PUBLIC CORPORATION CASES parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in
the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
I. Introduction and General Principles
d. Municipal Corporations; Elements; Dual Nature and Functions [Sec. 15]
G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967
BARA LIDASAN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Suntay for petitioner.
Barrios and Fule for respondent.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The question initially presented to the Commission on Elections, 1 is this: Is Republic
Act 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the
Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province —
Cotabato — to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that
"No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of the bill"? Comelec's answer is in the affirmative.
Offshoot is the present original petition for certiorari and prohibition.
On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as
Republic Act 4790, now in dispute. The body of the statute, reproduced in haec
verba, reads:
Sec. 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,
Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan,
Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain,
Matimos and Magolatung, in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan,
Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from said municipalities and
constituted into a distinct and independent municipality of the same province
to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The
seat of government of the municipality shall be in Togaig.
Sec. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality
shall be elected in the nineteen hundred sixty-seven general elections for
local officials.
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the
municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan,
Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are
Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August 15,
1967, the pertinent portions of which are:
For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters and for
other election purposes, the Commission RESOLVED that pursuant to RA
4790, the new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall comprise the
barrios of Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung,
Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung situated in the municipality of Balabagan,
Lanao del Sur, the barrios of Togaig and Madalum situated in the
municipality of Buldon, Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong,
Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and
Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of Parang, also of Cotabato.
Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios — in two municipalities in the
province of Cotabato — are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought
about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.
Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President,
through the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the
operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."
Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation,
declared that the statute "should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court."
This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara
Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a
qualified voter for the 1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared
unconstitutional; and that Comelec's resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September
20, 1967 implementing the same for electoral purposes, be nullified.
1. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement aforestated, that "[n]o bill
which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill."2
It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains
dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from
conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of
the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public
and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be
"expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit
of command."3 Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not
exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the
bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its
title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House of
Representatives4 where the bill, being of local application, originated. 5
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose
of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the
subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the
bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent
surprise or fraud upon the legislators.6
In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute conforms with the
constitutional requirement, the following, we believe, may be taken as guidelines:
The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and,
which technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated
in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title
which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be
informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents,
or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where
another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any
expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.
xxx xxx xxx
In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form
should be considered, and the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of
giving notice to all persons interested, should be kept in mind by the court.7
With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed statute. The
title — "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del
Sur"8 — projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected
by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in
the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town.
The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion,
makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a
two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of
Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan,
both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in
Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.
The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive.
Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it
did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the
province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their
towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the
public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill.
These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic
Act 4790.
Respondent's stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting
in "the substantial diminution of territorial limits" of Cotabato province is "merely the
incidental legal results of the definition of the boundary" of the municipality of
Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are taken
away "need not be expressed in the title of the law." This posture — we must say —
but emphasizes the error of constitutional dimensions in writing down the title of the
bill. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to another of
necessity involves reduction of area, population and income of the first and the
corresponding increase of those of the other. This is as important as the creation of a
municipality. And yet, the title did not reflect this fact.
Respondent asks us to read Felwa vs. Salas, L-16511, October 29, 1966, as
controlling here. The Felwa case is not in focus. For there, the title of the Act
(Republic Act 4695) reads: "An Act Creating the Provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao." That title was assailed as unconstitutional
upon the averment that the provisions of the law (Section, 8 thereof) in reference to
the elective officials of the provinces thus created, were not set forth in the title of the
bill. We there ruled that this pretense is devoid of merit "for, surely, an Act creating
said provinces must be expected to provide for the officers who shall run the affairs
thereof" — which is "manifestly germane to the subject" of the legislation, as set forth
in its title. The statute now before us stands altogether on a different footing. The
lumping together of barrios in adjacent but separate provinces under one statute is
neither a natural nor logical consequence of the creation of the new municipality of
Dianaton. A change of boundaries of the two provinces may be made without
necessarily creating a new municipality and vice versa.
As we canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is drawn to Hume vs. Village
of Fruitport, 219 NW 648, 649. There, the statute in controversy bears the title "An Act
to Incorporate the Village of Fruitport, in the County of Muskegon." The statute,
however, in its section 1 reads: "The people of the state of Michigan enact, that the
following described territory in the counties of Muskegon and Ottawa Michigan, to wit:
. . . be, and the same is hereby constituted a village corporate, by the name of the
Village of Fruitport." This statute was challenged as void by plaintiff, a resident of
Ottawa county, in an action to restraint the Village from exercising jurisdiction and
control, including taxing his lands. Plaintiff based his claim on Section 20, Article IV of
the Michigan State Constitution, which reads: "No law shall embrace more than one
object, which shall be expressed in its title." The Circuit Court decree voided the
statute and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court of Michigan voted to uphold the
decree of nullity. The following, said in Hume, may well apply to this case:
It may be that words, "An act to incorporate the village of Fruitport," would
have been a sufficient title, and that the words, "in the county of Muskegon"
were unnecessary; but we do not agree with appellant that the words last
quoted may, for that reason, be disregarded as surplusage.
 . . . Under the guise of discarding surplusage, a court cannot reject a part of
the title of an act for the purpose of saving the act. Schmalz vs. Woody, 56
N.J. Eq. 649, 39 A. 539.
A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to "challenge the attention of
those affected by the act to its provisions." Savings Bank vs. State of
Michigan, 228 Mich. 316, 200 NW 262.
The title here is restrictive. It restricts the operation of the act of Muskegon
county. The act goes beyond the restriction. As was said in Schmalz vs.
Wooly, supra: "The title is erroneous in the worst degree, for it is
misleading."9
Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political subdivisions, which
legislative purpose is not expressed in the title, were likewise declared
unconstitutional."10
We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.
2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be salvaged with reference
to the nine barrios in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with
the mere nullification of the portion thereof which took away the twelve barrios in the
municipalities of Buldon and Parang in the other province of Cotabato. The reasoning
advocated is that the limited title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the
province of Lanao del Sur.
We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of long standing, that
where a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the
parts will be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld. Black, however, gives
the exception to this rule, thus:
. . . But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and
connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations
for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a
whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not
pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all
the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall
with them,11
In substantially similar language, the same exception is recognized in the
jurisprudence of this Court, thus:
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the
Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion if separable from
the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid
portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to
presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had
supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. . . Enough
must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries
out the legislative intent. . . . The language used in the invalid part of the
statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever,
and what remains must express the legislative will independently of the void
part, since the court has no power to legislate, . . . .12
Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the Act, to create
the restricted area of nine barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del
Sur into the town of Dianaton, if the twelve barrios in the towns of Buldon and Parang,
Cotabato were to be excluded therefrom? The answer must be in the negative.
Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an
instrumentality of the State in carrying out the functions of government. Secondly.
They act as an agency of the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in
the latter character that they are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and
not a subdivision of the State.13
Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a
group of barrios is capable of maintaining itself as an independent municipality.
Amongst these are population, territory, and income. It was apparently these same
factors which induced the writing out of House Bill 1247 creating the town of
Dianaton. Speaking of the original twenty-one barrios which comprise the new
municipality, the explanatory note to House Bill 1247, now Republic Act 4790, reads:
The territory is now a progressive community; the aggregate population is
large; and the collective income is sufficient to maintain an independent
municipality.
This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern
themselves and enjoy the blessings of municipal autonomy.
When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality of the
twenty-one barrios — not nine barrios — was in the mind of the proponent thereof.
That this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself, thereafter enacted into
law, states that the seat of the government is in Togaig, which is a barrio in the
municipality of Buldon in Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a number of
questions, thus: Could the observations as to progressive community, large
aggregate population, collective income sufficient to maintain an independent
municipality, still apply to a motley group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one? Is
it fair to assume that the inhabitants of the said remaining barrios would have agreed
that they be formed into a municipality, what with the consequent duties and liabilities
of an independent municipal corporation? Could they stand on their own feet with the
income to be derived in their community? How about the peace and order, sanitation,
and other corporate obligations? This Court may not supply the answer to any of
these disturbing questions. And yet, to remain deaf to these problems, or to answer
them in the negative and still cling to the rule on separability, we are afraid, is to
impute to Congress an undeclared will. With the known premise that Dianaton was
created upon the basic considerations of progressive community, large aggregate
population and sufficient income, we may not now say that Congress intended to
create Dianaton with only nine — of the original twenty-one — barrios, with a seat of
government still left to be conjectured. For, this unduly stretches judicial interpretation
of congressional intent beyond credibility point. To do so, indeed, is to pass the line
which circumscribes the judiciary and tread on legislative premises. Paying due
respect to the traditional separation of powers, we may not now melt and recast
Republic Act 4790 to read a Dianaton town of nine instead of the originally intended
twenty-one barrios. Really, if these nine barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the
function of Congress, not of this Court, to spell out that congressional will.
Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality. 14
3. There remains for consideration the issue raised by respondent, namely, that
petitioner has no substantial legal interest adversely affected by the implementation of
Republic Act 4790. Stated differently, respondent's pose is that petitioner is not the
real party in interest.
