FAUSTO BARREDO V. SEVERINO GARCIA
Such act of the parents of the deceased
AND TIMOTEA ALMARIO
FACTS: There was a collision between a Malate
taxi driven by Fontanilla and a carretela guided
by Dimapilis. As a result of which, 16-yr old
Faustino Garcia, a passenger of the carretela,
died. Fontanilla was convicted in the criminal
action in the CFI of Rizal. The same court also
granted the petition that the right to bring a
separate civil action be reserved. The parents
(respondents herein) of the deceased brought an
action against Fausto Barredo, the sole proprietor
of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Fontanilla.
The CFI awarded damages in favor of herein
respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed such
award but reduced the amount from 2,000 to
1,000. As to Barredo's responsibility, the CA
found that he was careless in employing
Fontanilla who had been caught several times for
violation of the Automobile Law. Herein petitioner
claims that his liability is governed by the RPC
and hence only subsidiary. And since there was
no civil action against Fontanilla, Barredo cannot
be held responsible in this case.
ISSUE: WON plaintiffs may bring a separate civil
action against Barredo, thus making him
primarily and directly responsible under Art. 1903
of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro
Fontanilla.
HELD:
YES. A quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a
separate and distinct legal institution
independent from the civil responsibility arising
from criminal liability. Under Article 1903 of the
Civil Code, an employer is primarily and directly
responsible for the negligent acts of his
employee.
In the case at bar, the driver Fontanilla was not
sued in a civil action either alone or with his
employer. Fontanilla was found guilty of criminal
negligence, so that if he had even sued for for his
civil responsibility arising from the crime, he
would have been held primarily liable for civil
damages and Barredo would have been
subsidiarily liable for the same. But the
respondents herein directly sued Barredo on his
primary responsibility because of his own
presumed negligence under Article 1903-which
he did not overcome.
There were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the
subsidiary one because of the civil liability of
Fontanilla arising from his criminal negligence;
and second, Barredo's primary liability as an
employer under Article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Herein respondents were free to choose which
course to take and they chose the second
1
remedy.
was within their rights.
Judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Elcano vs. Hill
Facts:
Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally for
killing Agapito Elcano. At the time of the
occurrence, Reginald Hill is still a minor and is
already legally married. Reginald is still living and
gets subsistence with his father, Marvin Hill.
Reginald was acquitted on the ground that his
acts were not criminal because of “lack of intent
to kill, coupled with mistakes.
Issues:
WON the present civil action for damages
is already barred by the acquittal of Reginald.
WON Atty. Marvin Hill has a vicarious
liability being the father of a minor child who
committed a delict.
Held:
No. The acquittal of Reginald Hill in the
criminal case has not extinguished his liability for
quasi-delicts, hence the acquittal is not a bar to
the instant action against him. To find the
accused guilty in a criminal case, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is required unlike in civil cases,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient. The
concept of culpa acquiliana includes acts which
are criminal in character or in violation of the
penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. Also,
Art 2177 CC provides that “Responsibility for fault
or negligence is separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. However, plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission.
While it is true that parental authority is
terminated upon emancipation of the child (ART
327CC), and under Art 397, emancipation takes
place by marriage of the minor, such
emancipation is not absolute and full. Reginald
although married, was living with his father and
still dependent from the latter. ART 2180 applies
to Atty. Marvin Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald.

CINCO vs. CANONOY
Facts: A vehicular accident occurred involving
petitioner's automobile, and a jeepney driven by
private respondent Hilot and operated by private
respondents Valeriana and Carlos Pepito.
Petitioner filed a complaint against private
respondents for recovery of damages.
Subsequent thereto, a criminal case was filed
against Hilot, the driver of the jeepney. At the
pre-trial of the civil case, counsel for private
respondents moved to suspend the civil action
pending the final determination of the criminal
suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3(b) of the Rules
of Court, which provides:
“(b) After a criminal action has been
commenced, no civil action arising from the same
offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be
suspended in whatever stage it may be found,
unitl final judgment in the criminal proceeding
has been rendered.”
The City Court ordered the suspension of the civil
case. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari
before the CFI which denied the same.
Issue: Whether or not there can be an
independent civil action for damage to property
during the pendency of the criminal action.
Ruling: Yes, because the nature and character of
petitioner's action is quasi-delictual predicated
principally on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil
Code. Liability being predicted on quasi-delict,
the civil case may proceed as a separate and
independent civil action, as specifically provided
for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
“Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or
2
negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising
from negligence under the Penal code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.”
The civil action refrred to in Secs. 3(a) and
3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which
should be suspended after the criminal action has
been instituted is that arising from the criminal
offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict.
Article 31 of the Civil Code then clearly
assumes relevance when it provides:
“Art. 31. When the civil action is based on
an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.”
For obviously, the jural concept of a quasi-
delict is that of an independent source of
obligation “not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony.”
Therefore, since petitioner's action is
based on quasi-delict, then an independent civil
action can proceed despite a pending criminal
action.
DULAY vs. CA
FACTS:
An altercation between Benigno Torzuela
and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the “Big
Bang sa Alabang,” Alabang Village, Muntinlupa, in
which Torzuela, a security guard in the said
carnival shot and killed Atty. Dulay with a .38
caliber revolver belonging to Torzuela’s security
agency. Petitioner Maria Benita Dulay, widow of
the deceased Atty. Dulay filed an action for
damages against Torzuela and the SAFEGUARD
and/or SUPERGUARD security agency, the said
employer of Torzuela. The said security agency
was impleaded as alternative defendant as they
are the employer of Torzuela. Petitioner Dulay
alleged in her complaint that “the incident
resulting in the death of Atty. Dulay was due to
the concurring negligence of the defendants,
Torzuela’s wanton and reckless discharge of the
firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD
and/or SUPERGUARD1”
The respondent filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that the complaint does not state a
valid cause of action. Also, the SAFEGUARD
claimed that Torzuela’s act of shooting was
beyond the scope of his duties and that since the
alleged act of shooting was committed with
deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor
is governed by the Revised Penal Code2.
SAFEGUARD alleged that the complaint for
damages based on negligence under Article
2176, Civil Code, cannot lie, since the civil liability
under Art. 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses
under Art. 365 of the RPC. The RTC thru Judge
Regino upheld the arguments of the SAFEGUARD,
thus: “without stating the facts showing such
negligence are mere conclusions of law…x x x…
Respondent judge also declared that the
complaint was one for damages founded on
crimes punishable under Art.100 &103, RPC as
distinguished from those arising from quasi-
delict.” The CA affirmed the decision of the lower
court. Hence, the appeal before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: WON, Article 2176 covers only acts of
negligence
RULING:
No.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
Contrary to the theory of SAFEGUARD,
there is no justification for limiting the scope of
Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions
resulting from negligence. “Well-entrenched is
the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only
acts committed with negligence, but also which
are voluntary and intentional3”. Further
“whenever it refers to ‘fault or negligence’,
covers not only acts criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent”4.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The
decision of the CA and the RTC are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE vs. BALLESTEROS
Facts
1 is given to the heirs of the victims by way of
2 indemnity, and not as compensatory damages.
3 As regards moral damages, the amount of
4 psychological pain, damage and injury caused to
3
Carmelo Agliam, his half-brother Eduardo
and Ronnel Tolentino, Vidal Agliam, his brother
Jerry Agliam, Robert Cacal, Raymundo Bangi and
Marcial Barid proceeded to the barangay hall at
Carusipan to attend a dance. The group did not
tarry for long at the dance because they sensed
some hostility from Cesar Galo and his
companions who were giving them dagger looks.
The group had barely left when, within fifty
meters from the dance hall, their owner jeep was
fired upon from the rear. The precipitate attack
upon the jeep left two people dead (Eduardo and
Jerry) and four others injured.
Based upon the affidavits of Carmelo and
Vidal Agliam, warrants for the arrest of
Ballesteros, Galo and Bulusan were issued.
Charged with the crime of double murder with
multiple frustrated murder. The trial court found
the three accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, as
charged, defined and penalized under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue
WON the trial court is correct in the award
of damages to the heirs of the victims?
Held
The trial court was also correct in the
award of damages to the heirs of the victims.
Damages may be defined as the pecuniary
compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an
injury sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the
pecuniary consequences which the law imposes
for the breach of some duty or the violation of
some right. Actual or compensatory damages are
those awarded in satisfaction of, or in
recompense for, loss or injury sustained, whereas
moral damages may be invoked when the
complainant has experienced mental anguish,
serious anxiety, physical suffering, moral shock
and so forth, and had furthermore shown that
these were the proximate result of the offender's
wrongful act or omission. In granting actual or
compensatory damages, the party making a
claim for such must present the best evidence
available, viz., receipts, vouchers, and the like, as
corroborated by his testimony. Here, the claim for
actual damages by the heirs of the victims is not
controverted, the same having been fully
substantiated by receipts accumulated by them
and presented to the court. Therefore, the award
of actual damages is proper. However, the order
granting compensatory damages to the heirs of
Jerry Agliam and Eduardo Tolentino Sr. must be
amended. Consistent with the policy of this Court,
the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
the heirs of the victims, although inestimable,
may be determined by the trial court in its
discretion. Hence, we see no reason to disturb its
findings as to this matter.
CUSTODIO vs CA
Facts: Mabasa bought a parcel of land with an
apartment in Interior P. Burgos St., Tagig, Metro
Manila. There were tenants occupying the
apartment at the time of purchase. Taking P.
Burgos St. as the point of reference, on the left
side going to Mabasa’s apartment, the row of
houses are as follows: That of Custodio, then of
Santos, then that of Mabasa. On the right side is
that of Morato and a septic tank. The first
passageway from the apartment to P. Burgos St.
is through these houses. The second passageway
goes through the septic tank, with a width of less
than 1 meter. Sometime later, one of the
apartment’s tenants vacated it. Mabasa checked
the premises and saw that the Santoses built an
adobe fence, making the first passageway
narrower. Morato also built an adobe fence in
such a way that the entire passageway was
enclosed. Then the remaining tenants vacated
the area. Santos claimed that she built the fence
because of an incident involving her daughter
and a passing bicycle. She also mentioned that
some drunk tenants would bang their doors and
windows. The RTC granted a right of way and
damages in favor of Custodio and the Santoses.
The CA modified it, ordering an award of
damages to Mabasa. Custodio questioned the
right of way and award of damages in the SC.
Issue: WON the award of damages is proper
Held: Firstly, the Custodios are barred from
questioning the grant of the right of way, because
they failed to appeal the decision. The decision
has become final. As to the award of damages,
the CA erred in awarding damages in favor of
private respondents (Mabasa). The mere fact that
Mabasa suffered losses does not give rise to a
right to recover damages. To warrant the
recovery of damages, there must be both a right
of action for a legal wrong inflicted by Custodio,
and damage resulting to Mabasa. Wrong without
damage, or damage without wrong does not
constitute a cause of action, since damages are
merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury
caused by a breach or wrong. In the case at bar,
there were no previous easements existing in
favor of Mabasa. The construction of the adobe
fence is a natural use and enjoyment of one’s
property in a general and ordinary manner.
4
Nobody can complain of being injured here,
because the inconvenience arising from said use
can be considered as a mere consequence of
community life.
Board of liquidators vs. heirs of Kalaw
Facts: Maximo Kalaw was a general manager and
board of chairman of NACOCO (National Coconut
Corp.) Defendant Juan Bocar and Garcia were
menebers of Board. After the passage of RA 5
which empowers NACOCO to buy, sell, barter,
export their products, NACOCO embarked on
Copra trading Activities. Contracts were executed
by Kalaw. However due to typhoons, copra
industry was affected, causing impending
financial loss on the contracts executed by Kalaw.
A meeting was held with the board of directors
and the disclosure od the impending loss was
communicated to the members. Although no
action were taken afterwards.
Some of the buyer like nLouis Dreyful and
Co. sue the Corporation for damages due to
undelivered copra. Settlement was made with the
buyer. NACOCO on the other hand seeks recovery
from gen. manager Kalaw and its director.
Charging them with negligence under Art 2176
with bad faith or breach of trust for having
approved the contracts.
HELD:
Kalaw had authority to execute the contracts
without need of prior approval due to the nature
of his position as general manager. Also, doubts
were only thrown when the contracts turned out
to be unprofitable for NACOCO.
Rightfully had it been said that bad faith does not
simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means
breach of a known duty thru some motive or
interest or ill will; it partakes of the nature of
fraud.34 Applying this precept to the given facts
herein, we find that there was no "dishonest
purpose," or "some moral obliquity," or
"conscious doing of wrong," or "breach of a
known duty," or "Some motive or interest or ill
will" that "partakes of the nature of fraud."
Nor was it even intimated here that the NACOCO
directors acted for personal reasons, or to serve
their own private interests, or to pocket money at
the expense of the corporation.
As the trial court correctly observed, this is a case
of damnum absque injuria. Conjunction of
damage and wrong is here absent. There cannot
be an actionable wrong if either one or the other
is wanting. 43
GARCIA vs. FLORIDO
Facts: Petitioners hired and boarded a PU car
owned and operated by respondent, Marcelino
Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo
Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to
Zamboanga City. While the PU car was
negotiating a slight curve on the national
highway said car collided with an oncoming
passenger bus owned and operated by the
Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant,
Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid
collision, petitioners sustained various physical
injuries which necessitated their medical
treatment and hospitalization.
Petitioners filed for damages against the
private respondents, owners and drivers,
respectively, of the PU car and the passenger
bus.
Marcelino Inesin and Ricardo Vayson filed
their answer admitting the contract of carriage
with petitioners but alleged, by way of defense,
that the accident was due to the negligence and
reckless imprudence of the bus driver.
Respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and
Pedro Tumala, filed a motion to dismiss. The
principal argument advanced in said motion to
dismiss was that the petitioners had no cause of
action for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days before
the filing of the present action for damages,
respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in a
criminal case already. in a complaint filed by the
Chief of Police for "double serious and less
serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence," and that, with the filing of the
aforesaid criminal case, thus no civil action could
be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal
case has been finally adjudicated. tTherefore, the
filing of the instant civil action is premature,
because the liability of the employer is merely
5
subsidiary and does not arise until after final
judgment has been rendered finding the driver,
Pedro Tumala, guilty of negligence.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners may
recover damages under a separate and
independent action while a criminal case is
pending.
Ruling: Yes. Petitioners may recover damages for
liability arising from quasi-delict. From a careful
consideration of the allegations contained in the
complaint in Civil Case No. 2850, the essential
averments for a quasidelictual action under
Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are
present, namely: a) act or omission of the private
respondents; b) presence of fault or negligence or
the lack of due care in the operation of the
passenger Bus No. 25 by Tumala resulting in the
collision of the bus with the passenger car; c)
physical injuries and other damages sustained by
petitioners as a result of the collision, d)
existence of direct causal connection between
the damage or prejudice and the fault or
negligence of private respondents; and e) the
absence of preexisting contractual relations
between the parties. Under Sec. 2 in relation to
Sec. I of Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court, in
the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and
2177 of the Civil Code, an independent civil
action entirely separate and distinct from the civil
action, may be instituted by the injured party
during the pendency of the criminal case,
provided said party has reserved his right to
institute it separately. But it should be noted,
however, that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of
Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such reservation
shall be made. In the case at bar, there is no
question that petitioners never intervened in the
criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police
against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has
the said criminal action been terminated either
by conviction or acquittal of said accused.
Petitioners have two options from where they
could recover damages from—that arising out of
the criminal act, and that under quasi-delict.
Petitioners opted to recover damages under
quasi-delict, which in effect operated as their
abandonment of their claim to damages under
the pending criminal case. Therefore, petitioners
may still recover damages from their civil action
against the defendants.
DANIEL TAYLOR vs. MANILA ELECTRIC
RAILROAD AND LIGHT CO.
FACTS:
The defendant left some twenty or thirty
fulminating caps used for blasting charges of
dynamite scattered in the premises behind its
power plant. The plaintiff, a boy 15 years of age,
in company with another boy, 12 years of age,
entered the premises of the defendant, saw
fulminating caps and carried them away. Upon
reaching home they made a series of
experiments with the caps. They thrust the ends
of the wires into an electric light socket and
obtained no result. They next tried to break the
cap with a stone and failed. They then opened
one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it
was filled with a yellowish substance they got
matches, and the plaintiff held the cap while the
other boy applied a lighted match to the
contents. An explosion followed causing injuries
to the boys. This action was brought by the
plaintiff to recover damages for the injuries which
he suffered.
ISSUE: WON, a railroad company was liable for an
injury received by an infant while upon its
premises, from idle curiosity, or purposes of
amusement, if such injury was, under the
circumstances, attributable to the negligence of
company.
RULING: The Supreme Court held that under all
the circumstances of this case the negligence of
the defendant leaving the caps exposed on its
premises was not the proximate cause of the
injury received by the plaintiff which therefore
not “attributable to the negligence of the
defendant”.
The doctrine as laid down in the case of
Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific C.5, is as
follows:
“Difficulty seems to be
apprehended in deciding which acts
of the injured party shall be
considered immediate causes of the
accident. The test is simple. The
distinction must be made between
the accident and the injury, between
the event itself, without which there
could have been no accident, and
those acts of the victim not entering
into it, independent of it, but
contributing to his own proper
hurt…”
When the immediate cause of an accident
resulting in an injury is the plaintiff’s own act,
which contributed to the principal occurrence of
its determining factors, he cannot recover
5
6
damages for the injury.
The SC believes that it is quite clear that
under the doctrine thus stated, the immediate
cause of the explosion, the accident which
resulted in plaintiff’s injury, was his own act in
putting a match to the contents of the cap, and
that having contributed to the principal
occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he
cannot recover. Plaintiff’s action dismissed.
Tayag vs Alcantara
Facts:Heirs of Tayag filed a complaint for
damages against private respondent Phil Rabbit
Bus lines. Alleging among others that Pedro
Tayag Sr. was riding on a bicycle along mc Arthur
highway on his way home. He was hit by the bus
driven by Villa which causes his death.
Private respondent filed motion to
suspend trial on the ground that criminal case
against Villa was still pending. In the said criminal
case, Villa was acquitted on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
Private respondent (Phil Rabbit) filed a
motion to dismiss Civil case. Petitioner opposed
alleging that their cause of action is not base on
crime but on quasi-delict.
HELD:
the petition is meritorious. Article 31 of the Civil
Code provides as follows:
Art. 31. When the civil action is
based on an obligation not arising
from the act or commission
complained of as a felony. such
civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter.
Evidently, the above quoted provision of the Civil
Code refers to a civil action based, not on the act
or omission charged as a felony in a criminal
case, but one based on an obligation arising from
other sources, 13 like quasi delict. 14
In the case at bar, the allegations of the
complaint clearly show that petitioners' cause of
action was based upon a quasi delict
thus, the complaint alleged among others

That the Philippine Rabbit Bus ... was at the time

of the accident being driven by defendant Romeo
Villa y Cunanan in a faster and greater speed
than what was reasonable and proper and in a
gray negligent, careless, reckless and imprudent
manner, without due regards to injuries to
persons and damage to properties and in
violation of traffic rules and regulations;

That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc.

has failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision
of its employees, particularly defendant Romeo
Villa y Cunanan otherwise the accident in
question which resulted in the death of Pedro
Tayag, Sr. and damage to his property would not
have occurr

The essential averments for a quasi delictual

action are present, namely: (1) an act or omission
constituting fault or negligence on the part of
private respondent; (2) damage caused by the
said act or commission; (3) direct causal relation
between the damage and the act or commission;
and (4) no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties.