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Conflict in Syria through the Lens of Historical

Sunni-Shiite Relations
By: Muhamed Jusić (Democracy and Security in Southeastern Europe, Volume: 2, Issue:
10/11, 2012.)

As noted by Oxford University professor of European studies Timothy Garton Ash in insight
published earlier this year by The Guardian, Syria is now the crossroads of global ideological
tensions that pit a Shia, post-revolutionary Iran against a reactionary Saudi Arabia, as well as
a post-imperial Russia against a neo-ottoman Turkey.1
What is currently happening in and around Syria has moved beyond the efforts of its citizens
to free themselves from a despotic regime. Though it began with peaceful protests of citizens
requesting reforms and greater freedoms, violent and brutal attempts to suffocate and form of
opposition to the regime have given rise to a civil war that is slowly transforming into a chess
match of global proportions, in which geostrategic game pieces are increasingly influenced by
new and emerging ideologies along with ancient sectarian and ethnic conflicts.
Along with messages of hope and optimism that this part of the world may finally break the
chains of dictatorial regimes and foreign domination, and much sacrifice in the name of long-
dreamed-for freedoms, the so-called Arabic Spring has also brought many fears of an
uncertain future. One negative consequence of the Arab Spring that threatens to become a
serious problem and a source of new instability in the Muslim world- and not only in the
Middle East- is a renewed politicization of ancient ideological tensions within Islam, between
Sunnism and Shiism. While radical elements from both denominations have been blamed by
some for playing the card of long-held theological hostilities and unhealed wounds, thereby
broadening their own influence and promoting their visions of regional domination; others see
these heightened tensions as a consequence of the collapse of Arab nationalism, bringing
focus once again to the particular (often tribal) identities of people an the region.
In other to grasp current events in the Arabic world, or even those over the last century, it is
necessary to understand the main schools of Islamic theological thought- both in the modern
era, recognizing the impetus of Islamist movements that are gradually taking power in key
states of the Middle East and Northern Africa, as well as from almost-forgotten historical
events and theological discussions detailed in the dusty pages of abandoned books thought to
be of interest only to students of Islamic sciences or history.
Simply put, most events in this region, in this cradle of civilization burdened with tradition,
are interpreted through the lens of complicated historical and sectarian relations. This can be
seen clearly in the horrific example of events in Syria, where the brutality of a totalitarian
regime against its own people is most often viewed, interpreted, and analyzed exclusively
through the prism of Sunni-Shia relations and where, truthfully, that paradigm has failed to
evolve. Support from majority Shia Iran to the ruling regime, as well as from Turkey and
wealthy Sunni countries in the Gulf to insurgents, is seen in the context of relations between
the ruling Alawite elite and the majority Sunni insurgency. That filter has also led to political
polarization in Bahrain, Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq, with little consideration of where this
could be leading the “Muslim world”.

Roots of division

1
Timothy Garton Ash, „Europe has left Syria to a distinctly Ottoman fate”, The Guardian, April 11, 2012.
In Syria, a conflict that has been smoldering within Islam for centuries has emerged amid a
whirlpool of global ideologies and geostrategic conflicts that in no way help Syrians achieve
their social goals, and which make an already complex situation even more complicated. Of
course, this conflict represents the longest-standing internal strife among Muslims, dating
back to the first centuries of Islam.
The Arabic world sunni comes from the term ahlu-s-sunna wa-l-jama’ah, meaning the
followers of the sunnah (the sayings and actions of Muhammad as recorded in the hadiths),
and Sunnies make up the largest branch of Islam. The world Shiism comes from the Arabic
shi’at’Ali, a term which means the followers of Ali, referring to Muhammad’s son-in-law Ali
ibn Abi Talib. After the Prophet’s death, most of his students chose Abu Bakr as the new ruler
of the Muslim community, making him khalifatul-rasul, the Prophet’s successor. This title is
the origin of the world caliph, which was taken not only by the first four caliphs- known as
the “rightly guided” (Rashidun)- but also by later Islamic rulers of the Umayyad, Abbasi, and
Fatimid dynasties, and even by the Ottomans. But, in what became a crucial turn for Islam, a
number of Muslims felt that Ali should be the Prophet’s successor and, gathering around him,
established the first core of Shiism. Ali himself refused to oppose Abu Bakr and actually
cooperated closely with him as well as with two of his successors, Umar and Usman, until Ali
became the fourth of the “rightly guided” caliphs of Sunni Islam.
It was only after Ali’s death at the hand of a Haruri Kharijite- extremist who refused to accept
either Mu’awiyah, who succeeded Ali, or Ali himself- that Shiism became a religio-political
movement in Iraq. That is at least how this contentious moment in Islamic history was
described by Professor Seyyed Hossein Nasr in his introduction to Islam, simplified for
Western readers, The Heart of Islam.2 And these events are again being discussed all across
the Muslim world, including by Islamist circles in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region, as
indicated by much newly translated literature that reinterprets the prelude to the great Islamic
schism from the perspectives of extreme Shiism or Sunnism.

Surplus of history
The example of Syria clearly demonstrates the danger of conflicting identities and the
politicization of a “surplus of history”- abundant in all societies, including ours in the
Balkans. Even a glance at the history of relations among ethnic and religious groups in Syria
will reveal their great complexity and, in that, much opportunity for their manipulation, as is
the case with Sunni-Shiite relation: a quality mechanism must be found so that they are no
longer for new antagonisms.
But here we are, in a position in which the brutality of totalitarian regime against their own
people is increasingly examined through the lens of Sunni-Shiite relations. Online Arab
forums, where Arabs from around the world exchange information and comment on this
“Arab issue” of historical importance, strongly reflect this paradigm. Over time, discourse on
the aggression in Syria has seen Muslims from Syria and beyond move from mobilizing
against the regime of Bashar al-Assad based on calls to stand against a dictatorship that does
not insure freedoms, rights, and prosperity to its people toward calls to correct “historical
injustices” committed against religious communities and to settle unresolved conflicts in
Sunni-Shiite relations. It is interesting how, especially in conservative and radical circles of
Sunni ulema, positions on the alleged heresy of Shiite teachings and of its Alawite branch
have become the main argument justifying the fight against the regime, not the regime’s
brutality. This shift of focus- from fighting a regime consisting not only of Alawites, but also
of numerous Arab Sunnis and Christians- to a sectarian conflict, can be used to motivate
ideological indoctrination and radicalization far from Syrian borders.

2
Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Srce islama (Sarajevo, El-Kalem, 2002) 96-97.
Alawites or Nusayris
Although it is easy to get trapped by acceptance of the paradigm of Sunni-Shiite conflict in
Syria today, historical analysis of relations between Alawites, who are thought to have Shiite
roots, and Syrian Sunnis reveals that the problem is more convoluted the just a theological, or
even sectarian, dispute. First, it should be noted, when viewing events in Syria through the
lens of Sunni-Shiia relations, and more precisely when analyzing the Al-Assad family, which
belongs to the Alawite sect, that they are not Alawites from Turkey, and in spite of some
similarities, they do not belong to the same religious order. Alawites in Syria are members of
sect long known in Sunni literature as Nusayris- a mystical religious group consider to be
followers of Shia Islam.
Much classical Islamic literature refers to Nusayris, a name applied to followers of ninth
century imam Abu Shu’ayb Muhammad ibn Nusayr, who is believed by historians of this
order to have taught with the last three imams acknowledged by most Shiites as successors
and scions to the Prophet of Islam.3 Modern followers of the order do not accept the name
Nusayris and consider it insulting; instead, they refer to themselves as Alawites, and claim
that the name reflects their commitment to Ali- the first imam according to Shia teaching, and
the fourth rightly guided caliph according to Sunni tradition. But it was only in September
1920 that the term “Alawi” became official, when the French introduced the name for this
specific group of Syrians under the mandate of the French occupation force.4
According to Nasr, the sect is pre-Islamic and has roots in Gnosticism and in the religions of
Babylon. It survived as a Shia school, and during the last few decades, has strove for more
legitimacy within the Shia community.5 Although history has been marked by long period of
interaction, or at least tolerance, between Nusayris/ Alawites and other Islamic
denominations, periods of conflicts, oppression, and persecution have also been common.
Under Ottoman administration, Nusayris often led riots that were broken up by force. The fall
of the Ottoman Empire, which significantly contributed to rise of Syrian Alawites, was
followed by a period of French occupation. After World War I and their experience with
colonial administration in Algeria and Tunisia, the French wanted to prevent the rise of Sunni
Arab nationalism, which had proven to be the biggest obstacle to colonial domination, so,
they gave the Alawites full autonomy in Latakia and the Druze full autonomy in Jabal al-
Druze- where this second Shiite sect was the majority- in order to separate them both from
Sunni Arabs in Damascus and thereby strengthen French authority in the occupied state.
Additionally, in the first years of the French occupation, Alawite leader Saleh al-Ali led a
brutal resistance against French colonizers, who barely managed to hold their ground. This
experience gave the French a special reason for meeting the demands of Alawites, to prevent
them from revolting again.6
Until this period, the Alawite population in Latakia had lived primarily in rural areas, in an
almost serf-like position relative to mostly Sunni landowners; then, the French moved to
protect their interests. Under French administration, Alawites, Druzes, and other minorities
paid smaller taxes then the majority Sunni population, and received more assistance for
development projects, creating additional tensions between Sunnis and Alawites. Further,
these minority groups, along with Kurds and Circassians, were recruited in large numbers into
French Special Forces known as Troupes Speciales du Levant or Army of the Levant.7 This
further shaped the image of the Alawites as allies of the occupiers and therefore as the
enemies of Islam and Arabs, but it also made military services one of the best prospective
3
Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th ed., s.v. “Nosairis”
4
James Minahan, Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations: Ethnic and National Groups Around the World
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002) 79.
5
Nasr, Srce islama, 111.
6
Matti Moosa, Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects (Syracuse University Press, 1987) 282-282.
7
Robert D. Kaplan, “Syria: Identity Crisis”, The Atlantic, February 1993.
professions for many poor, young Alawite peasants, which would enable their future influence
on Syrian society. For, after liberation from colonization, the army played a key role and
organized frequent military coups, as Robert Kaplan outlined in a 1993 article in The Atlantic
entitled “Syria: Identity Crisis”. 8
At the same time that the colonial administration was buoying prospects for Syrian minorities,
they did everything they could to keep Sunni Arabs besieged.
Damascus was treated as an occupied territory and the French had a strong military presence
there, made up of occupation forces that mostly consisted of Senegalese troops alongside
Alawite and Druze units. But the dream of many Alawite that an independent Alawite state
would be established was dashed on February 28, 1937, when the autonomous province of
Latakia was re-incorporated into what would eventually become a new Syria. When Syrians
finally won their independence after World War II, suffering great sacrifice, Alawites became
the symbol to many Sunnis of the occupiers, and were seen as traitors to their own people.
In 1939, a part of northwest Syria known at the time as the Sanjak of Alexandretta (present-
day Hatay) was given by France to Turkey in response to a plebiscite conducted in the
province under the supervision of the League of Nations. Alawites had made up a significant
number of the population in the region and Alawite nationalists still claim that Turkey
expelled both Arab Alawites and Armenians who were living there in the year before the
plebiscite. This anti-Turkey sentiment is still at the forefront of Alawite collective memory
and influences current relations between Alawite –ruled Syria and Turkey. And in that context,
it is notable, too, that Zaki el-Arsuzi, a young Alawite leader from Sanjak of Alexandretta led
the resistance against Turkish annexation and leter became one of the founding members of
the Baath Party that still leads Syria now.

After independence
Syria officially gained independence on April 17, 1946, but the country faced instability as
significant power struggles led to multiple military coups. Following the Arab-Israeli War in
1948, a series of coup d`etats, and the rise to power of the Baath Party in 1949, Syria and
Egypt united in 1958 to become the United Arab Republic. It was the golden era of pan-
Arabic ideals; but only three years later, Syria left the union after a military coup that
proclaimed Syria independence once again. It was already obvious at this time that the
Alawite community had gained strength in Syria- the domination of Sunni Arab Egypt was
commonly stated as the key reason for Syrian dissatisfaction with the union.
Political instability and frequent military coups continued until a secret cadre, consisting
mostly of dissatisfied Alawite officers and including Hafez al-Assad and Salah Jadid, brought
the Baathists back to power. Gradually, this group of officers took control of the ruling party.
In 1966, Alawite officers and their allies, finally dismissed all the old Baath Party members,
who had followed ideas of Baath Party founders Arab Christian Michel Aflaq and Syrian
Sunni politician Salah al-Din al-Bitar. The new leadership dismissed these ideologists and
instead looked to Syrian philosopher and Arab nationalist Zaki al-Arsuzi as the ideological
father of a new and reformed Baath Party.9 This enabled the Alawite cadre to disguise their
military dictatorship under the cloak of political and social forces that have driven main
decision makers in Syria and justified rule with a firm hand to this day. This model was
formally shaped when Alawite Air Force General Hafez al-Assad, the father of current Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad, was brought to power in 1970.

Massacre in Hama

8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
Majority Sunni Arabs were again embittered by another bloodied page in the history of
sectarian relations, written in the town of Hama. This town was a historically important
foothold of Arab Sunnis and was therefore not an unexpected seat of resistance to Alawite
domination. In fact, a riot in Hama in 1964 had almost managed to remove the ruling
Baathists, including highly positioned Alawites. Finally, in February of 1982, the Sunni Arab
Muslim Brotherhood took control of the town and liquidated any officials brought to power
by the Alawite regime.
Sunni insurgents had previously attacked Alawite soldiers in Aleppo in response to brutalites
of the regime that had already begun to reveal the oppressive methods of rule we see coming
to culmination today. At that time, in the late 1970s, Sunni resistance increased with Assad`s
support to Maronite Christian militants in Lebanon, seen by Syrian Sunnis as further proof of
an Alawite- Christian conspiracy against them. Assad answer Sunni resistance by sending
12,000 Alawite solders to Hama; they massacred 30,000 Sunni civilians by some estimates,
and razed the entire town in a “scorched earth” operation.10 Decades after independence,
events in Hama in 1982 made it clear that behind the mask of stable Assad government boiled
tensions that kept Syria from moving any closer to national unity then when the Turks and
French had left.
These days, unfortunately, old, unhealed wounds are bleeding again in Syria, and have
dragged this beautiful country into the horrors of civil war; the price for which will be paid by
innocent civilians. Hasty transformation of the conflict into one of Sunni-Shiite opposition
could also have unseen consequences in Muslim communities around the world and could
have destabilizing effect in societies and countries far outside Syria.

10
Ibid.

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