Here the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that it violates the
constitutional requirement that the subject of the bill be expressed in its title. Capacity
to sue, therefore, hinges on whether petitioner's substantial rights or interests are
impaired by lack of notification in the title that the barrio in Parang, Cotabato, where
he is residing has been transferred to a different provincial hegemony.
The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislation
creating a town to ascertain that the law so created is not dismembering his place of
residence "in accordance with the Constitution" is recognized in this jurisdiction.15
Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections. His right to
vote in his own barrio before it was annexed to a new town is affected. He may not
want, as is the case here, to vote in a town different from his actual residence. He
may not desire to be considered a part of hitherto different communities which are
fanned into the new town; he may prefer to remain in the place where he is and as it
was constituted, and continue to enjoy the rights and benefits he acquired therein. He
may not even know the candidates of the new town; he may express a lack of desire
to vote for anyone of them; he may feel that his vote should be cast for the officials in
the town before dismemberment. Since by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill
must be shown in its title for the benefit, amongst others, of the community affected
thereby,16 it stands to reason to say that when the constitutional right to vote on the
part of any citizen of that community is affected, he may become a suitor to challenge
the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.
For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null and void, and to
prohibit respondent Commission from implementing the same for electoral purposes.
No costs allowed. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro
and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., dissenting:
With regret and with due recognition of the merit of the opinion of the Court, I find
myself unable to give my assent. Hence these few words to express my stand.
Republic Act No. 4790 deals with one subject matter, the creation of the municipality
of Dianaton in the province of Lanao del Sur. The title makes evident what is the
subject matter of such an enactment. The mere fact that in the body of such statute
barrios found in two other municipalities of another province were included does not
of itself suffice for a finding of nullity by virtue of the constitutional provision invoked.
At the most, the statute to be free from the insubstantial doubts about its validity must
be construed as not including the barrios, located not in the municipalities of Butig
and Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, but in Parang and Baldon, Cotabato.
The constitutional requirement is that no bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. 1 This
provision is similar to those found in the Constitution of many American States. It is
aimed against the evils, of the so-called omnibus bills, and log-rolling legislation, and
against surreptitious or unconsidered enactments.2 Where the subject of a bill is
limited to a particular matter, the members of the legislature as well as the people
should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative measures. This
constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider
being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill.
It is not to be narrowly construed though as to cripple or impede proper legislation.
The construction must be reasonable and not technical. It is sufficient if the title be
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which the statute
seeks to effect without expressing each and every end and means necessary for the
accomplishment of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The legislature is
not required to make the title of the act a complete index of its contents. The
constitutional provision is satisfied if all parts of an act which relates to its subject find
expression in its title.3
The first decision of this Court, after the establishment of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, in 1938, construing a provision of this nature, Government v. Hongkong &
Shanghai Bank,4 held that the inclusion of Section 11 of Act No. 4007, the
Reorganization Law, providing for the mode in which the total annual expenses of the
Bureau of Banking may be reimbursed through assessment levied upon all banking
institutions subject to inspection by the Bank Commissioner was not violative of such
a requirement in the Jones Law, the previous organic act. Justice Laurel, however,
vigorously dissented, his view being that while the main subject of the act was
reorganization, the provision assailed did not deal with reorganization but with
taxation. While the case of Government vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank was decided
by a bare majority of four justices against three, the present trend seems to be that
the constitutional requirement is to be given the liberal test as indicated in the majority
opinion penned by Justice Abad Santos, and not the strict test as desired by the
majority headed by Justice Laurel.
Such a trend has been reflected in subsequent decisions beginning with Sumulong v.
Commission on Elections,5 up to and including Felwa vs. Salas, a 1966 decision,6 the
opinion coming from Justice Concepcion.
It is true of course that in Philconsa v. Gimenez,7 one of the grounds on which the
invalidity of Republic Act No. 3836 was predicated was the violation of the above
constitutional provision. This Retirement Act for senators and representatives was
entitled "AN ACT AMENDING SUB-SECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF
COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX, AS AMENDED
BY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX." As we noted,
the paragraph in Republic Act No. 3836 deemed objectionable "refers to members of
Congress and to elective officers thereof who are not members of the Government
Service Insurance System. To provide retirement benefits, therefore, for these
officials, would relate to a subject matter which is not germane to Commonwealth Act
No. 186. In other words, this portion of the amendment ( re retirement benefits for
Members of Congress and appointive officers, such as the Secretary and Sergeants-
at-arms for each house) is not related in any manner to the subject of Commonwealth
Act No. 186 establishing the Government Service Insurance System and which
provides for both retirement and insurance benefits to its members." Nonetheless our
opinion was careful to note that there was no abandonment of the principle of
liberality. Thus: "we are not unmindful of the fact that there has been a general
disposition in all courts to construe the constitutional provision with reference to the
subject and title of the Act, liberally."
It would follow therefore that the challenged legislation Republic Act No. 4790 is not
susceptible to the indictment that the constitutional requirement as to legislation
having only one subject which should be expressed in his title was not met. The
subject was the creation of the municipality of Dianaton. That was embodied in the
title.
It is in the light of the aforementioned judicial decisions of this Court, some of the
opinions coming from jurists illustrious for their mastery of constitutional law and their
acknowledged erudition, that, with all due respect, I find the citation from Corpus Juris
Secundum, unnecessary and far from persuasive. The State decisions cited, I do not
deem controlling, as the freedom of this Court to accept or reject doctrines therein
announced cannot be doubted.
Wherein does the weakness of the statute lie then? To repeat, several barrios of two
municipalities outside Lanao del Sur were included in the municipality of Dianaton of
that province. That itself would not have given rise to a constitutional question
considering the broad, well-high plenary powers possessed by Congress to alter
provincial and municipal boundaries. What justified resort to this Court was the
congressional failure to make explicit that such barrios in two municipalities located in
Cotabato would thereafter form part of the newly created municipality of Dianaton,
Lanao del Sur.
To avoid any doubt as to the validity of such statute, it must be construed as to
exclude from Dianaton all of such barrios mentioned in Republic Act No. 4790 found
in municipalities outside Lanao del Sur. As thus interpreted, the statute can meet the
test of the most rigid scrutiny. Nor is this to do violence to the legislative intent. What
was created was a new municipality from barrios named as found in Lanao del Sur.
This construction assures precisely that.
This mode of interpreting Republic Act No. 4790 finds support in basic principles
underlying precedents, which if not precisely controlling, have a persuasive ring.
In Radiowealth v. Agregado,8 certain provisions of the Administrative Code were
interpreted and given a "construction which would be more in harmony with the tenets
of the fundamental law." In Sanchez v. Lyon Construction,9 this Court had a similar
ruling: "Article 302 of the Code of Commerce must be applied in consonance with [the
relevant] provisions of our Constitution." The above principle gained acceptance at a
much earlier period in our constitutional history. Thus in a 1913 decision, In re
Guariña:10 "In construing a statute enacted by the Philippine Commission we deem it
our duty not to give it a construction which would be repugnant to an Act of Congress,
if the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of another construction not in conflict
with the higher law. In doing so, we think we should not hesitate to disregard
contentions touching the apparent intention of the legislator which would lead to the
conclusion that the Commission intended to enact a law in violation of the Act of
Congress. However specious the argument may be in favor of one of two possible
constructions, it must be disregarded if on examination it is found to rest on the
contention that the legislator designed an attempt to transcend the rightful limits of his
authority, and that his apparent intention was to enact an invalid law."
American Supreme Court decisions are equally explicit. The then Justice, later Chief
Justice, Stone, construed statutes "with an eye to possible constitutional limitations so
as to avoid doubts as to [their] validity." 11 From the pen of the articulate jurist,
Frankfurter:12 "Accordingly, the phrase "lobbying activities" in the resolution must be
given the meaning that may fairly be attributed to it, having special regard for the
principle of constitutional adjudication which makes it decisive in the choice of fair
alternatives that one construction may raise serious constitutional questions avoided
by another." His opinion in the Rumely case continues with the above pronouncement
of Stone and two other former Chief Justices: "In the words of Mr. Chief Justice Taft,
'(i)t is our duty in the interpretation of federal statutes to reach conclusion which will
avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality', Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United
States, 275 US 331, 346, 48 S. Ct. 194, 198, 72 L. ed. 303. . . . As phrased by Mr.
Chief Justice Hughes, "if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal
principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided.' Crowell v. Benson, 285, 296, 76 L.
ed. 598, and cases cited." The prevailing doctrine then as set forth by Justice Clark in
a 1963 decision,13 is that courts "have consistently sought an interpretation which
supports the constitutionality of legislation." Phrased differently by Justice Douglas,
the judiciary favors "that interpretation of legislation which gives it the greater change
of surviving the test of constitutionality."14
It would follow then that both Philippine and American decisions unite in the view that
a legislative measure, in the language of Van Devanter "should not be given a
construction which will imperil its validity where it is reasonably open to construction
free from such peril."15 Republic Act No. 4790 as above construed incurs no such risk
and is free from the peril of nullity.
