MECHANICAL DEPART LABOR
UNION v. CIR G.R. No. L- 28223 /
24 SCRA 925
1968
FACTS:
The case began on 13 February 1965 by a
petition of the respondent "Samahan ng mga
Manggagawa, etc." calling attention to the
fact that there were three unions in the
Caloocan shops of the Philippine National
Railways: the "Samahan", the "Kapisanan ng
Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad Company",
and the Mechanical Department Labor
Union;
That no certification election had been held
in the last 12 months in the Caloocan shops;
that both the "Samahan" and the Mechanical
Department Labor Union had submitted
different labor demands upon the
management for which reason a certification
election was needed to determine the proper
collective bargaining agency for the
Caloocan shop workers.
The petition was opposed by the management
as well as by the Mechanical Department
Labor Union, the latter averring that it had
been previously certified in two cases as sole
and exclusive bargaining agent of the
employees and laborers of the PNR'S
mechanical department, and had negotiated
two bargaining agreements with management
in 1961 and 1963; that before the expiration
of the latter, a renewal thereof had been
negotiated and the contract remained to be
signed; that the "Samahan" had been
organized only in 21 January 1965; that the
Caloocan shops unit was not established nor
separated from the Mechanical Department
unit;
That the "Samahan" is composed mainly of
supervisors who had filed a pending case to
be declared non-supervisors; and that the
purpose of the petition was to disturb the
present smooth working labor management
relations.
TRIAL COURT: reviewed the collective
bargaining history of the Philippine National
Railways and allowed the establishment of
new and separate bargaining unit in one
company, even in one department of the same
company.
the Mechanical Department Labor Union
appealed to this Court questioning the
applicability under the circumstances of the
"Globe doctrine" of considering the will of
the employees in determining what union
should represent them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the employees at the
Caloocan Shops can desire the respondent
union, "Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa
Caloocan Shops", to be separated from the
Mechanical Department Labor Union, with a
view to the former being recognized as a
separate bargaining unit, applying the Globe
Doctrine
RULING: Yes, the Globe Doctrine is
applicable in this case.
Yes because even though Appellant
Mechanical contends that the application of
the "Globe doctrine" is not warranted because
the workers of the Caloocan shops do not
require different skills from the rest of the
workers in the Mechanical Department of the
Railway Company. This question is primarily
one of facts.
The Industrial Court has found that there is a
basic difference, in that those in the Caloocan
shops not only have a community of interest
and working conditions but perform major
repairs of railway rolling stock, using heavy
equipment and machineries found in said
shops, while the others only perform minor
repairs. It is easy to understand, therefore,
that the workers in the Caloocan shops
require special skill in the use of heavy
equipment and machinery sufficient to set
them apart from the rest of the workers.
In addition, the record shows that the
collective bargaining agreements negotiated
by the appellant union have been in existence
for more than two (2) years; hence, such
agreements cannot constitute a bar to the
determination, by proper elections, of a new
bargaining representative (PLDT Employees'
Union vs. Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Co., 51 Off. Gaz., 4519).
As to the charge that some of the members of
the appellee, "Samahan Ng Manggagawa",
are actually supervisors, it appears that the
question of the status of such members is still
pending final decision; hence, it would not
constitute a legal obstacle to the holding of
the plebiscite. At any rate, the appellant may
later question whether the votes of those
ultimately declared to be supervisors should
be counted.
Whether or not the agreement negotiated by
the appellant union with the employer, during
the pendency of the original petition in the
Court of Industrial Relations, should be
considered valid and binding on the workers
of the Caloocan shops is a question that
should be first passed upon by the Industrial
Court.
HERCULES INDUSTRIES INC. V. SEC.
OF DOLE, 214 SCRA 129 [1992]
FACTS:
On July 1987, National federation of Labor
filed a petition for certification election,
alleging that the CBA would expire in August
1987, and that it [NFL] enjoys the support of
more than 20% of Hercules rank and file
employees.
By the parties’ agreement, the Med -Arbiter
issued an order for the conduct of a
certification election —1. NFL, 2. Hercules
Employees Labor Union [HELU], 2. No
Union.
In the pre-election conference, the
parties were not able to agree on the list of
qualified voters, because the company
charged that the list included 98 scabs, 16
capatazes, 8 security guards, and 9
managerial employees. The Med-Arbiter
ordered the conduct of a certification
election, but excepted the following:
managerial employees, security force
department, and the striker employees who
executed quitclaims and accepted separation
pay.
NFL appealed this order to the BLR;
however, pending its resolution, a
certification election was conducted.
Eventually, the BLR director declared the
election null and void, and ordered a new
election, saying that the July1987 payroll,
excluding the 98 scab replacement, will
be the basis for the voters list.
NFL won in the certification election,
garnering 89 out of 91 votes [2 votes were
spoiled / invalid], and so theMed-Arbiter
declared and certified NFL as the SEBA of
the rank-and-files.
Hercules’ [the company] MfR was
denied by the DOLE Undersecretary on the
following grounds:
1.Sections 3 and 4, Rule 6, Book V of the
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code on
protests had not been followed.
2.The records disclose that no protest was
made before the election, nor formalized
within 5 days after the election.
3.DOLE has not found any legal obstacle to
NFL’s proclamation as the SEBA of the
rank-and-files
ISSUE:
Whether or not Hercules Industries, Inc., as
employer, may question the validity of the
certification election among its rank-
and-file employees.
HELD:
NO.
In a long line of decisions, this Court has
undeviatingly ruled that the employer is not a
party to a certification election which is the
sole or exclusive concern of the workers
(Rizal Workers Union v. Ferrer-Calleja, 186
SCRA 431). In the choice of their collective
bargaining representative, the employer is
definitely an intruder. His participation, to
put it mildly, deserves no encouragement
(Consolidated Farms, Inc. v. Noriel, 84
SCRA 469; Filipino Metals Corp. v. Ople,
107 SCRA 211).
The only instance when the employer may be
involved in that process is when it is obliged
to file a petition for certification election on
its workers’ request to bargain collectively
pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code.
After the order for a certification election
issues, the employer’s involvement ceases,
and it becomes a neutral bystander. (Rizal
Workers’ Union v. Calleja, supra.).
In this case, the Solicitor General correctly
observed that while the employees
themselves never requested the petitioner to
bargain collectively, still, they did not object
to the results of the certification election.
Hence, petitioner’s appeal to the Bureau of
Labor Relations from the Med-Arbiter’s
Order certifying the NFL as the exclusive
bargaining agent of its rank and file
employees, and its filing of this petition
for certiorari with us, must be rejected. The
employer’s intervention in the certification
election of its workers is frowned upon by
law.
