The Collapse of the Hyatt Regency Kansas City Walkways

In the 1970s, it became popular to design upscale hotels with large atriums, some extending the entire
height of the hotel, a design element still in use today. This feature helps create very dramatic
architectural spaces in hotel lobbies. Many of these designs also include walkways suspended over the
atrium. One hotel using this design was the Hyatt Regency Kansas City. Development of this hotel began
in 1976, and construction was completed in the summer of 1980. One year later, in July 1981, during a
dance party in the atrium lobby, some of the walkways on which people were dancing collapsed onto
the crowded atrium fl oor, leaving 114 people dead and 185 people injured.

The development of the Hyatt Regency Kansas City was initiated in 1976 by Crown Center
Redevelopment Corporation, which hired Gillum-Colaco, Inc. of Texas as the consulting structural
engineers. Gillum-Colaco worked closely with Crown Center Redevelopment and the project architects
to develop the plans and create the structural drawings and specifi cations. Construction on the hotel
began in 1978. Gillum-Colaco didn’t actually perform the structural engineering for this project, but
rather subcontracted this work to its subsidiary, Jack D. Gillum and Associates, Ltd.

The general contractor for the project was Eldridge Construction Company, which hired Havens Steel
Company as the subcontractor for fabrication and erection of the atrium steel. The original design called
for the walkways to be hung from rods connected to the atrium ceiling. There would be two walkways
connected to each rod by separate nuts (see Figure

5.1

). Implementation of this design required that the rods be threaded for most of their length, which
would greatly increase the cost of the rods. Havens suggested a change in the design that would avoid
the requirement for threading long pieces of rod. It is not uncommon for a subcontractor to suggest
changes in a structure, especially if the changes can lead to cost savings or easier fabrication. The
changed design, shown in Figure

5.2

, required that only a shorter section near the ends of the rods be threaded. In the original design, each
of the nuts supported the weight of only one fl oor of the walkway. Unfortunately, in the revised design,
some of the nuts supported the weight of both walkways, effectively doubling the load on the nuts.
Gillum and Associates later claimed never to have seen any documents related to this change. Nor, they
claimed, did anyone from Havens or Eldridge contact them about this change. However, drawings
indicating these changes were stamped with Gillum’s seal in February of 1979.
 In October of 1979, during construction, part of the roof of the atrium collapsed. There were
investigations of this by Gillum and Associates and by an independent engineering firm. Reports were
sent to the owners and architects assuring

In the wake of the accident, an investigation was conducted by the Missouri Board of Architects,
Professional Engineers, and Land Surveyors. This investigation resulted in charges of negligence,
incompetence, and misconduct on the part of Gillum and Associates and its parent company. The report
indicated that the original design was only marginally acceptable and didn’t conform to the Kansas City
building code. As originally designed, the walkways would only have had approximately 60% of the
capacity required by the code. The changes initiated by Havens and approved by Gillum made this
situation even worse.

Gillum and Associates was also found to be negligent in its investigation of the atrium collapse during
construction and was found to have placed too much reliance on Havens. As a result of this accident,
Jack Gillum lost his license to practice engineering, and Gillum and Associates lost its license as an
engineering firm