National Infrastructure Plan For Shareholder and Publicly Held Railways

National Infrastructure Plan for
Shareholder and Publicly Held Railways
Image Courtesy NCDOT
Derived by Financial Analysis of Infrastructure Investment Rates and Operations

Considering Public Good Tests of Long-Term Plans for Each System
Leveraged Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highway Investment
National Network Southwest Chief Long-Distance Rail Passenger Route Investment
Hybrid Toll Highway and Corridor Rail Passenger Route Investment
Shareholder Guided Intermodal Rail Freight Investment

Form Approved
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMB No. 0704-0188
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data
sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other
aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other
provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED (From - To)
01-04-2020 Transportation Financial & Economic Analysis 1956 - 2020
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
National Infrastructure Plan for Shareholder and Publicly Held Railways N/A
5b. GRANT NUMBER
Private Work
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
N/A
6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER
Virgil G. Payne, PE N/A
MS Registration 5e. TASK NUMBER
N/A
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
N/A
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
Private Work REPORT NUMBER
N/A
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)

N/A N/A
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT

NUMBER(S)
N/A
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Not to be Used for Construction
14. ABSTRACT
There has been a missing “quant” needed to understand intercity transportation in the United States, where infrastructure
is developed under differing investment methods. One method is a leveraged public investment, where excise taxes are
collected on the use of a broad base of resources and then devoted to only certain projects selected according to
economic rankings, which is largely the path set by the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense
Highways where taxes on the unrelated use of locally funded streets is the broad base. The level of the “quant” is defined
in the paper and conclusions drawn for a future path of the ground transportation program.
15. SUBJECT TERMS
Financial Analysis of Transportation Infrastructure Investment, Interstate Highways, Highway Trust Fund, HTF,
Railways, Railroads, Amtrak, National Railroad Passenger Corporation, P3, Tollroad, Shareholder Driven Investment
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
ABSTRACT OF
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Virgil G. Payne
PAGES
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)
Not Classified Not Classified Not Classified 108
N/A
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8/98)
ii
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18
Contents
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................................ 1
National Transportation Planning Questions....................................................................................................................... 4
The Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highway’s Inherent Leveraging ..................... 4
Future Interstate Highway Investment Needs Projected to Increase Greatly .................................................................. 5
Federal Coordination Needed for National Network Rail Passenger Services – How We Got Here .............................. 5
Fungible Capital and Operations Dollars – Long-Distance Trains Cost Allocation and Economics .............................. 7
National Railroad Passenger Corporation Reporting has Changed Often – Marginal Costing is Key ............................ 9
Combined Automobile and Passenger Rail Network – Can Outperform Regional Aviation ........................................ 10
Highway Trip-Time Competitive National Network Rail Passenger Routes ................................................................ 12
Average Highway Speeds - Trip Length, Rest, and Time of Day Influences................................................................ 12
Proposed Railway Infrastructure Investment Rate Equal to Rural Interstate Highways ............................................... 13
Equal Citizen Accessibility in Federal Programs .......................................................................................................... 14
Innovation, Ownership, and Competition - Investments Needed in Authorization Legislation .................................... 14
Beneficial Changes for Future Authorization Legislation ............................................................................................. 15
Rail Passenger Revenue and Traffic Design ..................................................................................................................... 16
Time-Utility Model Fits Traveler Choices Better than Time-Saved (VTTS) Model .................................................... 16
Reduced Access Cost Toward and Within Stations ....................................................................................................... 17
General Passenger Equipment Improvements: .............................................................................................................. 19
Proposed New Coach Service Equipment for Reinvestment:........................................................................................ 19
Why Overnight Rail Travel Works - Reimagining Overnight Service Objectives........................................................ 20
Proposed New Sleeping Service Equipment for Reinvestment: .................................................................................... 21
Southwest Chief National Network Route – Rail Passenger Operating Plan Improvements ............................................ 24
Through Car Lines – Elimination of Transfers where Beneficial .................................................................................. 24
Mid-Route Car Switching Improvements ...................................................................................................................... 24
Historical Revenue Response and Solutions ................................................................................................................. 25
Grand Canyon National Park - Direct Service............................................................................................................... 26
St. Louis - Direct Service ............................................................................................................................................... 28
Mid-Route Bus Bridge Increasing Operational Costs that could Instead Fund Infrastructure ...................................... 29
Motorcoaches as Long-Distance Common Carrier Vehicles ......................................................................................... 30
Hybrid Toll Highway and Corridor Rail Passenger Route Investment ............................................................................. 31
Urban Corridor Passenger Rail and Toll Road Infrastructure Investment Models ........................................................ 31
Denver to Southwest –Direct Service ............................................................................................................................ 35
Dallas/Ft. Worth - Direct Service .................................................................................................................................. 37
Twice Daily - Through Route Frequencies –Corridor Service Benefits Efficiently Achieved ..................................... 38
Cost of Nationally Expanded Long-Distance Routes and Twice Daily Frequencies .................................................... 39
Southwest Chief National Network Route - Express Freight Revenue and Traffic Design .............................................. 40
iii
Congressional Charge to Increase Net Revenues .......................................................................................................... 40
Addition of Mail & Express Once Allowed Revenue to Cover Above-the-Rail Costs ................................................. 40
Standard Truck Trailer Based Express Traffic .............................................................................................................. 42
Standard Shipping Pallet Based Express Traffic ........................................................................................................... 44
Safety Management System – PTC Equivalent Proposed Passenger Rail Operating Plan ............................................... 45
Initial Steps - PTC Equivalent Plan ............................................................................................................................... 45
I-ETMS Locomotive Segment Only - PTC Equivalent Plan ......................................................................................... 45
Vision Chipset Based Standalone Locomotive Segment - PTC Equivalent Plan .......................................................... 47
Shareholder Guided Intermodal Rail Freight Investment.................................................................................................. 48
Raton Pass Infrastructure ............................................................................................................................................... 48
Durable Solution for All Mainline Rail Infrastructure .................................................................................................. 48
Toward an Amicable On-Time Metrics and Dispatching Delay Resolution ................................................................. 49
Domestic Intermodal Rail Freight - Container and Trailer-load Operations ................................................................. 51
Appendix A – Interstate Cash Flow Analysis ................................................................................................................... 54
Decreasing Real Revenue – Effects of Historical Inflation & Highway Miles per Gallon Changes............................. 54
Public Accident Financial Costs – A Highway Operating Loss At or Above-the-Road Surface .................................. 56
Interstate Highways rely on Taxing the Use of Locally Financed Streets for Investment Leverage............................. 57
Future Interstate Highway Investment Needs Projected to Increase Greatly ................................................................ 58
Appendix B ....................................................................................................................................................................... 62
Southwest Chief National Network Route - Engineering Financial Study – Summary Results .................................... 62
Appendix C ....................................................................................................................................................................... 63
Proposed Federal Railroad Income Tax Credits –Intermodal Freight and Passenger Infrastructure ............................. 63
Rail Infrastructure – Shareholder Owned: ..................................................................................................................... 63
Rail Infrastructure – Publicly Held: ............................................................................................................................... 63
Appendix D- Proposed Mid-Route Bus Bridge - Speed and Operational Questions ........................................................ 64
Appendix E - 2018 Build Grant Format – Economic Benefit to Cost Analysis ................................................................ 66
Appendix F – 1965 to Current Southwest Chief Route Cost Reporting ............................................................................ 73
Appendix G –Division by APT of Federal Infrastructure Investment and Revenue Funded Operations ......................... 80
Appendix H - Southwest Chief National Network Route – Analysis of Proposed Operations ......................................... 87
Engineering Financial Study – Option 1 - Existing Operation Benchmarking Analysis ............................................... 87
Engineering Financial Study – Option 1A - New Passenger Equipment Analysis ....................................................... 92
Engineering Financial Study – Option 1B –New Passenger Equipment and Twice Daily Analysis ............................ 97
Engineering Financial Study – Option 1C - New Passenger and Express Equipment Analysis ................................. 102
Appendix I – Analysis of Long-Route Commuter Intercity Rail Costs .......................................................................... 107
iv
Executive Summary
The Federal role in transportation will be debated as the FAST Act expires in 2020. Could we return to a marketplace that
esteems incremental infrastructure improvements supportive of local governance, balanced rural and urban access, and
personal wealth creation while fixing the trust fund cliff? This is a tall order requiring some introspection not just blind
spending. The key to these questions is found in normalizing infrastructure investment to find a missing financial “Quant”
per intercity traveled mile or urban daily trip and in conforming long held economic time models to consumer values.
In the United States infrastructure investment occurs by differing methods, causing confusion when one seeks to compare
results. The most common method is a public leveraged investment, where taxes are collected on the use of a broad base
of resources, then devoted to finance only certain projects selected according to economic rankings. The Dwight D.
Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways is so leveraged, where excise “gas” taxes rest on the
unconditional daily use of locally funded streets. Shareholder led investments, where revenues must pay operating costs
and eventually a shareholder return before expansion is by default the method now open for mainline railroads and
utilities. Finally, hybrid investments, such as Public-Private Partnerships (P3s), involve shareholders accepting a defined
public leveraged investment along with design, innovation, construction, and some operating risk before earning a return,
such as in a toll-road franchise.
To define the magnitude of this missing “Quant” needed to compare methods, the excise tax program supporting the
Interstate Highways, known as the Highway Trust Fund (HTF), of which we have grown to love for its distributions from
the pension smoothing purse, is analyzed herein using six decades of financial records kept by the Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA). The goal is to analyze the cash flow as a business; considering public revenue from incremental
fuel taxes earned between exits and prorated fees, against public investments in construction, capital maintenance, and
accident costs not directly borne by users. These financial flows are then compared using three interest rates, in line with
those seen under the methods of infrastructure investment, as though there was a closed loop of revenues, expenses, and
borrowing to set the “Quant”.
As a practicing engineer, who coordinated with FHWA the Plans, Specifications, and Construction for I-269, one of the
last Interstate Highways built, the author appreciates the shuuuee-keen of a pile hammer on a cold autumn morning more
than most as progress. Certainly, this “Quant”, a calculated highway financial gap of around thirteen cents per rural
automobile mile, should not be construed to say that the rural Interstate Highways should not have been constructed or
now see re-investment, as their Public Good as a vast safety improvement over the depression era two-lane US highways
attests otherwise. However, considering how these programs are leveraged could guide the ground transportation program.
The traditional view on the question of ranking merit has not considered the inherent leveraging when highway funding
draws from an excise fuel tax placed on the use of a broad base of local streets, largely supported by local taxes and built
using private property mortgages, as paradoxically all roads, including neighborhood lanes, city streets, and county roads,
are called Highways in FHWA documents, perhaps to sidestep this question. Instead, the justification in the 1961
Highway Cost Allocation report 1 was based on taking the economic benefits shown by the late 1950’s Time-Saved model
as though they were cash-in-hand to justify the costs as studies showed that most of the Interstate Highway routes could
not have been supported by actual tolls 2 nor can be now 3. This leaves a shortage of demand responsive financial resources
as well as a confused general public when the time comes to maintain those assets and discuss the adequacy of the gas tax
level whose Marginal Revenue is now less than one-eighth of the Average Cost for even the original Interstate Highways.
The “Quant” financial metric is thus useful as a benchmark to guide a future nationwide scope of investment in both HTF
funded intercity highway and railway infrastructure projects outside of congested areas. Our Federal transportation policy
should recognize the leveraging of the fuel tax, the relative ratio of financial Marginal Revenue to Long-run Average
Cost, and rank projects accordingly, instead of chasing economic benefits that point to expansion at most any cost.
1 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads. "Final report of the highway cost allocation study / prepared pursuant to Section 210 of the
Highway Revenue Act of 1956." V II Pg. 32, 1961. < https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=ien.35556021232335;view=2up;seq=46;size=150>

2 Bureau of Public Roads. "Toll Roads and Free Roads." 1939. <http://www.virginiaplaces.org/transportation/tollroadsfreeroads.pdf>
3 Kirk, Robert and William Mallett. Congressional Research Service "Funding and Financing Highways and Public Transportation." 2019.
<https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45350>.
National Railway Infrastructure Plan - 1

Nationally Significant Projects that then deliver outstanding results would be prioritized in the budget order or redesigned
to do so, obtaining true efficiency. For local transportation projects, simply considering zoning code required private
parking costs to be a public tax, whose costs are imposed by government mandate, could unify the local and intercity
infrastructure financial investment models and so rediscover true Federalism 4.
Along this path of reform, transportation planning should be reconsidered in light of a Time-Utility economic model that
aligns with consumer behavior for complete activities, where time values vary, such as in the preference for a Crossover
over a Sedan or for beneficial time uses such as mobile work or closely sited daily destinations along a commuter path,
valued at differing rates by consumers for the same nominal time. Ideally, the “Quant” could then be coupled to this time-
utility economic model, now freed to only estimate consumer behavior generating revenue, to become a level-setting
value in planning for long-term infrastructure investment while avoiding conflicts between parties advocating for one
approach or the other. The “Quant” is perhaps also the key to exploring why some shareholder backed toll road Traffic
and Revenue projections have been less than accurate, leading to financial failures, when the background bias might not
have been considered as a step function in revenue estimates for the use of the toll road.
Understanding this leveraging effect from local assets would produce true budget and resource use efficiency in
infrastructure design, guiding engineers as they design new road infrastructure to select a reasonable road width using an
iterative feedback of costs, instead of just trying to provide for faster speeds to get to the now more distant grocery. It
would also promote preventative maintenance and asset preservation as these are much cheaper than building the next
new and expanded project. The coming shift from fuel taxes to lump sum General Funds will likely continue with
significant challenges arriving as vehicle electrification allows for local use outside the federal revenue system as well as
longer vehicle lifespans.
All of these effects limit the federal revenue leveraged toward highway investments and reduce proportionate local
vehicle sales tax revenue. If the Federal program is structured instead to encourage highway investment in projects that
support higher local property values, eschewing disposable, one generation frontage road type developments made at great
public cost, then there could be sufficient local property tax revenue to maintain the local street network that is in turn the
leveraged base of highway investment, hence creating a virtuous circle of prosperity and affordable, efficient mobility.
An example of the budgetary conflict that could be amicable resolved is the question of the future of the Amtrak National
Network operating on shareholder owned railroad infrastructure. Here polling of citizens shows bipartisan support of
around three-quarters 5 for keeping or expanding these through routed interregional or long-distance trains, yet they are
often characterized as an inefficient 6 and questionable form of transportation by those who would apply existing economic
metrics developed originally for relative highway route selection. Still others contend that based on financial metrics,
these routes should be developed for greater volumes to be an efficient method of providing attractive and accessible
surface transportation to the interior cities when compared to other ground options for individual trip distances under 1000
miles before commercial aviation becomes highly efficient.
The difference in viewpoints on the National Network, or so called long-distance rail passenger routes, appears to be
diverge over the same long held assumption that highway projects are funded from incremental revenue, called user fees
by some, earned between exits; taking fuel taxes as something like a ticket, which the “Quant” is seeking to examine.
Clearly this is an important question to fully explore before making transportation planning decisions, such as shifting the
focus toward shorter intercity passenger rail routes less than 400 miles long; as a nationwide and widespread highway
investment gap indicates that a national scope for coordinated Federal investment in infrastructure is equitable for an
extended trip lengths, not just to solve urban congestion when the default highway program becomes too expensive. Thus
the equation for highway equivalent investment in rail infrastructure should include metrics for both a fixed investments
within congested regions and an extended tail of investment per traveled mile for the heartland, not just a fixed lump sum.
As always the governmental challenge is in determining an agreeable, reasonable rate of investment.
4
Dilger, Robert D. 2015. "Federalism Issues in Surface Transportation Policy: A Historical Perspective." Congressional Research Service.
<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40431.pdf>.
5 Mitchell, Dean. Amtrak Support Levels CO-4, KS-1 & KS-2 Congressional Districts. Survey Report. Saint Paul, MN: DFM Research, 2013.
<https://static.smart-union.org/worksite/PDFs/CO_KS_Amtrak_Survey_2013.pdf>
6House Hearing Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 113th Congress – Understanding the Cost Drivers of Passenger Rail, 2013.
<https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-113hhrg81149/CHRG-113hhrg81149>

The developed “Quant” could function as simply a justification for service lines within a lump sum federal program or it
could be applicable as a Federal Income Tax Credit in future Federal legislation. The latter could provide the maximum
amount of flexibility in operating a rail passenger or intermodal freight service when converted to a rate per train-mile,
though with protections for shareholder owned common carrier railroad infrastructure so their future operational decisions
are not constrained, allowing for innovation and efficiency.
These competitive programs could be combined with a large loss risk program for all ground based commuter and
intercity passenger transportation providers, using either railways or highways, that is less per person-mile than the costs
already borne through general fund social programs used to cover significant automobile accidents. Here true budget
efficiency is achieved by reducing the causation of social program spending on persons consuming the Federal budget.
When the highway equivalent “Quant” rate is applied to passenger rail routes using an average number of persons, the
resulting sixteen dollars per train-mile is roughly the existing long-term investment, but greater efficiency could be had
with expansions in volume at this level of investment instead of trying to cut operations toward no federal investment.
The “Quant” when applied to intermodal freight rail traffic, using an average number of equivalent commercial truck
trailers, at a rate of around twenty-one dollars per train-mile, could provide a capacity investment base to support fluid
mainline rail capacity. This is important as typically capacity studies of railway mainlines find that significant common
investments are needed just to get to a fluid operations baseline before considering higher speeds or more frequent
operations. To the extent that only passenger projects bear these initial costs, they appear less efficient than they should.
This investment could be coupled with a nationwide renewal of the agreement for access to the private railroads.
In addition, a set of fixed Tax Credits could be considered to support the relatively fixed needs with respect to train
volume for publicly held commuter rail infrastructure in congested regions, where no reasonable effort can clear a path
through built up urban areas for new highways. The “Quant” thus can be used to explore if changes in volume and
distance are possible in the general railway system under highway equivalent levels of investment to encourage efficiency.
Ultimately it is proposed to bring the entire railroad infrastructure investment program into its own stable, multi-year
equivalent trust fund so to speak, both shareholder owned and publicly held, based eventually on Federal Income Tax
Credits to encourage pairing. However, the credits would have to be earned through continued and improved train-mile
operations combined with a fixed investment for congested urban regions to move this Public Good infrastructure
spending off the federal discretionary budget as it is crimped by automatic spending on persons.
These program changes would allow for railway investments to occur in parallel to highway investments, in small
incremental steps so as to improve the network gradually in a more efficient manner where engineers could plan for multi-
year projects. The need for such a dual approach was known around and shortly after the 1956 Interstate bill, as President
Eisenhower who had called for the Interstate Highways funding to be “self-liquidating… through the assured increase in
gas taxes” 7, appointed General Bragdon to a Study Committee 8 on city mobility and urban highways. The full report
questioning urban highway applications was not issued in 1960 due to lobbying supporting a highway only solution.
For six decades it has thus been understand that all mobility needs cannot be met by highways, but a steady financial
funding mechanism has not been put in place perhaps due to a lack of understanding of Highway Trust Fund leveraging
the “Quant” is meant to represent in the broader United States, where toll roads are essentially only an occasional solution
to a limited bottlenecks. We now have the experience to see the need for sustained dual investment program.
The result of this dual investment would be ordered support for both domestic manufacturing through more economical
finished goods freight movement by expanded rail intermodal freight on shorter hauls and efficient nationwide passenger
movement in a forgotten intercity trip band of 200 to 1000 miles for trips by individuals that are often too uncomfortable
to drive while not being efficiently served by commercial aviation. Certainty in investment would serve to redevelop links
to the potential of the heartland of the country, supporting prosperity by distributing opportunity to the interior cities that
citizens there might be engaged more effectively in the wider economy for our joint prosperity.
7 FHWA. Ike's Grand Plan - Notes from President Eisenhower's 1954 Governor’s Conference Speech. n.d.
<https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/50grandplan.cfm>.
8 Mertz, Lee. The Bragdon Committee - Highway History. n.d. <https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/bragdon.cfm>.

National Transportation Planning Questions
The Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highway’s Inherent Leveraging
The funding of infrastructure investment in what many view to be the default travel option, the Interstate Highways, has
always been a slippery concept. Generally, a broad federal level excise “gas” tax was placed on the existing use of a vast
network of greater than 3.3 million miles of existing local streets, neighborhood lanes, and city boulevards, in turn largely
locally funded through city taxes or constructed with private property development mortgages. Then formulaic programs
direct the funds largely to only limited access intercity highways or wide suburban arterials.
This arrangement is like taxing all the grocery stores, cafes, and restaurants in town to build just a new cheap buffet. The
Federal policy question is that some marvel over the seeming consumer choice of the now lower priced buffet so to speak
without considering the leveraged investment toward higher grade highways. Of course we need widespread and
dependable investment in all infrastructure for national connectedness not divisions over particular approaches, but can
better investment metrics be used that actually throttle investment for both long-term government efficiency and growth?
4.2 Million Route Miles Today

The HTF largely leverages
excise (gas) taxes from the
use of locally financed
streets toward NHS
highways.
Locally Financed
Chart of Road Route Mileage all Roads Now Termed to be “Highways” - USDOT Highway Statistics 9
Along these lines the leveraged, directed investment program was established called the Highway Trust Fund (HTF),
which over the last decade has needed $141 Billion 10 of federal general fund transfers even atop the leveraged investment.
The proposed fixed investment per train-mile is less than the six-decade average value of funds flowing from someplace
other than fuel and use taxes collected between Interstate Highway exits, as detailed in Appendix A. Thus the “Quant”
rate would seem to be a reasonable metric for an appropriate level of Federal investment in intercity freight and passenger
railway infrastructure and facilities as the shift to General Funds continues.
9 USDOT-FHWA. Office of Highway Policy Information - Publications Archive. n.d. 2019.

<https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/hsspubsarc.cfm>.
10 GAO Funding the Nation's Surface Transportation System - High Risk Issue 2017.
<https://www.gao.gov/key_issues/funding_nations_surface_transportation_system/issue_summary>

Future Interstate Highway Investment Needs Projected to Increase Greatly
Recent studies on the future needs by the National Academies have pointed out the inflection point at which we have
arrived. Even after the $141 Billion additional investment, the Interstate highway network is falling behind in its ability to
provide today’s level of service into the future. Estimates of around an additional $36 Billion 11 annually of investment
over a period of twenty years have been sketched out to meet just population growth levels of additional travel, though
around a half of the vehicle miles traveled on the system are in fact commuter trips, not interstate trips.
Conceptually, this study also demonstrates that future Interstate Highway congestion will spread beyond urban corridors,
stretching far into rural areas. A true twenty year plan from the USDOT should consider the question of a citizen’s ability
to choose a different option to long-distance driving. These needed investments would increase the “Quant” historical
highway revenue gap by about a nickel a mile, to about eighteen cents per rural automobile mile traveled but perhaps new
alignments should be separated from the averages to explore how investment rates that are two to three times the average
rate, around forty cents per automobile mile traveled, can fit the needs of citizens in congested regions.
Federal Coordination Needed for National Network Rail Passenger Services – How We Got Here
Following a long period of Interstate Commerce Commission railroad rate regulation, Federal excise taxes on freight bills
and passengers tickets 12 flowing to the general fund, as well as higher than typical property taxes, the entry of highway
and aviation carriers using Federally funded infrastructure only partially paid for by per mile incremental tax revenues led
to a decline of both freight and passenger rail traffic resulting in many railroad bankruptcies. The original Congressional
and Administration discussion in 1970 13 leading up to the creation of Amtrak did not really address rail infrastructure
spending, appearing to take infrastructure access to be provided at a very minimal cost by the private railroads, clarified
by Legislation in 1973 as incremental cost with quality based performance incentives; supported on the basis of the
remaining Common Carrier responsibility.
The original Amtrak contracts are said to have taken the form of another Common Carrier assuming responsibility to
operate a through line service. No distinction existed then between corridor and national routes in the legislation, only an
exclusion for commuter routes not applied for urban Interstate Highways. Soon questions of who funded the base
mainline, terminal, and platform infrastructure in the long-term and at what cost arose as rail freight revenue continued to
decline for a decade after Amtrak’s creation but the old thought pattern of freight revenue funded general railroad
infrastructure with no public investment available remained entrenched in government.
The mainline rail traffic did not then exist so as to require infrastructure reinvestment but this question has now become
significant 14 as new capacity is needed on the interstate rail network for growing passenger and freight traffic that
incremental cost is challenged to support financially. Perhaps the concepts presented will allow for an amicable solution
for joint use rail lines whose owners have public roles but see great development incentives provided to other private
industry for business expansion of facilities while supporting railway mainlines cannot compete on a level field.
Recently, some have proposed solutions involving the devolution of funding responsibility to the states for rail and
highway infrastructure, which has proved problematic and has frequently been misinterpreted 15 as necessary for
operational efficiency. Certainly, individual states could be sponsors of passenger rail operations, gearing the operations
toward innovative services, but a federally coordinated Below-the-Rail infrastructure investment should be available for
both Amtrak and state sponsored services as well as higher quality intermodal railroad freight, just as it is for general use
Interstate Highways from the leveraged Highway Trust Fund filled by excise taxes on the use of locally funded streets.
11 The National Academies of Sciences Engineering Medicine. "Renewing the National Commitment to the Interstate Highway System: A
Foundation for the Future." PG 158, 2019. <https://www.nap.edu/download/25334>

12
Kennedy, John F. "Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States." 1962.
<https://books.google.com/books?id=L7raAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PA296&ots=Rjhtjr_DG-
&dq=federal%20railroad%20waybill%20excise%20tax&pg=PA296#v=onepage&q=federal%20railroad%20waybill%20excise%20tax&f=true>
13 Secretary of Transportation. "Designation of the Preliminary Routes to be Served by the National Railroad Passenger Corporation." Memo to the
President. 1970. <https://www.enotrans.org/wp-content/uploads/Creation-of-the-Amtrak-Route-Map.pdf>.

14 APPLICATION OF THE NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION UNDER 49 U.S.C. § 24308(a) – CANADIAN NATIONAL
RAILWAY COMPANY. Finance Docket No. 35743. Surface Transportation Board. 2013-2018.
<https://www.stb.gov/home.nsf/case?openform&caseID=30982&caseDocket=FD_35743_0>
15 Johnson, Matt and Malcolm Kenton. Amtrak Shouldn’t Axe the National Network. 2013. <https://ggwash.org/view/30421/amtrak-shouldnt-axe-
the-national-network>

The United States the Preeminent Interstate Transportation Compact
The framers of the US Constitution certainly saw a Public Good need for a more involved role for the Federal government
in promoting interstate communication and trade as they added common use post-roads to the previous Articles of
Confederation clause so as to state, “Congress shall have the power to… establish post-offices and post-roads.”
Justice Story in his 1833 commentary on the Constitution summarized the Public Good benefits of Congress establishing
or founding such an interstate transportation network as “It thus administers, in a very high degree, to the comfort, the
interests, and the necessities of persons, in every rank and station of life. It brings the most distant places and persons, as
it were, in contact with each other; and thus softens the anxieties, increases the enjoyments, and cheers the solitude of
millions of hearts…” 16 Lost on many modern readers is that the “post” refers to routes where there was a customary daily
distance citizens could expect to travel before seeking lodging at intermediate “posts”, in other words common use
infrastructure. Imagine holding today such a lofty common Public Good goal for an imperfect federal government as was
held then near to the founding?
Interestingly, within the same 1970 Nixon administration, where a direct federal coordinating role in providing investment
in the Public Good of continued rail passenger service was being discouraged, the same office was encouraging continued
federal coordination to keep lead in gasoline 17 despite the increasingly apparent public harm to health. Further still, the
general decline in city property values, desirability as traffic generators, and some would say the civil rights unrest of the
late 1960’s, followed the federally coordinated investment through the Housing Acts of 1949 to 1974 to acquire through
imminent domain, demolish 18, and resell to private developers through redevelopment authorities, sometimes at less than
cost, large swaths of existing inner core building stock not counted in highway costs. The goal then was to creatively
destroy the cities to fit new concepts of highways, parking, and campus style developments. Many of these parcels simply
sat empty for decades or were used for surface parking, contributing little to local taxes or local job opportunities.
To set the infrastructure question in the current budget debate over the future of the HTF, does the United States expect
Arizona to maintain I-15 across its geographic corner with no Federal financial assistance for the common Public Good of
interstate travelers and heavy commercial vehicles even though there are few exits within the state borders and following
previous federal overriding of various state’s commercial vehicle size and weight laws? Neither is it reasonable to expect
individual States and cities to create new compacts to support the base infrastructure needs, the equivalent post-road
function, needed for interstate rail passenger routes, be they operated by Amtrak, the States, or privately for profit and
development as the existing United States federal compact is already so charged!
Foundation of Millennial’s Urban Interest

To a large degree this author sees the millennial generation’s affinity for urban environments as a product of simply being
the first full generation since a return to stability in cities in the late 1990’s as recorded by the then drop then in violent
crime statistics that first rose after the earlier disturbance of markets by the redevelopment authorities. It does not appear
to be some new way of living but only the return to balance after the Federal disturbance, but what is lacking is a
widespread appearance of the effect in many heartland cities perhaps due to a lack of easy connections to larger
metropolitan areas, a question felt when one tries to recruit a specialist doctor or innovative industry to your city. The
housing and office preferences of the generation were enabled by the first wave of successful commercial urban
renovations and developments as soon as these projects had a stable financial foothold upon which to be planned and
constructed. In this way we are perhaps returning to the previous market conditions prior to the great post-war intrusions
into the market.
16 Story, Joseph. Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States. Boston, 1833.
<https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d4/Joseph_Story%2C_Commentaries_on_the_Constitution_of_the_United_States_%281st_ed
%2C_1833%2C_vol_III%29.pdf>
17 Needleman, Hebert L. "The Removal of Lead from Gasoline: Historical and Personal Reflections." 2000.
<http://www.unc.edu/courses/2006fall/envr/230/001/Needleman_2000.pdf>
18 Ammon, Francesca R. Bulldozer - Demolition and Clearance of the Postwar Landscape. Yale University Press, 2016. Author Interview at
<https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/02/urban-renewal-wastelands/516378/>

Fungible Capital and Operations Dollars – Long-Distance Trains Cost Allocation and Economics
Design engineers examining alternative project designs understand that dollars are fungible between capital and
operations using a discount rate, however there is always the temptation to “capitalize” ongoing items. Transportation
Secretary Volpe’s original 1970 plan for Amtrak 19 relied on future Federal capital for high-speed corridor routes which
could in turn float an operational gap for reduced national routes. Thus no annual funding was provided equivalent to the
“Quant” rate of Interstate Highway levering atop excise (gas) taxes on the use of locally funded streets. This was prior to
the Reagan era change in capital policy when Federal annual funds were first provided to support re-paving maintenance.
Trying to parse between capital and operations of common infrastructure eventually leads to problems.
Obviously the slower National Network Long Distance routes incur greater operating labor costs but equally as obvious
the faster Northeast Corridor routes incur greater infrastructure cost. To the extent that operational numbers, such as the
leftmost red portion of the chart below, are presented for Amtrak business lines excluding reoccurring infrastructure costs,
the analysis is incomplete. Recent letters from Amtrak to support their focus have excluded around $1.57 Billion in
infrastructure Route Costs that when apportioned by areas of infrastructure ownership, as on the rightmost green chart
portion, demonstrate a sustained need for investment for the NEC core. The operational numbers are confusing when what
are really capital leases to use the shareholder owned railroad lines are termed operating instead of infrastructure costs. To
downgrade onboard amenities contributing to Time-Utility in order to meet these definitions is counterproductive
particularly when the relative rates of investment are considered by passenger-mile metrics. Buying time through either
higher speed infrastructure or amenities that allow for increased Time-Utility while en-route should be equally considered
at the Federal level according to an Average Cost metric that considers both capital and operations as fungible dollars.
A detailed analysis of Amtrak’s APT accounting system categories has been conducted in Appendix G to separate costs
between Below-the-Rail infrastructure costs and Above-the-Rail operating costs, similar to the division present for
funding highways and airports, demonstrating that the Federal Amtrak investment is currently only for infrastructure.
19 Library of Congress - Congressional Research Service. "Amtrak Profitability: An Analysis of Congressional Expectations at Amtrak’s Creation."
2002. <http://research.policyarchive.org/1446.pdf>

Previous National Network Passenger Rail Route Eliminations Have Not Saved Costs
“I will be as straight as I can, Senator. First of all, I do not play politics with trains. The elimination of the Pioneer
preceded me as the president of Amtrak, and I cannot speak to what the basis was for that decision. I will tell you,
though, that generally, in retrospect, all of those eliminations back in 1995 and 1996 ended up costing the company
more in lost revenue than we were able to take out in the way of expenses, given the fixed cost nature of the
operation.” Statement of Former Amtrak President Mr. Warrington in 2000 to the US Senate 20
For intercity rail a long history of trying to reduce incremental expenses on the National Network of Long-Distance
Amtrak routes through cuts in both onboard amenities and the 1979, 1995, and 2005 route reductions, has led to
increasingly poorer results, while leaving behind both interstate travelers and the high fixed costs of the remaining NEC
urban congestion relief network.
Each round of cuts was typically preceded by a decision not to invest in equipment suitable for longer trips and cutbacks
in onboard food amenities on the long-distance trains that drive ticket revenue through Time-Utility gains for consumers.
Instead, these routes should evaluated atop a base investment set at the same rate of Federally coordinated, leveraged
investment above and beyond the direct (gas) excise taxes collected on Interstate Highways, with the investment set at a
fixed rate per train-mile for Below-the-Rail facilities and infrastructure. Atop this fixed base investment, internal Amtrak
metrics should consider incremental financial revenues and expenses to guide a business case for revenue funded
operations and equipment reinvestment, the same standard to which other public intercity transportation modes are held.
1969 Interstate Commerce Commission Cost Study
The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the predecessor to the Surface Transportation Board (STB), began to
change toward the end, determining the avoidable expense of running passenger trains on routes similar to long-distance
routes to be $6.7 per train-mile in a 1969 ICC report 21 to Congress, equivalent to $48.7 per train-mile in ($2018), yet
Amtrak now reports a Total Assigned Cost of $62.5 per train-mile for today’s much smaller capacity, simpler to maintain
trains, in turn reporting large losses from these assigned numbers to cover infrastructure elsewhere and overhead.
Undoubtedly, some of the difference reflects real diseconomy of scale in a single daily train in each direction, but the
Total Allocated Costs reported by Amtrak for such routes include many fixed costs prorated to the route that would not be
eliminated with the discontinuance of the route or segments of such. The exhaustive ICC study provides an independent
collaboration of the levels in Appendix B which show that passenger trains have a declining average cost curve with
respect to increased volume at the current operating levels, providing a revenue to cost solution should rail infrastructure
investment be understood in light of the highway investment leveraging from taxes on locally funded streets.
Summary Figure from ICC Report - Investigation of Cost of Intercity Rail Passenger Service, 1969
20 Senate Hearing Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 106th Congress. - OVERSIGHT HEARING ON AMTRAK, 2000.
<https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-106shrg85968/CHRG-106shrg85968>
21 Interstate Commerce Commission. "Investigation of Costs of Intercity Rail Passenger Service." 1969.
<https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015004568708;view=1up;seq=49>

National Railroad Passenger Corporation Reporting has Changed Often – Marginal Costing is Key
The Legislature has directed the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) to publish short-term avoidable profit
or loss 22 yet those marginal or incremental cost metrics that are needed to guide business decisions and separate out fixed
infrastructure costs needs for legislative guidance are still not available to the public as required by law. This lack of
information is masking one of the inherent benefits of intercity rail, the low incremental cost to add additional capacity to
existing trains. Trains have a strongly declining Average Cost curve with respect to capacity that should be considered.
When a strategy of reducing costs is implemented, that does not consider a base of acceptable Federal investment per
train-mile similar to the leveraged nationwide investment rate above and beyond the incremental fuel taxes collected
between Interstate highway exits that the “Quant” determines, a resulting loss of Net Income may occur should revenues
decline faster than costs decline. For example, changes to eliminate fresh meal preparation onboard dining cars of eastern
trains such as on the Crescent route is likely going to save around $1.7 per train-mile in labor, benefits, and away from
home costs, but the cost of consumables will likely rise in move to a ready-to-serve food model and many preferential hot
breakfast items will no longer be available. If the ticket revenue per premium sleeper passenger-mile decreases anywhere
near $0.04 the total net savings is likely very small.
However, a strategy of increasing revenues from adding two new sleeping class cars to each Crescent route train, at an
incremental cost including equipment capital of $7.0 per train-mile under the existing labor coverage rates as
demonstrated later, could add $10.3 per train-mile in revenue for a $3.1 per train-mile net after sales cost just on the
operation of these cars, which consistently sell out. Then the larger pool of On Board Service staff from the increased
volume could be deployed to serve in the dining car with a union side agreement to efficiently meet demand as there
would be enough crew to cover greeting passengers boarding at stops along the way and provide for staff rotations.
So the $3.1 Net could become allocated ticket revenue allowed by the statue to cover the Food & Beverage reform goals 23
on an incremental basis to cover the $1.7 cost per train-mile of retaining fresh food preparation onboard the dining car
while avoiding possible ticket revenue decreases, a preferable outcome from consideration of incremental effects atop a
base. This operation would also serve to strengthen the overall desirability of the Amtrak Guest Rewards frequent travel
program for NEC trips by providing desirable options for rewards trips to the many vacation destinations off the NEC
along the Crescent route.
To this end an analysis of a complete route’s incremental, or avoidable costs above the rest of the Amtrak NEC core
infrastructure, has been independently conducted to guide the Public Good operations discussion focusing on the
Southwest Chief Route. The potential revenue and cost impacts of service changes is explored in Appendix B to see if
there are volumes under which revenues could cover all the long-term Above-the-Rail costs, such as equipment, staffing,
and operations, which appears possible with added passenger capacity due to a declining Average Cost curve with respect
to passenger volume.
Essentially this is how the Interstate Highways are structured, as incremental accident costs borne by governments alone
outweigh the fuel taxes raised between exits, requiring leveraged infrastructure investment, Below-the-Road, through
(gas) excise taxes on the use of locally funded streets to fill the Highway Trust Fund. Thus the proposal is for Federal
Investment in intercity passenger rail be reserved for fixed Below-the-Rail Facilities needed to support operations, such as
infrastructure, mainline tracks, bridges, yards, signaling, platforms, risk, security, and management of rail infrastructure,
leaving a balance of incremental revenue and cost Above-the-Rail to respond to the consumer.
22
49 USC. §24315. Reports and audits (a) Amtrak Annual Operations Report...(1) for each route on which Amtrak provided intercity rail passenger
transportation during the prior fiscal year, includes information on- (A) ridership; (B) passenger-miles; (C) the short-term avoidable profit or loss for
each passenger-mile; (D) the revenue-to-cost ratio; (E) revenues; (F) the United States Government subsidy; (G) the subsidy not provided by the
United States Government; and (H) on-time performance. <https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title49-
section24315&num=0&edition=prelim>
23
49 USC. §24321. Food and beverage reform (a) Plan.-Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of the Passenger Rail Reform and
Investment Act of 2015, Amtrak shall develop and begin implementing a plan to eliminate, within 5 years of such date of enactment, the operating
loss associated with providing food and beverage service on board Amtrak trains. b) Considerations.-In developing and implementing the plan,
Amtrak shall consider a combination of cost management and revenue generation initiatives, including- (1) scheduling optimization; (2) on-board
logistics; (3) product development and supply chain efficiency; (4) training, awards, and accountability; (5) technology enhancements and process
improvements; and (6) ticket revenue allocation. <https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title49-
section24321&num=0&edition=prelim>

Combined Automobile and Passenger Rail Network – Can Outperform Regional Aviation
Commercial aviation has perhaps been provided with the most generous infrastructure investment irrespective of cost
recovery as there was no dedicated accounting of airfield costs until the 1970 24 Airport and Airway Trust Fund, by which
time almost all of the main airway infrastructure was in place through conversions of military airfields. Yet still
operational cost atop this long established infrastructure is challenged for trips under 1000 miles per the chart below.
A combined ground network consisting of up to a 100 mile automobile trip on one end combined with an overnight
passenger train can outperform regional airline travel when considering the total trip cost including lodging for many
individual trip lengths less than 750 miles, or even trips up to 1000 miles that require an airport hub connection. This is
due to the price curve (nearly representative of a cost curve in a competitive market with low barriers where governments
own all the infrastructure) which has strongly increasing average per-mile values below 1000 mile trip lengths.
Note that even in the season of cheap Jet A fuel and new regional jets, illustrated in the 1998 chart above, average ticket
prices at a 700 mile trip distance have only changed from around $0.40 ($2018) per 1998 passenger mile to $0.35 per
2018 passenger mile during the route restructurings, but the uncounted costs of additional baggage and change fees, the
decreasing size of aircraft seating, and lost time of security screening have perhaps dropped the overall utility of the
product in a traveler’s estimation. If one looks carefully the elimination of mini-hub non-stops can be seen between the
1998 and 2018 chart as well as the influence of the one large Intra-California under 400 mile trip airline market.
24 FAA. Budget - Airport & Airway Trust Fund (AATF). 2019. <https://www.faa.gov/about/budget/aatf/>

Intercity Rail – 200 to 1000 Mile Trip Lengths
Are Most Addressable Nationwide
Access time and cost from airports, particularly in large metropolitan areas, combined with the cost curve above,
unproductive time, uncertain waiting in hub airport transfers, and the desire to generally arrive in the morning, now limits
the utility of regional aviation for shorter trips. It simply appears to no longer be possible to make a same day business trip
in the Author’s experience without a direct flight, necessitating at least one hotel night or perhaps two. However, there is
an aversion to long-distance highway trips that shows up as a large modal shift away from highways at trip distances
approximately that of a full days’ worth of highway driving 25.
To understand the space between these commercial airfare and long-distance highway driving consumer choice questions
for 200 mile to 1000 mile individual trip lengths, several worked examples using a proposed Time-Utility economic
analysis methods are outlined in Appendix E, including special worked studies under a modified BUILD grant framework
using experimental values.
25 Schafer, Andreas. "REGULARITIES IN TRAVEL DEMAND: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE." MIT, 2000.
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.454.5721&rep=rep1&type=pdf>

Highway Trip-Time Competitive National Network Rail Passenger Routes
Due to the inherent leveraging of highway infrastructure from taxes on the use of locally financed streets, travel by the
Interstate Highway system is the intercity travel option that occupies the largest modal share of intercity trips in the
United States. Hence it is reasonable to compare actual trip times by highway to those offered for trips under the apparent
1000 mile pricing breakpoint noted for commercial aviation. Amtrak by statue is to consider benchmarking their service
provisions against intercity trip times such as the highway trip curves below that include rest and meal stops, yet has
largely ignored the overlapping trip options on through running National Network rail passenger routes, particularly
comparisons against long distance driving for departures at the end of the day after productive time at the destination.
Average Highway Speeds - Trip Length, Rest, and Time of Day Influences
While overall trip times are important, even individual trip lengths over 200 miles not terminating in a large metropolitan
area can be highly competitive for intercity passenger rail due to the “lost-time” factor of spending too much unproductive
time driving even for a conceptual higher speed Class 4A mainline, which the Time-Utility methods explores. However,
to do so train stations need to embrace efficient automobile rental and parking options that are linked to the ticket. Such
links broadly fit within the push for Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS) many automakers are pursuing as a future market.
Daytime Rail Departures become

trip-time competitive with travel
by highways past 250 mile trips,
but have prior Time-Utility value.
Evening Rail Departures are trip-time competitive with travel by

highways and have Time-Utility values during daytime portions

Proposed Railway Infrastructure Investment Rate Equal to Rural Interstate Highways
The proposed long-term total level of Below-the-Rail investment in this paper is slightly less than the leveraged Interstate
Highway investment derived from taxes on the use of locally funded streets calculated in Appendix A.
Intermodal Rail Freight Tax Credit = NRPC Trackside Boarding Platform

$21.0 per train-mile Investment Capital, ADA mods, Terminal Tracks, and
Security = $8.0 per train-mile Investment
USDOT Large Loss Liability Pool (Operator

NRPC Mainline Track Capital Lease = covers small claims) = $0.007 per passenger-
$8.0 per train-mile Investment mile to allow for Joint Infrastructure use
Illustration of Proposed Components of Investment – Image Copyright Craig Walker

The proposed fixed rate for intercity rail is equivalent to the hard-dollar, leveraged Interstate Highway investment of
$0.109 per rural automobile vehicle-mile, resulting from taxing the use of locally financed streets then directing the funds
narrowly toward highway type projects, combined with the publically borne accident costs of $0.025, for an equivalent
$0.134 per automobile mile as discussed in Appendix A. While these values are expressed to several significant digits, the
reality is this calculation is backward looking and subject to likely a +/- 30% uncertainty as rural mileage has changed.
To convert this to a person-mile equivalent a 1.39 average automobile occupancy is used combined with a 180 passenger
per train-mile average for a total of $17.4 per equivalent train-mile. The proposed funding rate is thus $16.0 per train-mile
plus a proposed USDOT large loss liability pool at budget rate of $0.007 per passenger-mile, even though this is a trailing
metric. Many long-distance routes often in the near past exceeded this number of average passengers per train-mile until
recent revisions to limit passenger car capacity were implemented. It is important to note that new build Interstate
Highway type projects far exceed the original system’s average investment requirements proved over six-decades.
Note however, that this financial infrastructure investment metric does not count the substantial accident cost savings
accruing to persons who would otherwise drive along the route, around half of all current riders. The otherwise
uncompensated total economic value of lifetime losses from accidents and lost wages is around $0.11 per rural automobile
vehicle mile as discussed in Appendix A. The Economic Benefit to Cost calculations in Appendix E considers these
factors where costs are currently assumed on other public budgets or borne as personal losses. This is important in order to
properly order analysis between Financial and Economic methods. When thinking of the current question of national
investment priorities a congestion free Raton Pass route that the Southwest Chief route uses is a relative bargain at the
additional investment rates called for in the future relative to existing rural Interstate Highway investments.

Equal Citizen Accessibility in Federal Programs
Within Federal transportation planning there does need to be a consideration of equal access to funding. Consider the
example of the grandparents who have spent many years of their life in a community, building a business, donating,
educating, and contributing to the development of the wealth of the city's tax base that largely finances local
infrastructure. Currently, the Federal government is providing somewhat stable funding in most instances only for the
highway option from an excise (gas) tax on the use of the large base of locally financed streets, with no transportation
planning consideration for the actual needs of people who desire to make longer trips between the heartland interior cities.
Why shouldn't this couple expect the Federal government to devote a prorated, equal amount of investment in a passenger
train route to accommodate a physical limitation, an immutable personal characteristic, such as declining eyesight? They
could be just fine driving around town during the day, but have difficulty making long trips by automobile, particularly at
night or in poor weather. Once the financial reality of a near parity in required external investment rates between Interstate
Highways and Intercity Railroads, as discussed herein is understood, other legal accessibility considerations for Federal
decision making become significant questions to answer in setting public policy or upon judicial review of decisions.
It is also important to consider that rail transportation has been tasked by Federal legislation and rulemaking to provide
public transportation vehicles with geometries that most closely approach the architectural standards for accessible
buildings, far exceeding 26 space requirements in public use Motor-coaches and Aircraft. These accessibility provisions
extend to all aspects of travel for those with partial accessibility concerns, such as restrooms available in transit, resting,
sleeping, and food service facilities. To the degree that there is a choice between equal financial investment levels for a
public service that provides greater transportation accessibility, the sponsoring department may need to conduct a formal
review to assure that intercity passenger rail route and amenity eliminations do not reduce the equity required under law.
Innovation, Ownership, and Competition - Investments Needed in Authorization Legislation

Just as in Hybrid Public Private Partnership (P3) arrangements, there has to be some profitable incentive for the
individuals engaged in providing the service to propose and operate an efficient service. Currently, this incentive is
lacking within the Amtrak arrangement, as metrics tied to cuts to operating costs will not affect the fixed appropriation
level in the near term, leaving more cash on the table, but ultimately degrade the long-term Public Good proposition.
One solution, enacted into Public Law, was the creation of the Competitive Pilot program to invite those with an
agreement with the infrastructure owner (railroad) to submit an application to operate the route. This Author commented
within the FRA rulemaking framework 27 with worked examples of the proposed rules deficiencies, but was unable to
sway rule provisions that would have made the competitive aspect more probable.
Subsequent events to the rulemaking have demonstrated why there must be some incremental competitive pressure for
service improvements to occur instead of consistent retrenchment and reduction of service. The provision of a base
investment by train-mile for rail passenger infrastructure may provide the incentive for Amtrak, or any other operator, to
develop a program of long-term improvements in all routes while leaving open the possibility of another operator being
able to lead the route operation, with appropriate infrastructure risk mitigation, should Amtrak decline to provide the
Public Good service.
Consider that the 1971 to 1981 Auto-Train Corp. 28 private long-distance intercity service started after Amtrak would have
likely survived and expanded under the proposed base investment in rail passenger infrastructure per train-mile as the
route, now operated by Amtrak, comes just within covering from revenue all of its total allocated costs, including
infrastructure payments. Now think of the public response should such convenient auto-ferry services spread throughout
the country on a reasonable basis at an equivalent governmental investment rate.
26 United States Access Board. "Update of the Guidelines for Transportation Vehicles." 1991-2016. <https://www.access-board.gov/guidelines-and-
standards/transportation/vehicles/update-of-the-guidelines-for-transportation-vehicles>
27 Payne, Virgil. "Comments on FRA Rulemaking - Competitive Passenger Rail Service Pilot Program." 2016.
<https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp=50&so=DESC&sb=postedDate&po=0&dct=PS&D=FRA-2016-0023>.
28 Wikipedia. Auto-Train Corporation. 2019. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Auto-Train_Corporation>

Beneficial Changes for Future Authorization Legislation
1. Establish a large loss $295 Million per occurrence, liability pool at the USDOT for all ground passenger common
carriers operating from accessible terminals, using both railways or highways, with coverage provided by the
USDOT at a budget rate of $0.007/passenger mile; significantly below the existing rates other Federal general
fund social programs expend on automobile accidents outside the HTF. The route operators would in turn be
responsible for arranging first-dollar coverage of at least $2 Million per occurrence at a safety record rated
deductible, which the insurance market could price based on the operator’s safety record and management plan.
2. Structure Federal Amtrak and Common Carrier investments through railroad industry income Tax Credits either
claimed directly by private owners or assigned to the USDOT for national held assets according to Appendix C.
a. Fixed investments in two groups of unique bottleneck infrastructure costs, Northeast Corridor (NEC) and
State Corridors, whose costs are largely unchanging with respect to train-mile volume. This is the least
expensive way to provide intercity travel capacity for shorter intercity trips in crowded urban areas where
land for expansion is occupied, funded at a level of $0.9 Billion annually for each, $1.8 Billion total.
b. Variable investments in terminal and line-haul infrastructure by Train-mile for NEC, National Network,
Private, and State Corridor intercity rail passenger services that cross a state boundary or are over 50
miles in route length, the intercity trip cutoff point used in various USDOT studies, measuring through
car train connections as the full connecting route length. Funding passenger trains at a $16.0 per train-
mile Interstate Highway equivalent investment metric would consolidate many of the various USDOT
Federal programs, the FRA for Amtrak and the FTA for commuter rail, provide coordination for
infrastructure expansion and long-term improvement where such services mix, and allow for efficient
incremental improvements in a multi-year construction program.
c. Variable investment in Intermodal rail freight infrastructure at a $21.0 per train-mile Interstate Highway
equivalent investment metric for the first 800 miles between public terminals, for nimble private
investment to ensure major capacity projects are pursued to support the national economy efficiently.
d. Rebate fully all highway fuel taxes paid by Motor coach operators on Common Carrier routes to simplify
funding given the existing very low rates of infrastructure cost recovery anyway from operators due to the
existing leveraged highway investment noted in Appendix A and partial rebates in Federal and State law.
e. Rebate fully local property taxes paid on mainlines by railroads on routes with Class 4 track or above.
3. Enable Competitive Pilot Project petitioners to optionally pass-through as a NRPC subcontract, track access rights
and agreements when NRPC Train and Engine Operating crews or the infrastructure owner crews are used from
existing crew bases; revising the competitive pilot rule to allow petitioners to count these pass-through, sub-
contracted, provisions as meeting the requirements to first have an access agreement in this instance. This is
similar to the pass-through arrangement the States enjoy when sponsoring rail services and as such has survived
legal challenge. This also recognizes that NRPC exclusively acts as the gateway to the remaining Common
Carrier right of access for passenger operations at incremental cost with performance incentives. The action would
spur NRPC to respond competitively to marketplace opportunities or another operator may take up the challenge.
4. Extend the Competitive Pilot franchise period to at least 8 years, with dedicated funding from a pool of related
federal refundable Tax Credits assigned in the year of award so as not to rely on future appropriations.
5. Ensure a USDOT buy-back provision exists for equipment purchased for Competitive Pilot operations at the end
of contract, as there is now not enough volume, as exists in the United Kingdom, for leasing companies.
6. Simplify the Competitive Pilot program agreement starting point as such has been left to be arbitrated through a
complicated and lengthy STB process should an agreement not be forthcoming. It would be advantageous for
Legislation to set a upper level cost to access nationally held assets like terminals and yards as well as state
funded commuter infrastructure that will always be jointed shared as well as specifying the actual investment to
be provided by the US on the route in lieu of the Amtrak subsidy should an existing route be assumed from
Amtrak. Conceptually, these values could be near to those proposed for Amtrak’s federal funding in Appendix C,
thus providing a level playing field for competition and certainly when bidding.

Rail Passenger Revenue and Traffic Design
Time-Utility Model Fits Traveler Choices Better than Time-Saved (VTTS) Model
Conceptually, we all know that time has different positive and negative rates in an economy. We actually pay for the
privilege of sitting in a coffee shop “wasting time” away. Even our recounting of the quality of an experience suggests
different values. If we say “We had such a great time at dinner last night, the time just flew away…” then the perceived
cost of that time was low. If we say “The line inched along behind the accident backup, the time drug on forever…” then
the perceived cost of time was high, so that it could be measured as an economic disutility to that person, relative in both
cases to what one wanted to be doing at that time of day. There is always a difficult task to model the financial result of
just the value of time, what one would pay with cash, but it does affect a consumer’s choice of an overall product very
much, hence the use of economic models.
But what if the economic models traditionally used for transportation fail to capture values for long-distance travelers?
Herein is another overlooked key to designing a transportation network. The conventional USDOT approach, originating
from 1950 era transportation planning methods, is to use an economic benefit-cost analysis to judge transportation
projects, using set values of in-vehicle time savings, known as Value of Travel Time Savings (VTTS), that are largely the
same across various types or modes of ground transportation, which are then compared to infrastructure financial costs.
Further still even to this day US modeling completely ignores time of day drivers in trip generation calculations 29 contrary
to many experiences where the first question asked in planning a trip is when will we get there.
While it is largely true that say consumers will pay not much more for a slightly more comfortable airline seat, as they
perceive almost all of such experiences to be nearly the same, bearing the same utility; it is not true that options that
enable significantly different beneficial activities to occur are disregarded by consumers, say a flat-bed airline seat.
For example, friends of the Author would wake up very early to start a long car trip, with the goal of driving while their
young children were still asleep. They gained more net utility of time from driving overnight in that they could talk
quietly and continue the trip peacefully. In this case the government still invested at the same average financial value for
the below-the-road infrastructure, but based on consumer economics they choose a different product so to speak, a partly
overnight car trip. As another example, do consumers buy crossover because they are faster or cost less, or because the
time spent is more enjoyable within them due to the interior volume and seating position? Perhaps aspiring after high
speed rail is not the only solution to the problem, though the Southwest Chief route operating at 90 MPH over several
segments is perhaps already a very good compromise between speed, comfort, and access to population centers.
Passenger rail operators outside the US have explored Quantifying true consumer preference for utility of time onboard,
terming it a Value of Comfort (VoC) 30 planning metric, which explores productive use of time for mobile work, rest,
dining, drinks, and other hospitality services which could extend into the beginning and end experience of the entire trip,
such as through sheltered taxi drop offs, onward local transportation, or short duration rental cars booked at the same time
as the ticket purchase. These type of consumer evaluations can be compared to relatively expensive mainline speed
improvements to achieve reduced times in just the main segment that consumers may not view as highly if other parts of
the trip are disagreeable.
Ideally, for daytime corridors this could take the form of a circular slow speed distribution run around the metro area so
that intercity passengers could board at a close by station and have a one seat ride with few transfers as proposed as a
“Metro Flyer”, instead of one central station connected by a non-stop high-speed rail link. For overnight National
Network long-distance trains it means various ways to allow the trip to start and conclude at highly demanded times,
through twice daily operation of a mirrored interregional through line schedule or by through car lines set-out at major en-
route station sidings for desirable boarding and alighting times.
29 Federal Highway Administration. "Foundational Knowledge to Support a Long-Distance Passenger Travel Demand Modeling Framework Part A:
Final Report." 2015. <https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/analysisframework/docs/national_model.pdf>
30 KiM Netherlands Institute for Transport Policy Analysis. The Value of Comfort in Train Appraisal - English Summary. 2016.
<https://english.kimnet.nl/publications/papers/2016/10/5/the-value-of-comfort-in-train-appraisal-kopie>

Short Mobility as
a Service (MaaS)
Automobile Link
Economic Time-Utility Gain over Middle

Segment as a Passenger not Driving
Easy Automobile
“Cutoff” Access
from Suburbs
Automobile Access shown on Chart from MetroFlyer Proposal of Dr. Martland and Dr. Lu 31 32
As an example minor schedule revisions could produce more attractive arrival times into the Los Angeles metro area on
the Southwest Chief route. After all, more utility to a traveler is had arriving at 8 AM after an overnight trip than arriving
earlier at 6 AM, before being forced out to a waiting room before other businesses open. Consumers generally look for
travel options that allow them to accomplish the same daily activities they want to do at near the same time that they
would do them otherwise, while aspiring to gain the benefits of leisure or business travel. Along the way, consumers of
ground transportation often make choices for more expensive, but more comfortable arrangements.
This approach will require incremental rebuilding the existing network at a much lower cost than building just a few high
speed routes, as the name of the game is broad network coverage at reasonable cost. Local networks of general system rail
around urban areas would support both intercity rail, commuter rail, and ideally domestic freight intermodal terminals,
which would all combine for efficiency.
Pricing Approaches
Prices should be set on travels parties, with costs increasing only slightly as the party increases, equivalent to automobile
costing. This is a better way to segment the marketplace between Business and Leisure travel, particularly for families. So
in this way the advance pricing for groups of coach passengers that could fit in a single automobile would begin to level
off as it approached the $0.40 per mile variable cost measure for automobiles. Groups of sleeper passengers would see the
cost level for a combined suite of bedroom accommodations level off below the $0.80 per mile full cost of a full SUV.
Atop this pricing index advance purchase discounts could be set in the reservation system to manage demand.
Reduced Access Cost Toward and Within Stations

Coordinated one-way daytime automobile rental segments added to ticketed itinerary from an off-line community to a
station could serve to expand the market reach for premium long-haul multi-city services and for those who might not
have an automobile available to can make a long trip reliably. Conceptually, this would allow smaller city rental agencies
to cycle rental stock to larger cities for auction and replacement while also supporting downtown automobile rental
agencies near to a station that are in turn needed for allied convention and visitor traffic at nearby hotels and eateries.
31 Alex Lu, Dalong S. Shi and Carl D. Martland. "The Vital Role of Metropolitan Access in Intercity Passenger Transportation." MIT, 2002.
<http://www.mit.edu/~uic/metro-TRBv3.6.1.pdf>.
32 Lu, Alex. "From the Limiteds and the Zephyrs to the 21st Century MetroFlyer." MIT, 2003. <http://www.mit.edu/~uic/TRB-
handouts.ring.8.1.pdf>.

In this way a prospective intercity traveler could enter a city to city zip code search and get actual priced results that
combine the flexibility of an automobile for shorter distance daytime driving with productive non-driving time over the
longer middle segment as an intercity rail passenger. Ideally, such pricing would also include group insurance coverage.
Image of Integrated Automobile (Self Driving, Cab, or Ride Share) and Transit trip planner Courtesy of Citymapper
Station franchises could also serve as a means to reduce direct operating cost while making the station area more
attractive. Examples of this are combined coffee shop, express package pickup, and operator neutral rental car locations,
all Amtrak branded under a franchise type arrangement. The physical passenger platforms adjacent to the tracks would
still remain the responsibility of NRPC due to their special railroad construction, design, and maintenance requirements.
Premium Offerings have Significant Unmet Potential – Reservations Turned Away
There appears to insufficient capacity to offer enough “stock” to bring in full-rate business or leisure travel booked in the
one to two week interval closer to departure dates. SABER based corporate travel systems often block the National
Network trains. For a full understanding of the market potential that has been turned away, Amtrak should study phone
requests and internet searches that go unmet for lack of available space in a discussion over proper train capacity.
As an example, in 1973 the Southwest Chief route often operated at an 18 car train length 33, employing six double-deck
coaches and six single-level sleepers featuring 45 private bedrooms, for a total capacity of 556 persons, with two lounge
cars and two dining cars, compared to 318 persons capacity today with only 14 premium revenue private bedrooms. The
train also exchanged through cars in Kansas City for eastern travel, building revenue in the middle segment.
Yet Amtrak was able to raise fares for this service that year and came the closest they every have toward revenue covering
all of the total Capital and Operational cost of any route, even the NEC, requiring only around $9.0 34 ($2018) per train-
mile of investment on a cost plus 5% contract then to the host railroad to operate the service, half the equivalent “Quant”
highway investment rate when converted to an average trainload of people.
What happened thereafter was likely a focus on the Northeast Corridor after a 1973 Penn Central bankruptcy court ruling
that Amtrak was the majority user of the Northeast Corridor 35, hence responsible for the majority of the costs as well as
various reform concepts from the USDOT that focused more on short corridors fitting the congestion relief model 36 and
less on demonstrated consumer demand leading up to the 1979 route cuts. Likely the general rise in violent crime in large
cities from the mid-1970’s to the mid-1990’s also suppressed ridership though it is difficult to break this effect out
entirely. Further, restoration of large stations such as Washington Union Station also bring about increased ticket sales.
For these reasons a general re-investment in equipment is proposed with the goal of funding all costs above-the-rail with
consumer revenues from an increase in the passenger carrying capacity within each train while providing generous space.
33 Frailey, Fred. Zephyrs, Chiefs & Other Orphans: The First Five Years of Amtrak. 1977.
34 USDOT. "Report to Congress on the Rail Passenger Service Act." 1973. (Before the 1974 USDOT allocation revisons added cost to long-haul
routes it appears that the net was $0.08 x 199 persons per train-mile = $1.95 per train-mile in $1973 - See Appendix F for more detail)
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015048060373;view=2up;seq=96>.
35 ICC 342 Finance Docket 27353. Trustees of the Property of Penn Central Transportation Co, Debtor - Compensation for Passenger Service. 1973.
<https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015024020268;view=2up;seq=2>.
36 Runte, Alfred. "The Last Train To Grand Canyon: How Amtrak Fails The National Parks—And America." 2018.
<https://www.nationalparkstraveler.org/2018/08/essay-last-train-grand-canyon-how-amtrak-fails-national-parks-and-america>.

General Passenger Equipment Improvements:
In general the existing Superliner car fleet was built with several departures from previous
levels of comfort. Notably the lavatories where designed to mimic the smaller size of those
on aircraft, even though space is not on a premium on trains to anywhere near the same
extent. The sleeper rooms also reverted to essentially an economy bedroll atop seat
cushions, instead of previously used thicker mattress for many accommodations. Both of
these questions could be addressed in an interior rebuilding program to recapitalize the
structural shells for an additional 21 years of service life with a developed plan to deal
with 40 year inspections.
Another general improvement in the between car passageways, known as diaphragms,
would be to seal the passageway with positive HVAC air pressure. In this concept, tapered
engagement lugs at the joint in the walkway would align the seal while lateral shock
absorbers between car bodies and the mating surface would reduce body roll. This sealed
passageway would eliminate the need for opening end car end doors, increasing the
comfort for less mobile travelers, while reducing dust, noise, and door maintenance.
Image of Sealed Separable Passageways – Courtesy of CAF
Proposed New Coach Service Equipment for Reinvestment:

A new 2:1 seating configuration (2 seats on one side of the aisle and 1 seat on the other side) on multiple levels is
proposed as the basis for a reinvestment in this service. This would allow for seats to be sold as aisle access singles at
reservation time at a premium price if the ratio of doubles to singles is off relative to the equipment. The existing 2:2
seating configuration coaches could be rebuilt for continued use, with the seat spacing decreased slightly to become a
value plus type of service offering for shorter trips.
Proposed Characteristics of Rebuilt Coaches
A. Lockable valuables compartment under each seat, accessible with ticket or mobile device scan.
B. Larger restrooms employing newer toilet technologies using clear water and self-cleaning features.
C. Fixed seat backs, with inwardly reclining backs and cushions.
Image of Proposed New Railjet/ Nighjet Coach Equipment – Courtesy of Priestman Goode

Why Overnight Rail Travel Works - Reimagining Overnight Service Objectives
There are two projects underway in Europe, even though the geography has supported higher speed rail service 37, to
significantly reinvest in new sleeper equipment. These operations are driven by the growing realization following a
reduction in overnight services that the time spent shuttling from an airport to a hotel when entering a large metropolitan
region can eat into a significant portion of the daylight hours as well as the reality that there are a limited number of routes
where dedicated high-speed infrastructure can be efficient.
In both of these cases the operators are marketing these services as superior to what we would call regional aviation for
trips under 600 miles, far beyond what US transportation planners suggest is the target for intercity passenger rail trips.
ScotRail Caledonian Sleeper Franchise

In this case a bid was put out for an operator to run the service for 15 years if they were to reinvest in new equipment with
the government covering only a portion of the capital costs upfront. The operation of this route is separate from the base
passenger operator over nationally held infrastructure. So the nighttime and daytime services are separate but coordinated
so one can book one-way journeys on the same national reservation site. Significantly, this service also hosts long-
distance commuters on both ends who desire to get to the terminal city early.
New Suite Room - Image Courtesy of Caledonia Sleeper Franchise
ÖBB Nightjet and Railjet – Overnight and Daytime Travel Service Pairing
In this case the national rail operator is pairing an overnight service (Nightjet) with their existing daytime corridor trains
(Railjet) so that they can offer a more comprehensive travel service to conduct same day business. Conceptually, one
could use the Nightjet service to reach an early morning appointment, then begin a return trip after lunch and arrive back
later that night, all in less daytime hours than possible either driving or using connecting airline routes due to the need for
nighttime rest. This new equipment consists of Siemens Viaggio 38 coaches somewhat similar to the private operator of the
US Brightline now Virgin Trains Florida service, ordered by ÖBB at $2.8 M USD per car.
37 European Parliament - Transport and Tourism. "Passenger Night Trains in Europe: The End of the Line?" 2017.
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/601977/IPOL_STU(2017)601977_EN.pdf>
38 International Railway Journal. ÖBB agrees €1.5bn deal with Siemens for long-distance trains. 2018. <https://www.railjournal.com/rolling-
stock/bb-agrees-e145bn-deal-with-siemens-for-long-distance-trains/>.

Image of Proposed new Nightjet Suite Room – Courtesy of OBB
Proposed New Sleeping Service Equipment for Reinvestment:

New room configuration allowing for all seats to face forward, with en-suite full bathrooms for all bedroom sleeper
rooms, and available queen sized beds are proposed as the basis for a reinvestment in this service so as to obtain premium
revenue at moderately increased average costs. These improvements would allow for a new car of this type to bring in
significantly more revenue per mile, while covering all of the incremental costs to add it to the train. There is substantial
evidence that this market segment is just barely being serviced by Amtrak compared to new worldwide train
configurations.
A typical six person SUV has about 61square feet of floor area to the edge of the window glass, including the large
windshield dash area. Just the main area of one of the larger two person sleeping compartment would be 38 square feet,
not counting the restroom. Two rooms combined into a suite to hold a family of up six would equal 68 square feet, with a
much higher ceiling height and with the inclusion of two private restrooms available to the travelers whenever they desire
that are not counted in the floor area. Such an arrangement would be a superior good to regional jet trips or automobile
trips over 400 miles when combined with the coordinated rental of automobiles through the various mobile platforms
available today and the ability to continue traveling while sleeping. The avoided transfer of luggage to a hotel for a night
should be an equal dis-utility to the transfer into a rental automobile.
It is important to note that a new economy single occupancy coach sleeper design is also needed to fully capture potential
revenue from the range of trip demands. Ideally, this should be of a split-level design that does not include restroom
facilities within the room. Using a split level design (4) four completely separate, lockable, and private single rooms could
be had in 88” of railcar length versus the current Amtrak Roomette of which (2) two rooms each holding (2) two people
fit inside 80” of railcar length. The total revenue would benefit from being able to sell more one person parties an
accommodation at a higher rate per mile, increasing the overall revenue net yield per railcar mile. This economy design is
not discussed further in this paper but is an important potential leg of the total route revenue that was discarded with the
introduction of the Superliner design.

Incremental Cost for Additional Single-Level Sleeping Car with Revised Staffing ($3.5 with Existing Staffing Levels)
Proposed Characteristics of New Sleeping Cars

The proposed design for a 12 Bedroom single level sleeper incorporates several improvements over both the old Pullman
Bedrooms and the current Amtrak Bedrooms, nee Deluxe Bedrooms, to advance comfort and garner higher revenue. The
design could be incorporated into a Bi-level, Superliner car-shell as well, in which case 16 Bedrooms could fit in one car.
A. All rooms have full bathrooms, where a fold-up solid surface sink counter and wainscot hides the toilet so that the
area becomes part of the main area when not in use, instead of a lost space. A zero threshold shower drain (slit
drain - level with floor) allows for this dual use while improving cleaning efficiency and reducing trip hazards.
B. The accessible room is better configured for both side transfer and sale as a general purpose room. The room
design attempted to meet the changes recommended by a recent accessibility panel that are not yet codified.
C. All couches face forward for riding comfort during the day. The 64” wide couch is less than that provided now,
however for comparison this is about the shoulder level clear width inside the largest SUV on the market.
D. Motorized jackscrews support all beds in horizontal orientations with user adjustable heights. This automates the
process of nighttime conversion, allowing for the bed to be premade, with the passenger able to operate the
controls when a force override is provided. A simple horizontal throw mechanism allows the bed to follow the
contour of the carbody while being restrained.
E. Half the rooms are provided with a conventional height queen sized bed (60” x 75”) closer to what one gets in a
hotel. These rooms could be called Compartments and would best the revenue of anything currently offered.
F. The larger Compartments could be paired with an adjacent standard Bedroom through a pass through door in the
bathroom wall. Thus configured, families of up to two adults and four small children or three large children could
travel together in two adjoining rooms. The smaller Bedroom could be configured with three beds as all frames
stay horizontal and stack at the ceiling, so that four small children with Velcro attached mesh panels or parties of
three young adults could be accommodated. This pair of rooms would be much larger than a stretch SUV.
G. The attendant room is a stock Bedroom, with a tablet provided for monitoring of room attendant calls and trouble
alerts, allowing call duty to be passed off to other attendants covering nighttime shifts. This would allow the
attendant to occupy a room with a service defect or during periods of peak use on a segment, provide the room for
misconnects when compensated by agreement. The standard bedroom would be a substantially better away from
home space than provided in the current roomettes. These revised staffing plans would require a labor contract
side-agreement should two of these single level cars be operated with a single attendant enabled by the labor
saving and workplace improvements. Compared to a Superliner sleeper load of 42 beds on two levels the resulting
46 beds per attendant in a single level car seems within the range of a labor side-agreement.

Floorplan of Proposed New Sleeping Service Equipment – Daytime Configuration
Floorplan of Proposed New Sleeping Service Equipment –Nighttime Configuration

Southwest Chief National Network Route – Rail Passenger Operating Plan Improvements
Through Car Lines – Elimination of Transfers where Beneficial
The Utility of a passenger’s time, and hence the maximum possible revenue, can be greatly increased if they are allowed
to stay on their car throughout their entire schedule, with the exception of short connecting daytime shuttles on each end.
On the current schedule there are five locations where the creation of a through car connection would greatly increase the
route net revenue. Two locations currently have trains connecting nearby, though at very early or late times, and three
locations would require short connector trains to gain access to either the end of a connecting route or a major market.
The proposed first phase of through car movements are at the existing Kansas City transfer to the Missouri River Runner
and at Williams Junction to the Grand Canyon Railway. Both involve only limited switching operations at respectively a
crew change point or a short transfer run on existing trackage.
Williams, AZ Through Cars to Grand Canyon

Railway – No Nighttime Transfer Required -
Kansas City Through Cars to St. Louis

– No Nighttime Transfer Required -
Route Map Image Courtesy of Amtrak Train Tracker

The proposed second phase of through car routings involve short additional train segments, Raton, CO to Denver, CO;
Barstow, CA to Bakersfield, CA; and Oklahoma City, Ok to Newton, KS that would allow for connections to existing
trains serving large metropolitan areas with relatively few new train miles. These options are not fully analyzed herein.
Mid-Route Car Switching Improvements

The primary impediment to such a connection currently is the time it takes to add or subtract cars from the Head End
Power (HEP) 480 V electrical supply and the operating plan. An industry standard near source electrical lockout could be
provided at the end of each car so as to disengage the HEP electrical supply at the locomotive. This safety lockout would
be able to be “Blue Flagged” using a personal lock by creating an interrupt switch in the already existing much lower
power 74 Volt DC Train-line Complete circuit (TLC) 39 which must be continuous for the locomotive generator to
energize the electrical power line feeding the cars.
Thus the more efficient procedure would include a beginning of shift job briefing for the through car operation for the
Train and Engine personnel, establishment of protected switching limits with the dispatcher that would allow work to
proceed quickly, the use of the train radio to call to the engine crew to first operate the HEP power shutdown switch on
the engine before the conductor isolates and locks out the TLC circuit, then breaking and making the connections as the
39 APTA Commuter Rail Executive Committee. "15. APTA PR-E-RP-016-99 Recommended Practice for 480 VAC Head End Power System." 1999.
<https://www.apta.com/resources/standards/Documents/APTA-PR-E-RP-016-99.pdf>

switching occurs rapidly. In this manner of operation, the loss of power to the occupied consist might be only 4 minutes or
so, during which the emergency lights would run off battery supply.
Further, the development by the shortline rail freight industry of belt back remote operated switchers could be built upon
such that a cut of cars to be moved to a connecting train route could by operated by the Conductor under dispatcher
protection, using the car’s own 74 V DC battery power at a low speed of 4 mph through an electric motor urethane friction
drive wheel extended onto the tread of the railroad wheel, with no switcher cost or crew call.
Historical Revenue Response and Solutions

Typically passenger rail usage tends to respond to changes in gasoline pricing except in heavily congested urban corridors
where fewer automobiles are already owned, hence the full depreciation and insurance cost are more likely to be
considered as a step-function tradeoff. Before broad statements are accepted regarding retreating demand for longer
intercity rail trips a transparent study of the effects of lower incremental gasoline prices according to the chart below,
reduced checked baggage service, reduced hot meal availability, changing price segmentation methods, and reduced coach
capacity for longer trips in the reservation systems should be made. Such will require access to Amtrak’s detailed route
level ticket, stock, and reservation records.
For example, recent moves to reduce passenger capacity of National Network trains to achieve gains in occupancy metrics
appear to have led to an overall reduction in travel bookings for the long distance trains, particularly for longer travel
segments, as many of those segments appear to have been crowed out by shorter bookings in the reservation system
format when cars are reduced from trains.
Instead, the question of occupancy during travel lulls might be better answered by instituting a dynamic upcharge, starting
at just $5 and increasing toward half the ticket price, to book an entire seat pair, when they are empty, for a single traveler
over low demand route segments with a drink coupon included, thus fully occupying the accommodation for the purpose
of reporting and price segmenting the market to produce net revenue gains. Then the seats would be available for use in
the segments nearer to urban areas for shorter haul riders in a more orderly manner.
Recent comparisons have been made between 2010

and 2018 Long-Distance train ridership without
normalizing for $0.05 per mile gasoline cost difference.

Grand Canyon National Park - Direct Service
Currently, the Grand Canyon sees about 5800 automobiles per day. Around a forth of those are from neighboring states,
either as rentals from flights arriving at major international hub airports, or as owned automobiles. Conceptually a third of
the rental vehicle arrivals, those arriving from Los Angeles, CA area airports are potential users of the direct service,
which would represent a potential addressable market of about 1000 people a day, assuming Las Vegas and Phoenix
represent the other hub airports.
The conversion of these rental car trips would depend on a solution that provides for low dis-utility of time, such as
through a trip with a morning arrival into Grand Canyon Village, within walking distance of the rim without a transfer.
Williams, AZ Through Cars to Grand Canyon

Railway – No Nighttime Transfer Required -
Chart of Drive Time from Los Angeles for 4 PM Trip likely to take 10-12 hours with Rest Stops – Courtesy Google Maps

Superimposed Charts of Travelers 40 and Travel Mode Breakdown 41
The proposed operation is for two sets of through cars, each set comprised of three sleeping cars and a club café - coach to
circulate between Los Angeles, CA and Grand Canyon Village, AZ daily, yielding an estimated $3 million annual net to
the route. The Southwest Chief’s eastbound arrival into Williams Junction, AZ is around 3:45 AM and westbound arrival
is around 9:30 PM which proved to be too late for desirable cross-platform transfers absent a station building, leading to a
closure of the Williams Junction Amtrak stop, but would allow the cars to be transferred to and from existing trains to the
Canyon with plenty of buffer time. The junction and approximately 4 miles of trackage to reach the Grand Canyon
Railway are controlled by BNSF, the same host railroad used for the primary route with all infrastructure in place,
including a double ended siding to make the moves under dispatch CTC signal control it appears. The current service to
the canyon departs Williams, AZ at 9:30 AM and arrives at 11:45 AM. The return service departs at 3:30 PM and arrives
at Williams, AZ at 5:45 PM. There exists the possibility of adding an early morning service, leaving at 7:30 AM to the
canyon, which could be used to transfer the through cars and provide for an earlier 9:45 AM arrival at the canyon rim.
There would be the need for a BNSF access agreement to be procured by NRPC over these 4 miles and the provision of a
low horsepower switcher that would remain on the maintenance siding at the junction overnight, perhaps plugged into
shore electrical power, between bringing cars to and from the Grand Canyon Railway Williams, AZ transfer point.
The concepts discussed as mid-route switching improvements would be used to make the operation to add or subtract cars
take less than 10 minutes. Alternately, one piece of the dedicated equipment, likely the café and lounge car, could be fitted
with a Capstone turbine alternator of the kind used for hybrid buses so that no HEP electrical connections need to be made
to the main train. This dedicated group of through cars might be best sourced from the Grand Canyon railway should they
desire to design the service. The connecting operation would be eligible for the investments noted in Appendix C. An
efficient food service staffing plan could be implemented where employees board at an intermediate station near their
home town early in the morning, work to the terminal, rest, restock and clean, and then work the return trip to a late night
arrival at home all during the same day while earning significantly greater wages per day spent away from home.
40Grand Canyon Visitation Statistics. 2018. <https://grandcanyon.com/news/how-many-visitors-to-grand-canyon/>

41Grand Canyon National Park Northern Arizona TOURISM STUDY. 2015. https://nau.edu/economic-policy-institute/wp-
content/uploads/sites/20/Grand-Canyon-Comprehensive-Final-Report2005.pdf

St. Louis - Direct Service
Currently Amtrak offers a walking transfer connection between trains in Kansas City for service to St. Louis from this
route, but the connections are either relatively late or early, hence possessing higher dis-utility of time. Westbound
travelers arrive in Kansas City at 9:40 PM and wait until 10:42 PM for departure. Eastbound passengers arrive at 6:53 AM
and wait until 8:15 AM for departure. Should a through coach and sleeper be provided, Kansas City would also enjoy
effectively better service times as boarding could occur on the through cars while waiting on the connecting trains
avoiding a later or earlier transfer, while corridor coaches to Chicago could also be added in the same operation. These
additional revenue cars could increase the overall revenue density per mile for the entire route. The calculation of
Incremental Cost to add a railcar demonstrates why such operations produces positive net revenue.
There would appear to be little incremental switching cost as Kansas City has been used in this past year as a point to
remove coach car capacity from the Southwest Chief. A further development to through cars is what is known as a set-out
sleeper, in which a sleeping car is operated on a route originating in Kansas City. Here travelers could take a morning
state corridor train or arrive by automobile, enjoy productive time during the day in the city, and then board this set-out
sleeper at say 7:30 PM after dinner as it stands on a station track. The car would then be added to the Southwest Chief
when the other through cars are added from the later Missouri River Runner arrival. Eastbound this car might stand on
compressed air and shore electrical power on the station tracks for occupancy until 10 AM. A short extension of the
Missouri River Runner to the Illinois state corridor is easily justifiable as well in a rail network investment scenario.
Transfer Option in Reservation System - Images Courtesy Amtrak
Kansas City Through Cars to St. Louis

– No Nighttime Transfer Required -

Mid-Route Bus Bridge Increasing Operational Costs that could Instead Fund Infrastructure
A recent proposal by Amtrak is to revise the route to include a mid-route bus bridge for which some details were provided
on August 8, 2018, suggested to meet their own operating limitations that was only recently set above the long standing
Federal Railroad Administration standard for PTC exemptions. A summary chart of the options is reproduced below, with
Option #1 being the existing through routed Southwest Chief.
42
Option #1 - Existing Through Route Projects Lowest Investment versus Bus-Bridge Options #2 & #3
Amtrak suggested route cost figures are showing that the total variable cost of the current operation is $78.87 M on 1.649
Million train-miles, or $47.83 per train-mile, which typically excludes some equipment capital, but counts the track and
terminal access as an operational cost instead of infrastructure capital as done for the owned Northeast Corridor route. The
noted variable investment required after revenue for this very long route works out to $15.67 per train-mile by Amtrak’s
numbers, or about $0.11 per automobile equivalent mile, less than the six-decade leveraged Interstate Highway
investment rate derived from taxes on the use of locally funded streets as detailed in Appendix A.
The Amtrak proposal to convert the middle section to a bus bridge is actually shown to increase the operating loss even
using their optimistic remaining revenue numbers. Oddly, the Amtrak suggested additional $11.09 M yearly operating
loss should the middle section be converted to a bus bridge would be able to self-fund a present day capital infrastructure
investment of $145 M at the current 20-year US bond rate of 3.4% plus a 1.0% loan premium. This $145 M equivalent
present value is much more than Amtrak’s suggested capital cost of keeping the route operating as a through route, absent
the recent suggestion of an expensive sole use full-PTC installation not found to be required by Federal Railroad
Administration rule making and risk analysis. Additional grant programs have already been approved to further defray
Amtrak’s portion of the route infrastructure costs with limited matching funds. Later in this work, much more economical
means to obtain almost all the safety benefits of full PTC are outlined.
However, the revenue estimates for the long Bus Bridge Options #2 & #3 seem to overestimate remaining revenue. By
analyzing the city pair segments and applying Time Utility derived loss factors for each transfer, it appears that Options
#2 & 3 would only retain about 63% of the ridership, 48% percent of the passenger-miles of transportation, and 37% of
the total revenue, around $16.3 M, instead of $23.3 M, while 76% of costs, $60.2 M, would continue to be reported,
potentially yielding a $18.0 M increase in funding required annually, further available to offset capital investment.
42 Amtrak 8/18/2018 Presentation to stakeholders – Proposals #2 &#3 now on hold till beginning of FY2020

Motorcoaches as Long-Distance Common Carrier Vehicles
A recent proposal suggest that the replacement of segments of long-distance passenger rail routes with motorcoaches
would result in improved passenger network conditions without any further explanation. Proposals of this type seem to be
based in a lack of understanding of the financial leveraging of the Highway Trust Fund described earlier and a disregard
for consumer demonstrated Time-Utility considerations that have produced continuing reductions in common carrier
motorcoach travel despite their use of nearly free infrastructure.
The Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) has at times then interpreted FHWA provided data 43, which does not
consider who pays for the overall Interstate Highway costs that are actually funded through leveraging atop excise (gas)
taxes on the use of the broad base of locally funded streets or government borne accident costs. The FHWA studies
typically only look at the percentage each vehicle class is paying incrementally relative to the low percentage of the total
costs of highway infrastructure that are incrementally paid for by excise (gas) taxes garnered between exits. The BTS then
uses this data misunderstanding to indicate that there is very little public external investment, or in BTS terms “Net
Federal subsidies… the excess of expenditures over revenues”, for motorcoach 44 highway travel erroneously.
Besides ignoring the overall leveraging of highway infrastructure, another layer of leveraging is applied in such studies
and their trade group derivative reports 45 by using vehicles as the denominator when determining incremental costs of
highway infrastructure as opposed to persons, relying on the much broader base of automobile travel on highways to
further dilute the apparent cost of infrastructure for motorcoaches. Given the relatively low rates of infrastructure recovery
and patchwork of state and federal fuel tax rebates anyway it would be better to rebate all fuel taxes for motorcoaches and
focus on policies that find the best fit for such vehicles within the marketplace as otherwise the undisclosed limitation in
the scope of the FHWA Cost Allocation study data and the resulting BTS interpretation is then in turn used to indicate
financial preference. This curious series of conclusions can be traced back to the six decade old narrative regarding
limited access highway funding that now has the nation at a crossroads as highway facilities grow older with no clear
source of revenue for significant rebuilding.
Motorcoach Uses in a Coordinated Ground Common Carrier Network
Conceptually, there is still a demand for solutions to the missing band of intercity travel that has seen motorcoaches used
experimentally to fill attempts at even uprated overnight travel in stacked beds, but the inherent rougher ride of a large
vehicle, on stiff suspension over variable pavement 46 has challenged long term success. Even for daytime use only the
relatively much narrower seat widths and higher levels of lateral and vertical acceleration and vibration do not promote
comfort, or Time-Utility, on long motorcoach journeys.
The best role for motorcoaches in a coordinated system appears to be as feeders at either the beginning or end of an
individual person’s trip not a mid-point gap filler due to the way that passengers view the Time-Utility of a transfer when
looking for overall productive uses of blocks of time. This is particularly true when the transfer would otherwise occur
during early or late hours.
To help make this supporting role a broader reality this paper has proposed rebating of all fuel taxes paid by motorcoaches
and the inclusion of such highway operators using accessible terminals in the proposed USDOT run large loss risk pool to
provide certainty to both consumers and independent operators who would then enjoy unhindered access to Interstate
Highway infrastructure to make the best use for the benefit of persons desiring to take shorter lower volume trips or
connect to other transportation modes by motorcoach.
43 FHWA. Cost Allocation Study Final Report. 1997. <https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/hcas/final/>

44 Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Federal Subsidies to Passenger Transportation. 2004.
<https://www.bts.gov/archive/publications/federal_subsidies_to_passenger_transportation/index>
45 Damuth, Robert. "Federal Subsidies for Passenger Transportation, 1960-2009, Focus on 2002-2009." n.d.
<https://www.buses.org/assets/images/uploads/general/Report%20-%20Modal%20Subsidies%20-%20ABA.pdf>
46 Rudick, Roger. Cabin Sleep Bus is in Hibernation. 2019. <https://sf.streetsblog.org/2019/01/17/cabin-sleep-bus-is-in-hibernation/>

Hybrid Toll Highway and Corridor Rail Passenger Route Investment
Urban Corridor Passenger Rail and Toll Road Infrastructure Investment Models
It is important to note that the investment metrics proposed have been structured to support a full spectrum of operations
between shorter, hourly, urban feeder corridor routes and longer, one to three times daily, National Network connected
corridor routes without discrimination. Sometimes the argument is made that a large percentage of Amtrak users travel
less than 200 miles in each individual trip, so thus the routes should be shorter. However, without one overwhelming
destination, as exists on the NEC with New York, each individual trip will need to overlap atop each other to produce
efficient volume. Consulting the airfare price to distance curve, the competitive breakpoint just on ticket price alone is far
beyond the typically quoted 200-400 mile trip distance for rail passengers, stretching to almost 1000 miles for a single
traveler once connections are considered from non-hub airports. Numerically, the route itself should be designed to be two
to three times the average trip distance to allow for an overlapping of trips by building efficient passenger volume per
train-mile.
However, getting back to the larger numbers of travelers making shorter trips, if a person is making the same 200 mile trip
say 100 times a year, then federal capital to support 20,000 ground passenger miles is being requested, which is a far
greater financial investment than another person’s typical usage on the national network routes. An equitable basis must
exist for persons in federal investment along with efficiency incentives for whichever operator controls the service.
For this reason the train-mile metric was added, as both corridor and National Network operations would shift toward
efficiency under this standard, yet the investment level would be too small to prop-up underutilized train operations, with
low passengers per train-mile counts, thereby self-correcting inefficiency through marketplace feedback.
New Build Brightline - Virgin Trains Corridor Rail Passenger Route Miami Terminal – Image Courtesy Visit Florida
The characteristics of the Brightline - Virgin Trains USA new build corridor deserve consideration as they probe potential
nationwide marketplace interactions in the next twenty years with the Interstate Highway system absent massive
unchecked general fund investment. From the Virgin Trains USA LLC prospectus 47 the unique circumstance the Florida
Ridership and Revenue Study unveiled is in essence the same consumer economic evaluation of time quality or expressed
negatively, disutility of time that the author is pointing to by another name, unpleasant highway travel time, combined
with better absolute travel time for many door-to-door airline or highway trips.
Investors were advised that the alternative is a “Challenging Intercity Trip — At a distance of approximately 235 miles,
the journey from Orlando to Miami is relatively short for air travel (with total travel time disproportionately long for the
distance given airport security and delays) and relatively long for an auto trip, where traffic congestion can make the four
to five hour trip unpleasant and unreliable. Travel volumes on key highways connecting Central and Southeast Florida
are expected to exceed capacity by 2030, resulting in further delays and reduction in reliability.”
Though the most competitive highway route from Miami is a toll road, whose charges of around $0.07 per mile help the
Brightline - Virgin Trains rail route fund itself in a competitive consumer marketplace, some of the intermediate coastal
destinations along I-95 served by the new service will be competing against inherently leveraged Highway Trust Fund
47LLC, Virgin Trains USA. "SEC Form S-1." 2018. Page 91

<https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1737516/000114036119002524/s002218x12_s1a.htm#tIAR>.

(HTF) funded highways, where users do not see anywhere near the average cost of infrastructure, as the use of local roads,
those funded by local cities and property development mortgages, is taxed through a fuel proxy, then leveraged toward
highway investment.
Population Density 48 Brightline – Virgin Trains Route Florida Toll road Segments 49 – Some Partly HTF Funded
However, the nationwide question of HTF scope is providing headwinds to this approach, as recent work to extend toll
roads into central Orlando during the I-4 Ultimate (Rebuild) Program demonstrated that even managed lanes providing
free flowing traffic through dynamic tolls, have a very difficult time self-funding very large urban Interstate
reconstruction programs. Thus some type of solution is going to have to be worked out where projects are ranked by
financial efficiency when drawing from the HTF pot, perhaps similar to the author’s per-mile concepts, as otherwise the
general lanes will be left unmovable and without significant reconstruction as current and future managed toll lane
buildouts in existing right of ways need partial HTF assistance to make these expensive projects happen.
During the I-4 Ultimate proposal phase to reconstruct the urban Orlando area I-4 highway some far reaching projections
were performed to see what dynamic toll rates would be justified under future congestion. The I-4 Planning-Level Traffic
and Revenue Study 50 suggested that by 2045 toll rates would need to be around an all-day average of $0.60 per
automobile mile on the managed toll lanes to allow for free flowing traffic in those lanes relative to the overall general
lane demand.
48 The Louis Berger U.S., Inc. "Brightline Ridership and Revenue Study." 2018.
<https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1737516/000114036118043289/s002218x4_ex99-1.htm>.
49 SunPass. All Florida Toll Roads. 2019. <https://www.sunpass.com/en/about/whereToUseSunPass.shtml>
50 FDOT. "I-4 Planning-Level Traffic and Revenue Study." 2012. <https://i4ultimate.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/draft-2012-i-4-ml-technical-
memorandum_100212.pdf>.

But for this result to be true in a marketplace, the general access un-tolled lanes, largely rebuilt using HTF monies, would
be at a near standstill. The author supports beneficial rebuilding of highways though these results demonstrate why this is
becoming more difficult in constrained right of ways as well as how the market response signals are going to be gradually
restored.
Chart of Projected AAF/Brightline (Virgin Trains) Bond Package Passenger Revenue Rates per Mile 51
It is also worth noting that any rail passenger route is competing against the federal severe accident cost backstop,
provided to highway users though General Fund social programs such as Social Security Disability and Medicaid, that
ground common carriers must self-fund. In the case of passenger rail a $295 Million large loss insurance policy must
provide that backstop. While the amount of the highway backstop is not more than 8% of the total Above-the-Rail cost of
the Orlando to Miami rail passenger service, this cost is greater than the entire yearly equipment capital cost for the rail
passenger route, which represents one of the more distinctive consumer facing items for revenue generation.
Under the proposal in this paper the private rail operator should be able to receive coverage from the proposed USDOT
large-loss liability backstop. There is also the question of cost responsibility for ancillary improvements, such as street
grade crossings, as the HTF is providing many of the funds needed in the I-4 project to revise local roads and existing
general purpose Interstate lanes outside the toll cost structure while in contrast the Brightline – Virgin Trains project is
fronting many of the costs for existing crossing improvements and only asking for certain maintenance to be accepted in
the future by public authorities, for which they have been sued by various counties for alleged inequality.
51
"Florida Development Finance Corporation Surface Transportation Facility Revenue Bond (Brightline Passenger Rail Project — South Segment),
Series 2017." <https://emma.msrb.org/ER1107449-ER866075-ER1266758.pdf>

Pre-Interstate Legacy Toll Highways are now Hybrid Facilities
Chart 52 of 2018 Toll Rates on Legacy Toll Highway Facilities (Now Only Partially Revenue Funded)
For the pre-1956 legacy toll routes it must be remembered that States were reimbursed for some of the original cost and
future 4R capital maintenance through the 1991 ISTEA 53, so that they are in effect now operating as a hybrid facility as
part of the cost-sharing premise of ISTEA, though from a fixed pot of funds. Even the Pennsylvania Turnpike, the earliest
facility of the main east-west chain cutting through the Appalachian Mountains, benefited from direct grants of 40% 54 of
costs through Depression era funding as well as government risk assumption on the remaining borrowing. However, with
the nationwide marketplace expectation for user payments on highways set so low, by six-decades of practice, one has to
conclude that large scale tolling would not gain political acceptance in the United States outside of bottleneck urban areas.
It is instead intended that a hybrid bridge between leveraged public investments and shareholder led operations can be
mediated by the “Quant” investment rate as congestion increases in urban areas prior to a future full market restoration of
urban land prices and parking rates. For some time the investments structure could follow the arrangement shown with a
certain average cost public investment, atop which project sponsors either structure operations to generate enough revenue
or come to an agreement for a private developer, state, or local contribution for certain projects that need innovative
Design Build approaches with risk management. However, all other highway projects would use a “Quant” metric
reformed HTF for their funding source, inevitably filled with non-fuel tax General Fund dollars for political reasons.
Future Hybrid Transportation Infrastructure Project Funding Structure =
Public Leveraged Funds (Fixed Investment Rate per Mile) + P3 Managed Toll or Passenger Ticket (At Performance Risk)
52
MNDOT. "Minnesota Tolling Study Report Modern Tolling Practices and Policy Considerations." 2018.
<https://www.dot.state.mn.us/govrel/reports/2018/tolling-study-report.pdf>
53 US. "Public Law No: 102-240 Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act, Section 1012 Toll Roads Bridges and Tunnels (4R IM funds) &
Section 1014 Reimbursement for Segments of the Interstate System Constructed without Federal Assistance (Legacy Pre-1956 Toll roads)." 1991.
<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-105/pdf/STATUTE-105-Pg1914.pdf>
54
US Secretary of Commerce. “Progress and Feasability of Toll Roads and Their Relation to the Federal-Aid Program.” 1955.