Meralco Electric Co. v. Quisumbing, 302
SCRA 173 (1999); Resolution of February,
2000; Resolution of August 2000
FACTS:
MEWA is the duly recognized labor
organization of the rank-and-file employees
of MERALCO. On September 7, 1995,
MEWA informed MERALCO of its intention
to renegotiate the terms and conditions of
their existing 1992-1997 Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) covering the
remaining period of two years starting from
December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1997.
MERALCO signified its willingness to re-
negotiate through its letter dated October 17,
1995 and formed a CBA negotiating panel for
the purpose. On November 10, 1995, MEWA
submitted its proposal to MERALCO, which,
in turn, presented a counter-proposal.
Thereafter, collective bargaining
negotiations proceeded. However, despite the
series of meetings between the negotiating
panels of MERALCO and MEWA, the
parties failed to arrive at “terms and
conditions acceptable to both of them.” On
April 23, 1996, MEWA filed a Notice of
Strike with the National Capital Region
Branch of the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) which
was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-04-152-
96, on the grounds of bargaining deadlock
and unfair labor practices. The NCMB then
conducted a series of conciliation meetings
but the parties failed to reach an amicable
settlement. MERALCO filed a petition to let
the Secretary of DOLE to assume jurisdiction
over the case which was granted.
ISSUE:
Whether the members of MEWA are entitled
to benefits given as bonuses, being negotiated
in the CBA.
HELD:
The members of MEWA are entitled to the
benefits although in the form of benefits
which is a subject of the negotiation of CBA.
As a rule, a bonus is not a demandable and
enforceable obligation; it may nevertheless
be granted on equitable consideration as
when the giving of such bonus has been the
company’s long and regular practice. To be
considered a “regular practice,” the giving of
the bonus should have been done over a long
period of time, and must be shown to have
been consistent and deliberate. The ruling in
National Sugar Refineries Corporation vs.
NLRC: “The test or rationale of this rule on
long practice requires an indubitable showing
that the employer agreed to continue giving
the benefits knowing fully well that said
employees are not covered by the law
requiring payment thereof.” In this case, the
record shows the MERALCO, aside from
complying with the regular 13th month
bonus, has further been giving its employees
an additional Christmas bonus at the tail-end
of the year since 1988. While the special
bonuses differed in amount and bore different
titles, it cannot be denied that these were
given voluntarily and continuously on or
about Christmas time. The considerable
length of time MERALCO has been giving
the special grants to its employees indicates a
unilateral and voluntary act on its part, to
continue giving said benefits knowing that
such act was not required by law. Indeed, a
company practice favorable to the employees
has been established and the payments made
by MERALCO pursuant thereto ripened into
benefits enjoyed by the employees.
Consequently, the giving of the special bonus
can no longer be withdrawn by the company
as this would amount to a diminution of the
employee’s existing benefits.

7K CORPORATION v. EDDIE
ALBARICO
G.R. No. 182295
June 26, 2013
FACTS:
When he was dismissed on 5 April 1993,
Albarico was a regular employee of 7K
Corporation, a company selling water
purifiers. He started working for the company
in 1990 as a salesman. Because of his good
performance, his employment was
regularized. He was also promoted several
times: from salesman, he was promoted to
senior sales representative and then to acting
team field supervisor. In 1992, he was
awarded the President’s Trophy for being one
of the company’s top water purifier specialist
distributors. In April of 1993, the chief
operating officer of 7K Corporation
terminated Albarico’s employment allegedly
for his poor sales performance. Albarico had
to stop reporting for work, and he
subsequently submitted his money claims
against 7K Corporation for arbitration before
the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB). The issue for voluntary
arbitration before the NCMB, according to
the parties’ Submission Agreement was
whether Albarico was entitled to the payment
of separation pay and the sales commission
reserved for him by the corporation. As for its
defense, 7K Corporation claimed Albarico
had voluntarily stopped reporting for work
after receiving a verbal reprimand for his
sales performance; hence, it was he who was
guilty of abandonment of employment While
the case was pending before the NCMB,
Albarico filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal before the LA. The latter ruled in
favor of Albarico. However, the NLRC, on
appeal, vacated the decision of the LA on the
ground of forum-shopping, without prejudice
to the pending NCMB arbitration case. The
decision of the NLRC became final. NCMB
ruling Albarico was ILLEGALLY
DISMISSED The arbitrator explained that
the promotions, increases in salary, and
awards received by respondent belied the
claim that the latter was performing poorly. It
was also found that Albarico could not have
abandoned his job, as the abandonment
should have been clearly shown. The VA also
found that Albarico was dismissed from his
work without due process. However, it was
found that reinstatement was no longer
possible because of the strained relationship
of the parties. Thus, in lieu of reinstatement,
the VA ordered 7K Corporation to pay
separation pay for two years at P4,456 for
each year, or a total amount of P8,912. The
VA also ordered 7K Corporation to pay
backwages in the amount of P90,804.19, plus
attorney’s fees since Albarico had been
compelled to file an action for illegal
dismissal. 7K Corporation appealed to the
CA, imputing grave abuse of discretion on
the part of VA for ruling on the issue of
illegal dismissal and for awarding payment of
backwages and attorney’s fees. 7K
Corporation contended that the issue of the
legality of dismissal was not explicitly
included in the Submission Agreement. CA
RULING: AFFIRMED VA; Deleted
Attorney’s Fees for lack of factual basis.
ISSUE:
Did the VA properly assume jurisdiction to
decide the issue of the legality of the
dismissal of Albarico as well as the latter’s
entitlement to backwages?
RULING:
YES. The circumstances of the instant case
lead to no other conclusion than that the claim
of Albarico for separation pay was premised
on his allegation of illegal dismissal. Thus,
the VA properly assumed jurisdiction over
the issue of the legality of his dismissal
Moreover, it should be noted that even the
NLRC was of the understanding that the
NCMB arbitration case sought to resolve the
issue of the legality of the dismissal of the
Albarico. In fact, the identity of the issue of
the legality of his dismissal, which was
previously submitted to the NCMB, and later
submitted to the NLRC, was the basis of the
latter’s finding of forum shopping and the
consequent dismissal of the case before it. In
fact, 7K Corporation also implicitly
acknowledged this when it filed before the
NLRC its Motion to Dismiss Albarico’s
Complaint on the ground of forum shopping.
Thus, it is now estopped from claiming that
the issue before the NCMB does not include
the issue of the legality of the dismissal of
respondent. Besides, there has to be a reason
for deciding the issue of respondent’s
entitlement to separation pay. To think
otherwise would lead to absurdity, because
the voluntary arbitrator would then be
deciding that issue in a vacuum. The
arbitrator would have no basis whatsoever for
saying that Albarico was entitled to
separation pay or not if the issue of the
legality of Albarico’s dismissal was not
resolve first.
