The European Union As A Power

4.
The European Union as a Power
International Relations and the European

Union (3rd edn)
Christopher Hill, Michael Smith, and Sophie
Vanhoonacker
Publisher: Oxford University Press Print Publication Date: May 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198737322 Published online: Sep 2017
DOI: 10.1093/hepl/
9780198737322.001.0001
4. The European Union as a Power
Chapter: (p. 73) 4. The European Union as a Power
Author(s): Filippo Andreatta and Lorenzo Zambernardi
DOI: 10.1093/hepl/9780198737322.003.0004
The elusive concept of power

Destructive power: realist theories
Productive power: liberal theories
Integrative power: the social construction of Europe
Europe’s power in world politics
Conclusion
NOTES
FURTHER READING
WEB LINKS
Summary
Page 1 of 23
This chapter considers the European Union (EU) as a ‘power’ on the

world stage. Speaking of the EU in these terms may seem like an
oxymoron. Indeed European integration, among other things, was
meant to overcome violent interstate competition and power politics
on the Old Continent. In addition, the persistent inability to develop a
truly common foreign and security policy (or the purposive choice not
to) may raise serious doubts about the idea of the EU as a major
‘power’. However, the concept and reality of power should not be
confused with the threat or the use of coercive force alone. This
chapter suggests that the power to ‘produce’ and the power to
‘integrate’ are at least as important. Finally, the EU’s international
relations consist of more than the EU’s foreign policy. While the latter
is still at best a precarious process of coordination of member states’
national policies, the EU plays a significant role not only in economic
and financial matters, but also in the security area. As we show in this
chapter, though much is still lacking in terms of the EU as a ‘power’,
much has been achieved, even if it is likely to remain precarious in
the future.
(p. 74) The elusive concept of power
The issue of the ‘power’ of the EU is clearly puzzling. On the one

hand, its member states collectively wield significant military and
economic power. Europe as a whole is the largest producer and trader in
the world, and its aggregate defence expenditures are second only to
those of the USA, with China as a distant third. On the other hand,
Europe has been recently associated with ideas of stagnation and decline,
especially since the financial crisis, while its limits in influencing events
in its neighbourhood, especially with reference to terrorism and
migration, are increasingly clear. The recent referendum in the UK, which
resulted in the decision to leave the EU, has even led to speculation about
Europe’s ‘disintegration’. The main argument of this chapter is that the
puzzle concerning ‘the EU as a power’ lies in the elusive nature of power.
Indeed, depending on the type and definition of power taken into
consideration, there are different, opposing answers to the question of
how much ‘power’ Europe exerts on the international stage.
The role of power is central to politics. As Bertrand Russell (2004, 4)

famously maintained: ‘The fundamental concept in social science is
Power, in the same sense in which Energy is the fundamental concept in
physics’. As a matter of fact, one of the most important questions in
politics is who governs (Dahl 1961), i.e. who holds and exercises political
power. Although politics is far from being exclusively about power
(Baldwin 2013), one may argue that in a sense all politics is power politics
since the former always involves power. Yet the definition of power, and
even more its measurement, remains elusive. Robert Gilpin describes the
concept of power as ‘one of the most troublesome in the field of
international relations’ (1981: 13). Likewise, after noticing that in
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political discussion ‘no word is employed so frequently, and so glibly’,

Evan Luard (1988, 1) rightly noted that ‘few words are used so
imprecisely’ as ‘power’.
As Raymond Aron (1966) argued, the difficulty in defining this key

concept makes it difficult to apply economic modelling to the study of
politics, a difference that points also to the inevitable epistemological gap
between political science and economics. Whereas the main currency in
economics—money—is highly fungible and can satisfy different kinds of
motivation (e.g. egoistic or altruistic), the main currency of politics—
power—changes between one motivation and another (Deutsch 1968). In
other words, while economists can safely assume that most actors seek to
maximize their utility, defined in monetary terms, the same is not
applicable to politics. Indeed, the accumulation of power is not per se
sufficient to derive human behaviour unless we specify actors’
motivations and objectives. Being a loved leader or a feared one, for
example, requires very different skills and resources. Moreover, the
requirements for achieving one goal may be counterproductive for the
pursuit of another. Whereas economics, despite continuous debate and
disaccord on many important theoretical and empirical issues, has
developed a broad consensus on central assumptions concerning how
markets work, different views on the ultimate motivations of (p. 75)
human behaviour explain why in political science opposing paradigms
with different philosophical assumptions about the nature of power
survive and are likely to coexist in the future.
Over the past decades, two key ideas have been developed on the nature
of power. First, it has been argued that power has an intrinsically social
and relational nature (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950, 75), in the sense that
you need others over whom to exercise it. Max Weber’s classic definition
of power (1947, 152) as the ‘probability that one actor within a social
relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite
resistance’ captures this relational aspect. Following Robert Dahl’s
insight (1957), power is the notion of A causing B to do something that B
otherwise would not have done. Thus, being all-powerful without any
constraining actor, like a lonely castaway on a deserted island, means
actually to be powerless, since there is no one on whom to exercise that
power. A power relationship is born only when that castaway meets
another and, following Simmel (1902), even more so when they both
encounter a third person. This implies that whereas wealth can be
measured in absolute terms against the price of goods, power can only be
measured in relative terms against someone else’s power. For example,
having 100 divisions does not say much about a state’s military power
unless we gauge those units against someone else’s. As a matter of fact,
100 divisions amount to much power if others have only 10 divisions,
whereas they imply weakness if others have 1,000.
Second, since power is not always fungible, its nature and value are
contextual. Accordingly, in order to measure power we need at least to
specify its scope (i.e. the topic in question) and domain (i.e. the actors
Page 3 of 23


whose behaviour is meant to be affected). On this crucial aspect, as shall

later be seen, different traditions in international relations’ theory have
radically diverging views. This chapter will follow Kenneth Boulding’s
(1989) distinction between ‘destructive’ (i.e. the power to destroy),
‘productive’ (i.e. the power to make and create), and ‘integrative’ power
(the power to create relationship and bring actors together) and will
connect them to the three main paradigms of the discipline: realism,
liberalism, and constructivism, respectively. For realists, who view
international politics as an interstate competition for security, the scope is
chiefly military and the domain is represented by other states. In other
words, the most important aspect of power is the ability to coerce and to
resist others’ attempts at coercion. For liberals, who see international
politics as the arena in which governments act on behalf of a coalition of
domestic groups and social actors, the main scope is economic and the
domain is the transnational and intergovernmental processes on which
the pursuit of economic and societal goals depends. In this view, power
means chiefly the ability positively to influence the external environment,
transnational processes, and the willingness by other actors to cooperate
in one’s favour. For constructivists, who mainly focus on ideational
variables, the intersubjective construction of social reality is what really
matters. Power therefore means the ability to construct through practice
and by persuasion particular normative frameworks and meanings at the
social level and to change actors’ identities and interests accordingly.
(p. 76)Before dealing with more substantive policy issues, this chapter
will review these three main approaches. Much of the discussion will be
devoted to the role of different conceptions of power in explaining the
origins and dynamics of European integration, with special attention to
the foreign policy and defence field. The rationale behind such a focus is
that only successful integration will allow European states to use their
resources more efficiently and coherently, thereby enhancing European
‘power’ on the international stage, whereas the failure to develop
common positions and instruments equates to European weakness. As a
matter of fact, EU member states, Germany included, no longer have the
critical mass to influence global events alone. Finally, the section on
‘Europe’s power in world politics’ will concentrate on the assessment of
European power in the contemporary international system.
Destructive power: realist theories
State-centric views of international politics emphasize the

