group have significant limitations, they provide
some insight into the experience of national taxes on SSBs. Two studies examined the tax of
€0.0716 euro cents per liter in France that was introduced in 2012; a complication is that the
European Union changed their sugar quota in October 2011, which presumably had its own im-
pact on SSB prices at around the same time as the tax was introduced in January 2012. Berardi et al.
(5) examined data collected by a price comparison application for online supermarkets and found
that within 6 months, the tax was completely passed through for soda but less than fully shifted
for flavored water and fruit drinks. Etilé et al. (26) examined scanner data from Kantar World-
panel and estimated that the overall pass-through rate of the French tax was 40%, with variation
by household income and the competitiveness of local markets. Etilé et al. (26) hypothesize that
they found a lower pass-through than Berardi et al. (5) because the latter used online data that
are not nationally representative, failed to correct for seasonal effects, and failed to correct for the
increase in the price of sugar.
Two studies estimated the pass-through in Mexico, which introduced an excise tax on SSBs
of 1 peso per liter in January 2014. A serious challenge, however, is that Mexico also enacted
numerous other related policies at around the same time, including a substantial tax on energy-
dense foods, an information campaign regarding SSBs, programs to expand the availability of
drinkable water, limits on the advertising of SSBs to children, and regulation of unhealthy food
and beverages in schools; each of those policies may have had an impact on the price of SSBs that
is difficult to untangle from that of the SSB tax (21). The two studies in Mexico both examined
data from the country’s consumer price index, which collects information from 46 cities (22, 31).
One limitation of these data are that they are not collected from the same set of stores over time,
and the set of beverages examined may also vary, so there may be compositional changes that
affect prices over time. The two studies differ in their methods, with Grogger (31) using synthetic
control methods. Both studies estimated that prices increased by more than the tax, but with some
328 Cawley et al.

variation across beverage type; Colchero et al. (22) found lower pass-through for noncarbonated
sweetened beverages, and Grogger (31) founds little effect on the prices of taxed drinks other than
sodas.
Several other studies also found high pass-through of national or regional taxes. Bergman &
Hansen (6) examined two increases and one decrease in taxes on soft drinks in Denmark be-
tween 1998 and 2003, using data collected for that country’s consumer price index. They found
evidence that the tax increases were over-shifted, and the tax decrease was only partially passed
through.
The region of Catalonia in Spain implemented an SSB tax in May 2017 and, interestingly,
required that 100% of the tax be passed through to retail prices. Castelló & López-Casasnovas
(11) examined weekly sales data for one supermarket chain and confirmed that the chain did indeed
fully pass on the tax to consumers.
Overall, the trends in prices after nationwide taxes are consistent with the hypothesis that prices
rise by the full amount of the tax, with the important caveat that studies of national taxes tend to
lack a geographic control group, making it difficult to accurately identify the effect of the tax.
In addition, at the same time as some countries enacted a beverage tax, they also enacted other
policies that attempted to improve people’s diets, which makes it difficult to accurately estimate
the effect of the SSB tax separate from these other policies.
4.2. Effects on Sales or Purchases

A number of studies have estimated the impact of SSB taxes on either sales by stores or purchases
by consumers. This should not be confused with the impact on consumption, which is addressed
in Section 4.4: Even if sales fall in stores located in the taxing jurisdiction, consumers may respond
to the tax by increasing their shopping in stores across a border in order to avoid paying the tax,
and thus the tax could have little overall impact on consumption. In Supplemental Table 3, we
describe studies that have estimated the impact of beverage taxes on purchases or sales.
Three studies have used retail scanner data to examine the impact of SSB taxes on sales by stores
in Berkeley. The methods of these three studies were described in the previous subsection. In the
study by Rojas & Wang (46) using the Nielsen Retail Scanner Data for 10 stores in Berkeley, both
their difference-in-differences and synthetic control models failed to reject the null hypothesis of
no impact on average monthly volume of sales of SSBs or sodas. In the study by Silver et al. (47)
that used scanner data from two supermarket chains, they estimated a reduction of 9.6% in taxed
ounces per transaction, but did not report estimates of the impact on the number of transactions.
In the Bollinger & Sexton (8) study that examined one supermarket chain and one pharmacy chain,
they estimated a reduction in sales of SSBs of 7–12% at the chain supermarket, but could not reject
the null hypothesis of no change in sales at the pharmacy chain.
One study used consumer surveys to estimate the impact of the Philadelphia beverage tax on
consumers’ purchases. Cawley et al. (16) used a street-intercept method to survey shoppers exit-
ing retail stores in Philadelphia and in nearby control areas. They used a repeated cross-section
design, interviewing different sets of customers before and after the tax was implemented; the
pooled sample size was 2,806. They estimated that the tax reduced purchases of taxed beverages
in Philadelphia by 8.9 ounces per shopping trip.
In the absence of a control group, other studies have used before and after comparisons to
estimate the effect of national taxes on sales. Several studies examined the 1 peso per liter tax
implemented by Mexico in January 2014. As mentioned earlier, a challenge is that at around the
same time, Mexico implemented other policies intended to affect the sale of SSBs (21). The inabil-
ity to disentangle the effects of these various policies biases estimates of the effect of the SSB tax.