DOCTRINES: A voluntary arbitrator may,
by agreement of the parties, assume
jurisdiction over any of the labor disputes
enumerated under Article 223 of the Labor
Code or those which could fall under the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. He has
plenary jurisdiction and authority to interpret
an agreement to arbitrate and to determine the
scope of his own authority when the said
agreement is vague — subject only, in a
proper case, to the certiorari jurisdiction of
this Court. In deciding a case, the voluntary
arbitrator may award backwages upon a
finding of illegal dismissal, even though the
issue of entitlement thereto is not explicitly
claimed in the Submission Agreement.
Backwages, in general, are awarded on the
ground of equity as a form of relief that
restores the income lost by the terminated
employee by reason of his illegal dismissal.
Aside from illegal dismissal cases, separation
pay may also be awarded in the following
instances: a. when employees have been
terminated for authorized causes, such as
redundancy, retrenchment or installation of
labor-saving devices; b. when employees
have been terminated for a just cause other
than serious misconduct or an act reflecting
on moral character and social justice calls for
the awarding of separation pay; c. when it has
become an established practice of the
company to pay the said benefit to voluntarily
resigning employees; or d. when an employee
has been validly dismissed for non-
membership in a union as required in a
closedshop agreement
ST. JOHN COLLEGES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
ST. JOHN ACADEMY FACULTY AND
EMPLOYEES UNION
G.R. No. 167892 October 27, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner St. John Colleges, Inc. (SJCI) is a
domestic corporation which owns and
operates the St. John’s Academy (later
renamed St. John Colleges) in Calamba,
Laguna. Prior to 1998, the Academy offered
a secondary course only. The high school
then employed about 80 teaching and non-
teaching personnel who were members of the
St. John Academy Faculty & Employees
Union (Union).
CBA was set to expire
During the ensuing collective bargaining
negotiations, SJCI rejected all the proposals
of the Union for an increase in worker’s
benefits. This resulted to a bargaining
deadlock which led to the holding of a valid
strike by the Union
SJCI and the Union, through the efforts of the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB), agreed to refer the labor dispute to
the Secretary of Labor and Employment
(SOLE) for assumption of jurisdiction:
After which, the strike ended and classes
resumed. Subsequently, the SOLE issued an
Order dated January 19, 1998 assuming
jurisdiction over the labor dispute pursuant to
Article 263 of the Labor Code
Pending resolution of the labor dispute before
the SOLE, the Board of Directors of SJCI
approved on February 22, 1998 a resolution
recommending the closure of the high school
which was approved by the stockholders on
even date. the reason was because of the
irreconcilable differences between the school
management and the Academy’s Union
particularly the safety of our students and the
financial aspect of the ongoing CBA
negotiations.
25 employees conducted a protest action
within the perimeter of the high school. The
Union filed a notice of strike with the NCMB
On May 19, 1998, SJCI filed a petition to
declare the strike illegal before the NLRC
which was docketed as NLRC Case No.
RAB-IV-5-10035-98-L. It claimed that the
strike was conducted in violation of the
procedural requirements for holding a valid
strike under the Labor Code.
On May 21, 1998, the 25 employees filed a
complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP),
illegal dismissal and non-payment of
monetary benefits against SJCI before the
NLRC which was docketed as RAB-IV-5-
10039-98-L. The Union members alleged
that the closure of the high school was done
in bad faith in order to get rid of the Union
and render useless any decision of the SOLE
on the CBA deadlocked issues.
Labor arbiter held the strike invalid and the
loss of employment of the 25 employees; he
also dismissed the unions ULP and illegal
dismissal complaint
after the favorable decision of the Labor
Arbiter, SJCI resolved to reopen the high
school for school year 1999-2000. However,
it did not restore the high school teaching and
non-teaching employees it earlier terminated.
On July 23, 1999, the SOLE denied SJCI’s
motions to dismiss and certified the CBA
deadlock case to the NLRC. It ordered the
consolidation of the CBA deadlock case with
the ULP, illegal dismissal, and illegal strike
cases which were then pending appeal before
the NLRC.
NLRC reversed the decision of the LA and
held that there was ULP, illegal dismissal,
and there was no strike
CA affirmed
ISSUE:
1. w/n it was ULP when it closed down the
school
2. w/n there was illegal strike
HELD:
Petitioner is guilty of ULP and illegal
dismissal; there was no illegal strike as the
respondents were dismissed and not
employers when they did the strike
Under Article 283 of the Labor Code, the
following requisites must concur for a valid
closure of the business: (1) serving a written
notice on the workers at least one (1) month
before the intended date thereof; (2) serving
a notice with the DOLE one month before the
taking effect of the closure; (3) payment of
separation pay equivalent to one (1) month or
at least one half (1/2) month pay for every
year of service, whichever is higher, with a
fraction of at least six (6) months to be
considered as a whole year; and (4) cessation
of the operation must be bonafide. The
finding of the NLRC, which was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, that SJCI closed the
high school in bad faith is supported by
substantial evidence and is, thus, binding on
this Court. Consequently, SJCI is liable for
ULP and illegal dismissal.
The two decisive factors in determining
whether SJCI acted in bad faith are (1) the
timing of, and reasons for the closure of the
high school, and (2) the timing of, and the
reasons for the subsequent opening of a
college and elementary department, and,
ultimately, the reopening of the high school
department by SJCI after only one year from
its closure.
Prior to the closure of the high school by
SJCI, the parties agreed to refer the 1997
CBA deadlock to the SOLE for assumption
of jurisdiction under Article 263 of the Labor
Code. As a result, the strike ended and classes
resumed.
It closed its school allegedly because of
irreconcilable difference between school and
union and to circumvent the Union’s right to
collective bargaining and its members’ right
to security of tenure. By admitting that the
closure was due to irreconcilable differences
between the Union and school management,
specifically, the financial aspect of the
ongoing CBA negotiations, SJCI in effect
admitted that it wanted to end the bargaining
deadlock and eliminate the problem of
dealing with the demands of the Union. This
is precisely what the Labor Code abhors and
punishes as unfair labor practice since the net
effect is to defeat the Union’s right to
collective bargaining. SJCI claims it had no
choice but to refuse the Union’s demands
which thereafter led to the holding of a strike
on November 10, 1998. It argues that the
Union’s alleged illegal financial demands
was a valid justification for the closure of the
high school considering that it was
financially incapable of meeting said
demands. As already discussed, as to SJCs
contention that the demand of union is
unreasonable, neither party is obliged to give-
in to the other’s excessive or unreasonable
demands during collective bargaining,
The Labor Code does not authorize the
employer to close down the establishment on
the ground of illegal or excessive demands of
the Union. Instead, aside from the remedy of
submitting the dispute for voluntary or
compulsory arbitration, the employer may
file a complaint for ULP against the Union
for bargaining in bad faith. If found guilty,
this gives rise to civil and criminal liabilities
and allows the employer to implement a lock
out, but not the closure of the establishment
resulting to the permanent loss of
employment of the whole workforce.