coercive nature of power. States claim, as Weber (2004) maintained in his
famous lecture ‘Politics as a Vocation’, ‘the monopoly of the legitimate use
of physical force within a given territory’. Their chief purpose is to
protect their own independence and provide security to the population.
The search for military power and the ability to defend oneself from other
states are in this view the primary aims of foreign policy, and a
prerequisite for any other additional goal. ‘High politics’, intended as the
questions tied to the survival of the polity, takes precedence over other
Page 4 of 23


‘low politics’ issues. However, a state’s attempt to acquire security by

accumulating military capabilities may lead others to fear the other’s
might, leading to a vicious circle of mistrust and insecurity through a
mechanism known as the ‘security dilemma’ (Herz 1950). In other words,
conflict may occur in a system of security-seeking states even if no one
desires it. Hence, international politics takes place in the ‘shadow of
war’ (Aron 1966, 6).
Realists believe that anarchy is the primary determinant of international

politics, and that there can be no permanent peace without a world state
(Morgenthau 1973). However, they are sceptical about the possibility of
establishing a world government in the near future. Thus, in the absence
of a supranational government, states are responsible for their own
security and forced to increase their capabilities in order to deter
potential enemies. This leads to reciprocal suspicions which hinder
cooperation (Waltz 1979, 105–112). Sometimes states are forced to
cooperate before an imminent common threat, but usually this type of
collaboration takes the form of a temporary alliance, which tends to end
as soon as the threat which gave rise to it disappears. This is the main
reason why realists are generally pessimistic about the prospects for true
integration in the sensitive area of security, predicting that states will be
unwilling to permanently forfeit their freedom of action in military affairs.
As Mearsheimer argues (1994–5, 10), ‘the most basic motive driving
states is survival. States want to maintain their sovereignty’.
Realists also tend to dismiss the utility of integration short of

(p. 77)
creating a truly federal state, since sovereignty in the military sphere is

indivisible. Despite the locking-in function of some international
institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), if
independent states simply commit to cooperate in security affairs, but
maintain independence in their political decision-making and autonomous
armed forces, they can simply renege on their pledges at the critical
moment. Moreover, as neorealists maintain (Waltz 1979), even if
integration took place it would not change the basic nature of the
international system, as the fusion of several states into one does not
alter the anarchic relationship between the new unit and all the other
ones which have not participated in the union. When asked to comment
on the future of international politics after the end of the Cold War,
Kenneth Waltz stated that ‘the emerging world will nevertheless be one of
four or five great powers, whether the European one is called Germany or
the United States of Europe’ (Waltz 1993, 70). In a 2000 article, Waltz
suggests that Europe will not become a great power ‘in the absence of
radical change’ (essentially Europe becoming a state). He is dubious
about the prospects of this outcome and, therefore, predicts that a
European great power is unlikely to emerge (Waltz 2000, 31–2, cf. also
Gordon 1997, 81 and Zielonka 1998a).
Yet the persistence of European integration and the attempts to build a

‘European’ foreign policy have somehow forced realists to give an
explanation of these phenomena, even at the cost of adapting their
Page 5 of 23


theories. As justly noted by Joseph Grieco ‘the interest displayed by the

European countries in the EU creates a problem for realist
theory’ (Grieco 1997, 184; see also Wayman and Diehl 1994, 17). Some
realists have therefore tackled the empirical puzzle of European
integration, advancing two main arguments. First, integration could
emerge because European states no longer have the suitable dimension
to sustain great power status. Minor powers can therefore afford the
luxury of an eccentric policy in the form of integration. According to
Hinsley (1963, 8), European integration was possible only because of
Europe’s decline: ‘The [eventual] success of [European integration] will
have taken place in a changed situation which renders it irrelevant to a
solution of the international problem, and will have taken place because
of that changed situation.’ More recently, and in a similar vein, Robert
Kagan (2003) has argued that Europeans could afford integration as well
as a foreign policy relatively unconcerned with military affairs thanks to
American dominance and willingness to use force to stabilize the
continent and its environment. The alternative would be a process of
progressive isolation from the international system, due to the inadequate
capabilities of individual states to influence global events, like
Switzerland in the 17th century and Holland and Sweden in the 18th
century, when they abandoned power politics and chose neutrality since
they did not have the will and resources necessary for great power status.
The second realist argument for European integration stresses that this
enhanced form of cooperation, more lasting and far reaching than a
traditional alliance, would be due to a threat which European states feel
unable to tackle on their own. European integration can therefore only
result, especially in the foreign policy field, if the (p. 78) structural
conditions of the external environment dictate it. On this matter, realists
have advanced three possible threats which may have helped to foster
closer collaboration.
The first and most obvious one is the Soviet menace during the Cold War.
For example, Sebastian Rosato (2011, 46–7) suggests that
institutions largely reflect the distribution of power. States

confronting a common, powerful adversary can cooperate or
integrate. If their opponent is a great power and they are also great
powers, then they cooperate—they pool their assets and coordinate
their policies. But if their opponent is a great power and they are
minor powers, then they realize that they must organize their
efforts as efficiently as possible, and they consider integration. This
is not a welcome prospect, because it involves surrendering
sovereignty. But if they cannot devise an alternative strategy that
does not impinge on their sovereignty, they grudgingly accept
integration.
Page 6 of 23


In this case, the waning of the Soviet threat removes the main motive of
integration, and the expectation is that an effective European foreign
policy will not be pursued in the current international environment. In
John Mearsheimer’s (1990, 46) bleak view, even the established
achievements of integration may be subject to revision:
Without the Soviet threat […], Western European states will do

what they did for centuries before the onset of the Cold War, look
upon one another with suspicion. […] Cooperation in this new order
will be more difficult than it was during the Cold War. Conflict will
be more likely.
Second, a completely different cause refers to the attempts to increase

integration in foreign and defence policy after the Cold War, as a way to
balance American unipolarity after the end of the bipolar confrontation.
For example, Posen (2006) argues that the main motive behind a
European foreign policy might be the belief that the USA will pursue its
unilateral interests now that the Soviet threat is gone. Europeans might
therefore be tempted to influence world events collectively since the
distribution of power has shifted against them. Others maintain that
closer European cooperation, and a more independent foreign policy with
ties to other powers like Russia and China, could be the result of ‘soft’
balancing aiming to curb American tendencies to unilateralism (Paul
2005). Stephen Walt (2005) cites the alignment of Germany and France
with Russia against the American attack on Iraq in 2003 as an example of
this tendency. Adrian Hyde-Price (2006, 229) suggests that
from a European perspective […] unipolarity seemed to make US

foreign policy more unreliable and capricious, if not arbitrary and
high-handed. America appeared to be indifferent to some threats
(such as those in the Balkans) while pursuing ‘fancies abroad’ (in
Cuba, Iraq and Iran). In particular, [Europeans] needed the option
of addressing regional crises in their ‘backyard’ on their own terms
and with their own resources.
(p. 79) Third, other realist theories point to international relations within
Western Europe itself. In particular, Joseph Grieco, elaborating on an

earlier insight by Hans Morgenthau (1973, 509), suggests that European
integration could be the result of the attempts of other member states to
constrain Germany, especially after it has emerged potentially stronger
after unification. According to Grieco (1995, 34 see also 1996),
if states share a common interest and undertake negotiations on

rules constituting a collaborative arrangement, then the weaker but
still influential partners will seek to ensure that the rules so
constructed will provide sufficient opportunities for them to voice
Page 7 of 23


their concerns and interests and thereby prevent or at least

ameliorate their domination by stronger partners.
One might therefore expect a leap forward toward a common foreign

policy after German unification, as indeed happened, but with only
temporary impetus. Robert Art agrees that
the desire for security vis-à-vis one another has played a role in the
Western European states’ second great push for closer union in the
1990s, just as it did during their first great push in the late 1940s
and early 1950s.
(Art 1996, 2)
Closer cooperation was therefore possible because ‘if other nations did
not completely trust Germany, neither did Germans completely trust
themselves [and this is why they chose] a strategy of voluntary self-
entanglement’ (ibid., 24). More recently, Seth Jones (2007, 5) has argued
that ‘a unified Germany emerged as a potential regional hegemon. Then,
in the early 1990s, the United States began to rapidly reduce its troop
presence on the continent, raising concerns about its long-term
commitment to European security’. From a rationalist perspective,
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Verdier (2005) suggest that
integration can serve to establish a credible commitment that

removes the risk of future conflict among states of unequal power.
That integration presents an alternative to preventive war as a
means to stop a rising revisionist power from establishing a
regional hegemony. […] European integration since the early 1950s
was conceived as a means of committing a temporarily weak West
Germany not to use its future power to dominate Europe, thereby
obviating a preventive war against her.
Thus, the response of further integration after the Cold War was spurred
by the will to avoid a potentially dangerous security dilemma ignited by
German power in the growing absence of an American reassurance.
More generally, one may argue that for the realist tradition the efforts to
create a common European foreign policy could be conceptualized as a
stronger and more permanent agreement than a traditional alliance as a
response to changed structural conditions. In this light, integration could
represent a more dramatic loss of autonomy justified by an equally
dramatic increase in common capabilities. Given the drastic changes in
Europe’s international position after the Second World War, and (p. 80) in
particular the realization that continental anarchy could have near
suicidal consequences and that European states had no longer the
dimension to compete with the superpowers, the decision to begin
Page 8 of 23


integration appears logical. Where this realization was clearer, such as in

the defeated Axis countries (Italy and Germany), the propensity to
integrate has so far been higher than in the victorious continental powers
—such as France, which had been subject to German occupation but
emerged victorious—and higher still than in the UK, which had not even
been successfully invaded. In sum, from a realist perspective, Europe is
likely to develop common policies and institutions if its security is at stake
and if it can amass in this way the necessary coercive power.
Productive power: liberal theories
Liberals are characteristically more optimistic than realists in

their account of international politics. Security concerns are of course
important, but they do not always dominate decision-making. More
commonly, when the threat of war is not imminent, states pursue
economic welfare at least as much as military power. This is because the
pluralist approach of liberal theories emphasizes the importance of
domestic politics, in which individuals and groups are in general more
interested in their own individual prosperity rather than in the rather
abstract pursuit of power and glory of the state. Especially when
democracies interact with other democracies, governments are largely
concerned with economic growth and the interests and values of domestic
groups (Russett and Oneal 2001). Hence, states tend to cooperate for
producing mutual gain, and diplomacy is geared at providing others with
incentives (positive as well as negative) to collaborate and to desist from
discord. In this perspective, integration may thus result for two main
reasons, which may well reinforce each other. On the one hand,
increasing trade in goods and services increases economic efficiency,
thereby discouraging conflict as argued by the proponents of the
‘commercial’ or ‘capitalist’ peace (Gartzke 2007). On the other hand,
transnational flows, especially since the liberalization of capital controls,
expand in speed and dimension, and require wider political organizations
than traditional national states in order to control, or at least influence,
them. In particular, this was the main argument of the neofunctionalist
school of the 1960s aiming at explaining early efforts at integration (Haas
1958; Nye 1971; Stone Sweet and Sandholz 1997).
From the liberal perspective it is not surprising that international and

even supranational organizations have acquired increasing importance.
The recent growth in transnational flows has created interdependent
modern societies which have altered the traditional conception of
‘national interest’ (Keohane and Nye 1977). In particular, economic
concerns in Western Europe are at least as important as security
considerations, the former having pushed governments to unprecedented
levels of collaboration. The difficulty in controlling transnational
interdependence (p. 81) with the scale of the nation state has even
created an incentive to pool political resources together by building
institutions with a sufficient critical mass to deal with the new issues.
European integration would then be a more advanced regional example of
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this more general process of governance under globalization (Weiss 1999;

Zurn 2000), given Europe’s tighter web of transnational relations and the
relatively small dimensions of its states in comparison, for example, to the
USA. Other regions are likely to follow a similar path (Mansfield and
Milner 1999; Choi and Caporaso 2002).
The emphasis on domestic structures has also produced the so-called

intergovernmentalist school. Building on the model of two-level games
first developed by Robert Putnam (1988; see also Evans, Jacobson and
Putnam 1993, Milner 1997), this tradition envisages a world in which
governments act on two arenas simultaneously: the domestic and the
international. Andrew Moravcsik, who more than any other scholar can
be associated with intergovernmentalism, argues that—on the one hand—
governments negotiate at the supranational level only on those issues
which are favoured by their domestic constituencies. On the other hand,
Moravcsik suggests that:
international negotiations and institutions change the domestic

context in which policy is made by redistributing […] political
resources […]. The reallocation of control over domestic political
resources […] generally favours those who directly oversee national
involvement in international negotiations and institutions, generally
executives. […] This shift in domestic power resources feeds back
into international agreements, often facilitating international
cooperation.
(Moravcsik 1998, 3)
In other words, by delegating certain policies to a supranational level,

governments can actually increase, rather than decrease, their power
because they gain extra resources against their domestic adversaries as
well as a valid justification in terms of the need to respect an external
obligation. Integration would therefore be a process under strict
governmental planning, and proceeds only when governments judge it in
their interest to resort to supranational strategies and to reinforce their
control over a certain issue as well as enhanced resources for dealing
with the problems at hand. In this view, foreign policy could remain
outside the ‘community’ integrated framework which characterizes
monetary or commercial policy unless national preferences require it.
Conversely, once major commitments are made, they are difficult to back
out of, which makes a genuinely collective foreign policy an important
rubicon to cross.
This line of thought is substantiated by the historical enquiry of Alan