Colchero et al. (20) analyzed Nielsen Household Scanner Data for city residents in Mexico; unlike
the Nielsen Retail Scanner Data described earlier, which is collected by stores, the household data
are scanned by participating consumers. These data are unlikely to include single-serving SSBs
that consumers drink before returning home, and thus the data do not fully capture all SSB pur-
chases. Using these data, Colchero et al. (20) estimated that the SSB tax in Mexico decreased pur-
chases by an average of 6.1% in the year following the introduction of the tax. Colchero et al. (20)
also examined data from another source—sales data from surveys of the manufacturing industry—
and estimated that the tax in Mexico decreased per capita sales of SSBs by 7.3% and increased per
capita sales of water by 5.2%. Two limitations are that the data do not include imports but do
include drinks that were exported, and the SSB category includes some untaxed beverages (such
as diet drinks). Other evidence is available from the Catalan region of Spain: Castelló & López-
Casasnovas (11) estimated that the SSB tax decreased sales by 22% in a large supermarket chain
throughout the territory. All of these studies are subject to the limitations associated with the lack
of a geographic control group, described earlier.
4.3. Effects on Cross-Border Shopping

One concern about taxes enacted at the local level is that it is relatively easy to evade them through
cross-border shopping—that is, by buying the products subject to the tax outside of the taxing
jurisdiction. Studies have used a variety of approaches to measure the extent to which this occurs.
Three studies examined the extent of cross-border shopping in response to the Berkeley tax.
One indirect way to look for evidence of cross-border shopping is to test for geographic differences
in the pass-through of the tax. Stores that are further from competitors outside the jurisdiction
may have an increased ability to pass on the tax to consumers because they may lose less business
to cross-border shopping than stores located close to the border. Cawley & Frisvold (14) found
such a pattern in Berkeley: The pass-through of the tax was higher in stores that were farther from
untaxed rivals. Moreover, this was not true for individual servings (for which people are unlikely
to drive outside the city), but it was true for 2-liter bottles and cases of cans that people may buy
when driving to do their big shopping trips. Specifically, for each mile of distance from the closest
rival store selling untaxed SSBs, the pass-through rose 33.3% for 2-liter bottles and 25.8% for
cases of cans.
As part of a street-intercept surveys conducted by Falbe et al. (28), consumers were asked where
they had primarily bought SSBs during the past year and past month, and if they had switched
cities, why. They found that 2% of Berkeley residents who reported having bought SSBs primarily
in Berkeley before the tax had switched to buying SSBs elsewhere as a result of the tax or higher
prices.
Bollinger & Sexton (8) examined the change in beverage sales at a supermarket located outside
of, but close to, Berkeley. They found that after the introduction of the Berkeley tax, sales of SSBs
at the store increased 9–14%. Combined with their other findings, this implied that roughly half
of the decrease in sales of SSBs in Berkeley was simply a transfer of purchases to stores outside of
Berkeley.
Collectively, all three studies are consistent in finding there was at least some cross-border
shopping in response to the Berkeley tax, but the evidence is incomplete, and an accurate estimate
of the extent of such shopping is still needed.
Information on cross-border shopping is also available for other locations. Cawley et al. (15)
found that the pass-through of the Philadelphia tax was higher in stores that were further (in
vehicle travel time) from their nearest untaxed competitor; specifically, an additional 5 minutes of
travel time in the distance from an untaxed competitor was associated with an additional 0.365
330 Cawley et al.

cent per ounce pass-through of the 1.5 cent per ounce Philadelphia tax. Likewise, Bergman &
Hansen (6) found that the pass-through of the Danish tax on soda was higher the further the
retailer was from Denmark’s border with Germany.
The repeated cross-sectional surveys of street-intercepted consumers in Cawley et al. (16) pro-
vide information about cross-border shopping in two ways: (a) cross-border shopping is actually
observed (i.e., Philadelphia residents are found exiting stores outside of Philadelphia) and (b) the
survey includes questions about the practice. The evidence is mixed: There was not a significant
increase in the percentage of consumers intercepted in the control areas who were Philadelphia
residents, but the Philadelphia residents who were observed engaging in cross-border shopping
were 173% more likely to be buying beverages that would have been taxed in Philadelphia. The
change in the volume of SSBs they purchased outside of Philadelphia was large (more than 100%)
but imprecise and not statistically significant. In the responses to the surveys, there was no signif-
icant change in the probability that Philadelphia residents intercepted at Philadelphia stores re-
ported shopping outside of the city. However, Philadelphia residents intercepted at stores outside
of Philadelphia were significantly less likely after the introduction of the tax to report shopping in
Philadelphia weekly. In summary, taken collectively, the evidence suggests that Philadelphia res-
idents were not more likely to shop outside of the city, but those who did were shopping less in
Philadelphia and were more likely to purchase beverages outside of the city that would have been
taxed in Philadelphia.
Evidence from Boulder differs from that in Berkeley and Philadelphia. For data from Boulder,
Cawley et al. (13) failed to reject the hypothesis that pass-through rates do not vary with the
distance of a store to its nearest competitor in an untaxed area. This is different than the results
for Berkeley and Philadelphia, even though the Boulder tax (2 cents per ounce) is larger than those
in Berkeley (1 cent per ounce) and Philadelphia (1.5 cents per ounce).
The difference in results across cities is a reminder that the effect of an SSB tax on cross-
border shopping, as with its effect on pass-through, sales, and consumption, depends on local
conditions, such as local consumers’ price elasticity of demand, the opportunity cost of consumers’
time, the competitiveness of the local retail market, and even, perhaps, factors such as the public
transportation network, extent of vehicle ownership, and density and location of retailers, both
inside the taxing jurisdiction and in neighboring areas.
4.4. Effects on Consumption

One of the most important outcomes of interest is the consumption of SSBs: Changes in price
are generally seen as a means to an end, but reducing consumption is an end in itself for many
advocates of these taxes. Moreover, consumption reflects total purchases—that is, not just pur-
chases in the taxing jurisdiction but also any purchases made through cross-border shopping. In
Supplemental Table 4, we describe studies that have estimated the impact of beverage taxes on
consumption.
Three studies have used survey data to estimate the impact of SSB taxes on consumption. To
study the effect of the Berkeley tax, Falbe et al. (28) used a street-intercept method to survey res-
idents of low-income, minority neighborhoods in Berkeley relative to those in similar neighbor-
hoods in San Francisco and Oakland. The study had a repeated cross-section design, interviewing
one set of people 9–11 months prior to the tax and a different set of people 2–6 months after the
tax, with a pooled sample size of 2,679. Participants were asked to report the frequency with which
they drank various categories of SSBs. Results of the difference-in-differences models varied by
category of beverage. Falbe et al. estimated that the Berkeley tax decreased the frequency of total
SSB consumption by 24% and increased the frequency of water consumption by 37%, but there

was no detectable impact on the consumption of energy drinks, fruit drinks, or sweetened coffee
or tea.
To study the impact of the tax in Philadelphia, Zhong et al. (56) conducted a phone survey
1 month before the tax and 1–2 months after the tax in Philadelphia and three nearby control
communities (Trenton and Camden, New Jersey, and Wilmington, Delaware). This was a repeated
cross-section: Two different samples were interviewed in the two time periods, with a pooled sam-
ple size of 1,777. The authors estimated difference-in-differences regressions, and the results var-
ied; they found significant reductions for some types of beverages and measures, but no detectable
changes for others. For example, the authors estimated that the probability that regular soda would
be consumed daily fell 40%; the probability that energy drinks would be consumed daily fell 64%;
and the probability that bottled water would be consumed daily rose 58%. However, they found
no detectable changes in the probability of daily consumption of SSBs overall or of diet beverages.
Nor were there any significant changes during the past 30 days in the total volume consumed of
SSBs (or any category of SSBs), diet beverages, or bottled water, or in the 30-day consumption
frequency for any type of beverage, except regular soda.

Cawley et al. (16) conducted longitudinal telephone surveys of consumers in Philadelphia and
nearby control communities, surveying them 1–2 months before the Philadelphia beverage tax
took effect and 10–11 months after. This is the only longitudinal survey on this subject to date.
The advantage of longitudinal data is that it implicitly controls for time-invariant heterogeneity
across respondents. The authors interviewed 241 consumers in Philadelphia and 199 in the control
communities in both the pretax and post-tax periods, for a pooled sample size of 880. Adults were
surveyed about their consumption of SSBs as well as that of their child. The results varied for
adults and children, and among adults the results varied by beverage category. Among adults,
Cawley et al. (16) could not reject the null hypothesis of no change in SSB consumption overall,
but they estimated that the tax decreased the frequency of consumption of regular soda by 10
times per month and reduced the probability of consuming regular soda daily by 31%. Among
children, there was no detectable impact of the tax on the consumption of SSBs or any category of
SSBs. However, among children who consumed large volumes of SSBs at baseline, the tax reduced
the consumption of added sugars by 22%. This is the only study to provide evidence of the impact
of SSB taxes on children’s consumption of beverages.
Overall, evidence from city-level taxes in the United States indicates that the impact of the
taxes on consumption varies by the category of beverage. Each study found significant reductions
in adults’ consumption of some types of beverages, but each study also failed to detect changes in
the consumption of other types. The one study to examine children’s consumption found no de-
tectable effect of the tax on their consumption. No studies have examined the impact of nationwide
SSB taxes on consumption.
4.5. Product Availability

There is relatively little information about how taxes on SSBs affect the availability of beverages
in stores. The exception is Cawley et al. (15), which examined product availability using in-person
data collection at stores in Philadelphia and nearby control communities. Complicating this effort,
around the same time that Philadelphia implemented its beverage tax, it also began offering a tax
credit to encourage certain (but not all) stores to stock healthy beverages. The types of stores eli-
gible for the credit were stand-alone convenience stores and gas stations with convenience stores,
and the types that were ineligible included large grocery stores, warehouse stores, small grocery
stores, and pharmacies. Cawley et al. (15) estimated that, among stores ineligible for the tax credit,
332 Cawley et al.

the beverage tax raised the probability that they carried a given untaxed beverage by 18.7%; in
particular, they were significantly more likely to carry bottled water.
5. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE DESIGN

OF TAXES ON SSBs
In order to improve the design of taxes on SSBs, one first needs to be clear about the intended goal
of the tax. For example, if the primary goal is to raise revenue, then taxing diet beverages may be a
design improvement because it broadens the tax base, but if the goal is to encourage substitutions
of lower-calorie beverages in order to prevent obesity, then it may be preferable to exempt diet
drinks from the tax.
From the economic perspective, if one seeks to maximize social welfare, it would be ideal to
set the amount of the tax equal to the marginal external costs imposed by consumption of the
beverage—that is, the tax would reflect the long-term costs of any illness related to diabetes or
obesity that is caused by the consumption of SSBs. However, the amount of these costs is not
known with any accuracy, so this is not practical. At a minimum, though, the tax could be a sliding
scale based on the calorie content of the drink. Each of the taxes enacted by US cities is a flat
amount per ounce for all beverages subject to the tax. In contrast, the taxes recently implemented
in the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland are two tier, with a lower tax for less caloric
beverages and a higher rate for more caloric ones. Even if a two-tier tax is not set exactly equal to
the marginal external costs, it is useful because it encourages consumers to substitute less caloric
drinks for more caloric ones, and it incentivizes manufacturers to decrease the calorie content of
their beverages.
Any given tax would likely be more effective if implemented on a larger geographic scale. At
one extreme are the US city-level taxes, which are relatively easily evaded by driving outside the
city limits to shop. The repeals of the beverage tax in Cook County and a tax on saturated fat in
Denmark were preceded by strong opposition to the taxes by grocers, who argued that the tax had
resulted in consumers simply shifting their purchases out of the jurisdiction.
If the goal is to improve diet and prevent chronic disease, taxing a broader set of energy-dense,
nutrient-free foods (other than simply SSBs) reduces the ability of consumers to easily substitute
another energy-dense item for the taxed one. One possible approach is that instead of levying
the tax on a specific set of groceries, it could be levied on the relevant ingredients, such as sugar,
other sweeteners, fats, and oils, and thus the tax would be “baked into” a wide range of foods (34).
However, this would be particularly regressive if it resulted in a high proportion of foods being
taxed. It would raise the prices of nutrient-rich foods that include added sugars or fats, with a
possibly harmful effect on population health.
In order to protect lower-income households from the loss of well-being from a regressive food
tax, the revenue generated by such taxes can be used for programs that benefit such households
(38). For example, beverage tax revenue has been allocated to nutrition programs in public schools
and to health programs run by community organizations in Berkeley, prekindergarten education
programs in Philadelphia, and programs to promote healthy eating and physical activity in low-
income communities in Boulder.
It is well established that taxes have their greatest impact on behavior when they are salient—
that is, when they are highly visible to the consumer. For this reason, it is important that SSB taxes
be reflected in the shelf price so they are visible at the point of decision-making. In some places,
SSB taxes may be added at the register by retailers instead of included in the shelf price (13); this
presumably leads to less reduction in purchases because some people may not be aware that a tax
was charged. In order to maximize their effectiveness, governments can require that the taxes be
included in the shelf prices, following the example of Catalonia.
Table 1 Summary of findings from research about taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs)
Effects, considerations,
and further research Analysis
Effects of SSB taxes There is strong evidence that SSB taxes increase the retail prices of taxed beverages, with
the magnitude of the price increase varying by location.
SSB taxes reduce consumers’ purchases of taxed beverages in the taxing jurisdiction.
Consumers appear to respond to SSB taxes by increasing cross-border shopping, that is,
buying the taxed beverages outside of the taxing jurisdiction.
SSB taxes reduce adults’ consumption of some taxed beverages but not others.
Considerations for designing SSB To increase the impact of SSB taxes on purchases and consumption, taxes should be
taxes (a) salient to consumers, that is, included in the shelf price; (b) on a sliding scale that is
based on calorie content, with a higher tax for higher-calorie beverages to encourage
healthier substitutions and reformulations by manufacturers; and (c) cover a large
geographic area to minimize the potential for cross-border shopping.
Directions for future research Examine the strategic responses of manufacturers, distributors, and retailers to an SSB
tax; for example, to what extent do they increase advertising, reformulate their
products, or change availability in stores of taxed and untaxed products?
Better understand how the public debate that precedes the enactment of an SSB tax
affects the demand for SSBs.
Better understand consumer interpretation; for example, does the tax signal that a
product is unhealthy?
Examine the longer-term effects of SSB taxes on all outcomes.
Conduct additional studies of the impact of SSB taxes on consumption, especially in
children, which may be challenging to accurately measure.
Examine cross-price elasticities of demand; in response to an SSB tax, what do
consumers switch to?
Examine the long-term impact of SSB taxes on weight, obesity, and diabetes.
6. OVERALL SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH

During the past decade, numerous countries and cities have enacted taxes on SSBs, largely with
the goal of improving the public’s diet. A substantial number of studies have been conducted to
evaluate the effects of these taxes. Those with the strongest research design have a geographic
control group that can credibly control for trends in, or unobserved shocks to, outcomes.
Results vary across and within studies, but some clear patterns have emerged (Table 1). There
is strong evidence that taxes on SSBs raise the retail prices of SSBs. However, how much of a
rise occurs varies by location: For example, the pass-through was less than half in Berkeley, more
than half, but less than complete, in Boulder, and 100% in Philadelphia and Cook County, Illinois.
There is also evidence that SSB taxes reduce purchases by consumers and sales by stores in the
taxing jurisdiction; surveys of consumers tend to find that SSB purchases decrease after a tax,
although some studies using scanner data from stores cannot reject the null hypothesis of no
change. There is a wide variety of evidence indicating that some of the decrease in purchases
observed in the taxing jurisdiction is offset by increased cross-border shopping: This is evident
in lower pass-through in stores close to the border or to rival untaxed stores (e.g., in Berkeley
and Philadelphia, but not in Boulder), increases in sales of SSBs at untaxed stores near the taxing
jurisdiction, and in surveys of consumers. Estimates of how SSB taxes affect the ultimate outcome
of consumption vary across beverage category: Studies tend to find significant decreases in the
frequency of consumption for some categories of taxed beverages but not others. There is little
information on firm responses, but in Philadelphia, stores appear to have responded to the tax by
334 Cawley et al.