In fine, SJCI undermined the Labor Code’s
system of dispute resolution by closing down
the high school while the 1997 CBA
negotiations deadlock issues were pending
resolution before the SOLE. The closure was
done in bad faith for the purpose of defeating
the Union’s right to collective bargaining.
The fact that after one year from the time it
closed its high school, SJCI opened a college
and elementary department, and reopened its
high school department showed that it never
intended to cease operating as an educational
institution.
We agree with the findings of the NLRC and
CA that the protest actions of the Union
cannot be considered a strike because, by
then, the employer-employee relationship has
long ceased to exist because of the previous
closure of the high school on March 31, 1998.
In sum, the timing of, and the reasons for the
closure of the high school and its reopening
after only one year from the time it was
closed down, show that the closure was done
in bad faith for the purpose of circumventing
the Union’s right to collective bargaining and
its members’ right to security of tenure.
Consequently, SJCI is liable for ULP and
illegal dismissal.
Rizal Cement Workers Union v. CIR,
6 SCRA 841 (1962)
FACTS:
The Rizal Cement Workers Union, affiliated
with the Federation of Free Workers,
heretofore referred to as the Union, is a
legitimate labor organization. The twenty-
one complainant workers are members of the
Union and work at the Bodega Tanque, Paco,
Manila. Rizal Cement Co., Inc. is a
corporation likewise organized under the
laws of the Philippines and is engaged
principally in the manufacture of cement. It
operates a plant in Binangonan, Rizal, where
it manufactures cement. The bags of cement
are then sent in barges to the Bodega Tanque
at Paco, where they are unloaded by workers
therein and sent either directly to customers
on trucks and pick-ups or stored in the
warehouse for future deliveries. On May 27,
1956, the Union staged a strike at the plant of
Rizal Cement Co., Inc. in Binangonan, Rizal.
In the early morning of the following day,
that is, on May 28, 1956, Candido de Leon
warehouseman-encargado at the Bodega
Tanque, received a telephone call from one
Johnny de Leon, manager of the respondent
Rizal Cement Co., Inc., with the information
that the Union staged a strike against the
company on the previous day, May 27, 1956,
in Binangonan, Rizal De Leon further
informed him that he should take
precautionary measures in protecting the
properties of the company stored at the
Bodega Tanque because of the strikers
caused damage to the factory in Binangonan
and sabotage might occur. For this reason, he
was advised by the manager to request the
members of the Union to stay meanwhile
outside the premises of the Bodega Tanque.
What he did in the morning of May 28, 1956
was to station himself at the gate of the
compound. When the workers arrived for
work at 7:00 a.m., he did not allow the 21
complaining workers who are members of
the Union to enter the gate and allowed only
those who are not members of said Union.
Upon refusal of Candido de Leon to allow the
complaining workers to work on that day, the
Union, through Ramon L. Kabigting,
VicePresident of the FFW, sent a letter
addressed to the Manager, Bodega Tanque,
Rizal Cement Co., Inc On May 30, 1956, the
complaining workers formed a picket line in
front of the Madrigal Building on the Escolta,
Manila, where the Offices of the respondent
companies are located. The picket lasted up
to April 1957. After the complaining workers
were not allowed to work on May 28, 1956,
the respondent Rizal Cement Co., Inc. hired
substitutes in order that the work in the
Bodega Tanque, which consists mainly in
unloading and loading cement, may not be
paralyzed. With the foregoing facts, the
Court of Industrial Relations resolved in the
negative the issue presented therein, i.e.,
whether the Company's denial to the 21
complaining workers, of entrance to the
compound and work constitutes a lockout, for
the reason that the said act was resorted to
forestall any possible sabotage in the
warehouse. It was pointed out that although
the strike was declared in and confined the
factory in Binangonan Rizal, the activities in
the Tanque warehouse in Paco Manila, where
the complainants work, complement those at
the plant. Also, in the letter of the Union
dated September 24, 1954, addressed to the
management, and as found by the lower
court, the Union made it clear that the set of
demands (presented to the Company and
denial of which led to the declaration of the
strike in question) covers all employees of the
Rizal Cement Co., Inc. "including those
workers at the Bodega Tanque" (p. 31,
decision of Dec. 14, 1961), and that in the
notice of strike filed by the Union (Exhs. 125-
Rizal and 125-A-Rizal), it was specifically
declared that the establishment covered by
the objected strike covers the "factory, quarry
and warehouse," the last place obviously
referring to Bodega Tanque. Thus the court
held that, under the circumstances, the court
was resorted to as a defensive weapon or
dictated by economic necessity and,
consequently, did not constitute an unfair
labor practice. And, as in the decision
rendered in the main case (No. 14-IPA) the
strikers were ordered reinstated to their
former positions without back wages, which
decision became final and executory on May
27, 1961, the court directed the Company in
this case to reinstate the 21 complainants with
back wages only from May 28, 1961. This
decision was affirmed by the court en banc by
resolution of January 27, 1962. Hence, the
filing of the instant petition.
ISSUE:
WON the Company's refusal to admit the 21
complainants to work in the warehouse,
simply because they belong to the same
Union that staged the strike in the factory,
constituted a violation of Section (a) (4) of
the Industrial Peace Act (Rep. Act 875)
HELD
NO. Republic Act 875, on unfair labor
practices provides: SEC. 4. Unfair Labor
Practices ・ (a) It shall be unfair labor
practice for an employer: x x x x x x x x x (4)
To discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization:
Provided, That nothing in this Act or any
other Act or statute of the Republic of the
Philippines shall preclude an employer from
making agreement with a labor organization
to require as condition of employment
membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the
employees as provided in section twelve. x x
x x x x x x x It is not herein controverted that
the complainants were locked out or denied
work by the respondent Company. Under
Republic Act 875, however, for the
discrimination by reason of union
membership to be considered an unfair labor
practice, the same must have been committed
to courage or discourage such membership in
the union. This cannot be said of the act of the
Company complained of. As clearly
established by the evidence, its refusal to all
complainants to work and requirement that
the latter stay out of the premises in the
meantime (perhaps while the strike was still
going on at the factory) was borne out of the
Company's justified apprehension and fear
that sabotage might be committed in the
warehouse where the products machinery and
spare parts were stored, as has been the case
in Binangonan. It has never been shown that
the act of the Company was intended to
induce the complainants to renounce their
union-membership or as a deterrent for non-
members to affiliate therewith, nor as a
retaliatory measure for activities in the union
or in furtherance of the cause of the union. As
the strikers were declared entitled to wages
only from the finality of the decision in the
main case (No. 14-IPA) or from May 28,
1961, the award of back wages to herein
complainants, also from said date, is justified
and reasonable. It may even be stated in
support thereof that on May 30, 1956,
complainants actually joined the picket line
formed in front of the Company's office at
Escolta, Manila. Dispositive Decision
affirmed
Abaria vs. National Labor Relations
Commission
Note: Abria is one of the 90 complaining
Employees in this case
INTRA-UNION PARTIES:
Facts:
LOCAL CHAPTER - Nagkahiusang
Mamumuo sa MCCH (NAMA-MCCH-
NFL), NOT INDEPENDENTLY
REGISTERED
NATIONAL FEDERATION - NFL
Note: Metro Cebu Community Hospital, Inc.
(MCCHI) later changed its name to Visayas
Community Medical Center (VCMC),
The 4 consolidated petitions before us
involve the legality of mass termination of
hospital employees who participated in strike
and picketing activities.
Metro Cebu Community Hospital, Inc.
(MCCHI), presently known as the Visayas
Community Medical Center (VCMC), is a
non-stock, non-profit corporation organized
under the laws of the Philippines. It operates
the Metro Cebu Community Hospital
(MCCH), a tertiary medical institution
located at Osmeña Boulevard, Cebu City.
MCCH is owned by the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) and Rev.
Gregorio P. Iyoy (REV. IYOY) is the
Hospital Administrator.
The National Federation of Labor (NFL) is
the exclusive bargaining representative of
the rank-and-file employees of MCCHI.
The 1987, 1991 Collective Bargaining
Agreements (CBAs) were negotiated by
NFL, with Atty. Armando Alforque as NFL
Legal Counsel and Lumapguid as President
of NFL-MCCH Chapter.
In the CBA effective from January 1994 until
December 31, 1995, this was again
negotiated by NFL together with Perla
NAVA (NAVA), President of
Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa MCCH
(NAMA-MCCH-NFL) signed the Proof of
Posting.
December 6, 1995: Since the CBA was about
to expire, NAVA (as President of the local
chapter) wrote REV. IYOY as administrator
of MCCHI expressing the UNION’s desire to
renew the CBA, attaching to her letter a
statement of proposals signed/endorsed by
153 union members.
However, MCCHI returned the CBA
proposal for NAVA to secure first the
endorsement of the legal counsel of NFL as
the official bargaining representative of
MCCHI employees.
Atty. Alforque of the NFL (National
federation) informed MCCHI that the
proposed CBA submitted by NAVA was
never referred to NFL and that NFL has
not authorized any other legal counsel or
any person for collective bargaining
negotiations.
By January 1996, the collection of union
fees (check-off) was temporarily
suspended by MCCHI in view of the
existing conflict between the federation and
its local affiliate.
Thereafter, MCCHI attempted to take over
the room being used as union office but
was prevented to do so by NAVA and her
group who protested these actions and
insisted that management directly negotiate
with them for a new CBA.
MCCHI referred the matter to Atty.
Alforque, NFL’s Regional Director, and
advised NAVA that their group is not
recognized by NFL.
Thereafter, Atty. Alforque suspended the
union membership of the following
UNION officers for serious violation of the
Constitution and By-Laws of NFL:
NAVA, Canen, Jr., Gerona,
Bongcaras, Remocaldo, Alsado and Bañez.
SALIENT points of the letter:
It appears that the abovementioned UNION
officers openly declared during the General
Membership Meeting of the Union that said
the former (UNON officers)
-
recognized the officers of the KMU not
those of the NFL
-
submit to the authority of the KMU not
of the NFL
-
and that they are loyal only to the KMU
not to the NFL.
Said UNION officers appear to have sent a
letter to REV. IYOY saying that they do not
need any endorsement from NFL to negotiate
their CBA with MCCHI
Such actuations constitute the following
offenses in the UNION’S Constitution and
By-Laws (CBL):
1. Willful violation of the CBL of the
Federation
a) Defying NFL in the latter’s
instruction for NAVA to disaffiliate from the
KMU; and
b) disregarding the powers of the
Regional Director to negotiate and sign the
CBA together with the local negotiating
panel subject to prior ratification by the
general membership;
2. Joining or assisting another labor
organization (KMU is deemed an
organization that seeks to defeat the objective
of establishing independent and democratic
unions and seeks to replace the Federation as
exclusive representative of its members)
UNION officers were directed to submit
written explanation on the above charges
within 5 days BUT considering the gravity of
the charges the UNION officers were placed
under temporary suspension from their office
and membership in the union immediately
pending investigation and final disposition of
their case in accordance with the union’s
CBL.
The next day, several union members led by
NAVA and her group launched a series of
mass actions such as wearing black and red
armbands/headbands, marching around the
hospital premises and putting up placards,
posters and streamers.
Atty. Alforque immediately disowned the
concerted activities being carried out by
union members which are not sanctioned
by NFL.
MCCHI directed the union officers led by
NAVA to submit within 48 hours a written
explanation why they should not be
terminated for having engaged in illegal
concerted activities amounting to strike, and
placed them under immediate preventive
suspension.
Responding to this directive, NAVA and her
group denied there was a temporary stoppage
of work, explaining that employees wore
their armbands only as a sign of protest and
reiterating their demand for MCCHI to
comply with its duty to bargain collectively.
REV. IYOY, having been informed that
NAVA and her group have also been
suspended by NFL, directed said officers to
appear before his office for investigation in
connection with the illegal strike wherein
they reportedly uttered slanderous and
scurrilous words against the officers of the
hospital, threatening other workers and
forcing them to join the strike. Said union
officers, however, invoked the grievance
procedure provided in the CBA to settle the
dispute between management and the union.
On March 13 and 19, 1996, the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
Regional Office No. 7 issued certifications
stating that there is nothing in their
records which shows that NAMA-MCCH-
NFL is a registered labor organization,
and that said union submitted only a copy
of its Charter Certificate on January 31,
1995.
MCCHI then sent individual notices to all
union members asking them to submit
within 72 hours a written explanation why
they should not be terminated for having
supported the illegal concerted activities of
NAMA-MCCH-NFL which has no legal
personality as per DOLE records.
On March 13, 1996, NAMA-MCCH-NFL
(Local Chapter) filed a Notice of Strike with
the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB) Region 7 but the same was
deemed not filed for want of legal
personality on the part of the filer.
NCMB likewise denied their motion for
reconsideration on March 25, 1996.
Despite such denial, NAVA and her group
still conducted a strike vote on April 2,
1996 during which an overwhelming
majority of union members approved the
strike.
Meanwhile, the scheduled investigations did
not push through because the striking union
members insisted on attending the same only
as a group.
MCCHI again sent notices informing them
that their refusal to submit to investigation is
deemed a waiver of their right to explain their
side and management shall proceed to
impose proper disciplinary action under the
circumstances.
On March 30, 1996, MCCHI sent
termination letters to union leaders and
other members who participated in the
strike and picketing activities.
On April 8, 1996, it also issued a cease-and-
desist order to the rest of the striking
employees.
For their continued picketing activities
despite the said warning, more than 100
striking employees were dismissed
effective April 12 and 19, 1996.
Unfazed, the striking union members held
more mass actions. The means of ingress to
and egress from the hospital were blocked so
that vehicles carrying patients and employees
were barred from entering the premises.
Placards were placed at the hospital’s
entrance gate stating: “Please proceed to
another hospital” and “we are on protest.”
Employees and patients reported acts of
intimidation and harassment perpetrated by
union leaders and members.
With the intensified atmosphere of
violence and animosity within the hospital
premises as a result of continued protest
activities by union members, MCCHI
suffered heavy losses due to low patient
admission rates. The hospital’s suppliers
also refused to make further deliveries on
credit.
With the volatile situation adversely affecting
hospital operations and the condition of
confined patients, MCCHI filed a petition
for injunction in the NLRC (Cebu City) on
July 9, 1996 (Injunction Case No. V-0006-
96).
A TRO was issued on July 16, 1996.
MCCHI presented 12 witnesses (hospital
employees and patients), including a security
guard who was stabbed by an identified
sympathizer while in the company of
NAVA’s group.
MCCHI’s petition was granted and a
permanent injunction was issued on
September 18, 1996 enjoining the NAVA
group from committing illegal acts
mentioned in Art. 264 of the Labor Code
On August 27, 1996, the City Government of
Cebu ordered the demolition of the structures
and obstructions put up by the picketing
employees of MCCHI along the sidewalk,
having determined the same as a public
nuisance or nuisance per se.
Thereafter, several complaints for illegal
dismissal and unfair labor practice were
filed by the terminated employees against
MCCHI, REV. IYOY, UCCP and
members of the Board of Trustees of
MCCHI.
There were around 90 complainants/
dismissed employees. 3 complaints were
lodged with LA.
CASE 1 RAB-VII-02-0309-98 - pertaining
to complainants Yballe, Ong, Angel and
Cortez
CASE 2 RAB-VII-02-0394-98
CASE 3 RAB-VII-03-0596-98
CASE 1:
LABOR ARBITER: NO basis for ULP
charges. Termination valid.
NLRC: DISMISSED the complaint for ULP
and illegal dismissal and affirming LA’s
decision declaring all complainants to have
been validly dismissed. MR denied.
CA REVERSED. Petition for certiorari is
granted, ordering Private respondent MCCHI
to reinstate petitioners Yballe, et al. without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges;
to pay them their full backwages inclusive of
their allowances and other benefits computed
from the time of their dismissal up to the time
of their actual reinstatement.
MCCHI, et al. filed MR but the CA denied.
Both petitioners and private respondents in
CA-G.R. SP No. 66540 appealed to this
Court. Private respondent MCCHI in CA-
G.R. SP No. 84998, under its new name
Visayas Community Medical Center
(VCMC), filed a petition for certiorari in this
Court.
CASE 2&3
LABOR ARBITER: NO basis for ULP
charges. Termination valid. Executive LA
Belarmino rendered his decision dismissing
the complaints for unfair labor practice in 3
NLRC Cases (CASES 1,2,3) filed by NAVA
and 90 other complainants. The charge of
ULP and the strike and picketing activities
were held illegal having been conducted by
NAMA-MCCH-NFL which is not a
legitimate labor organization.
Complainants appealed to NLRC.
NLRC: AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS (about the pay),
declaring the dismissal of all the
complainants in CASE 2 & 3 valid and legal.
NLRC denied complainants’ MR. Hence
appeal to CA.
CA Dismissed on the ground of forum
shopping + AFFIRMS NLRC decision but
modifies as to the awards of separation
pay. Out of 88 petitioners only 47 have
signed the certification against forum
shopping. 18 Petitioners filed MR arguing
that the 47 signatories more than constitute
the principal parties as the petition involves a
matter of common concern to all the
petitioning employees.
By resolution, the CA reinstated the case only
insofar as the 47 petitioners who signed the
petition are concerned.
Petitioners challenged the validity of CA
order/resolution before SC in a petition for
review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
154113.
Petitioners Employees filed a MR, while
private respondents MCCH filed a motion for
partial reconsideration questioning the award
of separation pay. CA denied both motions.
All of the above cases were consolidated as
they involve similar factual circumstances
and identical or related issues.
ISSUES:
1. WON the CA erred in dismissing
the petition for certiorari (CA-G.R.
SP No. 66540) with respect to the
petitioners in G.R. No. 154113 for
their failure to sign the certification
against forum shopping;
2. WON MCCHI is guilty of unfair
labor practice? NO ULP
3. WON petitioning employees were
illegally dismissed? Union officers –
legal, Union members – illegal
4. If their termination was illegal,
WON petitioning employees are
entitled to separation pay,
backwages, damages and
attorney’s fees? Dismissed union
members not entitled to backwages
but should be awarded separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement
HELD:
PART 1: Dropping of petitioners who did
not sign the certification against forum
shopping improper
The certification against forum shopping
must be signed by all the plaintiffs or
petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did
not sign will be dropped as parties to the case.
Under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, however, as when all the
plaintiffs or petitioners share a common
interest and invoke a common cause of action
or defense, the signature of only one of them
in the certification against forum shopping
substantially complies with the Rule. Clearly,
the CA erred in dropping as parties-
petitioners those who did not sign the
certification against forum shopping.
PART 2: MCCHI not guilty of unfair labor
practice
Art. 248 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended,
makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer “[t]o violate the duty to bargain
collectively” as prescribed by the Code.
The applicable provision in this case
is Art. 253 which provides:
“ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively
when there exists a CBA.—When there is a
CBA, the duty to bargain collectively shall
also mean that neither party shall terminate
nor modify such agreement during its
lifetime. However, either party can serve a
written notice to terminate or modify the
agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its
expiration date. It shall be the duty of both
parties to keep the status quo and to continue
in full force and effect the terms and
conditions of the existing agreement during
the 60-day period and/or until a new
agreement is reached by the parties.”
NAMA-MCCH-NFL charged MCCHI with
refusal to bargain collectively when the latter
refused to meet and convene for purposes of
collective bargaining. MCCHI, on its part,
deferred any negotiations until the local
union’s dispute with the national union
federation (NFL) is resolved considering that
the latter is the exclusive bargaining agent
which represented the rank-and-file hospital
employees in CBA negotiations since 1987.
Records of the NCMB and DOLE Region 7
confirmed that NAMA-MCCH-NFL had not
registered as a labor organization, having
submitted only its charter certificate as an
affiliate or local chapter of NFL.
Not being a legitimate labor organization,
NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not entitled to those
rights granted to a legitimate labor
organization under Art. 242, specifically:
(a) To act as the representative of its
members for the purpose of collective
bargaining;
(b) To be certified as the exclusive
representative of all the employees in
an appropriate collective bargaining
unit for purposes of collective
bargaining;
Aside from the registration requirement, is
only the labor organization designated or
selected by the majority of the employees in
an appropriate collective bargaining unit
which is the exclusive representative of the
employees in such unit for the purpose of
collective bargaining, as provided in Art.
255.
NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not the labor
organization certified or designated by the
majority of the rank-and-file hospital
employees to represent them in the CBA
negotiations but the NFL, as evidenced by
CBAs concluded in 1987, 1991 and 1994.
While it is true that a local union has the right
to disaffiliate from the national federation,
NAMA-MCCH-NFL has not done so as there
was no effort on its part to comply with the
legal requisites for a valid disaffiliation
during the “freedom period” or the last 60
days of the last year of the CBA, through a
majority vote in a secret balloting in
accordance with Art. 241 (d).
NAVA and her group simply demanded that
MCCHI directly negotiate with the local
union which has not even registered as one.
To prove majority support of the employees,
NAMA-MCCH-NFL presented the CBA
proposal allegedly signed by 153 union
members. However, the petition signed by
said members showed that the signatories
endorsed the proposed terms and conditions
without stating that they were likewise voting
for or designating the NAMA-MCCH-NFL
as their exclusive bargaining representative.1
In any case, NAMA-MCCH-NFL at the time
of submission of said proposals was not a
duly registered labor organization, hence it
cannot legally represent MCCHI’s rank-and-
file employees for purposes of collective
bargaining.
Hence, even assuming that NAMA-MCCH-
NFL had validly disaffiliated from its mother
union, NFL, it still did not possess the legal
personality to enter into CBA negotiations.
A local union which is not independently
registered cannot, upon disaffiliation from
the federation, exercise the rights and
privileges granted by law to legitimate labor
organizations; thus, it cannot file a petition
for certification election. Besides, the NFL as
the mother union has the right to investigate
members of its local chapter under the
federation’s Constitution and By-Laws, and
if found guilty to expel such members.
MCCHI therefore cannot be faulted for
deferring action on the CBA proposal
submitted by NAMA-MCCH-NFL in view of
the union leadership’s conflict with the
national federation. We have held that the
issue of disaffiliation is an intra-union
dispute2 which must be resolved in a different
forum in an action at the instance of either or
both the federation and the local union or a
rival labor organization, not the employer.
Not being a legitimate labor organization nor
the certified exclusive bargaining
representative of MCCHI’s rank-and-file
employees, NAMA-MCCH-NFL cannot
demand from MCCHI the right to bargain
collectively in their behalf. Hence, MCCHI’s
refusal to bargain then with NAMA-MCCH-
NFL cannot be considered an unfair labor
practice to justify the staging of the strike.
Art. 255. Exclusive bargaining representation
and workers’ participation in policy and
decision-making.—The labor organization
designated or selected by the majority of the
employees in an appropriate collective
bargaining unit shall be the exclusive
representative of the employees in such unit
for the purpose of collective bargaining. x x
x Furthermore, the strike was illegal due to the
Art. 243 An intra-union dispute refers to any
conflict between and among union members,
including grievances arising from any
violation of the rights and conditions of
membership, violation of or disagreement
over any provision of the union’s constitution
and by-laws, or disputes arising from
chartering or disaffiliation of the union.
Sections 1 and 2, Rule XI of Department
Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003 of the DOLE
enumerate the following circumstances as
inter/intra-union disputes, viz.: x x x x (e)
validity/invalidity of union affiliation or
disaffiliation;
PART 3: Strike and picketing activities
conducted by union officers and members
were illegal\
“ART. 263. Strikes, picketing and
lockouts.—x x x
- (b) Workers shall have the right to
engage in concerted activities for
purposes of collective bargaining or for
their mutual benefit and protection. The
right of legitimate labor organizations to
strike and picket and of employers to
lockout, consistent with the national
interest, shall continue to be recognized
and respected. However, no labor
union may strike and no employer
may declare a lockout on grounds
involving inter-union and intra-union
disputes.
As borne by the records, NAMA-MCCH-
NFL was not a duly registered or an
independently registered union at the time it
filed the notice of strike on March 13, 1996
and when it conducted the strike vote on
April 2, 1996.
It could not then legally represent the union
members. Consequently, the mandatory
notice of strike and the conduct of the strike
vote report were ineffective for having been
filed and conducted by NAMA-MCCH-NFL
which has no legal personality as a legitimate
labor organization, in violation of Art. 263
(c), (d) and (f) of the Labor Code and Rule
XXII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code.3
commission of the following prohibited
activities:4
(1) violence, coercion, intimidation and
harassment against non-participating
employees; and
(2) blocking of free ingress to and egress
from the hospital, including preventing
patients and their vehicles from entering the
hospital and other employees from reporting
to work, the putting up of placards with a
statement advising incoming patients to
proceed to another hospital because MCCHI
employees are on strike/protest.
“ART. 263. Strikes, picketing
and lockouts.— xxxx
c. In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the
duly certified or recognized
bargaining agent may file a notice of
strike or the employer may file a
 notice of lockout with the Department
at least 30 days before the intended
date thereof. In cases of unfair labor
practice, the period of notice shall be
15 days and in the absence of a duly
certified or recognized bargaining
agent, the notice of strike may be
filed by any legitimate labor
organization in behalf of its
members . However, in case of
dismissal from employment of union
officers duly elected in accordance
with the union constitution and by-
laws, which may constitute union
busting, where the existence of the
union is threatened, the 15-day
cooling-off period shall not apply and
the union may take action
immediately. (As amended by
Executive Order No. 111, December
24, 1986.)
d. The notice must be in accordance
with such implementing rules and
regulations as the Department of
Labor and Employment may
promulgate. x x x x
f. A decision to declare a strike must be
approved by a majority of the total
union membership in the bargaining
unit concerned, obtained by secret
ballot in meetings or referenda called
for that purpose. A decision to declare
a lockout must be approved by a
majority of the board of directors of
the corporation or association or of
the partners in a partnership, obtained
by secret ballot in a meeting called for
that purpose. The decision shall be
valid for the duration of the dispute
based on substantially the same
grounds considered when the strike or
lockout vote was taken. The
Department may, at its own initiative
or upon the request of any affected
party, supervise the conduct of the
secret balloting. In every case, the
union or the employer shall furnish
the Ministry the voting at least seven
days before the intended strike or
lockout, subject to the cooling-off
period herein provided.” (As
amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang
130, August 21, 1981 and further
amended by Executive Order No.
111, December 24, 1986.)
Rule XXII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code reads:
SEC. 6. Who may declare a strike or
lockout.—Any certified or duly recognized
bargaining representative may declare a
strike in cases of bargaining deadlocks and
unfair labor practices. The employer may
declare a lockout in the same cases. In the
absence of a certified or duly recognized
bargaining representative, any legitimate
labor organization in the establishment may
declare a strike but only on grounds of
unfair labor practice.” (Emphasis
supplied.)
4
264 (e) of the Labor Code provides: “No
person engaged in picketing shall commit
any act of violence, coercion or intimidation
or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from
the employer’s premises for lawful purposes,
or obstruct public thoroughfares.”
As shown by photographs submitted by
MCCHI, as well as the findings of the NCMB
and Cebu City Government, the hospital
premises and sidewalk within its vicinity
were full of placards, streamers and
makeshift structures that obstructed its use by
the public who were likewise barraged by the
noise coming from strikers using
megaphones. On the other hand, the
affidavits51 executed by several hospital
employees and patients narrated in detail the
incidents of harassment, intimidation,
violence and coercion, some of these
witnesses have positively identified the
perpetrators. The prolonged work stoppage
and picketing activities of the striking
employees severely disrupted hospital
operations that MCCHI suffered heavy
financial losses.
The findings of the Executive Labor
Arbiter and NLRC, as sustained by the
appellate court, clearly established that
the striking union members created so
much noise, disturbance and obstruction
that the local government authorities
eventually ordered their removal for being
a public nuisance. This was followed by an
injunction from the NCMB enjoining the
union leaders from further blocking the free
ingress to and egress from the hospital, and
from committing threats, coercion and
intimidation against non-striking employees
and patients/vehicles desiring to enter for the
purpose of seeking medical
treatment/confinement. By then, the illegal
strike had lasted for almost five months.
PART 4: Consequences of illegal strike to
union officers and members
Art. 264 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended,
provides for the consequences of an illegal
strike to the participating workers:
“x x x Any union officer who knowingly
participates in illegal strike and any worker
or union officer who knowingly participates
in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike may be declared to have lost his
employment status:
Provided, That mere participation of a
worker in a lawful strike shall not
constitute sufficient ground for
termination of his employment, even if a
replacement had been hired by the employer
during such lawful strike.”
The above provision makes a distinction
between workers and union officers who
participate in an illegal strike:
An ordinary striking worker cannot be
terminated for mere participation in an illegal
strike. There must be proof that he or she
committed illegal acts during a strike.
A union officer, on the other hand, may be
terminated from work when he knowingly
participates in an illegal strike, and like other
workers, when he commits an illegal act
during a strike.
Considering their persistence in holding
picketing activities despite the declaration by
the NCMB that their union was not duly
registered as a legitimate labor organization
and the letter from NFL’s legal counsel
informing that their acts constitute disloyalty
to the national federation, and their filing of
the notice of strike and conducting a strike
vote notwithstanding that their union has no
legal personality to negotiate with MCCHI
for collective bargaining purposes, there is no
question that NAMA-MCCH-NFL officers
knowingly participated in the illegal strike.
The termination of union officers NAVA,
Alsado, Bañez, Bongcaras, Canen, Gerona
and Remocaldo was valid and justified.
With respect to the dismissed union
members, although MCCHI submitted
photographs taken at the picket line, it did not
individually name those striking employees
and specify the illegal act committed by each
of them. Hence, the dismissal of union
members who merely participated in the
illegal strike was illegal.
PART 5: Dismissed union members not
entitled to backwages but should be awarded
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement
Since there is no clear proof that union
members actually participated in the
commission of illegal acts during the strike,
they are not deemed to have lost their
employment status as a consequence of a
declaration of illegality of the strike.
Petitioners assail the CA in not ordering their
reinstatement with back wages. Invoking
stare decisis, they cited the case of Bascon v.
CA decided by this Court in 2004 and which
involved two former hospital employees who
likewise sued MCCHI after the latter
terminated their employment due to their
participation in the same illegal strike led by
NAMA-MCCH-NFL. However, the SC said
that the doctrine of stare decisis would not be
applied in this case. Said doctrine is not cast
in stone upon a showing that circumstances
attendant in a particular case override the
great benefits derived by our judicial system
from the doctrine of stare decisis. Thus, the
Court, especially with a new membership, is
not obliged to follow blindly a particular
decision that it determines, after re-
examination, to call for a rectification.
Separation pay is made an alternative relief in
lieu of reinstatement in certain
circumstances, like:
(a) when reinstatement can no longer be
effected in view of the passage of a long
period of time or because of the realities of
the situation;
(b) reinstatement is inimical to the
employer’s interest;
(c) reinstatement is no longer feasible;
(d) reinstatement does not serve the best
interests of the parties involved;
(e) the employer is prejudiced by the
workers’ continued employment;
(f) facts that make execution unjust or
inequitable have supervened; or

(g) strained relations between the employer

and employee.

Considering that 15 years had lapsed from the

onset of this labor dispute, and in view of
strained relations that ensued, in addition to
the reality of replacements already hired by
the hospital which had apparently recovered
from its huge losses, and with many of the
petitioners either employed elsewhere,
already old and sickly, or otherwise
incapacitated, separation pay without back
wages is the appropriate relief.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on

certiorari in G.R. No. 187861 is DENIED
while the petitions in G.R. Nos. 154113,
187778 and 196156 are PARTLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated October 17,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 66540 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS in that MCCHI is
ordered to pay the petitioners in G.R. Nos.
154113 and 187778, except the petitioners
who are union officers, separation pay
equivalent to one month pay for every year of
service, and reasonable attorney’s fees in the
amount of P50,000.00. The Decision dated
November 7, 2008 is likewise AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS in that MCCHI is
ordered to pay the private respondents in
G.R. No. 196156 separation pay equivalent to
one month pay for every year of service, and
that the award of back wages is DELETED.

The case is hereby remanded to the Executive

Labor Arbiter for the recomputation of
separation pay due to each of the petitioners
union members in G.R. Nos. 154113, 187778
and 196156 except those who have executed
compromise agreements approved by this
Court.