Denver to Southwest –Direct Service
Should the departure from Chicago be moved back closer to the original time, perhaps around 6:00 PM the current
Amtrak connection in Raton, NM could become a connection to the proposed Front Range Rail Corridor service at 1:30
PM in both directions to southwest destinations or the connection could be made in Trinidad, CO. Currently Amtrak
offers a transfer coach to Denver. Key to such a service would be the same through car arrangement as discussed
previously, such that the connection would to be one through single seat ride in a traveler’s evaluation of time quality.
Map of Proposed Front Range Passenger Rail Corridor – Courtesy CDOT 55

This connection would work with an originating corridor service from Fort Collins, serving early AM travelers into
Denver that would continue parallel to the congested Front Range highway corridor to the connection point. Then the
service would turn and run back. Such a corridor would likely have several frequencies to justify the infrastructure
investment such that the timings could match the connecting trains even for a proposed twice daily Southwest Chief route.
The use of semi-permanently coupled sets of passenger equipment would still allow for a through car arrangement as the
two to three through cars would simply be efficiently towed behind the corridor trainset using a standard AAR tight-lock
coupler with little incremental fuel burn.
55 Southwest Chief & Front Range Passenger Rail Commission. "Front Range Rail Corridor Map of Connections." 2017.
<https://www.codot.gov/about/southwest-chief-commission-front-range-passenger-rail/submissions-to-general-assembly/december-2017>

Map of Demographic based Multi-Frequency Corridors 56 overlapping and connecting to Southwest Chief Route
The illustration above from America 2050 perhaps best illustrates the concept of long-distance routes overlapped with
corridor routes on particular segments of higher population. There are a few additional links that are missing from the map
to get the overall long-distance network to an overall size of around 41,000 route miles, nearly the size of the Interstate
Highway network.
56 Regional Plan Association. "America 2050 - Beyond Driving and Flying." 2009. <http://www.america2050.org/2009/04/beyond-driving-and-
flying.html>

Detailed Map of Combined Southwest Region Long Distance and Corridor Services including Raton Pass Route 57
Dallas/Ft. Worth - Direct Service

This missing segment from Oklahoma City, OK to Newton, KS, needed to provide a minimal connection between Kansas
City, Oklahoma City, and Dallas –Ft. Worth, also shown on the demographic based map above, has been studied as a
stand-alone daytime intercity rail corridor and a low volume extension of the state funded Heartland Flyer to the
Southwest Chief, though without through car service.
However, the full cost of upgrading the shared intercity rail infrastructure was structured 58 in the study to be borne only
by the relatively minor portion of passenger train traffic, instead of being shared with time sensitive intermodal and
merchandise rail freight, thus producing a low Economic B/C ratio. Since there are relatively few methods to measure the
economic benefits of freight shipments, the use of the Interstate Highway equivalent financial infrastructure investment
levels, calculated in Appendix A, would significantly improve the favorability of the Benefit to Cost ratio by correctly
sharing the costs between freight and passenger traffic which would both derive operational benefits similar to highway
investments.
The shared public Tax Credit investment program based on passenger and intermodal freight train-miles is perhaps a more
sensible way to solve the delay minute questions driving the high infrastructure costs to start a service and meet the
suspended FRA delay metrics under review. Instead the old dispatching priority rule could be applied.
57USDOT-FRA. "SW Study Summary Report." 2014. <https://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/Details/L16012>

58Kansas DOT & Oklahoma DOT. "Kansas City-Wichita-Oklahoma City-Fort Worth Corridor Passenger Rail Service Development Plan." 2011.
<http://www.ksdot.org/PDF_Files/PDF-Passenger-Rail-SDP.pdf>

Twice Daily - Through Route Frequencies –Corridor Service Benefits Efficiently Achieved
The operation of two to three through trips per day per direction allows for greater opportunity to capture exponentially
more of the desired destination and arrival times for a traveler, hence increasing the theoretical price that could be charged
per passenger mile. Until the final collapse of service following the sudden United States Postal Service cancelation of
first class railway mail transportation contracts in 1967, thereafter paid at a 20% reduction in compensation to the railway
resulting in the use of general freight service, the common pattern for revenue maximization by private operators was just
such a two to three times a day frequency of service for longer haul routes even in the jet aircraft era.
Experimental 1972 Timetable – Note Chicago to Kansas City Corridor has Three Daily Frequencies – Source Amtrak
Amtrak for just three summer months in 1972, its first full year of operations, tried two frequencies over the entire
Southwest Chief route, with minimal advertising. It appeared to not continue the service due to pressing funding and
equipment needs due to the debate over funding the company that started in earnest in 1973 59 with OMB objections over
budget proposals. However, then as now the question of short-haul and long-haul roles for Amtrak was up for discussion,
with the difference that Mr. Lewis, the Amtrak president then thought that long-haul routes could be close to profitable.
59 The New York Times. "What Price Amtrak." 1973. <https://www.nytimes.com/1973/02/18/archives/what-price-amtrak-what-price-amtrak.html>.

Conceptually, the twice daily frequency schedule for the Chicago to Los Angeles route shown above is used in Appendix
B as Option #1B to evaluate the combined effects of an increased train consist size and an additional daily frequency.
Substantially greater volume was carried on this route on three daily frequencies in the 1960 to 1967 time period even
after the introduction of commercial jet aviation for end to end passengers, until the withdrawal of the USPS express
contracts in 1967 60 which caused one frequency to be dropped from the route. Since then population has grown by half
overall and over the road commercial freight has become more expensive. In light of the understanding that a large
majority of the trips are convertible from highway travel, no decline in demand level is understood.
It is worth noting that the prior to 1968 and during the short 1972 Chief/Super Chief combination, the twice daily
schedules allowed for many possible connections to what we would now call corridors so that revenue density could be
built on both the long-distance and corridor train by providing a combination with more travel utility.
Cost of Nationally Expanded Long-Distance Routes and Twice Daily Frequencies

As to the question on the total cost to expand frequencies, right now Amtrak operates about 14.6 Million long-distance
train-miles annually over 20,000 unique long-distance route miles. The highway equivalent “Quant” rate conversion to
account for leveraging would indicate a reasonable level of annual investment of $260 million for just these long-distance
trains, which appears to be a little higher than Amtrak’s own quotes made in prior years to Congress for the required
Direct Cost needed to keep investing in these services at a minimal level with little equipment reinvestment.
Added to this cost tied to the long-distance network, is the relatively unchanging cost of around $1200 to $1600 million
annually to keep the “core” Amtrak infrastructure functioning in the Northeast Corridor (NEC), where NRPC largely
owns the trackage, comprised of capital spending and services related to the larger terminals and facilities on the corridor.
Granted, the funding proposal would allow for train-miles operated on the NEC and intercity commuter trains over 50
route miles to obtain train-mile funding to promote efficiency. Since Amtrak annually runs around 37.5 million train-
miles across all the business lines and all other operators run around 72.5 million train-miles (many of those on the NEC
trackage operated by Amtrak and Chicago and California terminals), the total Federal intercity rail infrastructure funding
would sit at around $3.2 Billion a year, around the same Federal spending as currently enacted though through both the
FTA and FRA and other baskets. This proposal to include all of the other commuter trains, operating over intercity routes
over 50 miles would help to end the developing fracas over the reimbursement rates for use of the NEC trackage.
However, recognizing the national scope of highway investment defined by the “Quant” should point toward a national
scope of intercity rail throughout the nation. It would be reasonable to expect a long-distance route network roughly the
size of the original Interstate highway network about 41,000 route miles 61, with a twice daily operation in each direction
on such a route network. This would represent about 59.9 Million train-miles, but at most the additional average cost of
such a network over current practice would be $782 million annually, about 2.1% of the $36 billion as of yet unfunded
annual investment that the National Academies 62 has suggested is needed to just keep the Interstate highway network at
near the current level of utility over the next twenty years.
Thus a reasonable intercity passenger rail proposal able to deal with national demands of an expanding population, while
being entirely consistent with the lower, backward looking measure of leveraged highway spending from taxes on the use
of locally financed and maintained streets, would be possible for a $4.0 Billion annual Federal investment, much of which
is already in the budget in various buckets.
60 ICC 333 Finance Docket 24869. AT&SF Railway Co Discontinuance of Trains Nos. 19 and 20; and 23 and 24 Between Chicago, IL and Los
Angeles, CA. 1968. <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015038632959;view=2up;seq=586>

61 USDOT-FHWA. "Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways." n.d.
<https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/programadmin/interstate.cfm> . Note however that Pres. Eisenhower wanted the Interstates to be self-liquidating which
they are not, they are a leveraged investment, not the stated pay-as-you go standard on the page.

Southwest Chief National Network Route - Express Freight Revenue and Traffic Design
Congressional Charge to Increase Net Revenues
CFR §24306. Mail, express, and auto-ferry transportation
(a) Actions To Increase Revenues.—Amtrak shall take necessary action to increase its revenues from the transportation of
mail and express. To increase its revenues, Amtrak may provide auto-ferry transportation as part of the basic passenger
transportation authorized by this part.
Addition of Mail & Express Once Allowed Revenue to Cover Above-the-Rail Costs
The previous operating plan for Mail & Express service relied on either trans-loading pallets using forklifts from the local
truck trailer into high-speed boxcars in a manual cross-dock operation or using special bi-modal truck trailers called
RoadRailers that could be mated to a rail wheelset and coupled to the end of a train. These approaches were used due to
the need to quickly get a service up and running that would provide net operating revenue to support the Amtrak network,
but their limitations may have led to the suspension of the service in 2004, though it was reported to Congress in 1997 that
a more limited service then operated generated 42% 63 of the income of the route. Should developments be made in rapid
loading and flexibility to place cars at the front of the train behind the locomotives, Mail & Express haulage could have
significant contributions to future revenue.
The Southwest Chief at Fullerton, CA in 2003 with Specialized Express RoadRailers – Image Copyright Craig Walker
63United States Senate - 105th Congress - Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine of the Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation. "Amtrak's Financial Situation." 1997 PG 52.
<https://books.google.com/books?id=_9WPoHkU2YkC&pg=PP1&lpg=PP1&dq=senate+hearing+105-
273+Amtrak%27s+financial+situation+1997>.

This doubling “bump” in Total Assigned
costs shows the trailing effect of allocating
costs based on revenue, those same
allocated fixed costs survived the end of
express service and had to be absorbed by
other routes.
Chart of Historical Route Operating Results in Real Dollars ($2018)

It is important to note that the long-distance truck market has radically shifted since the 2004 decision to discontinue the
service by Amtrak to simplify operations and even later 2013 studies of the overall marketplace 64 for higher speed rail
intermodal freight. Notably, changes to the Hours of Service truck rules to ensure rested drivers and the ability to enforce
such rules through electronic logging (ELD) has made a proposed express freight service using the Amtrak National
Network trains to be a very clear speed winner over single driver trucking transit times. Timings just to Chicago from the
Los Angeles region would be about 1 ½ days faster using the Southwest Chief train route combined with innovative, but
higher initial capital cost, semi-automated transfer technologies to differentiate a new market segment at a much higher
net revenue.
64 Sharma & Associates, Inc. "MARKET ANALYSIS: VALIDATION OF A 70-TON HIGHER SPEED FREIGHT TRUCK DESIGN FOR
OPERATIONS UP TO 125 MPH." U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Railroad Administration, 2013.
<https://www.transportation.northwestern.edu/documents/2015/burns-fra-report.pdf>.

Conventional Intermodal
Rail Freight
Projected Express on
National Network Routes
Single Driver
Truck Freight
Base Chart Courtesy of Tiger Cool Express – ELD Inflection Point 65 - Continuous Speed Lines Author’s Estimate
The solutions proposed below are both highly reliant on automation so as to reduce the transfer operations staffing and
operating cost through the use of kiosk type stations where either the trailer or the pallet is brought by the tractor driver or
forklift operator to a kiosk after which it is inserted onto the train without additional staffing.
The transfer mechanism proposed are through much improved methods not available for the 1996-2004 operations:
• Standard Truck Trailer Based - Tractor drives trailer onto an automated exchange platform
• Standard Shipping Pallet Based - Automated pallet shuttle trans-loads pallets into railcars
The net financial returns from the standard truck trailer based system are modeled in Appendix E as Option 1C using cost
based on the more complex UIC profile based designs and considering that the host railroads would actually sell the
service as compensated agents using it as an added line of business to their existing intermodal freight menu of options
while occasionally using it to restore service timings to late loads.
Standard Truck Trailer Based Express Traffic

This intermodal freight service would be priced at a level above conventional expedited trailer-based intermodal options
that involve lifting the trailer onto a railcar with a crane in a slower process. However, it is proposed to be marketed by the
existing agents of the host railroads as an addition to their service offering, either for valued contract customers as a
service recovery option in the case of a missed train or as a expedite option. However, the ability for the trailer loading
sled to take nearly any existing wheeled trailer would mean that there would be significant opportunity to attract loads that
were not advanced planned to be routed as intermodal loads due to being loaded in locally available non-compatible
equipment.
65Prince, Theodore. "Analysis: ELDs are US trucking’s inflection point." Journal of Commerce 26 April 2018.
<http://www.tigercoolexpress.com/analysis-elds-are-us-truckings-inflection-point/>.

Images Courtesy of CargoBeamer AG
Transshipping 72 trailers can take as little as 15 minute using the CargoBeamer technology, at a greater capital cost, but a
much reduced operational cost that also allows for the capture of very time sensitive trailer based freight traffic due to the
short loading time.
The Lohr UIC wagon shown below is the most prevalent system in the EU for unmodified semi-trailers. It supports the
trailers at about 9 inches above the rail and requires adjustment to keep this low profile needed to clear EU tunnels. For
prevalent US loading gauges the trailer could ride around 14 inches above the rail and still clear almost all restrictive
spots, which has the potential to provide a much simplified railcar and unloading concept that would accept practically
any semi-trailer in use.
This ability to accept any trailer is important as often a time sensitive load will be dispatched the nearest trailer available
for loading, irrespective of whether it is a domestic intermodal container on road chassis or not. The author has further
confidential designs for a trailer side loader car conforming to AAR Plate B using reduced cost conventional components
while still allowing for service speeds to the current 90 MPH top speeds of the route that has conservatively not been
included in the financial analysis as an addition to net revenue.
Image Courtesy of LOHR and VIIA

Standard Shipping Pallet Based Express Traffic
Currently warehouse automation is being achieved using various types of automated storage and retrieval systems that did
not exist in common forms a decade ago. One of the more promising methods for high-value express revenue is to
completely eliminate the truck trailer or container body from the rail side of transportation, breaking the smallest unit load
down to the standard 40” x 48” pallet footprint.
Existing Viewliner II format baggage cars could be converted to accommodate such an automated pallet storage and
retrieval system, significantly reducing the time to load a car, as a forklift on the ground platform or truck dock level roller
deck could feed only to the point of the baggage car door from which the automated pallet shuttle would store and retrieve
the pallets within the confines of the car quickly. For western operations, a tri-level pallet car could be constructed in the
greater overall height allowed.
Purpose built pallet express cars could bring even greater efficiency by allowing pallets to be passed between cars and
loading height increased, so that a single loading point could serve several coupled cars with a much greater volume. This
option would also allow for the pallets to be sorted for dispersed destinations and moved between trains at Chicago or
other express route hubs in an efficient manner. The connecting hubs physically would consist of no more than short
portable ramps between groups of cars on adjacent tracks with the automated pallet shuttles moving loads between cars.
Image Courtesy of Interlake Mecalux Automated Pallet Shuttle

The automation of the functions of a Less Than Truckload (LTL) cross-dock transfer facility in such a way could allow
the pricing for the service to float higher than rates for just truckload team driving, as ancillary costs of buildings would
be eliminated as well as the transfer time to unload and cross-dock. Further, mid-route sorting of pallets while the train is
stopped at a station would allow for handoffs of express loads at intermediate points within the timeframe of a
conventional passenger train stop.
The author has further confidential designs to make the pallet shuttle concept work for in-route sorting of the pallets while
the train is moving, that if ultimately applied would produce results far exceeding the net revenue estimates generated for
the conventional truck trailer based express service. For this reason further financial analysis of this option has been
conservatively excluded for the route as such an operation would be on the scale that a joint venture with a private express
group or e-commerce shipper would be warranted and full route cost coverage would be possible.

Safety Management System – PTC Equivalent Proposed Passenger Rail Operating Plan
Instituting an additional cap of operating rules, above those set by the infrastructure owner, is a difficult task as by
definition the rules could only apply to the train operated by Amtrak, not other users of the line. However, the recent spate
of largescale accidents have been primarily caused by civil over-speed violations, simply put going too fast into a curve,
that can be corrected by changes within Amtrak’s equipment and operational plan alone.
Initial Steps - PTC Equivalent Plan

Simply the presence of two rules qualified crew members in the leading locomotive cab should pencil out to establish
equivalent safety levels for most instances of operation on lines that qualified for an exemption based on lower levels of
use when combined with the placement of large speed board signs ahead of restricted curve braking points, either with
Lineside Block Signal or reduced speed track warrants, A further later step would be for the passenger conductor(s) in the
consist to be issued a railroad tablet, displaying a split screen of the dispatcher’s track map, including authorized
occupancies from the dispatcher’s desktop transmitted by cellular signal, along with a GPS updated track chart with civil
limits superimposed to double check the locomotive crew conformance with operating rules. By nature of using a mobile
GPS antenna the accuracy would be less than perfect unless a roof mounted antenna and Wi-Fi repeater was installed.
I-ETMS Locomotive Segment Only - PTC Equivalent Plan

The use of the existing I-ETMS locomotive control unit, currently being installed on almost all mainline locomotives, on
non- PTC routes would appear to require an enhanced onboard track data storage and interrogation capability so that the
Locomotive Segment may enforce civil speed restrictions with GPS and wheel input only, without the function of the
Communication Segment, either in the event of a data radio failure, maintenance signal suspension, or by using extended
mapping, in areas without full components of PTC that otherwise qualify for a Mainline Track Exemption.
Should the FRA authorized track speed be above 40 mph, a civil speed restriction target could be set to 40 mph at all
facing point main track switches not protected by a Switch Point Monitoring System. The crew would then need to verify
the position from the locomotive cab before proceeding. Protection could be provided either through a local visual signal
indication at the switch, existing ABS block signal, or through non-vital Wayside Interface Unit communicating directly
with the Locomotive Segment by radio, even conceptually digitized voice over existing frequencies, using a security key
protocol.
Certainly, the premise that a full vital-level PTC will ultimately support ubiquitous Internet of Things (IoT) type
communication to multiple trackside devices at a low cost is the long range goal. Currently XBee format industrial
proximity sensor units, capable of 2 mile communications on the 915 Mhz unlicensed band, are available for less than
$200 complete. Although these devices are not completely hardened or at a vital level, in the near future many repetitive
sensors, of a size that could be bolted to the web of a rail by hyrail inspector, could be combined at one asset location to
communicate to the approaching locomotive’s onboard PTC unit that would be looking for them through a directional
antenae, with a speed reduction enforced for contridictory readings.
Thus a non-vital Switch Point Monitoring System could become much less expensive. Additionally, a 915 Mhz band radio
could also communicate the position of existing signals when incorporated into a IoT “smart” light bulb transmitting a
security keyed beacon signal as a retrofit vigilence overlay. Obviously, since the viewpoint that an additional level of
protection should exist that is not full Vital PTC is less than a year old, these products have yet to be rolled out by
manufactures in a large scale. Additional time for these developments to become more economical is certainly worth
considering in a formal review process that is transparent and involves input from the operating unions to consider the
efficiency of non-vital vigilence solutions to enhance safety as is being done for commercial highway drivers through
driver assistance systems.

Image of FRA research concept for Dark Territory Switch Point Monitoring Wireless Station - Courtsey FRA
Proposed Layout of Rail Mounted XBee radio format sensor (Yellow) that could be installed as a ABS territory backup
Ultimately it should be noted that even with PTC, there are substantial requirements and needs to maintain what is known
as a track (electrical) circuit for detection of broken rails as well as occupancy. While the Raton Pass route is gradually
being upgraded to newer format track circuit 66 and signal data lines it is worth noting that these capital projects should
perhaps be placed ahead of full PTC implementation in a risk management analysis.
66 FRA. "Next Generation Track Circuits." 2018. <https://www.fra.dot.gov/Elib/Document/17934>

Vision Chipset Based Standalone Locomotive Segment - PTC Equivalent Plan
For highway vehicle automation, chipsets currently are at production levels in the millions that are able to both recongize
traffic signs and traffic lights along roadways. Of course these chipset are not built to the same railroad definition of
“Vital” used in full PTC equipment, but many groups are pushing them as a means of accident reduction at the current
Level II capabilities. Should the I-ETMS based PTC equivalence plan suggested become too difficult, a set of Mobileye
EyeQ3 chipsets could be used to provide civil overspeed and Lineside Block Signal (railroad traffic light) visual
recognition in a briefcase sized piece of equipment.
Image Courtesy of Mobileye Vision Based EyeQ4 Chipset TFL (Traffic Light Recognition)
In this way a vision based system, looking through the locomotive windshield, first functions as safety vigilence alerter of
potential civil overspeed or signal violations when combined with a modified braking curve, and only later takes
enforcement action to reduce the train speed by a solenoid valve connected to the front train air brakeline. Such a concept
may in fact warrant FRA funding for the freight only route mileage that will not have full PTC or for use in terminal areas
otherwise exempted for FTA Commuter and LRT operations.
Since the viewpoint that an additioanl level of protection that is not full PTC is less than a year old, one of the existing
integrators of these Tier II automotive driver assistance system (DAS) products would have to produce the equipment
casing and trial it using prerecorded video from a similar monocular camera mounted in varied cab positions for the route
in question. However, given the goal to be a non-vital alerter, such a system might be brought into existance much more
rapidly. It too could be combined with short range wayside device communications using a 915 Mhz band.

Shareholder Guided Intermodal Rail Freight Investment
Raton Pass Infrastructure
Conceptually, the largest problem in supporting the ongoing infrastructure costs is simply the use of a segment of the
mainline by only a pair of passenger trains that was brought on at the time of the Railrunner commuter rail
implementation. However, time sensitive freight on a Los Angeles, Phoenix, or El Paso to Denver corridor is a logical fit
over the Raton Pass corridor when such trains could be operated with distributed locomotive power at a higher rate per
trailing ton as is common on many intermodal trains.
The Grade E equipment limit for trailing tonnage on the grades in the pass is 5500 trailing tons 67, equivalent to 110 loaded
truck trailers (TOFC) per train. Just one distributed locomotive could increase that limit to the full practical capacity of
any connecting route. But even at a relatively high horsepower to trailing tonnage ratio for a railroad, the intermodal rail
freight operation would still be very efficient for industry, stemming from a fuel burn of about 1/3rd of a comparable over
the road truck option 68with reduced labor and insurance costs for those truckload carriers selling the service.
Limited Solution to Raton Pass Only

One concept would be an agreement to run a pair of expedited single-level truck trailer intermodal and low-profile
finished automobile traffic trains over the pass, contributing to the infrastructure budget for this segment at an industry
common trackage rights rate of $21.0 per train-mile combined with at the very least a new Federal Tax Credit to defray
county property taxes of around $3.0 Million annually over the three-state 500 mile portion of the low use route. In 2013
$1.1 Million 69 in local property taxes alone was paid annually to counties on the New Mexico 183 mile mainline segment,
whose budgets would be devastated to have this property off the tax roles as is the case for highway right-of-ways should
full abandonment occur. The forward looking value of this provision to the railroad would of course be reduced by the
amount of future income taxes. However, a five-year look back provision could accelerate private infrastructure
investment to resolve the question of grant matches.
This single pair of proposed expedited trains could thus provide around $10 Million in annual private contribution to the
lesser used corridor infrastructure and connecting routes, say 500 affected miles, providing additional support for
domestic manufacturing through new, efficient intermodal freight routes as well as Interstate highway truck congestion
reduction on the mountain passes, leaving only $3.7 Million a year to be covered in the long-term by Amtrak or other
grant funds when using NMDOT developed maintenance study values 70. Should two pairs of expedited freight trains be
routed over the corridor they could completely cover the infrastructure mid-term stabilization investment needs.
However, there is still the question of capacity on the connecting routes to major markets over constrained rail capacity.
Durable Solution for All Mainline Rail Infrastructure

A long-range plan should also address the nationwide effects of the leveraged fuel tax investment in Interstate Highways
explained in Appendix A, as ultimately the suggested intermodal trains will traverse much more congested corridors
which will require more expensive capacity additions. In a tilted marketplace even STB allowed revenues of 180% of
Variable Cost may not be able to cover the estimated $2.6 to 4.0 Billion 71 in annual infrastructure needs otherwise unmet.
A reasonable level of equivalent private Tax Credit investment in freight rail infrastructure can be calculated using the
methods described in Appendix A for Interstate Highways, which considers the leveraging of fuel taxes on the use of
locally funded streets to fund the Highway Trust Fund. This leveraged investment rate is more than the common trackage
rights rate of $21 per train-mile used by railroads even when calculated for small capacity intermodal freight trains.
67 BNSF Railroad. "Colorado Division Timetable." 2009. <http://denversrailroads.com/Denver/Timetables/BNSF_2009-06-
03_colorado_timetable_6.pdf>
68ICF International. Comparative Evaluation of Rail and Truck Fuel Efficiency on Competitive Corridors. Washington: FRA, 2009.
<http://www.trb.org/Main/Blurbs/162604.aspx>
69 NMDOT. "NMDOT Analysis of Property Tax Impact of Potential Amtrak Southwest Chief Realignment." 2014.
<https://www.codot.gov/about/southwest-chief-commission/nmdot-bnsf-property-tax-analysis/view>.
70 NMDOT - Wilson & Company. "Amtrak Southwest Chief Maintenance Cost Between Newton, KS and Dalies, NM." 2014.
<https://www.codot.gov/about/southwest-chief-commission/wilson-and-company-maintenance-study/view>.
71 AASHTO. "Freight-Rail Bottom Line Report." n.d. <https://www.camsys.com/publications/case-studies/freight-rail-bottom-line-report>

So what if instead of searching for even greater efficiency in the railroad intermodal freight operation to enable the
payment of the private $10 Million contribution from revenue, a nationwide durable Federal Tax Credit is established at
the rate outlined? In this way the capacity on the connecting routes could also be improved through nimble privately
guided investment that would not otherwise occur at this tipping point in the marketplace.
Hence a reasonable concept to build mainline capacity on any investor owned infrastructure, with railroads essentially
being longstanding P3 arrangements with now undefined public contracts, is the targeted Tax Credits outlined in
Appendix C, particularly as capacity is needed for business cycle fluidity, maintenance operations, and resilience in the
face of national emergencies but revenue rates are held down through leveraged investment in highways. Even two-fold
increases in railroad mainline capacity 72 can be had to relieve bottlenecks for relatively efficient rates of around $3-5
Million per mainline railway mile.
While it would also seem to be entirely reasonable that railroads should already have a Federal Tax Credit to reimburse
local property taxes paid from a transportation equity basis, given that Interstate Highways pay no property taxes as they
are state property, but this has not occurred in Federal legislation to date. Certainly clearing this mental policy blockage
toward considering how the Highway Trust fund produces investment leverage is a further step in unpacking
transportation policy concerns so as to plan for future growth of the economy.
Throughout this report the concept of advancing both highway and intercity rail projects at a similar financial funding
level has been stressed as both have suitable roles. It should not be lost on the reader that the highway need is also
significant at $40 Billion 73 annually above the current funding levels for some time according to AASHTO estimates and
even more just for the Interstate in the recently released NAS report.
Toward an Amicable On-Time Metrics and Dispatching Delay Resolution

The public Tax Credit investment program, based on credits for actually running service sensitive passenger and
intermodal freight train-miles, is perhaps a more sensible way to solve the delay metrics questions before the courts and
the STB 74 as actual work to resolve functional capacity restraints that the stock market may not fund in the short term
would be funded. Then the standard would return to the time-tested dispatching priority test, but with actual better results
from more frequent sidings and staging yards. The mainline rail traffic did not exist at the time of Amtrak’s formation to
require infrastructure reinvestment as the industry continued to retract for another two decades afterwards, yet now this
question has become significant with new capacity needed on the interstate rail network for both passenger and freight
traffic. Perhaps the concepts presented will allow for an amicable solution for joint use rail lines whose owners have
public roles but see great targeted incentives provided to other private industry in manufacturing and corporate offices.
It is hoped that a future provision of the dual passenger and intermodal freight infrastructure Tax Credits would allow for
broad agreement that operation of up to three passenger trains per day per direction would be allowed at the train-mile
rates without upfront funds to upgrade the mainline infrastructure or reconfigure operations as efficiency would be gained
for both operations through additions to mainline capacity under the credits. This broad proposed standard might then be
paired with an agreement to return to the previous dispatching delay standard for delays, though with a legislative
understanding that operations of today’s now longer freight trains on routes with existing sidings that might not be able to
accommodate such train lengths without upgrades is considered a dispatching delay when the longer trains are advanced
into the path of a scheduled passenger train “slot” without sidings available for passing in the segment.
72 Cambridge Systematics, Inc. "National Rail Freight Infrastructure Capacity and Investment Study." 2008.
<https://www.stb.gov/stb/docs/RETAC/2008/September/Cambridge%20Systematics%20briefing.pdf>
73 AAHSTO. "Bottom Line Report - Transportation Bottom Line." 2014-2015. <http://bottomline.transportation.org/Pages/default.aspx>
74 APPLICATION OF THE NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION UNDER 49 U.S.C. § 24308(a) – CANADIAN NATIONAL
RAILWAY COMPANY. Finance Docket No. 35743. Surface Transportation Board. 2013-2018.
<https://www.stb.gov/home.nsf/case?openform&caseID=30982&caseDocket=FD_35743_0>

Table of Infrastructure Costs from Wilson and Company Maintenance Study MNDOT 2014
Table of Proposed Infrastructure Costs from Amtrak 8/16/2018 Presentation

Domestic Intermodal Rail Freight - Container and Trailer-load Operations
In order to consider the effects of the proposed federal $21 per intermodal freight train-mile Tax Credit the following
charts were prepared using a financial operations model that considered railroad and motor carrier cost structures. The
model assumed 8000 foot trains, using conventional 53 foot double stacked crane lifted domestic container (DB-COFC)
trains comprised of either 3-car articulated well sets holding 6 truck equivalent containers or conventional 53 foot crane
lifted trailer (TOFC) trains using 5-car articulated spine sets holding 5 truck equivalent trailers. The analysis was
conducted assuming the same net return to shareholders per train-mile for the use of infrastructure, an Operating Ratio
target of 0.60 for the railroad operations to cover the cost of a network where supporting activities must occur, and a
composite equipment borrowing rate of 8% for assumed new rail rolling stock.
It is important to note that significant investor driven restructuring of the railroad offered intermodal network has been
unfolding, with the focus shifting to high-volume lanes where the existing equipment pool and terminals can be used
fully, with minimal enroute switching to differing destinations, to command the highest net return. The proposed Tax
Credit was designed so that it is entirely voluntary on the part of the railroads such that they could choose to operate so as
to claim the credit using whatever equipment they choose or not, for any particular quarter or period as has been noted to
be a concern 75 in such a partnership.
This is a significantly different position than past state grants to build only intermodal terminals or small sections of line,
and as such it needs a multi-year, stable federal supporting structure. Guaranteeing future service to terminals or sections
of line built by state or local agencies is a very difficult business decision to sign on to as a shareholder held railroad while
reserving the right of future operational flexibility. This conflict leads to less innovation in terminal and railcar equipment
design, which in turn negatively affects attempts to reduce the distance of drayage truck runs used to bridge between
customers and railroad terminals as well as attempts to reduce truck urban highway congestion.
There are of course alternatives to providing railroads such an infrastructure Tax Credit to restore market balance arising
when commercial vehicles use Interstate Highways funded by the leveraged Highway Trust Fund that is in turn filled by
excise taxes on the use of locally funded streets. One such alterative would be to create a new class of diesel fuel tax, with
un-dyed diesel and its equivalents such as liquefied natural gas (LNG), required to be used for Class 3 trucks and larger
but under a much higher tax rate to recover the noted investment gap in Appendix A so that the Highway Trust Fund is
replenished. Then light vehicle diesel used in small vans and pickup trucks would use a new dye color or chemical marker
to indicate use in Class 2 trucks and smaller at the existing diesel fuel tax rate. The existing untaxed, dyed agricultural
diesel class would continue to exist, with the roadside test kits modified to detect conversions between the three classes.
This dyed diesel, three-class structure would be brutally efficient. But can a federal government really endorse such a shift
when industries dependent on certain logistics strategies have been effectively told to invest in a certain pattern for more
than three-quarters of a century? Perhaps, in the light of the alternatives, the railroad mainline infrastructure Tax Credit
for just intermodal freight, convertible from highway movement, is actually much easier politically.
The following charts illustrate the important effect of drayage run lengths and the extra Motor Carrier operational cost
needed to access intermodal freight terminals, represented by the entire area of the curves between the Railroad and Motor
Carrier Revenue Required. Should a intermodal shuttle train be operated between say two business parks then this cost
would nearly disappear, as the park’s existing terminal truck tractors could pick up units and take then to warehouse
docks, leave them at the dock, and return for new loads nearly as quickly as when operating out of a trailer drop lot.
75Wilbur Smith Associates, Inc, et al. "Rail Freight Solutions to Roadway Congestion NCHRP Project 8-42 - ASSESSING RAIL FREIGHT
SOLUTIONS TO ROADWAY CONGESTION." 2006. <http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/archive/NotesDocs/NCHRP08-42_FR_Rev10-
06.pdf>.

Estimated Current Breakeven Point with Only Leveraged Highway Infrastructure Investment
Estimated Breakeven Point with Highway Equivalent Railroad Tax Credit Infrastructure Investment

Estimated Second-Mover Breakeven Point Following Highway Equivalent Railroad Tax Credit Infrastructure Investment
It is also important to note the role that shared urban commuter passenger rail infrastructure could have in reducing
drayage trip distances as the economics of maintaining urban rail access are typically challenging. By having a high-
performance, two-track, shared access path into a metro area, a connecting shuttle from the far distant container terminals
could reach multiple metro area destinations so that a much shorter drayage trip could be had in a less congested direction
for the motor carrier, representing a net benefit instead of a cost relative to over the road operation. The operation of the
shuttle intermodal freight trains on commuter rail infrastructure could occur before the morning rush hour and after the
evening rush hour.
As to the level of influence of the $21 per train-mile Tax Credit, consider that the average infrastructure spending per
mainline mile is about $80,000 per year. If around twenty some freight trains are operated per day on a segment that
indicates an average cost per train-mile of $11. The shareholder required return of around $95,000 annually per mile
should be added to the average cost according to a prorated cost basis to obtain a total neutral basis of $24 per train-mile.
However, the goal of the Tax Credit is to encourage the expansion of fluid mainline capacity by adding sidings. Consider
that a modern 16,000 foot long siding is probably going to cost around $11 million to build. To place a new siding every
30 miles would require an additional $5 per train-mile if the capital is annualized through bonds, much less if annual cash
freed up by the Tax Credit is invested to complete projects. In a shareholder led company it might be assumed that about
half of the $21 per train-mile Tax Credit would be invested in otherwise new infrastructure, which would be enough to
easily cover the extra $5 per train-mile from the portion of intermodal trains on the route. Should the railway decide to not
operate the service sensitive service it would simply not get the Tax Credit, so an internal operations feedback loop exists
with no need for regulator led metrics or claw-back agreements, nor those associated costs.
The addition of new sidings would increase the overall mainline railway capacity, leading to even lower average costs,
thus promoting Public Good efficiencies for the overall economy, while leading to higher average speeds for all classes of
rail freight and passenger traffic. This type of proposed Tax Credit investment, when combined with a proposed
categorical exclusion to National Environmental Policy Act reviews for work conducted on existing railway right of ways
or on adjacent parcels less than one hundred feet wide when obtained with landholder consent even though traffic might
increase, would enable the rapid infrastructure improvements the administration and legislature envisions.

Appendix A – Interstate Cash Flow Analysis
Decreasing Real Revenue – Effects of Historical Inflation & Highway Miles per Gallon Changes
With the Interstate Highway System needing rebuilding the funds generated by the leveraged fuel excise tax arrangement
are far below what is needed to incrementally fund replacement costs. Some of this shortage is an artifact of
disagreements over the Federal and State level Highway Trust Funds (HTF) centering on the efficiency of the work, the
degree to which these taxes should be raised, and questions over what type of projects are funded. It seems as if the
consensus was lost around the time of the 1970’s fuel embargoes after which the hyper-inflation or the era and increasing
fuel efficiency led to significant declines in the real tax revenue routed to governments per incremental mile.
The current Federal and State level is less than even the hard dollar accident costs not borne by the users directly but
instead supported by various government programs or health care groups. Should this effect be netted out then the trust
funds would incur negative marginal revenue for each person-mile traveled even before considering road construction and
rebuilding costs.
However, any human activity will have differing accident costs related to the quality of the built item or in this case the
condition and geometry of the infrastructure. Thus a distinction between financial costs and economic values follows
latter with only the financial costs added to cash flow analysis results so as to enable the “Quant” to compare various
types of infrastructure designs inclusive of the accidents costs parsed by who currently pays for such.
Marginal Revenue per Vehicle-Mile (VMT) Automobile Excise Tax has Declined for use of the Interstates.
A further problem associated with a public expectation of such a low rate of revenue per mile is the difficulty in funding
rebuilding of very complicated urban projects. Say one were to try to get back to early 80’s level of receipts, this would
require doubling the per-gallon fuel tax, a politically difficult position. When one studies the projects being funded from
the HTF, most are the low hanging fruit. Major bottlenecks are left with just patches as there are not enough financial
resources to fund such projects by a factor of two or three.
For this reason the public messaging should change to first explain that a very expensive highway infrastructure was
installed in the past that should now be conserved through pricing in urban environments where little expansion is
economically possible as all adjacent property is improved and person-mile metrics used elsewhere to set budgets.

Long-Run Average Cost and Public Interstate Investment – Below-the-Road
To find the “Quant” six decades of FHWA records 76 with separate tabulations for Interstate Highway costs were used. The
cash flow analysis included construction and rebuilding cost to which accident cost not borne by users can be added
according to their current occurrence rates but did not include program overhead. A historically accurate Fuel Tax and
prorated fee revenue stream was compared to these costs in a time history to calculate the Net Present Value of the gap
between Revenue and Expenses. The Financial amounts shown below are the results of this Net Present Value (NPV)
analysis using USDOT-FHWA records for the Interstate program going back to 1956 under historical interest rates
corresponding to the differing project investment methods. The Aaa Corporate Bond rate was picked to be the comparison
rate as it is between the private shareholder Weighted Average Cost of Capital and the government borrowing effective
interest rate. As such the Aaa Corporate Bond rate most closely resembles the financing package P3 arrangements might
experience for a stable project with sufficient public backing of the up-front costs.
While these values are expressed to several significant digits, the reality is this calculation is backward looking and
subject to likely a +/- 30% uncertainty as rural mileage classifications have changed. The author has attempted to assign
costs for urban route mileage at three times the rural mileage cost for the original construction which took advantage of
now illegal relocation practices to clear the highway right-of-way. Now urban rebuilding costs are many times this
estimate for the original system as it is difficult to build under traffic and any expansion will consume expensive land.
The Adjusted Route Gap of $0.109 per Vehicle-Mile (VM) is the amount estimated to come from taxes outside of the
ramps of the Interstate system. This is the financially leveraged amount the “Quant” attempts to isolate. For comparison
TxDOT assumed in 2004 starting tolls of $0.12 77 ($0.16/VM in $2018) as a back check to see if tolling converged for
conceptual projects, but many toll-road projects now charge only what can be borne by the marketplace and floated with
low interest loans, then dip into the HTF pot-of-money for the rest. While many of these are High Occupancy Toll (HOT)
lanes the policy question is that the public does not understand that tolls are not funding the full costs of many facilities.
The analysis reproduced in full at the end of this paper shows the hard-dollar, leveraged Interstate Highway investment to
be $0.109 per rural automobile VM, funded by taxing the relatively unchanging use of locally financed streets then
directing the funds narrowly toward highway type projects. The “Quant” actually considers the cost of the privately
installed roadway base by default whose cost are not considered in government records though the construction is required
by zoning. This leveraging is combined with the publically borne accident costs of $0.025, for an equivalent $0.134 per
automobile mile. To convert this to a person-mile equivalent a 1.39 average automobile occupancy for longer trips is used
to find the estimated “Quant” of $0.096 per person-mile throughout the broader United States. It is important to note
that new build Interstate Highway type projects far exceed the original system’s average investment requirements.
76
USDOT-FHWA. Office of Highway Policy Information - Publications Archive. 2019.
77
Smith, Don, Chang-Albitres, Carlos, Stockton, Wm, Smith, Craig "Estimating Revenues Using a Toll Viability Screening Tool." 2004.
<https://static.tti.tamu.edu/tti.tamu.edu/documents/0-4726-1.pdf>.

However, the “Quant” metric does not count the substantial accident savings accruing to persons choosing not to drive but
take a common carrier, just the financial costs not covered by the driver directly. The otherwise uncompensated total
economic value of lifetime losses from accidents and lost wages is around $0.11 per rural automobile vehicle-mile as
discussed below. An Economic Benefit to Cost calculation would consider these factors in order to properly order analysis
between Financial and Economic methods.
Public Accident Financial Costs – A Highway Operating Loss At or Above-the-Road Surface

There is an operating cost for the Interstate as Federal Programs assume financial responsibility for the cost of major
accidents that bankrupt individuals and minor ones too. Accident costs requiring financial payment would be $277B/2957
B-VM = $0.094/VM ($2010). Of this amount Federal, State, and Others pay 23% of this or $0.022/VM ($2010) or
$0.025/VM ($2018), but these are just what is payed (estimated); excluded is the value of life or a courtroom level of
compensatory values of life. This also disregards that payments from Medical and Life insurance not Automobile
insurance is the source of most of the Insurer funds for accidents, effectively leveraging this cost onto a larger populace
with no incremental cost feedback.
Considering the value of life, for which Common Carriers already must provide compensation against in their ticket price,
the Interstate Comprehensive measure gives $88.2B/723.4 B-VM = $0.122/VM, and additional $0.115/VM in ($2018)
atop the public hard dollar cost of $0.025/VM in ($2018). Clearly there should be economic consideration given to safer
ground transportation where possible for trip distances in the 200 to 1000 mile band convertible from long-distance
highway travel for the efficiency of the national economy.
Charts from The Economic and Societal Impact Of Motor Vehicle Crashes, USDOT-NHSTA 2010

Interstate Highways rely on Taxing the Use of Locally Financed Streets for Investment Leverage
The fuel tax is a largely a diversion, as are all excise taxes, from the wealth of the land. The daily unavoidable use of
streets and roads, built with property mortgages and city taxes, is taxed to fund something else, highways. Citing absolute
preference from this leverage would be like taxing sales at all the markets, groceries, and restaurants in town, to fund just
a cheap buffet, then marveling at the likely shift in preference. Certainly Interstate Highways are needed under a prudent
rate of investment from the broader economy but so are other forms of intercity transportation. The question the “Quant”
seeks to answer is what metric can be used as funding increasing shifts to General Funds.
However, the USDOT never explored that Interstate Highways were anything other than “self-liquidating” or funded by
“Highway User Fees” to this Author’s knowledge though this was the condition of President Eisenhower original
approval of the 1956 Act. Arguably it was only misleading to a common understanding as all roads are termed
“Highways” in these reports even the neighborhood lane in front of one’s house built with a mortgage. Recently, with the
advent of various Federal General Fund bailouts of the Highway Trust Fund, this argument has shifted. However, no
known USDOT analysis has considered the rate of investment leveraging in the trust fund derived from taxing use of
locally funded street assets.
Further, the general depression of core business districts in the late 60’s through the early 90’s and the nearly threefold
violent crime increase from mid-70’s to mid-90’s, seemed to follow the leveraged infrastructure investment that allowed
business and employment to locate away from population centers and thus has a prominent place in determining why our
geography looks the way it does.
4.2 Million Route Miles Today

The HTF largely leverages
excise (gas) taxes from the
use of locally financed
streets toward NHS
highways.
Locally Financed
Chart of Road Route Mileage - All Roads Now Termed to be “Highways” - USDOT Highway Statistics 78
78USDOT-FHWA. Office of Highway Policy Information - Publications Archive. n.d. 2019.


Future Interstate Highway Investment Needs Projected to Increase Greatly
Recent studies on the future needs by the National Academies have pointed out the inflection point at which we have
arrived. Even after the $141 Billion in additional investment from General Funds over the last decade, the Interstate
highway network is falling behind in its ability to provide today’s level of service into the future. Estimates of around an
additional $36 Billion 79 annually of investment needs over a period of twenty years have been sketched out to meet just
population growth levels of additional travel, though around a half of the vehicle miles traveled on the system are in fact
commuter trips, not interstate trips.
Conceptually, this study also demonstrates that future Interstate Highway congestion will spread beyond urban corridors,
stretching far into rural areas particularly on routes favored by commercial vehicles. A true twenty year plan should
consider the question of a citizen’s ability to choose a different option to long-distance driving to escape these conditions.
These investments would increase the “Quant” historical highway revenue gap to about thirteen cents per person-mile.
Pre-Interstate Legacy Toll Highways are now Hybrid Facilities
Chart 80 of 2018 Toll Rates on Legacy Toll Highway Facilities (Now Only Partially Revenue Funded)
The chart above illustrates the full length rates in effect in 2018 that are much less than the toll rates for shorter distance
trips that might hit $0.26 per mile for a 2-axle automobile trip of just ten miles on the pre-1956 legacy toll highways.
The assumption is that the “Quant” effect eventually depresses the available marketplace revenue as for a longer trip one
might be able to triangulate over to a “free” road supported only from the HTF. The chart also illustrates that the truck
multiplier of four times the automobile rate applied within the “Quant” analysis is generally the same multiplier that has
evolved over the years of use for these systems and is in no way based on the relative damage heavier axle-loads cause.
Instead the truck multiplier of four is a marketplace segmentation figure much less than the relative damage metric.

80
MNDOT. "Minnesota Tolling Study Report Modern Tolling Practices and Policy Considerations." 2018.
<https://www.dot.state.mn.us/govrel/reports/2018/tolling-study-report.pdf>

For the legacy toll routes it must also be recalled that States were reimbursed for some of the original cost and future 4R
capital maintenance through the 1991 ISTEA 81 disbursements, so that they are in effect now operating as a hybrid facility
as part of the cost-sharing premise of ISTEA, though from a fixed pot of funds. Even the Pennsylvania Turnpike, the
earliest facility of the main east-west chain cutting through the mountains, benefited from direct grants of 40% 82 of costs
through Depression era funding as well as government risk assumption on the remaining borrowing.
However, with the nationwide marketplace expectation for user payments on highways set so low, by six-decades of
practice, one has to conclude that large scale tolling would not gain political acceptance in the United States outside of
bottleneck urban areas.
A Hybrid-Bridge Project Financial Structure as Urban Pricing is Restored
It is instead intended that a hybrid bridge between leveraged public investments and shareholder led investments can be
mediated by the “Quant” investment rate per person-mile for intercity projects as congestion increases in urban areas and
rural Interstate Highways along heavy commercial vehicle routes prior to a future full market restoration of urban land
prices and parking rates. A similar “Quant” could be established for local use per person-trip though this is not developed.
For some time the investments structure would be comprised of a certain average cost public investment, atop which
project sponsors either structure operations to generate enough revenue or come to an agreement for a private developer,
state, or local contribution for certain projects that need innovative Design Build approaches with risk management.
However, there would still be a large portion of intercity type highway projects that would rely on a “Quant” metric
reformed HTF for their funding source, inevitably filled with non-fuel tax General Fund dollars for political reasons.
Rethinking funding programs in light of this shift could produce true budget and resource efficiency, guiding engineers as
they design new road infrastructure to select a reasonable paved width and target speed using an iterative feedback of
costs, development value, and economically projected travel, instead of just trying to provide for faster speeds for elusory
Time-Savings to get to a now more distant grocery.
Rural intercity asset preservation would also advance over building the next new urban-edge highway with such a throttle
as existing links have established use that would count toward establishing funding levels so that we do not abandon
existing cities but for them building the next new thing.
Urban highway rebuilding, often languishing except when comprised of a quiet mix of HTF grants and estimated funds
from future High Occupancy Toll (HOT) collections, could advance if public messaging justified some “pre-paid” HOT
use per month on each tag for the occasional trip while daily commuters would still be market clearing tolled. The public
might actually prefer HOT expansion if they had a reliable occasional trip option again relative to congested traffic jams.
Future Hybrid Transportation Infrastructure Project Funding Structure =

Public Leveraged Funds (Fixed Investment Rate per Mile) + P3 Managed Toll or Passenger Ticket (At Performance Risk)
81 US. "Public Law No: 102-240 Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act, Section 1012 Toll Roads Bridges and Tunnels (4R IM funds) &
Section 1014 Reimbursement for Segments of the Interstate System Constructed without Federal Assistance (Legacy Pre-1956 Toll roads)." 1991.
<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-105/pdf/STATUTE-105-Pg1914.pdf>
82
US Secretary of Commerce. “Progress and Feasability of Toll Roads and Their Relation to the Federal-Aid Program.” 1955.

Analysis of Original Interstate Highway Long-run Average Construction and Rebuilding Costs relative to Fuel Taxes and Fees Collected for Use of System
HVUT, Trailer
& Truck tire Interstate Federal Interstate Interstate Federal- Interstate Federal-
fees Capital Expenditure Federal State Capital State Maintenance
Interstate State Average Fee (estimated) (Millions) Table FA- Maintenance (Millions) 10% (Millions) None User
Interstate Combo & per Gallon prorated to 204 & FA-3 Expenditure Match Assumed Assumed Prior to User Federal-
Total VMT Single Truck Table MF-205 VMT 1956 (IM) Prior to 1981 Table 1981 Table Resulting Federal- Resulting Federal-State Federal User State State Aaa
(Millions) VMT (Not Pro-rated by Table FE-101 Reimbursement of (Millions) SF-212A 1981-1995 SF-212A 1981-1995 State user fees for user capital repayment for Incremental Incremental Taxes per Corporate
Table VM- (Millions) Miles per Gallon Federal Fee per Quantity) 1956-1985 costs prior to 1956 Table FA-204 Table SF-12B 1994- Table SF-12B 1994- each year based on each year based on VMT, Taxes per Taxes per Truck Bond Rate 1-Yr
202, 203 & VM-201& VM-1 Gallon 1957-1995 Estimates per Sec. 1014 of & FA-3 to 2008 Table SF- 2008 Table SF-12/A VMT, Federal tax, Federal tax, MPG, and Fee Inflation CPI Auto VMT Auto VMT VMT (Est. prior Treasury NPV Aaa Corporate NPV 1-YR Treasury + NPV Investor WACC
Year VM-1 VM-1 Gasoline Diesel Gasoline Diesel Gasoline Diesel 1986-Current ISTEA 1991 2011 12/A 2009-2015 2009-2015 and MPG Test Ratio Factor Capital Cost ($2018) Index ($2018) ($2018) ($2018) to 1976) Year Rate Bond Rate 1% Rate Rate
Rural Urban
1956 14.3 5.0 $4,967 $4,967 $4,967,000,000 9.2463 $45,926,216,418 26.8 1956
1957 3,243 3,563 14.3 5.0 $0.030 $0.030 $0.056 $0.056 $0.004 $400 $444 $40,836,000 $403,608,444 8.9783 $3,990,338,164 27.6 $0.019 $0.035 $0.190 5.61% 1957 3.11% $5,245,648,700 $5,171,143,700 $5,335,054,700
1958 6,264 6,658 14.3 5.0 $0.030 $0.030 $0.057 $0.057 $0.004 $1,700 $1,889 $78,164,545 $1,810,724,343 8.6643 $16,365,967,366 28.6 $0.018 $0.034 $0.186 4.07% 1958 1.57% $5,879,181,910 $5,718,023,275 $6,075,522,671
1959 9,775 10,222 14.3 5.0 $0.030 $0.030 $0.059 $0.059 $0.004 $2,200 $2,444 $123,897,497 $2,320,546,948 8.5448 $20,887,356,322 29.0 $0.018 $0.035 $0.187 5.81% 1959 3.31% $8,136,689,807 $7,853,236,640 $8,486,390,412
1960 10,514 13,365 14.3 5.0 $0.040 $0.040 $0.059 $0.059 $0.004 $2,487 $2,763 $165,984,098 $2,597,349,235 8.4573 $23,370,443,686 29.3 $0.024 $0.035 $0.204 5.71% 1960 3.21% $11,054,344,974 $10,602,099,877 $11,618,538,356
1961 13,091 16,952 14.3 5.0 $0.040 $0.040 $0.061 $0.061 $0.004 $1,782 $1,980 $211,981,727 $1,768,018,273 8.3154 $16,464,563,758 29.8 $0.023 $0.035 $0.204 4.45% 1961 1.95% $14,259,194,601 $13,588,832,862 $15,104,380,566
1962 22,001 22,180 14.3 5.0 $0.040 $0.040 $0.062 $0.062 $0.004 $2,178 $2,420 $314,519,287 $2,105,480,713 8.2600 $19,989,200,000 30.0 $0.023 $0.036 $0.204 5.60% 1962 3.10% $16,924,736,795 $15,986,482,031 $18,120,956,353
1963 27,536 27,674 14.3 5.0 $0.040 $0.040 $0.062 $0.062 $0.004 $2,370 $2,633 $394,577,762 $2,238,755,571 8.1513 $21,465,131,579 30.4 $0.023 $0.035 $0.203 5.86% 1963 3.36% $20,145,388,254 $18,880,772,320 $21,775,782,145
1964 33,595 33,833 14.3 5.0 $0.040 $0.040 $0.063 $0.063 $0.004 $2,567 $2,852 $486,141,734 $2,366,080,488 8.0194 $22,873,160,734 30.9 $0.022 $0.035 $0.201 6.35% 1964 3.85% $23,805,536,958 $22,143,824,994 $25,971,722,540
1965 40,310 40,380 14.5 5.0 $0.040 $0.040 $0.064 $0.064 $0.005 $2,652 $2,947 $579,298,552 $2,367,368,115 7.9423 $23,403,333,333 31.2 $0.022 $0.035 $0.201 6.65% 1965 4.15% $27,912,030,006 $25,772,165,614 $30,732,347,384
1966 48,900 50,414 8,918 14.5 5.0 $0.040 $0.040 $0.064 $0.064 $0.005 $2,765 $3,072 $876,663,512 $2,195,558,710 7.7925 $23,940,146,751 31.8 $0.021 $0.035 $0.198 7.70% 1966 5.20% $32,610,911,777 $29,884,184,820 $36,244,188,471
1967 54,847 56,317 9,887 14.5 5.0 $0.040 $0.040 $0.065 $0.065 $0.005 $2,955 $3,283 $983,797,041 $2,299,536,293 7.5319 $24,729,787,234 32.9 $0.021 $0.034 $0.193 7.38% 1967 4.88% $37,375,188,009 $33,966,032,449 $41,968,515,972
1968 62,300 63,973 10,597 14.5 5.0 $0.040 $0.040 $0.066 $0.066 $0.005 $3,362 $3,736 $1,124,815,155 $2,610,740,400 7.2669 $27,145,767,351 34.1 $0.020 $0.033 $0.190 8.19% 1968 5.69% $42,924,084,221 $38,691,735,291 $48,690,430,686
1969 71,821 73,195 11,268 14.5 5.0 $0.040 $0.040 $0.068 $0.068 $0.005 $3,752 $4,169 $1,302,460,509 $2,866,428,380 6.9607 $29,018,277,154 35.6 $0.019 $0.033 $0.187 9.62% 1969 7.12% $49,915,274,750 $44,656,236,717 $57,159,764,825
1970 79,516 81,532 12,035 13.5 5.5 $0.040 $0.040 $0.070 $0.070 $0.005 $3,940 $4,378 $1,522,306,231 $2,855,471,546 6.5556 $28,698,765,432 37.8 $0.019 $0.034 $0.167 9.40% 1970 6.90% $57,743,183,224 $51,276,955,639 $66,749,126,843
1971 89,542 90,117 13,600 13.5 5.5 $0.040 $0.040 $0.071 $0.071 $0.006 $3,920 $4,356 $1,717,021,300 $2,638,534,256 6.2261 $27,118,257,956 39.8 $0.018 $0.033 $0.162 7.39% 1971 4.89% $65,076,895,358 $57,320,827,147 $76,001,260,982
1972 99,024 100,556 15,668 13.5 5.5 $0.040 $0.040 $0.073 $0.073 $0.006 $3,964 $4,404 $1,958,183,410 $2,446,261,034 6.0292 $26,555,263,585 41.1 $0.018 $0.033 $0.160 7.45% 1972 4.95% $72,760,229,120 $63,526,943,406 $85,913,976,297
1973 107,085 108,462 18,354 13.5 5.5 $0.040 $0.040 $0.075 $0.075 $0.006 $3,964 $4,404 $2,182,553,767 $2,221,890,678 5.8169 $25,620,219,092 42.6 $0.017 $0.032 $0.158 9.82% 1973 7.32% $82,591,767,487 $71,462,175,050 $98,627,696,909
1974 104,621 109,304 19,205 13.5 5.5 $0.040 $0.040 $0.076 $0.076 $0.007 $2,543 $2,826 $2,202,869,047 $622,686,508 5.3176 $15,025,164,521 46.6 $0.016 $0.030 $0.148 10.70% 1974 8.20% $93,888,719,589 $80,462,999,774 $113,455,786,035
1975 111,980 118,232 20,347 13.9 5.5 $0.040 $0.040 $0.077 $0.077 $0.008 $2,965 $3,294 $2,343,964,050 $950,480,394 4.7562 $15,669,161,868 52.1 $0.014 $0.026 $0.137 9.28% 1975 6.78% $103,282,064,582 $87,394,152,675 $126,718,367,300
1976 117,885 132,698 22,723 13.9 5.5 $0.040 $0.040 $0.077 $0.077 $0.008 $3,235 $3,594 $2,586,971,895 $1,007,472,549 4.4568 $16,019,844,125 55.6 $0.013 $0.025 $0.131 8.43% 1976 5.88% $113,019,348,518 $94,422,743,825 $140,703,837,044
1977 126,149 141,639 25,231 13.9 5.5 $0.040 $0.040 $0.078 $0.078 $0.009 $3,112 $3,458 $2,812,708,328 $645,069,450 4.2359 $14,646,792,023 58.5 $0.012 $0.024 $0.127 8.02% 1977 6.08% $123,171,772,117 $102,186,675,694 $155,944,793,529
1978 136,125 156,793 28,145 13.9 5.5 $0.040 $0.040 $0.078 $0.078 $0.009 $3,263 $3,626 $3,114,405,673 $511,149,883 3.9648 $14,374,602,667 62.5 $0.011 $0.022 $0.121 8.73% 1978 8.34% $134,626,051,836 $112,436,230,140 $174,400,393,995
1979 133,597 159,452 29,230 13.9 5.5 $0.040 $0.040 $0.080 $0.080 $0.010 $3,280 $3,644 $3,207,841,703 $436,602,741 3.6281 $13,222,449,976 68.3 $0.010 $0.021 $0.115 9.63% 1979 10.65% $148,150,914,245 $126,105,749,796 $197,366,687,881
1980 135,084 161,242 30,651 15.9 5.7 $0.040 $0.040 $0.082 $0.082 $0.011 $3,261 $170 $4,992 $3,049,892,751 $1,942,315,249 3.1851 $15,900,631,650 77.8 $0.008 $0.017 $0.104 11.94% 1980 12.00% $166,328,866,514 $142,992,858,367 $227,006,968,450
1981 139,304 166,479 32,539 15.9 5.7 $0.040 $0.040 $0.092 $0.092 $0.013 $3,519 $170 $4,496 $3,426,444,788 $1,069,491,212 2.8483 $12,805,665,986 87.0 $0.007 $0.016 $0.102 14.17% 1981 14.80% $192,115,208,219 $167,834,931,047 $268,378,929,337
1982 142,546 175,879 33,705 15.9 5.7 $0.040 $0.040 $0.091 $0.096 $0.014 $3,519 $268 $4,198 $3,607,648,216 $590,152,784 2.6278 $11,030,912,914 94.3 $0.007 $0.015 $0.099 13.79% 1982 12.27% $219,824,869,483 $191,318,039,093 $312,511,667,121
1983 145,250 192,470 35,241 15.9 5.7 $0.090 $0.090 $0.098 $0.103 $0.014 $3,162 $780 $4,586 $5,259,174,048 $672,856,048 2.5337 $11,620,548,061 97.8 $0.014 $0.016 $0.122 12.04% 1983 9.58% $246,952,990,948 $212,212,078,578 $356,485,208,072
1984 149,139 204,304 37,118 15.9 5.7 $0.090 $0.150 $0.106 $0.114 $0.015 $3,599 $1,901 $5,959 $6,162,819,512 $203,341,512 2.4318 $14,492,234,037 101.9 $0.014 $0.016 $0.149 12.71% 1984 10.91% $277,582,340,046 $236,733,543,933 $408,436,998,888
1985 154,357 216,188 37,252 17.4 5.7 $0.090 $0.150 $0.111 $0.116 $0.015 $3,640 $2,758 $7,386 $6,157,081,609 $1,229,180,391 2.3488 $17,348,964,205 105.5 $0.012 $0.015 $0.146 11.37% 1985 8.42% $308,916,990,668 $258,811,347,490 $461,263,209,470
1986 159,498 232,017 38,863 17.4 5.7 $0.090 $0.150 $0.118 $0.121 $0.016 $3,483 $2,930 $7,391 $6,677,491,375 $713,082,625 2.2609 $16,709,710,193 109.6 $0.012 $0.015 $0.143 9.02% 1986 6.45% $338,121,355,688 $279,413,547,208 $512,404,568,575
1987 170,493 244,836 41,245 17.4 5.7 $0.091 $0.151 $0.128 $0.133 $0.016 $2,623 $2,541 $7,564 $7,421,901,097 $141,671,903 2.2284 $16,854,796,667 111.2 $0.012 $0.016 $0.147 9.38% 1987 6.77% $370,617,108,627 $301,892,468,971 $570,258,432,837
1988 181,315 258,695 42,871 17.4 5.7 $0.091 $0.151 $0.134 $0.140 $0.017 $2,771 $2,543 $7,344 $8,047,905,421 $703,835,421 2.1417 $15,729,131,772 115.7 $0.011 $0.017 $0.145 9.71% 1988 7.65% $406,759,458,119 $328,160,094,060 $637,057,060,980
1989 191,085 270,735 44,719 17.4 5.7 $0.091 $0.151 $0.142 $0.148 $0.018 $2,421 $2,543 $8,149 $8,712,476,042 $563,939,042 2.0462 $16,673,884,960 121.1 $0.011 $0.017 $0.143 9.26% 1989 8.53% $443,656,373,360 $358,662,840,087 $711,239,273,143
1990 200,173 278,901 46,123 20.2 5.9 $0.091 $0.151 $0.155 $0.160 $0.019 $2,733 $2,508 $8,707 $8,551,206,582 $156,282,418 1.9451 $16,936,544,538 127.4 $0.009 $0.015 $0.139 9.32% 1990 7.89% $484,388,649,197 $389,933,893,348 $792,744,121,683
1991 205,011 285,325 47,369 21.1 5.9 $0.141 $0.201 $0.176 $0.176 $0.020 $2,754 $2,528 $8,331 $10,600,975,072 $2,270,463,072 1.8410 $15,336,559,239 134.6 $0.012 $0.015 $0.154 8.77% 1991 5.86% $527,039,522,118 $416,850,361,824 $875,409,620,152
1992 205,557 303,265 48,857 21.0 5.9 $0.141 $0.201 $0.180 $0.183 $0.020 $1,630 $2,339 $9,363 $11,190,614,959 $1,827,356,959 1.7944 $16,800,979,959 138.1 $0.012 $0.015 $0.153 8.14% 1992 3.89% $567,485,260,452 $434,852,855,800 $953,817,215,194
1993 208,308 317,399 49,009 20.5 5.9 $0.141 $0.201 $0.183 $0.186 $0.021 $1,218 $2,795 $8,931 $11,775,281,051 $2,844,025,051 1.7377 $15,520,092,825 142.6 $0.012 $0.016 $0.150 7.22% 1993 3.43% $606,498,404,124 $452,208,528,440 $1,032,947,075,779
1994 215,568 330,577 51,618 20.7 5.9 $0.184 $0.244 $0.185 $0.189 $0.021 $1,061 $2,782 $9,651 $1,373 $13,705,299,950 $2,681,299,950 1.6949 $16,357,850,889 146.2 $0.015 $0.015 $0.160 7.97% 1994 5.32% $651,765,633,085 $477,764,340,002 $1,130,126,056,953
1995 223,382 341,528 55,136 21.1 5.9 $0.184 $0.244 $0.185 $0.190 $0.022 $1,329 $2,775 $9,949 $1,377 $14,173,055,421 $2,846,861,421 1.6487 $16,402,716,244 150.3 $0.014 $0.014 $0.157 7.59% 1995 5.94% $698,349,834,021 $508,053,803,032 $1,237,145,131,860
1996 232,565 351,579 58,710 21.1 5.9 $0.183 $0.243 $0.185 $0.190 $0.022 $1,000 $2,427 $10,522 $1,474 $14,787,839,706 $2,792,422,706 1.6049 $16,886,258,778 154.4 $0.014 $0.014 $0.154 7.37% 1996 5.52% $746,761,541,681 $538,146,434,205 $1,350,692,597,341
1997 240,255 361,433 62,283 21.1 5.9 $0.183 $0.243 $0.185 $0.190 $0.023 $1,082 $2,404 $11,007 $1,329 $15,417,397,742 $3,081,070,742 1.5575 $17,143,509,552 159.1 $0.014 $0.014 $0.150 7.27% 1997 5.63% $798,055,673,924 $570,847,982,461 $1,474,791,497,076
1998 251,520 374,622 64,000 21.1 5.9 $0.183 $0.243 $0.187 $0.195 $0.023 $595 $2,490 $10,924 $1,334 $16,103,486,023 $3,846,209,023 1.5334 $16,750,504,092 161.6 $0.013 $0.014 $0.150 6.53% 1998 5.05% $846,886,444,770 $602,116,809,878 $1,600,308,483,387
1999 260,166 383,259 66,000 21.1 5.9 $0.183 $0.243 $0.191 $0.202 $0.024 $329 $3,199 $12,953 $1,479 $16,769,299,195 $2,337,021,195 1.5082 $19,536,542,951 164.3 $0.013 $0.014 $0.150 7.05% 1999 5.08% $902,474,572,367 $634,645,453,387 $1,741,133,685,667
2000 268,180 393,465 67,849 21.1 5.9 $0.183 $0.243 $0.200 $0.200 $0.025 $217 $3,597 $14,112 $1,724 $17,521,141,665 $1,685,001,665 1.4680 $20,716,424,982 168.8 $0.013 $0.014 $0.146 7.62% 2000 6.11% $968,728,032,571 $677,265,561,721 $1,909,476,945,056
2001 274,024 399,890 68,685 21.1 5.9 $0.183 $0.243 $0.193 $0.204 $0.025 $158 $3,793 $14,263 $1,725 $17,730,055,871 $1,742,891,871 1.4152 $20,184,255,348 175.1 $0.012 $0.013 $0.143 7.08% 2001 3.49% $1,035,509,677,495 $705,914,127,203 $2,068,885,895,091
2002 279,962 408,618 69,520 21.1 5.9 $0.183 $0.243 $0.202 $0.197 $0.026 $128 $4,414 $15,320 $1,806 $18,263,941,819 $1,137,309,819 1.3992 $21,436,370,656 177.1 $0.012 $0.013 $0.140 6.49% 2002 2.00% $1,100,858,250,011 $725,296,372,392 $2,222,054,699,882
2003 269,945 432,633 79,427 21.1 5.9 $0.183 $0.243 $0.191 $0.200 $0.026 $79 $3,893 $15,093 $1,900 $19,097,379,193 $2,103,881,193 1.3638 $20,584,196,394 181.7 $0.012 $0.012 $0.138 5.66% 2003 1.24% $1,161,965,145,406 $740,380,225,574 $2,369,541,181,806
2004 266,996 454,385 89,334 22.5 5.9 $0.183 $0.243 $0.191 $0.194 $0.027 $117 $3,822 $13,685 $1,658 $19,533,770,082 $4,190,243,082 1.3380 $18,310,830,441 185.2 $0.011 $0.011 $0.135 5.63% 2004 1.89% $1,225,161,453,389 $759,612,530,734 $2,531,595,403,037
2005 258,790 469,070 91,771 22.9 5.9 $0.183 $0.243 $0.193 $0.200 $0.028 $20 $4,082 $15,063 $2,213 $19,863,778,218 $2,587,774,218 1.2994 $19,572,796,811 190.7 $0.010 $0.011 $0.134 5.23% 2005 3.62% $1,284,828,004,606 $790,322,797,342 $2,714,079,305,070
2006 257,915 477,287 90,322 22.5 5.9 $0.183 $0.243 $0.203 $0.205 $0.029 $6 $4,373 $16,752 $2,281 $20,519,607,354 $1,486,617,354 1.2496 $20,934,130,254 198.3 $0.010 $0.011 $0.131 5.59% 2006 4.94% $1,353,917,459,266 $834,526,483,497 $2,931,935,792,310
2007 256,438 483,315 119,778 22.9 6.0 $0.183 $0.243 $0.193 $0.205 $0.029 $4 $4,000 $19,375 $2,104 $22,634,079,501 $1,155,759,501 1.2243 $23,720,721,113 202.4 $0.010 $0.010 $0.127 5.56% 2007 4.53% $1,427,625,996,722 $879,106,970,740 $3,163,361,275,381
2008 243,221 476,114 114,358 23.7 6.0 $0.183 $0.243 $0.205 $0.208 $0.031 $3 $4,901 $20,010 $2,505 $21,996,877,623 $517,777,377 1.1740 $23,490,749,710 211.1 $0.009 $0.010 $0.124 5.63% 2008 1.83% $1,506,780,511,577 $902,797,230,517 $3,380,713,917,027
2009 242,178 474,798 105,758 23.5 6.0 $0.183 $0.243 $0.208 $0.214 $0.032 $46 $4,622 $14,782 $4,118 $21,600,390,360 $2,700,565,360 1.1736 $17,348,248,641 211.1 $0.009 $0.010 $0.127 5.31% 2009 0.47% $1,587,335,828,098 $916,593,738,511 $3,589,988,939,217
2010 245,647 477,693 110,626 23.3 5.9 $0.183 $0.243 $0.218 $0.224 $0.032 $10 $5,000 $14,228 $5,971 $22,839,112,450 $2,639,420,450 1.1436 $16,271,439,516 216.7 $0.009 $0.011 $0.127 4.94% 2010 0.32% $1,662,916,244,717 $925,956,563,036 $3,798,651,404,844
2011 243,587 476,704 105,052 23.1 5.8 $0.183 $0.243 $0.214 $0.224 $0.032 $14 $5,000 $14,228 $5,971 $22,381,177,540 $2,181,485,540 1.1252 $16,010,177,931 220.2 $0.009 $0.010 $0.127 4.64% 2011 0.17% $1,737,313,668,913 $934,119,953,155 $4,010,562,581,753
2012 245,872 484,548 108,226 23.3 5.8 $0.183 $0.243 $0.216 $0.219 $0.032 $20,492 $3,533 $22,746,713,755 $1,278,852,245 1.0931 $22,399,758,029 226.7 $0.009 $0.010 $0.122 3.64% 2012 0.17% $1,798,290,994,848 $942,842,147,686 $4,210,884,509,193
2013 234,303 505,309 112,248 23.4 5.8 $0.183 $0.243 $0.219 $0.223 $0.032 $21,208 $3,668 $23,388,312,067 $1,487,687,933 1.0760 $22,819,550,152 230.3 $0.008 $0.010 $0.121 4.27% 2013 0.13% $1,876,411,479,564 $954,789,567,231 $4,440,209,885,827
2014 231,371 519,843 113,413 23.4 5.8 $0.183 $0.243 $0.226 $0.238 $0.032 $25,305 $3,843 $24,165,766,686 $4,982,233,314 1.0626 $26,889,275,300 233.2 $0.008 $0.010 $0.122 4.25% 2014 0.11% $1,957,709,882,116 $966,891,932,696 $4,681,282,740,889
2015 235,765 541,186 115,858 23.4 5.8 $0.183 $0.243 $0.250 $0.237 $0.032 $24,389 $3,324 $25,548,069,842 $2,164,930,158 1.0603 $25,860,480,103 233.7 $0.008 $0.011 $0.122 4.19% 2015 0.30% $2,044,928,915,067 $984,508,530,169 $4,940,916,612,902
2016 246,716 558,388 120,881 23.4 5.8 $0.183 $0.243 $0.251 $0.250 $0.032 $24,000 $3,200 $26,825,840,876 $374,159,124 1.0460 $25,104,263,402 236.9 $0.008 $0.011 $0.122 3.50% 2016 0.60% $2,118,742,129,808 $1,002,460,235,692 $5,197,155,934,373
2017 252,550 567,210 124,118 23.4 5.8 $0.183 $0.243 $0.251 $0.250 $0.032 $24,000 $3,200 $27,416,260,513 $216,260,513 1.0206 $24,494,233,937 242.8 $0.008 $0.011 $0.119 3.68% 2017 1.17% $2,197,099,768,365 $1,024,595,901,184 $5,482,146,841,417
2018 260,000 570,000 130,000 23.4 5.8 $0.183 $0.243 $0.251 $0.250 $0.032 $24,000 $3,200 $28,185,422,930 $985,422,930 1.0000 $24,000,000,000 247.8 $0.008 $0.011 $0.117 3.96% 2018 2.25% $2,283,880,094,763 $1,057,671,978,993 $5,815,012,683,000
Current 10,133,757 16,238,701 3,105,740 2006, 2016-2018 Not Found, Estimated $1,243,506,153,327 $0.014 $0.020 $0.149
NPV Aaa Corporate NPV 1-YR Treasury + NPV Investor WACC

Bond Rate 1% Rate Rate
Total Urban & Rural VMT 29,478,198 Total Route Miles 46,876 Fee Gap per Total VMT $0.087 $0.036 $0.197
1956 Incorporated Toll Route Miles 2,300 % Fuel Tax Rate 293% 121% 668%
Note: NHS category now used for major Interstate Capital and STP for bond financed new Interstate routes, Federal-State $2018 per Total Route Mile $26,527,565 Gap per Route Mile $35,274,130 $23,503,822 $129,222,504
Capital costs after 1998 don't reflect this as the data is not broken out by FHWA, several values extended Test Ratio for Historical Fees 1.00
2016-2018 due to lack of FHWA reports
Truck (N-1) Prorate Additional funds per VM to make up Gap - add to existing fuel fees
Total Cost Ratio
Automobile 100% $0.064 $0.024 $0.093
Class 8 Truck 400% $0.256 $0.095 $0.370
Rural-Urban Cost Assignment Adjusted Route Gap (No Cost-VM elasticity applied)
Mileage Rural 85% Rural 170% $0.109 $0.040 $0.157
Mileage Urban at 3x Cost per Mile 15% Urban 56% $0.036 $0.013 $0.052

Analysis of Recently Constructed Interstate Highway Long-Run Average Construction and Rebuilding Costs relative to Fuel Taxes and Fees Collected for Use of System
Interstate
Combo & HVUT, Trailer Resulting
Single & Truck tire At 90%-10% Interstate Federal user Resulting Federal user
Truck fees Split Interstate Federal fees for each capital repayment for AAA
VMT Federal Fee per (estimated) Federal Capital Maintenance year based on each year based on VMT, Corporat 1-Yr
Interstate Total VMT (Millions) Miles per Gallon Gallon prorated to Expenditure Expenditure VMT, Federal Federal tax, MPG, and Inflation Capital Cost in e Bond Treasury NPV AAA Corporate NPV 1-YR Treasury + NPV Investor WACC
Year (Millions) Estimated Est. Gasoline Diesel Gasoline Diesel VMT (Millions) (Millions) tax, and MPG Fee Test Ratio Factor 2012 Dollars Rate Rate Bond Rate 1% Rate Rate
Rural Urban
2005 22.9 5.9 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 $0 $0 1.0000 $0 2005 5.23% 2005 3.62% 0.0161 $0 $0 $0
2006 22.5 5.9 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 $0.006 $0 $6,000 1.0000 $6,000 2006 5.59% 2006 4.94% 0.0065 $0 $0 $0
2007 22.9 6.0 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 0.783 $0 $783,000 1.0000 $783,000 2007 5.56% 2007 4.53% 0.0103 $6,334 $6,332 $6,477
2008 23.7 6.0 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 6.683 $0 $6,683,000 1.0000 $6,683,000 2008 5.63% 2008 1.83% 0.038 $833,773 $811,670 $844,030
2009 24.7 6.1 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 14.116 $0 $14,116,000 1.0000 $14,116,000 2009 5.31% 2009 0.47% 0.0484 $7,915,914 $7,604,842 $7,991,749
2010 25.7 6.2 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 66.755 $0 $66,755,000 1.0000 $66,755,000 2010 4.94% 2010 0.32% 0.0462 $23,120,290 $22,007,557 $23,410,337
2011 26.7 6.3 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 24.577 $0 $24,577,000 1.0000 $24,577,000 2011 4.64% 2011 0.17% 0.0447 $94,045,504 $89,801,079 $95,261,482
2012 26.7 6.4 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 34.023 $0 $34,023,000 1.0000 $34,023,000 2012 3.64% 2012 0.17% 0.0347 $122,940,363 $115,716,302 $125,892,722
2013 26.7 6.5 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 101.622 $0 $101,622,000 1.0000 $101,622,000 2013 4.27% 2013 0.13% 0.0414 $163,665,698 $151,431,356 $168,573,559
2014 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 140.696 $0 $140,696,000 1.0000 $140,696,000 2014 4.25% 2014 0.11% 0.0414 $276,562,426 $255,862,248 $284,769,908
2015 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 88.898 $0 $88,898,000 1.0000 $88,898,000 2015 4.19% 2015 0.30% 0.0389 $434,741,554 $401,713,506 $448,585,725
2016 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 63.343 $0 $63,343,000 1.0000 $63,343,000 2016 3.50% 2016 0.60% 0.029 $541,966,938 $498,461,290 $565,110,389
2017 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 54.091 $0 $54,091,000 1.0000 $54,091,000 2017 3.68% 2017 1.17% 0.0251 $627,585,344 $573,995,443 $662,867,496
2018 104 13 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 36.451 $24,870,601 $11,580,399 1.0000 $36,451,000 2018 3.96% 2018 2.25% 0.0171 $708,670,727 $648,499,252 $760,520,894
2019 111 13 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 $26,362,837 $26,362,837 1.0000 $0 2019 4.00% 2019 2.00% 0.02 $749,061,171 $679,882,041 $818,427,371
2020 117 14 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 $27,855,073 $27,855,073 1.0000 $0 2020 4.00% 2020 2.00% 0.02 $751,606,268 $673,124,780 $839,588,406
2021 123 15 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 $29,347,309 $29,347,309 1.0000 $0 2021 4.00% 2021 2.00% 0.02 $752,701,243 $664,627,799 $860,437,333
2022 129 16 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 $30,839,545 $30,839,545 1.0000 $0 2022 4.00% 2022 2.00% 0.02 $752,288,091 $654,338,904 $880,955,426
2023 136 16 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 $32,331,781 $32,331,781 1.0000 $0 2023 4.00% 2023 2.00% 0.02 $750,306,488 $642,204,340 $901,122,834
2024 142 17 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 $33,824,017 $33,824,017 1.0000 $0 2024 4.00% 2024 2.00% 0.02 $746,693,695 $628,168,736 $920,918,516
2025 148 18 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 $35,316,253 $35,316,253 1.0000 $0 2025 4.00% 2025 2.00% 0.02 $741,384,465 $612,175,060 $940,320,169
2026 154 19 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 $36,808,489 $36,808,489 1.0000 $0 2026 4.00% 2026 2.00% 0.02 $734,310,940 $594,164,571 $959,304,151
2027 161 19 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 $38,300,725 $38,300,725 1.0000 $0 2027 4.00% 2027 2.00% 0.02 $725,402,549 $574,076,765 $977,845,401
2028 167 20 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 $39,792,961 $39,792,961 1.0000 $0 2028 4.00% 2028 2.00% 0.02 $714,585,897 $551,849,320 $995,917,356
2029 171 21 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 $40,787,785 $40,787,785 1.0000 $0 2029 4.00% 2029 2.00% 0.02 $701,784,653 $527,418,050 $1,013,491,859
2030 175 21 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 7.600 $41,807,480 $34,207,480 1.0000 $7,600,000 2030 4.00% 2030 2.00% 0.02 $687,436,742 $501,229,173 $1,031,066,318
2031 180 22 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 7.600 $42,852,667 $35,252,667 1.0000 $7,600,000 2031 4.00% 2031 2.00% 0.02 $679,358,433 $481,032,343 $1,056,670,368
2032 184 22 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 7.600 $43,923,984 $36,323,984 1.0000 $7,600,000 2032 4.00% 2032 2.00% 0.02 $669,869,997 $459,153,067 $1,082,702,763
2033 189 23 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 $45,022,083 $45,022,083 1.0000 $0 2033 4.00% 2033 2.00% 0.02 $658,887,854 $435,513,956 $1,109,161,506
2034 194 23 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 $46,147,635 $46,147,635 1.0000 $0 2034 4.00% 2034 2.00% 0.02 $638,420,401 $402,206,629 $1,127,987,789
2035 199 24 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 $47,301,326 $47,301,326 1.0000 $0 2035 4.00% 2035 2.00% 0.02 $615,963,677 $366,740,763 $1,146,750,562
2036 204 24 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 $48,483,859 $48,483,859 1.0000 $0 2036 4.00% 2036 2.00% 0.02 $591,408,844 $329,022,620 $1,165,416,190
2037 209 25 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 $49,695,956 $49,695,956 1.0000 $0 2037 4.00% 2037 2.00% 0.02 $564,641,984 $288,954,923 $1,183,948,271
2038 214 26 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 $50,938,355 $50,938,355 1.0000 $0 2038 4.00% 2038 2.00% 0.02 $535,543,870 $246,436,737 $1,202,307,454
2039 219 26 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 $52,211,814 $52,211,814 1.0000 $0 2039 4.00% 2039 2.00% 0.02 $503,989,736 $201,363,333 $1,220,451,245
2040 225 27 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 $53,517,109 $53,517,109 1.0000 $0 2040 4.00% 2040 2.00% 0.02 $469,849,039 $153,626,065 $1,238,333,798
2041 230 28 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 $54,855,037 $54,855,037 1.0000 $0 2041 4.00% 2041 2.00% 0.02 $432,985,207 $103,112,225 $1,255,905,690
2042 236 28 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 11.440 $56,226,413 $44,786,413 1.0000 $11,440,000 2042 4.00% 2042 2.00% 0.02 $393,255,377 $49,704,904 $1,273,113,693
2043 242 29 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 11.440 $57,632,073 $46,192,073 1.0000 $11,440,000 2043 4.00% 2043 2.00% 0.02 $362,407,723 $5,066,046 $1,302,026,917
2044 248 30 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 11.440 $59,072,875 $47,632,875 1.0000 $11,440,000 2044 4.00% 2044 2.00% 0.02 $328,864,276 $42,359,807 $1,331,184,935
2045 254 30 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 $60,549,697 $60,549,697 1.0000 $0 2045 4.00% 2045 2.00% 0.02 $292,480,658 $92,692,463 $1,360,565,183
2046 261 31 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 $62,063,439 $62,063,439 1.0000 $0 2046 4.00% 2046 2.00% 0.02 $241,208,200 $157,839,424 $1,378,016,416
2047 267 32 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 $63,615,025 $63,615,025 1.0000 $0 2047 4.00% 2047 2.00% 0.02 $186,310,551 $226,499,949 $1,394,910,156
2048 274 33 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 $65,205,401 $65,205,401 1.0000 $0 2048 4.00% 2048 2.00% 0.02 $127,603,347 $298,818,423 $1,411,172,839
2049 281 34 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 $66,835,536 $66,835,536 1.0000 $0 2049 4.00% 2049 2.00% 0.02 $64,893,864 $374,944,538 $1,426,725,484
2050 288 35 26.7 6.7 $0.183 $0.243 $0.032 $68,506,424 $68,506,424 1.0000 $0 2050 4.00% 2050 2.00% 0.02 $2,019,338 $455,033,476 $1,441,483,346
Total 6,434 772 $0.007 $0.036 $632 $689,164,000
$/Total
Constructed Route Miles 28.6 VMT $0.000 $0.063 $0.200
$2012 per Constructed Route Mile $24,096,643

Deficit per
Route Mile $70,606 $15,910,261 $50,401,516
Test Ratio for Fees 16.75
Truck (N-1) Prorate Additional funds per VM to make up capital deficit - add to existing fuel fees
Total Cost Ratio Total Cost Ratio
Automobile 100% $0.000 $0.052 $0.165
Class 8 Truck 400% $0.001 $0.208 $0.659
Computed Cost Responsibility per Class at VM
Automobile 65%
Class 8 Truck 35%

Appendix B
Southwest Chief National Network Route - Engineering Financial Study – Summary Results
Option 1 - Existing Operation Benchmarking Analysis ($2018)
(2) Existing Locomotives, (6) Existing Revenue Passenger Cars
At the current train consist size, which is historically small, the efficiency found in a passenger train’s declining
average cost curve with respect to volume is not being employed to reduce the required overall level of federal
investment. This is likely due to guidance from the use of Total Allocated Cost reporting for the long-distance
routes, which includes irreducible fixed costs as enumerated in Appendix F.
Option 1A - Proposed New Passenger Equipment ($2018)

(2) New Locomotives, (4) New and (4) Refurbished Revenue Passenger Cars
At this consist size, efficiency begins to take root, and the route could cover all costs from revenue other than
infrastructure investment, which would be a rate similar to that of the required Interstate Highway rate of
investment derived from sources other than prorated fuel taxes from driving between exits.
Option 1B - Proposed New Passenger Equipment and Twice Daily ($2018)

At this consist size and twice daily operation, further efficiency is found. The route could cover all costs from
revenue other than infrastructure investment, which would be a rate similar to that of the required Interstate
Highway rate of investment derived from sources other than prorated fuel taxes from driving between exits.
Option 1C - Proposed New Passenger and Express Equipment ($2018)

(4) New Locomotives, (4) New and (4) Refurbished Revenue Passenger Cars, (17) Truck Trailer Express Cars
At this consist size the route covers all operating costs as well as the required infrastructure investment from
revenue; a financial position that is much more efficient than the current highway and aviation programs. No
current form of transportation of persons reaches these levels of cost coverage other than walking and biking.

Appendix C
Proposed Federal Railroad Income Tax Credits –Intermodal Freight and Passenger Infrastructure
Rail Infrastructure – Shareholder Owned:
Proposed Federal Tax Credit to reimburse local property taxes paid on line-haul Right of Way property and plant. Interstate Highways
pay no property tax. This measure promotes market shift through equalization.
Proposed Federal Tax Credit of $21.0/train-mile for the first 800 train-miles of intermodal rail freight between public terminals. This
rate is less than the $0.26/truck-mile investment over and above user fees collected between exits of the original Interstate Highway
system for a 90 trailer train, thus more fiscally efficient.
In Total, the Tax Credit take is estimated to be about $2.8 Billion annually on an average of (4) four round trips a day over the core
network, spurring a private investment in the early phase of around $8 Billion annually.
These investments would be deficit-neutral through:
1. Reducing shippers’ financial costs by around $3 Billion annually through a projected market shift to greater intermodal use
and shorter drayage distances offered by more economical service offerings and near sited new terminals, while using private
work to achieves the benefits of commercial vehicle TSW study more economically.
2. Providing categorically exempt, nimble, privately led infrastructure investment to fund fluidity improvements, such as
passing and staging tracks, new faster alignments and stronger bridges as selected by private owners.
3. Ensuring fluid interstate rail routes exist for military movements and seasonal traffic surges, called for in FRA National Rail
Plan; thus postponing Interstate Highway congestion relief General Fund expenses.
National Rail Plan -

Intermodal Freight
Conversion Example
Source: 2010 Class 1
Railroad Investor Report
Rail Infrastructure – Publicly Held:

Proposed companion measure Trust Fund, for access to privately held Class I railroad track as well as passenger train fixed terminal
costs, large loss liability pools needed for interoperability, and shorter distance commuter rail infrastructure. $2.4 Billion annually
would be re-directed from Railroad Federal Income taxes instead of Federal General Fund buckets at the same level. This investment
is less than the equivalent highway investment, funded by leveraging taxes on the use of a broad base of locally funded roads. The
measure would also allow for a national expansion program and solve intercity commuter train access fess questions.
NRPC Mainline Track Capital Lease = $8.0/train-mile
NRPC Trackside Boarding Platform Capital, ADA mods, Terminal Tracks, and Security = $8.0/train-mile
USDOT Large Loss Liability Pool (Operator covers small claims) = $0.007/passenger-mile
Note: Combined the above equals about $17.2 per train-mile in equivalent Below-the-Rail Investment
US Nationwide Commuter Rail Infrastructure grants (Most Economical metro peak-capacity addition) $0.9 B annually
NEC Rail Infrastructure grants (Most Economical metro peak-capacity addition) $0.9 B annually
These investments are less than the investment needed above and beyond those fuel taxes collected between exits, and would further
reduce deficits by reducing government borne Social Security and Medicaid financial costs from automobile accidents and personal
lost wages, while prompting greater market revenue by taking advantage of the declining Average Cost curve of passenger trains with
respect to passenger volume.
After the highway equivalent investment in Below-the-Rail costs, the operator should be able to cover all remaining costs including
operating personnel, fuel, consumables, equipment capitalization and maintenance from consumer revenue, thus providing a
functioning feedback loop to improve service to the public.

Appendix D- Proposed Mid-Route Bus Bridge - Speed and Operational Questions
The bus bridge proposed by Amtrak in 2018 as Options 2 & 3 will likely be significantly less comfortable and slower. The
particulars of forcing a transfer for all of the riders, not just connecting riders joining the train would seem to present
many more challenges than alluded to in proposals to date, particularly as the service would operate off Interstate
Highway routes.
The Amtrak proposed Dodge City, KS to Albuquerque, NM Bus Bridge run time will likely be around an hour longer than
the suggested 10:57. In actuality it would likely be 11:41, comprised of 9:09 hours of pure driving time plus (2) 0:55
minute combined meal and ADA restroom stops, though additional stops would have to be made on request, plus (7) 0:06
minute station stops. Using the assumed 6:00 AM westbound bus start time, this puts arrival at Albuquerque, NM at 4:41
PM, after accounting for the time zone change. With a 0:45 transfer the train could not be scheduled to leave before 5:30
PM, but this assumes people traveling who must eat on schedule such as diabetics or even children could wait till then to
eat after boarding the train, getting checked into their seats, and proceeding to order and be served.
If the bus ran late, which could happen frequently in the winter or in the afternoon peak interstate commuter traffic on I-
25, given no schedule makeup is provided, dinner on the train could be pushed to as late as 8 PM. Likely the better option
would then be to stop in Albuquerque, NM for a dinner rest stop, pushing a westbound departure to 6:30 PM, around 1:45
after the existing departure timeslot westbound.

Amtrak Proposed Southwest Chief Route Bus Bridge Schedules
Motorcoach (Bus) Passenger Time-Utility Informed Traffic and Revenue
The bus bridge proposed by Amtrak has never not worked as Amtrak suggests in their proposal due to the reality that the
seating area per person is much more constrained on a motorcoach to around 17” as is typical on commercial aircraft
around half that found on current train coaches. The analysis in Appendix E is a conceptual explanation through an
objective seating area analysis of the preference that many surveys have found for a passenger train over a motorcoach for
common carrier ground transportation. Asked another way, more than 50% of current train passenger would drive instead
should the train go away as an option against 10% who would ride a substitute motorcoach 83. On a larger scale, as
passenger trains were curtailed people shifted to automobiles as the next most logical and preferential ground
transportation choice over motorcoaches.
However, modern motorcoaches certainly have a role as a feeder to an through routed intercity passenger train and for this
reason the remaining relatively low fuel taxes for common carriers should be fully rebated as the cost recovery rates for
highway infrastructure is already so low relative to the average cost borne mostly by taxing the use of locally financed
streets.
Rail Passengers Association. How would passengers travel without trains? 2019. <https://www.railpassengers.org/happening-now/news/blog/how-
83
would-passengers-travel-without-trains/>.

Appendix E - 2018 Build Grant Format – Economic Benefit to Cost Analysis
The values used in a conventional economic approach to benefit to cost analysis, used to rank access to a basket of
financial funds, simplify several factors that are likely very important to the users of the through route. For this reason
special studies have been conducted within this paper to Quantify these characteristics and evaluate them within the
existing benefit to cost framework. In order to do so, example origins and destinations have been picked to calculate the
savings with respect to the existing transportation alternatives as referenced literature in particular do not account for the
Special Study Topics in analysis of trips from 200 miles to 1000 miles in length. It is also worth noting that the Route
Financial Ratios developed include all costs above the top-of rail, above the publically provided common use
infrastructure and liability public backstop, as is consistent with highway and local road travel evaluations.
Special Study Topics:

• Time Utility Values – Utility in Mobile Work and Desired Activity for Passengers in Transit
• Trip Time of Day Inputs - Utility in Trip Arrival and Departure Times for Productivity at Destination
• Consumer Surplus Values - Reduced Marginal Automobile Operating Costs for Single Drivers
However, within the guidance for conducting a Benefit to Cost Analysis significant bias toward continuing highway
investment is present as reduced automobile operating costs and time savings are noted to be excluded should drivers
switch to becoming passengers, known as a mode change, while funding is present for a new highway facility that
converts either passengers or shorter-trip drivers into faster speed but longer-trip drivers, drawn from an unknown pool.
“savings in costs or travel time experienced by travelers… who switch to an improved facility or service are not an
accurate measure of the benefits they receive from doing so, and do not represent benefits in addition to the benefits
received by additional users of the improved alternative. The generalized costs for using the competing alternatives from
which an improved facility draws additional users are already incorporated in the demand curve for the improved facility
or service 84”
This sounds like a tight loop until one realizes that there is no demand curve for nationwide highway travel that extends to
cost ranges that include incrementally paying for personal accident costs so as to determine the market demand volume on
a segment of road. In fact most demand models use various assignment methods based on total population and ratios that
are completely non-variable. So the situation is actually one of insufficient market competition, which would void a
demand curve approach. For this reason, cost savings from those travelers shifting is termed consumer surplus, though
logically as the volume offered by intercity rail increased to a certain point the fares could float higher to capture half of
these savings as revenue. Further, to the main point of this paper, almost none of the costs of highway infrastructure are
being incrementally paid for in proportion to travel due to the financial leveraging effect of a broad highway fuel tax cast
over a vast network of local streets paid for by local taxes along with public funding of accident costs through non-
transportation budgets.
Historically, economic benefits were counted to plan for traffic gravitating to what would be a then un-congested
interstate highway to justify 85 those investments. It seems quite odd to disallow for benefits to be counted for a shift from
those now congested Interstate Highways when benefits from a shift to a shorter highway route are allowed. Further, since
passenger rail operations are counted as a potentially severable Federal appropriations line item in each budget it would
seem reasonable to argue that each new appropriation is in fact a “new” service, a take it or leave it proposition for future
years. The correct view is found in broader economic benefit literature where distinctions are made between transfer
payments and savings in real resources with economic value, such as keeping an automobile in service longer, avoiding a
costly away from home transmission failure, or avoiding a rock cracked windshield. Certainly reductions in marginal
automobile operating costs and greater time away from work due to the need to fit within sleep rhythms would qualify for
inclusion by that standard as true savings of real resources.
84 U.S. Department of Transportation. "Benefit-Cost Analysis Guidance for Discretionary Grant Programs." 2018.
<https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/mission/office-policy/transportation-policy/284031/benefit-cost-analysis-guidance-
2018_0.pdf>
85 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads. "Final report of the highway cost allocation study prepared pursuant to Section 210 of the
Highway Revenue Act of 1956." 1961. <https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/101679610>

Many of the concepts discussed as special studies are briefly touched upon as plausible factors in the guidance memo 86 on
value of time, but are not developed as standard values. For this reason the studies provide particular details for each case
used to establish values so that they may be reasonably reviewed.
Literature results have noted significant variabilities in Travel Time Savings on the land side of airports that can only be
explained by the type of Time Utility analysis proposed. Additionally, research conducted in China where there are
competing passenger services, High Speed Rail, Conventional Overnight rail, Commercial Aviation, and uncongested new
Highways has found that Conventional Overnight Rail fills a 400 to 1000 mile trip length gap 87 between high speed rail
and commercial aviation while still providing slightly less desirable coverage than high speed rail at shorter trip lengths.
These results are normalized by trip length, so the larger number of shorter trips might make the overall travelers greater
as highway garner a high market share of the trips less than 80 miles in in these very congested urban circumstances of
China at each end of the trip.
Market Share Chart - The Variation in the Value of Travel-Time Savings and the Dilemma of High-speed Rail in China
Time Utility Value Estimations on Southwest Chief Route
To estimate roughly the utility in having time available for mobile work or other desired activities instead of driving the
conventional automobile Time Savings value of $19.00/hour is divided by an average daytime Interstate Highway speed
of 52 mph for a reference point to calculate economic savings. Then a reduced $10.47/hour time cost, roughly estimated
using a prorated seating space, foodservice, and restroom availability comfort metric developed in the following pages for
railway coach travel, is divided by a 52 mph average passenger train speed to find a Utility of Time Savings of $0.164 per
passenger mile relative to the option to drive the distance in a daytime trip. This metric is applied to only 60% of the total
route passenger miles for the 14.5 hours of the day during normal productive times. Due to the length of the trip transfer
costs are neglected in the generalized analysis as they are less than 5% of the total comparable driving trip time. The trip
specific analysis does however assign values to transfer costs and other aspects of a complete trip.
Trip Time of Day Value Estimations on Southwest Chief Route
However, most travelers prefer to leave their destination near the late evening so a rough estimate of the Utility in Trip
Arrival and Departure Times is produced by calculating absolute time savings from being able to continue moving for a
trip that would otherwise require a driver to stop for the night and rest in a hotel before resuming the trip. The trip speed
calculations for a 500 mile trip presented earlier, show that the actual speed for highway driving is 26 mph, inclusive of an
overnight stop. So the conventional automobile Time Savings value of $19.00/hour is multiplied by the sum of the inverse
of the slower overnight highway trip speed and a faster continuous passenger train speed for a reference point to find an
Absolute Time Savings of $0.365 per passenger mile relative to the option to drive the distance in a daytime trip. This
metric is applied to only 40% of the total route passenger miles for the 9.5 hours of the day during night rest periods.
86 U.S. Department of Transportation "Revised Departmental Guidance on Valuation of Travel Time in Economic Analysis." 2016.
<https://www.transportation.gov/office-policy/transportation-policy/revised-departmental-guidance-valuation-travel-time-economic>
87 Jian Zhao, Yunyi Zhao, Ying Li. "The Variation in the Value of Travel-Time Savings and the Dilemma of High-speed Rail in China."
Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Volume A (2015): 130-140.

<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0965856415002463>

Consumer Surplus Values
While this paper recommends a fare structure that is capped so that the total coach fare for a travel party does not rise
above the costs to operate an automobile, there still will be some level of Consumer Surplus remaining where the ticket
cost will be less than the marginal cost to operate an automobile for a single traveler. While a more complicated trip
specific model should consider parking costs, the generalized value is just calculated by subtracting an average $0.11
ticket cost in the base coach accommodation from the conventional $0.25 per automobile mile operating cost. Single
travel parties in the base coach class are estimated to be 20% of the total passenger miles, producing a generalized $0.140
per passenger mile in consumer surplus relative to the option to drive the distance in a daytime trip that is then only
applied to 1/5th of route passenger miles estimated to be from single party travelers.
Generalized versus Trip Specific Time Utility Economic Models
The generalized special study results provided above have only been calculated for the purpose of a global Benefit to Cost
model run over three decades to study infrastructure investment needs as suggested modifications to the 2018 BUILD
grant framework to take into account Time Utility of a traveler.
The author believes that economic analysis only has a place when used in more detailed consumer calibrated models that
include all of the components of a trip, such as hotel and parking costs, to estimate revenue response and pricing. These
specific models should also be run for certain trip distance bands and trip start and end times. Just such an example of a
detailed model is included at the end of this section to illustrate the different uses of economic models for a 4 PM
departure on a 500 mile trip by two individuals in a traveling party.
The values are purely experimental, but the intent is to suggest that a first principles approach could be had to estimate
consumer responses according to the ability of a traveler to do the things they would otherwise want to do at that time of
day, such as enjoy a meal, work on a laptop, read a paper, rest, or have a restroom conveniently available nearby.
Ultimately, the Trip Specific method would combined both the Financial Price of the service and estimated Consumer
Economic evaluations to try to estimate the consumer value in a way that would free the economic model to only consider
consumer side estimations of trip time quality instead of mixing the economic questions up to try to justify infrastructure
spending through fictitious “speed” from a large pot of money. This approach is only possible once the leverage “Quant”
of the default Highway Trust Fund investment is understood as discussed earlier in this paper.

Example Benefit to Cost Analysis - Using Generalized Time Utility Method - 500 Mile Trip
Existing Through Route - FY20 Option #1 with Reinvestment Choice A: Expanded Passenger Capacity per Train-mile Starting in FY22
Consumer Surplus Single
Route Revenue - Est. Driver Reduced Public Absolute Time Public Utility of Time
Public Infrastructure Public Infrastructure Route Operations & 0.5% Annual Increase Automobile Operating Savings (Est. 40% of Savings (Est. 60% of Annual Person-
Investment Raton Pass Investment Common Maintenance Cost - due to Highway Route Net - Above the Cost (Est. 1/5th of Public Accident Cost Passenger Miles Passenger Miles Miles of
Year Route Only Route & Terminal Above the Rail Congestion Rail Passengers) Savings Overnight) Daytime) Travel
SUM $2019 $152,400,000 $609,000,000 $2,673,996,695 $2,873,904,455 199,907,760 $271,692,400 $767,887,050 $1,418,174,615 $955,028,642
3% NPV $107,826,963 $406,008,698 $1,765,220,674 $1,865,143,133 99,922,459 $179,969,457 $508,649,545 $939,401,013 $632,612,419
7% NPV $72,739,949 $254,395,828 $1,088,071,396 $1,118,135,151 30,063,755 $111,582,783 $315,367,578 $582,437,603 $392,225,744
2019 $6,400,000 $20,300,000 $70,144,106 $53,625,365 (16,518,741) $7,963,200 $22,506,475 $41,566,154 $27,991,523 284,400,000
2020 $6,400,000 $20,300,000 $70,144,106 $53,625,365 (16,518,741) $7,963,200 $22,506,475 $41,566,154 $27,991,523 284,400,000
2021 $6,400,000 $20,300,000 $70,144,106 $53,625,365 (16,518,741) $7,963,200 $22,506,475 $41,566,154 $27,991,523 284,400,000
2022 $6,400,000 $20,300,000 $91,243,125 $94,103,140 2,860,015 $8,582,000 $24,255,396 $44,796,154 $30,166,673 306,500,000
2023 $6,400,000 $20,300,000 $91,243,125 $94,573,656 3,330,531 $9,200,800 $26,004,317 $48,026,154 $32,341,823 328,600,000
2024 $6,400,000 $20,300,000 $91,243,125 $95,046,524 3,803,399 $9,200,800 $26,004,317 $48,026,154 $32,341,823 328,600,000
2025 $6,400,000 $20,300,000 $91,243,125 $95,521,757 4,278,632 $9,200,800 $26,004,317 $48,026,154 $32,341,823 328,600,000
2026 $6,400,000 $20,300,000 $91,243,125 $95,999,365 4,756,240 $9,200,800 $26,004,317 $48,026,154 $32,341,823 328,600,000
2027 $6,400,000 $20,300,000 $91,243,125 $96,479,362 5,236,237 $9,200,800 $26,004,317 $48,026,154 $32,341,823 328,600,000
2028 $6,400,000 $20,300,000 $91,243,125 $96,961,759 5,718,634 $9,200,800 $26,004,317 $48,026,154 $32,341,823 328,600,000
2029 $6,400,000 $20,300,000 $91,243,125 $97,446,568 6,203,443 $9,200,800 $26,004,317 $48,026,154 $32,341,823 328,600,000
2030 $6,400,000 $20,300,000 $91,243,125 $97,933,801 6,690,676 $9,200,800 $26,004,317 $48,026,154 $32,341,823 328,600,000
2031 $6,400,000 $20,300,000 $91,243,125 $98,423,470 7,180,345 $9,200,800 $26,004,317 $48,026,154 $32,341,823 328,600,000
2032 $6,400,000 $20,300,000 $91,243,125 $98,915,587 7,672,462 $9,200,800 $26,004,317 $48,026,154 $32,341,823 328,600,000
2033 $6,400,000 $20,300,000 $91,243,125 $99,410,165 8,167,040 $9,200,800 $26,004,317 $48,026,154 $32,341,823 328,600,000
2034 $6,400,000 $20,300,000 $91,243,125 $99,907,216 8,664,091 $9,200,800 $26,004,317 $48,026,154 $32,341,823 328,600,000
2035 $6,400,000 $20,300,000 $91,243,125 $100,406,752 9,163,627 $9,200,800 $26,004,317 $48,026,154 $32,341,823 328,600,000
2036 $6,400,000 $20,300,000 $91,243,125 $100,908,786 9,665,661 $9,200,800 $26,004,317 $48,026,154 $32,341,823 328,600,000
2037 $6,400,000 $20,300,000 $91,243,125 $101,413,330 10,170,205 $9,200,800 $26,004,317 $48,026,154 $32,341,823 328,600,000
2038 $6,400,000 $20,300,000 $91,243,125 $101,920,396 10,677,271 $9,200,800 $26,004,317 $48,026,154 $32,341,823 328,600,000
2039 $6,400,000 $20,300,000 $91,243,125 $102,429,998 11,186,873 $9,200,800 $26,004,317 $48,026,154 $32,341,823 328,600,000
2040 $2,000,000 $20,300,000 $91,243,125 $102,942,148 11,699,023 $9,200,800 $26,004,317 $48,026,154 $32,341,823 328,600,000
2041 $2,000,000 $20,300,000 $91,243,125 $103,456,859 12,213,734 $9,200,800 $26,004,317 $48,026,154 $32,341,823 328,600,000
2042 $2,000,000 $20,300,000 $91,243,125 $103,974,143 12,731,018 $9,200,800 $26,004,317 $48,026,154 $32,341,823 328,600,000
2043 $2,000,000 $20,300,000 $91,243,125 $104,494,014 13,250,889 $9,200,800 $26,004,317 $48,026,154 $32,341,823 328,600,000
2044 $2,000,000 $20,300,000 $91,243,125 $105,016,484 13,773,359 $9,200,800 $26,004,317 $48,026,154 $32,341,823 328,600,000
2045 $2,000,000 $20,300,000 $91,243,125 $105,541,566 14,298,441 $9,200,800 $26,004,317 $48,026,154 $32,341,823 328,600,000
2046 $2,000,000 $20,300,000 $91,243,125 $106,069,274 14,826,149 $9,200,800 $26,004,317 $48,026,154 $32,341,823 328,600,000
2047 $2,000,000 $20,300,000 $91,243,125 $106,599,621 15,356,496 $9,200,800 $26,004,317 $48,026,154 $32,341,823 328,600,000
2048 $2,000,000 $20,300,000 $91,243,125 $107,132,619 15,889,494 $9,200,800 $26,004,317 $48,026,154 $32,341,823 328,600,000
2049 $2,000,000 $20,300,000 $91,243,125 $107,668,282 16,425,157 $9,200,800 $26,004,317 $48,026,154 $32,341,823 328,600,000
Consumer Surplus Single Public Accident Cost Public Absolute Time Public Utility of Time
Route Financial Revenue Public Economic Benefit Driver Reduced Savings per Passenger Savings per Passenger Savings per Passenger
Public Economic Benefit to Cost Ratio - Above the & Consumer Surplus to Average Passenger Train Rural Automobile Automobile Operating Mile (Full Courtroom Mile for Overnight Mile for Mobile Work
to Cost Ratio Rail Public Cost Ratio Speed (MPH) Occupancy Cost Value of Life) Travel for Daytime Travel
SUM $2019 4.13 1.07 4.48 52 1.39 $0.140 $0.079 $0.365 $0.164
3% NPV 4.05 1.06 4.40 Average Daytime Highway Speed (MPH) Average Day & Night Highway Total Trip Speed (MPH)
7% NPV 3.94 1.03 4.28 52 26
Proposed Segemented Route - FY20 Amtrak Proposed Option #3 with Mid-Route Bus Bridge
Consumer Surplus Single
Route Revenue - Est. Driver Reduced Public Absolute Time Public Utility of Time
Public Infrastructure Public Infrastructure Route Operations & 0.5% Annual Increase Automobile Operating Savings (Est. 40% of Savings (Est. 60% of Annual Person-
Investment Train Investment Common Maintenance Cost - due to Highway Route Net - Above the Cost (Est. 1/5th of Public Accident Cost Passenger Miles Passenger Miles Miles of
Year Turning Facilities Route & Terminal Above the Rail Congestion Rail Passengers) Savings Overnight) Daytime) Travel
SUM $2019 $8,000,000 $552,000,000 $1,290,000,000 $522,018,070 ($767,981,930) $143,472,000 $405,496,403 $748,892,308 $504,319,846
3% NPV $7,540,767 $368,007,884 $860,018,425 $345,005,279 ($515,013,147) $95,650,049 $270,336,727 $499,272,235 $336,220,434
7% NPV $6,987,510 $230,585,381 $538,868,010 $213,377,903 ($325,490,107) $59,932,148 $169,386,853 $312,832,642 $210,668,087
2019 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $16,400,000 ($26,600,000) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2020 $8,000,000 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $16,400,000 ($26,600,000) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2021 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $16,400,000 ($26,600,000) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2022 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $16,400,000 ($26,600,000) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2023 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $16,482,000 ($26,518,000) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2024 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $16,564,410 ($26,435,590) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2025 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $16,647,232 ($26,352,768) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2026 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $16,730,468 ($26,269,532) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2027 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $16,814,121 ($26,185,879) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2028 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $16,898,191 ($26,101,809) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2029 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $16,982,682 ($26,017,318) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2030 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $17,067,596 ($25,932,404) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2031 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $17,152,933 ($25,847,067) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2032 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $17,238,698 ($25,761,302) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2033 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $17,324,892 ($25,675,108) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2034 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $17,411,516 ($25,588,484) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2035 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $17,498,574 ($25,501,426) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2036 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $17,586,067 ($25,413,933) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2037 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $17,673,997 ($25,326,003) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2038 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $17,762,367 ($25,237,633) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2039 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $17,851,179 ($25,148,821) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2040 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $17,940,435 ($25,059,565) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2041 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $18,030,137 ($24,969,863) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2042 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $18,120,287 ($24,879,713) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2043 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $18,210,889 ($24,789,111) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2044 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $18,301,943 ($24,698,057) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2045 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $18,393,453 ($24,606,547) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2046 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $18,485,420 ($24,514,580) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2047 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $18,577,847 ($24,422,153) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2048 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $18,670,737 ($24,329,263) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
2049 $0 $18,400,000 $43,000,000 $18,764,090 ($24,235,910) $4,782,400 $13,516,547 $24,963,077 $16,810,662 170,800,000
Consumer Surplus Single Public Accident Cost Public Absolute Time Public Utility of Time
Route Financial Revenue Public Economic Benefit Driver Reduced Savings per Passenger Savings per Passenger Savings per Passenger
Public Economic Benefit to Cost Ratio - Above the & Consumer Surplus to Average Passenger Train Rural Automobile Automobile Operating Mile (Full Courtroom Mile for Overnight Mile for Mobile Work
to Cost Ratio Rail Public Cost Ratio Speed (MPH) Occupancy Cost Value of Life) Travel for Daytime Travel
SUM $2019 (7.98) 0.40 (8.67) 52 1.39 $0.140 $0.079 $0.365 $0.164
3% NPV (7.93) 0.40 (8.61) Average Daytime Highway Speed (MPH) Average Day & Night Highway Total Trip Speed (MPH)
7% NPV (7.88) 0.40 (8.56) 52 26

Comparison of USDOT BUILD Grant Program and Time Utility Specific Trip Proposed Values
Economic Benefit Method
Value Unit
Personal Travel Time Savings Value $19.00 Hour
Business Travel Time Savings Value $25.40 Hour
Composite Travel Time Savings Value $20.40 Hour
Vehicle Operating Cost $0.25 Vehicle Mile
Occupancy 1.39 Persons per Automobile
Safety Benefits
Economic Time Utility / Disutility of Time

Total Comfort Restroom Nighttime Attention Personal
Value Unit Ratio Access Ratio Level Bed Available Area
Automobile Driver Day Time Disutility $19.00 Hour 115.20 0.3 0.5 768
Automobile Driver Night Time Disutility $23.75 Hour 92.16 0.3 0.4 768
Airport/Station/Rental/Parking Time Disutility $27.02 Hour 81.00 0.3 0.6 450
Security Screening Time Disutility $32.70 Hour 60.00 0.3 0.5 400 * TRB ACRP Web Only Doc. #22 - Back checked by analysis of TSA PreCheck cost to avoided screening time
Total Comfort Restroom Nighttime Attention Personal

Value Unit Ratio Access Ratio Level Bed Available Area Time Use Utility
Automobile Passenger Time Disutility $9.50 Hour 230.40 0.3 1.0 768
SUV/Crossover Passenger Time Disutility $7.24 Hour 302.40 0.3 1.0 1008
Taxi or Transit Time Disutility $13.84 Hour 158.10 0.3 1.0 527
Aircraft Passenger Coach Time Disutility $8.91 Hour 245.76 0.4 1.0 614 * Comfort derived by relative ratio of personal space per mode
Aircraft Passenger Business Coach Time Disutility $4.36 Hour 501.60 0.6 1.0 836 * Comfort derived by relative ticket price difference over trip time
Aircraft Passenger Flat Bed Night Time Disutility $2.18 Hour 1003.20 0.6 X 1.0 1672 * Comfort derived by relative ticket price difference over trip time
Rail Passenger Business Class Day Time Disutility $3.18 Hour 688.80 0.6 1.0 1148 * Comfort derived by relative ratio of personal space per mode
Rail Passenger Coach Day Time Disutility $5.24 Hour 418.00 0.5 1.0 836 * Comfort derived by relative ratio of personal space per mode
Rail Passenger Coach Night Time Disutility $5.24 Hour 418.00 0.5 1.0 836
Rail Passenger Coach Sleeper Day Time Disutility $4.34 Hour 504.00 0.5 1.0 1008 * Comfort derived by relative ratio of personal space per mode
Rail Passenger Coach Sleeper Night Time Disutility $1.37 Hour 1596.00 0.5 X 1.0 3192 * Comfort derived by relative ratio of personal space per mode
Rail Passenger Bedroom Sleeper Day Time Disutility $2.71 Hour 806.40 0.8 1.0 1008 * Comfort derived by relative ratio of personal space per mode
Rail Passenger Bedroom Sleeper Night Time Disutility $0.95 Hour 2310.40 0.8 X 1.0 2888 * Comfort derived by relative ratio of personal space per mode
Hotel Time Disutility relative to Home $0.55 Hour 4000.00 1.0 X 1.0 4000
Motorcoach Passenger Day Time Disutility $8.94 Hour 244.80 0.4 1.0 612 * Comfort derived by relative ratio of personal space per mode
Motorcoach Passenger Night Time Disutility $8.94 Hour 244.80 0.4 1.0 612 * Comfort derived by relative ratio of personal space per mode
Financial Trip Price

Automobile Sedan Operating Cost $0.25 Vehicle Mile - Capital not included - Capital not included
Automobile Sedan Average Cost $0.55 Vehicle Mile - IRS or Rental Rate - IRS or Rental Rate
Automobile SUV Operating Cost $0.30 Vehicle Mile - Capital not included - Capital not included
Automobile SUV Average Cost $0.65 Vehicle Mile - IRS or Rental Rate - IRS or Rental Rate
Automobile Intercity Trip Occupancy 1.39 Persons per Automobile
Automobile Accident Cost to Users Net of Insurance
Automobile Accident Cost to Others Net of Insurance
Rail Coach Price $0.11 Passenger Mile
Rail Business Coach Price $0.20 Passenger Mile
Rail Coach Sleeper Price $0.28 Passenger Mile - One Person Capacity - One Person Capacity
Rail Bedroom Sleeper Price $0.60 Room Mile - Two Persons Capacity with E - Two Persons Capacity with Ensuite Restroom
Motorcoach Price $0.09 Passenger Mile
Hotel Metro Area 3 Star $140 Each Night - Two Persons Capacity - Two Persons Capacity
Gym Club/Day Hotel Room $20 Each Morning
Parking Metro $28 Each Day
Parking Airport $28 Each Day
Baggage Airline Fee $30 Each
Long Taxi Trip $40 Each
Short Taxi Trip $20 Each

Trip Specific Time-Utility Model - Combined Economic and Financial Trip Preference Estimation
Trip Start Time 4:00 PM
Trip Length (Ground Measure) 500 Miles
Persons per Party 2 Person(s)
Airline Highway Highway Railway Railway Railway Highway

Coach Sedan SUV/Crossover Coach Bedroom Sleeper Coach Sleeper Motorcoach
Economic Time Disutility Costs Hours Disutility Cost Hours Disutility Cost Hours Disutility Cost Hours Disutility Cost Hours Disutility Cost Hours Disutility Cost Hours Disutility Cost
Automobile Driver Day Time Disutility 0.5 $9.50 7 $133.00 7 $133.00 0.5 $9.50 0.5 $9.50 0.5 $9.50 0.5 $9.50
Automobile Driver Night Time Disutility $0.00 2 $47.50 2 $47.50 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Automobile Passenger Time Disutility 0.5 $4.75 9 $85.50 $0.00 0.5 $4.75 0.5 $4.75 0.5 $4.75 0.5 $4.75
SUV/Crossover Passenger Time Disutility $0.00 $0.00 9 $65.14 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Security Screening Time Disutility 0.3 $19.62 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Aircraft Passenger Coach Time Disutility 1.9 $34.04 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Hotel Time Disutility relative to Home 10.5 $11.49 10.5 $11.49 10.5 $11.49 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Taxi or Transit Time Disutility 1.2 $33.23 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Rail Passenger Coach Day Time Disutility $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 3 $31.42 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Rail Passenger Coach Night Time Disutility $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 8 $83.78 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Rail Passenger Bedroom Sleeper Day Time Disutility $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 0.5 $2.71 $0.00 $0.00
Rail Passenger Bedroom Sleeper Night Time Disutility $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 10.5 $19.89 $0.00 $0.00
Rail Passenger Coach Sleeper Day Time Disutility $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 0.5 $4.34 $0.00
Rail Passenger Coach Sleeper Night Time Disutility $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 10.5 $28.80 $0.00
Motorcoach Passenger Day Time Disutility $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 6 $107.29
Motorcoach Passenger Night Time Disutility $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 8 $143.06
Total Economic Disutility of Time Value $112.63 $277.49 $257.13 $129.45 $36.86 $47.39 $264.60

Financial Travel Price Unit Rate Price Rate Price Rate Price Rate Price Rate Price Rate Price Rate Price
Automobile Sedan Operating Cost $0.25 $7.50 $0.25 $125.00 $0.25 $7.50 $0.25 $7.50 $0.25 $7.50 $0.25 $7.50
Automobile SUV Operating Cost $0.30 $150.00
Airfare Base per Airmile at 85% of Ground Miles $0.52 $524.72
Rail Coach Price $0.11 $110.00
Rail Business Coach Price
Rail Bedroom Sleeper Price $0.60 $300.00
Rail Coach Sleeper Price $0.28 $280.00
Motorcoach Price $0.09 $90.00
Hotel Metro Area 3 Star 1 $140.00 1 $140.00 1 $140.00
Gym Club/Day Hotel Room 1 $20.00 1 $20.00
Parking Metro 1 $28.00 1 $28.00 1 $28.00 1 $28.00 1 $28.00 1 $28.00
Parking Airport 1 $28.00
Baggage Airline Fee 1 $30.00
Long Taxi Trip 1 $40.00
Short Taxi Trip 1 $20.00 1 $20.00 1 $20.00 1 $20.00
Total Financial Trip and Accommodation Price $770.22 $293.00 $318.00 $185.50 $355.50 $335.50 $165.50
Total Perceived Trip Cost (Economic and Financial) $882.85 $570.49 $575.13 $314.95 $392.36 $382.89 $430.10

Trip Specific Time-Utility Model - Combined Economic and Financial Trip Preference Estimation
Trip Start Time 4:00 PM
Trip Length (Ground Measure) 700 Miles
Persons per Party 2 Person(s)

Economic Time Disutility Costs Hours Disutility Cost Hours Disutility Cost Hours Disutility Cost Hours Disutility Cost Hours Disutility Cost Hours Disutility Cost Hours Disutility Cost
Automobile Driver Day Time Disutility 0.5 $9.50 11.5 $218.50 11.5 $218.50 0.5 $9.50 0.5 $9.50 0.5 $9.50 0.5 $9.50
Automobile Driver Night Time Disutility $0.00 2 $47.50 2 $47.50 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Automobile Passenger Time Disutility 0.5 $4.75 13.5 $128.25 $0.00 0.5 $4.75 0.5 $4.75 0.5 $4.75 0.5 $4.75
SUV/Crossover Passenger Time Disutility $0.00 $0.00 13.5 $97.71 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Security Screening Time Disutility 0.3 $19.62 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Aircraft Passenger Coach Time Disutility 2.4 $41.96 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Hotel Time Disutility relative to Home 10.5 $11.49 10.5 $11.49 10.5 $11.49 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Taxi or Transit Time Disutility 1.2 $33.23 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Rail Passenger Coach Day Time Disutility $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 5 $52.36 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Rail Passenger Coach Night Time Disutility $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 10.5 $109.96 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Rail Passenger Bedroom Sleeper Day Time Disutility $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 5 $27.14 $0.00 $0.00
Rail Passenger Bedroom Sleeper Night Time Disutility $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 10.5 $19.89 $0.00 $0.00
Rail Passenger Coach Sleeper Day Time Disutility $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 5 $43.43 $0.00
Rail Passenger Coach Sleeper Night Time Disutility $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 10.5 $28.80 $0.00
Motorcoach Passenger Day Time Disutility $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 9 $160.94
Motorcoach Passenger Night Time Disutility $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 10.5 $187.76
Total Economic Disutility of Time Value $120.55 $405.74 $375.21 $176.58 $61.29 $86.48 $362.96

Financial Travel Price Unit Rate Price Rate Price Rate Price Rate Price Rate Price Rate Price Rate Price
Automobile Sedan Operating Cost $0.25 $7.50 $0.25 $175.00 $0.25 $7.50 $0.25 $7.50 $0.25 $7.50 $0.25 $7.50
Automobile SUV Operating Cost $0.30 $210.00
Airfare Base per Airmile at 85% of Ground Miles $0.40 $559.74
Rail Coach Price $0.11 $154.00
Rail Business Coach Price
Rail Bedroom Sleeper Price $0.60 $420.00
Rail Coach Sleeper Price $0.28 $392.00
Motorcoach Price $0.09 $126.00
Hotel Metro Area 3 Star 1 $140.00 1 $140.00 1 $140.00
Gym Club/Day Hotel Room 1 $20.00 1 $20.00
Parking Metro 1 $28.00 1 $28.00 1 $28.00 1 $28.00 1 $28.00 1 $28.00
Parking Airport 1 $28.00
Baggage Airline Fee 1 $30.00
Long Taxi Trip 1 $40.00
Short Taxi Trip 1 $20.00 1 $20.00 1 $20.00 1 $20.00
Total Financial Trip and Accommodation Price $805.24 $343.00 $378.00 $229.50 $475.50 $447.50 $201.50
Total Perceived Trip Cost (Economic and Financial) $925.79 $748.74 $753.21 $406.08 $536.79 $533.98 $564.46

Appendix F – 1965 to Current Southwest Chief Route Cost Reporting
ICC Cost Study for Similar Privately Operated Services on the Southwest Chief Route pre-Amtrak
Train-miles total for part-1967 = 273 days x 2

roundtrips x 2235 miles = 1,220,310 for each
train. For 1965 and 1965 full years =
3,265,335. The Inflation Factor $1967 to
$2019 is 7.77. Hence Total 1967 Out-of-
Pocket Operating Cost is $2019 $46.8 per
train-mile with express (Actual) and $41.9 per
train-mile without express (Pro-forma) mostly
comprised of Above-the-Rail Cost. At that
time the haulage of US Mail had mostly been
/3 stopped in October of 1967. Notably, below-
the-rail mainline costs are mostly excluded,
Chart from 1968 Interstate Commerce Commission’s Report 88 providing an ideal check of operations only.
The ICC report issued in 1968 when the private operators were seeking to abandon some trains on the route is useful to
investigate the actual level of Above-the-Rail marginal costs found to be $2019 $41.9 per train-mile in that era of longer
train consists and greater onboard food and beverage amenities. The analysis also compares the resulting net loss from
less volume by removing express, dining, and sleeping cars on Trains #23/24 versus prior net profits above-the-rail.
88 ICC 333 Finance Docket 24869. AT&SF Railway Co Discontinuance of Trains Nos. 19 and 20; and 23 and 24 Between Chicago, IL and Los
Angeles, CA. 1968. <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015038632959;view=2up;seq=586>

1972-73 First Amtrak Route Cost Reporting – 1973 Report to Congress on Rail Passenger Service Act
1972-73 Route Cost Reporting – 1974 Report to Congress on Rail Passenger Service Act
Note the developing difference in Allocations and Direct Cost during the private railroad contract operation era
without a cost control metric as some routes report around $45 ($2019) per train-mile while other routes, such as the
Chicago – Los Angeles route have begun to charge more at $67 ($2019) per train-mile, though with longer train
consists on this route and the start of charges for facilities infrastructure. The Inflation Factor from $1973 to $2019 is
5.79. A Below-the-rail investment metric could provide cost control and consistent reporting as route costs now
included infrastructure charges (terminal and trackage fees) as discusses on the next page.
Notes from the 1974 Report to Congress – Infrastructure Costs assigned to Routes
Note the confusion that is starting to work into the Route Cost Allocations with facilities infrastructure items and mainline
track capital leases, all below-the-rail, now starting to be included. The 1968 ICC reports only included terminal facilities
expenses or joint lines but did not include a cost for mainline track capital leases. Thus this infrastructure funding
oversight present in the initial Amtrak legislation is beginning to skew the Direct Cost calculations as no other form of
ground transportation was or now is required to support infrastructure from incremental consumer revenue as
demonstrated by the “Quant” highway fuel tax leveraging analysis.

2001 Route Cost Reporting
After this point many differing methods of allocating expenses are employed, but none of the methods
use the suggested division between above-the-rail operations and below-the-rail infrastructure
investment though ultimately the Amtrak Reform Council recommend something like this but with an
emphasis on separating out North East Corridor (NEC) costs for facilities infrastructure.


2012 Total Long Distance National Network - Cost Reporting
Amtrak Testimony in House Hearing 113-17– Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

The scaled $27 Million year Direct Cost gap, which includes infrastructure payments to use the shareholder owned
railroad, for the Southwest Chief route is equal to $16.4 per train-mile. This is roughly the proposed level of Below-the-
Rail infrastructure costs proposed in this paper as a benchmark and is less than the equivalent Interstate Highway
investment funded by excise taxes on the use of the locally funded street network.
2018 General and Legislative Annual Report
Route Cost Reporting Summary

It is clear that for almost five decades facilities infrastructure costs have been included as a route cost by various methods
of allocation, that no other form of ground passenger transportation pays for infrastructure from incremental revenue as
has been the standard set by these reports, and that it would be quite wise to reform Amtrak accounting to include an
analysis of the above-the-rail costs similar to the later ICC reports so that management could be held accountable for the
consumer facing performance of these intercity trains.
What follows in Appendix G is an attempt to suggest the ways in which the accounting could be reformed so as to obtain
above-the-rail costs for Amtrak routes.

Appendix G –Division by APT of Federal Infrastructure Investment and Revenue Funded
Operations
The categorization of Amtrak’s APT 2018 Cost Center data 89 detail on the following page shows that Federal investment
levels are currently equal to spending on cost centers that are Below-the-Rail infrastructure or its support, all of the
Facilities costs that would largely remain as fixed costs if either the state funded corridors or long distance routes were to
be cutback incrementally indicating that there is little hope to significantly reduce Federal Investment as Amtrak testified
in both 2013 and 2018 as noted in the prior Appendix F. However, one would not know this from Amtrak’s current public
presentation of operating results for various route Service Lines, as small portions of this relatively fixed infrastructure
cost are now incorporated into the operating expenses for the various route types using multitudes of equations,
incorporating little of the Below-the-Rail NEC infrastructure Average Costs of Capital and Operational expenses while
incorporating capital leases for track access on shareholder owned railroads into long-distance Operational results.
Certainly none of this was done secretively, as the account structure outlines were created by Legislation in an attempt at
good governance and the implementation reported 90 to Congress, but the reports we have today are perhaps even more
confusing than the older reports when entering the discussion of which routes or Service Lines meet a reasonable Public
Good test. Now it appears that operational decisions are being conflicted with the report that perhaps the new Viewliner II
sleeping cars will not be fully deployed to garner what can easily be shown to be net revenue on the long-distance routes,
even though their purchase price is a sunk cost at this point. Is this due to Service Line Fully Allocated costing?
In addition it should be noted that the Avoidable Cost calculations, required by Legislation for over a decade have still not
been implemented through the APT system and are still missing in the FRA reports 91 reproduced on following pages,
though funds were allocated for this purpose. If the long-term avoidable cost metric had been developed, the remaining
expenses could have been transparently understood by the Legislature to be the remaining fixed Below-the-Rail
infrastructure cost. The APT summaries could be very quickly repurposed to show infrastructure costs in a transparent
manner by preparing two alternative reports that direct cost centers to one of two buckets, either infrastructure or
operations, one report on a pure year accrual basis as is attempted on the following pages and another that applies discount
rates to capital spending but looks back to capture earlier capital spending.
89 USDOT/Volpe National Transportation Systems Center. "Update on the Methodology for Amtrak Cost Accounting - Annual Update for
Appendices A, B, and D." 2019. <https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/39857/dot_39857_DS1.pdf>
90 USDOT/FRA. "Account Structure Assessment and Recommendations in Accordance with Section 11201 of the FAST Act of 2015." 2018.
<https://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/Details/L19708>.
91 FRA. "Quarterly Report on the Performance and Service Quality of Intercity Passenger Train Operations Q4." 2018.
<https://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L19815#p1_z5_gD_lQR_y2018>.

Previous System Short and Long Term Variable Cost Reporting
The chart at left from a 1995 GAO report 92

demonstrates the pattern of not reporting the
fixed cost of Infrastructure for just the NEC
while categorizing Infrastructure use for long-
distance routes on Shareholder owned railroads
as an Operating cost that should be offset by
Revenue which is not a consistent nationwide
standard.
The 2008 chart below from Amtrak demonstrates

the total number of diverse users of the NEC
Infrastructure, where Amtrak is a minority user
but has a majority of the cost responsibility
which needs to be considered in infrastructure
studies. The proposed “Quant” train-mile rate of
railway infrastructure investment, when applied
to all intercity passenger trains, including
commuter trains operating on routes greater than
50 miles or across state boundaries, would enable
an amicable resolution to the NEC Infrastructure
cost division question.
92 US Government Accountability Office. "Financial and Operating Conditions Threaten Amtrak's Long-Term Viability." 1995.
<https://www.gao.gov/products/RCED-95-71>

Table B-2. Fully Allocated Costs by Subfamily, Pre-Audit FY2018 Dollars (Millions) APT Average Costs FY2018 Dollars (Millions) -
This table provides the allocated costs of each APT Subfamily. Responsibility for Infrastructure and Operations parsed per
Highway and Aviation Divisions
Percent
Operating Below-the-Rail Above-the-Rail Operations
Operating of Amtrak % of
Subfamily and Capital Infrastructure Investment (Mostly Variable with
Family Family Name Subfamily Name Costs Fully Operating
Number Costs (Mostly Fixed with Respect Respect to Train
(Millions) Allocated and Capital
(Millions) to Train Movements) Movements)
Costs
FM_101 Central Div MoW $19.90 0.5% $26.30 0.5% X $26.30
FM_102 MidAtlantic Div MoW $93.20 2.2% $150.30 2.7% X $150.30
FM_103 New England Div $59.10 1.4% $85.30 1.5% X $85.30

MoW
FM_104 New York Div $110.10 2.6% $140.10 2.5% X $140.10
Maintenance of
FM_MOW MoW
Way
FM_105 MoW Support $113.80 2.7% $572.60 10.4% X $572.60
FM_106 System Gangs $8.60 0.2% $114.00 2.1% X $114.00
FM_107 West Div MoW $11.10 0.3% $11.20 0.2% X $11.20
FM_108 Empire District $10.70 0.3% $14.70 0.3% X $14.70
FM_109 Michigan Line $10.30 0.2% $10.40 0.2% X $10.40
FM_201 MoE Turnaround $163.00 3.9% $163.30 3.0% X $163.30
FM_202 MoE Loco $88.30 2.1% $88.50 1.6% X $88.50
Maintenance
FM_203 MoE Car $38.00 0.9% $38.00 0.7% X $38.00
Maintenance
Maintenance of FM_204 MoE Support $39.10 0.9% $44.00 0.8% X $44.00
FM_MOE
Equipment FM_205 MoE Multiple $186.60 4.4% $344.00 6.2% X $344.00
FM_206 MoE HSR $57.60 1.4% $58.20 1.1% X $58.20
Maintenance
FM_207 MoE Back Shop $18.00 0.4% $79.10 1.4% X $79.10
FM_208 MoE Material Control $10.60 0.3% $10.60 0.2% X $10.60
FM_301 On Board Services $262.70 6.2% $262.70 4.8% X $262.70

(OBS)
FM_302 T&E $438.40 10.4% $438.40 7.9% X $438.40
FM_OPS_ Ops -
FM_303 Yard $71.00 1.7% $71.20 1.3% X $71.20
TRANS Transportation
FM_304 Fuel $128.10 3.0% $128.10 2.3% X $128.10
FM_305 Transportation - $11.50 0.3% $11.50 0.2% X $11.50
Multiple
FM_306 Train Movement $86.70 2.0% $86.80 1.6% X $86.80
FM_307 Train Movement - $152.30 3.6% $160.10 2.9% X $160.10
Host RR
FM_OPS_ Ops - FM_308 Transportation $77.60 1.8% $149.80 2.7% X $149.80
TRANS Transportation Support
FM_309 Power - Electric $81.10 1.9% $81.10 1.5% X $81.10
Traction
FM_310 Stations $196.90 4.7% $196.90 3.6% X $196.90
FM_SALES Sales and FM_401 Sales $10.30 0.2% $10.30 0.2% X $10.30
_MKTG Marketing FM_402 Information & $73.00 1.7% $73.00 1.3% X $73.00
Reservations
FM_403 Marketing $54.90 1.3% $77.40 1.4% X $77.40
FM_404 Station and On- Board $5.00 0.1% $5.00 0.1% X $5.00
Technology
FM_601 Corporate $144.10 3.4% $190.30 3.4% X $190.30
Administration
FM_602 Centralized $237.20 5.6% $296.40 5.4% X $296.40
General and Services
FM_G_A
Administrative FM_603 Qualified Mgmt $971.50 23.0% $1,015.60 18.4% X $1,015.60
FM_604 Direct Customer (Non- $49.40 1.2% $154.10 2.8% X $154.10
NTS)
FM_605 Subsidiary $39.20 0.9% $39.20 0.7% X $39.20
FM_UTILI Utilities FM_801 Utilities $5.80 0.1% $5.80 0.1% X $5.80
TIES
Police, FM_901 Police $58.90 1.4% $60.90 1.1% X $60.90
Environmental & FM_902 Emergency Mgmt $28.40 0.7% $34.40 0.6% X $34.40
FM_POLIC Safety & Corp Security
E_SAFETY
FM_903 Environmental & $7.40 0.2% $22.30 0.4% X $22.30
Safety
Grand Total $4,229.10 100% $5,521.60 100% $1,917.90 $3,604.00
Reconcilliation of APT Formula to Actual FY2018 Costs and Revenues
FY2018 Federal Government Investment after FRA witholding1 $1,924.90

Below-the-Rail Infrastrucutre Remaining to be Covered by Operations ($7.00) $7.00
Actual FY2018 Total Operating, Capital, Interest, Pensions, Tax, and Net Change in Cash1 $5,063.70
APT Formulaic Cost Above Actual FY2018 Costs $457.90 9.0% $ (457.90)
Total Above-the-Rail Operations Cost + Remaining Infrastructure Cost $ 3,153.10
Actual FY2018 Total Revenues (Tickets, State Contributions, Ancillary, and Other Core) 1 $ 3,386.70
1. Consolidated Financial Statements National Railroad Passenger Corporation and Subsidiaries (Amtrak) for FY2018
Almost no
Direct
Infrastructure
Cost
Many of these
Shared costs are
Infrastructure
Costs but there
is no accounting
of the main
MoW
Infrastructure
Cost
Chart from NRPC FY2014 Budget and Business Plan FY2015 Budget Request Justification FY2014 – 2018 Five Year Financial Plan

Operations Charged
Infrastructure Cost
Many of these
Shared costs are
Infrastructure
Costs, but note
greater G&A
assigned relative
to NEC.
Chart from NRPC FY2014 Budget and Business Plan FY2015 Budget Request Justification FY2014 – 2018 Five Year Financial Plan

Appendix H - Southwest Chief National Network Route – Analysis of Proposed Operations
Engineering Financial Study – Option 1 - Existing Operation Benchmarking Analysis
(2) Existing Locomotives, (6) Existing Revenue Passenger Cars

At the current train consist size, which is historically small, the efficiency found in a passenger train’s declining
average cost curve with respect to volume is not being employed to reduce the required overall level of federal
investment. This is likely due to guidance from the use of Total Allocated Cost reporting for the long-distance
routes, which includes irreducible fixed costs as enumerated in Appendix F.

Southwest Chief Route - Chicago to Los Angeles:
Number of Runs per Day per Direction 1

Revenue Passenger Cars per Train-mile 6
Total Passenger Cars per Train-mile 8
Baggage / Express Pallet Cars per Train-mile 1
Trailer Express Cars per Train-mile 0
Total Equivalent Cars per Train-mile 9
Capital Assumptions:
Infrastructure Interest Rate - Federally Secured RRIF Note 4.4%
Infrastructure Term (Years) 30
Equipment Bond Interest Rate - Owner Equity Backing 4.4%

Equipment Bond Term (Years) 24
Owner Equity Assumed Rate 20.0%

Owner Equity Percentage of Equipment Borrowing 10%
Owner Equity Repayment Term (Years) 15
Below-The-Rail Infrastructure:
Mid-Segment Route Recapitalization $50,000,000
Intermediate Station Platform Work $2,000,000
Infrastructure Capital Total $52,000,000

Infrastructure Repayment (Yearly) $3,021,939
Base Infrastructure Access Fee/Lease for Route (Yearly) $7,440,525

Additional Mid-Segment Infrastructure Access Fee/Lease (Yearly) $3,000,000
Infrastructure Access Fee/Lease for Shared Passenger Terminal Trackage (Yearly) $4,320,000
Infrastructure Access Fee/Lease for Passenger Terminal Platforms, ADA, & Security (Yearly) $6,480,000
Large Loss Insurance Subscription ($0.007/PSG-MI) (Yearly) $2,133,764
Total Infrastructure Lease (Yearly) $26,396,228 per Train-mile $15.96
Equipment Capital Depreciation/Reinvestment:

Complete Consist Equipment Sets Required - For Schedule and Daily Turns 5.0
Complete Consist Equipment Sets Required - 120% for Availability Coverage of Daily Runs 6.0
Depreciated Locomotive $600,000

Total Required 2
New 125 MPH/200 KPH Capable Locomotive $6,500,000
Total Required 0
Total Required 0
Depreciated Sleeper - Crew Dorm $600,000
Total Required 1
Depreciated Sleeper $600,000
Total Required 2
New Uprated Sleeper $3,500,000
Total Required 0
Depreciated Coach $600,000
Total Required 3
New Uprated Coach $3,300,000
Total Required 0
Depreciated Food Service / Lounge $600,000
Total Required 2
Baggage / Pallet Express $1,800,000
Total Required 1
Express Trailer Intermodal (Articulated Railcar holding 2 Conventional Truck Trailers) $375,000

Total Required 0
Equipment Capital Total $46,800,000

Equipment Bond Repayment (Yearly) $2,755,560
Equipment Equity Payment (Yearly) $834,140
Equipment Repayment (Yearly) $3,589,701 per Train-mile $2.17
Operations:
Trip Length (Miles) 2,265
Trip Length (Hours) 44.0
Train miles (Yearly) 1,653,450
Fuel Use per Trainmile (Gallons) 2.15
Cost of Diesel $3.00
Total Diesel Cost (Yearly) $10,664,753 per Train-mile $6.45
T&E Crew - Type II 12 Hour Segments - Engineer, Asst. Eng., Conductor, two Asst. Cond.
Total Route Type II Crew Calls 7.5
T&E Total Cost per Crew Call with Burden and Per Diem $2,125
Total T&E Costs - Type II Segments $11,643,257
T&E Crew - Type I 6 Hour Turn back Segments - Engineer, Conductor, two Asst. Conductors
Total Route Type I Crew Calls (Turn back) 3.0
T&E Total Cost per Crew Call with Burden and Pier Diem $1,140
Total T&E Costs - Type II Segments $2,499,269 per Train-mile $8.55
OBS Crew - Los Angeles Base

Total Crew Members per Crew Tour 9
Total Crew Tours 365
Total OBS Cost per Round Trip Crew Tour with Burden and Per Diem $2,555
Total OBS Costs $7,932,511 per Train-mile $4.80
Mechanical Daily Turns and Inspection Crew - Chicago and Los Angeles
Mechanical Cost per Employee Hour with Burden and Supervision $63
Mechanical Hours per Turn per Passenger Car 5.0
Mechanical Hours per Turn per Express Car 0.5
Mechanical Daily Turn Total Labor Cost $2,084,538
Mechanical Carbody Parts per Passenger Car (Yearly) $30,000
Total Carbody Parts (Yearly) $1,620,000
Mechanical Yard Tools, Utilities, and Tool Amortization $300,000
Holsters and Yard Operations $584,000
Total Mechanical Costs - Daily Terminal Running Maintenance Only $4,588,538 per Train-mile $2.78
Car Cleaning and Consumables - Chicago and Los Angeles

Cleaning Cost per Employee Hour with Burden and Supervision $41
Cleaning Hours per Turn per Passenger Car 3.0
Cleaning Total Labor Cost $712,663
Cleaning Supplies and Expendables $525,600
Food Cost of Goods Sold $6,472,351
Total Cleaning and Consumable Costs $7,710,614 per Train-mile $4.66
Locomotive Heavy Reliability Centered Maintenance per Mile $1.04

Car Running Gear Heavy Reliability Centered Maintenance per Mile $0.27
Prorated Heavy Reliability Centered Maintenance (Fleet Per Year) $7,457,060 per Train-mile $4.51
Passenger Car Interior and Systems Overhaul (1 Million Miles) $400,000

Locomotive Exterior and Systems Overhaul (1 Million Miles) $250,000
Prorated Car Overhaul (Fleet per Year) $6,779,145 per Train-mile $4.10

Express Trailer Intermodal Terminal
Trailer Check-In and Loading Crew (1 Crew per day 10 hour shift) $369,200
Loading Equipment Lease, Fuel, and Utilities $304,000
(2) 1.5 Acre Loading Yards (40 Trailer Total Capacity) Yearly Ground Lease and Improvements $1,140,000
$0 per Train-mile $0.00
Route Costs:
Route Management Office - Operations, Maintenance, and Planning $1,100,000
Road Foremen Offices -T&E Bases $630,000
Reservation Website - Fee for Phone Assistance $1,200,000
Small Loss Insurance, Legal Costs, and Claims $1,800,000
Staffed Intermediate Station Agents and Contract Local Police $2,464,000
Advertising, Inconvenience, and Promotional Rate Write-off $800,000
Passenger Credit Card Processing Fees at Est. 2.1% (Yearly) $1,126,133
Mail & Express Agent at 1.5% $0
$9,120,133 per Train-mile $5.52
Total Projected Revenue $53,625,365 PCT per Train-mile $32.43
Total Short-Term Direct Cost (Operations, Consumables, and No Re-Investment) $78,835,803 68% per Train-mile $47.68
Total Above-the-Rail Cost (Operations, Consumables, and Equipment Re-Investment) $71,984,979 74% per Train-mile $43.54
Total Below-the-Rail Costs (Infrastructure - Leases, Risk, and Re-Investment) $26,396,228 per Train-mile $15.96
Passenger Revenue:
Current Coach - To be Rebranded CoachPlus (2:2 Seating) $0.100 $0.10 to $0.14, Priced per Person
Passenger Car Seating Capacity 74
Assumed Occupancy Rate 59%
Average Passengers per Car 43.7
Total Train Revenue Cars in this Service 3.0
Revenue from Service Type $21,656,888 per Train-mile $13.10
Uprated Club Coach (2:1 Seating) (AVME) $0.220 $0.17 to $0.25, 1 or 2 People per Party
Imputed Number of Travel Parties per Car 27.2
Revenue from Service Type $0 per Train-mile $0.00
Current Sleeper / Crew Dorm

Roomette Average Fare (AVME) $0.330 $0.30 to $0.50, 1 or 2 People per Party
Number of Roomettes per Car 8.0
Assumed Room Occupancy Rate 80%
Current Sleeping Car

'Bedroom Average Fare (AVME) $0.680 Obsv. Constrained Supply Market Rate
Number of Bedrooms per Car 5.0
Accessible / Family Bedrooms average Fare (AVME) $0.500 $0.46 to $0.54, 1 or 3 People per Party
Number of Accessible / Family Bedrooms per Car 2.0
Uprated Sleeping Car

Bedroom Average Fare (AVME) $0.600 $0.54 to $0.68, 1 or 3 People per Party
Compartment Average Fare (AVME) $0.650 $0.54 to $0.70, 1 or 2 People per Party
Number of Compartments per Car 8.0
Food Service Revenue

Mail & Express Revenue:

Trailer Capacity by STB Train Length Limit Decision 42
Trailer Capacity by Equipment Operated 0
Market Single Driver OTR Rate (Average-2019 Nationwide Contract Rate) $2.20
Market Team Driver OTR Rate (Estimated Average-2019 Nationwide Contract Rate) $2.50
Assumed Sell Rate 85%
Backhaul Discount 30%
Assumed Truck Drayage Cost - Each End $500
Intermodal Conversion Difference - May Actually be a Premium with Time Difference $200
Average Express Trip Rate $2,733
Average Express Rate Per-Mile $1.21
Total Revenue $53,625,365 per Train-mile $32.43
Passenger Miles per Train-mile - Coach (From Revenue Calculations) 131
Passenger Miles per Train-mile - Sleeper (From Revenue Calculations) 53
Passenger Miles per Trainmile - Total 184
Total Passenger Miles (From Revenue Calculations) 304,823,428
Assumed Passengers per Travel Party 1.39
"Quant" rate of Equivalent Interstate Highway Investment per Person-Mile $0.096
Earned Equivalent "Quant" rate $29,263,049 per Train-mile $17.70
Earned Equivalent is Greater than Proposed Below-the-Rail Investment Level YES

.
Engineering Financial Study – Option 1A - New Passenger Equipment Analysis
At this consist size, efficiency begins to take root, and the route could cover all costs from revenue other than
infrastructure investment, which would be a rate similar to that of the required Interstate Highway rate of
investment derived from sources other than prorated fuel taxes from driving between exits.








Total Required 0
Total Required 2
Total Required 0
Total Required 1
Total Required 2
Total Required 2
Total Required 2
Total Required 2
Total Required 2
Total Required 1

Total Required 0

Equipment Equity Payment (Yearly) $3,486,279
Operations:





Route Costs:
$9,970,166 per Train-mile $6.03
Passenger Revenue:






Engineering Financial Study – Option 1B –New Passenger Equipment and Twice Daily Analysis
At this consist size and twice daily operation, further efficiency is found. The route could cover all costs from
revenue other than infrastructure investment, which would be a rate similar to that of the required Interstate
Highway rate of investment derived from sources other than prorated fuel taxes from driving between exits.








Total Required 0
Total Required 2
Total Required 0
Total Required 1
Total Required 2
Total Required 2
Total Required 2
Total Required 2
Total Required 2
Total Required 1

Total Required 0

Operations:





Route Costs:
$13,970,332 per Train-mile $4.22
Passenger Revenue:






Engineering Financial Study – Option 1C - New Passenger and Express Equipment Analysis
(4) New Locomotives, (4) New and (4) Refurbished Revenue Passenger Cars, (17) Truck Trailer Express Cars
At this consist size the route covers all operating costs as well as the required infrastructure investment from
revenue; a financial position that is much more efficient than the current highway and aviation programs. No
current form of transportation of persons reaches these levels of cost coverage other than walking and biking.








Total Required 0
Total Required 0
Total Required 4
Total Required 1
Total Required 2
Total Required 2
Total Required 2
Total Required 2
Total Required 2
Total Required 1

Total Required 17

Operations:





$1,813,200 per Train-mile $1.10
Route Costs:
Mail & Express Agent at 1.5% $864,940
$12,046,023 per Train-mile $7.29
Passenger Revenue:






Appendix I – Analysis of Long-Route Commuter Intercity Rail Costs
While termed commuter rail in many cases the operators of these intercity passenger rail routes of distances over 50 miles
are really offering an intercity service that could be improved upon if viewed by policy makers as an intercity service
instead of only as a daily transit service. In many cases persons use these services to take the occasional trip into a larger
city or for occasional home office stays into regions where highways are already far beyond capacity. These operations
can serve as a base to efficiently expand the total all-modes effective peak-hour capacity and serve as a base for a
competitive operator if the incremental infrastructure costs are eligible for Federal investment.
In many cases routes of this length will cross a State border or extend beyond the boundary of a Metropolitan Planning
Organization, complicating the evaluation of the cost and responsibility for the service. However, should the proposed
“Quant” derived highway equivalent Federal train-mile investment metric apply to these services on routes over 50 miles
then the operator of the service would be incentivized to extend the route on their own initiative. They would become
something of a hybrid operator, as public below-the-rail infrastructure investment combined with consumer ticket revenue
would more than exceed the variable cost of Operations and Maintenance per train-mile, roughly approximated in the
following analysis chart.
Importantly, this would focus the operator on improving the customer’s experience to gain incremental revenue as well as
integration of such services into privately led online ticketing and Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS) provisions for last mile
connections through on-demand ride hailing. Thus innovations like greater provision of a limited-stop express service
from a grouping of stations at communities further out combined with connecting full-stop service would likely result
from the overall greater volume of passengers, leading to a virtuous cycle of reduced average costs. Additionally, a focus
on overall seating area comfort might arise with certain cars used in the service provided with reclining seats and greater
onboard amenities all at a Federal investment rate less than the historical average cost of below-the-road Interstate
Highway investments flowing from sources other than the incremental fuel taxes collected between exits. However, there
would still be the need for existing local funding to continue as estimated as well by the following analysis chart.
Finally, the provision of Federal investment per train-mile for such intercity rail services would greatly ease the coming
legal fracas over the shared use Northeast Corridor (NEC) rail lines partially owned by the National Railroad Passenger
Corporation (NRPC) and partially owned by “commuter” railroads as a source of funds would be available to amicably
reach agreements to incrementally improve the infrastructure of this rail route as well as to invest in long-term re-building.
To check the relative rates of charges for below-the-rail facilities infrastructure on a mixed intercity and commuter
railroad it is helpful to look to the EU countries where there is actually more competition by law than exists in the United
States. Due to historical reasons the automobile fuel tax is around ten times that in the United States, which tends to set
the market at a closer point to equilibrium.
2020 DB Long-Distance train-mile Access Charges

$9.5 for large city peak access (long- commuter)
$21.7 for high-speed large city peak access
$8.5 for typical intercity travel outside peaks
$4.8 for off-peak / overnight access
Summary Chart of Track Charges in Germany 93 - Operator and Infrastructure by Separate Companies 94
93
"The Track Access Charges 2020 of DB Netz AG." 2020.
<https://fahrweg.dbnetze.com/resource/blob/1367430/7976d965d38a386f350dfd7f533a96f4/tpsbroschuere2018_en-data.pdf>.
94 Link, Heike. "Track access charges: reconciling conflicting objectives Case Study Germany." 2018.
<https://www.cerre.eu/sites/cerre/files/180509_CERRE_TrackAccessCharges_CaseStudy_Germany_Final.pdf>.

FY2017 National Transportation Database Analysis of Commuter Rail Operations by Train-Mile
Vehicle Vehicle
Primary Vehicle Operations and Operations and
NTD Organization UZA Facility General Revenue Passenger Cars Maintenance Maintenance
Name City State ID Type Population Mode TOS Vehicle Operations Vehicle Maintenance Maintenance Administration Total Hours Train-Miles per Train-Mile per Train-Mile per Car-Mile
Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority Seattle WA 00040 Independent Pub 3,059,393 CR PT $15,520,339 $11,460,893 $10,048,568 $8,472,362 $45,502,162 63,935 340,503 5.8 $79.24 $13.65
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Boston MA 10003 Independent Pub 4,181,019 CR PT $257,361,456 $114,094,542 $4,307,122 $23,277,345 $399,040,465 799,152 4,841,871 5.3 $76.72 $14.48
Connecticut Department of Transportation Newington CT 10102 State Governme 924,859 CR PT $12,834,471 $8,439,686 $4,241,839 $4,630,331 $30,146,327 38,230 608,171 3.5 $34.98 $10.07
Northern New England Passenger Rail Authority Portland ME 10115 Independent Pub 203,914 CR PT $9,988,116 $7,825,358 $1,937,119 $2,045,771 $21,796,364 69,698 451,371 4.9 $39.47 $8.12
Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company, dba: MTA New York NY 20078 Subsidiary Unit 18,351,295 CR DO $408,076,528 $281,229,165 $317,272,869 $213,654,739 $1,220,233,301 2,099,132 10,722,397 7.2 $64.29 $8.97
New Jersey Transit Corporation Newark NJ 20080 Other Publicly-O 18,351,295 CR DO $459,325,398 $228,355,827 $140,118,603 $143,475,789 $971,275,617 1,881,455 9,602,851 6.8 $71.61 $10.57
MTA Long Island Rail Road Jamaica NY 20100 Subsidiary Unit 18,351,295 CR DO $481,179,011 $438,547,959 $261,361,580 $180,863,778 $1,361,952,328 2,125,167 8,644,444 8.8 $106.40 $12.13
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority Philadelphia PA 30019 Independent Pub 5,441,567 CR DO $147,837,067 $40,873,107 $52,296,779 $28,639,262 $269,646,215 917,500 5,273,736 3.9 $35.78 $9.20
Maryland Transit Administration Baltimore MD 30034 State Governme 2,203,663 CR PT $78,621,564 $28,466,291 $6,183,081 $29,320,829 $142,591,765 169,957 1,297,422 5.3 $82.54 $15.46
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation Harrisburg PA 30057 State Governme 5,441,567 CR PT $13,869,116 $14,444,601 $3,621,417 $19,309,427 $51,244,561 74,436 844,474 5.0 $33.53 $6.71
Virginia Railway Express Alexandria VA 30073 Independent Pub 4,586,770 CR PT $36,099,622 $10,803,769 $5,122,457 $21,953,812 $73,979,660 74,767 404,459 6.5 $115.97 $17.79
Delaware Transit Corporation Dover DE 30075 Independent Pub 5,441,567 CR PT $0 $0 $0 $65,250 $65,250 0 404,459 6.5 $0.00 $0.00
South Florida Regional Transportation Authority Pompano Bea FL 40077 Independent Pub 5,502,379 CR PT $31,930,913 $19,335,445 $24,982,353 $14,677,076 $90,925,787 121,880 1,167,777 3.1 $43.90 $14.13
Regional Transportation Authority Nashville TN 40159 Independent Pub 969,587 CR PT $921,388 $1,346,561 $459,198 $1,525,513 $4,252,660 7,890 89,434 2.6 $25.36 $9.92
Central Florida Commuter Rail Sanford FL 40232 State Governme 1,510,516 CR PT $6,798,760 $8,865,562 $12,033,975 $6,410,086 $34,108,383 25,678 308,267 2.2 $50.81 $23.04
Metro Transit Minneapolis MN 50027 Subsidiary Unit 2,650,890 CR PT $4,751,704 $3,015,993 $1,992,879 $5,501,224 $15,261,800 14,482 148,780 3.8 $52.21 $13.66
Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District Chesterton IN 50104 Independent Pub 8,608,208 CR DO $21,898,294 $13,039,580 $3,745,889 $9,774,508 $48,458,271 115,659 795,717 5.7 $43.91 $7.76
Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad CorporaChicago IL 50118 Independent Pub 8,608,208 CR DO $310,063,192 $171,032,990 $141,792,010 $119,832,130 $742,720,322 1,437,803 7,201,311 6.4 $66.81 $10.52
Fort Worth Transportation Authority Fort Worth TX 60007 Independent Pub 5,121,892 CR PT $322,785 $5,513 $335,275 $1,525,816 $2,189,389 0 7,201,311 6.4 $0.05 $0.01
Dallas Area Rapid Transit Dallas TX 60056 Independent Pub 5,121,892 CR PT $10,816,263 $4,518,374 $7,183,110 $5,749,751 $28,267,498 72,469 585,899 2.8 $26.17 $9.19
Rio Metro Regional Transit District Albuquerque NM 60111 Independent Pub 741,318 CR PT $8,850,436 $5,990,425 $7,136,469 $6,453,532 $28,430,862 35,706 485,839 2.9 $30.55 $10.68
Utah Transit Authority Salt Lake CityUT 80001 Independent Pub 1,021,243 CR DO $12,042,361 $6,841,622 $5,348,535 $10,206,211 $34,438,729 154,744 1,343,424 4.0 $14.06 $3.51
Denver Regional Transportation District Denver CO 80006 Independent Pub 2,374,203 CR PT $26,379,241 $5,856,777 $3,070,656 $3,929,438 $39,236,112 71,128 1,327,258 2.0 $24.29 $12.14
North County Transit District Oceanside CA 90030 Independent Pub 2,956,746 CR PT $4,816,130 $4,276,976 $2,976,825 $5,980,021 $18,049,952 34,422 287,990 5.0 $31.57 $6.30
Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Board dba: Caltrain San Carlos CA 90134 Independent Pub 3,281,212 CR PT $43,818,371 $23,147,609 $15,730,174 $44,613,645 $127,309,799 217,327 1,390,674 5.4 $48.15 $8.94
Southern California Regional Rail Authority dba: MetroLos Angeles CA 90151 Independent Pub 12,150,996 CR PT $76,243,620 $38,562,545 $36,726,147 $70,487,364 $222,019,676 359,520 2,816,066 4.8 $40.77 $8.55
Altamont Corridor Express Stockton CA 90182 Independent Pub 370,583 CR PT $6,713,804 $3,045,413 $3,754,736 $8,070,154 $21,584,107 28,013 183,300 6.2 $53.24 $8.52
$2,487,079,950 $1,493,422,583 $1,073,779,665 $990,445,164 68,769,205 $57.88
Costs: Diesel Powered Long-Route (Low Three Average) $21.86
Total Vehicle Operations and Maintenance $3,980,502,533
Total Facilities and Administration $2,064,224,829
Revenues and Investments: Percent of Total
Passenger Fares $3,200,533,321 53%
Proposed Federal Investment ($17.4/TM) $1,196,584,167 20%
Proposed Remaining Local Sponsor Share $1,647,609,874 27%

National Infrastructure Plan For Shareholder and Publicly Held Railways

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

National Infrastructure Plan For Shareholder and Publicly Held Railways

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

National Infrastructure Plan for

Shareholder and Publicly Held Railways

Image Courtesy NCDOT

Derived by Financial Analysis of Infrastructure Investment Rates and Operations

National Network Southwest Chief Long-Distance Rail Passenger Route Investment

Hybrid Toll Highway and Corridor Rail Passenger Route Investment

Shareholder Guided Intermodal Rail Freight Investment

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Highway Revenue Act of 1956." V II Pg. 32, 1961. < https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=ien.35556021232335;view=2up;seq=46;size=150>

National Railway Infrastructure Plan - 1

National Railway Infrastructure Plan - 2

National Railway Infrastructure Plan - 3

4.2 Million Route Miles Today

9 USDOT-FHWA. Office of Highway Policy Information - Publications Archive. n.d. 2019.

National Railway Infrastructure Plan - 4

Foundation for the Future." PG 158, 2019. <https://www.nap.edu/download/25334>

President. 1970. <https://www.enotrans.org/wp-content/uploads/Creation-of-the-Amtrak-Route-Map.pdf>.

National Railway Infrastructure Plan - 5

Foundation of Millennial’s Urban Interest

National Railway Infrastructure Plan - 6

National Railway Infrastructure Plan - 7

National Railway Infrastructure Plan - 8

National Railway Infrastructure Plan - 9

National Railway Infrastructure Plan - 10

25 Schafer, Andreas. "REGULARITIES IN TRAVEL DEMAND: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE." MIT, 2000.

National Railway Infrastructure Plan - 11

Daytime Rail Departures become

Evening Rail Departures are trip-time competitive with travel by

National Railway Infrastructure Plan - 12

Intermodal Rail Freight Tax Credit = NRPC Trackside Boarding Platform

USDOT Large Loss Liability Pool (Operator

Illustration of Proposed Components of Investment – Image Copyright Craig Walker

National Railway Infrastructure Plan - 13

Innovation, Ownership, and Competition - Investments Needed in Authorization Legislation

National Railway Infrastructure Plan - 14

National Railway Infrastructure Plan - 15

National Railway Infrastructure Plan - 16

Economic Time-Utility Gain over Middle

Reduced Access Cost Toward and Within Stations

National Railway Infrastructure Plan - 17

National Railway Infrastructure Plan - 18

Proposed New Coach Service Equipment for Reinvestment:

National Railway Infrastructure Plan - 19

ScotRail Caledonian Sleeper Franchise

New Suite Room - Image Courtesy of Caledonia Sleeper Franchise

National Railway Infrastructure Plan - 20

Proposed New Sleeping Service Equipment for Reinvestment:

National Railway Infrastructure Plan - 21

Proposed Characteristics of New Sleeping Cars

National Railway Infrastructure Plan - 22

Floorplan of Proposed New Sleeping Service Equipment –Nighttime Configuration

National Railway Infrastructure Plan - 23

Williams, AZ Through Cars to Grand Canyon

Kansas City Through Cars to St. Louis

Route Map Image Courtesy of Amtrak Train Tracker

Mid-Route Car Switching Improvements

National Railway Infrastructure Plan - 24

Historical Revenue Response and Solutions

Recent comparisons have been made between 2010

National Railway Infrastructure Plan - 25

Williams, AZ Through Cars to Grand Canyon