stocking more bottled water. The effects of SSB taxes may vary across locations due to differences
in factors affecting the price elasticity of demand (e.g., income, consumer preferences for SSBs,
and ease of cross-border shopping) or the price elasticity of supply (e.g., the marginal costs of
selling SSBs and competitiveness of the local retail market).
Design considerations for implementing SSB taxes include ensuring that the tax is salient to
consumers in order to affect consumption; having a sliding scale tax based on calorie content to
incentivize consumers to substitute healthier options and manufacturers to reformulate products
to reduce calories; taxing at a larger geographic level than the city in order to limit the potential for
cross-border shopping; and taxing a broader range of energy-dense, nutrient-free foods in order
to more generally internalize external costs, limit the scope for substitution of equally unhealthy
untaxed items, and incentivize the reformulation of products to make them healthier.
7. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

There have been numerous studies of the impact of SSB taxes on retail prices, but there remains
virtually no information about the strategic responses of manufacturers, distributors, and retailers.
Although pass-through of the tax to higher retail prices has been documented, how the remain-
der of the tax is apportioned among manufacturers, distributors, and retailers remains unknown.
In addition, little is known about the extent to which firms respond to these taxes by increasing
advertising, paying more in stocking fees for prime shelf space, changing product availability in
stores, or increasing the frequency of sale prices (time-limited discounts). There are a few excep-
tions. The beverage tax in Philadelphia led stores to stock fewer SSBs and more bottled water (15).
In addition, it has been reported that the imminent implementation of the two-tiered beverage
tax in the United Kingdom led manufacturers to reformulate numerous beverages to make them
lower calorie (45), and the sugar tax in Hungary led approximately 40% of food manufacturers
to improve the healthfulness of their products (51). A study of the Mexico soda tax reported that
the industry responded with aggressive in-store promotions and marketing (21). A better under-
standing of strategic responses by manufacturers and vendors would shed important light on the
full impact of such taxes.
Some of the estimated effects of the taxes may be due to the public debate around their enact-
ment (23). This is particularly true in places where the tax was enacted by public referendum (e.g.,
Berkeley) because advocates and industry tend to run advertisements to influence voters. This is
less of an issue in studies that use an adjacent community as a control (because the control area
was likely exposed to the debate and advertising as well). In general, it would be useful to better
understand how debate itself affects public perceptions of the healthiness of SSBs and the demand
for such beverages.
There remains a need for studies of the impact of SSB taxes on individual consumption, both by
adults and children. SSB consumption by children may be particularly difficult to measure, relying
either on self-reports or proxy reports by parents, each of which may have substantial error.
It will be useful to examine the longer-run effects of the taxes on prices, sales, and consumption.
Most studies examine changes in prices or sales after a gap of several weeks to roughly a year.
Longer-term effects on sales and consumption should also be examined to see whether they are
smaller (people may revert to their old habits) or larger (people may gradually adopt new habits).
It will also be useful to study the effect of taxes on longer-term outcomes such as weight, obesity,
and diabetes.
It would also be useful to know how consumers interpret SSB taxes. Do they infer that if a
beverage is subject to the tax that it must be unhealthy? Is that message weakened if the tax is
applied to diet beverages as well?

There is a need to evaluate national SSB taxes using credible geographic controls. Studies of
national taxes have tended to lack geographic controls, with the result that they cannot control for
time trends in the outcomes. Studies will need to carefully address any other policies to improve
diet that were enacted around the same time as the SSB tax.
More generally, it would be useful to have a more holistic approach to studying the effects of
SSB taxes. This would take into account the various ways in which consumers switch to other
products in response to the tax, some of which may be healthful (e.g., drinking bottled water) and
some of which may not (e.g., drinking alcoholic beverages or consuming more food calories), and
the variation in these substitution patterns by different types of consumers (e.g., by income, eth-
nicity, adults versus children). It would also take into account industry responses, such as strategic
pricing, promotion of the taxed item and potential substitutes, and reformulation.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
J.C. and D.F. have received research funding from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. J.C.
has received consulting income from Novo Nordisk, Inc. A.M.T. and K.W. are not aware of any
affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings that might be perceived as affecting the
objectivity of this review.
LITERATURE CITED
1. Allcott H, Cass RS. 2015. Regulating internalities. J. Policy Anal. Manag. 34(3):698–705
2. Am. Acad. Pediatr. Dent. 2017. Policy on Dietary Recommendations for Infants, Children, and Adolescents.
Chicago, IL: Am. Acad. Pedatr. Dent.
3. Am. Public Health Assoc. 2012. Taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages. Am. Public Health Assoc. https://
www.apha.org/policies-and-advocacy/public-health-policy-statements/policy-database/2014/07/
23/13/59/taxes-on-sugar-sweetened-beverages
4. Azad MB, Abou-Setta AM, Chauhan BF, Rabbani R, Lys J, et al. 2017. Nonnutritive sweeteners and car-
diometabolic health: a systematic review and meta-analysis of randomized controlled trials and prospec-
tive cohort studies. CMAJ 189:E929–39
5. Berardi N, Sevestre P, Tepaut M, Vigneron A. 2016. The impact of a ‘soda tax’ on prices: evidence from
French micro data. Appl. Econ. 48(11):3976–94
6. Bergman UM, Hansen NL. 2017. Are excise taxes on beverages fully passed through to prices? The Danish evi-
dence. Work Pap., ResearchGate, Berl., Ger. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268429840_
Are_Excise_Taxes_on_Beverages_Fully_Passed_Through_to_Prices_The_Danish_Evidence/
download
7. Bleich SN, Vercammen KA, Koma JW, Li Z. 2018. Trends in beverage consumption among children and
adults, 2003–2014. Obesity 26:432–41
8. Bollinger B, Sexton S. 2018. Local excise taxes, sticky prices, and spillovers: evidence from Berkeley’s soda tax.
Work Pap., SSRN, Rochester, N.Y. https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3087966
9. Br. Med. Assoc. 2015. Food for Thought: Promoting Healthy Diets Among Children and Young People. London:
Br. Med. Assoc.
10. Cameron AC, Miller DL. 2015. A practitioner’s guide to cluster-robust inference. J. Hum. Resour. 50:317–
73
11. Castelló JV, López-Casasnovas G. 2018. Impact of SSB taxes on consumption. Work Pap. 201804–10, CRES-
UPF, Barc., Spain. https://www.upf.edu/documents/3223410/7582912/CRESWP201804110.pdf/
c888c03c-06e2-7c2b-415f-accae486a9c7
12. Cawley J. 2015. An economy of scales: a selective review of obesity’s economic causes, consequences, and
solutions. J. Health Econ. 43:244–68
13. Cawley J, Crain C, Frisvold D, Jones D. 2018. The pass-through of the largest tax on sugar-sweetened beverages:
the case of Boulder, Colorado. NBER Work Pap. 25050. https://www.nber.org/papers/w25050
336 Cawley et al.

14. Cawley J, Frisvold D. 2017. The pass-through of taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages to retail prices: the
case of Berkeley, California. J. Policy Anal. Manag. 36:303–26
15. Cawley J, Frisvold D, Hill A, Jones D. 2018. The impact of the Philadelphia beverage tax on prices and product
availability. NBER Work Pap. 24990. https://www.nber.org/papers/w24990
16. Cawley J, Frisvold D, Hill A, Jones D. 2018. The impact of the Philadelphia beverage tax on purchases and
consumption by adults and children. NBER Work Pap. 25052. https://www.nber.org/papers/w25052
17. Cawley J, Meyerhoefer C. 2012. The medical care costs of obesity: an instrumental variables approach.
J. Health Econ. 31:219–30
18. Cawley J, Willage B, Frisvold D. 2018. Pass-through of a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages at the Philadel-
phia International Airport. JAMA 319:305–6
19. Colantuoni F, Christian R. 2015. The impact of soda sales taxes on consumption: evidence from scanner
data. Contemp. Econ. Policy 33(4):714–34
20. Colchero MA, Guerrero-López CM, Molina M, Rivera J. 2016. Beverage sales in Mexico before and after
implementation of a sugar sweetened beverage tax. PLOS ONE 11:e0163463
21. Colchero MA, Popkin BM, Rivera JA, Ng SW. 2016. Beverage purchases from stores in Mexico under
the excise tax on sugar sweetened beverages: observational study. BMJ 352:h6704
22. Colchero MA, Salgado JC, Unar-Munguía M, Molina M, Ng S, Rivera-Dommarco JA. 2015 Changes in
prices after an excise tax to sweetened sugar beverages was implemented in Mexico: evidence from urban
areas. PLOS ONE 10:e0144408
23. Cornelsen L, Smith RD. 2018. Soda taxes—four questions economists need to address. Food Policy 74:138–
42
24. Donald SG, Lang K. 2007. Inference with difference-in-differences and other panel data. Rev. Econ. Stat.
89:221–33
25. Dubois P, Griffith R, O’Connell M. 2017. The effects of banning advertising in junk food markets. Rev.
Econ. Stud. 85:396–436
26. Etilé F, Lecocq S, Boizot-Szantai C. 2018. The incidence of soft-drink taxes on consumer prices and welfare:
evidence from the French soda tax. Work Pap. 2018–24, Paris Sch. Econ., Paris, Fr. https://halshs.archives-
ouvertes.fr/halshs-01808198/document
27. Falbe J, Rojas N, Grummon AH, Madsen KA. 2015. Higher retail prices of sugar-sweetened beverages
3 months after implementation of an excise tax in Berkeley, California. Am. J. Public Health 105:2194–
201
28. Falbe J, Thompson HR, Becker CM, Rojas N, McCulloch CE, Madsen KA. 2016. Impact of the Berkeley
excise tax on sugar-sweetened beverage consumption. Am. J. Public Health 106:1865–71
29. Fletcher JM, Frisvold DE, Tefft N. 2011. Are soft drink taxes an effective mechanism for reducing obesity?
J. Policy Anal. Manag. 30:655–62
30. Fullerton D, Metcalf GE. 2002. Tax Incidence. In Handbook of Public Economics, Vol. 4, ed. A Auerbach,
M Feldstein, pp. 1787–872. Amsterdam: Elsevier
31. Grogger J. 2017. Soda taxes and the prices of sodas and other drinks: evidence from Mexico. Am. J. Agric.
Econ. 99:481–98
32. Gruber J. 2013. Public Finance and Public Policy. New York: Worth. 4th ed.
33. Gruber J, Koszegi B. 2001. Is addiction “rational”? Theory and evidence. Q. J. Econ. 116:1261–303
34. Harding M, Lovenheim M. 2017. The effect of prices on nutrition: comparing the impact of product-
and nutrient-specific taxes. J. Health Econ. 53:53–71
35. Johnson RK, Appel LJ, Brands M, Howard BV, Lefevre M, et al. 2009. Dietary sugars intake and car-
diovascular health: a scientific statement from the American Heart Association. Circulation 120:1011–
20
36. Kotlikoff LJ, Summers LH. 1987. Tax incidence. In Handbook of Public Economics, Vol. 2, ed. A Auerbach,
M Feldstein, pp. 1043–92. Amsterdam: Elsevier
37. Leider J, Pipito A, Powell L. 2018. The impact of the Cook County, Illinois, sweetened beverage tax on
prices, 2017. Chicago: Ill. Prev. Res. Cent., Univ. Chic.
38. Lockwood BB, Taubinsky D. 2017. Regressive sin taxes. NBER Work Pap. 23085. https://www.nber.org/
papers/w23085

39. Malik VS, Hu FB. 2011. Sugar-sweetened beverages and health: Where does the evidence stand? Am. J.
Clin. Nutr. 94:1161–62
40. Malik VS, Schulze MB, Hu FB. 2006. Intake of sugar-sweetened beverages and weight gain: a systematic
review. Am. J. Clin. Nutr. 84:274–88
41. Mandrioli D, Kearns CE, Bero LA. 2016. Relationship between research outcomes and risk of bias, study
sponsorship, and author financial conflicts of interest in reviews of the effects of artificially sweetened
beverages on weight outcomes: a systematic review of reviews. PLOS ONE 11:e0162198
42. Marshall TA. 2013. Preventing dental caries associated with sugar-sweetened beverages. J. Am. Dent. Assoc.
144:1448–152
43. NCD Risk Factor Collab. 2016. Trends in adult body-mass index in 200 countries from 1975 to 2014:
a pooled analysis of 1,698 population-based measurement studies with 19.2 million participants. Lancet
387:1377–96
44. NCD Risk Factor Collab. 2016. Worldwide trends in diabetes since 1980: a pooled analysis of 751
population-based studies with 4.4 million participants. Lancet 387:1513–30
45. Pym H. 2018. Sugar tax is already producing results. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/health-
43372295
46. Rojas C, Wang E. 2017. Do taxes for soda and sugary drinks work? Scanner data evidence from Berkeley and
Washington. Work. Pap., SSRN, Rochester, N.Y. https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3041989
47. Silver LD, Ng SW, Ryan-Ibarra S, Taillie LS, Induni M, et al. 2017. Changes in prices, sales, consumer
spending, and beverage consumption one year after a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages in Berkeley,
California, US: a before-and-after study. PLOS Med. 14:e1002283
48. Thow AM, Quested C, Juventin L, Kun R, Khan AN, Swinburn B. 2011. Taxing soft drinks in the Pacific:
implementation lessons for improving health. Health Promot. Int. 26:55–64
49. Weyl EG, Fabinger M. 2013. Pass-through as an economic tool: principles of incidence under imperfect
competition. J. Political Econ. 121:528–83
50. WHO (World Health Organ.). 2009. Global Health Risks: Mortality and Burden of Disease Attributable to
Selected Major Risks. Geneva: WHO
51. WHO (World Health Organ.). 2015. Public Health Product Tax in Hungary: An Example of Successful In-
tersectoral Action Using a Fiscal Tool to Promote Healthier Food Choices and Raise Revenues for Public Health.
Geneva: WHO
52. WHO (World Health Organ.). 2016. Report of the Commission on Ending Childhood Obesity. Geneva: WHO
53. World Cancer Res. Fund Int. 2018. NOURISHING Framework: Use Economic Tools to Address Food Afford-
ability and Purchase Incentives. London: World Cancer Res. Fund Int.
54. Zhen C, Finkelstein EA, Nonnemaker JM, Karns SA, Todd JE. 2014. Predicting the effects of sugar-
sweetened beverage taxes on food and beverage demand in a large demand system. Am. J. Agric. Econ.
96:1–25
55. Zhen C, Wohlgenant MK, Karns SA, Kaufman P. 2011. Habit formation and demand for sugar-sweetened
beverages. Am. J. Agric. Econ. 93(1):175–93
56. Zhong Y, Auchincloss AH, Lee BK, Kanter GP. 2018. The short-term impacts of the Philadelphia bev-
erage tax on beverage consumption. Am. J. Prev. Med. 55:26–34
338 Cawley et al.

NU39_FrontMatter ARI 19 July 2019 10:11
Annual Review of
Nutrition
Contents Volume 39, 2019
Maintaining Balance
Janet C. King p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 1
FADS1 and FADS2 Polymorphisms Modulate Fatty Acid Metabolism
and Dietary Impact on Health
Berthold Koletzko, Eva Reischl, Conny Tanjung, Ines Gonzalez-Casanova,

Usha Ramakrishnan, Suzanne Meldrum, Karen Simmer, Joachim Heinrich,
and Hans Demmelmair p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p21
Dietary Fuels in Athletic Performance
Andreas Mæchel Fritzen, Anne-Marie Lundsgaard, and Bente Kiens p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p45
Copper Transport and Disease: What Can We Learn from Organoids?
Hannah Pierson, Haojun Yang, and Svetlana Lutsenko p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p75
Ocular Carotenoid Status in Health and Disease
Lydia Sauer, Binxing Li, and Paul S. Bernstein p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p95
The Benefits and Risks of Iron Supplementation in Pregnancy
and Childhood
Michael K. Georgieff, Nancy F. Krebs, and Sarah E. Cusick p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 121
The Role of Brain Barriers in Maintaining Brain Vitamin Levels
Kendra A. Tiani, Patrick J. Stover, and Martha S. Field p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 147
Bile Acids as Metabolic Regulators and Nutrient Sensors
John Y.L. Chiang and Jessica M. Ferrell p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 175
Mitochondrial DNA Mutation, Diseases, and Nutrient-Regulated
Mitophagy
Xuan Yang, Ruoyu Zhang, Kiichi Nakahira, and Zhenglong Gu p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 201
Evidence Collection and Evaluation for the Development of Dietary
Guidelines and Public Policy on Nutrition
Dena Zeraatkar, Bradley C. Johnston, and Gordon Guyatt p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 227
Pancreas–Microbiota Cross Talk in Health and Disease
Timon E. Adolph, Lisa Mayr, Felix Grabherr, Julian Schwärzler,
and Herbert Tilg p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 249
vii
NU39_FrontMatter ARI 19 July 2019 10:11
The Microbiota and Malnutrition: Impact of Nutritional Status

During Early Life
Carlos Gómez-Gallego, Izaskun Garcı́a-Mantrana, Cecilia Martı́nez-Costa,
Seppo Salminen, Erika Isolauri, and M. Carmen Collado p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 267
Time-Restricted Eating to Prevent and Manage Chronic Metabolic
Diseases
Amandine Chaix, Emily N.C. Manoogian, Girish C. Melkani,
and Satchidananda Panda p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 291
The Economics of Taxes on Sugar-Sweetened Beverages:
A Review of the Effects on Prices, Sales, Cross-Border Shopping,
and Consumption
John Cawley, Anne Marie Thow, Katherine Wen, and David Frisvold p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 317
Indexes
Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 35–39 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 339

Cumulative Index of Article Titles, Volumes 35–39 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 342
Errata
An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Nutrition articles may be found at
http://www.annualreviews.org/errata/nutr
viii Contents

The Economics of Taxes On Sugar-Sweetened Beverages - A Review of The Effects On Prices, Sales, Cross-Border Shopping, and Consumption

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

The Economics of Taxes On Sugar-Sweetened Beverages - A Review of The Effects On Prices, Sales, Cross-Border Shopping, and Consumption

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

NU39CH14_Cawley ARjats.

cls July 2, 2019 17:45

Annual Review of Nutrition

Shopping, and Consumption

Annu. Rev. Nutr. 2019. 39:317–38 Keywords

2.4. Cross-Price Elasticities of Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323

318 Cawley et al.

www.annualreviews.org • Taxing Sugar-Sweetened Beverages 319

2. THE ECONOMICS OF TAXES ON SSBs

on third parties through consumption or production. The consumption of energy-dense foods

2.2. The Predicted Effects of SSB Taxes on Prices

320 Cawley et al.

www.annualreviews.org • Taxing Sugar-Sweetened Beverages 321

322 Cawley et al.

2.4. Cross-Price Elasticities of Demand

2.5. The Regressivity of SSB Taxes

www.annualreviews.org • Taxing Sugar-Sweetened Beverages 323

95% confidence interval

Average percent of sample

324 Cawley et al.

3. THE ECONOMETRICS OF ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS

Yit = α0 + α1 Postt + α2 Treatedi + α3 Treatedi ∗ Postt + α4 Xit + εit ,

www.annualreviews.org • Taxing Sugar-Sweetened Beverages 325

4. THE ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF TAXES ON SSBs

4.1. Effects on Prices (also known as Pass-Through of the Tax

326 Cawley et al.

www.annualreviews.org • Taxing Sugar-Sweetened Beverages 327

328 Cawley et al.

4.2. Effects on Sales or Purchases

www.annualreviews.org • Taxing Sugar-Sweetened Beverages 329

4.3. Effects on Cross-Border Shopping

330 Cawley et al.

4.4. Effects on Consumption

www.annualreviews.org • Taxing Sugar-Sweetened Beverages 331

frequency for any type of beverage, except regular soda.

4.5. Product Availability

332 Cawley et al.

5. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE DESIGN

6. OVERALL SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH

334 Cawley et al.

7. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

www.annualreviews.org • Taxing Sugar-Sweetened Beverages 335

336 Cawley et al.

www.annualreviews.org • Taxing Sugar-Sweetened Beverages 337

338 Cawley et al.

Contents Volume 39, 2019

Berthold Koletzko, Eva Reischl, Conny Tanjung, Ines Gonzalez-Casanova,

The Microbiota and Malnutrition: Impact of Nutritional Status

Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 35–39 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 339

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen