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Disclaimer:
This is a Summers Project done in The Clearing Corporation of India Ltd. as per the
requirements of Mumbai University, MMS course.
All the information contained in this project is secondary information. And the references
are provided to the information provided. I apologize for the unreferenced information
found if any.
Praveen P. Mishall
Welingkar Institute of Management Development & Research
praveen.mishall@gmail.com
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Project by S R Prudvi EAIMS
TABLE OF CONTENT
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Project by S R Prudvi EAIMS
Executive Summary
“Life is either a daring adventure or nothing. Security does not exist in nature, nor do the
children of men as a whole experience it. Avoiding danger is no safer in the long run than
exposure.”
Helen Keller
US blind & deaf educator (1880 - 1968)
The credit derivatives are nothing but the logical extension to the family of derivatives
and have already made its presence felt globally. The credit derivatives have played a
significant role in the development of debt market but also share a blame for the
proliferation of subprime crisis.
A credit default swap which constitutes the major portion of credit derivatives is similar
to an insurance contract which allows you to transfer your risk to third party in exchange
of a premium. Right from its origin as plain vanilla product for hedging purpose it has
grown to very complex products and now has posed a question mark on its credibility.
The subprime crisis started in what were regarded as the world’s safest and most
sophisticated markets and spread globally, carried by securities and derivatives that were
thought to make the financial system safer. The subprime crisis brings the complexity of
securitized products and derivatives products, the human greedy nature, inability of rating
agencies to gauge the risk, inefficiency of regulatory bodies, etc. to the fore. Although
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Project by S R Prudvi EAIMS
CDS was not the cause of the subprime crisis but it had cascading effect on the market
and was considered as the reason for the collapse of AIG.
The lessons from the consequences of subprime crisis have helped in creating awareness
about the regulatory frameworks to be in place which has increased the transparency,
standardization, and soundness in the market. The various measures include formation of
central counterparty for CDS, hardwiring of auction protocol and ISDA determination
committee. On the backdrop of global crisis the movement of CDS is being watched
carefully. The various data sources now provide data even on weekly basis. The efforts
are being paid off and the market size of CDS has reduced considerably. And now with
the central counterparties in place the CDS market will have more transparency and
better control.
After opening up of the economy the equity market of India have grown significantly
bringing in more transparency. But the corporate bond market is still in undeveloped
mode and the efforts being taken on developing it have not provided expected returns.
Under this light, India is now all set to launch Credit Default Swaps which are expected
to ignite the spark which will flourish the corporate bond market. Considering the
cautious nature of RBI and the havoc created by CDS in global market the move by RBI
is significant. From the move of RBI one can say as the knife itself is not harmful but it
depends whether it’s in doctor’s hand or a robber’s hand. Similarly CDS as a product is
certainly not harmful but its utility will depend on the judicious use of the same.
RBI has given clear indications about the launch of CDS. In the words of Helen Keller
the child can no more hide from the danger. It’s the time to face it!
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Research Methodology
Objective of the research:
The main objective of the project was to understand about Credit Default Swaps, its
global footprint, its role in subprime crisis, its settlement in global arena and to check the
feasible settlement of CDS in India, after its introduction in India, by understanding about
Indian Credit Derivatives market. Research is concerned with the systematic and
objective collection, analysis and evaluation of information about specific aspects to
check the feasible settlement of CDSs in India.
Period of study:
The time period was two months for the study, starting from 20th May to 18th July ‘2009.
Data Used:
The types of data collected comprises of Primary data and Secondary data. As CDSs are
yet to be introduced in India the project relied mostly on secondary data. Secondary data
for the study has been compiled from the reports and official publication of the
organization, educational institutions (like Stanford University), internet, online forums,
textbooks, etc. which helped in getting an insight of the present scenario in the settlement
of CDSs abroad.
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Project by S R Prudvi EAIMS
Derivatives
Derivatives have become increasingly important in financial markets. We have observed
exciting developments in the last 25 years: the most “successful” innovations in capital
markets. “By far the most significant event in finance during the past decade has been the
extraordinary development and expansion of financial derivatives. These instruments
enhance the ability to differentiate risk and allocate it to those investors most able and
willing to take it - a process that has undoubtedly improved national productivity growth
and standards of living” -- Alan Greenspan, (former) chairman, Board of Governors of
the US Federal Reserve System. But again early falls of Baring bank, LTCM (Long-Term
Capital Management), Asian Financial Crisis and the most recent financial crisis posed a
big question mark on the rapid development of Derivatives. Even Warren Buffet said in
Berkshire Hathaway annual report for 2002 that – “derivatives are financial weapons of
mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal”. Now
with these conflicting views let’s understand what exactly are derivative and why it
posses a potential threats or potential opportunities in financial markets?
Introduction:
Derivatives are financial contracts, or financial instruments, whose prices are derived
from the price of something else (known as the underlying). The underlying price on
which a derivative is based can be that of an asset (e.g., commodities, equities (stocks),
residential mortgages, commercial real estate, loans, bonds), an index (e.g., interest rates,
exchange rates, stock market indices), or other items. Credit derivatives are based on
loans, bonds or other forms of credit.
The derivative contract also has a fixed expiry period mostly in the range of 3 to 12
months from the date of commencement of the contract. The value of the contract
depends on the expiry period and also on the price of the underlying asset. Usually,
derivatives are contracts to buy or sell the underlying asset at a future time, with the
price, quantity and other specifications defined today. Contracts can be binding for both
parties or for one party only, with the other party reserving the option to exercise or not.
If the underlying asset is not traded, for example if the underlying is an index, some kind
of cash settlement has to take place. Derivatives are traded in organized exchanges as
well as over the counter [OTC derivatives].
Uses of Derivatives:
Derivative contracts provide an easy and straightforward way to both reduce risk -
hedging, and to bear extra risk -speculating.
Hedging: Derivatives can be used to mitigate the risk of economic loss arising
from changes in the value of the underlying. This activity is known as hedging.
For example, a wheat farmer and a miller could sign a futures contract to
exchange a specified amount of cash for a specified amount of wheat in the
future. Both parties have reduced a future risk: for the wheat farmer, the
uncertainty of the price, and for the miller, the availability of wheat.
Speculation: Derivatives can be used by investors to increase the profit arising if
the value of the underlying moves in the direction they expect. This activity is
known as speculation. Speculators will want to be able to buy an asset in the
future at a low price according to a derivative contract when the future market
price is high, or to sell an asset in the future at a high price according to a
derivative contract when the future market price is low.
Arbitrage: Individuals and institutions may also look for arbitrage opportunities,
as when the current buying price of an asset falls below the price specified in a
futures contract to sell the asset.
Types of Derivatives:
Broadly speaking there are two distinct groups of derivative contracts, which are
distinguished by the way they are traded in market:
agreements, and exotic options are almost always traded in this way. The OTC
derivatives market is huge. According to the Bank for International Settlements,
the total outstanding notional amount is USD 592 trillion (as of December 2008).
Because OTC derivatives are not traded on an exchange, they are subject to
counter party risk as each counter party relies on the other to perform.
Forward and Future: Forward contracts are agreements by two parties to engage
in a financial transaction at a future point in time. A forward contract is traded in
the OTC market. Future contracts are similar to forward contract but they
normally are traded on an exchange and are standardized. To make sure that the
clearinghouse is financially sound and does not run into financial difficulties that
might jeopardize its contracts, buyers or sellers of futures contracts must put an
initial deposit, called a margin requirement. Futures contracts are then marked to
market every day. What this means is that at the end of every trading day, the
change in the value of the futures contract is added to or subtracted from the
margin account. A final advantage that futures markets have over forward markets
is that most futures contracts do not result in delivery of the underlying asset on
the expiration date, whereas forward contracts do.
Options: An option is a contract between a buyer and a seller that gives the buyer
the right, but not the obligation, to buy or to sell a particular asset (the underlying
asset) at a later day at an agreed price. In return for granting the option, the seller
collects a payment (the premium) from the buyer. A call option gives the buyer
the right to buy the underlying asset; a put option gives the buyer of the option the
right to sell the underlying asset. If the buyer chooses to exercise this right, the
seller is obliged to sell or buy the asset at the agreed price. The buyer may choose
not to exercise the right and let it expire.
There are two types of option contracts: American options can be exercised at any
time up to the expiration date of the contract, and European options can be
exercised only on the expiration date.
Swaps: Swaps are financial contracts that obligate each party to the contract to
exchange (swap) a set of payments (not assets) it owns for another set of
payments owned by another party. There are two basic kinds of swaps. Currency
swaps involve the exchange of a set of payments in one currency for a set of
payments in another currency. Interest-rate swaps involve the exchange of one set
of interest payments for another set of interest payments, all denominated in the
same currency. Most swaps are traded OTC, “tailor-made” for the counterparties.
As can be seen from above figure the total OTC derivative market was almost $600
trillion. Thus, in 10 years it has gown 826%. Some of the subcategories have grown even
more than simple average (of 826%) like, commodity contracts increased over 2000%,
interest rate contracts (which make up the largest portion, 66% of OTC market) increased
over 900% in last 10 years and CDS (Credit Default Swap) contracts increased over
905% in just three and half years (more about CDS is explained in later chapters).
Factors generally attributed as the major driving force behind growth of financial
derivatives are:
Although there are risks associated with derivatives there are number of advantages too.
So derivatives can be considered as necessary evils.
The world seems to be dividend into two camps: those who embrace financial derivatives
as the Holy Grail of the new investment area, and those who denigrate derivatives as the
financial Antichrist.
-David Edington
But still many believes derivatives are just a bet on a bet. Around 2002, soon after the
effects of the dotcom collapse ebbed away and Alan Greenspan flooded the world with
cheap credit, another form of betting became possible. This was the credit derivative.
These credit derivatives played a vital role in growing the subprime crisis all the more
and still continuing to do the same with CDS being a frontrunner along with TRS, credit
options, CLN, etc. So it is important to understand about credit derivatives which are
dealt in next chapter.
Credit Derivatives
The development of credit derivatives is a logical extension of the ever-growing array of
derivatives trading in the market. The concept of a derivative is to create a contract that
transfers some risk or some volatility. Credit derivatives apply the same notion to a credit
asset. Credit asset is the asset that a provider of credit creates, such as a loan given by a
bank, or a bond held by a capital market participant. A credit derivative enables the
stripping of the loan or the bond, from the risk of default, such that the loan or the bond
can continue to be held by the originator or holder thereof, but the risk gets transferred to
the counterparty. The counterparty buys the risk obviously for a premium, and the
premium represents the rewards of the counterparty. Thus, credit derivatives essentially
use the derivatives format to acquire or shift risks and rewards in credit assets, viz., loans
or bonds, to other financial market participants.
So here the protection buyer continues to hold the reference asset (loan or bond) and
protection seller holds the risk associated with the asset (loan or bond) also called as
holding synthetic asset. The protection seller holds the risk of default, losses, foreclosure,
delinquency, prepayment, etc. and the reward of premium.
There could be two possible ways of settlement in case of credit event. In first case,
physical settlement, protection seller gives the par value of asset to the protection buyer
and protection buyer hands over the asset to the protection seller. Whereas in second
case, cash settlement the difference between the par value of the asset and the market
1
More details on physical and cash settlement are available in the next chapter on Credit Default Swap.
Total Return Swaps: As the name implies, a total return swap is a swap of the
total return out of a credit asset swapped against a contracted prefixed return. The
total return out of a credit asset is reflected by the actual stream of cash-flows
from the reference asset as also the actual appreciation/depreciation in its price
over time, and can be affected by various factors, some of which may be quite
extraneous to the asset in question, such as interest rate movements. Nevertheless,
the protection seller here guarantees a prefixed spread to the protection buyer,
who in turn, agrees to pass on the actual collections and actual variations in prices
on the credit asset to the protection seller. Total Return Swap is also known as
Total Rate of Return Swap (TRORS).
Credit Linked Notes: It is a security with an embedded credit default swap
allowing the issuer (protection buyer) to transfer a specific credit risk to credit
investors.
CLNs are created through a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), or trust, which is
collateralized with securities. Investors buy securities from a trust that pays a
fixed or floating coupon during the life of the note. At maturity, the investors
receive par unless the referenced credit defaults or declares bankruptcy, in which
case they receive an amount equal to the recovery rate. The trust enters into a
default swap with a deal arranger. In case of default, the trust pays the dealer par
minus the recovery rate in exchange for an annual fee which is passed on to the
investors in the form of a higher yield on the notes.
Credit Spread Options: A financial derivative contract that transfers credit risk
from one party to another. A premium is paid by the buyer in exchange for
potential cash flows if a given credit spread changes from its current level.
The buyer of credit spread put option hopes that credit spread will widen and
credit spread call buyer hopes for narrowing of credit spread. It can be viewed as
similar to that of credit default swaps but it hedges also against credit
deterioration along with default.
Consider the buyer of credit spread put: he/she pays a premium for the put. If the
bond (the reference entity) deteriorates, the spread on the bond will increase and
the buyer will profit. But if the bond quality increases, the credit spread will
narrow, bond price will decrease, and the put will be worthless (i.e., put buyer has
lost the premium). In summary, the credit spread put buyer wants to hedge against
price deterioration and/or default risk of the obligation.
The payoff is duration (D) x notional (N) x [credit spread minus (-) the strike
spread; CS - K].
Various risks associated with credit derivatives are credit risk, market risk, and legal risk.
Credit Risk: The protection seller is having a credit risk related to underlying reference
asset because protection seller synthetically holds the asset and needs to do due diligence
to counter this risk. Another risk is associated is counterparty risk against protection
seller if he fails to make good of his obligations.
Market Risk: Market risk is associated with credit derivatives traders as the prices of the
instruments are a function of interest rates, the shape of the yield curve, and credit spread.
Other types of risks involved are marking to market risk, margin call risks, etc.
Legal Risk: Lack of standard documentation and agreement as to the definitions of credit
event leads to legal risks. Usage of master agreements though has simplified and
homogenized the trading of credit derivatives. More efforts are being taken recently to
counter this risk with International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) taking
active role in it. The most important legal issues still revolves around the nature of credit
event and the nature of obligations.
Within no time credit derivatives have grown to a great extent to be a big part of
derivatives segment after interest rate contracts (82% Q4’08) and foreign exchange
contracts (8.4% Q4’08) as per notional amounts outstanding (Credit derivatives – 7.9%
Q4’08, Data Source: OCC’s Quarterly Report). Securitization, index products and
structured credit trading.
Much of the significance credit derivatives enjoy today is because of the marketability
imparted by securitization. A securitized credit derivative, or synthetic securitization, is a
device of embedding a credit derivative feature into a capital market security so as to
transfer the credit risk into the capital markets. The synthesis of credit derivatives with
securitization methodology has complimented each other. This had allowed keeping the
portfolio of assets on the books but transferring the credit risk associated with it.
The index products have also contributed to the increasing popularity of credit
derivatives. It provides a means to buy or sell exposure to a broad-based indices, or sub-
indices diversifying the risks instead to buying or selling exposure to the credit risk of a
single entity.
The third important factor contributing to the growth of credit derivatives is structured
credit trading or tranching. Here the portfolio of assets is divided into various subclasses
known as tranches (means slice in French) to fulfill the risk appetite of various investors.
The tranches are divided into various levels like senior tranche, mezzanine tranche,
subordinate tranche, and equity tranche with the risk of default rising in a sequence for
these tranches (Tranching is explained in detail in later chapters).
Talking about the growth of credit derivatives from year-end 2003 to 2008, credit
derivative contracts grew at a 100% compounded annual growth rate. But due to the
global turmoil the growth has been curtailed from the end of 2007 (the reasons for which
will be explained in later chapters).
Origin of CDS:
By the mid-'90s, JPMorgan's books were loaded with billions of dollars in loans to
corporations and foreign governments, and by federal law it had to keep huge amounts of
capital in reserve in case any of them went bad. But what if JPMorgan could create a
device that would protect it if those loans defaulted, and free up that capital? And the
solution they come up with is nothing but the origin of “Credit Default Swap”.
Credit Default Swap (CDS) is some sort of insurance policy where the third party
assumes the risk of debt going sour and in exchange will receive regular payments from
the bank who issues debt, similar to insurance premiums. Although the idea was floating
for a while JP Morgan was the first bank to make a bet on CDS. They opened up a Swap
desk in mid-‘90s and formally brought the idea of CDS into reality.
Definition:
A credit default swap (CDS) is a credit derivative contract between two counterparties.
The buyer makes periodic payments to the seller, and in return receives a payoff if an
underlying financial instrument defaults.
The interesting thing about CDS market is you don’t need to own the underlying
reference entity to get into the contract. Such contract is know as naked CDS. Just like
any derivatives market CDS can be used for speculation, hedging and arbitrage purpose.
CDS Premium:
Premium prices – also known as fees or credit default spreads – are quoted in basis point
per annum of the contract’s notional value. In case of highly distressed credits in which
CDS market remains open upfront premium payment is a common thing. The CDS
spread is inversely related to the credit worthiness of the underlying reference entity.
Inevitably, the maturity of a CDS will depend on the credit quality of the reference entity,
with longer-dated contracts of five years and more only written on the best-rated names.
Although there are differences in the quotes given by banks on CDS prices due to some
technical reasons rather than financial reasons, but the CDS premium price more or less
remains the same. Over and above a valuation of credit risk, probability of default, actual
loss incurred, and recovery rate, the various factors in determination of CDS premium are
– liquidity, regulatory capital requirements, market sentiments and perceived volatility,
etc.
Trigger Events:
The market participants view the following three to be the most important trigger events:
Bankruptcy
Failure to Pay
Restructuring
Bankruptcy, the clearest concept of all, is the reference entity’s insolvency or inability to
repay its debt. Failure-to-Pay occurs when the reference entity, after a certain grace
period, fails to make payment of principal or interest. Restructuring refers to a change in
the terms of debt obligations that are adverse to the creditors.
The market size for Credit Default Swaps began to grow rapidly from 2003; by the end of
2007, the CDS market had a notional value of $62 trillion (as seen in the above figure).
But notional amount began to fall during 2008 as a result of dealer "portfolio
compression" efforts, and by the end of 2008 notional amount outstanding had fallen 38
percent to $38.6 trillion.
It is important to note that since default is a relatively rare occurrence (historically around
0.2% of investment grade companies would default in any one year) in most CDS
contracts the only payments are the spread payments from buyer to seller. Thus, although
the above figures for outstanding notional amount sound very large, the net cash flows
will generally only be a small fraction of this total.
Currently CDS dominates the credit derivatives market with its unprecedented growth.
Although after the subprime crisis (which will be discussed later) the credit derivatives
market, in the 4th quarter of 2008, reported credit derivatives notionals declined 2%, or
$252 billion, to $15.9 trillion, reflecting the industry’s efforts to eliminate many
offsetting trades (Reference: OCC’s Quarterly Report).
As shown in the chart above CDS represent the dominant product at 98% of all credit
derivatives notionals. As we can see from the other chart although majority of the CDSs
composition is dominated by the investment grade CDSs sub-investment grade CDSs
also forms a significant part of CDSs (34%) which is considered to be one of prime cause
for subprime crisis. Considering the global OTC market CDS accounts for about 8%.
Single-name CDS: These are credit derivatives where the reference entity is a single
name.
Multi-name CDS: CDS contracts where the reference entity is more than one name as in
portfolio or basket credit default swaps or credit default swap indices. A basket credit
default swap is a CDS where the credit event is the default of some combination of the
credits in a specified basket of credits. In the particular case of an nth-to-default basket it
is the nth credit in the basket of reference credits whose default triggers payments.
Another common form of multi-name CDS is that of the “tranched” credit default swap.
Variations operate under specifically tailored loss limits – these may include a “first loss”
tranched CDS, a “mezzanine” tranched CDS, and a senior (also known as a “super-
senior”) tranched CDS.
Physical Settlement:
The seller of the protection will buy back the distressed reference entity at par. Clearly
given that the credit event will have reduced the secondary market value of the
underlying reference entity, this will result in protection seller (CDS seller) incurring a
loss. This was the most common means for the settlement in CDSs and will generally
take place no later than 30 days after the credit event. Till 2006 ISDA2 allowed
settlement only in the form of physical settlement. But due to increased amount of naked
CDSs in the credit market ISDA has now allowed the choice between cash and physical
settlement.
Cash Settlement:
The seller of the protection will pay the buyer the difference between the notional of the
default swap and a final value for the same notional of the reference obligation. Cash
settlement is less prevalent because obtaining precise quotes can be difficult when the
reference credit is distressed. After the Auction process being started for the settlement of
CDSs as per ISDA, this problem has been resolved.
The example for the Physical and Cash settlement shown below will explain the process.
2
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA), which represents participants in the
privately negotiated derivatives industry, is among the world’s largest global financial trade associations as
measured by number of member firms.
the bond goes into default, the proceeds from the CDS contract will cancel out the losses
on the underlying bond.
For example, if you own a bond of Apple worth $10 million maturing after 5 years and
you are worried about its future then you can create a CDS contract with an insurance
company like AIG which will charge a premium of say 200bps annually for insuring your
bond. In this way you are hedging the risk of losing $10 million in case Apple goes
bankrupt. Here you will be paying $200000 to AIG for insuring your bond. If Apple goes
bankrupt you will receive the par value of bond from AIG and even if does not, you will
lose premium value at the most which is worth transferring the risk to AIG.
Counterparty Risks:
When entering into a CDS, both the buyer and seller of credit protection take on
counterparty risk. Examples of counter party risks:
The buyer takes the risk that the seller will default. If reference entity and seller
default simultaneously ("double default"), the buyer loses its protection against
default by the reference entity. If seller defaults but reference entity does not, the
buyer might need to replace the defaulted CDS at a higher cost.
The seller takes the risk that the buyer will default on the contract, depriving the
seller of the expected revenue stream. More important, a seller normally limits its
risk by buying offsetting protection from another party - that is, it hedges its
exposure. If the original buyer drops out, the seller squares its position by either
unwinding the hedge transaction or by selling a new CDS to a third party.
Depending on market conditions, that may be at a lower price than the original
CDS and may therefore involve a loss to the seller.
As is true with other forms of over-the-counter derivative, CDS might involve liquidity
risk. If one or both parties to a CDS contract must post collateral (which is common),
there can be margin calls requiring the posting of additional collateral. The required
collateral is agreed on by the parties when the CDS is first issued. This margin amount
may vary over the life of the CDS contract, if the market price of the CDS contracts
changes, or the credit rating of one of the party’s changes.
iTraxx index4. An investor might speculate on an entity's credit quality, since generally
CDS spreads will increase as credit-worthiness declines and decline as credit-worthiness
increases. The investor might therefore buy CDS protection on a company in order to
speculate that the company is about to default. Alternatively, the investor might sell
protection if they think that the company's creditworthiness might improve. As there is no
need to own an underlying entity to enter into a CDS contract it can be viewed as a
betting or gambling tool.
For example if you feel that Microsoft is not performing well and may go bankrupt in
near future then you might enter into a CDS contract with AIG for a notional value of
$10 million for 5 years even if you don’t own a single share of Microsoft. This kind of
CDS is known as Naked CDS.
3
CDX indices are credit default swap indices. CDX indices contain North American and Emerging Market
companies and are administered by CDS Index Company (CDSIndexCo) and marketed by Markit Group
Limited
4
iTraxx indices are credit default swap indices. iTraxx indices contain companies from the rest of the world
other than CDX indices and are managed by the International Index Company (IIC), and owned by Markit.
Much has been written about the structured investment vehicle market and the lack of
understanding of what was included in the various products. Sellers of protection in the
CDS market more than likely did not have sufficient understating of the underlying asset
to determine an appropriate risk profile (plus there was no history of these products to
assist in determining a risk profile). As it has become clear, the structured investment
vehicle market was a speculative market which was not really understood which led to
speculative CDS related to these products.
A larger problem is the pure speculation in the CDS market. Many hedge funds and
investment companies started to write CDS contracts without owning the underlying
security, but were just a "bet" on whether a "credit event" would occur. These CDS
contracts created a way to "short" sell the bond market, or to make money on the decline
in the value of bonds. Many hedge funds and other investment companies often place
"bets" on the price movement of commodities, interest rates, and many other items, and
now had a vehicle to "short" the credit markets.
[Actually CDS can be viewed as short in bond and buying a put option. Because in the
case of default protection buyer will have to give the underlying reference entity (bond)
to the protection seller (in case of physical settlement) so shorting the bond. While
protection seller will have to pay the par amount to protection buyer in case of default
hence can be viewed to be a put option. The payout to credit protection buyer can be
described as –
A still larger problem was the development of a secondary market for both legs of the
CDS product, particularly the seller of protection. The problem may be that a "weak
link" would occur in the chain of sales even if the CDS terms are the same. The "weak
link" is often a speculative buyer that offers to sell protection, but, in fact, is just looking
to quickly turn the product to another investor. This problem becomes particularly acute
when the CDS is based on structured investment vehicles and firms looking for a quick
profit. The reasons for such developments in the secondary market will be discussed later
while dealing with the role CDSs played in the subprime crisis.
An insurance company may unknowingly be pulled into one of these speculative aspects
of the CDS market. The insurance company would be viewed as "the deep pocket" and
may be asked (or sued) to recover losses by the buyer of protection.
CDS Pricing:
The main aim of CDS pricing is to calculate the amount of premium to be paid by
protection buyer to the protection seller. For calculating the CDS premium we need to
know the Recovery Rate and Probability of Default. Simple explanation of calculating
CDS premium (spread) for a 1-year CDS contract (with yearly premium) is shown below.
Now after understanding the basics of CDS, let’s look at the role played by it in the
subprime crisis by understanding first about subprime crisis and securitization process,
etc.
Subprime Crisis
Background of Subprime Crisis:
The immediate cause or trigger of the crisis was the bursting of the United States housing
bubble which peaked in approximately 2005–2006. High default rates on "subprime" and
adjustable rate mortgages (ARM) began to increase quickly thereafter. An increase in
loan incentives such as easy initial terms and a long-term trend of rising housing prices
had encouraged borrowers to assume difficult mortgages in the belief they would be able
to quickly refinance at more favorable terms. However, once interest rates began to rise
and housing prices started to drop moderately in 2006–2007 in many parts of the U.S.,
refinancing became more difficult. Defaults and foreclosure activity increased
dramatically as easy initial terms expired, home prices failed to go up as anticipated, and
ARM interest rates reset higher. Foreclosures accelerated in the United States in late 2006
and triggered a global financial crisis through 2007 and 2008.
In the years leading up to the crisis, high consumption and low savings rates in the U.S.
contributed to significant amounts of foreign money flowing into the U.S. from fast-
growing economies in Asia and oil-producing countries. This inflow of funds combined
with low U.S. interest rates from 2002-2004 resulted in easy credit conditions, which
fueled both housing and credit bubbles. Loans of various types (e.g., mortgage, credit
card, and auto) were easy to obtain and consumers assumed an unprecedented debt load.
As part of the housing and credit booms, the amount of financial agreements called
mortgage-backed securities (MBS), which derive their value from mortgage payments
and housing prices, greatly increased. Such financial innovation enabled institutions and
investors around the world to invest in the U.S. housing market. As housing prices
declined, major global financial institutions that had borrowed and invested heavily in
subprime MBS reported significant losses. Defaults and losses on other loan types also
increased significantly as the crisis expanded from the housing market to other parts of
the economy. Total losses are estimated in the trillions of U.S. dollars globally.
While the housing and credit bubbles built, a series of factors caused the financial system
to become increasingly fragile. Policymakers did not recognize the increasingly
important role played by financial institutions such as investment banks and hedge funds,
also known as the shadow banking system. Some experts believe these institutions had
become as important as commercial (depository) banks in providing credit to the U.S.
economy, but they were not subject to the same regulations. These institutions as well as
certain regulated banks had also assumed significant debt burdens while providing the
loans described above and did not have a financial cushion sufficient to absorb large loan
defaults or MBS losses. These losses impacted the ability of financial institutions to lend,
slowing economic activity. Concerns regarding the stability of key financial institutions
drove central banks to take action to provide funds to encourage lending and to restore
faith in the commercial paper markets, which are integral to funding business operations.
Governments also bailed out key financial institutions, assuming significant additional
financial commitments.
The risks to the broader economy created by the housing market downturn and
subsequent financial market crisis were primary factors in several decisions by central
banks around the world to cut interest rates and governments to implement economic
stimulus packages. Effects on global stock markets due to the crisis have been dramatic.
Between 1 January and 11 October 2008, owners of stocks in U.S. corporations had
suffered about $8 trillion in losses, as their holdings declined in value from $20 trillion to
$12 trillion. Losses in other countries have averaged about 40%. Losses in the stock
markets and housing value declines place further downward pressure on consumer
spending, a key economic engine. Leaders of the larger developed and emerging nations
met in November 2008 and March 2009 to formulate strategies for addressing the crisis.
As of April 2009, many of the root causes of the crisis had yet to be addressed. A variety
of solutions have been proposed by government officials, central bankers, economists,
and business executives.
Now after a brief idea about subprime crisis let’s understand in detail about subprime
crisis which shook the whole world.
The subprime mortgage crisis is an ongoing financial crisis triggered by a dramatic rise in
mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures in the United States, with major adverse
consequences for banks and financial markets around the globe. The crisis, which has its
roots in the closing years of the 20th century, became apparent in 2007 and has exposed
pervasive weaknesses in financial industry regulation and the global financial system.
Let’s understand the problem from both borrower’s and lenders point of view and then
sum it all up.
Borrower’s Side:
A subprime loan is a loan given to borrowers that are considered more risky, or less
likely to be able to make their loan payments, in relation to high quality borrowers
because of problems with their credit history. When you go to get a loan you need to get
a credit check, and what results from this credit check is something that is known as your
FICO score5. A FICO score is a number which represents how credit worthy you are
considered which is based on factors such as the amount of money that you earn, your
record of paying back past debts, and how much debt you currently hold. The higher the
score the better your credit is considered, and the more likely you are to get a loan.
In order to understand how these sub prime loans have caused so many problems, we
must first understand what happened in the years leading up to the recent problems.
In the years leading up to the sub prime crisis interest rates had been at historical lows as
the fed had aggressively cut interest rates to avoid going into recession after the tech
bubble burst in 2000 and after 9/11 terrorist attack. This had the following effects:
5
FICO Score: A type of credit score that makes up a substantial portion of the credit report that lenders
use to assess an applicant's credit risk and whether to extend a loan.
FICO is an acronym for the Fair Isaac Corporation, the creators of the FICO score.
1. When interest rates are low in general it causes the economy to expand because
businesses and individuals can borrow money easily which causes them to spend
more freely and thus increases the growth of the economy.
2. What drives interest rates lower is the fact that there is an increase in the supply of
money, meaning that there is more money to go around.
Before the Fed lowered interest rates substantially after the bursting of the NASDAQ
bubble in 2000, if you wanted to get a loan for a house you had to have a relatively good
credit score. Buyers with a FICO score below 620 (generally considered sub-prime)
where in most cases considered too risky to lend to and therefore could not get a loan.
After the fed lowered interest rates to historical lows however there was so much money
(also referred to as liquidity) available that financial institutions started offering loans to
buyers with FICO score’s below 620. Because these borrowers were considered less
likely to be able to pay the loan back than borrowers with higher credit scores, these sub
prime borrowers were charged a higher interest rate.
Things initially went very well for the financial institutions that made these loans because
in the years that followed interest rates stayed low, the economy continued to grow, and
the real estate market continued to expand causing the value of most people’s houses
(including the sub-prime borrower’s houses) to go up in value pretty dramatically. This
made it relatively easy for these borrowers to make payments on their loans as if they ran
into financial trouble they in more cases than not could tap the equity in their home
(which came from the increase in the house price) to refinance at more favorable terms or
to make their mortgage payment. Because a relatively few of these sub prime borrowers
were defaulting on their loans, the financial institutions which held these loans were
enjoying the additional profits earned by charging these borrowers a higher interest rate,
without many problems. Now pause for a minute to understand why financials
institutions were ready to take the risk of giving loans to these subprime borrowers. There
were some underlying assumptions which made it possible for financial institution to take
this step.
1. The prices of house will keep on increasing. (Even Alan Greenspan, former U.S.
Federal Reserve Chairman, backed this theory)
2. The interest rate will keep on falling. (As can be seen in the figure above)
6
Home Equity Loan: Home equity loan is a type of loan which is made available based on the appreciation
of your house value. Let’s say the cost of your house at the time of buying (before two years) was $200000
and now after appraising it, the current price is $220000 then $20000 is your home equity on which you
can get a loan.
After the initial success and profitability for those offering sub prime mortgages the
practice expanded dramatically and the terms which borrowers were given in order to
allow them to obtain loans became all the more creative.
There are now many different types of sub prime loans such as:
1. Interest Only Mortgages: These loans require the borrower to pay only the interest
portion of the loan for the first few years thus keeping the payment relatively low
for the first few years before the interest only component expires and the
borrower must pay the principle and interest component of the mortgage payment
(of course a much higher amount)
2. Adjustable Rate Mortgages: Unlike traditional mortgages have a fixed interest
rate so your payment is the same each month, with an adjustable rate mortgage if
interest rates rise (as they have been recently) your monthly mortgage payment
goes up as well!
3. Low Initial Fixed Rate Mortgages: Mortgages that initially have very low fixed
rates and then quickly convert to adjustable rate mortgages.
Because house prices had increased so rapidly in the last few years many of these sub
prime borrowers took out loans that they could not afford in the anticipation that, when
the mortgage reset to the higher payment, they would be able to refinance at more
favorable rates using the increased value of their home and the equity that they now had
as a result of that. But the point to be noted here is that the lender is aware of the financial
conditions of the borrower and the financial options available to him, but the borrower
may not be aware of the same. And even if the borrower knows about all the options he
might not be able to judge which option is the best option for him. This leads to the
possibility of predatory lending.
Moral Hazards:
Moral hazard refers to changes in behavior in response to redistribution of risk. In
managing delinquent loans, the loan servicer7 is faced with a standard moral hazard
problem vis-à-vis the mortgagor. In normal course of action mortgagor pays regular
installments to the servicer. But when the property is close to foreclosure then the
mortgager has little incentive to pay for taxes and insurance. Here the servicer is working
in the investor’s best interest and needs to keep the losses to the minimum, such that after
foreclosure the sales value of the property will remain as high as possible. But the
mortgagor is least interested to maintain the property in good shape which is close to
foreclosure.
7
Loan Servicer: These are companies or divisions of companies that specialize in servicing mortgages (i.e.
collecting payments, issuing statements etc.) These companies do this in exchange for a fee which is paid
by the mortgage owner and fees which they can charge to the borrower for things such as late payments.
The ARMs are also known as teaser loans. Teaser loans are considered an aspect of
subprime lending, as they are usually offered to low-income home buyers. Unfortunately,
when these borrowers try to refinance the loan before the rate increases, most will not
qualify for standard mortgages. This leaves borrowers with increased monthly payments,
which many cannot afford. This method of loaning is considered risky, as default rates
are high.
As can be seen above these all factors contributed for the reckless borrowing and the
8
Alternative A borrowers (“Alt-A”), are just a drop below prime. For variety of reasons, they may not
be able to document there income (e.g. someone leaving a secured job and starting a business)
Lender’s Side:
One of the reasons why this is such a big problem is because so many different types of
financial firms and investors have exposure to these subprime loans. To understand how,
we must understand something which is known as securitization. Securitization in simple
terms means taking a bunch of assets, pooling them together, and offering them out as
collateral for third party investment.
Up until relatively recently when you went to get a loan for a house from a bank, they
would lend you the money and then hold your loan, earning money from the fees they
charge you to give you the loan and the interest that you pay the bank on that loan. As the
money the bank was lending out was the money that people were depositing in the bank,
the bank was limited on how many loans it could do by how much money it had on
deposit. As the bank was holding all of the loans on its books so to speak it also held all
the risk for those loans.
As a way of diversifying risk and allowing the banks to make more loans (thus earn more
fees) investment bankers came up with a process for securitizing mortgages so they could
be sold off to other financial institutions and investors in a secondary market.
Securitization Process:
Securitization is the transformation of an illiquid asset into a security. For example, a
group of consumer loans can be transformed into a publicly-issued debt security.
The overview of the securitization process is shown above. One of the prime reasons for
the subprime crisis is the complicated procedures developed over the years for issuing
loans. The new and complex methods for generating the loan were made all the more
risky than these were traditionally.
As can be seen in the figure above, in traditional loan life cycle, the key entities were the
lender and borrower. The key loan processes were loan origination, loan servicing and
collections and the loan remained for entire life cycle on the books of the lender. The life
cycle is sometimes referred to as originate-and-hold approach. The credit risk
measurement is applied during loan origination for measuring the credit-worthiness of
borrower.
With the growth of the securitization market or the market for the pool of loans or
mortgage backed securities, this model changed introducing a third entity – the pooling
underwriter. The pooling underwriter is normally a separate financial institution that
builds a Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) like CDOs that are securitized by loans. The
use of SPVs allows the loans to be removed from the books. The pooling underwriter
breaks the instrument into various tranches (meaning slice in French) – each tranches
representing a pool of loan with similar exposure. These tranches are then sold to third
party, the investor, for immediate cash. This also benefits the lender in another critical
way – helps lender transfer its credit risk. This life cycle is also known as originate-and-
distribute approach. In this approach, credit risk measurement is now applied at two
levels: at origination during the underwriting process of loan and the pooling process
when the risk measurement has to be applied to calculate the risk of each tranche. This
can be better understood with the help of an example.
Let’s start with a $100 portfolio of ABS bonds which yield 7%. This is called the
collateral portfolio. The collateral portfolio has an average rating of BBB. In order to
fund the purchase of this portfolio, 5 different securities are sold. The amount, credit
rating and interest rate of the first four are as follows.
These are called the debt tranches. Some of you may notice that those yields for Class C
and D are far in excess of what typical bonds with similar ratings yield.
The fifth security sold is the equity tranche which is generally retained rather than getting
sold as it gives higher returns. Here equity branch is another $5.
Why are the tranches rated differently? Because interest and principal are paid
sequentially starting with Class A and ending with the equity tranche. Only once Class A
has been paid what its due does Class B get paid, and so on.
So our portfolio of bonds pays $7 per year in interest. The CDO then owes interest on the
debt it sold:
Class A: $4.13
Class B: $0.58
Class C: $0.36
Class D: $0.45
That makes a total of $5.52. So there is $1.48 left over. In a deal like this, the manager
probably charges around 0.20%, and there is another 0.05% for admin fees. So net of fees
there is $1.23 (Excess Spread). That passes through to the equity. Notice the return on the
equity is a quite attractive 24.6%. So equity branch turns out to be the most lucrative one
and this was the reason for changing the framework of loan process. This can be
visualized well from balance sheet CDO shown below:
So that's how it works if you have zero defaults, but of course, that's not going to happen.
Let’s say there are 30% default. So now we have a portfolio of $70 with a $4.90 yield. So
we can pay interest for class A, class B but won’t be able to pay interest thereon leading
to a big problem to originators. And look at the situation as against the previous situation.
Previously originator was getting a healthy yield of 24.6% from the whole process and
now he as zero returns against equity whereas he needs to pay for the rest unpaid from his
pocket. So in case of no default it was a fantastic investment which could have turned
sour if things go wrongs. And this is what happened.
To take it to one level further mortgage brokers were added to the system which did not
bother to check the credit history of the borrower and concentrated on lending more as
there incentives were based on volumes rather than quality of borrowing. To give as
example this thirst to get more borrowers grown to such an extent that a woman living on
social security of $1800 was having a loan of $9 million to be repaid.
There were many others involved too. Investment banks were selling these portfolios to
investors like hedge funds, pension funds, etc. But the question arises why one would buy
subprime collateral backed securities? The answer to that lies in tranches as mentioned
above. One more entity involved in this securitization process was rating agencies. The
mortgage backed securities were divided into tranches as –
Senior tranche
Subordinate tranche (Mezzanine tranche)
Equity tranche
Now what is the point in dividing collaterals in this way? Senior tranches were the ones
which were paid interest first from the underlying mortgage payments then subordinate
and finally the equity. This way senior tranches were made secured through this process
because senior tranches will default only if both equity and subordinate tranches default.
So this way the credit risk of senior tranche was reduced. This tranches also served the
purpose of fulfilling the appetite of investors having different ability and willingness to
handle risk. So senior tranche will provide low yield with low credit risk and subordinate
will provide higher yield for higher risk. These tranches can again be subdivided into
many levels. Now where do credit rating agencies come into picture? Credit rating
agencies were the ones which used to provide rating to these tranches (AAA/AA for
senior tranches, A/BBB for subordinate tranches). So this way BBB rated subprime
mortgages could be made investment grade instruments. Again these credit agencies were
paid by the investment bankers who were doing the securitization so there were enough
incentives to make those securities investment grade securities (conflict of interest).
Adverse Selection:
There is an important information asymmetry between the arranger (like Lehman
Brothers) and the third-parties (like hedge funds or Moody’s) concerning the quality of
mortgage loans. As the arranger is having more information about the quality of the
mortgages, arranger can securitize the bad loans (lemons) and can keep the good ones.
Also in case of credit rating agencies, their opinion is vulnerable to the lemons problem
as the arranger still knows more than credit rating agencies and credit rating agencies
only conduct limited due diligence.
Moral Hazards:
The servicer can have a significantly positive or negative effect on the losses realized
from the mortgage pool. This impact of servicer quality on losses has important
implications for both investors and credit rating agencies. Investor wants to minimize the
losses whereas credit rating agencies wants to minimize the uncertainty about the losses
to make accurate opinion.
The servicing fee is a flat percentage of the outstanding principal balance of mortgage
loans. So servicer always has an incentive to keep the mortgage on his book as long as
possible. Due to this servicer will try for modifying the terms of delinquent loans and will
try to defer the foreclosure. Second problem here is that in the event of foreclosure the
servicer has to pay all the expenses till the property gets liquidated and then these
expenses are reimbursed. So servicer tries to inflate the expenses in good times when the
recovery rates for the property are high.
Different effects of subprime crisis, indicating its reach and perforation, on the number of
bankruptcy filings, fed bailouts and various write downs are indicated in Appendix B.
Now after learning about the causes of subprime crisis it is clear that the crisis was
originated and caused by the flaws in US mortgage market, the securitization of
mortgages, etc. But there was one more factor involved in subprime crisis which had a
cascading effect, which is Credit Default Swaps. We will understand about the role of
these CDSs in next chapter.
Source:YieldCurve.com
We learnt about the securitization process in which the collateral of borrowings was
pooled and tranches at different levels were created. The subprime crisis is the unraveling
of a stupendously leveraged speculative bubble on real estate that built itself up for about
seven years from the beginning of this decade (and century); this speculative bubble was
mediated by fancy financial instruments fashioned by Wall Street, running all the way
from sub-prime mortgages, asset backed securities (ABS) and mortgage backed securities
(MBS), collateralized debt obligations (CDO) to credit default swaps (CDS).
Let’s understand with real life example to know where exactly CDS fits in. Suppose you
take a loan from Countrywide Financial (the largest US mortgage lender) for purchasing
a house. Many such loans are collateralized, put into many tranches, rated by Moody’s as
investment grade securities and bought by Lehman Brothers. Now Lehman Brothers sells
these securities to some of the hedge funds like JPMorgan Asset Management. For that
Lehman needs to convince about the credit-worthiness of the securities. This is done in
two ways: one with tranches and their high ratings. The other is by insuring the
underlying securities. And this can be done with the help of CDSs. These securities can
be insured from AIG making CDS contracts. Now these securities backed by insurance
can be sold again & again and the chain continues. In this way there can be many CDS
contracts on the same underlying assets. Even CDS contracts could be used for un-
hedged betting purpose (naked/leveraged CDSs) also which constitutes the large part of
CDS market in subprime crisis. Now look at the gravity of situation today, Countrywide
Financial was acquired by Bank of America in October 2008, Lehman Brothers went
bankrupt on 15th September 2008 (largest bankruptcy in the history of USA), AIG was
provided a government aid of $85 billion and there are many other companies which
made CDSs as buyer or seller and are in deep trouble as there are not enough funds to
realize these contracts9. This clearly indicates how severely the market was interlinked
and perforated.
9
Note: CDS contracts are not the cause for the debacle of these companies. CDSs just had the cascading
effect on the already sinking ships.
problem with naked CDS was that the protection seller need not have to allocate
collateral for fulfilling the contract. That means when AIG is insuring a contract worth
$10 million then it does not need to maintain collateral worth $10 million to get into
contract as long as it maintains AAA rating. That means it can have CDS contracts worth
billions of dollars without even bothering to have that much of funds. So when the
delinquencies increased as shown in the figure there were many contracts which
remained unfulfilled as there were not enough funds to fulfill the same.
The figures above indicate CDS has become a huge market with potential risks as it is an
OTC market. Let’s now understand what the disadvantages of OTC market are –
1. Prior to entering the contract, the parties must assess each others creditworthiness.
This adds an element of cost to the transaction and also implies a certain amount
of risk. Institutions with small balance sheets are often considered to be too high a
credit-risk for the major banks and are therefore excluded from the market, or
receive less favorable pricing than bigger companies.
2. Parties to a contract are not able to sell their contractual obligation to a third party.
Once a contract has been entered into, the only way that a party can get out of its
obligation is by way of early settlement of the contract (if this is catered for) or to
default.
3. OTC market is a dealer market where the dealers act as market makers.
4. The contract is not valued by an independent valuation agent. This means that
each party to the contract may attach its own value to the derivative position. It is
not uncommon for two parties to assign vastly different value to the same OTC
contract - a nightmare for auditors and a practice that has resulted in several cases
of fraud.
Due to these disadvantages a need for the central counterparty (CCP) was highlighted.
And post subprime crisis the CDS clearing was allowed to be done through CCP like
IntercontinentalExchange (ICE). Now before understanding the CCP clearing let’s first
understand about the various credit indices used.
Benefits:
Tradability: Credit indices can be traded and priced more easily
Liquidity: Significant liquidity is available in indices and has also driven more
liquidity in the single name market
Operational Efficiency: Standardized terms, legal documentation, electronic
straight-through processing
Transaction Costs: Cost efficient means to trade portions of the market
Industry Support: Credit indices are supported by all major dealer banks, buy-side
investment firms, and third parties
Transparency: Rules, constituents, fixed coupon, daily prices are all available
publicly
There are currently two main families of CDS indices: CDX and iTraxx. CDX indices
contain North American and Emerging Market companies and are administered by CDS
Index Company (CDSIndexCo) and marketed by Markit Group Limited, and iTraxx
contain companies from the rest of the world and are managed by the International Index
Company (IIC), also owned by Markit. The current set of CDX/ iTraxx indices can be
divided into North America – Investment Grade, North America – High Yield and
Crossover, Emerging Markets, Europe and Asia.
The composition of the new indices is chosen by participating dealers based on the
liquidity of individual contracts, i.e. the most actively traded names are included. The
compositions of the indices are changed every six months, a process known as "rolling"
the index. These indices are tradable instruments in their own right, with pre-determined
fixed rates, and the prices set by market demand.
that participants in OTC market use to manage the counterparty risk, to identify any
weaknesses in practices that appear to worsen the counterparty risk and to consider
changes needed in practices to mitigate those risks. The committees come up with the
following recommendations10 –
10
The recommendations are reproduced from “OTC Derivatives: Settlement Procedures And Counterparty
Risk Management” - Report by the CPSS & ECSC of the central banks of the Group of Ten countries
After understanding the various methods adopted in OTC market to estimate the risk and
the various measures taken to mitigate that risk we will now understand about the current
measures being taken to cope up with the issues associated with the nature of CDS
contracts. There were fundamental changes that happened recently in CDS market due to
subprime crisis. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers made reducing systemic risks in
credit derivatives a priority for Wall Street.
“Since then, the industry has pushed through 10 years worth of changes in just a few
months,” said Athanassios Diplas, managing director at Deutsche Bank. “This is a
complete transformation of the CDS industry.”
The changes:
In response to pressure from regulators, dealers in the CDS market are proposing three
key changes to the way the CDS market operates.
offsetting trades, since they would now have only single counterparty. It is
important to note that this would not be a trading platform or exchange.
Hardwiring the auction protocol: it would become compulsory to cash settle credit
events via an auction process, and physical settlement by delivering bonds outside
of the auction process would no longer be allowed. This will affect existing
contracts as well as new ones.
ISDA Determination Committee: a committee of eight global CDS dealers, two
regional CDS dealers for each region, and five non-dealers would decide if and
when credit events and succession events had occurred and which bonds could be
delivered into an auction. These decisions would be legally binding on all market
participants. A pool of five legal firms would resolve any disputes.
when contracts are signed and when contract prices change. This is the central
counterparty’s first line of defense. In special situations, additional financial resources
may also be required. To reduce losses when a participant defaults on its obligations the
CCP must have procedures that ensure rapid closing or safeguarding of positions.
Risk is reduced when a CCP of high quality replaces counterparties of variable quality.
The existence of CCPs that operate in accordance with high quality standards is in the
interest of securities market participants. Due to the potential centralization of risk in
CCPs, these institutions are subject to government requirements concerning authorization
and supervision. The use of central counterparties may also increase the liquidity in the
market concerned as well as reduce the need for liquidity in connection with settlements.
If a central counterparty is unable to fulfill its obligations, its activities will be terminated
for a shorter or longer period. The significance of this for financial stability depends on
the direct and indirect importance of the market concerned as well as the possibility of
clearing and settlement through alternative channels. Another risk is reputation risk,
where market participants facing a weak central counterparty question the quality of the
other parts of the financial infrastructure. It is, therefore, important to have efficient, safe
clearing and settlement systems, including central counterparties that are organized in
such a way that risk is limited.
After understanding what CCP does and how it could be beneficial to reduce the
counterparty default it makes sense why SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission)
promptly granted an exemption for the ICE (IntercontinentalExchange) to begin
guaranteeing CDS as CCP. Also the International Swaps and Derivatives Association,
Inc. (ISDA) on 19th February 2009 announced that major industry participants have
committed to the use of central counterparty clearing for CDS in the European Union
(EU). Nine of the leading dealer firms in the CDS industry have signed a letter to
European Commissioner, Charlie McCreevy, confirming their engagement to use EU-
based central clearing for eligible EU CDS contracts by end-July, 2009. The co-
signatories of the letter are: Barclays Capital, Citigroup Global Markets, Credit Suisse,
Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, J.P. Morgan, Morgan Stanley and UBS. As can
be seen from the table most of the big players in CDS market are ready for central
counterparty clearing. Also Bank of America, Barclays Capital, Citigroup, Credit Suisse,
Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley and UBS
have supported the establishment of the clearing house for CDS transactions, and are the
initial clearing members of ICE Trust. The early months of 2009 saw several fundamental
changes to the way CDSs operate, resulting from concerns over the instruments' safety
after the events of the previous year.
Even though the efforts are made to move the CDS market towards CCP clearing there
are still bilateral contracts existing in the market. As the confidence in CCP clearing will
enhance and the firms will be convinced of the benefits of CCP clearing, the footprint of
CCP clearing will increase significantly. But what is to done about the existing CDSs of
the firms? When a credit event occurs on a major company on which a lot of CDS
contracts are written, an auction (also known as a credit-fixing event) may be held to
facilitate settlement of a large number of contracts at once, at a fixed cash settlement
price. This Auction process is explained in detail in the next chapter.
CDS Auction
The rapid growth of the credit default swap (CDS) market and the increased number of
defaults in recent years have led to major changes in the way CDS contracts are settled
when default occurs. Auctions are increasingly the mechanism used to settle these
contracts, replacing physical transfers of defaulted bonds between CDS sellers and
buyers.
But the rapid development of the CDS market has led to a situation where some entities
have more CDS protection on them than there are actual bonds. This is because, while the
CDS buyer may desire to pay a premium to insure the value of the bond he owns, there is
no requirement that he own the bond. For example, the Depository Trust and Clearing
Corporation (DTCC), which collect data on a large fraction of the CDS market, recently
reported that the notional value of CDS contracts on General Motors’ debt summed to
$65 billion, which is about $20 billion more than the face value of the debt owed by GM.
Many of the CDS contracts were not purchased by debt investors but by other investors,
who may have purchased GM’s stock (and hedged the default risk with the CDS) or who
hold strong views on GM’s ability to repay its debt11. The disconnect between the size of
claims owed by the defaulting corporation and the aggregate notional value of CDS
contracts covering the firm’s obligations complicates the way in which CDS claims are
settled.
11
GM filed for bankruptcy protection on 1 st June 2009. The auction for GM happened on 12 th June and
18th June was the auction settlement date. The final settlement price was 12.5%.
With the CDS outstanding greater by multiples than the volume of bonds issued, the
bonds would have to be “recycled” a number of times through the market to settle all the
CDS trades. Investors recognizing this would rush to source bonds, artificially raising the
price of the bonds higher than the expected recovery value, and increasing the volatility
of the bonds post-default, which is undesirable for a number of reasons.
Cash settlement was widely regarded to be the best alternative, but unlike the basic
mechanism already in place for CDS contracts, a mechanism was required to set a
transparent, trustworthy price the whole market could use.
The answer the market came up with was credit event auctions. The benefit of auctions to
settle CDS contracts is to allow for more transparency in the process giving everyone an
equal opportunity to participate.
Another benefit of the auction is the setting of a market-wide price. The use of the same
price to settle all trades across the market eliminates basis risk for investors. For example
an investor with hedged positions, e.g. index Vs single-name, or tranche Vs index, may
have physically settled at different times, and sourced/sold bonds at different times to
settle their trades.
All of the actual CDS trades in the auction are cash settled. The physical settlement
segment is made up by trading the underlying cash obligation so that the net payment to a
protection buyer adds up to par and they also get the equivalent par amount of obligations
off of their books.
As an example, consider a $10m long protection investor. Assuming a 40% recovery rate,
they would be compensated 60% of par ($6m in this case), and sell $10m par of
bonds/loans. As the bond/loan trades in the auctions take place at the final price, they
receive $4m for the bonds/loans, in total receiving $10m, and pass off $10m par of
bonds/loans to a buyer in the auction.
Protection sellers would make requests to buy bonds/loans in the auction (as normally
they would be delivered bonds/loans in physical settlement). Investors wishing to cash
settle do not make a physical settlement request and simply cash settle their trade. Hence,
the investor’s net position after auction settlement is the same as their position after
physical settlement.
Note physical settlement requests are constrained by the investor’s derivative position –
the request an investor can make is between zero and the amount of bonds/loans they
would trade to fully physical settle their position. As an example a $10m long protection
buyer can only submit a sell request between 0 and $10m face value of underlying. They
cannot make a buy request as they would never be delivered bonds to settle their trade.
The dealer markets submitted are used to create an ‘inside market midpoint’ (IMM)
which is used in the second stage of the auction to constrain the final price. The ‘inside
market midpoint’ is set by discarding crossing/touching markets, and taking the ‘best
half’ of the bids and offers and calculating the average. The best half would be,
respectively, the highest bids, and the lowest offers.
The second step in this section is to sum the buy and sell physical settlement requests,
and tally the difference to determine the “open interest” (difference between the
aggregate buy and sell requests). This open interest to buy or sell bonds/loans is carried
into the second stage of the auction.
There is also a possible penalty in place for submissions that are off-market. If a dealer
supplies a bid or offer that is the wrong side of the inside market midpoint (e.g. a bid that
is higher than the IMM), and the open interest suggests it shouldn’t be (e.g. if a bid is
higher than the IMM, and the open interest is to sell suggesting the price should go down
so they shouldn’t be bidding high), then the dealer in question has to pay the quotation
amount times the amount that their price differed from the IMM. This amount is termed
an ‘Adjustment Amount’. This is not paid if the bid or offer in question did not cross with
any other offer or bid respectively. Adjustment amount is used to cover the costs
associated with the auction process and the remaining amount is distributed pro-rata to
the participating bidders.
If the open interest is to buy, we review the lowest ‘sell’ limit order submitted and match
it to the amount of open interest that is equivalent to the size associated with the limit
order. If the open interest was to sell, we use ‘buy’ limit orders and start at the highest.
As the open interest direction is published prior to the second stage, only limit orders of
the relevant type are gathered and submitted for the second part of the auction.
We then take the next lowest order (in the case of buy open interest) and match that. We
continue to run through this process until we have matched all the open interest, or run
out of limit orders. In the case of the former, the last limit order used to match against the
open interest is the final price.
At this point the ‘inside market midpoint’ is reviewed and checked against the price of
the last limit order used to match the open interest. If the final limit order is more than the
‘cap’ amount (typically 1% of par) higher (in case of sell open interest) or lower (in the
case of buy open interest) than the inside market midpoint, the final price will be set to be
the inside market midpoint plus or minus the cap respectively. This is to avoid a large
limit order being submitted off-market to try and manipulate the results, particularly in
the case of a small open interest.
To understand the process in a better way, refer to the Lehman Brother’s auction process
explained in the Appendix C.
Adherence to ISDA policies is voluntary among the contracting parties; however, there is
an understanding among the financial markets that ISDA continuously stays on top of all
derivative issues and attempts to incorporate these issues into policy and advice for
structuring agreements. Hence, most derivative deals utilize ISDA Master Agreements
and Definitions.
12
ISDA Mission statement More information on http://www.isda.org/
http://www.bba.org.uk/bba/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=341
http://www.dtcc.com/products/derivserv/data/index.php
Apart from these there are many other data sources like Credit Derivatives Research
LLC, Bloomberg, Markit, etc. The credit rating agencies like Fitch Ratings, Standard &
Poor’s, and Moodys also provide data on CDSs.
One way of addressing this risk in chains of trades is a service called TriOptima13, which
takes trades from multiple counterparties simultaneously and reduces chains to their end
counterparties and eliminates the circle completely. As shown above the trade between A
through E gets reduced to trade between A & E, of course by the consent of all the
parties. During 2008, TriOptima eliminated USD30.2tn of CDS notional trades
(TriOptima press release, 12 January 2009) and USD5.5tn in first quarter of 2009
(TriOptima press release, 8 April 2009).
13
TriOptima is an international financial technology company that is solving some of the most challenging
post-trade processing problems in the OTC derivatives market.
terms, the two contracts would cancel out and you would end up with no outstanding
contracts, rather than two separate contracts. This would eliminate the vast majority of
counterparty risk.
Of course, all trades between counterparty and the central counterparty would be
collateralized and subject to daily margining as the mark-to-market of those trades
moved. It is likely that the central counterparty would demand initial margin as well.
There are four firms either trying or has been successful to set up a central counterparty
for CDS. They are –
ICE Trust
NYSE Euronext & LCH.Clearnet SA
CME Group Inc./ Citadel Investment Group (CMDX)
Eurex AG.
IntercontinentalExchange Trust:
ICE Trust is a limited purpose bank that serves as a central clearing facility for credit
default swaps (CDS). Although it is an ICE subsidiary, ICE Trust membership, Board of
Directors, officers and operating staff are separate from ICE's other exchange, clearing
house and brokerage operations.
ICE Trust's clearing services are provided by The Clearing Corporation (TCC). TCC was
acquired by ICE on March 6, 2009. ICE Trust has also entered into an agreement with
Markit to produce daily pricing data required for mark-to-market pricing, margining and
clearing.
CDS Clearing:
ICE Trust is designed to accommodate the clearing of all North American CDS indices,
initially focusing on the most active indices. ICE Trust has surpassed $1 trillion in
cleared credit default swaps (CDS) since operations began on March 9, 2009. ICE Trust
also set a weekly clearing record of $247 billion in notional value for the week ending
June 12, on transaction volume of 2,330 contracts. Since launch, the total number of
transactions cleared is 12,050 [data till 15 June 2009]. ICE Trust offers open architecture
connectivity and interoperability model. It has integration and co-existence with other
elements of CDS processing infrastructure, including DTCC Trade Information
Warehouse (TIW) and buy-side access to independent warehouse record.
On December 22, 2008, in partnership with derivatives exchange NYSE Euronext Liffe,
LCH.Clearnet launched a clearing service for Markit iTraxx Europe CDS indices in UK
on Bclear. With this launch Liffe became the first exchange to offer clearing of CDS
contracts.
CME Clearing’s margin framework and methodology has been tested and
validated on a variety of portfolios and across a wide range of stress scenarios.
CMDX is the only one which includes a clearing house and an electronic
execution platform.
Criticism:
As CME plans to use its existing clearing house to clear CDS there are concerns like
mixing the funds will jeopardize the entire financial system as per Thomas Peterffy of
Interactive Brokers Group Inc. The same concern has shared by GME group members
including Penson GHCO Chief Executive Officer Chris Hehmeyer (Source: Bloomberg).
Eurex AG:
Eurex Credit Clear is the Eurex Clearing’s European OTC clearing solution for CDS
(European index and single name CDS) which is currently in simulation phase making it
available to future credit clear members for testing of workflow and risk processing.
Eurex clear is expected to start clearing their European index and single name CDS
Minimum duration between the novation date and scheduled termination date is
greater than specified duration.
Clearing member has sufficient collateral to clear the trade, etc.
Trade Lifecycle:
DTCC submits the trade for OTC CDS clearing to the respective clearing houses
if flagged accordingly.
The clearing house will calculate the margin required and check for margin and
collateral for its sufficiency.
If the collateral is sufficient then clearing house will perform the process of
novation. In the process it will act on behalf of clearing member and will
terminate the original trade to create two new trades with CCP acting as seller to
buyer and buyer to seller. This termination and new trade entry will be sent to
DTCC Deriv/SERV where this will get reflected in TIW.
The netting advantage will be provided by the clearing house to the requested
clearing members.
In case of credit event DTCC “Determination Committee” declares credit event
and will decide whether to hold the auction or not.
If the auction is held the auction price will be applicable to all the CCP
transactions and will be used to determine the cash settlement amount. Future
fixed coupon payments will be adjusted. Affected index trades will be adjusted.
Reconciliation for calculated cash amounts and affected trades between DTCC
records and clearing house records will be performed.
Pricing
Almost all the clearing houses use Markit CDS pricing information. CCP will provide
Markit with details of cleared product with open interest by clearing participant. Markit
provides the proposed settlement prices, matched interest trades, and raw EOD price
quotes. Markit will receive clearing participant’s intraday price runs. And also will be
furnished with official EOD settlement prices.
Apart from Markit pricing Eurex Clearing also plans to have their own Eurex clearing
pricing team which will be collecting data from members (quotes, traded levels & EOD
pricing), data extracted from various data vendors, cross checking with different sources,
having a time series check (comparing current spread with the past time series) and if no
satisfying data is available obtaining theoretical quote to obtain the CDS spread.
and is highly dealer based. CCP will be serving dealers and with insufficient number of
dealers the model is not supposed to give expected results. He suggest the proposed CCPs
are only supposed to provide clearing for simple CDS contracts but many of the contracts
are complicated to be cleared by CCPs. He suggests having a common CCP across the
multiple OTC products to improve multilateral netting. He is also against the idea of
having multiple CCPs for CDS market both in Europe and US. Rather he supports the
usage of single CCP across US and EU resulting in better multilateral netting.
But there are different thoughts which go against the opinions of Duffie and Zhu. There is
a strong belief that having multiple CCPs gives a choice of freedom and also forces the
CCPs to compete with each other. Also a single monopolistic CCP may not be preferred
from a risk concentration point of view. All CCPs are planning to add different products
lined up for the future releases to have central clearing. And as mentioned earlier having
a single CCP for many OTC products can jeopardize the financial system as the
mechanisms for various products are different and the risk associated with it is also
different to judge.
Conclusion:
The acceptance of ICE acting as CCP has proved the need for the CCPs. And the
regulators have always backed the need for the CCPs. So even with criticisms CCPs have
found a place in the market. Having an economic interest in ICE has hampered the
development of NYSE Euronext acting as CCP which has even been accepted by NYSE
Euronext officials. Due to these internal economic issues the operation of NYSE
Euronext is yet to pick up and with the resolution of issues market for NYSE Euronext
will pick up. Now with this background it will be interesting to see how market accepts
CME Groups and Eurex AG as CCPs.
But with the successful launch of CCPs and with ICE surpassing the 1 trillion mark one
can say the CCPs are going to be there settling CDS contracts. And having a support
from regulators and dealers is an added benefit.
Credit derivatives would help resolve these issues. Banks and the financial institutions
derive four main benefits from credit derivatives, namely:
Credit derivatives allow banks to transfer credit risk and hence free up capital,
which can be used in productive opportunities.
Banks can conduct business on existing client relationships in excess of exposure
norms and transfer away the risks.
Banks can construct and manage a credit risk portfolio of their own choice and
risk appetite unconstrained by funds, distribution and sales effort. Banks can
acquire exposure to, and returns on, an asset or a portfolio of assets by simply
writing a credit protection.
Credit risk would be diversified – from banks/FIs alone to other players in the
financial markets and lead to financial stability.
Apart from above mentioned benefits credit derivatives also provides better liquidity than
the existing mechanisms of managing the risks like insurance, guarantee, securitization,
etc. It also allows financial intermediaries to gain access to high gain portfolios.
Minimum Conditions:
As per Report of the Working Group on Introduction of Credit Derivatives in India by
Department of Banking Operations and Development the bank should fulfill minimum
conditions relating to risk management processes and that the credit derivative should be
direct, explicit, irrevocable and unconditional. These conditions are explained below.
Direct: The credit protection must represent a direct claim on the protection
provider.
Explicit: The credit protection must be linked to specific exposures, so that the
extent of the cover is clearly defined and incontrovertible.
Irrevocable: Other than a protection purchaser’s non-payment of money due in
respect of the credit protection contract, there must be no clause in the contract
that would allow the protection provider unilaterally to cancel the credit cover.
Participants allowed:
Protection Buyers:
Commercial banks and Primary dealers
A protection buyer shall have an underlying credit risk exposure in the form of
permissible underlying asset / obligation
Protection Sellers:
Commercial banks and Primary dealers
RBI will consider allowing insurance companies and mutual funds as protection buyer or
protection seller as and when their respective regulators permit them to transact in credit
default swaps.
Product Requirements:
Structure: A CDS may be used –
By the eligible protection buyers, for buying protection on specified loans and
advances, or investments where the protection buyer has a credit risk exposure.
By the eligible protection sellers, for selling protection on specified loans and
advances, or investments on which the protection buyer has a credit risk exposure.
Settlement Methods:
Physical Settlement
Cash Settlement
Fixed Amount Settlement (binary CDS)
Documentation:
1992 or 2002 ISDA Master Agreement compliance.
2003 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions and subsequent supplements to
definitions compliance.
Documenting the establishment of the legal enforceability of the contracts in all
relevant jurisdictions before undertaking CDS transactions.
Credit Events:
Bankruptcy
Obligation Acceleration
Obligation Default
Failure to pay
Repudiation/ Moratorium
Restructuring
Minimum Requirements:
A CDS contract must represent a direct claim on the protection seller and must be
explicitly referenced to specific exposures of the protection buyer, so that the
extent of the cover is clearly defined and indisputable. It must be irrevocable.
The CDS contract shall not have any clause that could prevent the protection
seller from making the credit event payment in a timely manner after occurrence
of the credit event and completion of necessary formalities in terms of the
contract.
The protection seller shall have no recourse to the protection buyer for losses.
The credit events specified in the CDS contract shall contain as wide a range of
triggers as possible with a view to adequately cover the credit risk in the
underlying / reference asset and, at a minimum, cover –
o Failure to pay
o Bankruptcy, insolvency or inability of the obligor to pay its debts
o Restructuring of the underlying obligation involving forgiveness or
postponement of principal, interest or fees that results in a credit loss event
CDS contracts must have a clearly specified period for obtaining post-credit-event
valuations of the reference asset, typically no more than 30 days
The credit protection must be legally enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions
The underlying asset/ obligation shall have equal seniority with, or greater
seniority than, the reference asset/ obligation.
The protection buyer must have the right/ability to transfer the reference/
deliverable asset/ obligation to the protection seller, if required for settlement (in
case of physical settlement).
The credit risk transfer should not contravene any terms and conditions relating to
the reference / deliverable / underlying asset / obligation and where necessary all
consents should have been obtained.
The credit derivative shall not terminate prior to expiration of any grace period
required for a default on the underlying obligation to occur as a result of a failure
to pay. The grace period in the credit derivative contract must not be longer than
the grace period agreed upon under the loan agreement.
The identity of the parties responsible for determining whether a credit event has
occurred must be clearly defined. This determination must not be the sole
responsibility of the protection seller. The protection buyer must have the
right/ability to inform the protection seller of the occurrence of a credit event.
Where there is an asset mismatch between the underlying asset/ obligation and the
reference asset/ obligation then:
o The reference and underlying assets/ obligations must be issued by the
same obligor (i.e. the same legal entity)
o The reference asset must rank pari passu or more junior than the
underlying asset/ obligation; and
o There are legally effective cross-reference clauses between the reference
asset and the underlying asset.
Risk Management:
Banks should consider carefully all related risks and rewards before entering the
credit derivatives market. They should not enter into such transaction unless their
management has the ability to understand and manage properly the credit and
other risks associated with these instruments. They should establish sound risk
management policy and procedures integrated into their overall risk management.
Banks which are protection buyers should periodically assess the ability of the
protection sellers to make the credit event payment as and when they may fall
due. The results of such assessments should be used to review the counterparty
limits.
Banks should be aware of the potential legal risk arising from an unenforceable
contract, e.g. due to inadequate documentation, lack of authority for a
counterparty to enter into the contract, etc.
The credit derivatives activity to be undertaken by bank should be under the
adequate oversight of its Board of Directors and senior management (via a copy
of a resolution passed by their Board of Directors or via adequate MIS).
Now after understanding the need for credit derivatives and the draft guidelines provided
by RBI we will now understand the possible settlement procedures to be adopted for CDS
contracts.
Role of CCIL:
The Clearing Corporation of India (CCIL) was set up with the prime objective to improve
efficiency in the transaction settlement process, insulate the financial system from shocks
emanating from operations related issues, and to undertake other related activities that
would help to broaden and deepen the Money, Gilts and Forex markets in India. The role
of CCIL is unique as it provides settlement of three different products under one
umbrella. It has been instrumental in setting up and running electronic trading platforms
like NDS-OM, NDS-Call and NDS-Auction system for the central bank that had helped
the Indian market to evolve and grow immensely. It had also immensely bolstered CCIL's
image in terms of ability to provide transparent, efficient, robust and cost effective end to
end solutions to market participants in various markets. The introduction of ClearCorp14
Repo Order Matching System (CROMS), an anonymous Repo trading platform, has also
changed the trading pattern in Repo market i.e. shifting of interest from specific security
to basket of securities. The success of its money market product 'CBLO' has helped the
market participants as well as RBI to find a solution to unusual dependence on
uncollateralized call market. The total settlement volume during 2009-10 in government
securities, forex market and CBLO stood at Rs.14934 billion, Rs.25424 billion, and
Rs.20433 billion respectively.
The CCIL already has the necessary infrastructure for the settlement of OTC products
like interest rate swaps and forward rate agreement. CCIL already has a trade reporting
platform for IRS which provides non-guaranteed settlement for the reported trades. Now
CCIL is moving towards the guaranteed settlement of IRS which will involve trade
matching, initial and MTM margining, exposure check, novation, multilateral netting,
default handling etc. On this backdrop one can say CCIL is well equipped with all its
experience to act as central counterparty for the settlement of CDS contracts.
14
Clearcorp Dealing Systems (India) Limited (Clearcorp), a wholly owned subsidiary of CCIL, was
incorporated in June, 2003 to facilitate, set up and carry on the business of providing dealing
systems/platform in Collateralized Borrowing and Lending Obligation (CBLO), Repos and all money
market instruments of any kind and also in foreign exchange, foreign currencies of all kinds.
But before the introduction of CDS contracts in India, there are some issues that need to
be handled for the effective CDS market. Those are –
Although RBI has allowed insurance companies and mutual funds as protection
buyer or protection seller, the permission of respective regulators needs to be
addressed quickly before making CDS market open. Otherwise it may obstruct the
stipulated expeditious growth of the CDS in India and will also defeat the purpose
of CDS, i.e., to maximize the number of participants in the market and transmit
the credit risk from the banking system to other risk seeking financial entities.
As per the draft guidelines provided by RBI restructuring is considered as a credit
event which has created many legal disputes in the global CDS market.
Considering the complexities associated with the restructuring, restructuring as a
credit event has been removed from North American CDS contracts. So more
clear information on restructuring as credit event is required.
As CDS contract in India is only allowed if the protection buyer bears the loss
making it similar to insurance. Considering this close proximity of CDS contract
with that of insurance contract, CDS contract should be made to be out of the
purview of regulations of insurance contract making it incontrovertible.
Although CDS has helped in perforation of subprime crisis which has created negative
vibes about CDS but CDS as in instrument is very effective means of hedging your risk.
And in India it is expected to provide the needed push to the corporate bond market. So it
won’t be long for the CDS market to pick up in India.
Conclusion
When JPMorgan created CDS they never must have thought that the same will bring
them the write downs worth $5.5 billions. When CDS were launched they were meant to
separate the risk and providing new avenues of generating business/profit. But during the
evolution of CDS it turned to many complex products which were difficult to understand
even for those dealing in it. Being an OTC market many problems did not came to fore.
Once the market reached a huge volume the problems became eminent.
The efforts are being taken to bring in more regulation to CDS market and to preserve its
credibility. After all the products were never bad it’s just that the users were incompetent.
Many of the auctions are conducted by ISDA, the determination committee has resolved
the legal conflicts to a great deal, the central counterparties have already started their
operations and gaining good response. With many other CCPs to follow the transparency,
price discovery, liquidity will improve.
With the feedback being asked for by RBI on the launch of CDS to the banks, India is all
poised to introduce CDS. The lessons learnt from the west will allow India to do away
with the drawbacks or the product and to exploit the advantages. So with Basel II norms
adopted by India and clearing house/ regulations to be in place, India will be launching
the CDS soon.
The west has already experienced the glory and perils of CDS. India is now set to launch
the Credit Default Swaps and for India this is just a new beginning.
Drawbacks/Limitations
The research included in this project may not be reflecting true picture as it is a secondary
data and it may have contradictory opinions or so.
Data collected and included in this research is taken from various available sources and
may not be up to date. Particularly considering the severity of the situation after subprime
crisis and the role played by CDS contracts in perforating the subprime crisis, rapid
changes are happening to bring more regulation, transparency, standardization, soundness
to the CDS market making the data used stale.
The possible settlement of CDS contracts suggested in the project can have different and
may be contradictory opinions.
Value of CDS (to the protection buyer) = PV [contingent leg] – PV [fixed (premium) leg]
In order to calculate these values, one needs information about the default probability of
the reference credit, the recovery rate in a case of default, and risk-free discount factors.
A less obvious contributing factor is the counterparty risk. For simplicity, we assume that
there is no counterparty risk. [We assume that the parties involved in the contracts do
their due diligence and are involved in the contract only when there is high credit rating
(AAA) virtually eliminating counterparty risk.]
On each payment date, the periodic payment is calculated as the annual CDS premium, S,
multiplied by di, the accrual days (expressed in a fraction of one year) between payment
dates (i.e. di S). However, this payment is only going to be made when the reference
credit has not defaulted by the payment date. So, we have to take into account the
survival probability q(t), or the probability that the reference credit has not defaulted on
the payment date. Then, using the discount factor for the particular payment date, D(ti),
the present value for this payment is D(ti)q(ti)Sdi . Summing up PVs for all these
payments, we get
N
∑ D(ti) q(ti) Sdi -- (1)
i=1
However, there is another piece in the fixed leg - the accrued premium paid up to the date
of default when default happens between the periodic payment dates. The accrued
payment can be approximated by assuming that default, if it occurs, occurs at the middle
of the interval between consecutive payment dates. Then, when the reference entity
defaults between payment date ti-1 and payment date ti, the accrued payment amount is
Sdi/2. This accrued payment has to be adjusted by the probability that the default actually
occurs in this time interval. In other words, the reference credit survived through payment
date ti-1, but NOT to next payment date, ti. This probability is given by
{q(ti-1)- q(ti)}.
Now we have both components of the fixed leg. Adding (1) and (2), we get the present
value of the fixed leg:
N N
PV [fixed leg] = ∑ D(ti) q(ti) Sdi + ∑ D(ti) {q(ti-1) - q(ti)} Sdi/2 --(3)
i=1 i=1
where,
D(ti) = Discounting Factor
q(ti) = Survival Probability
S = CDS Premium (Spread)
di = Accrual days expressed in a fraction of a year
{q(ti-1) - q(ti)} = Survival Probability till credit default event
Next, we compute the present value of the contingent leg. Assume the reference entity
defaults between payment date ti-1 and payment date ti. The protection buyer will receive
the contingent payment of (1-R), where R is the recovery rate. This payment is made only
if the reference credit defaults, and, therefore, it has to be adjusted by {q(ti-1)- q(ti)}, the
probability that the default actually occurs in this time period. Discounting each expected
payment and summing up over the term of a contract, we get
N
PV [contingent leg] = (1-R) ∑ D(ti) {q(ti-1) - q(ti)} --(4)
i=1
where,
D(ti) = Discounting Factor
R = Recovery Rate
{q(ti-1) - q(ti)} = Survival Probability till credit default event
Plugging equation (3) and (4) into the equation in the beginning, we arrive at a formula
for calculating value of a CDS transaction.
When two parties enter a CDS trade, the CDS spread is set so that the value of the swap
transaction is zero (i.e. the value of the fixed leg equals that of the contingent leg). Hence,
the following equality holds:
N N N
∑ D(ti) q(ti) Sdi + ∑ D(ti) {q(ti-1) - q(ti)} Sdi/2 = (1-R) ∑ D(ti) {q(ti-1) - q(ti)}
i=1 i=1 i=1
Given all the parameters, S, the annual premium payment is set as:
N
(1-R) ∑ D(ti) {q(ti-1) - q(ti)}
i=1
15
S=
N N
∑ D(ti) q(ti) di + ∑ D(ti) {q(ti-1) - q(ti)} di/2
i=1 i=1
Example:
Consider a 2-year CDS with quarterly premium payments. Spread is 160 bps and the
discount factors and the survival probability for each payment date are as shown below:
15
Note: Source for CDS pricing is Credit Default Swap (CDS) Primer by Nomura Fixed Income Research.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Expected Expected Expected
PV of PV of PV of
Survival Fixed Value of Default Accrued Contingent
Fixed Accrued Contingent
Discount Probability Periodic Fixed Probability Payment Payment
Month Payment Payment Payment
Factor to period Payment Payment for the (bps) (bps) at
$1M x $1M x $1M x
(%) (bps) (bps) period (%) (3)/2 x R = 40%
(4) x (1) (7) x (1) (9) x (1)
(2) x (3) (6) (1-R) x (6)
0 1 100 0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0 0
3 0.99 99.9 40 39.96 3956 0.1 0.02 1.98 6 594
6 0.98 99.6 40 39.84 3904 0.3 0.06 5.88 18 1764
9 0.97 99 40 39.60 3841 0.6 0.12 11.64 36 3492
12 0.96 98.1 40 39.24 3767 0.9 0.18 17.28 54 5184
15 0.95 97 40 38.80 3686 1.1 0.22 20.90 66 6270
18 0.94 95.8 40 38.32 3602 1.2 0.24 22.56 72 6768
21 0.93 94.5 40 37.80 3515 1.3 0.26 24.18 78 7254
24 0.92 93.2 40 37.28 3430 1.3 0.26 23.92 78 7176
Sum of PV ($) 29751 Sum of PV 128.34 Sum of PV 38502
Notional amount = $1 million
Hence, we can find the value of this CDS to the protection buyer when the spread is 160
bps per annum as:
Value of CDS (to the protection buyer) = PV [contingent leg] – PV [fixed (premium) leg]
= $38502 - $29879
= $8623 for the notional value of $1 million.
From above table we can conclude if the recovery rate drops down even further (say
30%) then the value of CDS to the protection buyer will increase and if the recovery rate
is very high (say 90%) then the value of CDS to the protection seller will be positive.
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
Series1
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
08Q 08Q
06Q1 06Q2 06Q3 06Q4 07Q1 07Q2 07Q3 07Q8 08Q1 08Q2 3 4
Series1 4,086 4,858 5,284 5,586 6,280 6,705 7,167 7,985 8,713 9,743 11,504 12,901
Due to surge in the house prices the mortgagor found it difficult to payoff their debt. This
led to the increase in individual’s bankruptcy as well as to the business bankruptcy filings
as shown in the figures.
350,000
300,000
250,000
200,000
Series1
150,000
100,000
50,000
0
06Q1 06Q2 06Q3 06Q4 07Q1 07Q2 07Q3 07Q8 08Q1 08Q2 08Q3 08Q4
Series1 112,685 150,975 165,862 177,599 187,361 203,744 211,742 218,428 236,982 266,767 280,787 288,436
Bailout Timeline:
Write-downs on the value of loans, MBS and CDOs due to the subprime
mortgage crisis
The amounts of write downs indicated and the number of countries involved could
explain better about the reach and gravity of subprime crisis.
Stage 1:
On the morning of the auction, each dealer submitted a bid price and an offer price at
which they were willing to trade the standard “quotation size” of $5 million (par value) in
eligible Lehman bonds if necessary. Each dealer also submitted a physical settlement
request to buy or sell bonds at the final auction price, for its own account and on behalf of
its customers. Prices are expressed relative to a par value of 100. A dealer’s bid and offer
price may not differ by more than 2, and the pair is referred to as the dealer’s “inside
market”. Physical settlement requests must be in the same direction as, and not in excess
of, a party’s market position.
The auction administrators sort the bids and offers in ascending order. If the highest bid is
greater than or equal to the lowest offer, both are removed from the pool, and this process
is repeated until every remaining bid is lower than every remaining offer. Then the
administrators calculate the arithmetic mean (rounded to the nearest 1/8) of the highest
50% of bids and the lowest 50% of offers (shaded above). This first-stage price is
referred to as the “inside market midpoint”, and it was equal to 9.75 in the Lehman
Brothers auction. The net sum of all physical settlement requests is referred to as the
“open interest”. In this case, it was $4.92 billion to sell.
HSBC’s bid price of 10 was higher than the inside market midpoint of 9.75, and it
crossed with offer prices from other dealers that were also 10. Furthermore, the open
interest was to sell bonds, which suggests that dealers should be bidding below the inside
market midpoint rather than above it. So HSBC had to pay a penalty (“Adjustment
Amount”) to ISDA equal to the standard quotation size times the difference between its
bid and the inside market midpoint ( $12,500).
Stage 2
If the open interest is zero, the inside market midpoint becomes the final auction
settlement price. But otherwise, a second stage is conducted in which each dealer can
submit any number of limit orders to meet a portion of the open interest at a particular
price, either for its own account or on behalf of its customers. In the Lehman auction, the
open interest was to sell bonds, so participants submitted limit orders in the form of offers
to buy. Second-stage prices are capped at 1 unit above the inside market midpoint (or 1
unit below, if the open interest is to sell) in order to avoid manipulation of the final
auction price.
In the Lehman Brother auction, participants submitted 453 offers to buy, ranging from
small offers at the cap price of 10.75 to large and very optimistic offers at a price of only
0.125. The median price was 7.5 and the median volume was $50 million. These offers
are sorted and then matched against the open interest in descending order. The price of
the final matched offer becomes the final auction settlement price. In this case, there were
second-stage limit orders summing to $4.92 billion (meeting the first-stage open interest)
at prices of 8.625 or higher, so the final settlement price was 8.625. All physical
settlements arranged in the auction were executed at this price, and all cash settlements of
CDS contracts between parties adhering to the auction protocol were executed at this
price too.
Glossary of Terms
This abbreviated glossary covers only the most commonly encountered terms.