Milward, who has argued that European integration—far from eroding
national sovereignty—has helped to reinforce European states in the
reconstruction era. Regarding the origins of European integration,
Milward (1992; see also 1984) writes that ‘nation-states have played the
dominant role in its formation and retained firm control over their new
Page 10 of 23


creation’. This view reinforces Stanley Hoffmann’s (1966) traditional

judgement that European integration was not a device to overcome
(p. 82) national states, but to make them more viable and ‘obstinate’
instead. In this view, foreign policy has undergone less integration than
other areas, such as monetary or agricultural affairs, because
governments already enjoy a high degree of autonomy in that particular
field, which is inherently elitist.
The institutionalist model has been applied to European common security

policy by Carsten Tams (1999), who argues that European institutions
serve the purpose of ameliorating collective action problems emerging
from cooperation in the military field. In particular, while France and
Germany wish for stronger European institutions because the more
ambitious the project the more acute are the collective action problems,
the UK prefers weaker institutions because it wants a more limited role
for European foreign policy. In general, liberals take the position that
European states freely choose to opt for a common foreign policy, rather
than being forced to integrate by external circumstances. The common
policy is therefore more geared to influence the external environment in a
desired sense rather than to secure Europe itself (a function which is still
largely assigned to NATO or national forces). Domestic preferences and
the particular ‘nature’ of the European polity may also explain the EU
penchant for being a ‘civilian’ rather than military power (Duchêne 1972),
both in terms of objectives aiming at democratization, liberalization, and
the spread of human rights, and in terms of instruments, preferring
diplomatic and economic pressure to the use of force. The democratic
institutions both at the national and at the European level may therefore
produce, in a typically liberal fashion, this particular type of foreign policy
(Sjursen 2011b).
Given their focus on domestic groups and economic capabilities, liberal

theories tend to have a much more optimistic assessment of the success
of European integration. Through common trade and—more recently—
monetary policies, Europe has enjoyed decades of growth which make it
the largest economic area in the world. Andrew Moravcsik (2002, 114),
for example, claims that the establishment of the single market and
currency marked the European Community (EC) as ‘the most ambitious
and most successful example of peaceful international co-operation in
world history’. In turn, this development of ‘market’ power (Damro 2012)
has positive consequences on Europe’s ability to influence the
international system. Richard Rosecrance (1998, 16–19) goes as far as
suggesting that, since economic prosperity attracts neighbours willing to
join the Union or at least to have warm relations with it, Europe might
have a major effect on global politics even without developing a fully-
fledged common foreign policy. Also important is the political use of
economic power (Baldwin 1985), witnessed by the increasing recourse to
joint economic and financial sanctions by the EU, which gives European
foreign policy more clout than acknowledging only the military aspects.
However, these achievements are not a foregone conclusion, especially if
Page 11 of 23


domestic publics change attitudes in a number of key countries. Both

neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism alike acknowledge the fact
that isolationist public opinions in domestic environments could stop, or
even derail, the integration process (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970;
Schmitter 1970).
Integrative power: the social construction

(p. 83)
of Europe
The classical analysis of power inaugurated by Lasswell, Kaplan, and

Dahl, which has informed most realist and liberal accounts, rests
primarily on material variables of a military or economic nature. This
approach has been criticized by Bachrach and Baratz in their classic Two
Faces of Power (1962), in which they emphasize the importance of the
strategic use of agenda setting. Power is not only about having one’s way
on a given issue, whether by coercion or cooperation, but it is also about
being able to preclude the issue from being discussed in the first place. In
International Relations theory, Susan Strange (1988, 25) introduced a
somewhat similar notion with her definition of ‘structural power’ as the
ability ‘to decide how things shall be done [and] to shape frameworks
within which states relate to each other.’ Before Strange developed the
concept of ‘structural power’, Stephen Lukes (1974) had already
introduced the notion of the ‘third face’ of power, emphasizing the
relevant role of ideology, intended as the ability to influence the
substantive beliefs of others in a way compatible with one’s own views (cf.
also Mann 1986, 22–8). This novel perspective, which significantly owes a
debt to the Gramscian conception of hegemony (Cox 1983), highlights the
importance of ideational and axiological considerations. Individuals and
groups may comply with a request not because they pragmatically accept
the advantages it offers or want to avoid the costs they would sustain if
they do not, but because they internalize certain moral expectations and
beliefs about what is considered just and appropriate behaviour.
According to Joseph Nye, the ability to create moral expectations and
norms of behaviour are at the core of ‘soft’ and ‘smart’ power, which can
be just as effective as traditional ‘hard’ power (Nye 2004).
Thanks to these contributions, the mainstream debate between realists

and liberals has over the years been subject to a number of critiques, on
the grounds that it deals with only the superficial layer of social reality. In
particular, in the last two decades a number of alternative approaches
have emerged emphasizing the importance of cognitive and normative
factors in the formulation of foreign policy. First, while the traditional
theories assume the rationality of actors, some middle range approaches
based on the foreign policy analysis tradition employ notions of ‘bounded
rationality’, which take into account the cognitive constraints facing
decision makers. The limited amount of time to gather information, its
possible bias, and the limited capacity to process it, lead to decisions
based on less than full rationality. Second, some scholars question the
ability to observe social events objectively and independently (Wendt
Page 12 of 23


2015), opting for a more ‘reflective’ approach based on the fact that
theories are an inextricable part of social reality. Rather than explaining
international events ‘from the outside’, scholars should focus on the
understanding ‘from the inside’ of the point of view of decision makers,
reconstructing the intersubjective as well as the objective milieu in which
they operate (Hollis and Smith 1991). Both approaches—in short—agree
that the emphasis placed by realists and some liberals on ‘exogenous’
objective interests is misplaced and that it is better to consider (p. 84)
actors’ motives as an ‘endogenous’ variable dependent on certain
cognitive conditions.
These approaches consider European institutions as more than a simple

set of material constraints and opportunities. Three main groups of
theories ascribe importance to the social origins of behaviour, and to the
power of ideational variables (Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 28–36; Adler
2002). First, for the ‘new institutionalist’ school, although states do not
transfer sovereignty to institutions and retain, in theory, ultimate control
over their policies, in practice states tend to conform to the institutional
rules and ‘scripts’ to which they have subscribed (Hall and Taylor 1996).
In particular, states adopt the logic of ‘appropriateness’ according to
which they follow institutional rules, unless this explicitly infringes one of
their vital interests, because they fear being considered untrustworthy or
‘inappropriate’ (March and Olsen 1998). Institutions can therefore
influence decisions by, for example, fostering common platforms which
are then followed by national policies in the absence of better
alternatives. A process of ‘Europeanization’ could follow which, like a
coordinated reflex, could progressively draw national positions closer
(Wong and Hill 2011). Furthermore, policy networks and epistemic
communities can influence decision-making in an institutional context by
producing significant information and knowledge (Haas 1992). Belief
systems can also be viewed from a post-positivist viewpoint as a means of
identifying ‘general lines in a country’s foreign policy’, as for example in
the form of national attitudes and discourses on European integration
(Larsen 1997, 10). On this point, Meyer (2006, 11) finds a certain degree
of convergence among national strategic cultures: ‘normative
convergence in these areas does not mean that national beliefs have
become fully compatible, but only that differences have narrowed’. He
also suggests that such a convergence has moved towards a general
preference for civilian rather than military policy, suggesting the
emergence of a ‘humanitarian power Europe’.
Second, other approaches emphasize the fact that states do not seek only
material objectives, but are also inspired by ideological motivations. Ideas
can in this light be considered as ‘causes’ for international events, like
the Community’s founding fathers’ belief that independent nation states
‘tended inevitably toward conflict; they also divided Europe’s economic
markets into small, inefficient pieces’ (Parsons 2003, 44). At a minimum,
the fact that the EU exists creates pressures to preserve its unity, and
develops a consistent bias toward common, rather than national,
Page 13 of 23


positions. At a maximum, the existence of the EU as an institution which

embodies certain principles—democracy, the rule of law, human rights,
free markets—creates an incentive for states to sustain those same
objectives and constitute a ‘European’ identity. States which are part of
the process become socialized with institutional aims and with those of
other members and try to adapt accordingly (M.E. Smith 2004a).
According to Wayne Sandholtz (1996, 406), institutions ‘allow […]
governments to become intimately acquainted with the goals, aversions,
tastes and domestic constraints of each other’. In other words, identities
and roles are not constant, and can vary in a process in which agents and
structures are indeed ‘mutually constitutive’ (Wendt 1987 (p. 85) ; Risse et
al. 1999; Biersteker 2002; Legro 2009). In time, national loyalties could
even give way to a true European identity (Cederman 2001). On this
point, Ben Tonra (2003, 738) speculates that ‘CFSP [the Common Foreign
and Security Policy] might thus be better understood in terms of identity
creation than as an exclusively rationally-based exercise in national self-
interest’. Risse (2010) argues that the process of building a European
‘identity’ is advancing, whereas Checkel and Katzenstein (2009, 224) are
less optimistic. Integration in foreign and defence policy would be
particularly significant in a process of European ‘nation’ building
(Anderson and Seitz 2006, 24).
Third, norms and conventions can be seen as part of the international

environment facing states. In particular, the presence of a tight network
of rules in Europe can approximate the traditional conception—
introduced by the English school of international relations—of an
international society (Bull 1977; Wight 1991). Unlike in an international
system, in which interactions between states occur in a normative
vacuum, in an international society there are conventions which guide
foreign policy and limit eventual conflict. In this regard, the EU, also due
to its institutions, could be considered as the most developed example of
an international society. An even more ambitious view sees the
international system itself, and its characteristic anarchical condition, as
a ‘social construction’ which can be altered or transformed by finding an
alternative lens through which to conceptualize international relations
(Wendt 1992). Seen in this light, European integration could represent an
experiment in the construction of a different type of international order,
in which conflict is replaced by cooperation, and suspicion by mutual
trust (Wendt 1999, 308). For example, Robert Cooper sees the Treaty of
Rome as the pillar of ‘postmodern Europe’, which is a system that ‘does
not rely on balance; nor does it emphasize sovereignty or the separation
of domestic and foreign affairs. The European Union is a highly developed
system for interference in each other’s domestic affairs, right down to
beer and sausages’ (Cooper 2003, 27). The European model could expand
to other regions either by the force of emulation and attraction or by
selective incentives promoting certain types of behaviour. Whether these
postmodern institutions will be exported beyond European borders is a
Page 14 of 23


crucial empirical and political question, which no one, however, is at the

moment in the position to answer.
The emphasis on ideational factors is also useful to evaluate the ‘internal’

effects of European integration—that is, the influence on the national
foreign policies of member states among one another. From this
perspective, Europe appears as an exemplar of Karl Deutsch’s ‘pluralistic
security community’ (Bellamy 2004), in which there is a ‘real assurance
that the members of that community will not fight each other physically,
but will settle their disputes in some other way’ (Deutsch et al. 1957, 6).
This transactionalist theory assumes that frequent and institutionalized
interactions can change actors’ identities and expectations, leading to a
change in the perception of each other’s role from rivals to partners and
from enemy to friend up to a point where armed conflict is ‘subrationally
unthinkable’ (Mueller 1989, 240). Adler and Barnett (1998, 43) also
suggest that regional organizations function as (p. 86) security
community-building institutions in that they provide ‘sites of socialization
and learning [which] foster the creation of a regional ‘culture’ around
commonly held attributes’. M. Smith (1996b), Rumelili (2007), and
Andreatta and Castelli (2014) find that European integration has allowed
a certain number of conflicts to be sublimated and peacefully resolved.
If the main raison d’être of the European project is to pacify the Old
Continent, and in particular the Franco-German relationship, it follows
that a common European foreign policy would acquire peculiar
characteristics also towards the external environment. In particular,
whereas the liberal tradition has emphasized the idea of a ‘civilian’
power, others have gone further by introducing the idea of a
‘civilizing’ (Linklater 2005), ‘ethical’ (Aggestam 2008), or ‘normative’
power (Manners 2002) or ‘normative’ entity (Parsons 2002). A
prototypical ‘prehistoric’ example would be that of Europe’s sanctions
against South African apartheid, which employed economic means to
further a human rights goal (Holland 1995). More recently, Europe has
consistently acted to promote the abolition of the death penalty, although
on the protection of minority rights its efforts have been less coherent
(Lerch and Schwellnus 2006). Actually, the EU already has defined
specific foreign policy principles, which often inform its actions and
identity. These include
emphasising diplomatic rather than coercive instruments, the

centrality of mediation in conflict resolution, the importance of
long-term economic solutions to political problems, and the need
for indigenous peoples to determine their own fate—all of these in
contradistinction to the norms of superpower politics.
(Hill, 1983: 200)
Page 15 of 23


To assess the role of Europe in the world, this constructivist perspective

stresses not so much ‘what it does or what it says, but what it
is’ (Manners 2002, 252). According to this exemplarist account, Europe
can use its attractiveness in terms of political and economic institutions
or use diplomatic and other ‘normative’ tools to change international
standards and foster behaviour compatible with its own view of the world
shaping others’ ‘conceptions of the normal’. This view is criticized by
those who stress, from a realist (Hyde-Price 2006) or critical (Diez 2013)
point of view, the fact that most ‘powers’ seek to advance their individual
goals by appealing to universal principles, and that Europe is not really
different in this respect from other hegemons who use all tools at their
disposal—including ideational and normative ones—to secure a
favourable environment for themselves. Recent European efforts at
curbing migration and fighting terrorism on the southern shore of the
Mediterranean, irrespective of the destabilizing effects these may have on
the involved countries, may substantiate this critique.
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that Europe has proven to be attractive, at

least for its immediate neighbours. Ginsberg argues that Europe has
‘power’ for simply being present in the calculations of many non-members
for what the EU broadly represents and what the EU can do for their
interests (2001, 274). Europe’s neighbours, far from being threatened by
integration or the extension of its borders, have in general been willing
either to propose their own membership, or to cooperate with the (p. 87)
Union. The entry of new members into the EU has indeed changed the
geopolitical context of the continent and has a profound impact on
political equilibria and outcomes, as it relegates the ‘iron curtain’ to the
past, and ensures the consolidation of transition, so important in order to
avoid other collapses into violence like the one experienced in former
Yugoslavia. Even if it has rarely been conceptualized as such,
enlargement is also a foreign policy action, as it permanently shapes the
international environment (Hill 2002). However, it remains an atypical
tool of foreign policy. Indeed, it reaches its goals through the extension of
the European domestic sphere rather than with traditional foreign policy
instruments.
Europe’s power in world politics
On the eve of the Gulf War in January 1991 the Foreign

Minister of Belgium, Mark Eyskens, famously remarked that Europe was
‘an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm’.1 Implicit in
this assessment of the economic, political, and military weight of the EU
is the idea that no single formulation of power captures its different forms
and modes of operation. Indeed, the question of how much power, if any,
the EU exercises in the international arena depends very much on the
definition of power employed and the issue area taken into consideration.
Those realist accounts focusing on the coercive nature of power are the
most sceptical about the EU as a major power, given both the limits in
European military capabilities and the frequent divisions on foreign policy
Page 16 of 23


issues. Liberal and constructivist accounts are in general (though not

always nor necessarily) more positive in seeing the Union as an influential
international player, given its achievements in the economic and
ideational arenas.
Although there is no such thing as an international hierarchy of power,

but rather a number of hierarchies depending on the diverse scope and
domain taken into account, a few generalizations can be advanced on the
main topic of this chapter. With regard to the EU as a coercive power it
should be noted that while the Union has organized more than 25
missions and operations abroad—a remarkable achievement which could
not be foreseen 20 years ago—it also has not made significant progress
towards the creation of a truly common foreign and security policy. Since
the intergovernmental process is still dominant in these domains,
speaking of a ‘European foreign policy’ is at the moment an exaggeration,
despite the presence of a European spokesperson in the position of the
High Representative. The problem does not only lie in the inability to
mobilize capabilities and resources, but in the fact that on international
affairs there is neither agreement among member states nor
supranational procedures to aggregate the views and interests of its parts
in a single, unified European position. Actually, not only do member states
still conduct their foreign and defence policies in terms of their own
global visions and national interests, but in some occasions they have
been at odds with each other on how to (p. 88) respond to international
crises. In instances such as the wars in Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011,
the EU was spectacularly divided. In foreign policy, the timing of events is
almost always dictated by external actors, and the urgency may leave
little time for compromises and consensus building procedures at the EU
level.
Much more positive is the assessment of the EU’s capability to produce

economic ‘market’ power, despite the recent euro crisis. As a matter of
fact, the EU is more than one among several economic superpowers; it is
the world’s largest economy and exporter. More importantly, the
economic weight of the Union is employed in a variety of international
contexts and organizations, such as in the trade negotiations within the
World Trade Organization, where the international actorness of the EU is
high. For decades the EC effectively co-shaped (with the USA) the global
trade regime. From the creation of the European Custom Union to the
Uruguay Round, Europe succeeded in projecting its policy preferences at
the international level and resisted the demands of liberalization in areas
incompatible with its own domestic preferences, such as in the
agriculture and textile sectors. Hence, it is no exaggeration to say that
trade liberalization from 1958 to 1995 largely reflected European
preferences. It must be noted, however, that today the EU’s power to
influence the process and content of the trade regulatory regime is
partially diminished. Although still a gigantic market and a major trading
bloc, a variety of factors such as the rise of emergent economies, low
growth rates in EU member states, and the judicialization of the world
Page 17 of 23


trade regime have determined a relative decline in the ‘trade power’ of

the Union (De Bièvre and Poletti 2013).
While the ‘trade power’ of the EU may be diminished, recent events show
that the Union is active in exercising forms of economic statecraft—that
is, the use of economic resources as a political instrument (Baldwin
1985). Among the tools of economic statecraft, sanctions appear as one of
the current favourite instruments employed by the Union. Indeed, the EU
is increasingly resorting to restrictive measures to achieve foreign policy
objectives, especially when diplomatic engagement fails and member
states consider the use of force an impracticable option. According to a
recent analysis ‘the EU has 37 sanctions regimes in place—a fivefold
increase when compared to 1991 and more than double the number that
existed in 1999—with a record list of targeted non-state entities and
individuals’ (Portela 2010; Dreyer and Luengo-Cabrera 2015, 9). Thus, the
restrictive measures against Iran, Russia, and Syria are only some of the
latest examples of EU’s reliance on this non-military foreign policy tool.
Although the use of sanctions is becoming more and more frequent, their
effectiveness in achieving ambitious security goals is far from clear. On
the one hand, in cases like Russia and Syria sanctions have had at best a
constraining effect on the target rather than a coercive impact. Indeed
neither Russia nor Syria have fully complied with the requests of the EU
and of the wider international community. Moreover, being rarely
imposed in isolation their specific impact on the target is not always easy
to measure (Giumelli 2013). On the other hand, a few cases show the
importance of the EU as a sanctioning power. For instance, in the case of
Iran not only have restrictive measures negatively affected the (p. 89)
Iranian domestic economy, but those sections of society most affected by
sanctions are also those that have supported the political leadership
favourable to a negotiated international agreement on the nuclear
programme (Bazoobandi 2015). Thus, although it is still unclear when
restrictive measures in trade work, the adoption of sanctions show that
the Union is capable of using economic instruments for political and
security goals.
Still with reference to integrative power, it must be emphasized that the

Second World War marked the passage, at least in Europe, from
international relations based on power politics to an environment where
the use of violence has been removed as the final arbiter among nations.
Although European integration has stopped well short of a federation,
this peacemaking role was the main motive behind the ideas and political
activity of European federalists (Spinelli 1972, 68; see also Lodge 1984,
Pinder 1991, Deudney 1995). The end of the Cold War has brought no
change to this pattern. Although there is no central authority that
monopolizes violence in Europe, states seem to share a common
understanding about the fact that none of them poses a threat to one
another. In so doing, the EU has domesticated anarchy and some of its
traditional perilous effects, such as the arms race, the security dilemma,
and the use of force for interstate competition. Indeed, this major
Page 18 of 23


achievement is now undisputed by generations of European citizens who

have not lived through the world wars and reconstruction periods. The
current scepticism about European integration may be the paradoxical
result of its most important success, which is today taken for granted.
Since the 1970s enlargement has extended the geographical area of the
European security community. By consolidating new democracies both in
Southern and then Eastern Europe, enlargement has also been a major
case of success in stability and democracy promotion abroad. From this
point of view, enlargement has been a powerful instrument of foreign
policy, even if it has had some negative externalities within the Union.
Indeed, enlargement not only extends the borders of the EU’s regional
subsystem, but it changes also the political relations of its members with
the outside world. From this perspective, enlargement expands the
borders of the European security community, and also exercises influence
on its neighbours. Aggressive security competition has been eliminated
within the EU, while the Union has equally become a sort of ‘safe haven’
which enhances the protection of its member states from external threats.
Indeed, despite rising fears over Russian foreign policy, what happened to
Georgia and the Ukraine is unlikely to occur to other former members of
the Soviet Union such as the Baltic countries given their EU status.
However, enlargement as a foreign policy tool may also represent
diminishing returns, at least in the short term. On the one hand, Europe
itself is facing domestic protests over what are deemed to be
unacceptable and uncontrollable levels of migration from its near abroad,
fuelling the appeal of populist and anti-European parties. On the other
hand, Europe has reached what may be its ultimate geopolitical limits—at
least for a generation—as its current neighbours (with few minor
exceptions) are either unwilling or unable to seriously negotiate their
entry into the EU.
(p. 90) Conclusion
On the face of it, European foreign policy has made impressive

progress since its launch at the Cologne Council in June 1999, thanks to
the Saint-Malo Anglo-French summit and the less spectacular but no less
important EU negotiations begun in 1998 under the Austrian Presidency.
Article 42 of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty mentions a common defence
explicitly. There have been a number of Common Security and Defence
Policy (CSDP) missions in Europe’s neighbourhood and beyond, as far as
Congo and the Indian Ocean and deploying around 10,000 military
personnel in total. Some progress has also been made in the crucial area
of defence industry integration. In economic and ideological terms, the
EU is even more of a significant actor on the global stage. Scholars no
longer argue on whether there is a European foreign policy, but rather on
its significance or peculiar characteristics. Yet, these steps have remained
limited and partial. Whatever view is taken, it is clear that a ‘European’
foreign policy still lacks the full menu of options at the disposal of a
traditional ‘great power’. European foreign policy remains a hybrid
Page 19 of 23


system of actions of member states as well as of common institutions, and

of resources for traditional as well innovative types of foreign policy. For
the future, there are two main factors which will determine whether this
ultimately unstable situation will bring about further integration or,
rather, will expose the weaknesses of the European project. An indefinite
continuation of a hybrid institutional arrangement—on the model of a
medieval empire (Zielonka 2006)—is unlikely to be up to the challenges of
the early 21st century. The new challenges and opportunities will test the
member states’ willingness and ability to develop a truly common policy,
at least on the part of a subgroup of them in the form of a Permanent
Structured Cooperation under Article 42/6, as proposed in 2012 by the
Weimar group.
The first challenge to Europe’s coherence is represented by the

international environment, which has radically changed from that of the
Cold War in which the European project began. It pushes the EU to
develop a fuller range of capabilities than in the past. There are two
reasons why Europe is pressured to assume a more traditional role if it
wants to exert influence beyond the continent. On the one hand, Europe’s
atypical policy of enlargement and civilian power could emerge only
because American protection during the Cold War guaranteed continental
security even without a European contribution. As Hedley Bull noted
(1982: 151), the civilian power concept could be described as a
contradiction in terms because ‘the power of influence exerted by the
European Community and other such civilian actors is conditional upon a
strategic environment provided by others’. Where this order is wanting,
as for example in the Middle East or in the Caucasus, more traditional
means—such as the ability to use force—are necessary if one wants to
prevent the gap between capabilities and expectations from widening
(Hill 1998). On the other hand, while Europe’s importance as a strategic
theatre has diminished in recent decades, Europe must now concentrate
on global issues because some of the risks it faces, such as terrorism
(p. 91) or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, originate in
extra-European regions and therefore require a power projection

capability (Piening 1997). The formulation of a European Security
Strategy, extensively revised in 2016 (European Council 2003; European
Union 2016), originated in this context, while the progress of the CSDP
has represented a pragmatic response of European states to new crisis
management needs (Howorth 2007). Collective territorial defence,
however, still heavily relies on NATO.
The limited means that the EU has acquired are still too weak for
missions beyond the (mainly peacekeeping) Petersberg tasks outlined in
the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty, which were conceived of in a more stable
international system. The necessity for increased rationalization and
consolidation at the European level is beyond doubt due to the rising
supply costs of defence technologies and shrinking budgets (which have
diminished by about 10 per cent in the decade since 2005, while the
military expenditures of Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia have more than
Page 20 of 23


doubled over the same period). The prospect otherwise is that of a sum of
Lilliputian national forces in a world of Gullivers, each without the critical
mass to sustain Europe’s ambitions or even to protect its own security in
the long term. European national armed forces, even in the cases of
Britain and France, are no longer able to sustain a full range of
capabilities.2 The current mechanisms are under stress to face up to the
challenges of a resurgent Russian expansionism from the East and the
terrorist threat and migrant crisis arising from the South. When facing a
fast-paced international emergency, the institutional mechanisms are still
too slow and cumbersome when confronted with the policy of a nation
state. Europe therefore faces a choice between on the one hand reverting
to a more traditional sum of ‘renationalized’ foreign (and domestic)
policies, and on the other of proceeding to establish a truly common
mechanism, thus becoming, in Johan Galtung’s phrase (1973; see also
Buchan 1993), a ‘superpower in the making’.
Even after the end of bipolarity, much depends, as during the Cold War,
on the transatlantic relationship. Robert Kagan (2003) predicted that the
differences between the USA and Europe would grow, due to the
weakness of a ‘European’ foreign policy. According to Kagan the USA
would therefore be forced to use its power unilaterally to preserve global
order, while Europe would retrench itself behind its prosperity and
relative security after enlargement. Charles Kupchan (2003a) took the
opposite view, believing that Europe would acquire the instruments of
hard power (which it still lacks), not least because the world was
becoming multipolar, and that the foreign policy of the USA would
become increasingly prone to parochialism, thereby becoming less
attractive in terms of protecting European interests. John Ikenberry
(2002), finally, took a middle position by arguing that—unless the
traditional American multilateralism were abandoned—the transatlantic
relationship and NATO could prosper for some time to come. Europe
would continue its itinerary toward the construction of a common foreign
policy without being affected by—or provoking—sea changes in global
alignments. Yet given the recent instability in its neighbourhood, which
risks spilling over inside Europe, the way ahead will clearly (p. 92) be
influenced by how much stability will be provided to the international
system, and by whom.
The second factor affecting the prospects for a European foreign policy is
internal to the Union. The field of foreign and defence policy cannot avoid
the test of democratic accountability since it ultimately concerns matters
of life and death. If Europe wants to develop a foreign policy based on
both hard as well as soft power, this will intimately be linked to the more
general process of integration, itself under strain as never before, not
least through the decision of Britain, a leading foreign policy player, to
head for the exit door. European institutions cannot in practice withstand
the possibility of armed force being used by common institutions without
full democratic legitimacy, while the EU would be incapable of fighting a
medium or high intensity conflict without control being transferred to the
Page 21 of 23


collective European level. It is difficult to imagine a war being conducted

through the cumbersome decision-making procedures of
intergovernmentalism, with 28 or 27 veto powers. In short, as
Christopher Hill has argued (1993b), only the establishment of a
federation can approximate the foreign policy of a state. In an increasing
number of European countries, populist and anti-integrationist forces are
growing, making this process more difficult, at least in the short term.
Ultimately, however, the power of the EU to guarantee not only the
stability of its external environment but also its own domestic prosperity
will depend on the ability to maintain and enhance its capabilities while at
the same time strengthening its legitimacy against mounting centrifugal
forces. Although the EU has changed considerably since its creation half
a century ago, it is now being forced to face change again, if it does not
want to lose what it has achieved so far.
Further Reading
On the concept of power in general in international relations, see Baldwin
(2013). On Europe’s ‘peculiar’ type of power, see Bull (1982), Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni and Verdier (2005), Manners (2002), and Zielonka (2006).
For critiques of the EU’s view of its own power and potential, see Hyde-
Price (2006), Rosato (2011), and Webber (2016).
Baldwin, D. (2013) Power and International Relations: A Conceptual

Approach (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
Bull, H. (1982) ‘Civilian Power Europe. A Contradiction in Terms?’,

Journal of Common Market Studies 21/2: 149–70.
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. and Verdier, D. (2005) ‘European

(p. 93)
Integration as a Solution to War’, European Journal of International

Relations 11/1: 99–135.
Hyde-Price, A. (2006) ‘ “Normative” Power Europe: a Realist Critique’,

Journal of European Public Policy 13/2: 217–34.
Manners, I. (2002) ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’,

Journal of Common Market Studies, 40/2: 235–58.
Rosato, S. (2011) Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the
European Community (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
Webber, D. (2016) ‘Declining Power Europe: The Evolution of the

European Union’s World Power in the Early 21st Century’, European
Review of International Studies 3/1: 31–52.
Zielonka, J. (2006) Europe as Empire: the Nature of the Enlarged

European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Page 22 of 23


Web Links
There is a wide range of websites with material which is potentially
relevant to the analysis of the EU’s power position in world politics. But
readers will find the following particularly useful:
European Council on Foreign Relations: http://www.ecfr.eu/
Egmont Institute – Belgium’s Royal Institute for International Relations:

http://www.egmontinstitute.be/core/eu-strategy-and-foreign-policy/
European Union External Action Service: https://eeas.europa.eu/

headquarters/headquarters-homepage/82/about-the-european-
external-action-service-eeas_en
European Foreign Policy Unit, the London School of Economics and

Political Science, Department of International Relations: http://
www.lse.ac.uk/internationalRelations/centresandunits/EFPU/
EFPUhome.aspx
European Union Institute for Security Studies: http://

www.iss.europa.eu/
Istituto Affari Internazionali: http://www.iai.it/
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin: https://www.swp-berlin.org/

(p. 94)
Notes:
1 Craig R. Whitney: ‘Gulf Fighting Shatters Europeans’ Fragile Unity’,
New York Times, 25 January 1991.
2 Clara Marina O’Donnell: Time to Bite the Bullet on European Defence,

Centre for European Reform, 1 February 2013.
Page 23 of 23


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4.

The European Union as a Power

International Relations and the European

Publisher: Oxford University Press Print Publication Date: May 2017

4. The European Union as a Power

Chapter: (p. 73) 4. The European Union as a Power

Author(s): Filippo Andreatta and Lorenzo Zambernardi

The elusive concept of power

This chapter considers the European Union (EU) as a ‘power’ on the

(p. 74) The elusive concept of power

The issue of the ‘power’ of the EU is clearly puzzling. On the one

The role of power is central to politics. As Bertrand Russell (2004, 4)

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political discussion ‘no word is employed so frequently, and so glibly’,

As Raymond Aron (1966) argued, the difficulty in defining this key

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whose behaviour is meant to be affected). On this crucial aspect, as shall

Destructive power: realist theories

State-centric views of international politics emphasize the

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Subscriber: Nottingham Trent University; date: 20 January 2020

‘low politics’ issues. However, a state’s attempt to acquire security by

Realists believe that anarchy is the primary determinant of international

Realists also tend to dismiss the utility of integration short of

creating a truly federal state, since sovereignty in the military sphere is

Yet the persistence of European integration and the attempts to build a

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theories. As justly noted by Joseph Grieco ‘the interest displayed by the

institutions largely reflect the distribution of power. States

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Without the Soviet threat […], Western European states will do

Second, a completely different cause refers to the attempts to increase

from a European perspective […] unipolarity seemed to make US

Western Europe itself. In particular, Joseph Grieco, elaborating on an

if states share a common interest and undertake negotiations on

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their concerns and interests and thereby prevent or at least

One might therefore expect a leap forward toward a common foreign

integration can serve to establish a credible commitment that

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integration appears logical. Where this realization was clearer, such as in

Productive power: liberal theories

Liberals are characteristically more optimistic than realists in

From the liberal perspective it is not surprising that international and

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this more general process of governance under globalization (Weiss 1999;

The emphasis on domestic structures has also produced the so-called

international negotiations and institutions change the domestic

In other words, by delegating certain policies to a supranational level,

This line of thought is substantiated by the historical enquiry of Alan

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creation’. This view reinforces Stanley Hoffmann’s (1966) traditional

The institutionalist model has been applied to European common security

Given their focus on domestic groups and economic capabilities, liberal

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