So I would view the matter, with all due acknowledgment of the practical
considerations clearly brought to light in the opinion of the Court.
e. De Jure and De Facto Municipal Corporations distinguished
G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965
EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
Zulueta, Gonzales, Paculdo and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the
Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-
three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. 1 Soon after the date last
mentioned, or on November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President
of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ
of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him,
as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of
public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by
said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that
said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Respondent maintains the
contrary view and avers that the present action is premature and that not all proper
parties — referring to the officials of the new political subdivisions in question — have
been impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalities adversely
affected by the aforementioned executive orders — because the latter have taken
away from the former the barrios composing the new political subdivisions —
intervened in the case. Moreover, Attorneys Enrique M. Fernando and Emma
Quisumbing-Fernando were allowed to and did appear as amici curiae.
The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names
changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:
All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under
the provisions hereof.
Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio
may be created or the name of an existing one may be changed by the
provincial board of the province, upon recommendation of the council of the
municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The
recommendation of the municipal council shall be embodied in a resolution
approved by at least two-thirds of the entire membership of the said council:
Provided, however, That no new barrio may be created if its population is
less than five hundred persons.
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios
may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by
Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority
of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the
municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Petitioner
argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a
barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios,
since barrios are units of municipalities?"
Respondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory that a new municipality can
be created without creating new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the
jurisdiction of the new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main import
of the petitioner's argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential
authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create
municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. The cogency and force of
this argument is too obvious to be denied or even questioned. Founded upon logic
and experience, it cannot be offset except by a clear manifestation of the intent of
Congress to the contrary, and no such manifestation, subsequent to the passage of
Republic Act No. 2379, has been brought to our attention.
Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed
executive orders are based, provides:
The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order
define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince,
municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and
increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province
into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a
province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of such
subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created,
and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such
place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the
authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall
first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to
be defined or any province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces.
When action by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines in
accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the
jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-
General) President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice
of the head of the Department having executive control of such officer, shall
 redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers
to the new districts so formed.
Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the
foregoing authority, an equitable distribution of the funds and obligations of
the divisions thereby affected shall be made in such manner as may be
recommended by the (Insular Auditor) Auditor General and approved by the
(Governor-General) President of the Philippines.
Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this
section does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying
upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binañgonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he
claims, has settled it. Such claim is untenable, for said case involved, not the creation
of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory — from an already
existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality (Binañgonan), likewise,
existing at the time of and prior to said transfer (See Gov't of the P.I. ex rel.
Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality, of Binañgonan [34 Phil. 518, 519-5201) — in
consequence of the fixing and definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common
boundaries of two municipalities.
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in
order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may
partake of an administrative nature — involving, as it does, the adoption of means
and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities — the authority to
create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of
other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function" (State ex rel. Higgins vs. Aicklen, 119
S. 425, January 2, 1959) or "solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power"
(Udall vs. Severn, May 29, 1938, 79 P. 2d 347-349). As the Supreme Court of
Washington has put it (Territory ex rel. Kelly vs. Stewart, February 13, 1890, 23 Pac.
405, 409), "municipal corporations are purely the creatures of statutes."
Although1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to
fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law:
(a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried
out or implemented by the delegate2 — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which
are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in
the performance of his functions.2a Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy,
the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of
every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to
determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or
beyond the scope of his authority.2b Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself
the power, not only to make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by
adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of
Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our
Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement
of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the
President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects
above referred to. In this connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the last
clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President:
... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such
place therein as the public welfare may require.
It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the
public welfare may require" qualified, not the clauses preceding the one just quoted,
but only the place to which the seat of the government may be transferred. This fact
becomes more apparent when we consider that said Section 68 was originally
Section 1 of Act No. 1748,3 which provided that, "whenever in the judgment of the
Governor-General the public welfare requires, he may, by executive order," effect the
changes enumerated therein (as in said section 68), including the change of the seat
of the government "to such place ... as the public interest requires." The opening
statement of said Section 1 of Act No. 1748 — which was not included in Section 68
of the Revised Administrative Code — governed the time at which, or the conditions
under which, the powers therein conferred could be exercised; whereas the last part
of the first sentence of said section referred exclusively to the place to which the seat
of the government was to be transferred.
At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is
concerned, even if we assumed that the phrase "as the public welfare may require,"
in said Section 68, qualifies all other clauses thereof. It is true that in Calalang vs.
Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had upheld
"public welfare" and "public interest," respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid
delegation of the authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in these
cases — as all judicial pronouncements — must be construed in relation to the
specific facts and issues involved therein, outside of which they do not constitute
precedents and have no binding effect.4 The law construed in the Calalang case
conferred upon the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, the power to issue rules and regulations
to promote safe transit upon national roads and streets. Upon the other hand, the
Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the Insular Treasurer, under Act No. 2581,
to issue and cancel certificates or permits for the sale of speculative securities. Both
cases involved grants to administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of
their administrative functions, calling for the determination of questions of fact.
Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68. As above indicated, the
creation of municipalities, is not an administrative function, but one which is
essentially and eminently legislative in character. The question of whether or not
"public interest" demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. it is "purely a
legislative question "(Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike
Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310-313, 315-318), or a political question (Udall vs. Severn, 79
P. 2d. 347-349). As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has aptly characterized it, "the
question as to whether incorporation is for the best interest of the community in any
case is emphatically a question of public policy and statecraft" (In re Village of North
Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1033, 1035-1037).
For this reason, courts of justice have annulled, as constituting undue delegation of
legislative powers, state laws granting the judicial department, the power to determine
whether certain territories should be annexed to a particular municipality (Udall vs.
Severn, supra, 258-359); or vesting in a Commission the right to determine the plan
and frame of government of proposed villages and what functions shall be exercised
by the same, although the powers and functions of the village are specifically limited
by statute (In re Municipal Charters, 86 Atl. 307-308); or conferring upon courts the
authority to declare a given town or village incorporated, and designate its metes and
bounds, upon petition of a majority of the taxable inhabitants thereof, setting forth the
area desired to be included in such village (Territory ex rel Kelly vs. Stewart, 23 Pac.
405-409); or authorizing the territory of a town, containing a given area and
population, to be incorporated as a town, on certain steps being taken by the
inhabitants thereof and on certain determination by a court and subsequent vote of
the inhabitants in favor thereof, insofar as the court is allowed to determine whether
the lands embraced in the petition "ought justly" to be included in the village, and
whether the interest of the inhabitants will be promoted by such incorporation, and to
enlarge and diminish the boundaries of the proposed village "as justice may require"
(In re Villages of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1035-1037); or creating a Municipal
Board of Control which shall determine whether or not the laying out, construction or
operation of a toll road is in the "public interest" and whether the requirements of the
law had been complied with, in which case the board shall enter an order creating a
municipal corporation and fixing the name of the same (Carolina-Virginia Coastal
Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310).
Insofar as the validity of a delegation of power by Congress to the President is
concerned, the case of Schechter Poultry Corporation vs. U.S. (79 L. Ed. 1570) is
quite relevant to the one at bar. The Schechter case involved the constitutionality of
Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act authorizing the President of the
United States to approve "codes of fair competition" submitted to him by one or more
trade or industrial associations or corporations which "impose no inequitable
restrictions on admission to membership therein and are truly representative,"
provided that such codes are not designed "to promote monopolies or to eliminate or
oppress small enterprises and will not operate to discriminate against them, and will
tend to effectuate the policy" of said Act. The Federal Supreme Court held:
To summarize and conclude upon this point: Sec. 3 of the Recovery Act is
without precedent. It supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity.
It does not undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular
states of fact determined by appropriate administrative procedure. Instead of
prescribing rules of conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe
them. For that legislative undertaking, Sec. 3 sets up no standards, aside
from the statement of the general aims of rehabilitation, correction and
expansion described in Sec. 1. In view of the scope of that broad
declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the
discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus
enacting laws for the government of trade and industry throughout the
country, is virtually unfettered. We think that the code making authority thus
conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to vest in the President a discretion that
is "virtually unfettered." and, consequently, tantamount to a delegation of legislative
power, it is obvious that "public welfare," which has even a broader connotation, leads
to the same result. In fact, if the validity of the delegation of powers made in Section
68 were upheld, there would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of
authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be required by
public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication
of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring about a total
collapse of the democratic system established by our Constitution, which it is the
special duty and privilege of this Court to uphold.
It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in question were issued after the
legislative bills for the creation of the municipalities involved in this case had failed to
pass Congress. A better proof of the fact that the issuance of said executive orders
entails the exercise of purely legislative functions can hardly be given.
Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may
be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere
in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the
executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to
act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive,
insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the
fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether
said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by
statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments,
so long as the same or its officers act Within the scope of their authority. He may not
enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if
it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that
the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor.
Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within
the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He may not
even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary
action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial
board.5
Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect,
remove any of its officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein
the barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his office would thereby become
vacant.6 Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he
had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his
dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him
by the Constitution.
Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments,
bureaus or offices implies no more than the authority to assume directly the functions
thereof or to interfere in the exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such
control does not include the authority either to abolish an executive department or
bureau, or to create a new one. As a consequence, the alleged power of the
President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by
him of an authority even greater than that of control which he has over the executive
departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate
above quoted. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than
that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the
process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over
municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departments,
bureaus or offices.
In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly
does, said Section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on
March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the
Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory
enactment.7
There are only two (2) other points left for consideration, namely, respondent's claim
(a) that "not all the proper parties" — referring to the officers of the newly created
municipalities — "have been impleaded in this case," and (b) that "the present petition
is premature."
As regards the first point, suffice it to say that the records do not show, and the
parties do not claim, that the officers of any of said municipalities have been
appointed or elected and assumed office. At any rate, the Solicitor General, who has
appeared on behalf of respondent Auditor General, is the officer authorized by law "to
act and represent the Government of the Philippines, its offices and agents, in any
official investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the services of a lawyer" (Section
1661, Revised Administrative Code), and, in connection with the creation of the
aforementioned municipalities, which involves a political, not proprietary, function,
said local officials, if any, are mere agents or representatives of the national
government. Their interest in the case at bar has, accordingly, been, in effect, duly
represented.8
With respect to the second point, respondent alleges that he has not as yet acted on
any of the executive order & in question and has not intimated how he would act in
connection therewith. It is, however, a matter of common, public knowledge, subject
to judicial cognizance, that the President has, for many years, issued executive
orders creating municipal corporations and that the same have been organized and in
actual operation, thus indicating, without peradventure of doubt, that the expenditures
incidental thereto have been sanctioned, approved or passed in audit by the General
Auditing Office and its officials. There is no reason to believe, therefore, that
respondent would adopt a different policy as regards the new municipalities involved
in this case, in the absence of an allegation to such effect, and none has been made
by him.
WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab
initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any
expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any
disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring and dissenting:
A sign of progress in a developing nation is the rise of new municipalities. Fostering
their rapid growth has long been the aim pursued by all three branches of our
Government.
So it was that the Governor-General during the time of the Jones Law was given
authority by the Legislature (Act No. 1748) to act upon certain details with respect to
said local governments, such as fixing of boundaries, subdivisions and mergers. And
the Supreme Court, within the framework of the Jones Law, ruled in 1917 that the
execution or implementation of such details, did not entail abdication of legislative
power (Government vs. Municipality of Binañgonan, 34 Phil. 518; Municipality of
Cardona vs. Municipality of Binañgonan, 36 Phil. 547). Subsequently, Act No. 1748's
aforesaid statutory authorization was embodied in Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code. And Chief Executives since then up to the present continued to
avail of said provision, time and again invoking it to issue executive orders providing
for the creation of municipalities.
From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued
executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code. Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in
implementation of said executive orders.
Suing as private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed in this
Court a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General.
It seeks to restrain the respondent or any person acting in his behalf, from passing in
audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the executive orders
aforementioned.
Petitioner contends that the President has no power to create a municipality by
executive order. It is argued that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of
1917, so far as it purports to grant any such power, is invalid or, at the least, already
repealed, in light of the Philippine Constitution and Republic Act 2370 (The Barrio
Charter).
Section 68 is again reproduced hereunder for convenience:
SEC. 68. General authority of [Governor-General) President of the
Philippines to fix boundaries and make new subdivisions. — The [Governor-
General] President of the Philippines may by executive order define the
 boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality,
[township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or
diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or
more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into
such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or
portions with another, name any new subdivision so created, and may
change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein
as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the
[Philippine Legislature] Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained
whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or
any province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by
the [Governor-General] President of the Philippines in accordance herewith
makes necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any
administrative officer or any judicial officer, the [Governor-General] President
of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the
Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the
territory of the several officers to the new districts so formed.
Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the
foregoing authority, an equitable distribution of the funds and obligations of
the divisions thereby affected shall be made in such manner as may be
recommended by the [Insular Auditor] Auditor General and approved by the
[Governor-General] President of the Philippines.
From such working I believe that power to create a municipality is included: to
"separate any political division other than a province, into such portions as may be
required, merge any such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new
subdivision so created." The issue, however, is whether the legislature can validly
delegate to the Executive such power.
The power to create a municipality is legislative in character. American authorities
have therefore favored the view that it cannot be delegated; that what is delegable is
not the power to create municipalities but only the power to determine the existence
of facts under which creation of a municipality will result (37 Am. Jur. 628).
The test is said to lie in whether the statute allows any discretion on the delegate as
to whether the municipal corporation should be created. If so, there is an attempted
delegation of legislative power and the statute is invalid (Ibid.). Now Section 68 no
doubt gives the President such discretion, since it says that the President "may by
executive order" exercise the powers therein granted. Furthermore, Section 5 of the
same Code states:
SEC. 5. Exercise of administrative discretion — The exercise of the
permissive powers of all executive or administrative officers and bodies is
based upon discretion, and when such officer or body is given authority to do
any act but not required to do such act, the doing of the same shall be
dependent on a sound discretion to be exercised for the good of the service
and benefit of the public, whether so expressed in the statute giving the
authority or not.
Under the prevailing rule in the United States — and Section 68 is of American origin
— the provision in question would be an invalid attempt to delegate purely legislative
powers, contrary to the principle of separation of powers.
It is very pertinent that Section 68 should be considered with the stream of history in
mind. A proper knowledge of the past is the only adequate background for the
present. Section 68 was adopted half a century ago. Political change, two world wars,
the recognition of our independence and rightful place in the family of nations, have
since taken place. In 1917 the Philippines had for its Organic Act the Jones Law. And
under the setup ordained therein no strict separation of powers was adhered to.
Consequently, Section 68 was not constitutionally objectionable at the time of its
enactment.
The advent of the Philippine Constitution in 1935 however altered the situation. For
not only was separation of powers strictly ordained, except only in specific instances
therein provided, but the power of the Chief Executive over local governments
suffered an explicit reduction.
Formerly, Section 21 of the Jones Law provided that the Governor-General "shall
have general supervision and control of all the departments and bureaus of the
government in the Philippine Islands." Now Section 10 (1), Article VII of the Philippine
Constitution provides: "The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.
In short, the power of control over local governments had now been taken away from
the Chief Executive. Again, to fully understand the significance of this provision, one
must trace its development and growth.
As early as April 7, 1900 President McKinley of the United States, in his Instructions
to the Second Philippine Commission, laid down the policy that our municipal
governments should be "subject to the least degree of supervision and control" on the
part of the national government. Said supervision and control was to be confined
within the "narrowest limits" or so much only as "may be necessary to secure and
enforce faithful and efficient administration by local officers." And the national
government "shall have no direct administration except of matters of purely general
concern." (See Hebron v. Reyes, L-9158, July 28, 1958.)
All this had one aim, to enable the Filipinos to acquire experience in the art of self-
government, with the end in view of later allowing them to assume complete
management and control of the administration of their local affairs. Such aim is the
policy now embodied in Section 10 (1), Article VII of the Constitution (Rodriguez v.
Montinola, 50 O.G. 4820).
It is the evident decree of the Constitution, therefore, that the President shall have no
power of control over local governments. Accordingly, Congress cannot by law grant
him such power (Hebron v. Reyes, supra). And any such power formerly granted
under the Jones Law thereby became unavoidably inconsistent with the Philippine
Constitution.
It remains to examine the relation of the power to create and the power to control
local governments. Said relationship has already been passed upon by this Court
in Hebron v. Reyes, supra. In said case, it was ruled that the power to control is an
incident of the power to create or abolish municipalities. Respondent's view,
therefore, that creating municipalities and controlling their local governments are "two
worlds apart," is untenable. And since as stated, the power to control local
governments can no longer be conferred on or exercised by the President, it follows
a fortiori that the power to create them, all the more cannot be so conferred or
exercised.
I am compelled to conclude, therefore, that Section 10 (1), Article VII of the
Constitution has repealed Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code as far as
the latter empowers the President to create local governments. Repeal by the
Constitution of prior statutes inconsistent with it has already been sustained in De los
Santos v. MaIlare, 87 Phil. 289. And it was there held that such repeal differs from a
declaration of unconstitutionality of a posterior legislation, so much so that only a
majority vote of the Court is needed to sustain a finding of repeal.
Since the Constitution repealed Section 68 as far back as 1935, it is academic to ask
whether Republic Act 2370 likewise has provisions in conflict with Section 68 so as to
repeal it. Suffice it to state, at any rate, that statutory prohibition on the President from
creating a barrio does not, in my opinion, warrant the inference of statutory prohibition
for creating a municipality. For although municipalities consist of barrios, there is
nothing in the statute that would preclude creation of new municipalities out of pre-
existing barrios.
It is not contrary to the logic of local autonomy to be able to create larger political
units and unable to create smaller ones. For as long ago observed in President
McKinley's Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission, greater autonomy is to
be imparted to the smaller of the two political units. The smaller the unit of local
government, the lesser is the need for the national government's intervention in its
political affairs. Furthermore, for practical reasons, local autonomy cannot be given
from the top downwards. The national government, in such a case, could still exercise
power over the supposedly autonomous unit, e.g., municipalities, by exercising it over
the smaller units that comprise them, e.g., the barrios. A realistic program of
decentralization therefore calls for autonomy from the bottom upwards, so that it is
not surprising for Congress to deny the national government some power over barrios
without denying it over municipalities. For this reason, I disagree with the majority
view that because the President could not create a barrio under Republic Act 2370,
a fortiori he cannot create a municipality.
It is my view, therefore, that the Constitution, and not Republic Act 2370, repealed
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code's provision giving the President
authority to create local governments. And for this reason I agree with the ruling in the
majority opinion that the executive orders in question are null and void.
In thus ruling, the Court is but sustaining the fulfillment of our historic desire to be free
and independent under a republican form of government, and exercising a function
derived from the very sovereignty that it upholds. Executive orders declared null and
void.
G.R. No. 103702 December 6, 1994
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, QUEZON; MAYOR JUAN K. UY;
COUNCILORS: DEOGRACIAS R. ARGOSINO III, BENITO T. CAPIO, EMMANUEL
R. CORTEZ, NORMANDO MONTILLA, LEONARDO C. UY, FIDEL C.
AURELLANA, PEDRO C. CARABIT, LEONARDO D. AURELLANA, FABIAN M.
MEDENILLA, TRINIDAD F. CORTEZ, SALVADOR M. MEDENILLA, CERELITO B.
AUREADA and FRANCISCA A. BAMBA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO V. MENDEZ, SR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
62, 4th Judicial Region, Gumaca, Quezon; MUNICIPALITY OF SAN ANDRES,
QUEZON; MAYOR FRANCISCO DE LEON; COUNCILORS: FE LUPINAC, TOMAS
AVERIA, MANUEL O. OSAS, WILFREDO O. FONTANIL, ENRICO U. NADRES,
RODELITO LUZOIR, LENAC, JOSE L. CARABOT, DOMING AUSA, VIDAL
BANQUELES and CORAZON M. MAXIMO, respondents.
Manuel Laserna, Jr. for petitioners.
Florante Pamfilo for private respondents.
VITUG, J.:
On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued, pursuant to the then
Sections 68 and 2630 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, Executive
Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating
from the municipality of San Narciso of the same province, the barrios of San Andres,
Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios.
Executive Order No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the President
and coursed through the Provincial Board of Quezon, of the municipal council of San
Narciso, Quezon, in its Resolution No. 8 of 24 May 1959. 1
By virtue of Executive Order No. 174, dated 05 October 1965, issued by President
Diosdado Macapagal, the municipal district of San Andres was later officially
recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality beginning 01 July
1963 by operation of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1515.2 The executive order added
that "(t)he conversion of this municipal district into (a) municipality as proposed in
House Bill No. 4864 was approved by the House of Representatives."
On 05 June 1989, the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo
warranto with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, in Gumaca, Quezon, against the
officials of the Municipality of San Andres. Docketed Special Civil Action No. 2014-G,
the petition sought the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No. 353 and prayed
that the respondent local officials of the Municipality of San Andres be permanently
ordered to refrain from performing the duties and functions of their respective
offices.3 Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General,4 the petitioning
municipality contended that Executive Order No. 353, a presidential act, was a clear
usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature and in violation of the
constitutional principle of separation of powers. Hence, petitioner municipality argued,
the officials of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres had no right to
exercise the duties and functions of their respective offices that righfully belonged to
the corresponding officials of the Municipality of San Narciso.
In their answer, respondents asked for the dismissal of the petition, averring, by way
of affirmative and special defenses, that since it was at the instance of petitioner
municipality that the Municipality of San Andres was given life with the issuance of
Executive Order No. 353, it (petitioner municipality) should be deemed estopped from
questioning the creation of the new municipality; 5 that because the Municipality of
San Andred had been in existence since 1959, its corporate personality could no
longer be assailed; and that, considering the petition to be one for quo warranto,
petitioner municipality was not the proper party to bring the action, that prerogative
being reserved to the State acting through the Solicitor General. 6
On 18 July 1991, after the parties had submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, the
trial court resolved to defer action on the motion to dismiss and to deny a judgment on
the pleadings.
On 27 November 1991, the Municipality of San Andres filed anew a motion to dismiss
alleging that the case had become moot and academic with the enactment of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,
which took effect on 01 January 1991. The movant municipality cited Section 442(d)
of the law, reading thusly:
Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. — . . .
(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this
Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing
municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or
executive orders and which have their respective set of elective
municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this
Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.
The motion was opposed by petitioner municipality, contending that the
above provision of law was inapplicable to the Municipality of San Andres
since the enactment referred to legally existing municipalities and not to
those whose mode of creation had been void ab initio.7
In its Order of 02 December 1991, the lower court8 finally dismissed the petition9 for
lack of cause of action on what it felt was a matter that belonged to the State, adding
that "whatever defects (were) present in the creation of municipal districts by the
President pursuant to presidential issuances and executive orders, (were) cured by
the enactment of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as Local Government Code of 1991." In
an order, dated 17 January 1992, the same court denied petitioner municipality's
motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition "for review on certiorari." Petitioners 10 argue that in issuing the
orders of 02 December 1991 and 17 January 1992, the lower court has "acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction." Petitioners
assert that the existence of a municipality created by a null and void presidential order
may be attacked either directly or even collaterally by anyone whose interests or
rights are affected, and that an unconstitutional act is not a law, creates no office and
is inoperative such as though its has never been passed. 11
Petitioners consider the instant petition to be one for "review on certiorari" under
Rules 42 and 45 of the Rules of Court; at the same time, however, they question the
orders of the lower court for having been issued with "grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction, and that there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law available to petitioners to
correct said Orders, to protect their rights and to secure a final and definitive
interpretation of the legal issues involved." 12 Evidently, then, the petitioners intend to
submit their case in this instance under Rule 65. We shall disregard the procedural
incongruence.
The special civil action of quo warranto is a "prerogative writ by which the
Government can call upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a public
office or exercises a public franchise." 13 When the inquiry is focused on the legal
existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo
warranto or any other credit proceeding. 14 It must be brought "in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines" 15 and commenced by the Solicitor General or the fiscal
"when directed by the President of the Philippines . . . ." 16 Such officers may, under
certain circumstances, bring such an action "at the request and upon the relation of
another person" with the permission of the court. 17 The Rules of Court also allows an
individual to commence an action for quo warranto in his own name but this initiative
can be done when he claims to be "entitled to a public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another." 18 While the quo warranto proceedings filed
below by petitioner municipality has so named only the officials of the Municipality of
San Andres as respondents, it is virtually, however, a denunciation of the authority of
the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres to exist and to act in that capacity.
At any rate, in the interest of resolving any further doubt on the legal status of the
Municipality of San Andres, the Court shall delve into the merits of the petition.
While petitioners would grant that the enactment of Republic Act
No. 7160 may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de
facto municipality, they, however, contend that since the petition for quo warranto had
been filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner municipality had acquired a
vested right to seek the nullification of Executive Order No. 353, and any attempt to
apply Section 442 of Republic Act 7160 to the petition would perforce be violative of
due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Petitioners' theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been
seasonably brought. Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San
Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of
on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the Quezon must now be conceded.
legality of the executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal District, and later the
Municipality, of San Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against
authority of a duly created local government unit. In the same manner that the failure petitioners.
of a public officer to question his ouster or the right of another to hold a position within
a one-year period can abrogate an action belatedly filed, 19 so also, if not indeed with
greatest imperativeness, must a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful SO ORDERED.
authority of a political subdivision be timely raised. 20 Public interest
demands it. f. Local Government Units (LGUs) and Unions or Federations of LGUs in the
Philippines
Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining G.R. No. 135962 March 27, 2000
in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San
Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom vs.
cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.
the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when,
on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could
have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive PUNO, J.:
Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental
acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence of the Not infrequently, the government is tempted to take legal shortcuts solve urgent
Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, problems of the people. But even when government is armed with the best of
Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class intention, we cannot allow it to run roughshod over the rule of law. Again, we let the
municipality after having surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act hammer fall and fall hard on the illegal attempt of the MMDA to open for public use a
No. 1515. Section 31 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary private road in a private subdivision. While we hold that the general welfare should be
Reorganization Act of 1980, constituted as municipal circuits, in the establishment of promoted, we stress that it should not be achieved at the expense of the rule of law.
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country, certain municipalities that comprised the
municipal circuits organized under Administrative Order No. 33, dated 13 June 1978,
Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in
issued by this Court pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537. Under this
Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock,
administrative order, the Municipality of San Andres had been covered by the 10th
non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private
Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the province of Quezon.
subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune
Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be
dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a
of the House of Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality
notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to
of San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities
public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. The notice reads:
composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section
442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their SUBJECT: NOTICE of the Opening of Neptune Street to Traffic.
respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity
of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." No pretension Dear President Lindo,
of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code is
proferred. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The
Please be informed that pursuant to the mandate of the MMDA law or
power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just
Republic Act No. 7924 which requires the Authority to rationalize the use of
that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in
roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of
essence are retrospective, 21 and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would
persons, Neptune Street shall be opened to vehicular traffic effective
have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with,"
January 2, 1996.
are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against
impairment of vested rights. 22
 In view whereof, the undersigned requests you to voluntarily open the points
of entry and exit on said street.
Thank you for your cooperation and whatever assistance that may be
extended by your association to the MMDA personnel who will be directing
traffic in the area.
Finally, we are furnishing you with a copy of the handwritten instruction of
the President on the matter.
Very truly yours,
PROSPERO I. ORETA
Chairman 1
On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall
separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be
demolished.
On January 2, 1996, respondent instituted against petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 136, Makati City, Civil Case No. 96-001 for injunction. Respondent
prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the
perimeter wall. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order the following day.
On January 23, 1996, after due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a
preliminary injunction. 2 Respondent questioned the denial before the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549. The appellate court conducted an ocular
inspection of Neptune Street 3 and on February 13, 1996, it issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the MMDA's proposed action. 4
On January 28, 1997, the appellate court rendered a Decision on the merits of the
case finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street,
a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that
the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance. The decision
disposed of as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the challenged Order dated
January 23, 1995, in Civil Case No. 96-001, is SET ASIDE and the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction issued on February 13, 1996 is hereby made
permanent.
For want of sustainable substantiation, the Motion to Cite Roberto L. del
Rosario in contempt is denied. 5
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 6
The Motion for Reconsideration of the decision was denied on September 28, 1998.
Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner MMDA raises the following questions:
I
HAS THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
(MMDA) THE MANDATE TO OPEN NEPTUNE STREET TO PUBLIC
TRAFFIC PURSUANT TO ITS REGULATORY AND POLICE POWERS?
II
IS THE PASSAGE OF AN ORDINANCE A CONDITION PRECEDENT
BEFORE THE MMDA MAY ORDER THE OPENING OF SUBDIVISION
ROADS TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC?
III
IS RESPONDENT BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. ESTOPPED
FROM DENYING OR ASSAILING THE AUTHORITY OF THE MMDA TO
OPEN THE SUBJECT STREET?
IV
WAS RESPONDENT DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS DESPITE THE
SEVERAL MEETINGS HELD BETWEEN MMDA AND THE AFFECTED
EEL-AIR RESIDENTS AND BAVA OFFICERS?
V
HAS RESPONDENT COME TO COURT WITH UNCLEAN HANDS?7
Neptune Street is owned by respondent BAVA. It is a private road inside Bel-Air
Village, a private residential subdivision in the heart of the financial and commercial
district of Makati City. It runs parallel to Kalayaan Avenue, a national road open to the
general public. Dividing the two (2) streets is a concrete perimeter wall approximately
fifteen (15) feet high. The western end of Neptune Street intersects Nicanor Garcia,
formerly Reposo Street, a subdivision road open to public vehicular traffic, while its
eastern end intersects Makati Avenue, a national road. Both ends of Neptune Street
are guarded by iron gates.
Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public
traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of
basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is traffic management
which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety,
convenience and welfare of the general public. It is alleged that the police power of
MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang
v. Intermediate Appellate Court. 8 From the premise that it has police power, it is now
urged that there is no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening
Neptune street to the public. 9
Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power
vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner
of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. 10 The power is
plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for
public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare. 11
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. 12 It
cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative
power. 13 The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the
President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal
corporations or local government units. 14 Once delegated, the agents can
exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national
lawmaking body. 15
A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted
by law and has substantial control of local affairs." 16 The Local Government Code of
1991 defines a local government unit as a "body politic and corporate." 17 — one
endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a
corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory. 18 Local government units
are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. 19 They are also the territorial
and political subdivisions of the state. 20
Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units in the Local
Government Code of 1991. This delegation is found in Section 16 of the same Code,
known as the general welfare clause, viz:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as
powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units
shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve
public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve
the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. 21
Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative
bodies. The legislative body of the provincial government is the sangguniang
panlalawigan, that of the city government is the sangguniang panlungsod, that of the
municipal government is the sangguniang bayan, and that of the barangay is
the sangguniang barangay. The Local Government Code of 1991 empowers
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan to
"enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare
of the [province, city or municipality, as the case may be], and its inhabitants pursuant
to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the
[province, city municipality] provided under the Code . . . " 22 The same Code gives
the sangguniang barangay the power to "enact ordinances as may be necessary to
discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law or ordinance and to promote
the general welfare of the inhabitants thereon." 23
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government
units — i.e., twelve (12) cities and five (5) municipalities, namely, the cities of
Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, Muntinlupa, Las
Pinas, Marikina, Paranaque and Valenzuela, and the municipalities of Malabon,
Navotas, Pateros, San Juan and Taguig. With the passage of Republic Act (R. A.)
No. 7924 24 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and
administrative region" and the Administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting
the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. 25
"Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide impact and
transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not
be viable for said services to be provided by the individual local government units
comprising Metro Manila." 26 There are seven (7) basic metro-wide services and the
scope of these services cover the following: (1) development planning; (2) transport
and traffic management; (3) solid waste disposal and management; (4) flood control
and sewerage management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, and
shelter services; (6) health and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control; and
(7) public safety. The basic service of transport and traffic management includes the
following:
(b) Transport and traffic management which include the
formulation, coordination, and monitoring of policies, standards, programs
and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure
requirements, the use of thoroughfares, and promotion of safe and
convenient movement of persons and goods; provision for the mass
transport system and the institution of a system to regulate road
users; administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement
operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education
programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metropolitan
Manila;" 27
In the delivery of the seven (7) basic services, the MMDA has the following powers
and functions:
Sec. 5. Functions and powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority. —
The MMDA shall:
 (a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium and
long-term plans and programs for the delivery of metro-wide services, land
use and physical development within Metropolitan Manila, consistent with
national development objectives and priorities;
(b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium-term
investment programs for metro-wide services which shall indicate sources
and uses of funds for priority programs and projects, and which shall include
the packaging of projects and presentation to funding institutions;
(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide programs and projects for
the delivery of specific services under its jurisdiction, subject to the approval
of the Council. For this purpose, MMDA can create appropriate project
management offices;
(d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plans, programs and
projects in Metro Manila; identify bottlenecks and adopt solutions to
problems of implementation;
(e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and
shall coordinate and regulate the implementation of all programs and
projects concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to
enforcement, engineering and education. Upon request, it shall be extended
assistance and cooperation, including but not limited to, assignment of
personnel, by all other government agencies and offices concerned;
(f) Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect
fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and
regulations, whether moving or non-moving in nature, and confiscate and
suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws
and regulations, the provisions of RA 4136 and PD 1605 to the contrary
notwithstanding. For this purpose, the Authority shall impose all traffic laws
and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may
deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government
units, duly licensed security guards, or members of non-governmental
organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such
conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose; and
(g) Perform other related functions required to achieve the objectives of the
MMDA, including the undertaking of delivery of basic services to the local
government units, when deemed necessary subject to prior coordination with
and consent of the local government unit concerned.
The implementation of the MMDA's plans, programs and projects is undertaken by
the local government units, national government agencies, accredited people's
organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector as well as by
the MMDA itself. For this purpose, the MMDA has the power to enter into contracts,
memoranda of agreement and other arrangements with these bodies for the delivery
of the required services Metro Manila. 28
The governing board of the MMDA is the Metro Manila Council. The Council is
composed of the mayors of the component 12 cities and 5 municipalities, the
president of the Metro Manila Vice-Mayors' League and the president of the Metro
Manila Councilors' League. 29 The Council is headed by Chairman who is appointed
by the President and vested with the rank of cabinet member. As the policy-making
body of the MMDA, the Metro Manila Council approves metro-wide plans, programs
and projects, and issues the necessary rules and regulations for the implementation
of said plans; it approves the annual budget of the MMDA and promulgate the rules
and regulations for the delivery of basic services, collection of service and regulatory
fees, fines and penalties. These functions are particularly enumerated as follows:
Sec. 6. Functions of the Metro Manila Council. —
(a) The Council shall be the policy-making body of the MMDA;
(b) It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects and issue rules
and regulations deemed necessary by the MMDA to carry out the purposes
of this Act;
(c) It may increase the rate of allowances and per diems of the members of
the Council to be effective during the term of the succeeding Council. It shall
fix the compensation of the officers and personnel of the MMDA, and
approve the annual budget thereof for submission to the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM);
(d) It shall promulgate rules and regulations and set policies and standards
for metro-wide application governing the delivery of basic services, prescribe
and collect service and regulatory fees, and impose and collect fines and
penalties.
Clearly, the scope of the MMDA's function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7)
basic services. One of these is transport and traffic management which includes the
formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects to rationalize the
existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares
and promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass
transport system and the institution of a system of road regulation, the administration
of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education
programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for
traffic violations. Under the service, the MMDA is expressly authorized "to set the
policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the implementation of all
traffic management programs." In addition, the MMDA may "install and administer a
single ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic
violations.
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts:
formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no
syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power.
Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in
R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve
resolutions appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro
Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." 30 It is
an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the
various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic
services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in
nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:
Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. — . . . .
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions,
and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the
delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the
autonomy of the local government units concerning purely local matters. 31
Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate
Court 32 where we upheld a zoning ordinance issued by the Metro Manila Commission
(MMC), the predecessor of the MMDA, as an exercise of police power. The
first Sangalang decision was on the merits of the petition, 33 while the second decision
denied reconsideration of the first case and in addition discussed the case of Yabut
v. Court of Appeals. 34
Sangalang v. IAC involved five (5) consolidated petitions filed by respondent BAVA
and three residents of Bel-Air Village against other residents of the Village and the
Ayala Corporation, formerly the Makati Development Corporation, as the developer of
the subdivision. The petitioners sought to enforce certain restrictive easements in the
deeds of sale over their respective lots in the subdivision. These were the prohibition
on the setting up of commercial and advertising signs on the lots, and the condition
that the lots be used only for residential purposes. Petitioners alleged that
respondents, who were residents along Jupiter Street of the subdivision, converted
their residences into commercial establishments in violation of the "deed restrictions,"
and that respondent Ayala Corporation ushered in the full commercialization" of
Jupiter Street by tearing down the perimeter wall that separated the commercial from
the residential section of the village. 35
The petitions were dismissed based on Ordinance No. 81 of the Municipal Council of
Makati and Ordinance No. 81-01 of the Metro Manila Commission (MMC). Municipal
Ordinance No. 81 classified Bel-Air Village as a Class A Residential Zone, with its
boundary in the south extending to the center line of Jupiter Street. The Municipal
Ordinance was adopted by the MMC under the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for
the National Capital Region and promulgated as MMC Ordinance No. 81-01. Bel-Air
Village was indicated therein as bounded by Jupiter Street and the block adjacent
thereto was classified as a High Intensity Commercial Zone. 36
We ruled that since both Ordinances recognized Jupiter Street as the boundary
between Bel-Air Village and the commercial district, Jupiter Street was not for the
exclusive benefit of Bel-Air residents. We also held that the perimeter wall on said
street was constructed not to separate the residential from the commercial blocks but
simply for security reasons, hence, in tearing down said wall, Ayala Corporation did
not violate the "deed restrictions" in the deeds of sale.
We upheld the ordinances, specifically MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, as a legitimate
exercise of police power. 37 The power of the MMC and the Makati Municipal Council
to enact zoning ordinances for the general welfare prevailed over the "deed
restrictions".
In the second Sangalang/Yabut decision, we held that the opening of Jupiter Street
was warranted by the demands of the common good in terms of "traffic decongestion
and public convenience." Jupiter was opened by the Municipal Mayor to alleviate
traffic congestion along the public streets adjacent to the Village. 38 The same reason
was given for the opening to public vehicular traffic of Orbit Street, a road inside the
same village. The destruction of the gate in Orbit Street was also made under the
police power of the municipal government. The gate, like the perimeter wall along
Jupiter, was a public nuisance because it hindered and impaired the use of property,
hence, its summary abatement by the mayor was proper and legal. 39
Contrary to petitioner's claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case at
bar. Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal council of
Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the basis for the proposed opening of
Neptune Street is contained in the notice of December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to
respondent BAVA, through its president. The notice does not cite any ordinance or
law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the
legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA simply
relied on its authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of roads and/or
thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons." Rationalizing the
use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within the scope of
transport and traffic management. By no stretch of the imagination, however, can this
be interpreted as an express or implied grant of ordinance-making power, much less
police power.
Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the
MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree
(P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater
powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA.
Metropolitan Manila was first created in 1975 by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 824. It
comprised the Greater Manila Area composed of the contiguous four (4) cities of
Manila, Quezon, Pasay and Caloocan, and the thirteen (13) municipalities of Makati,
Mandaluyong, San Juan, Las Pinas, Malabon, Navotas, Pasig, Pateros, Paranaque,
Marikina, Muntinlupa and Taguig in the province of Rizal, and Valenzuela in the
province of Bulacan. 40 Metropolitan Manila was created as a response to the finding
that the rapid growth of population and the increase of social and economic
requirements in these areas demand a call for simultaneous and unified development;
that the public services rendered by the respective local governments could be
administered more efficiently and economically if integrated under a system of central
planning; and this coordination, "especially in the maintenance of peace and order
and the eradication of social and economic ills that fanned the flames of rebellion and
discontent [were] part of reform measures under Martial Law essential to the safety
and security of the State." 41
Metropolitan Manila was established as a "public corporation" with the following
powers:
Sec. 1. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila. — There is hereby created
a public corporation, to be known as the Metropolitan Manila, vested with
powers and attributes of a corporation including the power to make
contracts, sue and be sued, acquire, purchase, expropriate, hold, transfer
and dispose of property and such other powers as are necessary to carry
out its purposes. The Corporation shall be administered by a Commission
created under this Decree. 42
The administration of Metropolitan Manila was placed under the Metro Manila
Commission (MMC) vested with the following powers:
Sec. 4. Powers and Functions of the Commission. — The Commission shall have the
following powers and functions:
1. To act as a central government to establish and administer programs and
provide services common to the area;
2. To levy and collect taxes and special assessments, borrow and expend
money and issue bonds, revenue certificates, and other obligations of
indebtedness. Existing tax measures should, however, continue to be
operative until otherwise modified or repealed by the Commission;
3. To charge and collect fees for the use of public service facilities;
4. To appropriate money for the operation of the metropolitan government
and review appropriations for the city and municipal units within its
jurisdiction with authority to disapprove the same if found to be not in
accordance with the established policies of the Commission, without
prejudice to any contractual obligation of the local government units involved
existing at the time of approval of this Decree;
5. To review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and acts of
cities and municipalities within Metropolitan Manila;
6. To enact or approve ordinances, resolutions and to fix penalties for any
violation thereof which shall not exceed a fine of P10,000.00 or
imprisonment of six years or both such fine and imprisonment for a single
offense;
7. To perform general administrative, executive and policy-making functions;
8. To establish a fire control operation center, which shall direct the fire
services of the city and municipal governments in the metropolitan area;
9. To establish a garbage disposal operation center, which shall direct
garbage collection and disposal in the metropolitan area;
10. To establish and operate a transport and traffic center, which shall direct
traffic activities;
11. To coordinate and monitor governmental and private activities pertaining
to essential services such as transportation, flood control and drainage,
water supply and sewerage, social, health and environmental services,
housing, park development, and others;
12. To insure and monitor the undertaking of a comprehensive social,
economic and physical planning and development of the area;
13. To study the feasibility of increasing barangay participation in the affairs
of their respective local governments and to propose to the President of the
Philippines definite programs and policies for implementation;
14. To submit within thirty (30) days after the close of each fiscal year an
annual report to the President of the Philippines and to submit a periodic
report whenever deemed necessary; and
15. To perform such other tasks as may be assigned or directed by the
President of the Philippines.
The MMC was the "central government" of Metro Manila for the purpose of
establishing and administering programs providing services common to the area. As a
"central government" it had the power to levy and collect taxes and special
assessments, the power to charge and collect fees; the power to appropriate money
for its operation, and at the same time, review appropriations for the city and
municipal units within its jurisdiction. It was bestowed the power to enact or approve
ordinances, resolutions and fix penalties for violation of such ordinances and
resolutions. It also had the power to review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances,
resolutions and acts of any of the four (4) cities and thirteen (13) municipalities
comprising Metro Manila.
P.D. No. 824 further provided:
Sec. 9. Until otherwise provided, the governments of the four cities and
thirteen municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila shall continue to exist in
their present form except as may be inconsistent with this Decree. The
members of the existing city and municipal councils in Metropolitan Manila
shall, upon promulgation of this Decree, and until December 31, 1975,
become members of the Sangguniang Bayan which is hereby created for
every city and municipality of Metropolitan Manila.
 In addition, the Sangguniang Bayan shall be composed of as many
barangay captains as may be determined and chosen by the Commission,
and such number of representatives from other sectors of the society as may
be appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
The Sangguniang Bayan may recommend to the Commission ordinances,
resolutions or such measures as it may adopt; Provided, that no such
ordinance, resolution or measure shall become effective, until after its
approval by the Commission; and Provided further, that the power to impose
taxes and other levies, the power to appropriate money and the power to
pass ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions shall be vested
exclusively in the Commission.
The creation of the MMC also carried with it the creation of the Sangguniang Bayan.
This was composed of the members of the component city and municipal councils,
barangay captains chosen by the MMC and sectoral representatives appointed by the
President. The Sangguniang Bayan had the power to recommend to the MMC the
adoption of ordinances, resolutions or measures. It was the MMC itself, however, that
possessed legislative powers. All ordinances, resolutions and measures
recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan were subject to the MMC's approval.
Moreover, the power to impose taxes and other levies, the power to appropriate
money, and the power to pass ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions were
vested exclusively in the MMC.
Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a "central government," i.e., the MMC which fully
possessed legislative police powers. Whatever legislative powers the component
cities and municipalities had were all subject to review and approval by the MMC.
After President Corazon Aquino assumed power, there was a clamor to restore the
autonomy of the local government units in Metro Manila. Hence, Sections 1 and 2 of
Article X of the 1987 Constitution provided:
Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. There
shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
herein provided.
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
The Constitution, however, recognized the necessity of creating metropolitan regions
not only in the existing National Capital Region but also in potential equivalents in the
Visayas and Mindanao. 43 Section 11 of the same Article X thus provided:
Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political
subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The
component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and
shall be entitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies. The
jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be
limited to basic services requiring coordination.
Constitution itself expressly provides that Congress may, by law, create "special
metropolitan political subdivisions" which shall be subject to approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected; the jurisdiction of
this subdivision shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination; and the cities
and municipalities comprising this subdivision shall retain their basic services
requiring coordination; and the cities and municipalities comprising this subdivision
shall retain their basic autonomy and their own local executive and legislative
assemblies. 44 Pending enactment of this law, the Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution gave the President of the Philippines the power to constitute the
Metropolitan Authority, viz:
Sec. 8. Until otherwise provided by Congress, the President may constitute
the Metropolitan Authority to be composed of the heads of all local
government units comprising the Metropolitan Manila area. 45
In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E. O.) No. 392 and constituted the
Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA). The powers and functions of the MMC were
devolved to the MMA. 46 It ought to be stressed, however, that not all powers and
functions of the MMC were passed to the MMA. The MMA's power was limited to the
"delivery of basic urban services requiring coordination in Metropolitan Manila." 47 The
MMA's governing body, the Metropolitan Manila Council, although composed of the
mayors of the component cities and municipalities, was merely given power of: (1)
formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination and
consolidation; and (2) promulgation resolutions and other issuances, approval of a
code of basic services and the exercise of its rule-making power. 48
Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily responsible
for the governance of their respective political subdivisions. The MMA's jurisdiction
was limited to addressing common problems involving basic services that
transcended local boundaries. It did not have legislative power. Its power was merely
to provide the local government units technical assistance in the preparation of local
development plans. Any semblance of legislative power it had was confined to a
"review [of] legislation proposed by the local legislative assemblies to ensure
consistency among local governments and with the comprehensive development plan
of Metro Manila," and to "advise the local governments accordingly." 49
When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a "special development
and administrative region" and the MMDA a "special development authority" whose
functions were "without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected local government
units." The character of the MMDA was clearly defined in the legislative debates
enacting its charter.
R.A. No. 7924 originated as House Bill No. 14170/11116 and was introduced by
several legislators led by Dante Tinga, Roilo Golez and Feliciano Belmonte. It was
presented to the House of Representatives by the Committee on Local Governments
chaired by Congressman Ciriaco R. Alfelor. The bill was a product of Committee
consultations with the local government units in the National Capital Region (NCR),
with former Chairmen of the MMC and MMA, 50 and career officials of said agencies.
When the bill was first taken up by the Committee on Local Governments, the
following debate took place:
THE CHAIRMAN [Hon. Ciriaco Alfelor]: Okay, Let me explain. This has been
debated a long time ago, you know. It's a special . . . we can create a special
metropolitan political subdivision.
Actually, there are only six (6) political subdivisions provided for in the
Constitution: barangay, municipality, city, province, and we have the
Autonomous Region of Mindanao and we have the Cordillera. So we have 6.
Now. . . . .
HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman. In the case of the
Autonomous Region, that is also specifically mandated by the Constitution.
THE CHAIRMAN: That's correct. But it is considered to be a political
subdivision. What is the meaning of a political subdivision? Meaning to say,
that it has its own government, it has its own political personality, it has the
power to tax, and all governmental powers: police power and everything. All
right. Authority is different; because it does not have its own government. It
is only a council, it is an organization of political subdivision, powers, "no,
which is not imbued with any political power.
If you go over Section 6, where the powers and functions of the Metro
Manila Development Authority, it is purely coordinative. And it provides here
that the council is policy-making. All right.
Under the Constitution is a Metropolitan Authority with coordinative power.
Meaning to say, it coordinates all of the different basic services which have
to be delivered to the constituency. All right.
There is now a problem. Each local government unit is given its respective . .
. as a political subdivision. Kalookan has its powers, as provided for and
protected and guaranteed by the Constitution. All right, the exercise.
However, in the exercise of that power, it might be deleterious and
disadvantageous to other local government units. So, we are forming an
authority where all of these will be members and then set up a policy in order
that the basic services can be effectively coordinated. All right.
Of course, we cannot deny that the MMDA has to survive. We have to
provide some funds, resources. But it does not possess any political power.
We do not elect the Governor. We do not have the power to tax. As a matter
of fact, I was trying to intimate to the author that it must have the power to
sue and be sued because it coordinates. All right. It coordinates practically
all these basic services so that the flow and the distribution of the basic
services will be continuous. Like traffic, we cannot deny that. It's before our
eyes. Sewerage, flood control, water system, peace and order, we cannot
deny these. It's right on our face. We have to look for a solution. What would
be the right solution? All right, we envision that there should be a
coordinating agency and it is called an authority. All right, if you do not want
to call it an authority, it's alright. We may call it a council or maybe a
management agency.
xxx xxx x x x 51
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the
MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules
and regulations in the implementation of the MMDA's functions. There is no grant of
authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of the metropolis. This was explicitly stated in the last Committee
deliberations prior to the bill's presentation to Congress. Thus:
THE CHAIRMAN: Yeah, but we have to go over the suggested revision. I
think this was already approved before, but it was reconsidered in view of
the proposals, set-up, to make the MMDA stronger. Okay, so if there is no
objection to paragraph "f". . . And then next is paragraph "b," under Section
6. "It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects and issue
ordinances or resolutions deemed necessary by the MMDA to carry out the
purposes of this Act." Do you have the powers? Does the MMDA... because
that takes the form of a local government unit, a political subdivision.
HON. [Feliciano] BELMONTE: Yes, I believe so, your Honor. When we say
that it has the policies, it's very clear that those policies must be followed.
Otherwise, what's the use of empowering it to come out with policies. Now,
the policies may be in the form of a resolution or it may be in the form of a
ordinance. The term "ordinance" in this case really gives it more teeth, your
honor. Otherwise, we are going to see a situation where you have the power
to adopt the policy but you cannot really make it stick as in the case now,
and I think here is Chairman Bunye. I think he will agree that that is the case
now. You've got the power to set a policy, the body wants to follow your
policy, then we say let's call it an ordinance and see if they will not follow it.
THE CHAIRMAN: That's very nice. I like that. However, there is a
constitutional impediment.1âwphi1 You are making this MMDA a political
subdivision. The creation of the MMDA would be subject to a plebiscite. That
is what I'm trying to avoid. I've been trying to avoid this kind of predicament.
Under the Constitution it states: if it is a political subdivision, once it is
created it has to be subject to a plebiscite. I'm trying to make this as
administrative. That's why we place the Chairman as a cabinet rank.
HON. BELMONTE: All right, Mr. Chairman, okay, what you are saying there
is . . . . .
THE CHAIRMAN: In setting up ordinances, it is a political exercise, Believe
me.
 HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: Mr. Chairman, it can be changed into issuances of
rules and regulations. That would be . . . it shall also be enforced.
HON. BELMONTE: Okay, I will . . . .
HON. LOPEZ: And you can also say that violation of such rule, you impose a
sanction. But you know, ordinance has a different legal connotation.
HON. BELMONTE: All right, I defer to that opinion, your Honor.
THE CHAIRMAN: So instead of ordinances, say rules and regulations.
HON. BELMONTE: Or resolutions. Actually, they are actually considering
resolutions now.
or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by
petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so
ruling. We desist from ruling on the other issues as they are unnecessary.
We stress that this decision does not make light of the MMDA's noble efforts to solve
the chaotic traffic condition in Metro Manila. Everyday, traffic jams and traffic
bottlenecks plague the metropolis. Even our once sprawling boulevards and avenues
are now crammed with cars while city streets are clogged with motorists and
pedestrians. Traffic has become a social malaise affecting our people's productivity
and the efficient delivery of goods and services in the country. The MMDA was
created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately
the powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the
opening for public use of a private street in a private subdivision without any legal
warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of
the rule of law.1âwphi1.nêt

THE CHAIRMAN: Rules and resolutions. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549 are affirmed.

HON. BELMONTE: Rules, regulations and resolutions. 52

SO ORDERED.

The draft of H. B. No. 14170/11116 was presented by the Committee to the House of
Representatives. The explanatory note to the bill stated that the proposed MMDA is a
"development authority" which is a "national agency, not a political government
unit." 53 The explanatory note was adopted as the sponsorship speech of the
Committee on Local Governments. No interpellations or debates were made on the
floor and no amendments introduced. The bill was approved on second reading on
the same day it was presented. 54

When the bill was forwarded to the Senate, several amendments were
made.1âwphi1 These amendments, however, did not affect the nature of the MMDA
as originally conceived in the House of Representatives. 55

It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public
corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a "special metropolitan
political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The
creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." 56 R. A.
No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The
Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by the
President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his
function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the
President, 57 whereas in local government units, the President merely exercises
supervisory authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA.

Clearly then, the MMC under P.D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under
R.A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the
welfare of the community. It is the local government units, acting through their
respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. In the
case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance