MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R.

187167, August 16, 2011

Facts:

In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
Archipelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their
territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving
the drawing of baselines around Sabah.

In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The
requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints and
classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.

Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;
2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty
and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over those territories.

Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

Ruling:
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that regulates
conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts,
serving as geographic starting points to measure. it merely notices the international community of the
scope of our maritime space.

2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes within the
archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such,
international law norms operate.The fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both
passages does not place them in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a
customary international law, no modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.

3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it
increased the Phils.’ total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils.’ continues claim of
sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.

If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:

Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago’.

Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.

KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll breach the rules: that it should
follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.
Professional Video v. Technical Education Skills Development Authority

Facts

In 1999, TESDA sought to issue security-printed certification or ID polyvinyl or PVC cards to its trainees
who have passed the certification process.

After two failed public biddings, TESDA entered into a contract agreement with Professional Video or
PROVI, wherein the latter will provide goods and services specified in the Technical Proposal. In return,
TESDA would pay PROVI about 39.5 Million Pesos-- 30% of which will be payable 30 days after TESDA’s
receipt and acceptance of the contracted supplies, with the balance payable within 30 days after the initial
payment.

PROVI said that as of June 13, 2000, it had already delivered all items agreed upon. That includes
hundreds of thousands of pre-printed cards and a hundred thousand scannable answer sheets, among
others. PROVI alleged that of the entire payment amount agreed upon, TESDA only paid around 3.7
million, which is not even 30% of the amount.

On July 11, 2001, PROVI filed with the RTC a complaint for sum of money with damages against TESDA,
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment or garnishment. TESDA argued that
public funds cannot be the subject of garnishment, and that TESDA should be immune from suit arising
from the performance of its official function, which was to develop a national system of skills
standardization, testing and certification.

PROVI argues that TESDA can be sued because it has effectively waived its immunity when it entered
into a contract with PROVI for a commercial purpose

Issue/s

Is TESDA immune from suit even if it entered into a “commercial contract” with PROVI?

May TESDA funds be subject to garnishment?

Ruling

Yes and no.

The Court held that as an unincorporated instrumentality of the government, directly attached to the
DOLE through the participation of the Secretary of Labor as its Chairman, TESDA is an agency of the
State, and cannot therefore be sued without its consent. This is embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the
1987 Constitution and has been an established principle that antedates this Constitution.

TESDA’s funds are public in character, hence exempt from attachment or garnishment.
Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary contract with PROVI and thereby gave its implied
consent to be sued, TESDA’s funds are still public in nature and, thus, cannot be the valid subject of a writ
of garnishment or attachment.
Deutsche Gesellschaft v. CA

Facts

In 1971, the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of the Philippines ratified
an Agreement concerning a 5-year Technical Cooperation setup.

The two governments agreed to extend the same in1999. The furtherance arrangement affirmed the
common commitment of both governments to jointly promote a project called Social Health Insurance
Networking and Empowerment or SHINE.

In the arraignment, both governments likewise named their respective implementing organizations for
SHINE. The Philippines designated the Department of Health (DOH) and the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (Philhealth) with the implementation of SHINE. For their part, the German government
"charge[d] the Deustche Gesellschaft.

In September 1999, Anne Nicolay, a Belgiannational, assumed the post of SHINE Project Manager.

Disagreements eventually arose between Nicolay and private respondents in matters such as proposed
salary adjustments, and the course Nicolay was taking in the implementation of SHINE different from her
predecessors.

After several rounds of verbal disputes, each of the private respondents received a letter from Nicolay
informing them of the pre-termination of their contracts.

Private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC.

GTZ filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the case, as its
acts were undertaken in the discharge of the government functions and sovereign acts of the Govt of the
Federal Republic of Germany.

This was opposed by private respondents with the arguments that GTZ had failed to secure a certification
that it was immune from suit

Issue

Is GTZ, by conception, able to enjoy the Federal Republic's immunity from suit?

Ruling

No. this Court has no basis in fact to conclude or presume that GTZ enjoys immunity from suit.

The Court is thus holds and so rules that GTZ consistently has been unable to establish with satisfaction
that it enjoys the immunity from suit generally enjoyed by its parent country, the Federal Republic of
Germany.
Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency v. UP

Facts:

Petitioner Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency, Inc entered into a contract for security services
with respondent UP.

In 1998, several security guards assigned to UP filed separate complaints against Lockheed and UP for
payment of underpaid wages, 25% overtime pay, premium pay for rest days and special holidays, holiday
pay, and other fees.

Upon the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC finding UP liable for the unpaid legislated salary increases of
peittioner’s security guards, a Notice of Garnishment was issued to the PNB UP Diliman for the
satisfaction of the award somewhere north of 12 million pesos. PNB reminded UP that the bank only has
10 working days from receipt of the order to deliver the garnished funds, and unless it receives a notice
ordering the contrary, it shall be constrained to cause the release of the garnished funds.

On September 2, 2005, the amount of P12,062,398.71 was withdrawn by the sheriff from UP’s PNB
account. UP then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, saying that the NLRC acted without
jurisdiction when it authorized garnishment of UP’s public funds.

Lockheed contends that UP has its own separate and distinct juridical entity from the national government
and has its own charter. Thus, it can be sued and be held liable. Lockheed moreover submits that UP
cannot invoke state immunity to justify and perpetrate an injustice. UP itself admitted its liability and thus
it should not be allowed to renege on its contractual obligations.

Issue/s:

Having a charter with which it can sue and be sued, can UP funds be garnished?

Ruling:

Yes. UP is a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government and has the capacity to sue
and be sued. Thus, also like NEA, it cannot evade execution, and its funds may be subject to
garnishment or levy. However, before execution may be had, a claim for payment of the judgment award
must first be filed with the COA.

Since the garnishment was erroneously carried out and did not go through the proper procedure (the filing
of a claim with the COA), UP is entitled to reimbursement of the garnished funds plus interest of 6% per
annum, to be computed from the time of judicial demand to be reckoned from the time UP filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA which occurred right after the withdrawal of the garnished funds from PNB.
Air Transportation Office v. Sps. David and Elisea Ramos

Facts:

Respondent Spouses discovered that a portion of their registered land in Baguio City was being used as
part of the runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air
Transportation Office (ATO). The respondents agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by
deed of sale to the ATO in consideration of the amount of P778,150.00. However, the ATO failed to pay
despite repeated verbal and written demands.

Thus, the respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and some of its officials in the RTC.
In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the issuance of
Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that included the
respondents affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport. They asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction
to entertain the action without the States consent considering that the deed of sale had been entered into
in the performance of governmental functions.

The RTC held in favor of the Spouses, ordering the ATO to pay the plaintiffs Spouses the amount of
P778,150.00 being the value of the parcel of land appropriated by the defendant ATO as embodied in the
Deed of Sale, plus an annual interest of 12% from August 11, 1995, the date of the Deed of Sale until
fully paid; (2) The amount of P150,000.00 by way of moral damages and P150,000.00 as exemplary
damages; (3) the amount of P50,000.00 by way of attorneys fees plus P15,000.00 representing the 10,
more or less, court appearances of plaintiffs counsel; (4) The costs of this suit.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision with modification deleting the awarded cost, and reducing
the moral and exemplary damage to P30,000.00 each, and attorneys fees is lowered to P10,000.00.

Issue/s: Could ATO be sued without the State's consent?

Ruling:

Yes.

ATO is an agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but
was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not
the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the
States immunity from suit. We uphold the CAs aforequoted holding.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for
compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper expropriation
proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs property.

The State’s immunity from suit does not extend to the petitioner because it is an agency of the State
engaged in an enterprise that is far from being the State’s exclusive prerogative.
Gregorio Vigilar et al v. Arnulfo Aquino

Facts:

Aquino was invited by DPWH to a bidding for the construction of a dike by bulldozing a part of the Porac
River at Barangay Ascomo-Pulungmasle, Guagua, Pampanga. Aquino was subsequently awarded the
“Contract of Agreement” by the said government agency.

By 9 July 1992, the project was duly completed by respondent, who was then issued a Certificate of
Project Completion dated 16 July 1992. However, claimed that PhP1,262,696.20 was still due him, but
petitioners refused to pay the amount. He thus filed a Complaint for the collection of sum of money with
damages before the RTC. Petitioners, for their part, set up the defense that the Complaint was a suit
against the state; that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and that the “Contract of
Agreement” covering the project was void for violating Presidential Decree No. 1445, absent the proper
appropriation and the Certificate of Availability of Funds.

The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent. Petitioners (DPWH) then appealed the case before the CA
which ruled in their favor, declaring the contract null and void ab initio but ordered compensation to
Aquino for worked delivered, subject to Commission on Audit rules. Unsatisfied with the CA’s decision,
Petitioners then raised the issue before the Supreme Court seeking complete dismissal of the case
without paying Aquino any money.

Issue/s: Was the doctrine of sovereign immunity properly/validly invoked?

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court said that the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen.

The court said that it would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable if the respondent is not duly
compensated for actual work performed and services rendered, where both the government and the
public have received benefits from the project and reaped the fruits of respondent’s honest toil and labor.

The Court further said that the no government agency or agent can conveniently hide under the State’s
cloak of invincibility against suit, because this principle has limitations especially when that the ends of
justice would be subverted if we were to uphold, in this particular instance, the State’s immunity from suit.

The Court finally said that in this case, it can’t be an instrument of injustice by upholding the immunity
from suit principle and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Shell PH Exploration v. Fren Jalos

Facts

Petitioner Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and the Republic of the Philippines entered into Service
Contract 38 for the exploration and extraction of petroleum in northwestern Palawan.

Two years later, Shell discovered natural gas in the Camago-Malampaya area and pursued its
development of the well under the Malampaya Natural Gas Project.

This entailed the construction and installation of a pipeline, which spanned 504 kms. and crossed the
Oriental Mindoro Sea, from Shell’s production platform to its gas processing plant in Batangas.

On May 19, 2003, respondents, 78 individuals, claiming that they were all subsistence fishermen from the
coastal barangay of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro, filed a complaint for damages against Shell on the ground
that their livelihood was adversely affected the construction and operation of Shell’s natural gas pipeline.

Shell moved for dismissal of the complaint alleging that the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), not the
trial court, has primary jurisdiction over pollution cases and actions for related damages and that it could
not be sued pursuant to the doctrine of state immunity without the State’s consent on the basis that it
merely serves as an agent of the Philippine government in the development of the Malampaya gas
reserves through Service Contract 38.

The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that it should be brought first to the PAB. CA reversed RTC’s
order upon respondent’s petition for certiorari. Shell moved for reconsideration of the CA’s decision but
the same was denied. Hence, Shell filed this petition for review under Rule 45.

Issue/s: Can Shell invoke state immunity, as agent of the Republic of the Philippines?

Ruling

No. Shell cannot invoke state immunity because it is not an agent of the Republic of the Philippines. It is
just a service contractor for the exploration and development of one of the country’s natural gas reserves.
While the Republic appointed Shell as the exclusive party to conduct petroleum operations in the
Camago-Malampayo area under the State’s full control and supervision, it does not follow that Shell has
become the State’s “agent” within the meaning of the law.

Shell’s primary obligation under the Service Contract 38 is not to represent the Philippine government for
the purpose of transacting business with third persons, rather, its contractual commitment is to develop
and manage petroleum operations on behalf of the state. Hence, Shell is not an agent of the Philippine
government but a provider of services, technology and financing for the Malampaya Natural Gas Project;
it is not immune from suit and it may be sued for claims even without the State’s consent. And as evident
in the stipulations agreed upon by the parties under Service Contract 38, the Phil. Government
recognized that Shell could be sued in relation to the project.
Holy See v. Rosario Jr.

Facts

Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered under the name Holy See, was
contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).

The land was donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents the Holy See,
who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his residence.

Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to respondents Starbright
Sales Enterprises, Inc.

When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two parties because both were
unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said lots.

Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy See should clear the property while Holy
See says that respondent corporation should do it or the earnest money will be returned. With this, Msgr.
Cirilios, the agent, subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money.

The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation.

Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific performance and damages
against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation.

The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign
immunity from suit. RTC denied the motion on ground that petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign
immunity by entering into a business contract. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was also denied
hence this special civil action for certiorari was forwarded to the Supreme Court.

Issue/s: Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity.

Ruling:

The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non-suability. As expressed
in Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted principles of International Law are adopted by
our Courts and thus shall form part of the laws of the land as a condition and consequence of our
admission in the society of nations.

The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern is non-propriety in nature.
The lot was acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial purpose, but
for the use of petitioner to construct the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer
of the property and its subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental (non-proprietal)
character as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or gain rather because it merely cannot evict the squatters
living in said property.

In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the complaints were dismissed accordingly.
Romualdez-Yap v. CSC

Facts:

Petitioner Conchita Romualdez-Yap started working with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) on September
20, 1972. After several promotions, she was appointed in 1983 as a Senior Vice President assigned to the
Fund Transfer Department. The case at bar is a special civil action for certiorari assailing petitioner’s
separation from PNB in light of EO 80 or the Revised Charter of PNB.

While she was on leave, Executive Order No. 80 (Revised Charter of the PNB) was approved on 3
December 1986. Said executive order authorized the restructure/ reorganization and rehabilitation of PNB.
Pursuant to the reorganization plan, the Fund Transfer Department was abolished and its functions
transferred to the International Department.

Consequently, petitioner was notified of her separation from the service

Petitioner argues that her separation from the service was illegal and was done in bad faith considering that
her termination on February 16, 1986 was made effective prior to the effectivity of Executive Order No. 80
on December 3, 1986, which law authorized the reorganization of the PNB, and even before February 25,
1986, when President Corazon C. Aquino came into power. She further claims that although the notice of
termination was dated January 30, 1987 it was only served upon her on February 16, 1987 when the new
Constitution which guarantees security of tenure to public employees was already in effect.

Issue/s

Is the reorganization of PNB, a government-owned or controlled corporation performing ministrant

functions, valid? If valid, was it done in good faith?

Ruling:

Yes. Executive Order No. 80 conferred upon the PNB the authority to reorganize. The order was issued
by then Pres. Corazon Aquino on 3 December 1986 while she was exercising the powers vested in the
President of the Philippines by the Freedom Constitution. After 3 December 1986, what remained to be
done was the implementation of the reorganization. There is no doubt as to the legal basis for PNB’s
reorganization. The real question is: was it done in good faith, tested by the Dario v. Mison doctrine?

The abolition of the office was not a whimsical, thoughtless move. It was a thoroughly evaluated action for
streamlining functions based on a rehabilitation plan.

As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in ‘good faith’ if it is for the purpose of economy or to
make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal or separation actually occurs because the
position itself ceases to exist.

In the instant case, therefore, this Commission is inclined to believe that the reorganization of PNB was
done in good faith. For indeed, the reorganization was pursued to achieve economy. It undertook
reduction in force as a means to streamline the number of the workforce. It was incidental that movant
Yap’s position was one among those abolished.
Govt of the Ph Island v. Monte de Piedad

Facts:

A devastating earthquake took place in the Philippines sometimes in 1863. Contributions amounting to
$400,000 were collected during the Spanish regime for the relief of the victims of an earthquake. Out of
the aid, $80,000.00 was left untouched. The Monte de Piedad, a charitable institution, in need for more
working capital, petitioned the Governor-General for the transfer of $80,000 as a loan.

In June 1893, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000. The
respondent bank declined to comply with this order upon the ground that only the Governor-General of
the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement.

On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands, through the Attorney-General, bring
suit against the Monte de Piedad for a recover of the $80,000, together with interest, for the benefit of
those persons or their heirs. After due trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of
$80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency, together with legal interest from February 28, 1912,
and the costs of the cause.

The defendant appealed. One of the assignment of errors made by the defendant was to question the
competence of the plaintiff (government) to bring the action, contending that the suit could be instituted
only by the intended beneficiaries themselves or by their heirs.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the respondent bank
for the reimbursement of the money of the intended beneficiaries?

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the right of the Government to file the case as parens patriae in
representation of the legitimate claimants. The legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae,
has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over
the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it.

This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is
lodged in a royal person or in the legislature. It is a most beneficient functions, and often necessary to be
exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect
themselves. The beneficiaries of charities, who are often incapable of vindicating their rights, and justly
look for protection to the sovereign authority, acting as parens patriae. They show that this beneficient
functions has not ceased to exist under the change of government from a monarchy to a republic; but that
it now resides in the legislative department, ready to be called into exercise whenever required for the
purposes of justice and right, and is clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any
other cases whatever.
Cabanas v. Pilapil

Facts:

Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his child to be his sole beneficiary. He likewise indicated
that if he dies while the child is still a minor, the proceeds shall be administered by his brother Francisco.

Florentino died when the child was only ten years old hence, Francisco took charge of Florentino’s
benefits for the child.

Meanwhile, the mother of the child Melchora Cabañas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the sum of
money in her favor and allow herself to be the child’s trustee.

Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and contended that as a private contract its terms
and obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended beneficiaries.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the terms of the insurance policy?

Ruling:

YES.

The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that whenever
any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then the
judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve according to the best interest of that person.

The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of the
minor child and it is assumed that the mother shows more care towards the child than an uncle. The trust,
insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted provision of law, is pro tanto null and void.

Its main reliance was on Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code. The former provides: “The father, or in his
absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority.
If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the
approval of the Court of First Instance. The latter states: “The property which the unemancipated child has
acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership,
and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he
lives.

It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens
patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to
his best interest. It may happen, family relations may press their respective claims. It would be more in
consonance not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the country for a parent to be
preferred. it could have been different if the conflict were between father and mother. Such is not the case
at all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its role of
parens patriae, cannot remain insensible to the validity of her plea.
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Assoc v. Health Secretary

Facts

On October 28, 1986, Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino by
virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution.

The Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing
of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981.

From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be
supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not
permitted for breastmilk substitutes.

The Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument
provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and
ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of
breastfeeding.

The DOH issued RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of The “Milk Code,”
assailing that the RIRR was going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and
expanding the coverage of said law.

Issue/s

Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the
Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;

Ruling

Yes, for some parts of it.

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have
the force of domestic law.

Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic
law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can
be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature

Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL
and VOID for being ultra vires. The Department of Health and respondents are PROHIBITED from
implementing said provisions. The international instruments pointed out by the respondents, UNRC,
ICESR, CEDAW, are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may implement them
through the RIRR.
The Milk Code is a verbatim reproduction of the (ICMBS), but it did not prohibit advertising or other forms
of promotion to the general public of products. Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides that advertising,
promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved
by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).

In this regard, the WHA Resolutions adopting the ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally non-
binding. This may constitute “soft law” or non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state
behavior. Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions, although
signed by most of the member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member
states and obligatory in nature.

The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be
implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature. On the other hand,
the petitioners also failed to explain and prove by competent evidence just exactly how such protective
regulation would result in the restraint of trade. Since all the regulatory provisions under the Milk Code apply
equally to both manufacturers and distributors, the Court sees no harm in the RIRR. Except Sections 4(f),
11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the objective, purpose and intent
of the Milk Code.
Mijares v. Ranada

Facts

Ten Filipino citizens who each alleged having suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention,
torture and rape in the hands of police or military forces during the Marcos regime, filed with the US District
Court, Hawaii, against the Estate Ferdinand E. Marcos.

Trial ensued, and subsequently a jury rendered a Final Judgment and an award of compensatory and
exemplary damages in favor of the plaintiff class with an award of a total of One Billion Nine Hundred Sixty
Four Million Five Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents ($1,964,005,859.90)

The present petitioners filed Complaint with the Makati RTC for the enforcement of the Final Judgment.

Respondent Judge Ranada of the Makati RTC issued the subject Order dismissing the complaint without
prejudice. He opined that the subject matter of the complaint was capable of pecuniary estimation, as it
involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of definite sums of money, allowing
for easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment.

The RTC estimated the proper amount of filing fees was approximately Four Hundred Seventy Two Million
Pesos, which obviously had not been paid.

Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation as the subject matter of the suit is
the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and not an action for the collection of a sum of money or recovery
of damages. They also point out that to require the class plaintiffs to pay Four Hundred Seventy Two Million
Pesos (P472,000,000.00) in filing fees would negate and render inutile the liberal construction ordained by
the Rules of Court, particularly the inexpensive disposition of every action.

ISSUE:
What provision, if any, then should apply in determining the filing fees for an action to enforce a foreign
judgment?

RULING:

The conditions required by the Philippines for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment has
remained unchanged.

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title;

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

The procedure and requisites outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 derive their efficacy not merely from the
procedural rule, but by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Rules of procedure are
promulgated by the Supreme Court,70 and could very well be abrogated or revised by the high court itself.
Yet the Supreme Court is obliged, as are all State components, to obey the laws of the land, including
generally accepted principles of international law which form part thereof, such as those ensuring the
qualified recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.

There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in personam. For
an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an action
inpersonam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such
decision in the local forum. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign
judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy.

Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its
validity.
Oposa v. Factoran

Facts
The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Invoking
Section 16, Article II the petitioners claimed that as taxpayers they have the right to the full benefit, use
and enjoyment of the natural resources of the country’s rainforests. They prayed that respondent,
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), be ordered to:

1. Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are
so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource
property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

The trial court’s conclusion is that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal
right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.

Ruling: No, they did not.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the
civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly
stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments
and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for
they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the
fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself,
thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would
be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to
inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991
dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 was set aside. The petitioners amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
PH Merchant Marine School v. CA

Facts

Petitioner PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOL, INC. (PMMSI), was established in Manila in
1950 to train and produce competent marine officers.

Public respondent Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) has repeatedly disapproved
petitioner's requests for renewal permit/recognition due to the following recurrent violations against public
respondent’s orders:

1). That Petitioner is ordered to cease operating without a renewal permit/recognition;

2.) That Petitioner is deficient in terms of the minimum requirements as provided in DECS Order No. III,
series of 1987, which
refers to the policies and standards for Maritime Education Plan.
3.) The Petitioner school has not acquired its own school site and building. The present school campus is
not conducive for training and is found to be very limited in space so that there is difficulty for school
development and expansion.
4.) That the petitioner is ordered to phase-out its Marine Engineering and Marine Transportation courses.

Despite these violations, petitioner still continued to enrol students and still offered courses in Marine
Engineering and Marine Transportation. The DECS informed petitioner that it had received reports that
petitioner enrolled freshmen for its maritime programs which were ordered phased out.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration regarding the non-compliance with the DECS’ minimum
requirements and subsequently moved for reconsideration regarding the phasing out of the two Marine
courses stated above. Both motions were denied by the DECS.

Petitioner appealed to the Office of the President. Pending appeal, the DECS issued a Closure Order.
Thereafter, petitioner sought reconsideration of the Closure Order alleging compliance with the DECS’
requirements. The Office of the President dismissed the appeal finding no reason to disturb the DECS’
action. Petitioner moved for reconsideration praying that the case be remanded to the DECS for another
ocular inspection and evaluation of its alleged improved facilities. Petitioner anchored its motion on the
proposition that since it had made substantial improvements on school equipment and facilities there
existed no valid ground to deny them a permit to offer maritime courses.

After another circumspect review of the case, the Office of the President found no cogent reason to set
aside its previous resolution.

Petitioner assailed both resolutions of the Office of the President before respondent Court of Appeals by
way of certiorari. It alleged that the resolutions failed to meet the constitutional requirement of due
process because the basis for affirming the DECS phase-out and closure orders was not sufficiently
disclosed.

Respondent CA dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was not given due process in the closure.
RULING:
Set against the records of the case, the assertion of petitioner that it was deprived of its right to a hearing
and any opportunity whatsoever to correct the alleged deficiencies readily collapses. The earlier narration
of facts clearly demonstrates that before the DECS issued the phase-out and closure orders, petitioner
was duly notified, warned and given several opportunities to correct its deficiencies and to comply with
pertinent orders and regulations.
In re: Laureta, GR l-68635

G.R. No. L-68635 May 14, 1987

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO

LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R. No.
68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET
AL."

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Before us are 1) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration of the Per Curiam Resolution of
this Court promulgated on March 12, 1987, finding him guilty of grave professional misconduct and
suspending him indefinitely from the practice of law; and 2) Eva Maravilla-Ilustre's Motion for
Reconsideration of the same Resolution holding her in contempt and ordering her to pay a fine of
P1,000.00.

Essentially, Atty. Laureta maintains that the Order of suspension without hearing violated his right to life
and due process of law and by reason thereof the Order is null and void; that the acts of misconduct
imputed to him are without basis; that the charge against him that it was he who had circulated to the
press copies of the Complaint filed before the Tanodbayan is unfounded such that, even in this Court's
Resolution, his having distributed copies to the press is not stated positively; that the banner headline
which appeared In the Daily Express is regrettable but that he was not responsible for such "misleading
headline;" that he "did nothing of the sort" being fully conscious of his responsibilities as a law practitioner
and officer of the Court; that as a former newspaperman, he would not have been satisfied with merely
circulating copies of the Complaint to the press in envelopes where his name appears; "he himself would
have written stories about the case in a manner that sells newspapers; even a series of juicy articles
perhaps, something that would have further subjected the respondent justices to far worse publicity;" that,
on the contrary, the press conference scheduled by Ilustre was cancelled through his efforts in order to
prevent any further adverse publicity resulting from the filing of the complaint before the Tanodbayan;
that, as a matter of fact, it was this Court's Resolution that was serialized in the Bulletin Today, which
newspaper also made him the subject of a scathing editorial but that he "understands the cooperation
because after all, the Court rendered a favorable judgment in the Bulletin union case last year;" that he
considered it "below his dignity to plead for the chance to present his side" with the Editor, Mr. Ben
Rodriguez, "a long-time personal friend" since he "can afford to be the sacrificial lamb if only to help the
Honorable Court uphold its integrity;" that he was called by a reporter of DZRH and was asked to
comment on the case filed before the Tanodbayan but that his remarks were confined to the filing of the
case by Ilustre herself, and that the judgment of the trial Court had attained its finality long ago; that he is
not Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan and did not prepare the complaint filed before it, his
professional services having been terminated upon the final dismissal of Ilustre's case before this Court;
that similarities in the language and phraseology used in the Ilustre letters, in pleadings before this Court
and before the Tanodbayan do not prove his authorship since other lawyers "even of a mediocre caliber"
could very easily have reproduced them; that the discussions on the merits in the Per Curiam Resolution
are "more properly addressed to the Tanodbayan, Justice Raul M. Gonzales being competent to deal with
the case before him;" that he takes exception to the accusation that he has manifested lack of respect for
and exposed to public ridicule the two highest Courts of the land, all he did having been to call attention to
errors or injustice committed in the promulgation of judgments or orders; that he has "not authorized or
assisted and/or abetted and could not have prevented the contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and
malicious charges of Eva Maravilla Ilustre who was no longer his client when these alleged acts were
done; that "he is grateful to this Court for the reminder on the first duty of a lawyer which is to the Court
and not to his client, a duty that he has always impressed upon his law students;" and finally, that "for the
record, he is sorry for the adverse publicity generated by the filing of the complaint against the Justices
before the Tanodbayan."

In her own Motion for Reconsideration, Eva Maravilla-Ilustre also raises as her main ground the alleged
deprivation of her constitutional right to due process. She maintains that as contempt proceedings are
commonly treated as criminal in nature, the mode of procedure and rules of evidence in criminal
prosecution should be assimilated, as far as practicable, in this proceeding, and that she should be given
every opportunity to present her side. Additionally, she states that, with some sympathetic lawyers, they
made an "investigation" and learned that the Resolution of the First Division was arrived at without any
deliberation by its members; that Court personnel were "tight-lipped about the matter, which is shrouded
mystery" thereby prompting her to pursue a course which she thought was legal and peaceful; that there
is nothing wrong in making public the manner of voting by the Justices, and it was for that reason that she
addressed Identical letters to Associate Justices Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, Isagani Cruz
and Florentino Feliciano; that "if the lawyers of my opponents were not a Solicitor General, and member
of the Supreme Court and a Division Chairman, respectively, the resolution of May 14, 1986 would not
have aroused my suspicion;" that instead of taking the law into her own hands or joining any violent
movement, she took the legitimate step of making a peaceful investigation into how her case was
decided, and brought her grievance to the Tanodbayan "in exasperation" against those whom she felt had
committed injustice against her "in an underhanded manner."

We deny reconsideration in both instances.

The argument premised on lack of hearing and due process, is not impressed with merit. What due
process abhors is absolute lack of opportunity to be heard (Tajonera vs. Lamaroza, et al., 110 SCRA 438
[1981]). The word "hearing" does not necessarily connote a "trial-type" proceeding. In the show-cause
Resolution of this Court, dated January 29, 1987, Atty. Laureta was given sufficient opportunity to inform
this Court of the reasons why he should not be subjected to dispose action. His Answer, wherein he
prayed that the action against him be dismissed, contained twenty-two (22) pages, double spaced. Eva
Maravilla-Ilustre was also given a like opportunity to explain her statements, conduct, acts and charges
against the Court and/or the official actions of the Justices concerned. Her Compliance Answer, wherein
she prayed that the contempt proceeding against her be dismissed, contained nineteen (19) pages,
double spaced. Both were afforded ample latitude to explain matters fully. Atty. Laureta denied having
authored the letters written by Ilustre, his being her counsel before the Tanodbayan, his having
circularized to the press copies of the complaint filed before said body, and his having committed acts
unworthy of his profession. But the Court believed otherwise and found that those letters and the charges
levelled against the Justices concerned, of themselves and by themselves, betray not only their malicious
and contemptuous character, but also the lack of respect for the two highest Courts of the land, a
complete obliviousness to the fundamental principle of separation of powers, and a wanton disregard of
the cardinal doctrine of independence of the Judiciary. Res ipsa loquitur. Nothing more needed to have
been said or proven. The necessity to conduct any further evidentially hearing was obviated (See People
vs. Hon. Valenzuela, G.R. Nos. 63950-60, April 19, 1985, 135 SCRA 712). Atty. Laureta and Ilustre were
given ample opportunity to be heard, and were, in fact, heard.

(1)

In his Motion for Reconsideration, Atty. Laureta reiterates his allegations in his Answer to the show-cause
Resolution that his professional services were terminated by Ilustre after the dismissal of the main petition
by this Court; that he had nothing to do with the contemptuous letters to the individual Justices; and that
he is not Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan.

Significantly enough, however, copy of the Tanodbayan Resolution dismissing Ilustre's Complaint was
furnished Atty. Laureta as "counsel for the complainant" at his address of record. Of note, too, is the fact
that it was he who was following up the Complaint before the Tanodbayan and, after its dismissal, the
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of dismissal.

Of import, as well, is the report of Lorenzo C. Bardel, a process server of this Court, that after having
failed to serve copy of the Per Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987 of this Court on Ilustre personally at
her address of record, "101 F. Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City," having been informed that she is 6 not a
resident of the place," he proceeded to the residence of Atty. Laureta where the latter's wife "voluntarily
received the two copies of decision for her husband and for Ms. Maravina-Ilustre" (p. 670, Rollo, Vol. 11).

That Ilustre subsequently received copy of this Court's Resolution delivered to Mrs. Laureta is shown by
the fact that she filed, as of March 27, 1987, a "Petition for Extension of Time to file Motion for
Reconsideration" and subsequently the Motion for Reconsideration. In that Petition Ilustre acknowledged
receipt of the Resolution on March 12, 1987, the very same date Mrs. Laureta received copy thereof. If,
indeed, the lawyer-client relationship between her husband and Ilustre had been allegedly completely
severed, all Mrs. Laureta had to do was to return to the Sheriff the copy intended for Ilustre. As it was,
however, service on Atty. Laureta proved to be service on Ilustre as well. The close tie- up between the
corespondents is heightened by the fact that three process servers of this Court failed to serve copy of
this Court's Per Curiam Resolution on Ilustre personally.

Noteworthy, as well, is that by Atty. Laureta's own admission, he was the one called by a "reporter" of
DZRH to comment on the Ilustre charges before the Tanodbayan. If, in fact, he had nothing to do with the
complaint, he would not have been pinpointed at all. And if his disclaimer were the truth, the logical step
for him to have taken was to refer the caller to the lawyer/s allegedly assisting Ilustre, at the very least,
out of elementary courtesy and propriety. But he did nothing of the sort. " He gave his comment with
alacrity.

The impudence and lack of respect of Atty. Laureta for this Court again surfaces when he asserts in his
Motion for Reconsideration that he "understands the cooperation" of the Bulletin Today as manifested in
the serialized publication of the Per Curiam Resolution of this Court and his being subjected to a scathing
editorial by the same newspaper "because after all, the Court rendered a favorable judgment in the
Bulletin union case last year." The malice lurking in that statement is most unbecoming of an officer of the
Court and is an added reason for denying reconsideration.

Further, Atty. Laureta stubbornly contends that discussions on the merits in the Court's Per Curiam
Resolution are more properly addressed to the Tanodbayan, forgetting, however, his own discourse on
the merits in his Answer to this Court's Resolution dated January 29, 1987. He thus incorrigibly insists on
subordinating the Judiciary to the executive notwithstanding the categorical pronouncement in the Per
Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987, that Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code has no application to
the members of a collegiate Court; that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
on the ground that a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper; plus the clear and extended
dissertation in the same Per Curiam Resolution on the fundamental principle of separation of powers and
of checks and balances, pursuant to which it is this Court "entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to
adjudicate with finality all justifiable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may
pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust' upon controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy
and of sound practice."

Atty. Laureta's protestations that he has done his best to protect and uphold the dignity of this Court are
belied by environmental facts and circumstances. His apologetic stance for the "adverse publicity"
generated by the filing of the charges against the Justices concerned before the Tanodbayan rings with
insincerity. The complaint was calculated precisely to serve that very purpose. The threat to bring the
case to "another forum of justice" was implemented to the fun. Besides, he misses the heart of the matter.
Exposure to the glare of publicity is an occupational hazard. If he has been visited with disciplinary
sanctions it is because by his conduct, acts and statements, he has, overall, deliberately sought to
destroy the "authenticity, integrity, and conclusiveness of collegiate acts," to "undermine the role of the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justifiable disputes," and to subvert public confidence in the
integrity of the Courts and the Justices concerned, and in the orderly administration of justice.

In fine, we discern nothing in Atty. Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration that would call for a modification,
much less a reversal, of our finding that he is guilty of grave professional misconduct that renders him
unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to an attorney and officer of
the Court.

(2)

Neither do we find merit in Ilustre's Motion for Reconsideration. She has turned deaf ears to any reason
or clarification. She and her counsel have refused to accept the untenability of their case and the
inevitability of losing in Court. They have allowed suspicion alone to blind their actions and in so doing
degraded the administration of justice. "Investigation" was utterly uncalled for. All conclusions and
judgments of the Court, be they en banc or by Division, are arrived at only after deliberation. The fact that
no dissent was indicated in the Minutes of the proceedings held on May 14, 1986 showed that the
members of the Division voted unanimously. Court personnel are not in a position to know the voting in
any case because all deliberations are held behind closed doors without any one of them being present.
No malicious inferences should have been drawn from their inability to furnish the information Ilustre and
Atty. Laureta desired The personality of the Solicitor General never came into the picture. It was Justice
Abad Santos, and not Justice Yap, who was Chairman of the First Division when the Resolution of May
14, 1986 denying the Petition was rendered. Thereafter Justice Yap inhibited himself from any
participation. The fact that the Court en banc upheld the challenged Resolutions of the First Division
emphasizes the irrespective of Ilustre's case irrespective of the personalities involved.

Additionally, Ilustre has been trifling with this Court. She has given our process servers the run-around.
Three of them failed to serve on her personally her copy of this Court's Per Curiam Resolution of March
12, 1987 at her address of record. Mrs. Laureta informed process server Lorenzo C. Bardel that Ilustre
was residing at 17-D, Quezon St., Tondo, Manila. Romeo C. Regala, another process server, went to that
address to serve copy of the Resolution but he reported:

4. That inspite of diligent efforts to locate the address of ms.Eva Maravilla-Ilustre, said
address could not be located;

5. That I even asked the occupants (Cerdan Family) of No. 17 Quezon Street, Tondo,
Manila, and they informed that there is no such Ms. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre in the
neighborhood and/or in the vicinity; ... (p. 672, Rollo, Vol. 11).

The third process server, Nelson C. Cabesuela, was also unable to serve copy of this Court's Resolution
on Ilustre. He reported:

2. On March 17, 1987, at about 9:30 A.M., I arrived at the house in the address furnished
at; the notice of judgment (101 Felix Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City), and was received
by an elderly woman who admitted to be the owner of the house but vehemently refused
to be Identified, and told me that she does not know the addressee Maravilla, and told me
further that she always meets different persons looking for Miss Maravilla because the
latter always gives the address of her house;

3. That, I was reminded of an incident that I also experienced in the same place trying to
serve a resolution to Miss Maravilla which was returned unserved because she is not
known in the place; ... (p. 674, Rollo, Vol. II).

And yet, in her Petition for Extension of Time and in her Motion for Reconsideration she persists in giving
that address at 101 Felix Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City, where our process servers were told that she
was not a resident of and that she was unknown thereat. If for her contumacious elusiveness and lack of
candor alone, Ilustre deserves no further standing before this Court.

ACCORDINGLY, the respective Motions for reconsideration of Atty. Wenceslao G. Laureta for the setting
aside of the order suspending him from the practice of law, and of Eva Maravilla Ilustre for the lifting of
the penalty for contempt are DENIED, and this denial is FINAL. Eva Maravilla Ilustre shall pay the fine of
P1,000.00 imposed on her within ten (10) days from notice, or, suffer imprisonment for ten (10) days upon
failure to pay said fine within the stipulated period.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Yap, J., * took no part.

Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v. Majaducon

EN BANC

G.R. No. 136760. July 29, 2003

THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE, represented by its Chairman, SENATOR

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE B. MAJADUCON, Presiding
Judge of Branch 23, Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, and ATTY. NILO J.
FLAVIANO,respondents.

[G.R. No. 138378. July 29, 2003

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE JOSE S. MAJADUCON,

in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 23, Regional Trial Court, General
Santos City, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

For resolution are two consolidated petitions: (a) G.R. No. 136760, for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and preliminary injunction, assailing the resolution dated
November 11, 1998 of Judge Jose S. Majaducon of the Regional Trial Court of
General Santos City, Branch 23, which denied the Senate Blue Ribbon Committees
motion to dismiss the petition for prohibition, injunction with writ of preliminary
injunction filed by private respondent Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano; and (b) G.R. No.
138378, for review of the resolution dated April 15, 1999 of respondent Judge
Majaducon declaring petitioner Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. guilty of indirect
contempt of court.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

G.R. No. 136760:

On August 28, 1998, Senator Blas F. Ople filed Senate Resolution No. 157 directing
the Committee on National Defense and Security to conduct an inquiry, in aid of
legislation, into the charges of then Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado that a
group of active and retired military officers were organizing a coup detat to
prevent the administration of then President Joseph Estrada from probing alleged
fund irregularities in the Armed Forces of the Philippines. 1cräläwvirtualibräry

On the same date, Senator Vicente C. Sotto III also filed Resolution No. 160,
directing the appropriate senate committee to conduct an inquiry, in aid of
legislation, into the alleged mismanagement of the funds and investment portfolio
of the Armed Forces Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS)
xxx. 2cräläwvirtualibräry

The Senate President referred the two resolutions to the Committee on

Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee) and
the Committee on National Defense and Security.

During the public hearings conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
(hereafter called the Committee), it appeared that the AFP-RSBS purchased a lot
in General Santos City, designated as Lot X, MR-1160, for P10,500.00 per square
meter from private respondent Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano. However, the deed of sale
filed with the Register of Deeds indicated that the purchase price of the lot was
only P3,000.00 per square meter.

The Committee thereafter caused the service of a subpoena to respondent Atty.

Flaviano, directing him to appear and testify before it. Respondent refused to
appear at the hearing. Instead, he filed a petition for prohibition and preliminary
injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial
Court of General Santos City, Branch 23, which was docketed as SP Civil Case No.
496.

On October 21, 1998, the trial court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
directing the Committee to CEASE and DESIST from proceeding with the inquiry in
P.S. 160 particularly in General Santos City and/or anywhere in Region XI or
Manila on matters affecting the patenting/titling and sale of Lot X, MR-1160-D to
AFP-RSBS, and from issuing subpoenas to witnesses from Region XI, particularly
from General Santos City, pending the hearing of the petition for prohibition and
injunction.3cräläwvirtualibräry

On November 5, 1998, the Committee filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the
grounds of (a) lack of jurisdiction, and (b) failure to state a valid cause of action.
It further argued that the issuance of the Temporary Restraining Order was invalid
for violating the rule against ex-parte issuance thereof; and that the same was not
enforceable beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court.

On November 11, 1998, the trial court denied petitioners motion to dismiss and
granted the writ of preliminary injunction, thus:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the motion to dismiss is DENIED, and the
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION is hereby issued against respondent. It is
enjoined from enforcing its subpoenas to petitioner in Region XI to appear and
testify before it in any of its inquiry or investigation anywhere in the Philippines
regarding the acquisition by the AFP-RSBS of Lot X, MR-1160-D, located in General
Santos City. The bond of petitioner filed on October 21, 1998, for P500,000.00 for
the TRO also serves as his bond in this injunction.

SO ORDERED.4cräläwvirtualibräry

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari which was docketed as G.R. No. 136760,
alleging that respondent Judge Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion
and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when he:

I. DENIED PETITIONERS MOTION TO DISMISS THE PETITION FOR

PROHIBITION AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION FILED BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENT, ATTY. NILO J. FLAVIANO, AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN
SP. CIVIL CASE NO. 496.

II. ISSUED (1) A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER EX-PARTE FOR A PERIOD

OF TWENTY (20) DAYS AGAINST THE PETITIONER ON OCTOBER 21,
1998, AND (2) A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ON NOVEMBER 11,
1998 ENJOINING THE PETITIONER FROM ENFORCING ITS SUBPOENAS
TO PRIVATE RESPONENT IN REGION XI.

III. APPLIED THE RULING OF BENGZON VS. SENATE BLUE RIBBON IN

GRANTING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.5cräläwvirtualibräry

G.R. No. 138378:

On January 13, 1999, the newspaper, The Philippine Star published a news report
on the filing by the Committee with this Court of the petition for certiorari which
was docketed as G.R. No. 136760. The news report quoted portions of the petition
filed by the Committee, alleging that Regional Trial Court Judge Majaducon was
guilty of gross ignorance of the rules and procedures when he issued the
temporary restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction because, under
the principle of separation of powers, courts cannot interfere with the exercise by
the legislature of its authority to conduct investigations in aid of
legislation.6cräläwvirtualibräry

Reacting to the aforesaid news report, respondent Judge Majaducon motu

proprioinitiated a charge for indirect contempt of court against Senator Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr., news reporter Perseus Echeminada, Philippine Star publisher
Maximo Soliven, editor-in-chief Ramon J. Farolan, and executive editor Bobby G.
dela Cruz, which was docketed as Special Civil Case No. 496. Judge Majaducon
averred that the news report created in the minds of the reader the impression
that he violated the separation of powers clause of the Constitution and that he
was guilty of gross ignorance of the rules and procedures.
After the respondents submitted their respective answers, a decision was
rendered on April 15, 1999 finding petitioner Pimentel guilty of indirect contempt.

Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:

I. THE EXPRESSION GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OR

GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN REFERENCE TO THE RESPONDENTS
EX-PARTE ISSUANCE OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IS NOT PEJORATIVE AS TO
CONSTITUTE A GROUND FOR INDIRECT CONTEMPT.

II. THIS HONORABLE COURT ITSELF USES GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW
AND OTHER EXPRESSIONS OF SIMILAR FORCEFUL IMPORT IN
DESCRIBING GROSS AND PALPABLE ERRORS OF JUDGES.

III. BY UPHOLDING HIS CONTEMPT CHARGE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, THE

RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS, IN EFFECT, PREEMPTED THIS HONORABLE
COURT IN RESOLVING THE ISSUES RAISED AGAINST HIM IN G.R. NO.
136760.

IV. THE PUBLICATION BY PHILIPPINE STAR OF THE BLUE RIBBON PETITION

IN G.R. NO. 136760, OR EXCERPTS THEREOF WAS A LEGITIMATE
EXERCISE OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND OF THE PRESS.

The two petitions, namely, G.R. No. 136760 and G.R. No. 138378, were ordered
consolidated on December 11, 2000.

The issues for resolution in these joint petitions are: (a) whether or not
respondent Judge Jose Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion when he
dismissed petitioners motion to dismiss the petition for prohibition and issued the
writ of preliminary injunction; and (b) whether or not respondent Judge erred in
convicting petitioner Pimentel of indirect contempt of court.

On the first issue, petitioner Committee contends that courts have no jurisdiction
to restrain Congress from performing its constitutionally vested function to
conduct investigations in aid of legislation, following the principle of separation of
powers. Moreover, the petition filed by respondent Flaviano before the trial court
failed to state a cause of action considering that the legislative inquiry did not deal
with the issuance of the patent and title to Lot X, MR-1160-D in the name of AFP-
RSBS, which is well within the courts jurisdiction, but with the anomaly in the
purchase thereof, which falls squarely within the ambit of Senate Resolutions Nos.
1577 and 160.8cräläwvirtualibräry

On the other hand, respondent Flaviano contends that the trial court may properly
intervene into investigations by Congress pursuant to the power of judicial review
vested in it by the Constitution. He avers that he has a valid cause of action to file
the petition for prohibition considering that the Committees investigation will
delve into the validity of the patenting and titling of Lot X, MR-1160-D which, as
admitted by petitioner, falls within the competence of judicial courts. In fact, the
validity of the purchase by AFP-RSBS of the subject lot is already the subject of a
pending action before the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City and the
Ombudsman of Mindanao. Finally, he cites the case of Bengzon v. Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee,9 and argues that preliminary injunction may issue in cases
pending before administrative bodies such as the Ombudsman or the Office of the
Prosecutor as long as the right to self-incrimination guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights is in danger. Furthermore, an information against him has been filed with
the Sandiganbayan.

We find for petitioner. There is grave abuse of discretion when the respondent
acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of his
judgment, as when the assailed order is bereft of any factual and legal
justification.10 In this case, the assailed resolution of respondent Judge Majaducon
was issued without legal basis.

The principle of separation of powers essentially means that legislation belongs to

Congress, execution to the Executive, and settlement of legal controversies to the
Judiciary. Each is prevented from invading the domain of the others. 11 When the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee served subpoena on respondent Flaviano to appear
and testify before it in connection with its investigation of the alleged misuse and
mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, it did so pursuant to its authority to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Article VI, Section
21 of the Constitution, thus:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees

may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries
shall be respected.

Hence, the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, or any court for that
matter, had no authority to prohibit the Committee from requiring respondent to
appear and testify before it.

The ruling in Bengzon, cited by respondent, does not apply in this case. We agree
with petitioner Committee that the factual circumstances therein are different
from those in the case at bar. In Bengzon, no intended legislation was involved
and the subject matter of the inquiry was more within the province of the courts
rather than of the legislature. More specifically, the investigation in the said case
was an offshoot of the privilege speech of then Senator Enrile, who urged the
Senate to look into a possible violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
by the relatives of then President Corazon Aquino, particularly Mr. Ricardo Lopa, in
connection with the alleged sale of 36 to 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin
Romualdez. On the other hand, there was in this case a clear legislative purpose,
as stated in Senate Resolution No. 160, and the appropriate Senate Committee
was directed to look into the reported misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-
RSBS funds, with the intention of enacting appropriate legislation to protect the
rights and interests of the officers and members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. Further, in Bengzon, the validity of the sale of Romualdezs
corporations was pending with the Sandiganbayan when the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee decided to conduct its investigation. In short, the issue had already
been pre-empted by the court.

In the instant case, the complaint against respondent Flaviano regarding the
anomaly in the sale of Lot X, MR-1160 was still pending before the Office of the
Ombudsman when the Committee served subpoena on him. In other words, no
court had acquired jurisdiction over the matter. Thus, there was as yet no
encroachment by the legislature into the exclusive jurisdiction of another branch
of the government. Clearly, there was no basis for the respondent Judge to apply
the ruling in Bengzon. Hence, the denial of petitioners motion to dismiss the
petition for prohibition amounted to grave abuse of discretion.

In G.R. No. 138378, Petitioner, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., contends that
respondent judge erred in finding him, as representative of the Committee, guilty
of indirect contempt of court under Rule 71, Section 3(d) of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. According to Pimentel, the phrase gross ignorance of the rules of law
and procedure, which the Committee used in the petition, is not depreciatory, but
merely a description of normal usage in petitions where the acts of lower courts
are challenged before higher judicial bodies. In fact, this Court often uses the
phrase in its decisions to describe judges who commit gross and palpable
mistakes in their interpretation and application of the law. Petitioner further
maintains that when the Committee used the phrase, it did so without malice.
Rather, it was only to stress the unfamiliarity of or disregard by the respondent
Judge of a basic rule of procedure, and to buttress its arguments in support of its
petition for certiorari.

Petitioner Pimentel also contends that he had no participation in the publication in

the Philippine Star of excerpts from the Committees petition for certiorari. Even
assuming arguendo that it was within his control, he pointed out that he could not
have prevented the editors and writers of the newspaper from publishing the
same, lest he violate their constitutional right of free expression. Indeed, the
report by the Philippine Star of the filing of the petition and the reproduction of its
contents was a legitimate exercise of press freedom.

Respondent Judge counters that Pimentel was guilty of indirect contempt of

court, first, for causing the publication of the Committees petition in the Philippine
Star notwithstanding that the same was sub judice; second, for making derogatory
remarks in the petition itself which affected the honor and integrity of the
respondent judge and degraded the administration of justice; and third, for
making it appear that an administrative complaint was filed against respondent
Judge for gross ignorance of the law. These, he said, constituted malicious and
false report which obstructed the administration of justice.

Rule 71, Section 3(d) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a

charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to
comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard
by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished
for indirect contempt:

xxx

d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or

degrade the administration of justice; x x x.
After deliberating on the parties arguments, we find that petitioner Pimentel is not
guilty of improper conduct which obstructs or degrades the administration of
justice.

Verily, it does not appear that Pimentel caused the publication in the Philippine
Star of the fact of filing of the petition for certiorari by the Committee and the
reproduction of excerpts thereof. He had no right to choose which news articles
will see print in the newspaper. Rather, it is the publisher thereof which decides
which news events will be reported in the broadsheet. In doing so, it is allowed
the widest latitude of choice as to what items should see the light of day so long
as they are relevant to a matter of public interest, pursuant to its right of press
freedom.12cräläwvirtualibräry

Respondent Judges allegation that petitioner made it appear that an

administrative complaint was filed against him is without basis. From a careful
perusal of the records, it appears that while the Committee prayed for the
imposition of administrative sanctions against respondent Judge Majaducon for
gross ignorance of the law, no formal administrative complaint was instituted
separately from the petition for certiorari.

Finally, the statement that respondent Judge was grossly ignorant of the rules of
law and procedure does not constitute improper conduct that tends to impede,
obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. As correctly argued by
petitioner, the phrase gross ignorance of the rules of law and procedure is
ordinarily found in administrative complaints and is a necessary description to
support a petition which seeks the annulment of an order of a judge wherein basic
legal principles are disregarded.

In Spouses Bacar v. Judge De Guzman, Jr.,13 it was held that when the law is so
elementary, not to know it or to act as if a judge does not know it, constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. In this case, there was no showing that petitioner
Pimentel, as representative of the Committee, used the phrase to malign the trial
court. Rather, it was used to express what he believed as a violation of the basic
principle of separation of powers.

In this connection, it bears stressing that the power to declare a person in

contempt of court must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle,
and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment.14 This was aptly
expressed in the case of Nazareno v. Barnes:15cräläwvirtualibräry

A judge, as a public servant, should not be so thin-skinned or sensitive as to feel

hurt or offended if a citizen expresses an honest opinion about him which may not
altogether be flattering to him. After all, what matters is that a judge performs his
duties in accordance with the dictates of his conscience and the light that God has
given him. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice,
passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties. He should always bear in
mind that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for
purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not
for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 136760
and 138378 are GRANTED. The resolution of the Regional Trial Court of General
Santos City, Branch 23, in Special Civil Case No. 496 dated November 11, 1998,
which denied the Senate Blue Ribbon Committees motion to dismiss, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the trial court on
November 11, 1998 is DISSOLVED. The resolution dated April 15, 1999, which
declared Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. guilty of indirect contempt of court, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for indirect contempt is ordered
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Corpuz v. People

G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014

LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated
November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution2 dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
which affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code.

The antecedent facts follow.

Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City
sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino
players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him
on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis.
Private complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items: an
18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with
an aggregate value of ₱98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both agreed that
petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period
of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces
of jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he
will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.

Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa, which reads as follows:
That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after having received from one Danilo
Tangcoy, one (1) men's diamond ring, 18k, worth ₱45,000.00; one (1) three-baht men's bracelet, 22k,
worth ₱25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies' bracelet, 22k, worth ₱12,000.00, or in the total amount of
Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos (₱98,000.00), Philippine currency, under expressed obligation on the part
of said accused to remit the proceeds of the sale of the said items or to return the same, if not sold, said
accused, once in possession of the said items, with intent to defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse
of confidence, and far from complying with his aforestated obligation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the
aforesaid jewelries (sic) or the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, the accused
failed and refused to return the said items or to remit the amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand Pesos
(₱98,000.00), Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in the
aforementioned amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of Danilo Tangcoy. On the
other hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized, as follows:

Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged in the
financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For every collection made, they earn a
commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any business with private complainant.

However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was made to sign a
blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence
against him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
Information. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code;

there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating circumstance/s to vary the penalty
imposable;

accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of liberty consisting of
an imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of
Prision Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8)
MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant
Danilo Tangcoy the amount of ₱98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner and affirmed the
decision of the RTC, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 30, 2004 of the RTC of
San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the imposable prison
term, such that accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each
additional ₱10,000.00, or a total of 7 years. The rest of the decision stands.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court the present petition
stating the following grounds:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE ADMISSION AND

APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS EXHIBITS,
WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE;

B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING
THAT THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH
THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE IN THAT -

1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF]
JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY TO BE REMITTED, IF
SOLD;

2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION AS

OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE TESTIFIED TO BY THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;

C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING
THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE
PROCEEDS, IF SOLD – AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE – WAS PROVED;

D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING
THAT THE PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH -

1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF THE INCIDENT;

2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER – ACCUSED IS MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD AND

LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCE;

3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND APPLIED TO THIS CASE;

4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE.

In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated the following counter-
arguments:

The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to their admissibility.

The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the designation of the offense
and the acts complained of.

The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.

This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.

The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight when
said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of
support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of
discretion.4 Petitioner is of the opinion that the CA erred in affirming the factual findings of the trial court.
He now comes to this Court raising both procedural and substantive issues.

According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court, admitting in evidence a
receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings, although the same was merely a
photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule. However, the records show that petitioner never
objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in
court by private complainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an
objection in his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed
the said receipt. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to
evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. 5

Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective Information filed
against him. He contends that the Information does not contain the period when the pieces of jewelry
were supposed to be returned and that the date when the crime occurred was different from the one
testified to by private complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA did not err in finding that the
Information was substantially complete and in reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and
substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. It is true that the gravamen of
the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or
conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner 6 and that the time of occurrence is
not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the
occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. The CA
ruled:

x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense
and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides
that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;

the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the
place wherein the offense was committed. In the case at bar, a reading of the subject Information shows
compliance with the foregoing rule. That the time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or
about the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause considering that
Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a material
ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the
prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an
essential element of the crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date
does not render the Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date
within which accused-appellant should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of
jewelry] as testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-
appellant, therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of the charges
proferred against him.7

It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1
(b) of the RPC, which reads:

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow.

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

 xxxx

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal
property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property; x x x

The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or other personal
property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation
or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand
made by the offended party on the offender.8

Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended party on the
offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his testimony, private complainant narrated how he
was able to locate petitioner after almost two (2) months from the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and
asked petitioner about the same items with the latter promising to pay them. Thus:

PROS. MARTINEZ

q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction could have been finished on
5 July 1991, the question is what happens (sic) when the deadline came?

a I went looking for him, sir.

q For whom?

a Lito Corpuz, sir.

q Were you able to look (sic) for him?

a I looked for him for a week, sir.

q Did you know his residence?

a Yes, sir.

q Did you go there?

a Yes, sir.

q Did you find him?

a No, sir.

q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?

a I talked to him, sir.

q How many times?

a Two times, sir.

q What did you talk (sic) to him?

a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.

q Referring to Exhibit A-2?

a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him where the items are and he
promised me that he will pay these amount, sir.

q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him partially or full?

a No, sir.9

No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. 10 Demand need not even be formal;
it may be verbal.11 The specific word "demand" need not even be used to show that it has indeed been
made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this
case, property], would be tantamount to a demand.12 As expounded in Asejo v. People:13

With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this kind of estafa need
not be formal or written. The appellate court observed that the law is silent with regard to the form of
demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:

When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be necessary, the law
would have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be interpreted in its general meaning as to
include both written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to present a written demand as
evidence is not fatal.

In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to the
accused, we held that the query was tantamount to a demand, thus:

x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of the crime of
embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account, upon demand for funds or property held in trust,
is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The same way, however, be established by other proof,
such as that introduced in the case at bar.14

In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove the existence of all
the elements of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on
commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation to sell or return the same
within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds
of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within
or after the agreed period despite demand from the private complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.

Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by petitioner, the same is
unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great
respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which
merely rely on the records of the case.15 The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding
if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence,
especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA.16 Truth is established not by the number of witnesses,
but by the quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the
witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.17
As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this case, the question of the
continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving property came up. The legislature
apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the money and property in 1930 when it enacted the
Revised Penal Code. Since the members of the division reached no unanimity on this question and since
the issues are of first impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for consideration
and resolution. Thus, several amici curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to give their academic
opinions on the matter. Among those that graciously complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean
Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives. The parties were later heard on oral arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty.
Mario L. Bautista appearing as counsel de oficio of the petitioner.

After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court finds the following:

There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts continue
to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the amount of damage measured by the
value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties
because that would constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the
penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would
be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the government. This, however, does not render the
whole situation without any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which reads:

ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by
the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may
deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall
report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to
believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.

In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such
statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict
enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty,
taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.18

The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a case which is not
punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render the proper decision and
thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons why the same
act should be the subject of penal legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is
not the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the need
to make that act punishable by law through legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the first except
for the situation wherein the act is already punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed by
the court as excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of
the sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to
be non-commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive,
this time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty.

In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,19 Guillermo B. Guevara opined that in Article 5,
the duty of the court is merely to report to the Chief Executive, with a recommendation for an amendment
or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:

This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege," that is, that there
can exist no punishable act except those previously and specifically provided for by penal statute.

No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it necessary to prohibit its
perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely powerless to punish such act.
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a sentence on the ground
that the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that
the Court could do in such eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief Executive with a
recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. 20

Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino and
retired Associate Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, in their book, The Revised Penal Code,21 echoed the
above-cited commentary, thus:

The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle that justice must be
tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with the wisdom or justness of the
penalties fixed by law. "Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law upon conviction of violations of
particular statutes are too severe or are not severe enough, are questions as to which commentators on
the law may fairly differ; but it is the duty of the courts to enforce the will of the legislator in all cases
unless it clearly appears that a given penalty falls within the prohibited class of excessive fines or cruel
and unusual punishment." A petition for clemency should be addressed to the Chief Executive.22

There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be based on the current
inflation rate or at the ratio of ₱1.00 is equal to ₱100.00 . However, it would be dangerous as this would
result in uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of the penalties. It must be remembered that
the economy fluctuates and if the proposed imposition of the penalties in crimes against property be
adopted, the penalties will not cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a self-amending law. Had the
framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it should have provided the same, instead, it included the
earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is also improper to presume why the present legislature has not
made any moves to amend the subject penalties in order to conform with the present times. For all we
know, the legislature intends to retain the same penalties in order to deter the further commission of those
punishable acts which have increased tremendously through the years. In fact, in recent moves of the
legislature, it is apparent that it aims to broaden the coverage of those who violate penal laws. In the
crime of Plunder, from its original minimum amount of ₱100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature
lowered it to ₱50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered the threshold amount upon which
the Anti-Money Laundering Act may apply, from ₱1,000,000.00 to ₱500,000.00.

It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties do not seem to be
excessive compared to the proposed imposition of their corresponding penalties. In Theft, the provisions
state that:

Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing
stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the value of the thing
stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed
in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection
with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of
this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the
thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.

3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the
property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.

4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the value of
the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.
 5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.

6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.

7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the
circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of the thing
stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provision of any of the
five preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.

8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the
thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger,
poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his family.

In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the above-provision states that the penalty is
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).
Applying the proposal, if the value of the thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the penalty is imprisonment of arresto
mayor in its medium period to prision correccional minimum period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4
months). It would seem that under the present law, the penalty imposed is almost the same as the
penalty proposed. In fact, after the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law under the existing law,
the minimum penalty is still lowered by one degree; hence, the minimum penalty is arresto mayor in its
medium period to maximum period (2 months and 1 day to 6 months), making the offender qualified for
pardon or parole after serving the said minimum period and may even apply for probation. Moreover,
under the proposal, the minimum penalty after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is arresto menor
in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period (21 days to 2 months) is not too far from the
minimum period under the existing law. Thus, it would seem that the present penalty imposed under the
law is not at all excessive. The same is also true in the crime of Estafa.23

Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the thing stolen in the crime of Theft
and the damage caused in the crime of Estafa, the gap between the minimum and the maximum
amounts, which is the basis of determining the proper penalty to be imposed, would be too wide and the
penalty imposable would no longer be commensurate to the act committed and the value of the thing
stolen or the damage caused:

I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be modified but the penalties are not
changed:

1. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00 will become ₱1,200,000.00 to ₱2,200,000.00, punished by prision

mayor minimum to prision mayor medium (6 years and 1 day to 10 years).

2. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to ₱1,200,000.00, punished by prision

correccional medium and to prision correccional maximum (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6
years).24

3. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to ₱600,000.00, punishable by prision

correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2
months).

4. ₱50.00 to ₱200.00 will become ₱5,000.00 to ₱20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor

medium to prision correccional minimum (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).

5. ₱5.00 to ₱50.00 will become ₱500.00 to ₱5,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and
1 day to 6 months).
 6. ₱5.00 will become ₱500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum to arresto mayor medium.

x x x x.

II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also be modified but the penalties
are not changed, as follows:

1st. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00, will become ₱1,200,000.00 to ₱2,200,000.00, punishable by

prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8
years).25

2nd. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to ₱1,200,000.00, punishable by prision

correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2
months).26

3rd. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to ₱600,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor
maximum to prision correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).

4th. ₱200.00 will become ₱20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum (4 months and 1
day to 6 months).

An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici curiae, is that the
incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal Protection Clause.

The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is determined according to a valid
classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, 27 which
has four requisites:

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.28

According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on substantial distinctions as
₱10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it is not so today, which violates the first requisite;
the IPR was devised so that those who commit estafa involving higher amounts would receive heavier
penalties; however, this is no longer achieved, because a person who steals ₱142,000.00 would receive
the same penalty as someone who steals hundreds of millions, which violates the second requisite; and,
the IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering that the IPR is limited to existing conditions at the time the
law was promulgated, conditions that no longer exist today.

Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the incremental penalty in
Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause, what then is the penalty that should
be applied in case the amount of the thing subject matter of the crime exceeds ₱22,000.00? It seems that
the proposition poses more questions than answers, which leads us even more to conclude that the
appropriate remedy is to refer these matters to Congress for them to exercise their inherent power to
legislate laws.

Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR unconstitutional, the remedy is to
go to Congress. Thus:
 xxxx

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck down as unconstitutional
because it is absurd.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual punishment.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is more than Twenty-Two
Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental penalty rule
unconstitutional, then that would ... the void should be filled by Congress.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos ...

DEAN DIOKNO:

Well, my presen ... (interrupted)

JUSTICE PERALTA:

For every One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand
(₱22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting an additional penalty of one (1) year, did I get you right?

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory interpretation.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Ah ...

DEAN DIOKNO:

If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law...

JUSTICE PERALTA:

But if we de ... (interrupted)

DEAN DIOKNO:
....then....

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, the court cannot fix the amount
...

DEAN DIOKNO:

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00)
Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO:

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

The Court cannot do that.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Could not be.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

The only remedy is to go to Congress...

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

... and determine the value or the amount.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand
(₱22,000.00) Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.

Thank you, Dean.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Thank you.

x x x x29

Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm,30 Dean Diokno avers that the United States Federal Supreme Court
has expanded the application of a similar Constitutional provision prohibiting cruel and unusual
punishment, to the duration of the penalty, and not just its form. The court therein ruled that three things
must be done to decide whether a sentence is proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare the
nature and gravity of the offense, and the harshness of the penalty; (2) Compare the sentences imposed
on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e., whether more serious crimes are subject to the same
penalty or to less serious penalties; and (3) Compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same
crime in other jurisdictions.

However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case, because in Solem what
respondent therein deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the state court of South Dakota after it took
into account the latter’s recidivist statute and not the original penalty for uttering a "no account" check.
Normally, the maximum punishment for the crime would have been five years imprisonment and a
$5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless, respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole under South Dakota’s recidivist statute because of his six prior felony convictions. Surely, the
factual antecedents of Solem are different from the present controversy.

With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the imposable penalty for the offense
is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for the imposition of a higher penalty against a domestic servant is the
fact that in the commission of the crime, the helper will essentially gravely abuse the trust and confidence
reposed upon her by her employer. After accepting and allowing the helper to be a member of the
household, thus entrusting upon such person the protection and safekeeping of the employer’s loved
ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal of that trust is so repulsive as to warrant the necessity of
imposing a higher penalty to deter the commission of such wrongful acts.

There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are dependent on the subject
matter of the crime and which, by adopting the proposal, may create serious implications. For example, in
the crime of Malversation, the penalty imposed depends on the amount of the money malversed by the
public official, thus:

Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. — Any public officer who,
by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the
same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit
any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of
the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:

1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved
in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.
 2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is
more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.

3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum
period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand
pesos.

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved
is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount
exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the
property embezzled.

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing funds or property to personal use.

The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses money due to the unlawful
acts of the offender. Thus, following the proposal, if the amount malversed is ₱200.00 (under the existing
law), the amount now becomes ₱20,000.00 and the penalty is prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods (2 years 4 months and 1 day to 6 years). The penalty may not be commensurate to the
act of embezzlement of ₱20,000.00 compared to the acts committed by public officials punishable by a
special law, i.e., Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically Section
3,31 wherein the injury caused to the government is not generally defined by any monetary amount, the
penalty (6 years and 1 month to 15 years)32 under the Anti-Graft Law will now become higher. This should
not be the case, because in the crime of malversation, the public official takes advantage of his public
position to embezzle the fund or property of the government entrusted to him.

The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or
uninhabited) where the value of the thing unlawfully taken and the act of unlawful entry are the bases of
the penalty imposable, and also, in Malicious Mischief, where the penalty of imprisonment or fine is
dependent on the cost of the damage caused.

In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase the value of the thing
unlawfully taken, as proposed in the ponencia, the sole basis of the penalty will now be the value of the
thing unlawfully taken and no longer the element of force employed in entering the premises. It may
likewise cause an inequity between the crime of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling under Article 280, and
this kind of robbery because the former is punishable by prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine not exceeding ₱1,000.00 (₱100,000.00 now if
the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to the premises is with violence or intimidation, which is the main
justification of the penalty. Whereas in the crime of Robbery with force upon things, it is punished with a
penalty of prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) if the intruder is unarmed without the penalty of
Fine despite the fact that it is not merely the illegal entry that is the basis of the penalty but likewise the
unlawful taking.

Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest penalty that can be imposed is
arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months) if the value of the
damage caused exceeds ₱1,000.00, but under the proposal, the value of the damage will now become
₱100,000.00 (1:100), and still punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months). And, if the
value of the damaged property does not exceed ₱200.00, the penalty is arresto menor or a fine of not
less than the value of the damage caused and not more than ₱200.00, if the amount involved does not
exceed ₱200.00 or cannot be estimated. Under the proposal, ₱200.00 will now become ₱20,000.00,
which simply means that the fine of ₱200.00 under the existing law will now become ₱20,000.00. The
amount of Fine under this situation will now become excessive and afflictive in nature despite the fact that
the offense is categorized as a light felony penalized with a light penalty under Article 26 of the
RPC.33 Unless we also amend Article 26 of the RPC, there will be grave implications on the penalty of
Fine, but changing the same through Court decision, either expressly or impliedly, may not be legally and
constitutionally feasible.

There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may also be affected by the
proposal, such as those that impose imprisonment and/or Fine as a penalty based on the value of the
damage caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the property of the National Library and National Museum),
Article 312 (Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property), Article 313 (Altering
boundaries or landmarks), Article 316 (Other forms of swindling), Article 317 (Swindling a minor), Article
318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special cases of malicious mischief) and Article 331 (Destroying or
damaging statues, public monuments or paintings). Other crimes that impose Fine as a penalty will also
be affected, such as: Article 213 (Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses), Article 215
(Prohibited Transactions),

Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article 218 (Failure of accountable
officer to render accounts), Article 219 (Failure of a responsible public officer to render accounts before
leaving the country).

In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also affect crimes which are
punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or Violation of Section 68 of Presidential
Decree No. 705, as amended.34The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or
other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified
theft.35 Under the law, the offender shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and
31036 of the Revised Penal Code, which means that the penalty imposable for the offense is, again,
based on the value of the timber or forest products involved in the offense. Now, if we accept the said
proposal in the crime of Theft, will this particular crime of Illegal Logging be amended also in so far as the
penalty is concerned because the penalty is dependent on Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC? The answer
is in the negative because the soundness of this particular law is not in question.

With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and Special Laws, and
other related provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a thorough study is needed to determine
its effectivity and necessity. There may be some provisions of the law that should be amended;
nevertheless, this Court is in no position to conclude as to the intentions of the framers of the Revised
Penal Code by merely making a study of the applicability of the penalties imposable in the present times.
Such is not within the competence of the Court but of the Legislature which is empowered to conduct
public hearings on the matter, consult legal luminaries and who, after due proceedings, can decide
whether or not to amend or to revise the questioned law or other laws, or even create a new legislation
which will adopt to the times.

Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised Penal Code. During the
oral arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court that at present, fifty-six (56) bills are now
pending in the Senate seeking to amend the Revised Penal Code,37 each one proposing much needed
change and updates to archaic laws that were promulgated decades ago when the political, socio-
economic, and cultural settings were far different from today’s conditions.

Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp
legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or construction, it
should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend,
distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms. 38 The
Court should apply the law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the
law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from encroaching
upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an
inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial legislation.

Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a Fine; hence, it can be
increased by the Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed
and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not
caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the
recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate
succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding
five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;

(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or
compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which
in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person
dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to
pay the victim a sum of money as restitution. Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to the death of the
victim could not be contemplated as akin to the value of a thing that is unlawfully taken which is the basis
in the imposition of the proper penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the reasoning in increasing the value of
civil indemnity awarded in some offense cannot be the same reasoning that would sustain the adoption of
the suggested ratio. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount
for awards of civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the
minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity
can be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants it. Corollarily, moral
damages under Article 222039 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages that can be
awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the
private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so
long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.

In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed as tantamount to cruel
punishment. However, all penalties are generally harsh, being punitive in nature. Whether or not they are
excessive or amount to cruel punishment is a matter that should be left to lawmakers. It is the prerogative
of the courts to apply the law, especially when they are clear and not subject to any other interpretation
than that which is plainly written.

Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpio’s opinions is that the incremental
penalty provision should be declared unconstitutional and that the courts should only impose the penalty
corresponding to the amount of ₱22,000.00, regardless if the actual amount involved exceeds
₱22,000.00. As suggested, however, from now until the law is properly amended by Congress, all crimes
of Estafa will no longer be punished by the appropriate penalty. A conundrum in the regular course of
criminal justice would occur when every accused convicted of the crime of estafa will be meted penalties
different from the proper penalty that should be imposed. Such drastic twist in the application of the law
has no legal basis and directly runs counter to what the law provides.
It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation of criminal justice by the
Ramos Administration by virtue of Republic Act No. 765940 in December 1993. The said law has been
questioned before this Court. There is, arguably, no punishment more cruel than that of death. Yet still,
from the time the death penalty was re-imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by Republic Act No.
9346,41 the Court did not impede the imposition of the death penalty on the ground that it is a "cruel
punishment" within the purview of Section 19 (1),42 Article III of the Constitution. Ultimately, it was through
an act of Congress suspending the imposition of the death penalty that led to its non-imposition and not
via the intervention of the Court.

Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare the provision of the
law from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the present action. Not only is it violative
of due process, considering that the State and the concerned parties were not given the opportunity to
comment on the subject matter, it is settled that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked
collaterally because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally, 43 more so in the
present controversy wherein the issues never touched upon the constitutionality of any of the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code.

Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at
the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and
applies to punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those
inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling,
and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.44

It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be
obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not
make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the
punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the
offense as to shock the moral sense of the community."45

Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and adapt it to our
modern time.

The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the questioned monetary
values to the present value of money based only on the current inflation rate. There are other factors and
variables that need to be taken into consideration, researched, and deliberated upon before the said
values could be accurately and properly adjusted. The effects on the society, the injured party, the
accused, its socio-economic impact, and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated and weighed upon in
order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of us believe should be made to our existing law. Dejectedly,
the Court is ill-equipped, has no resources, and lacks sufficient personnel to conduct public hearings and
sponsor studies and surveys to validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal Code. This function
clearly and appropriately belongs to Congress. Even Professor Tadiar concedes to this conclusion, to wit:

xxxx

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the value of Peso you have to
take into consideration several factors.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:

Per capita income.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Per capita income.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Consumer price index.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yeah.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Inflation ...

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yes.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be determined utilizing all of those
economic terms.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah, but ...

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

And I don’t think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and peg the value to One
Hundred (₱100.00) Pesos to ...

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

... One (₱1.00.00) Peso in 1930.

JUSTICE PERALTA:
That is legislative in nature.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

That is my position that the Supreme Court ...

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah, okay.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to make the adjustment that is
a power that belongs to the legislature.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Thank you, Professor.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Thank you.46

Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes the view that the role
of the Court is not merely to dispense justice, but also the active duty to prevent injustice. Thus, in order
to prevent injustice in the present controversy, the Court should not impose an obsolete penalty pegged
eighty three years ago, but consider the proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply compensating for inflation.
Furthermore, the Court has in the past taken into consideration "changed conditions" or "significant
changes in circumstances" in its decisions.

Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the validity of the substance of a
statute. The issue is no different from the Court’s adjustment of indemnity in crimes against persons,
which the Court had previously adjusted in light of current times, like in the case of People v.
Pantoja.47 Besides, Article 10 of the Civil Code mandates a presumption that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.

With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and my Colleagues, all the
proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation. Short of being repetitious and as extensively
discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers of the Court to legislate laws, such immense power
belongs to Congress and the Court should refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to civil
indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers to civil liability which is awarded to the offended party as a
kind of monetary restitution. It is truly based on the value of money. The same cannot be said on
penalties because, as earlier stated, penalties are not only based on the value of money, but on several
other factors. Further, since the law is silent as to the maximum amount that can be awarded and only
pegged the minimum sum, increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity is not proscribed. Thus, it can
be adjusted in light of current conditions.

Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified the ruling of the RTC. The
RTC imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional in its
medium period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in its
minimum period, as maximum. However, the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus
one (1) year for each additional ₱10,000.00, or a total of seven (7) years.
In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in Cosme, Jr. v. People 48 is highly
instructive, thus:

With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if
the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds
the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and
for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.

The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in which case, Article
65 of the same Code requires the division of the time included in the penalty into three equal portions of
time included in the penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of the three portions. Applying the
latter provisions, the maximum, medium and minimum periods of the penalty prescribed are:

Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years

Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days

Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days 49

To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión correccional maximum to prisión
mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time each of which portion shall be
deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 6550 of the RPC.51 In the present case, the amount
involved is ₱98,000.00, which exceeds ₱22,000.00, thus, the maximum penalty imposable should be
within the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor. Article 315 also
states that a period of one year shall be added to the penalty for every additional ₱10,000.00 defrauded
in excess of ₱22,000.00, but in no case shall the total penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years.

Considering that the amount of ₱98,000.00 is ₱76,000.00 more than the ₱22,000.00 ceiling set by law,
then, adding one year for each additional ₱10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21
days to 8 years of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7 years. Taking the maximum of the
prescribed penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional 7 years, the maximum of the indeterminate
penalty is 15 years.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge
against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower
would then be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6 months and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months.

One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of lawmaking. The
Court should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent powers of making and enacting laws. While it
may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a dangerous proposition, lest the
Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of petitioner Lito Corpuz is
hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution dated September 5,
2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision
correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished the President of
the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice.

Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.

SO ORDERED.

Greco Belgica v. ES

G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M.
ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE
OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE
PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in
his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 208493

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE
FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209251

PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -

Province of Marinduque, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
 DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

"Experience is the oracle of truth."1

-James Madison

Before the Court are consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail
the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Due to the complexity of the subject matter, the Court shall
heretofore discuss the system‘s conceptual underpinnings before detailing the particulars of the
constitutional challenge.

The Facts

I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.

"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin.3 Historically, its usage may be
traced to the degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of black slaves
who would cast their famished bodies into the porcine feast to assuage their hunger with morsels
coming from the generosity of their well-fed master.4 This practice was later compared to the
actions of American legislators in trying to direct federal budgets in favor of their districts. 5 While
the advent of refrigeration has made the actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to
political bills that "bring home the bacon" to a legislator‘s district and constituents. 6 In a more
technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for
localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's
district.7Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to legislative control of local
appropriations.8

In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds
of Members of the Legislature,9 although, as will be later discussed, its usage would evolve in
reference to certain funds of the Executive.

II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.

A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).

Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered11 as the earliest form of
"Congressional Pork Barrel" in the Philippines since the utilization of the funds
appropriated therein were subjected to post-enactment legislator approval. Particularly, in
the area of fund release, Section 312 provides that the sums appropriated for certain
public works projects13 "shall be distributed x x x subject to the approval of a joint
committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives. "The committee
from each House may also authorize one of its members to approve the distribution
made by the Secretary of Commerce and Communications."14 Also, in the area of fund
realignment, the same section provides that the said secretary, "with the approval of said
joint committee, or of the authorized members thereof, may, for the purposes of said
distribution, transfer unexpended portions of any item of appropriation under this Act to
any other item hereunder."

In 1950, it has been documented15 that post-enactment legislator participation broadened

from the areas of fund release and realignment to the area of project identification. During
that year, the mechanics of the public works act was modified to the extent that the
 discretion of choosing projects was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications to legislators. "For the first time, the law carried a list of projects
selected by Members of Congress, they ‘being the representatives of the people, either
on their own account or by consultation with local officials or civil leaders.‘" 16 During this
period, the pork barrel process commenced with local government councils, civil groups,
and individuals appealing to Congressmen or Senators for projects. Petitions that were
accommodated formed part of a legislator‘s allocation, and the amount each legislator
would eventually get is determined in a caucus convened by the majority. The amount
was then integrated into the administration bill prepared by the Department of Public
Works and Communications. Thereafter, the Senate and the House of Representatives
added their own provisions to the bill until it was signed into law by the President – the
Public Works Act.17 In the 1960‘s, however, pork barrel legislation reportedly ceased in
view of the stalemate between the House of Representatives and the Senate. 18

B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).

While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently discontinued in 1972
after Martial Law was declared, an era when "one man controlled the legislature,"19 the
reprieve was only temporary. By 1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already introduced a
new item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) called the" Support for Local
Development Projects" (SLDP) under the article on "National Aid to Local Government
Units". Based on reports,20 it was under the SLDP that the practice of giving lump-sum
allocations to individual legislators began, with each assemblyman receiving
₱500,000.00. Thereafter, assemblymen would communicate their project preferences to
the Ministry of Budget and Management for approval. Then, the said ministry would
release the allocation papers to the Ministry of Local Governments, which would, in turn,
issue the checks to the city or municipal treasurers in the assemblyman‘s locality. It has
been further reported that "Congressional Pork Barrel" projects under the SLDP also
began to cover not only public works projects, or so- called "hard projects", but also "soft
projects",21 or non-public works projects such as those which would fall under the
categories of, among others, education, health and livelihood.22

C. Post-Martial Law Era:

Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).

After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of Philippine
democracy, "Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in the form of the "Mindanao
Development Fund" and the "Visayas Development Fund" which were created with lump-
sum appropriations of ₱480 Million and ₱240 Million, respectively, for the funding of
development projects in the Mindanao and Visayas areas in 1989. It has been
documented23 that the clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon legislators for a
similar funding, prompted the creation of the "Countrywide Development Fund" (CDF)
which was integrated into the 1990 GAA24 with an initial funding of ₱2.3 Billion to cover
"small local infrastructure and other priority community projects."

Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,25 CDF funds were, with the approval of the
President, to be released directly to the implementing agencies but "subject to the
submission of the required list of projects and activities."Although the GAAs from 1990 to
1992 were silent as to the amounts of allocations of the individual legislators, as well as
their participation in the identification of projects, it has been reported 26 that by 1992,
Representatives were receiving ₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds, while Senators were
receiving ₱18 Million each, without any limitation or qualification, and that they could
identify any kind of project, from hard or infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges,
and buildings to "soft projects" such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships. 27
D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).

The following year, or in 1993,28 the GAA explicitly stated that the release of CDF funds
was to be made upon the submission of the list of projects and activities identified by,
among others, individual legislators. For the first time, the 1993 CDF Article included an
allocation for the Vice-President.29 As such, Representatives were allocated ₱12.5 Million
each in CDF funds, Senators, ₱18 Million each, and the Vice-President, ₱20 Million.

In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained the same provisions on project
identification and fund release as found in the 1993 CDF Article. In addition, however, the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was directed to submit reports to the
Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations on the
releases made from the funds.33

Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice-President, in
consultation with the implementing agency concerned, were directed to submit to the
DBM the list of 50% of projects to be funded from their respective CDF allocations which
shall be duly endorsed by (a) the Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee
on Finance, in the case of the Senate, and (b) the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, in the case of
the House of Representatives; while the list for the remaining 50% was to be submitted
within six (6) months thereafter. The same article also stated that the project list, which
would be published by the DBM,35 "shall be the basis for the release of funds" and that
"no funds appropriated herein shall be disbursed for projects not included in the list
herein required."

The following year, or in 1998,36 the foregoing provisions regarding the required lists and
endorsements were reproduced, except that the publication of the project list was no
longer required as the list itself sufficed for the release of CDF Funds.

The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" at that time.
Other forms of "Congressional Pork Barrel" were reportedly fashioned and inserted into
the GAA (called "Congressional Insertions" or "CIs") in order to perpetuate the ad
ministration‘s political agenda.37 It has been articulated that since CIs "formed part and
parcel of the budgets of executive departments, they were not easily identifiable and
were thus harder to monitor." Nonetheless, the lawmakers themselves as well as the
finance and budget officials of the implementing agencies, as well as the DBM,
purportedly knew about the insertions.38 Examples of these CIs are the Department of
Education (DepEd) School Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative Allocations, the
Public Works Fund, the El Niño Fund, and the Poverty Alleviation Fund. 39 The allocations
for the School Building Fund, particularly, ―shall be made upon prior consultation with
the representative of the legislative district concerned.”40 Similarly, the legislators had the
power to direct how, where and when these appropriations were to be spent. 41

E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).

In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3) separate forms of
CIs, namely, the "Food Security Program Fund,"43 the "Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap
Program Fund,"44and the "Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund,"45 all
of which contained a special provision requiring "prior consultation" with the Member s of
Congress for the release of the funds.

It was in the year 200046 that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF)
appeared in the GAA. The requirement of "prior consultation with the respective
 Representative of the District" before PDAF funds were directly released to the
implementing agency concerned was explicitly stated in the 2000 PDAF Article.
Moreover, realignment of funds to any expense category was expressly allowed, with the
sole condition that no amount shall be used to fund personal services and other
personnel benefits.47 The succeeding PDAF provisions remained the same in view of the
re-enactment48 of the 2000 GAA for the year 2001.

F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).

The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely contained a single
special provision ordering the release of the funds directly to the implementing agency or
local government unit concerned, without further qualifications. The following year,
2003,50 the same single provision was present, with simply an expansion of purpose and
express authority to realign. Nevertheless, the provisions in the 2003 budgets of the
Department of Public Works and Highways51 (DPWH) and the DepEd52 required prior
consultation with Members of Congress on the aspects of implementation delegation and
project list submission, respectively. In 2004, the 2003 GAA was re-enacted.53

In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to fund priority
programs and projects under the ten point agenda of the national government and shall
be released directly to the implementing agencies." It also introduced the program menu
concept,55 which is essentially a list of general programs and implementing agencies from
which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by the identifying authority.
The 2005 GAA was re-enacted56 in 2006 and hence, operated on the same bases. In
similar regard, the program menu concept was consistently integrated into the
2007,57 2008,58 2009,59 and 201060 GAAs.

Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with respect to the specific
amounts allocated for the individual legislators, as well as their participation in the
proposal and identification of PDAF projects to be funded. In contrast to the PDAF
Articles, however, the provisions under the DepEd School Building Program and the
DPWH budget, similar to its predecessors, explicitly required prior consultation with the
concerned Member of Congress61anent certain aspects of project implementation.

Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal participation of
non-governmental organizations (NGO) in the implementation of government projects
were introduced. In the Supplemental Budget for 2006, with respect to the appropriation
for school buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged to participate. For such purpose,
the law stated that "the amount of at least ₱250 Million of the ₱500 Million allotted for the
construction and completion of school buildings shall be made available to NGOs
including the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Inc.
for its "Operation Barrio School" program, with capability and proven track records in the
construction of public school buildings x x x."62 The same allocation was made available
to NGOs in the 2007 and 2009 GAAs under the DepEd Budget.63 Also, it was in 2007 that
the Government Procurement Policy Board64 (GPPB) issued Resolution No. 12-2007
dated June 29, 2007 (GPPB Resolution 12-2007), amending the implementing rules and
regulations65 of RA 9184,66 the Government Procurement Reform Act, to include, as a
form of negotiated procurement,67 the procedure whereby the Procuring Entity68(the
implementing agency) may enter into a memorandum of agreement with an NGO,
provided that "an appropriation law or ordinance earmarks an amount to be specifically
contracted out to NGOs."69

G. Present Administration (2010-Present).

 Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF Articles, the 2011 70 PDAF
Article included an express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual
legislators and the Vice-President: Representatives were given ₱70 Million each, broken
down into ₱40 Million for "hard projects" and ₱30 Million for "soft projects"; while ₱200
Million was given to each Senator as well as the Vice-President, with a ₱100 Million
allocation each for "hard" and "soft projects." Likewise, a provision on realignment of
funds was included, but with the qualification that it may be allowed only once. The same
provision also allowed the Secretaries of Education, Health, Social Welfare and
Development, Interior and Local Government, Environment and Natural Resources,
Energy, and Public Works and Highways to realign PDAF Funds, with the further
conditions that: (a) realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project
category as the original project, for infrastructure projects; (b) allotment released has not
yet been obligated for the original scope of work, and (c) the request for realignment is
with the concurrence of the legislator concerned.71

In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "identification of projects
and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design
prepared by each implementing agency (priority list requirement) x x x." However, as
practiced, it would still be the individual legislator who would choose and identify the
project from the said priority list.74

Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund realignment76 were included in the

2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles; but the allocation for the Vice-President, which was
pegged at ₱200 Million in the 2011 GAA, had been deleted. In addition, the 2013 PDAF
Article now allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies if they have the
technical capability to implement the projects.77 Legislators were also allowed to identify
programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships, outside of
his legislative district provided that he secures the written concurrence of the legislator of
the intended outside-district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House.78 Finally, any
realignment of PDAF funds, modification and revision of project identification, as well as
requests for release of funds, were all required to be favorably endorsed by the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may
be.79

III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.

While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds of
Members of Congress, the present cases and the recent controversies on the matter have,
however, shown that the term‘s usage has expanded to include certain funds of the President
such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under Section 8 80 of
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 910,81 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on
March 22, 1976. In enacting the said law, Marcos recognized the need to set up a special fund to
help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration,
exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth.82 Due to
the energy-related activities of the government in the Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan, or
the "Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project",83 the special fund created under PD 910
has been currently labeled as Malampaya Funds.

On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV84 of PD
1869,85 or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). PD
1869 was similarly issued by Marcos on July 11, 1983. More than two (2) years after, he
amended PD 1869 and accordingly issued PD 1993 on October 31, 1985,86 amending Section
1287 of the former law. As it stands, the Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special
 funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which
the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the
regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of
PAGCOR.88

IV. Controversies in the Philippines.

Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased tremendously,89 owing in no
small part to previous Presidents who reportedly used the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain
congressional support.90 It was in 1996 when the first controversy surrounding the "Pork Barrel"
erupted. Former Marikina City Representative Romeo Candazo (Candazo), then an anonymous
source, "blew the lid on the huge sums of government money that regularly went into the pockets
of legislators in the form of kickbacks."91 He said that "the kickbacks were ‘SOP‘ (standard
operating procedure) among legislators and ranged from a low 19 percent to a high 52 percent of
the cost of each project, which could be anything from dredging, rip rapping, sphalting,
concreting, and construction of school buildings."92 "Other sources of kickbacks that Candazo
identified were public funds intended for medicines and textbooks. A few days later, the tale of the
money trail became the banner story of the Philippine Daily Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996,
accompanied by an illustration of a roasted pig."93 "The publication of the stories, including those
about congressional initiative allocations of certain lawmakers, including ₱3.6 Billion for a
Congressman, sparked public outrage."94

Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted
in the 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of "any pertinent evidentiary
support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of
unscrupulous Members of Congress," the petition was dismissed. 95

Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its
probe into allegations that "the government has been defrauded of some ₱10 Billion over the past
10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government
agencies for scores of ghost projects."96 The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six
(6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles
(Napoles) – had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using no
fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate
recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers declared that the money was diverted into Napoles‘
private accounts.97 Thus, after its investigation on the Napoles controversy, criminal complaints
were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and
three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the
lawmakers‘ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3)
implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles. 98

On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit
investigation99covering the use of legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3)
years of the Arroyo administration. The purpose of the audit was to determine the propriety of
releases of funds under PDAF and the Various Infrastructures including Local Projects
(VILP)100 by the DBM, the application of these funds and the implementation of projects by the
appropriate implementing agencies and several government-owned-and-controlled corporations
(GOCCs).101 The total releases covered by the audit amounted to ₱8.374 Billion in PDAF and
₱32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of the total PDAF and VILP
releases that were found to have been made nationwide during the audit period. 102 Accordingly,
the Co A‘s findings contained in its Report No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled "Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various Infrastructures including Local Projects
(VILP)," were made public, the highlights of which are as follows: 103
 ● Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of legislators
significantly exceeded their respective allocations.

● Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of sponsoring

members of the Lower House.

● Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount appropriated under the
2007 to 2009 GAAs.

● Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these having been
turned over to the government.

● Significant amounts were released to implementing agencies without the latter‘s

endorsement and without considering their mandated functions, administrative and
technical capabilities to implement projects.

● Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by the implementing

agencies themselves but by NGOs endorsed by the proponent legislators to which the
Funds were transferred.

● The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence of any appropriation
law or ordinance.

● Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations.

● Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven hundred seventy two
(772) projects amount to ₱6.156 Billion were either found questionable, or submitted
questionable/spurious documents, or failed to liquidate in whole or in part their utilization
of the Funds.

● Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing agencies, of goods and

services reportedly used in the projects were not compliant with law.

As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least ₱900 Million from
royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for
agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO."104 According to incumbent CoA
Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in the
process of preparing "one consolidated report" on the Malampaya Funds.105

V. The Procedural Antecedents.

Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy,
several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional. To recount, the relevant procedural antecedents in these cases are as
follows:

On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social Justice Society,
filed a Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition),
seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued
permanently restraining respondents Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their respective
capacities as the incumbent Senate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further
taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form
and by whatever name it may be called, and from approving further releases pursuant thereto. 106 The
Alcantara Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208493.

On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben M.
Abante, Quintin Paredes San Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an Urgent
Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the
provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum,
discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, 107 be declared
unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray
that the Court issue a TRO against respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary
Abad) and Rosalia V. De Leon, in their respective capacities as the incumbent Executive Secretary,
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and National Treasurer, or their agents,
for them to immediately cease any expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the
Court order the foregoing respondents to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete
schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013,
specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all
pertinent data thereto"; and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the
proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013,
specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data
thereto."108 Also, they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently
off-budget, lump-sum, discretionary funds including, but not limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya
Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR."109 The Belgica Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208566.110

Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a Petition dated
August 23, 2012 (Nepomuceno Petition), seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a
cease and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino)
and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress and, instead, allow their release
to fund priority projects identified and approved by the Local Development Councils in consultation with
the executive departments, such as the DPWH, the Department of Tourism, the Department of Health,
the Department of Transportation, and Communication and the National Economic Development
Authority.111 The Nepomuceno Petition was docketed as UDK-14951.112

On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a) consolidating all cases; (b)
requiring public respondents to comment on the consolidated petitions; (c) issuing a TRO (September 10,
2013 TRO) enjoining the DBM, National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or any of the persons acting
under their authority from releasing (1) the remaining PDAF allocated to Members of Congress under the
GAA of 2013, and (2) Malampaya Funds under the phrase "for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910 but not for the purpose of "financing energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government‖ under the same
provision; and (d) setting the consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on October 8, 2013.

On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated Comment
(Comment) of even date before the Court, seeking the lifting, or in the alternative, the partial lifting with
respect to educational and medical assistance purposes, of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO, and
that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of merit.113

On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directing petitioners to reply to the
Comment.

Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies to the Comment: (a) on
September 30, 2013, Villegas filed a separate Reply dated September 27, 2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on
October 1, 2013, Belgica, et al. filed a Reply dated September 30, 2013 (Belgica Reply); and (c) on
October 2, 2013, Alcantara filed a Reply dated October 1, 2013.
On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the guidelines to be observed by the
parties for the Oral Arguments scheduled on October 8, 2013. In view of the technicality of the issues
material to the present cases, incumbent Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza (Solicitor General) was
directed to bring with him during the Oral Arguments representative/s from the DBM and Congress who
would be able to competently and completely answer questions related to, among others, the budgeting
process and its implementation. Further, the CoA Chairperson was appointed as amicus curiae and
thereby requested to appear before the Court during the Oral Arguments.

On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted. Thereafter, the Court directed the
parties to submit their respective memoranda within a period of seven (7) days, or until October 17, 2013,
which the parties subsequently did.

The Issues Before the Court

Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the following are the main issues for
the Court‘s resolution:

I. Procedural Issues.

Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable
controversy; (b) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to judicial
review; (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue; and (d) the Court‘s Decision dated August 19, 1994 in
G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, and 113888, entitled "Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez"114 (Philconsa) and Decision dated April 24, 2012 in G.R. No. 164987, entitled "Lawyers Against
Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management"115 (LAMP) bar the re-litigatio n of the
issue of constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis.

II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."

Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of
powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political
dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.

III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."

Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due
to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.

These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. In addition, the Court shall
also tackle certain ancillary issues as prompted by the present cases.

The Court’s Ruling

The petitions are partly granted.

I. Procedural Issues.
The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of
a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the
legal requisites for judicial inquiry,117 namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for
the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. 118 Of these
requisites, case law states that the first two are the most important 119and, therefore, shall be discussed
forthwith.

A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.

By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy. 120 This is
embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that "judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable x x x." Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one
which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.121 In other words, "there
must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence."122 Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
"ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication.
"A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action."123 "Withal, courts will decline
to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve
hypothetical or moot questions."124

Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these
cases.

The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties
on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are
ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such as
the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
for the Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate
or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.

As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot
and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more
actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the
merits.125 Differing from this description, the Court observes that respondents‘ proposed line-item
budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution
since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a
distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the President‘s declaration that
he had already "abolished the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive
branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By
constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the
passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality. Instructive on this
point is the following exchange between Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) and the
Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments:126

Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the law,127 correct? Solicitor General
Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the General Appropriations Act, correct?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the case, for example of the PDAF,
the President has a duty to execute the laws but in the face of the outrage over PDAF, the President was
saying, "I am not sure that I will continue the release of the soft projects," and that started, Your Honor.
Now, whether or not that … (interrupted)

Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the project, he has the power to
stop the releases in the meantime, to investigate, and that is Section 38 of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the
Revised Administrative Code128 x x x. So at most the President can suspend, now if the President
believes that the PDAF is unconstitutional, can he just refuse to implement it?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the specific case of the PDAF
because of the CoA Report, because of the reported irregularities and this Court can take judicial notice,
even outside, outside of the COA Report, you have the report of the whistle-blowers, the President was
just exercising precisely the duty ….

xxxx

Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. You‘ve seen the CoA Report, there are anomalies, you stop and
investigate, and prosecute, he has done that. But, does that mean that PDAF has been repealed?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.

xxxx

Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases. Congress passes a law to
repeal it, or this Court declares it unconstitutional, correct?

Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF. (Emphases supplied)

Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and academic‘
principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case." The
Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and
the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. 129

The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners – they
essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of separation
of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.

The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved

– the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and
continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as
a matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the
system‘s flaws have never before been magnified. To the Court‘s mind, the coalescence of the CoA
Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the government‘s own recognition that reforms
are needed "to address the reported abuses of the PDAF"130 demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse
which only underscores the importance of the matter. It is also by this finding that the Court finds
petitioners‘ claims as not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by
the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the
government. In Delos Santos v. CoA,131 a recent case wherein the Court upheld the CoA‘s disallowance
of irregularly disbursed PDAF funds, it was emphasized that:

The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant
and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people's,
property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to
the check and balance system inherent in our form of government.

It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one
which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of
powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of
administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are
not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when
the CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. x x x. (Emphases
supplied)

Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these
cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.

The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive
ruling on the system‘s constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson
estimates that thousands of notices of disallowances will be issued by her office in connection with the
findings made in the CoA Report. In this relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen
(Justice Leonen) pointed out that all of these would eventually find their way to the courts.132 Accordingly,
there is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein in order
to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated
disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds
should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.

Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation and
passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence. 133 The
relevance of the issues before the Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF -free budget for
2014."134 The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course of
history, lends a semblance of truth to petitioners‘ claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a
different collar."135 In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, 136 the government had already backtracked on a
previous course of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition but evading review" exception in
order "to prevent similar questions from re- emerging."137 The situation similarly holds true to these cases.
Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved
at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.

B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.

The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies‖ carries the assurance
that "the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government."138 Essentially,
the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the classic
formulation of Baker v. Carr,139applies when there is found, among others, "a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it" or "the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast against this light, respondents
submit that the "the political branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-related reforms
but also to do them in response to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as such, "urge the
Court not to impose a solution at this stage."140

The Court must deny respondents‘ submission.

Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which
are within its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure." 141 The intrinsic
constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political
branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to
act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political
branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power.
More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial
power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
cannot be any clearer: "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law. It includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." In Estrada v. Desierto,142 the expanded concept of judicial power
under the 1987 Constitution and its effect on the political question doctrine was explained as follows:143

To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it
expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the
Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are
given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new
provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. x x x (Emphases supplied)

It must also be borne in mind that ― when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it
does not assert any superiority over the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act
of the legislature or the executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution."144 To a great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-
equal branches of government. But it is by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its
duty. Ultimately, it is the Court‘s avowed intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in
any manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of
change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people that
each great branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a holistic
and genuine solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed
respondents‘ plea for judicial restraint.

C. Locus Standi.

"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously
affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing." 145

Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and
accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury." 146 Clearly, as
taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel System"
under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as
taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules.
Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are
wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, 147 as in these cases.

Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues
they have raised may be classified as matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance
to society, or of paramount public interest."148 The CoA Chairperson‘s statement during the Oral
Arguments that the present controversy involves "not merely a systems failure" but a "complete
breakdown of controls"149 amplifies, in addition to the matters above-discussed, the seriousness of the
issues involved herein. Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of
public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid
statute.150 All told, petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases.

D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.

Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non quieta et movere (or simply, stare
decisis which means "follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled") are general
procedural law principles which both deal with the effects of previous but factually similar dispositions to
subsequent cases. For the cases at bar, the Court examines the applicability of these principles in
relation to its prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.

The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a
previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the
first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
action.151 This required identity is not, however, attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively
involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the
cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork Barrel System." Also, the ruling in
LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on the
merits – in that petitioners therein failed to present any "convincing proof x x x showing that, indeed, there
were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their
sole discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary support to demonstrate the illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of
kickbacks and has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress." As such, the
Court up held, in view of the presumption of constitutionality accorded to every law, the 2004 PDAF
Article, and saw "no need to review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for
the foregoing reasons, the res judicata principle, insofar as the Philconsa and LAMP cases are
concerned, cannot apply.

On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under
Article 8152 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached
in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even
though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions
relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case
litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate
the same issue.153

Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel provision, i.e., the
1994 CDF Article, was resolved by the Court. To properly understand its context, petitioners‘ posturing
was that "the power given to the Members of Congress to propose and identify projects and activities to
be funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an
appropriation act is in implementation of the law" and that "the proposal and identification of the projects
do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, the only function given to the
Congress by the Constitution."154 In deference to the foregoing submissions, the Court reached the
following main conclusions: one, under the Constitution, the power of appropriation, or the "power of the
purse," belongs to Congress; two, the power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the
project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law and it can be detailed and as broad as
Congress wants it to be; and, three, the proposals and identifications made by Members of Congress are
merely recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a
separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification
authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination
of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the
entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within
a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related to the area of project identification but
also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader legal
analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a
wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.

In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional
inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. As may be deduced from
the main conclusions of the case, Philconsa‘s fundamental premise in allowing Members of Congress to
propose and identify of projects would be that the said identification authority is but an aspect of the
power of appropriation which has been constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this premise, the
contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the
power of appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress, then it follows that: (a) it
is Congress which should exercise such authority, and not its individual Members; (b) such authority must
be exercised within the prescribed procedure of law passage and, hence, should not be exercised after
the GAA has already been passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied in the GAA, has the force of law
and, hence, cannot be merely recommendatory. Justice Vitug‘s Concurring Opinion in the same case
sums up the Philconsa quandary in this wise: "Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law, to
appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the
individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible."
As the Court now largely benefits from hindsight and current findings on the matter, among others, the
CoA Report, the Court must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the
post-enactment identification authority of Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely
recommendatory. This postulate raises serious constitutional inconsistencies which cannot be simply
excused on the ground that such mechanism is "imaginative as it is innovative." Moreover, it must be
pointed out that the recent case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima155(Abakada) has effectively
overturned Philconsa‘s allowance of post-enactment legislator participation in view of the separation of
powers principle. These constitutional inconsistencies and the Abakada rule will be discussed in greater
detail in the ensuing section of this Decision.

As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural technicality and,
hence, has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in
these cases. In fine, stare decisis would not apply.

II. Substantive Issues.

A. Definition of Terms.

Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of these cases, it must first define the terms
"Pork Barrel System," "Congressional Pork Barrel," and "Presidential Pork Barrel" as they are essential to
the ensuing discourse.

Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between the Legislative and Executive
branches of government to accumulate lump-sum public funds in their offices with unchecked
discretionary powers to determine its distribution as political largesse."156 They assert that the following
elements make up the Pork Barrel System: (a) lump-sum funds are allocated through the appropriations
process to an individual officer; (b) the officer is given sole and broad discretion in determining how the
funds will be used or expended; (c) the guidelines on how to spend or use the funds in the appropriation
are either vague, overbroad or inexistent; and (d) projects funded are intended to benefit a definite
constituency in a particular part of the country and to help the political careers of the disbursing official by
yielding rich patronage benefits.157 They further state that the Pork Barrel System is comprised of two (2)
kinds of discretionary public funds: first, the Congressional (or Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently known as
the PDAF;158 and, second, the Presidential (or Executive) Pork Barrel, specifically, the Malampaya Funds
under PD 910 and the Presidential Social Fund under PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993.159

Considering petitioners‘ submission and in reference to its local concept and legal history, the Court
defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by
which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the
respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members.
The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:

First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary
fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to
effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through various post-enactment measures
and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as
Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows individual
legislators to wield a collective power;160 and

Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary
fund which allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier
stated,161 the Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund.

With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the substantive issues of these
cases.

B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.

1. Separation of Powers.

a. Statement of Principle.

The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental
powers of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 162 it
means that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government."163 To the legislative branch of
government, through Congress,164belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of
government, through the President,165 belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of
government, through the Court,166 belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers
have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, "each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere."167 Thus, "the
legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has no authority to make or
construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law."168 The principle of
separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the
powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the
division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the
citizenry.169 To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of
government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack
of independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-
interest assertions of another or others.170
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of
government unduly encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the
principle of separation of powers may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch may interfere
impermissibly with the other’s performance of its constitutionally assigned function"; 171 and "alternatively,
the doctrine may be violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to
another."172 In other words, there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a) interference
with and/or (b) assumption of another department‘s functions.

The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both
constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr.
v. Hon. Carague173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that the phase of budget execution "covers the
various operational aspects of budgeting" and accordingly includes "the evaluation of work and financial
plans for individual activities," the "regulation and release of funds" as well as all "other related activities"
that comprise the budget execution cycle.174 This is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in
the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them.175 Thus, unless the
Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department should exclusively exercise all roles and
prerogatives which go into the implementation of the national budget as provided under the GAA as well
as any other appropriation law.

In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not
cross over the field of implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the
domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that "Congress enters the picture when
it deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of
its own judgment and wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established
by the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance
with an appropriation made by law." Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress‘ law -making role
necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive‘s role of implementing the national budget
begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must "not concern it self
with details for implementation by the Executive."176

The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that "from
the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional."177 It must be clarified, however, that since the
restriction only pertains to "any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may still
exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution itself
allows. But it must be made clear that Congress‘ role must be confined to mere oversight. Any post-
enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis
and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions. As the
Court ruled in Abakada:178

Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and

investigation.1âwphi1 In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings
conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be
heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation; and

(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
(Emphases supplied)
b. Application.

In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel – among others, the 2013 PDAF
Article – "wrecks the assignment of responsibilities between the political branches" as it is designed to
allow individual legislators to interfere "way past the time it should have ceased" or, particularly, "after the
GAA is passed."179 They state that the findings and recommendations in the CoA Report provide "an
illustration of how absolute and definitive the power of legislators wield over project implementation in
complete violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers."180 Further, they point out that
the Court in the Philconsa case only allowed the CDF to exist on the condition that individual legislators
limited their role to recommending projects and not if they actually dictate their implementation. 181

For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not been violated since
the President maintains "ultimate authority to control the execution of the GAA‖ and that he "retains the
final discretion to reject" the legislators‘ proposals.182 They maintain that the Court, in Philconsa, "upheld
the constitutionality of the power of members of Congress to propose and identify projects so long as
such proposal and identification are recommendatory."183 As such, they claim that "everything in the
Special Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF Article follows the Philconsa framework, and hence, remains
constitutional."184

The Court rules in favor of petitioners.

As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel
would be the authority of legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project
implementation.

At its core, legislators – may it be through project lists,185 prior consultations186 or program menus187 –
have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be
funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory
authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from the import of Special
Provisions 1 to 3 as well as the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. To elucidate, Special Provision
1 embodies the program menu feature which, as evinced from past PDAF Articles, allows individual
legislators to identify PDAF projects for as long as the identified project falls under a general program
listed in the said menu. Relatedly, Special Provision 2 provides that the implementing agencies shall,
within 90 days from the GAA is passed, submit to Congress a more detailed priority list, standard or
design prepared and submitted by implementing agencies from which the legislator may make his choice.
The same provision further authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects outside his district for as long
as the representative of the district concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile, Special Provision 3 clarifies
that PDAF projects refer to "projects to be identified by legislators"188 and thereunder provides the
allocation limit for the total amount of projects identified by each legislator. Finally, paragraph 2 of Special
Provision 4 requires that any modification and revision of the project identification "shall be submitted to
the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable
endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be." From the foregoing special
provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted that legislators have been accorded post-enactment authority
to identify PDAF projects.

Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority
in the areas of fund release and realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of
legislators to participate in the area of fund release through congressional committees is contained in
Special Provision 5 which explicitly states that "all request for release of funds shall be supported by the
documents prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be"; while their statutory authority
to participate in the area of fund realignment is contained in: first , paragraph 2, Special Provision
4189 which explicitly state s, among others, that "any realignment of funds shall be submitted to the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the
DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be‖ ; and, second , paragraph 1, also of Special
Provision 4 which authorizes the "Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local
Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and
Trade and Industry190 x x x to approve realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment
received from this Fund, subject to among others (iii) the request is with the concurrence of the legislator
concerned."

Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release
and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators
to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by
virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in – as
Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work
and financial plans for individual activities" and the "regulation and release of funds" in violation of the
separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be
overstated – from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress
or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the
principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.191 That the said authority is treated as
merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat,
covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must
therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the
guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents‘ reliance on the same falters
altogether.

Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to substantiate their position
that the identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import. Quite the contrary,
respondents – through the statements of the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments – have admitted
that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before his PDAF can be
tapped as a funding source, thereby highlighting the indispensability of the said act to the entire budget
execution process:192

Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislator’s identification of the project, can the PDAF of the
legislator be utilized?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.

Justice Bernabe: It cannot?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot… (interrupted)

Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the project by the individual legislator?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx

Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?

Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done and then there is no
identification.

xxxx

Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project was implemented without the
identification by the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I have no specific examples.
I would doubt very much, Your Honor, because to implement, there is a need for a SARO and the NCA.
And the SARO and the NCA are triggered by an identification from the legislator.

xxxx

Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we were replying to a question,
"How can a legislator make sure that he is able to get PDAF Funds?" It is mandatory in the sense that he
must identify, in that sense, Your Honor. Otherwise, if he does not identify, he cannot avail of the PDAF
Funds and his district would not be able to have PDAF Funds, only in that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases
supplied)

Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other
provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the
separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through
which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed
as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the
same unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do exist and have, in fact, been constantly
observed throughout the years has not been substantially disputed here. As pointed out by Chief Justice
Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during the Oral Arguments of these cases: 193
Chief Justice Sereno:

Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2) Houses of Congress, if we
enforces the initial thought that I have, after I had seen the extent of this research made by my staff, that
neither the Executive nor Congress frontally faced the question of constitutional compatibility of how they
were engineering the budget process. In fact, the words you have been using, as the three lawyers of the
DBM, and both Houses of Congress has also been using is surprise; surprised that all of these things are
now surfacing. In fact, I thought that what the 2013 PDAF provisions did was to codify in one section all
the past practice that had been done since 1991. In a certain sense, we should be thankful that they are
all now in the PDAF Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through formal measures
written into the law or informal practices institutionalized in government agencies, else the Executive
department be deprived of what the Constitution has vested as its own.

2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.

a. Statement of Principle.

As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,194 legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by
the body to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist
of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision
on initiative and referendum.195 Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a
bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally
wield legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative
power, and the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local
governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local matters;196 and (b)
constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national
emergency,197or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress
may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. 198
Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to delegate rule-making
authority to implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its
enforcement (supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation
(contingent rule-making).199The conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were
explained in the case of People v. Maceren200 as follows:

The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation
of powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or
"subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
increased difficulty of administering the law."

xxxx

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot
be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by
the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)

b. Application.

In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment
identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said
legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled in
Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.201 That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through
legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To understand
what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular
Auditor202 (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain
sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article,
individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how
much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also
determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in
Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same,
undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not,
however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby
declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the
similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.

3. Checks and Balances.

a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.

The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and distinct does not
mean that they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has also
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government.203

A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an item
written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a
process known as "bill presentment." The President‘s item-veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:

Sec. 27. x x x.
 xxxx

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue,
or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may exercise his
power of item-veto, forms part of the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" for
law-passage as specified under the Constitution.204 As stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-making
process is the "submission of the bill to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law
after the required publication."205

Elaborating on the President‘s item-veto power and its relevance as a check on the legislature, the Court,
in Bengzon, explained that:206

The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief Executive an
integral part of the law-making power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially
a legislative act. The questions presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are precisely the same as
those the legislature must determine in passing a bill, except that his will be a broader point of view.

The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in this
respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to
enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may
defeat the will of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the
Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict construction or
hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of
the constitutionality of a veto in the same manner as they will presume the constitutionality of an act as
originally passed by the Legislature. (Emphases supplied)

The justification for the President‘s item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent
log-rolling legislation,207 impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive
branch‘s role in the budgetary process.208 In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US
Supreme Court characterized the President‘s item-power as "a salutary check upon the legislative body,
calculated to guard the community against the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse
unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body"; phrased differently,
it is meant to "increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through
haste, inadvertence, or design."209

For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item"
which may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the
particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands,210 the US Supreme Court characterized an item
of appropriation as follows:

An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of
money, not some general provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. (Emphases
supplied)

On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be able
to exercise his power of item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general
provisions" which provide for parameters of appropriation.

Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular
correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose,
otherwise known as a "line-item."211 This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its
definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto
the same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the
Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then
be considered as "line- item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be
observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into component percentages or values;
however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose
for such component to be considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed
out, a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting
practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in which
case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the President‘s item
veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds would equally square with the
constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence as
herein discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it must be added that Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution requires that the "special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended,
and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or t o be raised
by a corresponding revenue proposal therein." Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds, Section 2
5(6), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that said funds "shall be disbursed only for public
purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed
by law."

In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular
lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation
type necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual
purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it
cannot be said that the appropriation law already indicates a "specific appropriation of money‖ and hence,
without a proper line-item which the President may veto. As a practical result, the President would then
be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes
wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate
purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues
considering that the implementing authority would still have to determine, again, both the actual amount
to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations
constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be
exercising legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability.

b. Application.

In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump-sum
appropriation, the legislator‘s identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the
President the chance to veto that item later on."212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto power of
the President mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item budgeting" and that "Congress cannot
choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President
useless."213

On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution envisions a process which is
intended to meet the demands of a modernizing economy and, as such, lump-sum appropriations are
essential to financially address situations which are barely foreseen when a GAA is enacted. They argue
that the decision of the Congress to create some lump-sum appropriations is constitutionally allowed and
textually-grounded.214

The Court agrees with petitioners.

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit
since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive
personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds
based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the
GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated
without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting
system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of
presentment and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out,
the above-described system forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire ₱24.79
Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be
consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other
legislators with legitimate projects.215

Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would
remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation
above-characterized. In particular, the lump-sum amount of ₱24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere
funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance
to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc. This setup
connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for
further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to
the President‘s power of item veto.

In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson
relays, "limited state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more
stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds."216 Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a "line
by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency."217

Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of similar operation, to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system
provides for a greater degree of flexibility to account for future contingencies cannot be an excuse to
defeat what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth of the matter is that
unconstitutional means do not justify even commendable ends.218

c. Accountability.

Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of Congressional Pork Barrel operate
defies public accountability as it renders Congress incapable of checking itself or its Members. In
particular, they point out that the Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each legislator a direct, financial
interest in the smooth, speedy passing of the yearly budget" which turns them "from fiscalizers" into
"financially-interested partners."219 They also claim that the system has an effect on re- election as "the
PDAF excels in self-perpetuation of elective officials." Finally, they add that the "PDAF impairs the power
of impeachment" as such "funds are indeed quite useful, ‘to well, accelerate the decisions of senators.‘"220

The Court agrees in part.

The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office
is a public trust," is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise
their official functions only in accordance with the principles of the Constitution which embodies the
parameters of the people‘s trust. The notion of a public trust connotes accountability, 221 hence, the
various mechanisms in the Constitution which are designed to exact accountability from public officers.

Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure of public funds may be
checked is the power of congressional oversight. As mentioned in Abakada, 222 congressional oversight
may be performed either through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and
the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear
before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation;223 or (b) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.224

The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork
Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that
individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult
for them to become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the
implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as
said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities
in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept of post-
enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:

Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel
before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative
bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of
office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit
or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation – a matter before
another office of government – renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.

The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the
individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office. Indeed,
while the Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislator‘s use thereof may be linked to this area of interest,
the use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts
and on a case-to-case basis.

Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between legislators
and the Executive department, through the former‘s post-enactment participation, may affect the process
of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the
Pork Barrel System‘s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.

In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other
forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional.

4. Political Dynasties.

One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are members of
political dynasties to accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of Section 26,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution225 which states that:

Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not self-executing due to the
qualifying phrase "as may be defined by law." In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself,
provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies guideline for legislative or
executive action.226 Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on
political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it
has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political
dynasties.

5. Local Autonomy.

The State‘s policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article II and Sections 2 and 3,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:

ARTICLE II

Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

ARTICLE X

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their
powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and
removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to
the organization and operation of the local units.

Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160,227 otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of
1991" (LGC), wherein the policy on local autonomy had been more specifically explicated as follows:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and
political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to
attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the
attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local
government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of
decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the local government units.

xxxx

(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic
consultations with appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and people‘s organizations, and
other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their
respective jurisdictions. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of the State to empower
local government units (LGUs) to develop and ultimately, become self-sustaining and effective
contributors to the national economy. As explained by the Court in Philippine Gamefowl Commission v.
Intermediate Appellate Court:228

This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to the policy of local
autonomy which is intended to provide the needed impetus and encouragement to the development of
our local political subdivisions as "self - reliant communities." In the words of Jefferson, "Municipal
corporations are the small republics from which the great one derives its strength." The vitalization of local
governments will enable their inhabitants to fully exploit their resources and more important, imbue them
with a deepened sense of involvement in public affairs as members of the body politic. This objective
could be blunted by undue interference by the national government in purely local affairs which are best
resolved by the officials and inhabitants of such political units. The decision we reach today conforms not
only to the letter of the pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the Constitution.229 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional
principles on local autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute
their judgments in utilizing public funds for local development.230 The Court agrees with petitioners.

Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the unequal" and that "it is also a
recognition that individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional
colleagues, are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the
priority to be given each project."231 Drawing strength from this pronouncement, previous legislators
justified its existence by stating that "the relatively small projects implemented under the Congressional
Pork Barrel complement and link the national development goals to the countryside and grassroots as
well as to depressed areas which are overlooked by central agencies which are preoccupied with mega-
projects.232 Similarly, in his August 23, 2013 speech on the "abolition" of PDAF and budgetary reforms,
President Aquino mentioned that the Congressional Pork Barrel was originally established for a worthy
goal, which is to enable the representatives to identify projects for communities that the LGU concerned
cannot afford.233

Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which
actually belies the avowed intention of "making equal the unequal." In particular, the Court observes that
the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into
account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the
allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or
geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. As a result, a district representative of a highly-
urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural
province which would be relatively "underdeveloped" compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver
scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-
President – who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as
well. These certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrel‘s original intent which is "to make
equal the unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under the effective
control of each legislator and given unto them on the sole account of their office.

The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts
with the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated
to "assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and
coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction."234 Considering that LDCs are
instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, 235 their
programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who
are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body. The
undermining effect on local autonomy caused by the post-enactment authority conferred to the latter was
succinctly put by petitioners in the following wise: 236

With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects on his
own, and even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of personality-driven project
identification has not only contributed little to the overall development of the district, but has even
contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the government."

Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby
subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional
Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.
With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now turns to the substantive
issues involving the Presidential Pork Barrel.

C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.

1. Validity of Appropriation.

Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now, amended by PD
1993), which respectively provide for the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid
appropriations laws since they do not have the "primary and specific" purpose of authorizing the release
of public funds from the National Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an
appropriation law since the "primary and specific‖ purpose of PD 910 is the creation of an Energy
Development Board and Section 8 thereof only created a Special Fund incidental thereto. 237 In similar
regard, petitioners argue that Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a valid appropriations law since the
allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is merely incidental to the "primary and specific" purpose of PD
1869 which is the amendment of the Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR. 238 In view of the foregoing,
petitioners suppose that such funds are being used without any valid law allowing for their proper
appropriation in violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."239

The Court disagrees.

"An appropriation made by law‖ under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable 240 amount of
money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose. These two minimum designations of
amount and purpose stem from the very definition of the word "appropriation," which means "to allot,
assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose," and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate
that the legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any
particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall
be made, except that it be ‘made by law,‘" an appropriation law may – according to Philconsa – be
"detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be" for as long as the intent to appropriate may be
gleaned from the same. As held in the case of Guingona, Jr.:241

There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words or
religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be
"made by law," such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential
decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past
but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the
present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The
Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in
special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific
public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative
intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32
P. 272), whether in the past or in the present. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La Grave: 242

To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund applicable to the designated
purpose. The word appropriate means to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose.
An appropriation in the sense of the constitution means the setting apart a portion of the public funds for a
public purpose. No particular form of words is necessary for the purpose, if the intention to appropriate is
plainly manifested. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation must be the
"primary and specific" purpose of the law in order for a valid appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a
legal provision designates a determinate or determinable amount of money and allocates the same for a
particular public purpose, then the legislative intent to appropriate becomes apparent and, hence, already
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an "appropriation made by law" under contemplation of the
Constitution.

Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:

Section 8. Appropriations. x x x

All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including receipts from service
contracts and agreements such as application and processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus,
production bonus; all money collected from concessionaires, representing unspent work obligations, fines
and penalties under the Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the government share representing royalties,
rentals, production share on service contracts and similar payments on the exploration, development and
exploitation of energy resources, shall form part of a Special Fund to be used to finance energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as
may be hereafter directed by the President. (Emphases supplied)

Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:

Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty
(50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from this
Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate gross earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and
shall accrue to the General Fund to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance
the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by
the Office of the President of the Philippines. (Emphases supplied)

Analyzing the legal text vis-à-vis the above-mentioned principles, it may then be concluded that (a)
Section 8 of PD 910, which creates a Special Fund comprised of "all fees, revenues, and receipts of the
Energy Development Board from any and all sources" (a determinable amount) "to be used to finance
energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" (a specified public purpose), and (b)
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which similarly sets aside, "after deducting five (5%)
percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross
earnings of PAGCOR, or 60%, if the aggregate gross earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00" (also a
determinable amount) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration
of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of
the President of the Philippines" (also a specified public purpose), are legal appropriations under Section
29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal
appropriation under the said constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains post-
enactment measures which effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations. These
intermediate appropriations are the actual appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made
by individual legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes
that the real appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is not the ₱24.79 Billion allocated for the
entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment determinations made by the individual legislators which are,
to repeat, occurrences outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an
"appropriation made by law" since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual legislators to
appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle as afore-discussed.

2. Undue Delegation.
On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power since the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" gives the President "unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose the funds will be
used."243 Respondents, on the other hand, urged the Court to apply the principle of ejusdem generis to
the same section and thus, construe the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" to refer only to other purposes related "to energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government."244

The Court agrees with petitioners‘ submissions.

While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient
for a legal appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the
same law delegates rule-making authority to the Executive245 either for the purpose of (a) filling up the
details of the law for its enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining facts to
bring the law into actual operation, referred to as contingent rule-making.246 There are two (2)
fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines for delegated rule-making are indeed adequate.
The first test is called the "completeness test." Case law states that a law is complete when it sets forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate. On the other hand, the
second test is called the "sufficient standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a sufficient
standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate‘s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.247 To be sufficient, the standard must
specify the limits of the delegate‘s authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions
under which it is to be implemented.248

In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes as
may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of
the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it
reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other
purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the
purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to "energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government" under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning
that the general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be restricted to – things akin to,
resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, 249 is belied by three (3) reasons:
first, the phrase "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government" states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of
specific things from which the general phrase "for such other purposes" may be limited; second, the said
phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development programs of the
government;250 and, third, the Executive department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-
energy related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents‘ own position that it
is limited only to "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government."251 Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness test since the policy
of energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase "and for such other purposes as may
be hereafter directed by the President" under the same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken
down as unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating
law. This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use
of the Malampaya Funds "to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government," remains legally effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared
unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be
used – as it should be used – only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.

As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Section 12 of PD 1869
has already been amended by PD 1993 which thus moots the parties‘ submissions on the
same.252 Nevertheless, since the amendatory provision may be readily examined under the current
parameters of discussion, the Court proceeds to resolve its constitutionality.
Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund
may be used "to first, finance the priority infrastructure development projects and second, to finance the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the
Office of the President of the Philippines." The Court finds that while the second indicated purpose
adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for
restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte
blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a "priority".
Verily, the law does not supply a definition of "priority in frastructure development projects" and hence,
leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as
one of "infrastructure" is too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of
facility. This may be deduced from its lexicographic definition as follows: "the underlying framework of a
system, especially public services and facilities (such as highways, schools, bridges, sewers, and water-
systems) needed to support commerce as well as economic and residential development." 253 In fine, the
phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" must be stricken down as
unconstitutional since – similar to the above-assailed provision under Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other
provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.

D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.

Petitioners’ Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.

Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System unconstitutional – as the Court did so in
the context of its pronouncements made in this Decision – petitioners equally pray that the Executive
Secretary and/or the DBM be ordered to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete
schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013,
specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all
pertinent data thereto" (PDAF Use Schedule/List);254 and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum,
discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the
PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or
individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"255 (Presidential Pork Use Report). Petitioners‘ prayer is
grounded on Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:

ARTICLE II

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

ARTICLE III Sec. 7.

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.

The Court denies petitioners‘ submission.

Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is to file a petition for
mandamus. As explained in the case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission: 256

While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the
government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to
afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its
performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment
of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The
constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a
proper case.

But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be enforced
and the concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.

The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether
the information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. (Emphases
supplied)

Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.257 (Valmonte), it has been clarified that the right to
information does not include the right to compel the preparation of "lists, abstracts, summaries and the
like." In the same case, it was stressed that it is essential that the "applicant has a well -defined, clear and
certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act
required." Hence, without the foregoing substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular request for
information. The pertinent portions of Valmonte are hereunder quoted:258

Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to
official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to
prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public
concern.

It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-
defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant
to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must
be clear and specific Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v.
Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.

The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to
prepare the list requested. (Emphases supplied)

In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of mandamus actions, the
Court finds that petitioners have failed to establish a "a well-defined, clear and certain legal right" to be
furnished by the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF Use Schedule/List and
Presidential Pork Use Report. Neither did petitioners assert any law or administrative issuance which
would form the bases of the latter‘s duty to furnish them with the documents requested. While petitioners
pray that said information be equally released to the CoA, it must be pointed out that the CoA has not
been impleaded as a party to these cases nor has it filed any petition before the Court to be allowed
access to or to compel the release of any official document relevant to the conduct of its audit
investigations. While the Court recognizes that the information requested is a matter of significant public
concern, however, if only to ensure that the parameters of disclosure are properly foisted and so as not to
unduly hamper the equally important interests of the government, it is constrained to deny petitioners‘
prayer on this score, without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they, or even the CoA, may
choose to pursue through a separate petition.

It bears clarification that the Court‘s denial herein should only cover petitioners‘ plea to be furnished with
such schedule/list and report and not in any way deny them, or the general public, access to official
documents which are already existing and of public record. Subject to reasonable regulation and absent
any valid statutory prohibition, access to these documents should not be proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte,
while the Court denied the application for mandamus towards the preparation of the list requested by
petitioners therein, it nonetheless allowed access to the documents sought for by the latter, subject,
however, to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations,viz.:259
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject
to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination,
to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties
of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the
records may be insured Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta,
80 Phil. 383, 387. The petition, as to the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by
petitioners, is meritorious.

However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e.,

"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO
and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."

The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.

2. Petitioners’ Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations.

Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of
all presently, off-budget, lump sum, discretionary funds including but not limited to, proceeds from the x x
x Malampaya Fund, remittances from the PAGCOR and the PCSO or the Executive‘s Social Funds."260

Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by petitioners covers a matter which is generally left
to the prerogative of the political branches of government. Hence, lest the Court itself overreach, it must
equally deny their prayer on this score.

3. Respondents’ Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of Decision.

The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation accorded by the DBM to the concept of
released funds. In response to the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO that enjoined the release of the
remaining PDAF allocated for the year 2013, the DBM issued Circular Letter No. 2013-8 dated
September 27, 2013 (DBM Circular 2013-8) which pertinently reads as follows:

3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013 GAA, where a Special Allotment Release
Order (SARO) has been issued by the DBM and such SARO has been obligated by the implementing
agencies prior to the issuance of the TRO, may continually be implemented and disbursements thereto
effected by the agencies concerned.

Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the continued implementation and disbursement
of PDAF funds as long as they are: first, covered by a SARO; and, second, that said SARO had been
obligated by the implementing agency concerned prior to the issuance of the Court‘s September 10, 2013
TRO.

Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that "the issuance of the SARO does not yet
involve the release of funds under the PDAF, as release is only triggered by the issuance of a Notice of
Cash Allocation [(NCA)]."261 As such, PDAF disbursements, even if covered by an obligated SARO,
should remain enjoined.

For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only covers "unreleased and unobligated
allotments." They explain that once a SARO has been issued and obligated by the implementing agency
concerned, the PDAF funds covered by the same are already "beyond the reach of the TRO because
they cannot be considered as ‘remaining PDAF.‘" They conclude that this is a reasonable interpretation of
the TRO by the DBM.262
The Court agrees with petitioners in part.

At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether or not the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO
should be lifted is a matter rendered moot by the present Decision. The unconstitutionality of the 2013
PDAF Article as declared herein has the consequential effect of converting the temporary injunction into a
permanent one. Hence, from the promulgation of this Decision, the release of the remaining PDAF funds
for 2013, among others, is now permanently enjoined.

The propriety of the DBM‘s interpretation of the concept of "release" must, nevertheless, be resolved as it
has a practical impact on the execution of the current Decision. In particular, the Court must resolve the
issue of whether or not PDAF funds covered by obligated SAROs, at the time this Decision is
promulgated, may still be disbursed following the DBM‘s interpretation in DBM Circular 2013-8.

On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners‘ posturing for the fundamental reason that funds covered
by an obligated SARO are yet to be "released" under legal contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the
DBM itself in its website, is "aspecific authority issued to identified agencies to incur obligations not
exceeding a given amount during a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures
the release of which is subject to compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to separate
approval or clearance by competent authority."263

Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of an obligation and
not the directive to pay. Practically speaking, the SARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of
placing public funds beyond the control of the disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even be
withdrawn under certain circumstances which will prevent the actual release of funds. On the other hand,
the actual release of funds is brought about by the issuance of the NCA, 264 which is subsequent to the
issuance of a SARO. As may be determined from the statements of the DBM representative during the
Oral Arguments:265

Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued simultaneously with the SARO?

xxxx

Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the go signal for the agencies to obligate or to
enter into commitments. The NCA, Your Honor, is already the go signal to the treasury for us to be able to
pay or to liquidate the amounts obligated in the SARO; so it comes after. x x x The NCA, Your Honor, is
the go signal for the MDS for the authorized government-disbursing banks to, therefore, pay the payees
depending on the projects or projects covered by the SARO and the NCA.

Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled or revoked?

Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that there are instances that the SAROs issued are
withdrawn by the DBM.

Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?

Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which have been
"released." In this respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only covered by
obligated SAROs, and without any corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of this Decision’s
promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund.
Verily, in view of the declared unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated
pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed even though already obligated, else the Court sanctions the dealing
of funds coming from an unconstitutional source.

This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds which have been
obligated but not released – meaning, those merely covered by a SARO – under the phrase "and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910; and (b)
funds sourced from the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were
altogether declared by the Court as unconstitutional. However, these funds should not be reverted to the
general fund as afore-stated but instead, respectively remain under the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their corresponding special purposes not otherwise declared as
unconstitutional.

E. Consequential Effects of Decision.

As a final point, it must be stressed that the Court‘s pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the
2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar
thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects"
under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect in
view of the operative fact doctrine.

To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate
case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional
and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with. As
explained in the recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power
Corporation,266 the doctrine merely "reflects awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the
governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid,
a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a
declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no
recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication."267 "In the language of an American
Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of
unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.‘" 268

For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.

Conclusion

The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our history. In
the final analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the
inherent defects in the rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to
wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution,
the system has violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators
the power of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund
specific projects which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability
of legislative power ; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized
into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process,
denied the President the power to veto items ; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional
oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which
they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public accountability ;
insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local
nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local
autonomy ; and again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds
intended by law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other
public funds under the broad classification of "priority infrastructure development projects," it has once
more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.

For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious unconstitutional methods and
mechanisms the Court has herein pointed out should never again be adopted in any system of
governance, by any name or form, by any semblance or similarity, by any influence or effect.
Disconcerting as it is to think that a system so constitutionally unsound has monumentally endured, the
Court urges the people and its co-stewards in government to look forward with the optimism of change
and the awareness of the past. At a time of great civic unrest and vociferous public debate, the Court
fervently hopes that its Decision today, while it may not purge all the wrongs of society nor bring back
what has been lost, guides this nation to the path forged by the Constitution so that no one may
heretofore detract from its cause nor stray from its course. After all, this is the Court‘s bounden duty and
no other‘s.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations discussed in
this Decision, the Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b)
all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and
CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators – whether
individually or collectively organized into committees – to intervene, assume or participate in any of the
various post-enactment stages of the budget execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project
identification, modification and revision of project identification, fund release and/or fund realignment,
unrelated to the power of congressional oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and present
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various
Congressional Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators from which they
are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine; (d) all informal practices of similar
import and effect, which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing the sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of
non-delegability of legislative power.

Accordingly, the Court‘s temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby declared to be
PERMANENT. Thus, the disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the year 2013,
as well as for all previous years, and the funds sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds under the phrase
"and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1993, which are, at the time this Decision is promulgated, not covered by
Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether
obligated or not, are hereby ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds covered by this permanent injunction
shall not be disbursed/released but instead reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund,
while the funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to be
utilized for their respective special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.

On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES
petitioners‘ prayer seeking that the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and
Management be ordered to provide the public and the Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules or
detailed reports related to the availments and utilization of the funds subject of these cases. Petitioners‘
access to official documents already available and of public record which are related to these funds must,
however, not be prohibited but merely subjected to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations or any valid
statutory prohibition on the same. This denial is without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they
or the Commission on Audit may choose to pursue through a separate petition.
The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject of these cases in the
budgetary deliberations of Congress as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the political
branches of government.

Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within the bounds of
reasonable dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all government officials and/or private
individuals for possible criminal offenses related to the irregular, improper and/or unlawful
disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel System.

This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

Miriam Santiago v. Teofisto Guingona

EN BANC

G.R. No. 134577. November 18, 1998

SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S.

TATAD, Petitioners, v. SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B.
FERNAN, Respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of
government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own
constitutionally allocated sphere.

Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch
prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. Where no provision
of the Constitution or the laws or even the Rules of the Senate is clearly shown to have
been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to
Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority. This Court will be
neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the
rule and majesty of the law.

The Case

On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad instituted an
original petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the
ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the
declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.

On August 4, 1998, the Court, upon receipt of the Petition, required the respondents and
the solicitor general to file COMMENT thereon within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15)
days from notice. On August 25, 1998, both respondents and the solicitor general submitted
their respective Comments. In compliance with a Resolution of the Court dated September
1, 1998, petitioners filed their Consolidated Reply on September 23, 1998. Noting said
pleading, this Court gave due course to the petition and deemed the controversy submitted
for decision, without need of memoranda, on September 29, 1998.

In the regular course, the regional trial courts and this Court have concurrent jurisdiction 1 to
hear and decide petitions for quo warranto (as well as certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus), and a basic deference to the hierarchy of courts impels a filing of such
petitions in the lower tribunals.2However, for special and important reasons or for
exceptional and compelling circumstances, as in the present case, this Court has allowed
exceptions to this doctrine.3 In fact, original petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto assailing acts of legislative officers like the Senate
President4 and the Speaker of the House5 have been recognized as exceptions to this rule.

The Facts

The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmea as presiding officer,
convened on July 27, 1998 for the first regular session of the eleventh Congress. At the
time, in terms of party affiliation, the composition of the Senate was as
follows:6cräläwvirtualibräry

10 members -Laban ng Masang Pilipino (LAMP)

7 members - Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats-United Muslim

Democrats of the Philippines (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP)

1 member - Liberal Party (LP)

1 member - Aksyon Demokrasya

1 member - Peoples Reform Party (PRP)

1 member - Gabay Bayan

2 members - Independent

----------

23 - total number of senators7 (The last six members are all classified by petitioners as
independent.)

On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Nominated by Sen. Blas F. Ople to
the position of Senate President was Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad was
also nominated to the same position by Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago. By a vote of 20 to
2,8 Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate.
The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen.
Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.

Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago,
allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority
leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority,
while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority.

During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate minority, Sen. Juan M. Flavier
manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party -- numbering seven
(7) and, thus, also a minority -- had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No
consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the
question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the
third session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.

On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter
signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators,9stating that they had elected Senator
Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally
recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.

The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition
for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully
holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to
them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

Issues

From the parties pleadings, the Court formulated the following issues for resolution:

1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?

2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?

3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of
Senate minority leader?

4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent
Guingona as the minority leader?

The Courts Ruling

After a close perusal of the pleadings10 and a careful deliberation on the

arguments, pro and con, the Court finds that no constitutional or legal infirmity or grave
abuse of discretion attended the recognition of and the assumption into office by
Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader.

First Issue: The Courts Jurisdiction

Petitioners principally invoke Avelino v. Cuenco11 in arguing that this Court has jurisdiction
to settle the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader. They submit that the
definitions of majority and minority involve an interpretation of the Constitution, specifically
Section 16 (1), Article VI thereof, stating that [t]he Senate shall elect its President and the
House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members.

Respondents and the solicitor general, in their separate Comments, contend in common that
the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader is an internal matter pertaining
exclusively to the domain of the legislature, over which the Court cannot exercise
jurisdiction without transgressing the principle of separation of powers. Allegedly, no
constitutional issue is involved, as the fundamental law does not provide for the office of a
minority leader in the Senate. The legislature alone has the full discretion to provide for
such office and, in that event, to determine the procedure of selecting its occupant.

Respondents also maintain that Avelino cannot apply, because there exists no question
involving an interpretation or application of the Constitution, the laws or even the Rules of
the Senate; neither are there peculiar circumstances impelling the Court to assume
jurisdiction over the petition. The solicitor general adds that there is not even any legislative
practice to support the petitioners theory that a senator who votes for the winning Senate
President is precluded from becoming the minority leader.

To resolve the issue of jurisdiction, this Court carefully reviewed and deliberated on the
various important cases involving this very important and basic question, which it has ruled
upon in the past.

The early case Avelino v. Cuenco cautiously tackled the scope of the Courts power of judicial
review; that is, questions involving an interpretation or application of a provision of the
Constitution or the law, including the rules of either house of Congress. Within this scope
falls the jurisdiction of the Court over questions on the validity of legislative or executive
acts that are political in nature, whenever the tribunal finds constitutionally imposed limits
on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.12cräläwvirtualibräry

In the aforementioned case, the Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was
the rightful Senate President, since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively
within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court
ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) in the light of subsequent events which justify its
intervention; and (2) because the resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the
constitutional provision on the presence of a quorum to hold a session 13 and therein elect a
Senate President.

Justice Feria elucidated in his Concurring Opinion: [I] concur with the majority that this
Court has jurisdiction over cases like the present x x x so as to establish in this country the
judicial supremacy, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, to see that no one branch
or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, not only in justiceable but
political questions as well.14cräläwvirtualibräry

Justice Perfecto, also concurring, said in part:

Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as obtaining in the upper chamber of
Congress, is highly explosive. It had echoed in the House of Representatives. It has already
involved the President of the Philippines. The situation has created a veritable national
crisis, and it is apparent that solution cannot be expected from any quarter other than this
Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the people for an effective settlement are
pinned.15
x x x This case raises vital constitutional questions which no one can settle or decide if this
Court should refuse to decide them.16

x x x The constitutional question of quorum should not be left

unanswered.17cräläwvirtualibräry

In Taada v. Cuenco,18 this Court endeavored to define political question. And we said that it
refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not [the] legality, of a particular
measure.19cräläwvirtualibräry

The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal by the senators was not a political question. The choice of these members did not
depend on the Senates full discretionary authority, but was subject to mandatory
constitutional limitations.20 Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within its
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to
consider and determine the issue.

In another landmark case, Lansang v. Garcia,21 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion wrote that
the Court had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases
required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ [of habeas
corpus]. This ruling was made in spite of the previous pronouncements in Barcelon v.
Baker22 and Montenegro v. Castaeda23 that the authority to decide whether the exigency
has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege x x x) belongs to the President and his
decision is final and conclusive upon the courts and upon all other persons. But the Chief
Justice cautioned: the function of the Court is merely to check -- not to supplant --- the
Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of
his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his
act.

The eminent Chief Justice aptly explained later in Javellana v. Executive

Secretary:24cräläwvirtualibräry

The reason why the issue under consideration and other issues of similar character are
justiciable, not political, is plain and simple. One of the principal bases of the non-
justiciability of so-called political questions is the principle of separation of powers --
characteristic of the presidential system of government -- the functions of which are
classified or divided, by reason of their nature, into three (3) categories, namely, 1) those
involving the making of laws, which are allocated to the legislative department; 2) those
concerning mainly with the enforcement of such laws and of judicial decisions applying
and/or interpreting the same, which belong to the executive department; and 3) those
dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or
prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable, which are apportioned to courts
of justice. Within its own sphere -- but only withinsuch sphere each department is supreme
and independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority not only to encroach upon
the powers or field of action assigned to any of the other departments, but also to inquire
into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or
decisions made by the other departments -- provided that such acts, measures or decision
are within the area allocated thereto by the Constitution."
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the
issue of whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the
limitations respected is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one
of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications,
conditions or limitations -- particularly those prescribed by the Constitution -- would be set
at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof are
the main functions of the courts of justice under the presidential form of government
adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic
predicates. As a consequence, we have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline
passing upon said issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation -- made particularly more
exacting and peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest Court of the land, to
support and defend the Constitution -- to settle it. This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson
[92 Ky. 589, 18 SW 522, 523], it was held that courts have a duty, rather than a power, to
determine whether another branch of the government has kept within constitutional limits.

Unlike our previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of
judicial power. The present Constitution now fortifies the authority of the courts to
determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. It
speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.25cräläwvirtualibräry

This express definition has resulted in clearer and more resolute pronouncements of the
Court. Daza v. Singson,26 Coseteng v. Mitra Jr.27and Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales28 similarly
resolved issues assailing the acts of the leaders of both houses of Congress in apportioning
among political parties the seats to which each chamber was entitled in the Commission on
Appointments. The Court held that the issue was justiciable, even if the question were
political in nature, since it involved the legality, not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the
Commission on Appointments as prescribed by [Section 18, Article VI of] the Constitution.

The same question of jurisdiction was raised in Taada v. Angara,29wherein the petitioners
sought to nullify the Senates concurrence in the ratification of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Agreement. The Court ruled: Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty
of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The Court en banc unanimously stressed that in taking
jurisdiction over petitions questioning an act of the political departments of government, it
will not review the wisdom, merits or propriety of such action, and will strike it down only on
either of two grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and (2) grave abuse of discretion.

Earlier in Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives30(HRET), the Court

refused to reverse a decision of the HRET, in the absence of a showing that said tribunal
had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Court ruled
that full authority had been conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate as sole judges of all contests relating to the election, the
returns, and the qualifications of their respective members. Such jurisdiction is original and
exclusive.31 The Court may inquire into a decision or resolution of said tribunals only if such
decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion.32cräläwvirtualibräry
Recently, the Court, in Arroyo v. De Venecia,33 was asked to reexamine the enrolled bill
doctrine and to look beyond the certification of the Speaker of the House of Representatives
that the bill, which was later enacted as Republic Act 8240, was properly approved by the
legislative body. Petitioners claimed that certain procedural rules of the House had been
breached in the passage of the bill. They averred further that a violation of the
constitutionally mandated House rules was a violation of the Constitution itself.

The Court, however, dismissed the petition, because the matter complained of concerned
the internal procedures of the House, with which the Court had no concern. It
enucleated:34cräläwvirtualibräry

It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this

Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has
disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to
seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that
department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into
complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its
power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of discretion were it to do so. x x x In the
absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House
thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and
deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.

In the instant controversy, the petitioners -- one of whom is Senator Santiago, a well-
known constitutionalist -- try to hew closely to these jurisprudential parameters. They claim
that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, has not been observed in the selection of
the Senate minority leader. They also invoke the Courts expanded judicial power to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of Respondents.

Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza submits that the Court has no jurisdiction
over the petition. Well-settled is the doctrine, however, that jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of
whether the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted.35 In light of the aforesaid
allegations of petitioners, it is clear that this Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is
well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or
its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the
exercise of their functions and prerogatives.

Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution

Having assumed jurisdiction over the petition, we now go to the next crucial question: In
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader, did the Senate or its
officials, particularly Senate President Fernan, violate the Constitution or the laws?

Petitioners answer the above question in the affirmative. They contend that the
constitutional provision requiring the election of the Senate President by majority vote of all
its members carries with it a judicial duty to determine the concepts of majority and
minority, as well as who may elect a minority leader. They argue that majority in the
aforequoted constitutional provision refers to that group of senators who (1) voted for the
winning Senate President and (2) accepted committee chairmanships. Accordingly, those
who voted for the losing nominee and accepted no such chairmanships comprise the
minority, to whom the right to determine the minority leader belongs. As a result,
petitioners assert, Respondent Guingona cannot be the legitimate minority leader, since he
voted for Respondent Fernan as Senate President. Furthermore, the members of the Lakas-
NUCD-UMDP cannot choose the minority leader, because they did not belong to the
minority, having voted for Fernan and accepted committee chairmanships.

We believe, however, that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support
from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper
House.

The term majority has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a
certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or
more than half of any total.36 The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional
clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half
of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate whocomprise the
majority, much less the minority, in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers
of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms.

In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected
by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide
that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who
could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated
candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

The Comment37 of Respondent Guingona furnishes some relevant precedents, which were
not contested in petitioners Reply. During the eighth Congress, which was the first to
convene after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the nomination of Sen. Jovito R.
Salonga as Senate President was seconded by a member of the minority, then Sen. Joseph
E. Estrada.38 During the ninth regular session, when Sen. Edgardo J. Angara assumed the
Senate presidency in 1993, a consensus was reached to assign committee chairmanships to
all senators, including those belonging to the minority.39 This practice continued during the
tenth Congress, where even the minority leader was allowed to chair a committee. 40 History
would also show that the majority in either house of Congress has referred to the political
party to which the most number of lawmakers belonged, while the minority normally
referred to a party with a lesser number of members.

Let us go back to the definitions of the terms majority and minority. Majority may also refer
to the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes,41 not necessarily more than
one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is a group, party,
or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the
majority.42Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the
greater number would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But
where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which
is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the minorities. In a government
with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners
themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be identified by
the Comelec as the dominant minority party for purposes of the general elections. In the
prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different political
parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the
many minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to select
the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House
Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both
chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that [e]ach House shall choose such
other officers as it may deem necessary.43 To our mind, the method of choosing who will
be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method
must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.

In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power to determine the
rules of its proceedings.44 Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated and adopted a set of
rules to govern its internal affairs.45 Pertinent to the instant case are Rules I and II thereof,
which provide:

Rule I

ELECTIVE OFFICERS

SECTION 1. The Senate shall elect, in the manner hereinafter provided, a President, a
President Pro Tempore, a Secretary, and a Sergeant-at-Arms.

These officers shall take their oath of office before entering into the discharge of their
duties.

Rule II

ELECTION OF OFFICERS

SEC. 2. The officers of the Senate shall be elected by the majority vote of all its Members.
Should there be more than one candidate for the same office, a nominal vote shall be
taken; otherwise, the elections shall be by viva voce or by resolution.

Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority
leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and
prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate,
such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon
which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of
respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the
internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress
how to do its work.46 Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is
of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist,
then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may
intervene.47cräläwvirtualibräry

Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of
permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. 48 Being
merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body49 at will, upon the concurrence of a
majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such
officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to
prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority
to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running
afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold -- the very
duty that justifies the Courts being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard
for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the
internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a
wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and
majesty of the law.

To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to

judicial legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers. If for this argument alone, the petition would easily fail.

While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules and even the practice of the
Senate was violated, and while the judiciary is without power to decide matters over which
full discretionary authority has been lodged in the legislative department, this Court may
still inquire whether an act of Congress or its officials has been made with grave abuse of
discretion.50 This is the plain implication of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which
expressly confers upon the judiciary the power and the duty not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but likewise to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Explaining the above-quoted clause, former Chief Justice Concepcion, who was a member of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, said in part:51cräläwvirtualibräry

xxx the powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: the
Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and
independent of the others. Because of that supremacy[, the] power to determine whether a
given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of
the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final
arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has
acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only
a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot
hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute a political question.

With this paradigm, we now examine the two other issues challenging the actions, first, of
Respondent Guingona and, second, of Respondent Fernan.

Third Issue: Usurpation of Office

Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power 52 by

one without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto.53 A quo warranto proceeding
is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and
to oust the holder from its enjoyment.54 The action may be brought by the solicitor general
or a public prosecutor55 or any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position
usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. 56 The action shall be brought against
the person who allegedly usurped, intruded into or is unlawfully holding or exercising such
office.57cräläwvirtualibräry

In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that
he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the
office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. 58 In this case, petitioners
present no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate
minority leader.

As discussed earlier, the specific norms or standards that may be used in determining who
may lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been laid down by the Constitution, the
statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power has been vested. Absent any clear-cut
guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent
Guingonas assumption and exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader.
Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his
specific acts as minority leader.

Fourth Issue: Fernans Recognition of Guingona

The all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government is restricted only by the definition
and confines of the term grave abuse of discretion.

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as

is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.59cräläwvirtualibräry

By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion
as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. Let us
recall that the latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader,
he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent
Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were
liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.

Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment or of an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility. Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or
even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated,
disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate
officials for acts done within their competence and authority.

WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

The Sangguniang Brgy of Don Mariano Marcos, Municipality of Bayombong v. Punong Barangay
Severino Martinez GR 170626

G.R. No. 170626 March 3, 2008

THE SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF BARANGAY DON MARIANO MARCOS, MUNICIPALITY OF

BAYOMBONG PROVINCE OF NUEVA VISCAYA represented by BARANGAY KAGAWAD JOSE
CENEN SANTOS, MARIO BACUD, WALTER FRANCISCO, ROSITA SEBASTIAN, LAURETA
CABAUATAN, CECILIA ALINDAYU and MELY SIMANGAN, petitioners,
vs.
PUNONG BARANGAY SEVERINO MARTINEZ, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Orders dated
20 October 20051 and 30 November 20052 of the Regional Trial Court (trial court), Branch 27, of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, in Special Civil Action No. 6727. In its assailed Orders, the trial court ruled
that the Sangguniang Bayan of Bayombong, Neuva Vizcaya (Sangguniang Bayan), exceeded its
jurisdiction when it imposed upon respondent Severino Martinez the administrative penalty of removal
from office.

Petitioner Sangguniang Barangay is the legislative body of Barangay Don Mariano Marcos, Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya, a local government unit created, organized and existing as such under pertinent laws of
the Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Martinez is the incumbent Punong Barangay of the said local
government unit.3

On 5 November 2004, Martinez was administratively charged with Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption
by petitioner through the filing of a verified complaint before the Sangguniang Bayan as the disciplining
authority over elective barangay officials pursuant to Section 614 of Rep. Act No. 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code. Petitioner filed with the Sangguniang Bayan an Amended Administrative
Complaint against Martinez on 6 December 2004 for Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office and Violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.5 Petitioner alleged that Martinez committed the following acts:

1. Failure to submit and fully remit to the Barangay Treasurer the income of their solid waste
management project since 2001 particularly the sale of fertilizer derived from composting.

2. Failure to submit/remit to the barangay treasurer the sale of recyclable materials taken from
garbage collection.

3. Using the garbage truck for other purposes like hauling sand and gravel for private persons
without monetary benefit to the barangay because no income from this source appears in the
year end report even if payments were collected x x x.

4. Using/spending barangay funds for repair, gasoline, lubricants, wheels and other spare parts of
the garbage truck instead of using the money or income of said truck from the garbage fees
collected as income from its Sold Waste Management Project. x x x.
 5. Unliquidated traveling expenses for Seminar/Lakbay-Aral in 2003 because although a cash
advance was made by the respondent for the said purpose, he, however, did not attend said
seminar because on the dates when he was supposed to be on seminar they saw him in the
barangay. x x x.

6. That several attempts to discuss said problem during sessions were all in vain because
respondent declined to discuss it and would adjourn the session.x x x. 6

Upon his failure to file an Answer to the Amended Administrative Complaint dated 6 December 2004,
Martinez was declared by the Sangguniang Bayan as in default. Pending the administrative proceedings,
Martinez was placed under preventive suspension for 60 days or until 8 August 2005. 7

On 28 July 2005, the Sangguniang Bayan rendered its Decision which imposed upon Martinez the
penalty of removal from office.8

The Decision dated 28 July 2005 was conveyed to the Municipal Mayor of Bayombong, Nueva Ecija,
Severino Bagasao, for its implementation. On 3 August 2005, Municial Mayor Bagasao issued a
Memorandum, wherein he stated that the Sanggunaing Bayan is not empowered to order Martinez’s
removal from service. However, the Decision remains valid until reversed and must be executed by him.
For the meantime, he ordered the indefinite suspension of Martinez since the period of appeal had not yet
lapsed.9 The dispositive portion of the said Memorandum states that:10

The FOREGOING considered come AUGUST 8, 2005, respondent SEVERINO D. MARTINEZ is

hereby directed NOT to ASSUME and DISCHARGE the functions of the Office of the Punong
Barangay of Barangay Don Mariano Marcos, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and for complainant
JOSE CENEN SANTOS to CONTINUE assuming and discharging the functions of the said office
in ACTING CAPACITY pursuant to the provisions of Sections 67 and 68 of Republic Act No.
7160.

On 26 August 2005, Martinez filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with a prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction before the trial court against petitioner, the Sangguniang
Bayan and Mayor Bagasao questioning the validity of the Decision dated 28 July 2005 of the
Sangguniang Bayan. This case was docketed as Special Civil Action No. 6727, which was initially heard
by Branch 28, but later raffled to Branch 27 of the trial court.11

On 20 October 2005, the trial court issued an Order declaring the Decision of the Sangguniang Bayan
and the Memorandum of Mayor Bagasao void. It maintained that the proper courts, and not the petitioner,
are empowered to remove an elective local official from office, in accordance with Section 60 of the Local
Government Code. Thus, the Order of the Sangguniang Bayan removing Martinez from service is void.
As a consequence, Mayor Bagasao cannot prevent Martinez from assuming his office on the basis of a
void order. The trial court further ruled that Martinez properly availed himself of the remedy of Special
Civil Action, where the order assailed was a patent nullity.12

On 10 November 2005, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration13 of the trial court’s Order dated 10
October 2005. The trial court denied the said motion in another Order dated 30 November 2005. 14

Hence, the present petition was filed.

Although Martinez’s term as Punong Baranggay expired upon the holding of the 29 October 2007
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections and, thus, rendering this petition moot and
academic, the Court will nevertheless settle a legal question that is capable of repetition yet evading
review.15
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan may remove Martinez, an elective
local official, from office. The pertinent legal provisions and cases decided by this Court firmly establish
that the Sanggunaing Bayan is not empowered to do so.

Section 60 of the Local Government Code conferred upon the courts the power to remove elective local
officials from office:

Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions.—An elective local official may be disciplined,
suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds:

x x x x.

An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order
of the proper court. (Emphasis provided.)

During the deliberations of the Senate on the Local Government Code,16 the legislative intent to confine to
the courts, i.e., regional trial courts, the Sandiganbayan and the appellate courts, jurisdiction over cases
involving the removal of elective local officials was evident:

Senator Pimentel. This has been reserved, Mr. President, including the issue of whether or not
the Department Secretary or the Office of the President can suspend or remove an elective
official.

Senator Saguisag. For as long as that is open for some later disposition, may I just add the
following thought: It seems to me that instead of identifying only the proper regional trial
court or the Sandiganbayan, and since we know that in the case of a regional trial court,
particularly, a case may be appealed or may be the subject of an injunction, in the framing
of this later on, I would like to suggest that we consider replacing the phrase "PROPER
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OR THE SANDIGANBAYAN" simply by "COURTS." Kasi po,
maaaring sabihin nila na mali iyong regional trial court o ang Sandiganbayan.

Senator Pimentel. "OR THE PROPER COURT."

Senator Saguisag. "OR THE PROPER COURT."

Senator Pimentel. Thank you. We are willing to accept that now, Mr. President.

Senator Saguisag. It is to be incorporated in the phraseology that we will craft to capture the other
ideas that have been elevated. (Emphasis provided.)

In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,17 the Court en banc categorically ruled that the Office of the President is
without any power to remove elected officials, since the power is exclusively vested in the proper courts
as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code. It further
invalidated Article 125, Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code
of 1991, which provided that:

Article 125. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. x x x.

x x x x.

(b) An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph
(a) of this Article by order of the proper court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other.
The Court nullified the aforequoted rule since the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and
Regulations of the Local Government Code exceeded its authority when it granted to the "disciplining
authority" the power to remove elective officials, a power which the law itself granted only to the proper
courts. Thus, it is clear that under the law, the Sangguniang Bayan is not vested with the power to
remove Martinez.

Petitioner contends that administrative cases involving elective barangay officials may be filed with, heard
and decided by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned, which can, thereafter,
impose a penalty of removal from office. It further claims that the courts are merely tasked with issuing the
order of removal, after the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan finds that a penalty of
removal is warranted.18

The aforementioned position put forward by the petitioner would run counter to the rationale for making
the removal of elective officials an exclusive judicial prerogative. In Pablico v. Villapando,19 the court
declared that:

It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove erring elective local officials from service is
lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124 (sic 125)20 (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, insofar as it vests power on the
"disciplining authority" to remove from office erring elective local officials, is void for being
repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The law on
suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied, and the
authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost
good faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people
through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put to
naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where the disciplining
authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to remove, it should not be
permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove. (Emphasis supplied.)

The rule which confers to the proper courts the power to remove an elective local official from office is
intended as a check against any capriciousness or partisan activity by the disciplining authority. Vesting
the local legislative body with the power to decide whether or not a local chief executive may be removed
from office, and only relegating to the courts a mandatory duty to implement the decision, would still not
free the resolution of the case from the capriciousness or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Thus,
the petitioner’s interpretation would defeat the clear intent of the law.

Moreover, such an arrangement clearly demotes the courts to nothing more than an implementing arm of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang Bayan. This would be an unmistakable breach of the
doctrine on separation of powers, thus placing the courts under the orders of the legislative bodies of
local governments. The courts would be stripped of their power of review, and their discretion in imposing
the extreme penalty of removal from office is thus left to be exercised by political factions which stand to
benefit from the removal from office of the local elective official concerned, the very evil which Congress
sought to avoid when it enacted Section 60 of the Local Government Code.

Congress clearly meant that the removal of an elective local official be done only after a trial before the
appropriate court, where court rules of procedure and evidence can ensure impartiality and fairness and
protect against political maneuverings. Elevating the removal of an elective local official from office from
an administrative case to a court case may be justified by the fact that such removal not only punishes
the official concerned but also, in effect, deprives the electorate of the services of the official for whom
they voted.

As the law stands, Section 61 of the Local Government Code provides for the procedure for the filing of
an administrative case against an erring elective barangay official before the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan. However, the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan cannot order the
removal of an erring elective barangay official from office, as the courts are exclusively vested with this
power under Section 60 of the Local Government Code. Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by
the barangay official are of a grave nature and, if found guilty, would merit the penalty of removal from
office, the case should be filed with the regional trial court. Once the court assumes jurisdiction, it retains
jurisdiction over the case even if it would be subsequently apparent during the trial that a penalty less
than removal from office is appropriate. On the other hand, the most extreme penalty that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring elective barangayofficial is
suspension; if it deems that the removal of the official from service is warranted, then it can resolve that
the proper charges be filed in court.

Petitioner alleged that an interpretation which gives the judiciary the power to remove local elective
officials violates the doctrine of separation of powers. This allegation runs contrary to the 1987
Constitution itself, as well as jurisprudence.

The 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. It establishes the authority of the
courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of acts of the political departments. It speaks of
judicial prerogative in terms of duty.21 Paragraph 2, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,
provides that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis provided.)

The doctrine of separation of powers is not absolute in its application; rather, it should be applied in
accordance with the principle of checks and balances. The removal from office of elective officials must
not be tainted with partisan politics and used to defeat the will of the voting public. Congress itself saw it
fit to vest that power in a more impartial tribunal, the court. Furthermore, the local government units are
not deprived of the right to discipline local elective officials; rather, they are prevented from imposing the
extreme penalty of dismissal.

Petitioner questions the Decision dated 20 October 2005 of the trial court for allowing the petition filed
before it as an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. If, indeed, the
Sangguniang Bayan had no power to remove Martinez from office, then Martinez should have sought
recourse from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. This Court upholds the ruling of the trial court.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative
authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be
elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of
action, which is one of the grounds allowed by the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint. 22

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, which is based on sound public policy and
practical consideration, is not inflexible. There are instances when it may be dispensed with and judicial
action may be validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptions are: 1) where there is estoppel on
the part of the party invoking the doctrine; 2) where the challenged administrative act is patently
illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; 3) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that
will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; 4) where the amount involved is relatively small as to make
the rule impractical and oppressive; 5) where the question raised is purely legal and will ultimately
have to be decided by the courts of justice; 6) where judicial intervention is urgent; 7) where its
application may cause great and irreparable damage; 8) where the controverted acts violate due process;
9) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; 10) where there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 11) when strong public interest is involved; and 13)
in quo warrantoproceedings.23
As a general rule, no recourse to courts can be had until all administrative remedies have been
exhausted. However, this rule is not applicable where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction and where the question or questions involved are essentially judicial.

In this case, it is apparent that the Sangguniang Bayan acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued the
assailed Order dated 28 July 2005 removing Martinez from office. Such act was patently illegal and,
therefore, Martinez was no longer required to avail himself of an administrative appeal in order to annul
the said Order of the Sangguniang Bayan.24 Thus, his direct recourse to regular courts of justice was
justified.

In addition, this Court in Castro v. Gloria25 declared that where the case involves only legal questions, the
litigant need not exhaust all administrative remedies before such judicial relief can be sought. The reason
behind providing an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that issues of law
cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer. Appeal to the administrative officer would
only be an exercise in futility. A legal question is properly addressed to a regular court of justice rather
than to an administrative body.26

In the present case, Martinez raised before the trial court the sole issue of whether the Sangguniang
Bayan has jurisdiction over a case involving the removal of a local elective official from office. 27 In
Martinez’s petition before the trial court, only a legal question was raised, one that will ultimately be
resolved by the courts. Hence, appeal to the administrative officer concerned would only be circuitous
and, therefore, should no longer be required before judicial relief can be sought.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the
Bayombong RTC in Special Civil Action No. 6727 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

In Re: In the Matter of Clarification of Exemption from Payment of All Court and Sheriff’s Fees of
Cooperatives Duly Registered in Accordance with Rep. Ac No. 9520

A.M. No. 12-2-03-0 March 13, 2012

RE: IN THE MATTER OF CLARIFICATION OF EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF ALL COURT AND
SHERIFF'S FEES OF COOPERATIVES DULY REGISTERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 9520 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE PHILIPPINE COOPERATIVE CODE OF 2008,
PERPETUAL HELP COMMUNITY COOPERATIVE (PHCCI), Petitioner,

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

In a Petition1 dated 24 October 2011, Perpetual Help Community Cooperative (PHCCI), through counsel,
requests for the issuance of a court order to clarify and implement the exemption of cooperatives from the
payment of court and sheriff’s fees pursuant to Republic Act No. 6938, as amended by Republic Act No.
9520, otherwise known as the Philippine Cooperative Act of 2008.

PHCCI contends that as a cooperative it enjoys the exemption provided for under Section 6, Article 61 of
Republic Act No. 9520, which states:
(6) Cooperatives shall be exempt from the payment of all court and sheriff’s fees payable to the Philippine
Government for and in connection with all actions brought under this Code, or where such actions is
brought by the Authority before the court, to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of the
cooperative.

It claims that this was a reiteration of Section 62, paragraph 6 of Republic Act No. 6938, An Act to Ordain
a Cooperative Code of the Philippines,2 and was made basis for the Court’s Resolution in A.M. No. 03-4-
01-0, as well as of Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) Circular No. 44-2007.3

It avers that despite the exemptions granted by the aforesaid laws and issuances, PHCCI had been
continuously assessed and required to pay legal and other fees whenever it files cases in court.

PHCCI reports that it filed with the Office of the Executive Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, a Motion to implement the exemption of cooperatives from the
payment of court and sheriff’s fees in cases filed before the courts in his jurisdiction, but the Executive
Judge ruled that the matter is of national concern and should be brought to the attention of the Supreme
Court for it to come up with a straight policy and uniform system of collection. In the meantime, the MTCC
has continued the assessment of filing fees against cooperatives.

Records reveal that on 21 September 2011, Executive Judge Antonio Estoconing (Executive Judge
Estoconing), MTCC, Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, issued an Order treating the motion filed by
PHCCI as a mere consulta considering that no main action was filed in his court. Executive Judge
Estoconing submits that he had second thoughts in considering the exemption in view of the guidelines
laid down in the Rules. He reported that many cases filed by PHCCI are small claims cases and under
Section 8 of the Rule on Small Claims, the plaintiff is required to pay docket fees and other related costs
unless he is allowed to litigate the case as an indigent.

Hence, this Petition.

Before this Court is the issue on whether cooperatives are exempt from the payment of court and sheriff’s
fees. The fees referred to are those provided for under Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court.

The term "all court fees" under Section 6, Article 61 of Republic Act No. 9520 refers to the totality of "legal
fees" imposed under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as an incident of instituting an action in court.4 These
fees include filing or docket fees, appeal fees, fees for issuance of provisional remedies, mediation fees,
sheriff’s fees, stenographer’s fees and commissioner’s fees.5

With regard to the term "sheriff’s fees," this Court, in an extended minute Resolution dated 1 September
2009, held that the exemptions granted to cooperatives under Section 2, paragraph 6 of Republic Act No.
6938; Section 6, Article 61 of Republic Act No. 9520; and OCA Circular No. 44-2007 clearly do not cover
the amount required "to defray the actual travel expenses of the sheriff, process server or other court-
authorized person in the service of summons, subpoena and other court processes issued relative to the
trial of the case,"6 which are neither considered as court and sheriff’s fees nor are amounts payable to the
Philippine Government.7

In fine, the 1 September 2009 Resolution exempted the cooperatives from court fees but not from sheriff’s
fees/expenses.

On 11 February 2010, however, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a Resolution in A.M. No. 08-2-01-
0,8 which denied the petition of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for recognition of its
exemption from payment of legal fees imposed under Section 22 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. In the
GSIS case, the Court citing Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice,9 stressed that the 1987 Constitution
molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary; took away the power of Congress to repeal,
alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure; and held that the power to
promulgate these Rules is no longer shared by the Court with Congress, more so, with the
Executive,10 thus:

Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one
of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court
with Congress, much less with the Executive.11

xxxx

The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an
impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the
sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue
orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by this Court.
Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of exemption from the payment of legal fees
under Section 39 of R.A. 8291 necessarily fails.

Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees without
transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Court’s independence - fiscal
autonomy.12Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and collect
fees,13 including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141 have two basic components, the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). 14 The laws
which established the JDF and SAJF15 expressly declare the identical purpose of these funds to
guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy. 16 Legal
fees therefore do not only constitute a vital source of the Court’s financial resources but also comprise an
essential element of the Court’s fiscal independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees
granted by Congress to government-owned or controlled corporations and local government units will
necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it
impairs the Court’s guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence. 17

In a decision dated 26 February 2010 in Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative

(BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes,18 this Court reiterated its ruling in the GSIS case when it denied the
petition of the cooperative to be exempted from the payment of legal fees under Section 7(c) of Rule 141
of the Rules of Court relative to fees in petitions for extra-judicial foreclosure.

On 10 March 2010, relying again on the GSIS ruling, the Court En Banc issued a resolution clarifying that
the National Power Corporation is not exempt from the payment of legal fees. 19

With the foregoing categorical pronouncements of the Supreme Court, it is evident that the exemption of
cooperatives from payment of court and sheriff’s fees no longer stands. Cooperatives can no longer
invoke Republic Act No. 6938, as amended by Republic Act No. 9520, as basis for exemption from the
payment of legal fees.

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the petition of PHCCI requesting for this Court to
issue an order clarifying and implementing the exemption of cooperatives from the payment of court and
sheriff’s fees is hereby DENIED.1âwphi1

The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to issue a circular clarifying that cooperatives are not
exempt from the payment of the legal fees provided for under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ABAKADA Guro PL v. Purisima

G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S.

ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R.
SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L.
PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON.
ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act
(RA) 93352(Attrition Act of 2005).

RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC
officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation
Board (Board).3 It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of
service, regardless of employment status.4

The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the
year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or
reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in
the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue. 5

The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF)
or his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her
Undersecretary, the Director General of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her
Deputy Director General, the Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners, two
representatives from the rank-and-file employees and a representative from the officials nominated by
their recognized organization.6

Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and
release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees
whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria
adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions,
including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress. 7
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate
and issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335,8 to be approved by a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee created for such purpose.9

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335,
a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law
"transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters"
as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and
incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and
employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no
valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and
employees of all other government agencies.

In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the
President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides
that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the
target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the
fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore
be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC
personnel.

Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and
completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight
committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.

In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, question the petition for being
premature as there is no actual case or controversy yet. Petitioners have not asserted any right or claim
that will necessitate the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction. Nevertheless, respondents acknowledge that
public policy requires the resolution of the constitutional issues involved in this case. They assert that the
allegation that the reward system will breed mercenaries is mere speculation and does not suffice to
invalidate the law. Seen in conjunction with the declared objective of RA 9335, the law validly classifies
the BIR and the BOC because the functions they perform are distinct from those of the other government
agencies and instrumentalities. Moreover, the law provides a sufficient standard that will guide the
executive in the implementation of its provisions. Lastly, the creation of the congressional oversight
committee under the law enhances, rather than violates, separation of powers. It ensures the fulfillment of
the legislative policy and serves as a check to any over-accumulation of power on the part of the
executive and the implementing agencies.

After a careful consideration of the conflicting contentions of the parties, the Court finds that petitioners
have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA 9335, except as shall hereafter
be discussed.

Actual Case And Ripeness

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial adjudication.10 A closely related requirement is ripeness, that is, the question must
be ripe for adjudication. And a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the governmental act
being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. 11 Thus, to be ripe for judicial
adjudication, the petitioner must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself
that can be redressed by a favorable decision of the Court.12
In this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a judicial controversy by the
mere enactment of the law even without any further overt act,13 petitioners fail either to assert any specific
and concrete legal claim or to demonstrate any direct adverse effect of the law on them. They are unable
to show a personal stake in the outcome of this case or an injury to themselves. On this account, their
petition is procedurally infirm.

This notwithstanding, public interest requires the resolution of the constitutional issues raised by
petitioners. The grave nature of their allegations tends to cast a cloud on the presumption of
constitutionality in favor of the law. And where an action of the legislative branch is alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute.14

Accountability of
Public Officers

Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution states:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,
act with patriotism, and justice, and lead modest lives.

Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not for his own personal gain but for the
benefit of the public for whom he holds it in trust. By demanding accountability and service with
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government officials and employees
have the duty to be responsive to the needs of the people they are called upon to serve.

Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. This presumption
necessarily obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials and employees. RA 9335 operates on the basis
thereof and reinforces it by providing a system of rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging
the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC to exceed their revenue targets and optimize their
revenue-generation capability and collection.15

The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it. It cannot be overturned by
mere conjecture or denied in advance (as petitioners would have the Court do) specially in this case
where it is an underlying principle to advance a declared public policy.

Petitioners’ claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC officials and employees into
"bounty hunters and mercenaries" is not only without any factual and legal basis; it is also purely
speculative.

A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification,
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one. 16 To
invalidate RA 9335 based on petitioners’ baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the
legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.

Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and
exceptional performance. A system of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is
not anathema to the concept of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to
duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving government personnel.

In United States v. Matthews,17 the U.S. Supreme Court validated a law which awards to officers of the
customs as well as other parties an amount not exceeding one-half of the net proceeds of forfeitures in
violation of the laws against smuggling. Citing Dorsheimer v. United States,18 the U.S. Supreme Court
said:

The offer of a portion of such penalties to the collectors is to stimulate and reward their zeal and
industry in detecting fraudulent attempts to evade payment of duties and taxes.

In the same vein, employees of the BIR and the BOC may by law be entitled to a reward when, as a
consequence of their zeal in the enforcement of tax and customs laws, they exceed their revenue targets.
In addition, RA 9335 establishes safeguards to ensure that the reward will not be claimed if it will be
either the fruit of "bounty hunting or mercenary activity" or the product of the irregular performance of
official duties. One of these precautionary measures is embodied in Section 8 of the law:

SEC. 8. Liability of Officials, Examiners and Employees of the BIR and the BOC. – The officials,
examiners, and employees of the [BIR] and the [BOC] who violate this Act or who are guilty of
negligence, abuses or acts of malfeasance or misfeasance or fail to exercise extraordinary
diligence in the performance of their duties shall be held liable for any loss or injury suffered by
any business establishment or taxpayer as a result of such violation, negligence, abuse,
malfeasance, misfeasance or failure to exercise extraordinary diligence.

Equal Protection

Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the same conditions and among
persons similarly situated; it is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are
classified based on substantial differences in relation to the object to be accomplished. 19 When things or
persons are different in fact or circumstance, they may be treated in law differently. In Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union,20 this Court declared:

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the
laws upon all citizens of the [S]tate. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which
are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection
clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within
which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in
law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation
or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid
because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes
without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is
based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters
within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not
necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their
relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence,
 legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal
protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm,
and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear. 21 (emphasis supplied)

The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. 23 Since the
subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the
incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover,
the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of
generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and
charges.

The BIR performs the following functions:

Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. – The Bureau of Internal Revenue, which shall be
headed by and subject to the supervision and control of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
who shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary [of the DOF],
shall have the following functions:

(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees and charges and account for all revenues collected;

(2) Exercise duly delegated police powers for the proper performance of its functions and duties;

(3) Prevent and prosecute tax evasions and all other illegal economic activities;

(4) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent and subordinate units; and

(5) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.24

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, the BOC has the following functions:

Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. – The Bureau of Customs which shall be headed and subject to
the management and control of the Commissioner of Customs, who shall be appointed by the
President upon the recommendation of the Secretary[of the DOF] and hereinafter referred to as
Commissioner, shall have the following functions:

(1) Collect custom duties, taxes and the corresponding fees, charges and penalties;

(2) Account for all customs revenues collected;

(3) Exercise police authority for the enforcement of tariff and customs laws;

(4) Prevent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all other economic frauds within all ports of
entry;

(5) Supervise and control exports, imports, foreign mails and the clearance of vessels and
aircrafts in all ports of entry;

(6) Administer all legal requirements that are appropriate;

 (7) Prevent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal activities in all ports under its jurisdiction;

(8) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent units;

(9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.25

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of
being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions –
taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the
law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy
the demands of equal protection.

Undue Delegation

Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the
sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out
or implemented by the delegate.26 It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines
or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot.27 To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority,
announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented. 28

RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and
the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the
law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs
(BOC) by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and
Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the
purpose of encouraging their officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets.

Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing"29 the delegated power to the President to
fix revenue targets:

SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. – A Rewards and Incentives Fund, hereinafter referred to
as the Fund, is hereby created, to be sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in
excess of their respective revenue targets of the year, as determined by the Development
Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC), in the following percentages:

Excess of Collection of the Percent (%) of the Excess Collection to

Excess the Revenue Targets Accrue to the Fund
30% or below – 15%
More than 30% – 15% of the first 30% plus 20% of the
remaining excess

The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately following the year
when the revenue collection target was exceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal year.

Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection expected of the
BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as stated in the Budget of Expenditures and
Sources of Financing (BESF) submitted by the President to Congress. The BIR and the
 BOC shall submit to the DBCC the distribution of the agencies’ revenue targets as allocated
among its revenue districts in the case of the BIR, and the collection districts in the case of the
BOC.

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR
and the BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the
President to Congress.30 Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President
as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.

On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board’s authority and identifies the conditions
under which officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%
may be removed from the service:

SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. – The Board in the agency shall have the following
powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees
whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least seven and a half percent
(7.5%), with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection as
provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under this Act, subject to civil service laws,
rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process:
Provided, That the following exemptions shall apply:

1. Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-created, not exceeding two years in
operation, as has no historical record of collection performance that can be used as basis
for evaluation; and

2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent transferee in the middle
of the period under consideration unless the transfer was due to nonperformance of
revenue targets or potential nonperformance of revenue targets: Provided, however, That
when the district or area of responsibility covered by revenue or customs officials or
employees has suffered from economic difficulties brought about by natural calamities
or force majeure or economic causes as may be determined by the Board, termination
shall be considered only after careful and proper review by the Board.

(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted in the preceding paragraph:
Provided, That such decision shall be immediately executory: Provided, further, That the
application of the criteria for the separation of an official or employee from service under
this Act shall be without prejudice to the application of other relevant laws on
accountability of public officers and employees, such as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards of Public Officers and Employees and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Clearly, RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the
BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the
service for causes other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the
employee.31 In the case of RA 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue
collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting
the level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of
official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws. 32 The action for removal is also
subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due
process.

At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public interest," "justice and
equity," "public convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare." 33 In this case, the
declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC
is infused with public interest.

Separation Of Powers

Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:

SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. – There is hereby created a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee composed of seven Members from the Senate and seven
Members from the House of Representatives. The Members from the Senate shall be appointed
by the Senate President, with at least two senators representing the minority. The Members from
the House of Representatives shall be appointed by the Speaker with at least two members
representing the minority. After the Oversight Committee will have approved the implementing
rules and regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter become functus officio and therefore cease to exist.

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On
May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist.
Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the
law may be considered moot and academic.

This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to confront the issue of the
constitutionality of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created under RA 9335 (or other similar
laws for that matter).

The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno on the concept of congressional
oversight in Macalintal v. Commission on Elections34 is illuminating:

Concept and bases of congressional oversight

Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to
enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has
enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress:
(a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether
agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to
prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive
conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.

The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and
integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. x x x x x x x
xx

Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power with increased frequency to check the
perceived "exponential accumulation of power" by the executive branch. By the beginning of the
20th century, Congress has delegated an enormous amount of legislative authority to the
executive branch and the administrative agencies. Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to
make sure that the administrative agencies perform their functions within the authority delegated
to them. x x x x x x x x x

Categories of congressional oversight functions

The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided
into three categories, namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision.

a. Scrutiny

Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to

administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to determine economy and efficiency of
the operation of government activities. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress
may request information and report from the other branches of government. It can give
recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of the agency involved.

xxx xxx xxx

b. Congressional investigation

While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at the facts that
are readily available, congressional investigation involves a more intense digging of facts.
The power of Congress to conduct investigation is recognized by the 1987 Constitution
under section 21, Article VI, xxx xxx xxx

c. Legislative supervision

The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its oversight power is thru
legislative supervision. "Supervision" connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part
of a congressional committee regarding executive operations in a given administrative area.
While both congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch
actions in order to influence future executive branch performance, congressional supervision
allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making authority, and permits
Congress to retain part of that delegated authority.

Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto power. It typically
utilizes veto provisions when granting the President or an executive agency the power to
promulgate regulations with the force of law. These provisions require the President or an agency
to present the proposed regulations to Congress, which retains a "right" to approve or disapprove
any regulation before it takes effect. Such legislative veto provisions usually provide that a
proposed regulation will become a law after the expiration of a certain period of time, only if
Congress does not affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the meantime. Less frequently,
the statute provides that a proposed regulation will become law if Congress affirmatively
approves it.

Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the balance of power between
the legislative and the executive branches of government as it offers lawmakers a way to
delegate vast power to the executive branch or to independent agencies while retaining the
option to cancel particular exercise of such power without having to pass new legislation or to
repeal existing law. They contend that this arrangement promotes democratic accountability as it
provides legislative check on the activities of unelected administrative agencies. One proponent
thus explains:
 It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation policy: the policy is too deeply
embedded in our law and practice. It suffices to say that the complexities of modern
government have often led Congress-whether by actual or perceived necessity- to
legislate by declaring broad policy goals and general statutory standards, leaving the
choice of policy options to the discretion of an executive officer. Congress articulates
legislative aims, but leaves their implementation to the judgment of parties who may or
may not have participated in or agreed with the development of those aims.
Consequently, absent safeguards, in many instances the reverse of our constitutional
scheme could be effected: Congress proposes, the Executive disposes. One safeguard,
of course, is the legislative power to enact new legislation or to change existing law. But
without some means of overseeing post enactment activities of the executive branch,
Congress would be unable to determine whether its policies have been implemented in
accordance with legislative intent and thus whether legislative intervention is appropriate.

Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue encroachment upon the
executive prerogatives. They urge that any post-enactment measures undertaken by the
legislative branch should be limited to scrutiny and investigation; any measure beyond
that would undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. They
contend that legislative veto constitutes an impermissible evasion of the President’s veto authority
and intrusion into the powers vested in the executive or judicial branches of government.
Proponents counter that legislative veto enhances separation of powers as it prevents the
executive branch and independent agencies from accumulating too much power. They submit
that reporting requirements and congressional committee investigations allow Congress to
scrutinize only the exercise of delegated law-making authority. They do not allow Congress to
review executive proposals before they take effect and they do not afford the opportunity for
ongoing and binding expressions of congressional intent. In contrast, legislative veto permits
Congress to participate prospectively in the approval or disapproval of "subordinate law" or those
enacted by the executive branch pursuant to a delegation of authority by Congress. They further
argue that legislative veto "is a necessary response by Congress to the accretion of policy control
by forces outside its chambers." In an era of delegated authority, they point out that legislative
veto "is the most efficient means Congress has yet devised to retain control over the evolution
and implementation of its policy as declared by statute."

In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the
validity of legislative veto provisions. The case arose from the order of the immigration judge
suspending the deportation of Chadha pursuant to § 244(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act. The United States House of Representatives passed a resolution vetoing the suspension
pursuant to § 244(c)(2) authorizing either House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the
decision of the executive branch to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United
States. The immigration judge reopened the deportation proceedings to implement the House
order and the alien was ordered deported. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the
alien’s appeal, holding that it had no power to declare unconstitutional an act of Congress. The
United States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit held that the House was without constitutional
authority to order the alien’s deportation and that § 244(c)(2) violated the constitutional doctrine
on separation of powers.

On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court declared § 244(c)(2) unconstitutional. But the Court shied
away from the issue of separation of powers and instead held that the provision violates the
presentment clause and bicameralism. It held that the one-house veto was essentially legislative
in purpose and effect. As such, it is subject to the procedures set out in Article I of the
Constitution requiring the passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment to the
President. x x x x x x x x x

Two weeks after the Chadha decision, the Court upheld, in memorandum decision, two lower
court decisions invalidating the legislative veto provisions in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978
 and the Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1980. Following this precedence, lower
courts invalidated statutes containing legislative veto provisions although some of these
provisions required the approval of both Houses of Congress and thus met the bicameralism
requirement of Article I. Indeed, some of these veto provisions were not even
exercised.35 (emphasis supplied)

In Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of the power of congressional oversight and
considering the nature and powers of a constitutional body like the Commission on Elections, the Court
struck down the provision in RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) creating a Joint
Congressional Committee. The committee was tasked not only to monitor and evaluate the
implementation of the said law but also to review, revise, amend and approve the IRR promulgated by the
Commission on Elections. The Court held that these functions infringed on the constitutional
independence of the Commission on Elections.36

With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it
neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor
undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances
inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as
it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.

However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the
Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. 37 It may not vest itself, any of its
committees or its members with either executive or judicial power. 38 And, when it exercises its legislative
power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under
the Constitution,39 including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment.

Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget hearings
conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be
heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation40 and

(2) investigation and monitoring41 of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.42

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
Legislative vetoes fall in this class.

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the
proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee
formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect.
As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-
turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and
investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. 43It radically
changes the design or structure of the Constitution’s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct
role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.44

Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy within the broad horizons of
its legislative competence.45 It can itself formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch the
responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those standards. 46 In the
latter case, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of
the legislature.47 Thus, what is left for the executive branch or the concerned administrative agency when
it formulates rules and regulations implementing the law is to fill up details (supplementary rule-making) or
ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).48

Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which
they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect.49 Such rules and
regulations partake of the nature of a statute50and are just as binding as if they have been written in the
statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality
and legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court.51 Congress,
in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its
stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In
exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they
conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power
exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.

Considered Opinion of
Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga

Moreover, the requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as
a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule
on presentment.52

Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution states:

Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to
the people by the provision on initiative and referendum. (emphasis supplied)

Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws) 53 is vested in Congress which
consists of two chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative
power requires the act of both chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two
chambers nor by a committee of either or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a legislative veto,
both a single-chamber legislative veto and a congressional committee legislative veto are invalid.

Additionally, Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto it
and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the
objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-
thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with
the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by
two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of
each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the members voting for or
against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the
House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall
become a law as if he had signed it. (emphasis supplied)

Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval or veto. In the absence of
presentment to the President, no bill passed by Congress can become a law. In this sense, law-making
under the Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature and of the Executive. Assuming that legislative veto
is a valid legislative act with the force of law, it cannot take effect without such presentment even if
approved by both chambers of Congress.
In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a law. First, it must be approved by both Houses of
Congress.54Second, it must be presented to and approved by the President.55 As summarized by Justice
Isagani Cruz56 and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.57, the following is the procedure for the approval of bills:

A bill is introduced by any member of the House of Representatives or the Senate except for
some measures that must originate only in the former chamber.

The first reading involves only a reading of the number and title of the measure and its referral by
the Senate President or the Speaker to the proper committee for study.

The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it may be recommended for approval, with or without
amendments, sometimes after public hearings are first held thereon. If there are other bills of the
same nature or purpose, they may all be consolidated into one bill under common authorship or
as a committee bill.

Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second reading. It is at this stage that the bill is
read in its entirety, scrutinized, debated upon and amended when desired. The second reading is
the most important stage in the passage of a bill.

The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and copies thereof are
distributed at least three days before the third reading. On the third reading, the members merely
register their votes and explain them if they are allowed by the rules. No further debate is allowed.

Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other chamber, where it will also undergo the
three readings. If there are differences between the versions approved by the two chambers, a
conference committee58 representing both Houses will draft a compromise measure that if ratified
by the Senate and the House of Representatives will then be submitted to the President for his
consideration.

The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by the Congress, thereafter authenticated
with the signatures of the Senate President, the Speaker, and the Secretaries of their respective
chambers…59

The President’s role in law-making.

The final step is submission to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law
after the required publication.60

Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it has enacted pursuant to
sufficient standards established in the said law, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and
conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the hands of the
legislature when it becomes effective because it is only upon effectivity of the statute that legal rights and
obligations become available to those entitled by the language of the statute. Subject to the indispensable
requisite of publication under the due process clause,61 the determination as to when a law takes effect is
wholly the prerogative of Congress.62 As such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law may be executed
and the executive branch acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law. Before that point, the
role of the executive branch, particularly of the President, is limited to approving or vetoing the law. 63

From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress
or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be
unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling
made by the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.

Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as unconstitutional. While there
may be similar provisions of other laws that may be invalidated for failure to pass this standard, the Court
refrains from invalidating them wholesale but will do so at the proper time when an appropriate case
assailing those provisions is brought before us.64

The next question to be resolved is: what is the effect of the unconstitutionality of Section 12 of RA 9335
on the other provisions of the law? Will it render the entire law unconstitutional? No.

Section 13 of RA 9335 provides:

SEC. 13. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act is declared invalid by a competent
court, the remainder of this Act or any provision not affected by such declaration of invalidity shall
remain in force and effect.

In Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,65 the Court laid down the following rules:

The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while
another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced.
The presence of a separability clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature
intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute. To justify this result, the valid
portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the
legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not constitutionally enact
the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible and valid statute, which carries
out the legislative intent. x x x

The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent
and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as
to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate
the rest. In making the parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one another,
the legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if
one part is void, in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus
dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them.

The separability clause of RA 9335 reveals the intention of the legislature to isolate and detach any
invalid provision from the other provisions so that the latter may continue in force and effect. The valid
portions can stand independently of the invalid section. Without Section 12, the remaining provisions still
constitute a complete, intelligible and valid law which carries out the legislative intent to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC by providing for a system of rewards
and sanctions through the Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board.

To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if their purpose is to enforce
or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The IRR of RA 9335 were published on May 30,
2006 in two newspapers of general circulation66 and became effective 15 days thereafter.67 Until and
unless the contrary is shown, the IRR are presumed valid and effective even without the approval of the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the law is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining
provisions of RA 9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions remain
in force and effect.
SO ORDERED.

Review CEnter Assoc of the PH v. Ermita

[G.R. NO. 180046 : April 2, 2009]

REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA and COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION
represented by its Chairman ROMULO L. NERI, Respondents.

CPA REVIEW SCHOOL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (CPAR), PROFESSIONAL REVIEW

AND TRAINING CENTER, INC. (PRTC), ReSA REVIEW SCHOOL, INC. (ReSA), CRC-
ACE REVIEW SCHOOL, INC.

(CRC-ACE), Petitioners-Intervenors.

PIMSAT COLLEGES, Respondent-Intervenor.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for prohibition and mandamus assailing Executive Order No.
566 (EO 566)1and Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Memorandum Order No. 30,
series of 2007 (RIRR).2

The Antecedent Facts

On 11 and 12 June 2006, the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) conducted the
Nursing Board Examinations nationwide. In June 2006, licensure applicants wrote the PRC
to report that handwritten copies of two sets of examinations were circulated during the
examination period among the examinees reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review Center and
Inress Review Center. George Cordero, Inress Review Center's President, was then the
incumbent President of the Philippine Nurses Association. The examinees were provided with
a list of 500 questions and answers in two of the examinations' five subjects, particularly
Tests III (Psychiatric Nursing) and V (Medical-Surgical Nursing). The PRC later admitted the
leakage and traced it to two Board of Nursing members.3 On 19 June 2006, the PRC
released the results of the Nursing Board Examinations. On 18 August 2006, the Court of
Appeals restrained the PRC from proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful
examinees set on 22 August 2006.

Consequently, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) replaced all the

members of the PRC's Board of Nursing. President Arroyo also ordered the examinees to re-
take the Nursing Board Examinations.
On 8 September 2006, President Arroyo issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED to
supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the
Philippines.

On 3 November 2006, the CHED, through its then Chairman Carlito S. Puno (Chairman
Puno), approved CHED Memorandum Order No. 49, series of 2006 (IRR). 4

In a letter dated 24 November 2006,5 the Review Center Association of the Philippines
(petitioner), an organization of independent review centers, asked the CHED to "amend, if
not withdraw" the IRR arguing, among other things, that giving permits to operate a review
center to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional
organizations will effectively abolish independent review centers.

In a letter dated 3 January 2007,6 Chairman Puno wrote petitioner, through its President
Jose Antonio Fudolig (Fudolig), that to suspend the implementation of the IRR would be
inconsistent with the mandate of EO 566. Chairman Puno wrote that the IRR was presented
to the stakeholders during a consultation process prior to its finalization and publication on
13 November 2006. Chairman Puno also wrote that petitioner's comments and suggestions
would be considered in the event of revisions to the IRR.

In view of petitioner's continuing request to suspend and re-evaluate the IRR, Chairman
Puno, in a letter dated 9 February 2007,7 invited petitioner's representatives to a dialogue
on 14 March 2007. In accordance with what was agreed upon during the dialogue, petitioner
submitted to the CHED its position paper on the IRR. Petitioner also requested the CHED to
confirm in writing Chairman Puno's statements during the dialogue, particularly on lowering
of the registration fee from P400,000 to P20,000 and the requirement for reviewers to have
five years' teaching experience instead of five years' administrative experience. Petitioner
likewise requested for a categorical answer to their request for the suspension of the IRR.
The CHED did not reply to the letter.

On 7 May 2007, the CHED approved the RIRR. On 22 August 2007, petitioner filed before
the CHED a Petition to Clarify/Amend Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations8 praying
for a ruling:

1. Amending the RIRR by excluding independent review centers from the coverage of the
CHED;

2. Clarifying the meaning of the requirement for existing review centers to tie-up or be
integrated with HEIs, consortium or HEIs and PRC-recognized professional associations with
recognized programs, or in the alternative, to convert into schools; andcralawlibrary

3. Revising the rules to make it conform with Republic Act No. 7722 (RA 7722)9 limiting the
CHED's coverage to public and private institutions of higher education as well as degree-
granting programs in post-secondary educational institutions.

On 8 October 2007, the CHED issued Resolution No. 718-200710 referring petitioner's
request to exclude independent review centers from CHED's supervision and regulation to
the Office of the President as the matter requires the amendment of EO 566. In a letter
dated 17 October 2007,11 then CHED Chairman Romulo L. Neri (Chairman Neri) wrote
petitioner regarding its petition to be excluded from the coverage of the CHED in the RIRR.
Chairman Neri stated:
While it may be true that regulation of review centers is not one of the mandates of CHED
under Republic Act 7722, however, on September 8, 2006, Her Excellency, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, issued Executive Order No. 566 directing the Commission on Higher
Education to regulate the establishment and operation of review centers and similar entities
in the entire country.

With the issuance of the aforesaid Executive Order, the CHED now is the agency that is
mandated to regulate the establishment and operation of all review centers as provided for
under Section 4 of the Executive Order which provides that "No review center or similar
entities shall be established and/or operate review classes without the favorable
expressed indorsement of the CHED and without the issuance of the necessary
permits or authorizations to conduct review classes. x x x"

To exclude the operation of independent review centers from the coverage of CHED would
clearly contradict the intention of the said Executive Order No. 566.

Considering that the requests requires the amendment of Executive Order No. 566, the
Commission, during its 305th Commission Meeting, resolved that the said request be
directly referred to the Office of the President for appropriate action.

As to the request to clarify what is meant by tie-up/be integrated with an HEI, as required
under the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations, tie-up/be integrated simply means,
to be in partner with an HEI.12 (Boldfacing and underscoring in the original)

On 26 October 2007, petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before this
Court praying for the annulment of the RIRR, the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and
unconstitutional, and the prohibition against CHED from implementing the RIRR.

Dr. Freddie T. Bernal, Director III, Officer-In-Charge, Office of the Director IV of CHED, sent
a letter13 to the President of Northcap Review Center, Inc., a member of petitioner, that it
had until 27 November 2007 to comply with the RIRR.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl
lαω lιbrαrÿ

On 15 February 2008,14 PIMSAT Colleges (respondent-intervenor) filed a Motion For Leave

to Intervene and To Admit Comment-in-Intervention and a Comment-in-Intervention
praying for the dismissal of the petition. Respondent-intervenor alleges that the Office of
the President and the CHED did not commit any act of grave abuse of discretion in issuing
EO 566 and the RIRR. Respondent-intervenor alleges that the requirements of the RIRR are
reasonable, doable, and are not designed to deprive existing review centers of their review
business. The Court granted the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Comment-in-
Intervention in its 11 March 2008 Resolution.15

On 23 April 2008, a Motion for Leave of Court for Intervention In Support of the Petition and
a Petition In Intervention were filed by CPA Review School of the Philippines, Inc. (CPAR),
Professional Review and Training Center, Inc. (PRTC), ReSA Review School, Inc. (ReSA),
CRC-ACE Review School, Inc. (CRC-ACE), all independent CPA review centers operating in
Manila (collectively, petitioners-intervenors). Petitioners-intervenors pray for the declaration
of EO 566 and the RIRR as invalid on the ground that both constitute an unconstitutional
exercise of legislative power. The Court granted the intervention in its 29 April 2008
Resolution.16
On 21 May 2008, the CHED issued CHED Memorandum Order No. 21, Series of 2008 (CMO
21, s. 2008)17 extending the deadline for six months from 27 May 2008 for all existing
independent review centers to tie-up or be integrated with HEIs in accordance with the
RIRR.

In its 25 November 2008 Resolution, this Court resolved to require the parties to observe
the status quo prevailing before the issuance of EO 566, the RIRR, and CMO 21, s. 2008.

The Assailed Executive Order and the RIRR

Executive Order No. 566 states in full:

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 566

DIRECTING THE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT

AND OPERATION OF REVIEW CENTERS AND SIMILAR ENTITIES

WHEREAS, the State is mandated to protect the right of all citizens to quality education at
all levels and shall take appropriate steps to make education accessible to all, pursuant to
Section 1, Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution;

WHEREAS, the State has the obligation to ensure and promote quality education through
the proper supervision and regulation of the licensure examinations given through the
various Boards of Examiners under the Professional Regulation Commission;

WHEREAS, the lack of regulatory framework for the establishment and operation of review
centers and similar entities, as shown in recent events, have adverse consequences and
affect public interest and welfare;

WHEREAS, the overriding necessity to protect the public against substandard review centers
and unethical practices committed by some review centers demand that a regulatory
framework for the establishment and operation of review centers and similar entities be
immediately instituted;

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7722, otherwise known as the Higher Education Act of 1994,
created the Commission on Higher Education, which is best equipped to carry out the
provisions pertaining to the regulation of the establishment and operation of review centers
and similar entities.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, the President of the Republic of the

Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:

SECTION 1. Establishment of a System of Regulation for Review Centers and Similar

Entities. The Commission on Higher Education (CHED), in consultation with other concerned
government agencies, is hereby directed to formulate a framework for the regulation of
review centers and similar entities, including but not limited to the development and
institutionalization of policies, standards, guidelines for the establishment, operation and
accreditation of review centers and similar entities; maintenance of a mechanism to monitor
the adequacy, transparency and propriety of their operations; and reporting mechanisms to
review performance and ethical practice.
SEC. 2. Coordination and Support. The Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), Technical
Skills Development Authority (TESDA), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the
various Boards of Examiners under the PRC, as well as other concerned non-government
organizations life professional societies, and various government agencies, such as the
Department of Justice (DOJ), National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), and others that may be tapped later, shall provide the necessary assistance
and technical support to the CHED in the successful operationalization of the System of
Regulation envisioned by this Executive Order.

SEC. 3. Permanent Office and Staff. To ensure the effective implementation of the System
of Regulation, the CHED shall organize a permanent office under its supervision to be
headed by an official with the rank of Director and to be composed of highly competent
individuals with expertise in educational assessment, evaluation and testing; policies and
standards development, monitoring, legal and enforcement; and statistics as well as
curriculum and instructional materials development. The CHED shall submit the staffing
pattern and budgetary requirements to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
for approval.

SEC. 4. Indorsement Requirement. No review center or similar entities shall be established

and/or operate review classes without the favorable expressed indorsement of the CHED
and without the issuance of the necessary permits or authorizations to conduct review
classes. After due consultation with the stakeholders, the concerned review centers and
similar entities shall be given a reasonable period, at the discretion of the CHED, to comply
with the policies and standards, within a period not exceeding three (3) years, after due
publication of this Executive Order. The CHED shall see to it that the System of Regulation
including the implementing mechanisms, policies, guidelines and other necessary
procedures and documentation for the effective implementation of the System, are
completed within sixty days (60) upon effectivity of this Executive Order.

SEC. 5. Funding. The initial amount necessary for the development and implementation of
the System of Regulation shall be sourced from the CHED Higher Education Development
Fund (HEDF), subject to the usual government accounting and auditing practices, or from
any applicable funding source identified by the DBM. For the succeeding fiscal year, such
amounts as may be necessary for the budgetary requirement of implementing the System
of Regulation and the provisions of this Executive Order shall be provided for in the annual
General Appropriations Act in the budget of the CHED. Whenever necessary, the CHED may
tap its Development Funds as supplemental source of funding for the effective
implementation of the regulatory system. In this connection, the CHED is hereby authorized
to create special accounts in the HEDF exclusively for the purpose of implementing the
provisions of this Executive Order.

SEC. 6. Review and Reporting. The CHED shall provide for the periodic review performance
of review centers and similar entities and shall make a report to the Office of the President
of the results of such review, evaluation and monitoring.

SEC. 7. Separability. Any portion or provision of this Executive Order that may be declared
unconstitutional shall not have the effect of nullifying other provisions hereof, as long as
such remaining provisions can still subsist and be given effect in their entirely.

SEC. 8. Repeal. All rules and regulations, other issuances or parts thereof, which are
inconsistent with this Executive Order, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SEC. 9. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately upon its publication in
a national newspaper of general circulation.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 8th day of September, in the year of Our Lord, Two
Thousand and Six.

(Sgd.) Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

By the President:

(Sgd.) Eduardo R. Ermita

Executive Secretary

The pertinent provisions of the RIRR affecting independent review centers are as follows:

Rule VII

IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES

Section 1. Authority to Establish and Operate - Only CHED recognized, accredited and
reputable HEIs may be authorized to establish and operate review center/course by the
CHED upon full compliance with the conditions and requirements provided herein and in
other pertinent laws, rules and regulations. In addition, a consortium or consortia of
qualified schools and/or entities may establish and operate review centers or conduct review
classes upon compliance with the provisions of these Rules.

Rule XIV
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS

Section 1. Review centers that are existing upon the approval of Executive Order No. 566
shall be given a grace period of up to one (1) year, to tie-up/be integrated with existing
HEIs[,] consortium of HEIs and PRC recognized Professional Associations with recognized
programs under the conditions set forth in this Order and upon mutually acceptable
covenants by the contracting parties. In the alternative, they may convert as a school and
apply for the course covered by the review subject to rules and regulations of the CHED and
the SEC with respect to the establishment of schools. In the meantime, no permit shall be
issued if there is non-compliance with these conditions or non-compliance with the
requirements set forth in these rules.

Section 2. Only after full compliance with the requirements shall a Permit be given by the
CHED to review centers contemplated under this Rule.

Section 3. Failure of existing review centers to fully comply with the above shall bar them
from existing as review centers and they shall be deemed as operating illegally as such. In
addition, appropriate administrative and legal proceedings shall be commence[d] against
the erring entities that continue to operate and appropriate sanctions shall be imposed after
due process.

The Issues

The issues raised in this case are the following:

1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power as it
expands the CHED's jurisdiction; andcralawlibrary

2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executive's rule-making power.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has merit.

Violation of Judicial Hierarchy

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the dismissal of the petition. Among
other grounds, the OSG alleges that petitioner violated the rule on judicial hierarchy in filing
the petition directly with this Court.

This Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction is not exclusive but is concurrent with the Regional
Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals in certain cases.18 The Court has explained:

This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking

any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that
judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary
writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is
[an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the
Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket.19

The Court has further explained:

The propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial
system by seeking relief directly from this Court must be put to a halt for two reasons: (1)
it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (2) it would cause an
inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in
some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum
under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court
is not a trier of facts.20

The rule, however, is not absolute, as when exceptional and compelling circumstances
justify the exercise of this Court of its primary jurisdiction. In this case, petitioner alleges
that EO 566 expands the coverage of RA 7722 and in doing so, the Executive Department
usurps the legislative powers of Congress.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

The issue in this case is not only the validity of the RIRR. Otherwise, the proper remedy of
petitioner and petitioners-intervenors would have been an ordinary action for the
nullification of the RIRR before the Regional Trial Court.21 The alleged violation of the
Constitution by the Executive Department when it issued EO 566 justifies the exercise by
the Court of its primary jurisdiction over the case. The Court is not precluded from brushing
aside technicalities and taking cognizance of an action due to its importance to the public
and in keeping with its duty to determine whether the other branches of the Government
have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution.22

OSG's Technical Objections

The OSG alleges that the petition should be dismissed because the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping were signed only by Fudolig without the express
authority of any board resolution or power of attorney. However, the records show that
Fudolig was authorized under Board Resolution No. 3, series of 2007 23 to file a petition
before this Court on behalf of petitioner and to execute any and all documents necessary to
implement the resolution.

The OSG also alleges that the petition should be dismissed for violation of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice because Fudolig only presented his community tax certificate as
competent proof of identity before the notary public. The Court would have required Fudolig
to comply with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice except that Fudolig already presented his
Philippine passport before the notary public when petitioner submitted its reply to the OSG's
comment.

EO 566 Expands the Coverage of RA 7722

The OSG alleges that Section 3 of RA 7722 should be read in conjunction with Section 8,
enumerating the CHED's powers and functions. In particular, the OSG alleges that the CHED
has the power under paragraphs (e) and (n) of Section 8 to:

(e) monitor and evaluate the performance of programs and institutions of higher learning
for appropriate incentives as well as the imposition of sanctions such as, but not limited to,
diminution or withdrawal of subsidy, recommendation on the downgrading or withdrawal of
accreditation, program termination or school closure;

(n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such other powers and functions as
may be necessary to carry out effectively the purpose and objectives of this Act[.]

The OSG justifies its stand by claiming that the term "programs x x x of higher learning" is
broad enough to include programs offered by review centers.

We do not agree.

Section 3 of RA 7722 provides:

Sec. 3. Creation of Commission on Higher Education. - In pursuance of the abovementioned

policies, the Commission on Higher Education is hereby created, hereinafter referred to as
the Commission.

The Commission shall be independent and separate from the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS), and attached to the Office of the President for administrative
purposes only. Its coverage shall be both public and private institutions of higher
education as well as degree-granting programs in all post-secondary educational
institutions, public and private. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

Neither RA 7722 nor CHED Order No. 3, series of 1994 (Implementing Rules of RA
7722)24defines an institution of higher learning or a program of higher learning.

"Higher education," however, is defined as "education beyond the secondary level" 25 or

"education provided by a college or university."26 Under the "plain meaning" or verba
legisrule in statutory construction, if the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation.27 The legislature is
presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have
expressed its intent by use of such words as are found in the statute.28 Hence, the term
"higher education" should be taken in its ordinary sense and should be read and interpreted
together with the phrase "degree-granting programs in all post-secondary educational
institutions, public and private." Higher education should be taken to mean tertiary
education or that which grants a degree after its completion.

Further, Articles 6 and 7 of the Implementing Rules provide:

Article 6. Scope of Application. - The coverage of the Commission shall be both public and
private institutions of higher education as well as degree granting programs in all post-
secondary educational institutions, public and private.

These Rules shall apply to all public and private educational institutions offering tertiary
degree programs.

The establishment, conversion, or elevation of degree-granting institutions shall be

within the responsibility of the Commission.

Article 7. Jurisdiction. - Jurisdiction over institutions of higher learning primarily

offering tertiary degree programs shall belong to the Commission. (Emphasis
supplied)cralawlibrary

Clearly, HEIs refer to degree-granting institutions, or those offering tertiary degree or post-
secondary programs. In fact, Republic Act No. 8292 or the Higher Education Modernization
Act of 1997 covers chartered state universities and colleges. State universities and colleges
primarily offer degree courses and programs.

Sections 1 and 8, Rule IV of the RIRR define a review center and similar entities as follows:

Section 1. REVIEW CENTER. - refers to a center operated and owned by a duly authorized
entity pursuant to these Rules intending to offer to the public and/or to specialized groups
whether for a fee or for free a program or course of study that is intended to refresh and
enhance the knowledge and competencies and skills of reviewees obtained in the formal
school setting in preparation for the licensure examinations given by the Professional
Regulations Commission (PRC). The term review center as understood in these rules shall
also embrace the operation or conduct of review classes or courses provided by individuals
whether for a fee or not in preparation for the licensure examinations given by the
Professional Regulations Commission.

xxx
Section 8. SIMILAR ENTITIES - the term refer to other review centers providing review or
tutorial services in areas not covered by licensure examinations given by the Professional
Regulations Commission including but not limited to college entrance examinations, Civil
Service examinations, tutorial services in specific fields like English, Mathematics and the
like.

The same Rule defines a review course as follows:

Section 3. REVIEW COURSE - refers to the set of non-degree instructional program of study
and/or instructional materials/module, offered by a school with a recognized
course/program requiring licensure examination, that are intended merely to refresh and
enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees.

The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHED's coverage under RA 7722.
The CHED's coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions of
higher education and degree-granting programs in all public and private post-
secondary educational institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework
for the regulation of review centers and similar entities.

The definition of a review center under EO 566 shows that it refers to one which offers "a
program or course of study that is intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge
or competencies and skills of reviewees obtained in the formal school setting in
preparation for the licensure examinations" given by the PRC. It also covers the
operation or conduct of review classes or courses provided by individuals whether for a fee
or not in preparation for the licensure examinations given by the PRC.

A review center is not an institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722. It does

not offer a degree-granting program that would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED. A
review course is only intended to "refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and
skills of reviewees." A reviewee is not even required to enroll in a review center or to take a
review course prior to taking an examination given by the PRC. Even if a reviewee enrolls in
a review center, attendance in a review course is not mandatory. The reviewee is not
required to attend each review class. He is not required to take or pass an examination, and
neither is he given a grade. He is also not required to submit any thesis or dissertation.
Thus, programs given by review centers could not be considered "programs x x x of higher
learning" that would put them under the jurisdiction of the CHED.

Further, the "similar entities" in EO 566 cover centers providing "review or tutorial services"
in areas not covered by licensure examinations given by the PRC, which include, although
not limited to, college entrance examinations, Civil Services examinations, and tutorial
services. These review and tutorial services hardly qualify as programs of higher learning.

Usurpation of Legislative Power

The OSG argues that President Arroyo was merely exercising her executive power to ensure
that the laws are faithfully executed. The OSG further argues that President Arroyo was
exercising her residual powers under Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292),29 particularly
Section 20, Title I of Book III, thus:

Section 20. Residual Powers. - Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall
exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are
provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which
are not delegated by the President in accordance with law. (Emphasis
supplied)ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Section 20, Title I of Book III of EO 292 speaks of other powers vested in the President
under the law.30The exercise of the President's residual powers under this provision requires
legislation,31 as the provision clearly states that the exercise of the President's other powers
and functions has to be "provided for under the law." There is no law granting the
President the power to amend the functions of the CHED. The President may not amend RA
7722 through an Executive Order without a prior legislation granting her such power.

The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the
CHED under RA 7722. Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal
them,32 and this power is vested with the Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which states:

Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to
the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

In Ople v. Torres,33 the Court declared void, as a usurpation of legislative power,

Administrative Order No. 308 (AO 308) issued by the President to create a national
identification system. AO 308 mandates the adoption of a national identification system
even in the absence of an enabling legislation. The Court distinguished between Legislative
and Executive powers, as follows:

The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative
power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal
them." The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited
capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative
power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses
plenary power for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by
usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has
lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or
impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern
or common interest.

While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. The
executive power is vested in the President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce
and administer laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and
enforcing their due observance.

As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents
the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and
employees of his department. He has control over the executive department, bureaus and
offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the
executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials.
Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the
enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is
granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to
discharge his duties effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform
standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this
end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.

x x x. An administrative order is:

"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be
promulgated in administrative orders."

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific

aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law
and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative
policy. x x x.34

Just like AO 308 in Ople v. Torres, EO 566 in this case is not supported by any enabling law.
The Court further stated in Ople:

x x x. As well stated by Fisher: "x x x Many regulations however, bear directly on the public.
It is here that administrative legislation must be restricted in its scope and application.
Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making that Congress
enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to
respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of
power to make laws."35

Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise
of the CHED's quasi-legislative power.

Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through the

promulgation of rules and regulations.36 The CHED may only exercise its rule-making power
within the confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. The RIRR covers review centers and
similar entities which are neither institutions of higher education nor institutions offering
degree-granting programs.

Exercise of Police Power

Police power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order
or safety, and the general welfare of the people flows from the recognition that salus populi
est suprema lex - the welfare of the people is the supreme law.37 Police power primarily
rests with the legislature although it may be exercised by the President and administrative
boards by virtue of a valid delegation.38 Here, no delegation of police power exists under RA
7722 authorizing the President to regulate the operations of non-degree granting review
centers.

Republic Act No. 8981 is Not the Appropriate Law

It is argued that the President of the Philippines has adequate powers under the law to
regulate review centers and this could have been done under an existing validly delegated
authority, and that the appropriate law is Republic Act No. 8981 39 (RA 8981). Under Section
5 of RA 8981, the PRC is mandated to "establish and maintain a high standard of admission
to the practice of all professions and at all times ensure and safeguard the integrity of all
licensure examinations." Section 7 of RA 8981 further states that the PRC shall adopt
"measures to preserve the integrity and inviolability of licensure examinations."

There is no doubt that a principal mandate of the PRC is to preserve the integrity of
licensure examinations. The PRC has the power to adopt measures to preserve the integrity
and inviolability of licensure examinations. However, this power should properly be
interpreted to refer to the conduct of the examinations. The enumeration of PRC's powers
under Section 7(e) includes among others, the fixing of dates and places of the
examinations and the appointment of supervisors and watchers. The power to preserve the
integrity and inviolability of licensure examinations should be read together with these
functions. These powers of the PRC have nothing to do at all with the regulation of
review centers.

The PRC has the power to investigate any of the members of the Professional Regulatory
Boards (PRB) for "commission of any irregularities in the licensure examinations which taint
or impugn the integrity and authenticity of the results of the said examinations."40 This is an
administrative power which the PRC exercises over members of the PRB. However, this
power has nothing to do with the regulation of review centers. The PRC has the power to
bar PRB members from conducting review classes in review centers. However, to
interpret this power to extend to the power to regulate review centers is clearly an
unwarranted interpretation of RA 8981. The PRC may prohibit the members of the PRB
from conducting review classes at review centers because the PRC has administrative
supervision over the members of the PRB. However, such power does not extend to the
regulation of review centers.

Section 7(y) of RA 8981 giving the PRC the power to perform "such other functions and
duties as may be necessary to carry out the provisions" of RA 8981 does not extend to the
regulation of review centers. There is absolutely nothing in RA 8981 that mentions
regulation by the PRC of review centers.

The Court cannot likewise interpret the fact that RA 8981 penalizes "any person who
manipulates or rigs licensure examination results, secretly informs or makes known
licensure examination questions prior to the conduct of the examination or tampers with the
grades in the professional licensure examinations"41as a grant of power to regulate review
centers. The provision simply provides for the penalties for manipulation and other corrupt
practices in the conduct of the professional examinations.

The assailed EO 566 seeks to regulate not only review centers but also "similar entities."
The questioned CHED RIRR defines "similar entities" as referring to "other review centers
providing review or tutorial services in areas not covered by licensure examinations given
by the PRC including but not limited to college entrance examinations, Civil Service
examinations, tutorial services in specific fields like English, Mathematics and the
like."42 The PRC has no mandate to supervise review centers that give courses or lectures
intended to prepare examinees for licensure examinations given by the PRC. It is like the
Court regulating bar review centers just because the Court conducts the bar
examinations. Similarly, the PRC has no mandate to regulate similar entities whose
reviewees will not even take any licensure examination given by the PRC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and the petition-in-intervention.

We DECLARE Executive Order No. 566 and Commission on Higher Education Memorandum
Order No. 30, series of 2007 VOID for being unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.

Dat Michael Abas Kida et al v. Senate

EN BANC

G.R. No. 196271 February 28, 2012

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity, and in representation of MAGUINDANAO
FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI MUHMINA J. USMAN,
JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-
SAIDI J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and BASSAM ALUH SAUPI, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, thru
its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of the President Executive
Secretary, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary of Budget, and ROBERTO TAN, Treasurer of the
Philippines,Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 196305

BASARI D. MAPUPUNO, Petitioner,

vs.
SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission on Elections, FLORENCIO
ABAD, JR. in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, PAQUITO
OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as
Senate President, and FELICIANO BELMONTE, in his capacity as Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 197221

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, Petitioner,

vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 197280

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU CASAN CONDING CANA, and PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO
LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP-LABAN), Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR.,
in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, and HON. ROBERTO
B. TAN, in his capacity as Treasurer of the Philippines, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 197282

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 197392

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 197454

JACINTO V. PARAS, Petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondents.

MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents-Intervenor.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

We resolve: (a) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Datu Michael Abas Kida, et al. in G.R.
No. 196271; (b) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Rep. Edcel Lagman in G.R. No. 197221;
(c) the ex abundante ad cautelam motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R.
No. 196305; (d) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo Macalintal in G.R. No.
197282; (e) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, Datu Casan Conding
Cana and Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan in G.R. No. 197280; (f) the manifestation and
motion filed by petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, et al. in G.R. No. 197280; and (g) the very urgent motion
to issue clarificatory resolution that the temporary restraining order (TRO) is still existing and effective.

These motions assail our Decision dated October 18, 2011, where we upheld the constitutionality of
Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153
postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were
scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and
recognized the President’s power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these
positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials.

The Motions for Reconsideration

The petitioners in G.R. No. 196271 raise the following grounds in support of their motion:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ARMM ELECTIONS ARE
LOCAL ELECTIONS, CONSIDERING THAT THE CONSTITUTION GIVES THE ARMM A
SPECIAL STATUS AND IS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM ORDINARY LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS.

II. R.A. 10153 AND R.A. 9333 AMEND THE ORGANIC ACT.

III. THE SUPERMAJORITY PROVISIONS OF THE ORGANIC ACT (R.A. 9054) ARE NOT
IRREPEALABLE LAWS.

IV. SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVII OF R.A. 9054 DOES NOT VIOLATE SECTION 18, ARTICLE X
OF THE CONSTITUTION.

V. BALANCE OF INTERESTS TILT IN FAVOR OF THE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE[.] 1

The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 raises similar grounds, arguing that:

I. THE ELECTIVE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE OFFICIALS OF ARMM

CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS OR EQUATED WITH THE TRADITIONAL LOCAL
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS (LGUs) BECAUSE (A)
THERE IS NO EXPLICIT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON SUCH PARITY; AND (B) THE
ARMM IS MORE SUPERIOR THAN LGUs IN STRUCTURE, POWERS AND AUTONOMY, AND
CONSEQUENTLY IS A CLASS OF ITS OWN APART FROM TRADITIONAL LGUs.

II. THE UNMISTAKABLE AND UNEQUIVOCAL CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE FOR AN

ELECTIVE AND REPRESENTATIVE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT AND LEGISLATIVE
ASSEMBLY IN ARMM INDUBITABLY PRECLUDES THE APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
OF OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE (OICs), ALBEIT MOMENTARY OR TEMPORARY, FOR THE
POSITIONS OF ARMM GOVERNOR, VICE GOVERNOR AND MEMBERS OF THE REGIONAL
ASSEMBLY.

III. THE PRESIDENT’S APPOINTING POWER IS LIMITED TO APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS AND

DOES NOT EXTEND TO ELECTIVE OFFICIALS EVEN AS THE PRESIDENT IS ONLY VESTED
WITH SUPERVISORY POWERS OVER THE ARMM, THEREBY NEGATING THE AWESOME
POWER TO APPOINT AND REMOVE OICs OCCUPYING ELECTIVE POSITIONS.

IV. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PROSCRIBE THE HOLDOVER OF ARMM ELECTED
OFFICIALS PENDING THE ELECTION AND QUALIFICATION OF THEIR SUCCESSORS.

V. THE RULING IN OSMENA DOES NOT APPLY TO ARMM ELECTED OFFICIALS WHOSE
TERMS OF OFFICE ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR BY THE CONSTITUTION BUT PRESCRIBED
BY THE ORGANIC ACTS.

VI. THE REQUIREMENT OF A SUPERMAJORITY OF ¾ VOTES IN THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SENATE FOR THE VALIDITY OF A SUBSTANTIVE
AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THE ORGANIC ACTS DOES NOT IMPOSE AN
IRREPEALABLE LAW.

VII. THE REQUIREMENT OF A PLEBISCITE FOR THE EFFECTIVITY OF A SUBSTANTIVE

AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THE ORGANIC ACTS DOES NOT UNDULY EXPAND THE
PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION.
 VIII. SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE ARMM ELECTION WITH THE NATIONAL AND LOCAL
ELECTIONS IS NOT MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION.

IX. THE COMELEC HAS THE AUTHORITY TO HOLD AND CONDUCT SPECIAL ELECTIONS
IN ARMM, AND THE ENACTMENT OF AN IMPROVIDENT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
STATUTE IS AN ANALOGOUS CAUSE WARRANTING COMELEC’S HOLDING OF SPECIAL
ELECTIONS.2 (italics supplied)

The petitioner in G.R. No. 196305 further asserts that:

I. BEFORE THE COURT MAY CONSTRUE OR INTERPRET A STATUTE, IT IS A CONDITION

SINE QUA NON THAT THERE BE DOUBT OR AMBIGUITY IN ITS LANGUAGE.

THE TRANSITORY PROVISIONS HOWEVER ARE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS: THEY

REFER TO THE 1992 ELECTIONS AND TURN-OVER OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS.

IN THUS RECOGNIZING A SUPPOSED "INTENT" OF THE FRAMERS, AND APPLYING THE

SAME TO ELECTIONS 20 YEARS AFTER, THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT MAY HAVE
VIOLATED THEFOREMOST RULE IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.

xxxx

II. THE HONORABLE COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THAT RA 9054, AN ORGANIC
ACT, WAS COMPLETE IN ITSELF. HENCE, RA 10153 SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE
BEEN ENACTED PRECISELY TO AMEND RA 9054.

xxxx

III. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY HAVE COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN DECLARING
THE 2/3 VOTING REQUIREMENT SET FORTH IN RA 9054 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

xxxx

IV. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY HAVE COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING
THAT A PLEBISCITE IS NOT NECESSARY IN AMENDING THE ORGANIC ACT.

xxxx

V. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN DECLARING THE HOLD-

OVER OF ARMM ELECTIVE OFFICIALS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

xxxx

VI. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN UPHOLDING THE

APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE.3 (italics and underscoring supplied)

The petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 contends that:

A.

ASSUMING WITHOUT CONCEDING THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF OICs FOR THE

REGIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE ARMM IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL TO BEGIN WITH,
 SUCH APPOINTMENT OF OIC REGIONAL OFFICIALS WILL CREATE A FUNDAMENTAL
CHANGE IN THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT SUCH THAT R.A.
NO. 10153 SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO A PLEBISCITE IN THE ARMM FOR
APPROVAL BY ITS PEOPLE, WHICH PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENT CANNOT BE
CIRCUMVENTED BY SIMPLY CHARACTERIZING THE PROVISIONS OF R.A. NO. 10153 ON
APPOINTMENT OF OICs AS AN "INTERIM MEASURE".

B.

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE APPOINTMENT BY THE

PRESIDENT OF OICs FOR THE ARMM REGIONAL GOVERNMENT IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF
THE CONSTITUTION.

C.

THE HOLDOVER PRINCIPLE ADOPTED IN R.A. NO. 9054 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
CONSTITUTION, AND BEFORE THEIR SUCCESSORS ARE ELECTED IN EITHER AN
ELECTION TO BE HELD AT THE SOONEST POSSIBLE TIME OR IN MAY 2013, THE SAID
INCUMBENT ARMM REGIONAL OFFICIALS MAY VALIDLY CONTINUE FUNCTIONING AS
SUCH IN A HOLDOVER CAPACITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 7, ARTICLE VII OF
R.A. NO. 9054.

D.

WITH THE CANCELLATION OF THE AUGUST 2011 ARMM ELECTIONS, SPECIAL

ELECTIONS MUST IMMEDIATELY BE HELD FOR THE ELECTIVE REGIONAL OFFICIALS OF
THE ARMM WHO SHALL SERVE UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS ARE ELECTED IN THE MAY
2013 SYNCHRONIZED ELECTIONS.4

Finally, the petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 argue that:

a) the Constitutional mandate of synchronization does not apply to the ARMM elections;

b) RA No. 10153 negates the basic principle of republican democracy which, by constitutional
mandate, guides the governance of the Republic;

c) RA No. 10153 amends the Organic Act (RA No. 9054) and, thus, has to comply with the 2/3
vote from the House of Representatives and the Senate, voting separately, and be ratified in a
plebiscite;

d) if the choice is between elective officials continuing to hold their offices even after their terms
are over and non-elective individuals getting into the vacant elective positions by appointment as
OICs, the holdover option is the better choice;

e) the President only has the power of supervision over autonomous regions, which does not
include the power to appoint OICs to take the place of ARMM elective officials; and

f) it would be better to hold the ARMM elections separately from the national and local elections
as this will make it easier for the authorities to implement election laws.

In essence, the Court is asked to resolve the following questions:

 (a) Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with national
and local elections?

(b) Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No. 10153 have to comply with the
supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements?

(c) Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional?

(d) Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections in ARMM?

(e) Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate the elective and representative
nature of ARMM regional legislative and executive offices?

(f) Does the appointment power granted to the President exceed the President’s supervisory
powers over autonomous regions?

The Court’s Ruling

We deny the motions for lack of merit.

Synchronization mandate includes ARMM elections

The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates the synchronization of national and
local elections. While the Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national
and local elections, the intention can be inferred from the following provisions of the Transitory Provisions
(Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which state:

Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the
second Monday of May, 1987.

The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be
simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all
Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.

Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local officials first elected
under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.

Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes
shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve for three years.

xxxx

Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7,
1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the
second Monday of May, 1992.

To fully appreciate the constitutional intent behind these provisions, we refer to the discussions of the
Constitutional Commission:
MR. MAAMBONG. For purposes of identification, I will now read a section which we will temporarily
indicate as Section 14. It reads: "THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS ELECTED IN THE FIRST ELECTION SHALL
SERVE FOR FIVE YEARS, TO EXPIRE AT NOON OF JUNE 1992."

This was presented by Commissioner Davide, so may we ask that Commissioner Davide be recognized.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. Before going to the proposed amendment, I would only state that in view of the action
taken by the Commission on Section 2 earlier, I am formulating a new proposal. It will read as follows:
"THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL
OFFICIALS FIRST ELECTED UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION SHALL SERVE UNTIL NOON OF JUNE
30, 1992."

I proposed this because of the proposed section of the Article on Transitory Provisions giving a term to
the incumbent President and Vice-President until 1992. Necessarily then, since the term provided by the
Commission for Members of the Lower House and for local officials is three years, if there will be an
election in 1987, the next election for said officers will be in 1990, and it would be very close to 1992. We
could never attain, subsequently, any synchronization of election which is once every three years.

So under my proposal we will be able to begin actual synchronization in 1992, and consequently,
we should not have a local election or an election for Members of the Lower House in 1990 for them to be
able to complete their term of three years each. And if we also stagger the Senate, upon the first election
it will result in an election in 1993 for the Senate alone, and there will be an election for 12 Senators in
1990. But for the remaining 12 who will be elected in 1987, if their term is for six years, their election will
be in 1993. So, consequently we will have elections in 1990, in 1992 and in 1993. The later election will
be limited to only 12 Senators and of course to the local officials and the Members of the Lower House.
But, definitely, thereafter we can never have an election once every three years, therefore defeating the
very purpose of the Commission when we adopted the term of six years for the President and another six
years for the Senators with the possibility of staggering with 12 to serve for six years and 12 for three
years insofar as the first Senators are concerned. And so my proposal is the only way to effect the
first synchronized election which would mean, necessarily, a bonus of two years to the Members
of the Lower House and a bonus of two years to the local elective officials.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). What does the committee say?

MR. DE CASTRO. Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner de Castro is recognized.

MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.

During the discussion on the legislative and the synchronization of elections, I was the one who proposed
that in order to synchronize the elections every three years, which the body approved — the first national
and local officials to be elected in 1987 shall continue in office for five years, the same thing the
Honorable Davide is now proposing. That means they will all serve until 1992, assuming that the term of
the President will be for six years and continue beginning in 1986. So from 1992, we will again have
national, local and presidential elections. This time, in 1992, the President shall have a term until 1998
and the first 12 Senators will serve until 1998, while the next 12 shall serve until 1995, and then the
local officials elected in 1992 will serve until 1995. From then on, we shall have an election every
three years.
So, I will say that the proposition of Commissioner Davide is in order, if we have to synchronize our
elections every three years which was already approved by the body.

Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

xxxx

MR. GUINGONA. What will be synchronized, therefore, is the election of the incumbent President and
Vice-President in 1992.

MR. DAVIDE. Yes.

MR. GUINGONA. Not the reverse. Will the committee not synchronize the election of the Senators and
local officials with the election of the President?

MR. DAVIDE. It works both ways, Mr. Presiding Officer. The attempt here is on the assumption that the
provision of the Transitory Provisions on the term of the incumbent President and Vice-President would
really end in 1992.

MR. GUINGONA. Yes.

MR. DAVIDE. In other words, there will be a single election in 1992 for all, from the President up to
the municipal officials.5 (emphases and underscoring ours)

The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective more clearly – there was to be a
single election in 1992 for all elective officials – from the President down to the municipal officials.
Significantly, the framers were even willing to temporarily lengthen or shorten the terms of elective
officials in order to meet this objective, highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate.

We came to the same conclusion in Osmeña v. Commission on Elections, 6 where we unequivocally

stated that "the Constitution has mandated synchronized national and local elections."7 Despite the length
and verbosity of their motions, the petitioners have failed to convince us to deviate from this established
ruling.

Neither do we find any merit in the petitioners’ contention that the ARMM elections are not covered by the
constitutional mandate of synchronization because the ARMM elections were not specifically mentioned
in the above-quoted Transitory Provisions of the Constitution.

That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution
on synchronization cannot be interpreted to mean that the ARMM elections are not covered by the
constitutional mandate of synchronization. We have to consider that the ARMM, as we now know it, had
not yet been officially organized at the time the Constitution was enacted and ratified by the people.
Keeping in mind that a constitution is not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years but
is to endure through generations for as long as it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate sovereign,
a constitution should be construed in the light of what actually is a continuing instrument to govern not
only the present but also the unfolding events of the indefinite future. Although the principles embodied in
a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the time of its adoption, a constitution must be construed
as a dynamic process intended to stand for a great length of time, to be progressive and not static.8

To reiterate, Article X of the Constitution, entitled "Local Government," clearly shows the intention of the
Constitution to classify autonomous regions, such as the ARMM, as local governments. We refer to
Section 1 of this Article, which provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.

The inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political subdivisions of the State under the
heading "Local Government" indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider autonomous
regions as one of the forms of local governments.

That the Constitution mentions only the "national government" and the "local governments," and does not
make a distinction between the "local government" and the "regional government," is particularly
revealing, betraying as it does the intention of the framers of the Constitution to consider the autonomous
regions not as separate forms of government, but as political units which, while having more powers and
attributes than other local government units, still remain under the category of local governments. Since
autonomous regions are classified as local governments, it follows that elections held in autonomous
regions are also considered as local elections.

The petitioners further argue that even assuming that the Constitution mandates the synchronization of
elections, the ARMM elections are not covered by this mandate since they are regional elections and not
local elections.

In construing provisions of the Constitution, the first rule is verba legis, "that is, wherever possible, the
words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed."9 Applying this principle to determine the scope of "local elections," we refer to the meaning of
the word "local," as understood in its ordinary sense. As defined in Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary Unabridged, "local" refers to something "that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited
district, often a community or minor political subdivision." Obviously, the ARMM elections, which are held
within the confines of the autonomous region of Muslim Mindanao, fall within this definition.

To be sure, the fact that the ARMM possesses more powers than other provinces, cities, or municipalities
is not enough reason to treat the ARMM regional elections differently from the other local elections. Ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. When the law does not distinguish, we must not
distinguish.10

RA No. 10153 does not amend RA No. 9054

The petitioners are adamant that the provisions of RA No. 10153, in postponing the ARMM elections,
amend RA No. 9054.

We cannot agree with their position.

A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only the first ARMM elections;11 it
does not provide the date for the succeeding regular ARMM elections. In providing for the date of the
regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 clearly do not amend RA No. 9054 since these
laws do not change or revise any provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of the ARMM elections
subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 merely filled the gap left in RA No. 9054.

We reiterate our previous observations:

This view – that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date of succeeding ARMM
elections to legislative discretion – finds support in ARMM’s recent history.

To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First
Organic Act – RA No. 6734 – not only did not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix
the specific date of the first ARMM elections, leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment.
Consequently, RA No. 7647, RA No. 8176, RA No. 8746, RA No. 8753, and RA No. 9012 were all
enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or modify
any part or provision of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there
was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.

The Second Organic Act – RA No. 9054 – which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001, provided that the
first elections would be held on the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA
No. 9140 to reset the date of the ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the
plebiscite for the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM
regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite
held to approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333, which further reset the date
of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.

From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix the date
of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted
consistently with this intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the
amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054. 12 (emphases
supplied)

The petitioner in G.R. No. 196305 contends, however, that there is no lacuna in RA No. 9054 as regards
the date of the subsequent ARMM elections. In his estimation, it can be implied from the provisions of RA
No. 9054 that the succeeding elections are to be held three years after the date of the first ARMM
regional elections.

We find this an erroneous assertion. Well-settled is the rule that the court may not, in the guise of
interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided nor intended by
the lawmakers. An omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially
supplied however later wisdom may recommend the inclusion.13 Courts are not authorized to insert into
the law what they think should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if
its attention had been called to the omission.14Providing for lapses within the law falls within the exclusive
domain of the legislature, and courts, no matter how well-meaning, have no authority to intrude into this
clearly delineated space.

Since RA No. 10153 does not amend, but merely fills in the gap in RA No. 9054, there is no need for RA
No. 10153 to comply with the amendment requirements set forth in Article XVII of RA No. 9054.

Supermajority vote requirement makes RA No. 9054 an irrepealable law

Even assuming that RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054, however, we have already established that the
supermajority vote requirement set forth in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 15 is unconstitutional for
violating the principle that Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws.

The power of the legislature to make laws includes the power to amend and repeal these laws. Where the
legislature, by its own act, attempts to limit its power to amend or repeal laws, the Court has the duty to
strike down such act for interfering with the plenary powers of Congress. As we explained in Duarte v.
Dade:16

A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or
things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited
expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind
itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body
may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be
exercised at the same session at which the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its
progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular
mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of
subsequent legislation upon existing statutes. [emphasis ours]

Under our Constitution, each House of Congress has the power to approve bills by a mere majority vote,
provided there is quorum.17 In requiring all laws which amend RA No. 9054 to comply with a higher voting
requirement than the Constitution provides (2/3 vote), Congress, which enacted RA No. 9054, clearly
violated the very principle which we sought to establish in Duarte. To reiterate, the act of one legislature is
not binding upon, and cannot tie the hands of, future legislatures.18

We also highlight an important point raised by Justice Antonio T. Carpio in his dissenting opinion, where
he stated: "Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 erects a high vote threshold for each House of Congress to
surmount, effectively and unconstitutionally, taking RA 9054 beyond the reach of Congress’ amendatory
powers. One Congress cannot limit or reduce the plenary legislative power of succeeding Congresses by
requiring a higher vote threshold than what the Constitution requires to enact, amend or repeal laws. No
law can be passed fixing such a higher vote threshold because Congress has no power, by ordinary
legislation, to amend the Constitution."19

Plebiscite requirement in RA No. 9054 overly broad

Similarly, we struck down the petitioners’ contention that the plebiscite requirement20 applies to all
amendments of RA No. 9054 for being an unreasonable enlargement of the plebiscite requirement set
forth in the Constitution.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the
purpose[.]" We interpreted this to mean that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act
constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions – i.e., those aspects specifically
mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act 21 – require ratification
through a plebiscite. We stand by this interpretation.

The petitioners argue that to require all amendments to RA No. 9054 to comply with the plebiscite
requirement is to recognize that sovereignty resides primarily in the people.

While we agree with the petitioners’ underlying premise that sovereignty ultimately resides with the
people, we disagree that this legal reality necessitates compliance with the plebiscite requirement for all
amendments to RA No. 9054. For if we were to go by the petitioners’ interpretation of Section 18, Article
X of the Constitution that all amendments to the Organic Act have to undergo the plebiscite requirement
before becoming effective, this would lead to impractical and illogical results – hampering the ARMM’s
progress by impeding Congress from enacting laws that timely address problems as they arise in the
region, as well as weighing down the ARMM government with the costs that unavoidably follow the
holding of a plebiscite.

Interestingly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 posits that RA No. 10153, in giving the President the
power to appoint OICs to take the place of the elective officials of the ARMM, creates a fundamental
change in the basic structure of the government, and thus requires compliance with the plebiscite
requirement embodied in RA No. 9054.

Again, we disagree.

The pertinent provision in this regard is Section 3 of RA No. 10153, which reads:
Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. — The President shall appoint officers-in-charge for the
Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in
the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.

We cannot see how the above-quoted provision has changed the basic structure of the ARMM regional
government. On the contrary, this provision clearly preserves the basic structure of the ARMM regional
government when it recognizes the offices of the ARMM regional government and directs the OICs who
shall temporarily assume these offices to "perform the functions pertaining to the said offices."

Unconstitutionality of the holdover provision

The petitioners are one in defending the constitutionality of Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, which
allows the regional officials to remain in their positions in a holdover capacity. The petitioners essentially
argue that the ARMM regional officials should be allowed to remain in their respective positions until the
May 2013 elections since there is no specific provision in the Constitution which prohibits regional elective
officials from performing their duties in a holdover capacity.

The pertinent provision of the Constitution is Section 8, Article X which provides:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. [emphases ours]

On the other hand, Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054 provides:

Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials. – (1) Terms of Office. The terms of office of the
Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and members of the Regional Assembly shall be for a period
of three (3) years, which shall begin at noon on the 30th day of September next following the day of the
election and shall end at noon of the same date three (3) years thereafter. The incumbent elective
officials of the autonomous region shall continue in effect until their successors are elected and qualified.

The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of the framers of the
Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the period within which all elective local officials can
occupy their offices. We have already established that elective ARMM officials are also local officials; they
are, thus, bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes
irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in a holdover
capacity. Short of amending the Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term
limit by inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years for local officials
should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be extended by holdover by
Congress.

Admittedly, we have, in the past, recognized the validity of holdover provisions in various laws. One
significant difference between the present case and these past cases 22 is that while these past cases all
refer to elective barangay or sangguniang kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly
provided for in the Constitution, the present case refers to local elective officials - the ARMM Governor,
the ARMM Vice Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly - whose terms fall
within the three-year term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.

Even assuming that a holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it
(namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054), the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option
where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary
intent is evident.23
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153 and removing the holdover option, has made it clear that it wants to
suppress the holdover rule expressed in RA No. 9054. Congress, in the exercise of its plenary legislative
powers, has clearly acted within its discretion when it deleted the holdover option, and this Court has no
authority to question the wisdom of this decision, absent any evidence of unconstitutionality or grave
abuse of discretion. It is for the legislature and the executive, and not this Court, to decide how to fill the
vacancies in the ARMM regional government which arise from the legislature complying with the
constitutional mandate of synchronization.

COMELEC has no authority to hold special elections

Neither do we find any merit in the contention that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is
sufficiently empowered to set the date of special elections in the ARMM. To recall, the Constitution has
merely empowered the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election.24 Although the legislature, under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa
Bilang [BP] 881), has granted the COMELEC the power to postpone elections to another date, this power
is confined to the specific terms and circumstances provided for in the law. Specifically, this power falls
within the narrow confines of the following provisions:

Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or
destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of
such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any
political subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and
after due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard,
shall postpone the election therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after
the cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had
been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during
the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election
would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any
interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not
held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the
cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. [emphases
and underscoring ours]

As we have previously observed in our assailed decision, both Section 5 and Section 6 of BP 881
address instances where elections have already been scheduled to take place but do not occur or had to
be suspended because of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances, such as violence, fraud,
terrorism, and other analogous circumstances.

In contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed by law, in furtherance of the constitutional mandate of
synchronization of national and local elections. Obviously, this does not fall under any of the
circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881.

More importantly, RA No. 10153 has already fixed the date for the next ARMM elections and the
COMELEC has no authority to set a different election date.

Even assuming that the COMELEC has the authority to hold special elections, and this Court can compel
the COMELEC to do so, there is still the problem of having to shorten the terms of the newly elected
officials in order to synchronize the ARMM elections with the May 2013 national and local elections.
Obviously, neither the Court nor the COMELEC has the authority to do this, amounting as it does to an
amendment of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which limits the term of local officials to three years.

President’s authority to appoint OICs

The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 argues that the President’s power to appoint pertains only to appointive
positions and cannot extend to positions held by elective officials.

The power to appoint has traditionally been recognized as executive in nature. 25 Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution describes in broad strokes the extent of this power, thus:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may
be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers
lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]

The 1935 Constitution contained a provision similar to the one quoted above. Section 10(3), Article VII of
the 1935 Constitution provides:

(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint
the heads of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the
Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law
to appoint; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone,
in the courts, or in the heads of departments. [emphasis ours]

The main distinction between the provision in the 1987 Constitution and its counterpart in the 1935
Constitution is the sentence construction; while in the 1935 Constitution, the various appointments the
President can make are enumerated in a single sentence, the 1987 Constitution enumerates the various
appointments the President is empowered to make and divides the enumeration in two sentences. The
change in style is significant; in providing for this change, the framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly
sought to make a distinction between the first group of presidential appointments and the second group of
presidential appointments, as made evident in the following exchange:

MR. FOZ. Madame President x x x I propose to put a period (.) after "captain" and x x x delete "and all"
and substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY.

MR. REGALADO. Madam President, the Committee accepts the proposed amendment because it makes
it clear that those other officers mentioned therein do not have to be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments.26

The first group of presidential appointments, specified as the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the Armed Forces, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, pertains to the appointive officials
who have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.

The second group of officials the President can appoint are "all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint."27 The second sentence acts as the "catch-all provision" for the President’s appointment power,
in recognition of the fact that the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature. 28 The wide latitude
given to the President to appoint is further demonstrated by the recognition of the President’s power to
appoint officials whose appointments are not even provided for by law. In other words, where there
are offices which have to be filled, but the law does not provide the process for filling them, the
Constitution recognizes the power of the President to fill the office by appointment.

Any limitation on or qualification to the exercise of the President’s appointment power should be strictly
construed and must be clearly stated in order to be recognized.29 Given that the President derives his
power to appoint OICs in the ARMM regional government from law, it falls under the classification of
presidential appointments covered by the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution;
the President’s appointment power thus rests on clear constitutional basis.

The petitioners also jointly assert that RA No. 10153, in granting the President the power to appoint OICs
in elective positions, violates Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, 30 which merely grants the President
the power of supervision over autonomous regions.

This is an overly restrictive interpretation of the President’s appointment power. There is no incompatibility
between the President’s power of supervision over local governments and autonomous regions, and the
power granted to the President, within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.

The power of supervision is defined as "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers
perform their functions in accordance with law."31 This is distinguished from the power of control or "the
power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter."32

The petitioners’ apprehension regarding the President’s alleged power of control over the OICs is rooted
in their belief that the President’s appointment power includes the power to remove these officials at will.
In this way, the petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as
representatives of the President and not of the people.

Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners’ supposition. The provision states:

Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. — The President shall appoint officers-in-charge for the
Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in
the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.

The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the
Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will
remain in office until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in
this provision even hints that the President has the power to recall the appointments he already made.
Clearly, the petitioners’ fears in this regard are more apparent than real.

RA No. 10153 as an interim measure

We reiterate once more the importance of considering RA No. 10153 not in a vacuum, but within the
context it was enacted in. In the first place, Congress enacted RA No. 10153 primarily to heed the
constitutional mandate to synchronize the ARMM regional elections with the national and local elections.
To do this, Congress had to postpone the scheduled ARMM elections for another date, leaving it with the
problem of how to provide the ARMM with governance in the intervening period, between the
expiration of the term of those elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office – twenty-one (21)
months away – of those who will win in the synchronized elections on May 13, 2013.
In our assailed Decision, we already identified the three possible solutions open to Congress to address
the problem created by synchronization – (a) allow the incumbent officials to remain in office after the
expiration of their terms in a holdover capacity; (b) call for special elections to be held, and shorten the
terms of those to be elected so the next ARMM regional elections can be held on May 13, 2013; or (c)
recognize that the President, in the exercise of his appointment powers and in line with his power of
supervision over the ARMM, can appoint interim OICs to hold the vacated positions in the ARMM regional
government upon the expiration of their terms. We have already established the unconstitutionality of the
first two options, leaving us to consider the last available option.

In this way, RA No. 10153 is in reality an interim measure, enacted to respond to the adjustment that
synchronization requires. Given the context, we have to judge RA No. 10153 by the standard of
reasonableness in responding to the challenges brought about by synchronizing the ARMM elections with
the national and local elections. In other words, "given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for a
holdover and the unavailability of constitutional possibilities for lengthening or shortening the
term of the elected ARMM officials, is the choice of the President’s power to appoint – for a fixed
and specific period as an interim measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution – an unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to make?"33

We admit that synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election process in a local community, the
ARMM, as well as the community’s choice of leaders. However, we have to keep in mind that the
adoption of this measure is a matter of necessity in order to comply with a mandate that the Constitution
itself has set out for us. Moreover, the implementation of the provisions of RA No. 10153 as an interim
measure is comparable to the interim measures traditionally practiced when, for instance, the President
appoints officials holding elective offices upon the creation of new local government units.

The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs in place of the elective members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. The power granted to the President, via RA No.
10153, to appoint members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is comparable to the power granted by
BP 881 (the Omnibus Election Code) to the President to fill any vacancy for any cause in the Regional
Legislative Assembly (then called the Sangguniang Pampook). 34

Executive is not bound by the principle of judicial courtesy

The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280, in their Manifestation and Motion dated December 21, 2011, question
the propriety of the appointment by the President of Mujiv Hataman as acting Governor and Bainon Karon
as acting Vice Governor of the ARMM. They argue that since our previous decision was based on a close
vote of 8-7, and given the numerous motions for reconsideration filed by the parties, the President, in
recognition of the principle of judicial courtesy, should have refrained from implementing our decision until
we have ruled with finality on this case.

We find the petitioners’ reasoning specious.

Firstly, the principle of judicial courtesy is based on the hierarchy of courts and applies only to lower
courts in instances where, even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction or TRO issued by a higher
court, it would be proper for a lower court to suspend its proceedings for practical and ethical
considerations.35 In other words, the principle of "judicial courtesy" applies where there is a strong
probability that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as a result of the
continuation of the proceedings in the lower court or court of origin.36Consequently, this principle cannot
be applied to the President, who represents a co-equal branch of government. To suggest otherwise
would be to disregard the principle of separation of powers, on which our whole system of government is
founded upon.

Secondly, the fact that our previous decision was based on a slim vote of 8-7 does not, and cannot, have
the effect of making our ruling any less effective or binding. Regardless of how close the voting is, so long
as there is concurrence of the majority of the members of the en banc who actually took part in the
deliberations of the case,37 a decision garnering only 8 votes out of 15 members is still a decision of the
Supreme Court en banc and must be respected as such. The petitioners are, therefore, not in any
position to speculate that, based on the voting, "the probability exists that their motion for reconsideration
may be granted."38

Similarly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282, in his Very Urgent Motion to Issue Clarificatory Resolution,
argues that since motions for reconsideration were filed by the aggrieved parties challenging our October
18, 2011 decision in the present case, the TRO we initially issued on September 13, 2011 should remain
subsisting and effective. He further argues that any attempt by the Executive to implement our October
18, 2011 decision pending resolution of the motions for reconsideration "borders on disrespect if not
outright insolence"39 to this Court.

In support of this theory, the petitioner cites Samad v. COMELEC,40 where the Court held that while it had
already issued a decision lifting the TRO, the lifting of the TRO is not yet final and executory, and can
also be the subject of a motion for reconsideration. The petitioner also cites the minute resolution issued
by the Court in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,41 where the Court reproached the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue for manifesting its intention to implement the decision of the Court, noting that
the Court had not yet lifted the TRO previously issued. 42

We agree with the petitioner that the lifting of a TRO can be included as a subject of a motion for
reconsideration filed to assail our decision. It does not follow, however, that the TRO remains effective
until after we have issued a final and executory decision, especially considering the clear wording of the
dispositive portion of our October 18, 2011 decision, which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA
No. 10153 for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the temporary
restraining order we issued in our Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs. 43 (emphases ours)

In this regard, we note an important distinction between Tolentino and the present case. While it may be
true that Tolentino and the present case are similar in that, in both cases, the petitions assailing the
challenged laws were dismissed by the Court, an examination of the dispositive portion of the decision in
Tolentino reveals that the Court did not categorically lift the TRO. In sharp contrast, in the present case,
we expressly lifted the TRO issued on September 13, 2011.1âwphi1 There is, therefore, no legal
impediment to prevent the President from exercising his authority to appoint an acting ARMM Governor
and Vice Governor as specifically provided for in RA No. 10153.

Conclusion

As a final point, we wish to address the bleak picture that the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 presents in
his motion, that our Decision has virtually given the President the power and authority to appoint 672,416
OICs in the event that the elections of barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan officials are postponed or
cancelled.

We find this speculation nothing short of fear-mongering.

This argument fails to take into consideration the unique factual and legal circumstances which led to the
enactment of RA No. 10153. RA No. 10153 was passed in order to synchronize the ARMM elections with
the national and local elections. In the course of synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and
local elections, Congress had to grant the President the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM, in light of
the fact that: (a) holdover by the incumbent ARMM elective officials is legally impermissible; and (b)
Congress cannot call for special elections and shorten the terms of elective local officials for less than
three years.
Unlike local officials, as the Constitution does not prescribe a term limit for barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan officials, there is no legal proscription which prevents these specific government officials from
continuing in a holdover capacity should some exigency require the postponement of barangay or
Sangguniang Kabataan elections. Clearly, these fears have neither legal nor factual basis to stand on.

For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petitioners’ motions for reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY with FINALITY the motions for reconsideration for lack of
merit and UPHOLD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

SO ORDERED.

PH Judges Assoc v. Prado

G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993

THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS,
Vice-President for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig, Makati, and Pasay, Metro
Manila, ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid, JESUS G.
BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City and Branches
160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively: the NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF THE
JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, composed of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by its President. REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL
CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its
President, TOMAS G. TALAVERA; by themselves and in behalf of all the Judges of the Regional
Trial and Shari'a Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Courts throughout the
Country, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General, and the
PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted by the petitioners
that this hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the statute and circular they are here challenging. The
Supreme Court is itself affected by these measures and is thus an interested party that should ordinarily
not also be a judge at the same time. Under our system of government, however, it cannot inhibit itself
and must rule upon the challenge, because no other office has the authority to do so. We shall therefore
act upon this matter not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always,
with detachment and fairness.

The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal
Corporation through its Circular No.
92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land
Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be
prejudiced by the above-named measures. The National Land Registration Authority has taken common
cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as sending of requisite notices in registration cases,
affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been allowed to intervene.

The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more
than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both
Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the
members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the
Judiciary.

We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to wit, the presumption of the
constitutionality of statutes. The theory is that as the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, every
statute is supposed to have first been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was
finally enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly shown that it is constitutionally flawed, the attack against its
validity must be rejected and the law itself upheld. To doubt is to sustain.

We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill
passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent
surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title gives no intimation,
and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly
apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subject
of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by
petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.1

It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking
privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.

R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers,
Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes
Connected Therewith."

The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which provides:

The State shall pursue the following objectives of a nationwide postal system:

a) to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail and other postal matters, from
sender to addressee, with full recognition of their privacy or confidentiality;

b) to promote international interchange, cooperation and understanding through the

unhampered flow or exchange of postal matters between nations;

c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal services to cater to different users and
changing needs, including but not limited to, philately, transfer of monies and valuables,
and the like;

d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by and within the industry to finance
the overall cost of providing the varied range of postal delivery and messengerial services
as well as the expansion and continuous upgrading of service standards by the same.
Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows:

Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. — All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions,
rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
repealed or modified accordingly.

All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for
under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and
5059. The Corporation may continue the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated
October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President, under such arrangements and
conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.

The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act violates the
Constitution.

The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to
cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general
subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the
legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. 2

To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the
statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation
impossible. 3 As has been correctly explained:

The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter
germane to the subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment of
the object in view, may properly be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the
same act the machinery by which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for
its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If such matters are
properly connected with the subject as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they
should also have special mention in the title (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed.
725).

This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal of a statute on a
given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same subject; and
therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the
subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a matter more germane to an act and to the object to be
accomplished thereby than the repeal of previous legislations connected therewith."4

The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of
the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its
title.5 As observed in one case,6 if the title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was
never claimed that every other act which repeals it or alters by implication must be mentioned in the title
of the new act. Any such rule would be neither within the reason of the Constitution, nor practicable.

We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and
effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35
did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.

II
The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking
privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the
original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the
Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as
follows:

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and
the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in
the Journal.

The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that
amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by
a conference committee of both chambers. They stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject of any
disagreement between both Houses and so the second paragraph could not have been validly added as
an amendment.

These argument are unacceptable.

While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the
Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is described
thus:

A conference committee may, deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited
to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the conference
committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the
freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But
occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its
mandate, These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on
conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of
conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed.,
p.81).

It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and
duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled
with its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House
of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to
and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.

Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the
approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez7 laid
down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be
entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the
bill).8 The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still
valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons,9 where we explained the reason thus:

To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as
we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the, letter and spirit of the
organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a
coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions, of the Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was
made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its
final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the
legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec.
26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the
government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

III

The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal protection clause.

It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from the
Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines;
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Commission on Elections; former
Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing
of complaints against public offices and officers.10

The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification
in accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has been withdrawn not only
from the Judiciary but also the Office of Adult Education, the Institute of National Language; the
Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National Historical
Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering
Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Office of Special Prosecutor); the
Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino Language; the Provincial and City Assessors; and
the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons.11

The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination
offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause
in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a more, specific guaranty against any form of undue
favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the
due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice,
the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.

According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar
subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others.

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things
without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law
prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but
violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according
to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other
in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars. 13

What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Is the franking privilege
extended to the President of the Philippines or the Commission on Elections or to former Presidents of
the Philippines purely as a courtesy from the lawmaking body? Is it offered because of
the importance or status of the grantee or because of its need for the privilege? Or have the grantees
been chosen pell-mell, as it were, without any basis at all for the selection?

We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a whole was carefully
deliberated upon, by the political departments before it was finally enacted. There is reason to suspect,
however, that not enough care or attention was given to its repealing clause, resulting in the unwitting
withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Judiciary.

We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy, for it is unimaginable that
the political departments would have intended this serious slight to the Judiciary as the third of the major
and equal departments the government. The same observations are made if the importance or status of
the grantee was the criterion used for the extension of the franking privilege, which is enjoyed by the
National Census and Statistics Office and even some private individuals but not the courts of justice.

In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the perceived need of
the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the
Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of communication between the government
and the people.

Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the government, it is the
Judiciary, that has been denied the franking privilege. There is no question that if there is any major
branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the respondents
themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would justify the distinction on the basis precisely of this
need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while extending it to others less
deserving.

In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal Service Office show that
from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00. Of this
amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of judicial
processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman,
amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming fromthe Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those
coming from the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The respondents' conclusion is
that because of this considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be
withdrawn from it.

The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege should be
extended only to those who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the widows of former Presidents) but
not to those who need it badly (especially the courts of justice). It is like saying that a person may be
allowed cosmetic surgery although it is not really necessary but not an operation that can save his life.

If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems
to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including those who do not need it. The
problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no
substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary,
which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn,
Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the
need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is
no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for
such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces of
the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme Court should be
similarly treated as that Committee. And while we may concede the need of the National Census and
Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not greater need is not
recognized in the courts of justice.

(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable need for withdrawing the privilege from the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, which, like former Presidents of the
Philippines or their widows, does not send as much frank mail as the Judiciary.)
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation, was
created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may have
been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the
benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government and the many
advantages it enjoys under its charter.14Among the services it should be prepared to extend is free
carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of
their own public functions.

We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion pesos, 55% of
which is supplied by the Government, and that it derives substantial revenues from the sources
enumerated in Section 10, on top of the exemptions it enjoys. It is not likely that the retention of the
franking privilege of the Judiciary will cripple the Corporation.

At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the withdrawal
from it of the franking privilege can only further deepen this serious problem. The volume of judicial mail,
as emphasized by the respondents themselves, should stress the dependence of the courts of justice on
the postal service for communicating with lawyers and litigants as part of the judicial process. The
Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the national budget compared to the Legislative and Executive
Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for 1993, only .84%, or less than 1%, is alloted for the
judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine the increased difficulties of our courts if they have to affix a
purchased stamp to every process they send in the discharge of their judicial functions.

We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise
of discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its repealing clause to be
a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all
persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on
substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking
privilege.

This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of
arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to correct.

IV

In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its title and that it
was not passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, we annul Section 35 of the law
as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal
protection of laws."

We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the criticism it is certain to provoke. While ruling
against the discrimination in this case, we may ourselves be accused of similar discrimination through the
exercise of our ultimate power in our own favor. This is inevitable. Criticism of judicial conduct, however
undeserved, is a fact of life in the political system that we are prepared to accept.. As judges, we cannot
debate with our detractors. We can only decide the cases before us as law imposes on us the duty to be
fair and our own conscience gives us the light to be right.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege
from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional trail Courts, the Municipal trial Courts, and
the National Land Registration Authority and its Register of Deeds to all of which offices the said privilege
shall be RESTORED. The temporary restraining order dated June 2, 1992, is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.
Emmanuel Pelaez v. Auditor General

G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965

EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.

Zulueta, Gonzales, Paculdo and Associates for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

CONCEPCION, J.:

During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to
act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121,
124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin.1 Soon after the
date last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the
Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and
agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders
and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.

Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has
been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power. Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the present action is premature and that
not all proper parties — referring to the officials of the new political subdivisions in question — have been
impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalities adversely affected by the aforementioned
executive orders — because the latter have taken away from the former the barrios composing the new
political subdivisions — intervened in the case. Moreover, Attorneys Enrique M. Fernando and Emma
Quisumbing-Fernando were allowed to and did appear as amici curiae.

The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:

Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the
provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.

Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:

All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the provisions hereof.

Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be created or the
name of an existing one may be changed by the provincial board of the province, upon
recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is
stipulated. The recommendation of the municipal council shall be embodied in a resolution
approved by at least two-thirds of the entire membership of the said council: Provided, however,
That no new barrio may be created if its population is less than five hundred persons.

Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be
created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the
corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the
"recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is
situated." Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a
barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of
municipalities?"

Respondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory that a new municipality can be created without
creating new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new municipality. This
theory overlooks, however, the main import of the petitioner's argument, which is that the statutory denial
of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create
municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. The cogency and force of this argument is too
obvious to be denied or even questioned. Founded upon logic and experience, it cannot be offset except
by a clear manifestation of the intent of Congress to the contrary, and no such manifestation, subsequent
to the passage of Republic Act No. 2379, has been brought to our attention.

Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed executive orders are
based, provides:

The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary,
or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other
political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any
province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into
such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name
any new subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision
to such place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the
(Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary
of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or more
subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines in accordance
herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative
officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with the
recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having executive control of such
officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the
new districts so formed.

Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing authority, an
equitable distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions thereby affected shall be made
in such manner as may be recommended by the (Insular Auditor) Auditor General and approved
by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines.

Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this section does not
amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality
of Binañgonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he claims, has settled it. Such claim is untenable, for said case
involved, not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory — from an already
existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality (Binañgonan), likewise, existing at the time of and
prior to said transfer (See Gov't of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality, of Binañgonan
[34 Phil. 518, 519-5201) — in consequence of the fixing and definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the
common boundaries of two municipalities.

It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle
conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature —
involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said
municipalities — the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the
language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function" (State ex rel. Higgins vs. Aicklen, 119 S. 425,
January 2, 1959) or "solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power" (Udall vs. Severn, May 29,
1938, 79 P. 2d 347-349). As the Supreme Court of Washington has put it (Territory ex rel. Kelly vs.
Stewart, February 13, 1890, 23 Pac. 405, 409), "municipal corporations are purely the creatures of
statutes."

Although1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in
the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle
of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate2 — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions.2a Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or
formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there
would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or
beyond the scope of his authority.2b Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to
make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the
end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and
the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our
Republican system.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid
delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to
be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to
avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the last
clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President:

... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as the
public welfare may require.

It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the public welfare may
require" qualified, not the clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to which the seat of
the government may be transferred. This fact becomes more apparent when we consider that said
Section 68 was originally Section 1 of Act No. 1748,3 which provided that, "whenever in the judgment of
the Governor-General the public welfare requires, he may, by executive order," effect the changes
enumerated therein (as in said section 68), including the change of the seat of the government "to
such place ... as the public interest requires." The opening statement of said Section 1 of Act No. 1748 —
which was not included in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code — governed the time at which,
or the conditions under which, the powers therein conferred could be exercised; whereas the last part of
the first sentence of said section referred exclusively to the place to which the seat of the government
was to be transferred.

At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is concerned, even if we
assumed that the phrase "as the public welfare may require," in said Section 68, qualifies all other
clauses thereof. It is true that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil.
328), this Court had upheld "public welfare" and "public interest," respectively, as sufficient standards for
a valid delegation of the authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in these cases — as all
judicial pronouncements — must be construed in relation to the specific facts and issues involved therein,
outside of which they do not constitute precedents and have no binding effect. 4 The law construed in the
Calalang case conferred upon the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, the power to issue rules and regulations to promote safe transitupon
national roads and streets. Upon the other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the
Insular Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or permits for the
sale of speculative securities. Both cases involved grants to administrative officers of powers related to
the exercise of their administrative functions, calling for the determination of questions of fact.

Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68. As above indicated, the creation of
municipalities, is not an administrative function, but one which is essentially and eminently legislative in
character. The question of whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of such power is not one
of fact. it is "purely a legislativequestion "(Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike
Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310-313, 315-318), or a political question (Udall vs. Severn, 79 P. 2d. 347-349). As
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has aptly characterized it, "the question as to whether incorporation is
for the best interest of the community in any case is emphatically a question of public policy and
statecraft" (In re Village of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1033, 1035-1037).

For this reason, courts of justice have annulled, as constituting undue delegation of legislative powers,
state laws granting the judicial department, the power to determine whether certain territories should be
annexed to a particular municipality (Udall vs. Severn, supra, 258-359); or vesting in a Commission the
right to determine the plan and frame of government of proposed villages and what functions shall be
exercised by the same, although the powers and functions of the village are specifically limited by statute
(In re Municipal Charters, 86 Atl. 307-308); or conferring upon courts the authority to declare a given town
or village incorporated, and designate its metes and bounds, upon petition of a majority of the taxable
inhabitants thereof, setting forth the area desired to be included in such village (Territory ex rel Kelly vs.
Stewart, 23 Pac. 405-409); or authorizing the territory of a town, containing a given area and population,
to be incorporated as a town, on certain steps being taken by the inhabitants thereof and on certain
determination by a court and subsequent vote of the inhabitants in favor thereof, insofar as the court is
allowed to determine whether the lands embraced in the petition "ought justly" to be included in the
village, and whether the interest of the inhabitants will be promoted by such incorporation, and to enlarge
and diminish the boundaries of the proposed village "as justice may require" (In re Villages of North
Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1035-1037); or creating a Municipal Board of Control which shall determine whether
or not the laying out, construction or operation of a toll road is in the "public interest" and whether the
requirements of the law had been complied with, in which case the board shall enter an order creating a
municipal corporation and fixing the name of the same (Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal
Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310).

Insofar as the validity of a delegation of power by Congress to the President is concerned, the case
of Schechter Poultry Corporation vs. U.S. (79 L. Ed. 1570) is quite relevant to the one at bar. The
Schechter case involved the constitutionality of Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act
authorizing the President of the United States to approve "codes of fair competition" submitted to him by
one or more trade or industrial associations or corporations which "impose no inequitable restrictions on
admission to membership therein and are truly representative," provided that such codes are not
designed "to promote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not operate to
discriminate against them, and will tend to effectuate the policy" of said Act. The Federal Supreme Court
held:

To summarize and conclude upon this point: Sec. 3 of the Recovery Act is without precedent. It
supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity. It does not undertake to prescribe rules of
conduct to be applied to particular states of fact determined by appropriate administrative
procedure. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe
them. For that legislative undertaking, Sec. 3 sets up no standards, aside from the statement of
the general aims of rehabilitation, correction and expansion described in Sec. 1. In view of the
scope of that broad declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the
discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the
government of trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered. We think that the
code making authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.

If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to vest in the President a discretion that is "virtually
unfettered." and, consequently, tantamount to a delegation of legislative power, it is obvious that "public
welfare," which has even a broader connotation, leads to the same result. In fact, if the validity of the
delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there would no longer be any legal impediment to
a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be required by
public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers of
Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring about a total collapse of the democratic system
established by our Constitution, which it is the special duty and privilege of this Court to uphold.
It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in question were issued after the legislative bills for
the creation of the municipalities involved in this case had failed to pass Congress. A better proof of the
fact that the issuance of said executive orders entails the exercise of purely legislative functions can
hardly be given.

Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise
general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the
laws be faithfully executed.

The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of
such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices
of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the
Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the
fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local
governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the
President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act Within the scope
of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to
pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the
corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote, set
aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how
patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take
any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial
board.5

Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its
officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned
resides, for his office would thereby become vacant.6 Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a
new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his
dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution.

Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices
implies no more than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise
of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include the authority either to abolish an
executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. As a consequence, the alleged power of the
President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority
even greater than that of control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In
other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the
constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments
than that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and
does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which
he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.

In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said Section
68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed
by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent
with said statutory enactment.7

There are only two (2) other points left for consideration, namely, respondent's claim (a) that "not all the
proper parties" — referring to the officers of the newly created municipalities — "have been impleaded in
this case," and (b) that "the present petition is premature."
As regards the first point, suffice it to say that the records do not show, and the parties do not claim, that
the officers of any of said municipalities have been appointed or elected and assumed office. At any rate,
the Solicitor General, who has appeared on behalf of respondent Auditor General, is the officer
authorized by law "to act and represent the Government of the Philippines, its offices and agents, in any
official investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the services of a lawyer" (Section 1661, Revised
Administrative Code), and, in connection with the creation of the aforementioned municipalities, which
involves a political, not proprietary, function, said local officials, if any, are mere agents or representatives
of the national government. Their interest in the case at bar has, accordingly, been, in effect, duly
represented.8

With respect to the second point, respondent alleges that he has not as yet acted on any of the executive
order & in question and has not intimated how he would act in connection therewith. It is, however, a
matter of common, public knowledge, subject to judicial cognizance, that the President has, for many
years, issued executive orders creating municipal corporations and that the same have been organized
and in actual operation, thus indicating, without peradventure of doubt, that the expenditures incidental
thereto have been sanctioned, approved or passed in audit by the General Auditing Office and its
officials. There is no reason to believe, therefore, that respondent would adopt a different policy as
regards the new municipalities involved in this case, in the absence of an allegation to such effect, and
none has been made by him.

WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the
respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is
so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring and dissenting:

A sign of progress in a developing nation is the rise of new municipalities. Fostering their rapid growth has
long been the aim pursued by all three branches of our Government.

So it was that the Governor-General during the time of the Jones Law was given authority by the
Legislature (Act No. 1748) to act upon certain details with respect to said local governments, such as
fixing of boundaries, subdivisions and mergers. And the Supreme Court, within the framework of the
Jones Law, ruled in 1917 that the execution or implementation of such details, did not entail abdication of
legislative power (Government vs. Municipality of Binañgonan, 34 Phil. 518; Municipality of Cardona vs.
Municipality of Binañgonan, 36 Phil. 547). Subsequently, Act No. 1748's aforesaid statutory authorization
was embodied in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. And Chief Executives since then up to
the present continued to avail of said provision, time and again invoking it to issue executive orders
providing for the creation of municipalities.

From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive orders to
create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. Public funds
thereby stood to be disbursed in implementation of said executive orders.
Suing as private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed in this Court a petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General. It seeks to restrain the respondent or
any person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of
the executive orders aforementioned.

Petitioner contends that the President has no power to create a municipality by executive order. It is
argued that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, so far as it purports to grant any such
power, is invalid or, at the least, already repealed, in light of the Philippine Constitution and Republic Act
2370 (The Barrio Charter).

Section 68 is again reproduced hereunder for convenience:

SEC. 68. General authority of [Governor-General) President of the Philippines to fix boundaries
and make new subdivisions. — The [Governor-General] President of the Philippines may by
executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality,
[township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory
comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political
division other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of such
subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created, and may change the
seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may
require: Provided, That the authorization of the [Philippine Legislature] Congress of the
Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be
defined or any province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the
[Governor-General] President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a
change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the
[Governor-General] President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head
of the Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the
several officers to the new districts so formed.

Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing authority, an
equitable distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions thereby affected shall be made
in such manner as may be recommended by the [Insular Auditor] Auditor General and approved
by the [Governor-General] President of the Philippines.

From such working I believe that power to create a municipality is included: to "separate any political
division other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any such subdivisions or
portions with another, name any new subdivision so created." The issue, however, is whether the
legislature can validly delegate to the Executive such power.

The power to create a municipality is legislative in character. American authorities have therefore favored
the view that it cannot be delegated; that what is delegable is not the power to create municipalities but
only the power to determine the existence of facts under which creation of a municipality will result (37
Am. Jur. 628).

The test is said to lie in whether the statute allows any discretion on the delegate as to whether the
municipal corporation should be created. If so, there is an attempted delegation of legislative power and
the statute is invalid (Ibid.). Now Section 68 no doubt gives the President such discretion, since it says
that the President "may by executive order" exercise the powers therein granted. Furthermore, Section 5
of the same Code states:

SEC. 5. Exercise of administrative discretion — The exercise of the permissive powers of all
executive or administrative officers and bodies is based upon discretion, and when such officer or
body is given authority to do any act but not required to do such act, the doing of the same shall
 be dependent on a sound discretion to be exercised for the good of the service and benefit of the
public, whether so expressed in the statute giving the authority or not.

Under the prevailing rule in the United States — and Section 68 is of American origin — the provision in
question would be an invalid attempt to delegate purely legislative powers, contrary to the principle of
separation of powers.

It is very pertinent that Section 68 should be considered with the stream of history in mind. A proper
knowledge of the past is the only adequate background for the present. Section 68 was adopted half a
century ago. Political change, two world wars, the recognition of our independence and rightful place in
the family of nations, have since taken place. In 1917 the Philippines had for its Organic Act the Jones
Law. And under the setup ordained therein no strict separation of powers was adhered to. Consequently,
Section 68 was not constitutionally objectionable at the time of its enactment.

The advent of the Philippine Constitution in 1935 however altered the situation. For not only was
separation of powers strictly ordained, except only in specific instances therein provided, but the power of
the Chief Executive over local governments suffered an explicit reduction.

Formerly, Section 21 of the Jones Law provided that the Governor-General "shall have general
supervision and control of all the departments and bureaus of the government in the Philippine Islands."
Now Section 10 (1), Article VII of the Philippine Constitution provides: "The President shall have control of
all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

In short, the power of control over local governments had now been taken away from the Chief Executive.
Again, to fully understand the significance of this provision, one must trace its development and growth.

As early as April 7, 1900 President McKinley of the United States, in his Instructions to the Second
Philippine Commission, laid down the policy that our municipal governments should be "subject to the
least degree of supervision and control" on the part of the national government. Said supervision and
control was to be confined within the "narrowest limits" or so much only as "may be necessary to secure
and enforce faithful and efficient administration by local officers." And the national government "shall have
no direct administration except of matters of purely general concern." (See Hebron v. Reyes, L-9158, July
28, 1958.)

All this had one aim, to enable the Filipinos to acquire experience in the art of self-government, with the
end in view of later allowing them to assume complete management and control of the administration of
their local affairs. Such aim is the policy now embodied in Section 10 (1), Article VII of the Constitution
(Rodriguez v. Montinola, 50 O.G. 4820).

It is the evident decree of the Constitution, therefore, that the President shall have no power of control
over local governments. Accordingly, Congress cannot by law grant him such power (Hebron v. Reyes,
supra). And any such power formerly granted under the Jones Law thereby became unavoidably
inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution.

It remains to examine the relation of the power to create and the power to control local governments. Said
relationship has already been passed upon by this Court in Hebron v. Reyes, supra. In said case, it was
ruled that the power to control is an incident of the power to create or abolish municipalities.
Respondent's view, therefore, that creating municipalities and controlling their local governments are "two
worlds apart," is untenable. And since as stated, the power to control local governments can no longer be
conferred on or exercised by the President, it follows a fortiori that the power to create them, all the more
cannot be so conferred or exercised.
I am compelled to conclude, therefore, that Section 10 (1), Article VII of the Constitution has repealed
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code as far as the latter empowers the President to create local
governments. Repeal by the Constitution of prior statutes inconsistent with it has already been sustained
in De los Santos v. MaIlare, 87 Phil. 289. And it was there held that such repeal differs from a declaration
of unconstitutionality of a posterior legislation, so much so that only a majority vote of the Court is needed
to sustain a finding of repeal.

Since the Constitution repealed Section 68 as far back as 1935, it is academic to ask whether Republic
Act 2370 likewise has provisions in conflict with Section 68 so as to repeal it. Suffice it to state, at any
rate, that statutory prohibition on the President from creating a barrio does not, in my opinion, warrant the
inference of statutory prohibition for creating a municipality. For although municipalities consist of barrios,
there is nothing in the statute that would preclude creation of new municipalities out of pre-existing
barrios.

It is not contrary to the logic of local autonomy to be able to create larger political units and unable to
create smaller ones. For as long ago observed in President McKinley's Instructions to the Second
Philippine Commission, greater autonomy is to be imparted to the smaller of the two political units. The
smaller the unit of local government, the lesser is the need for the national government's intervention in its
political affairs. Furthermore, for practical reasons, local autonomy cannot be given from the top
downwards. The national government, in such a case, could still exercise power over the supposedly
autonomous unit, e.g., municipalities, by exercising it over the smaller units that comprise them, e.g., the
barrios. A realistic program of decentralization therefore calls for autonomy from the bottom upwards, so
that it is not surprising for Congress to deny the national government some power over barrios without
denying it over municipalities. For this reason, I disagree with the majority view that because the
President could not create a barrio under Republic Act 2370, a fortiori he cannot create a municipality.

It is my view, therefore, that the Constitution, and not Republic Act 2370, repealed Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code's provision giving the President authority to create local governments. And
for this reason I agree with the ruling in the majority opinion that the executive orders in question are null
and void.

In thus ruling, the Court is but sustaining the fulfillment of our historic desire to be free and independent
under a republican form of government, and exercising a function derived from the very sovereignty that it
upholds. Executive orders declared null and void.

Makalintal and Regala, JJ., concur.

ABAKADA Guro PL v. The Honorable ES GR 168056

G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) OFFICERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA and ED
VINCENT S. ALBANO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA; HONORABLE SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CESAR PURISIMA; and HONORABLE COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR., Respondent.

x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 168207

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY E. ESTRADA, PANFILO M.

LACSON, ALFREDO S. LIM, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, AND SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, CESAR V. PURISIMA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE,
GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Respondent.

x-------------------------x

G.R. No. 168461

ASSOCIATION OF PILIPINAS SHELL DEALERS, INC. represented by its President, ROSARIO

ANTONIO; PETRON DEALERS’ ASSOCIATION represented by its President, RUTH E. BARBIBI;
ASSOCIATION OF CALTEX DEALERS’ OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by its President,
MERCEDITAS A. GARCIA; ROSARIO ANTONIO doing business under the name and style of "ANB
NORTH SHELL SERVICE STATION"; LOURDES MARTINEZ doing business under the name and style
of "SHELL GATE – N. DOMINGO"; BETHZAIDA TAN doing business under the name and style of
"ADVANCE SHELL STATION"; REYNALDO P. MONTOYA doing business under the name and style of
"NEW LAMUAN SHELL SERVICE STATION"; EFREN SOTTO doing business under the name and style
of "RED FIELD SHELL SERVICE STATION"; DONICA CORPORATION represented by its President,
DESI TOMACRUZ; RUTH E. MARBIBI doing business under the name and style of "R&R PETRON
STATION"; PETER M. UNGSON doing business under the name and style of "CLASSIC STAR
GASOLINE SERVICE STATION"; MARIAN SHEILA A. LEE doing business under the name and style of
"NTE GASOLINE & SERVICE STATION"; JULIAN CESAR P. POSADAS doing business under the name
and style of "STARCARGA ENTERPRISES"; ADORACION MAÑEBO doing business under the name
and style of "CMA MOTORISTS CENTER"; SUSAN M. ENTRATA doing business under the name and
style of "LEONA’S GASOLINE STATION and SERVICE CENTER"; CARMELITA BALDONADO doing
business under the name and style of "FIRST CHOICE SERVICE CENTER"; MERCEDITAS A. GARCIA
doing business under the name and style of "LORPED SERVICE CENTER"; RHEAMAR A. RAMOS
doing business under the name and style of "RJRAM PTT GAS STATION"; MA. ISABEL VIOLAGO doing
business under the name and style of "VIOLAGO-PTT SERVICE CENTER"; MOTORISTS’ HEART
CORPORATION represented by its Vice-President for Operations, JOSELITO F. FLORDELIZA;
MOTORISTS’ HARVARD CORPORATION represented by its Vice-President for Operations, JOSELITO
F. FLORDELIZA; MOTORISTS’ HERITAGE CORPORATION represented by its Vice-President for
Operations, JOSELITO F. FLORDELIZA; PHILIPPINE STANDARD OIL CORPORATION represented by
its Vice-President for Operations, JOSELITO F. FLORDELIZA; ROMEO MANUEL doing business under
the name and style of "ROMMAN GASOLINE STATION"; ANTHONY ALBERT CRUZ III doing business
under the name and style of "TRUE SERVICE STATION", Petitioners,
vs.
CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Finance and GUILLERMO
L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent.

x-------------------------x

G.R. No. 168463

FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA,

RODOLFO G. PLAZA, DARLENE ANTONINO-CUSTODIO, OSCAR G. MALAPITAN, BENJAMIN C.
AGARAO, JR. JUAN EDGARDO M. ANGARA, JUSTIN MARC SB. CHIPECO, FLORENCIO G. NOEL,
MUJIV S. HATAMAN, RENATO B. MAGTUBO, JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO, TEOFISTO DL. GUINGONA III,
RUY ELIAS C. LOPEZ, RODOLFO Q. AGBAYANI and TEODORO A. CASIÑO, Petitioners,
vs.
CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in
his capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary,Respondent.

x-------------------------x

G.R. No. 168730

BATAAN GOVERNOR ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, JR. Petitioner,

vs.
HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary; HON. MARGARITO TEVES, in
his capacity as Secretary of Finance; HON. JOSE MARIO BUNAG, in his capacity as the OIC
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; and HON. ALEXANDER AREVALO, in his capacity as
the OIC Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

The expenses of government, having for their object the interest of all, should be borne by everyone, and
the more man enjoys the advantages of society, the more he ought to hold himself honored in
contributing to those expenses.

-Anne Robert Jacques Turgot (1727-1781)

French statesman and economist

Mounting budget deficit, revenue generation, inadequate fiscal allocation for education, increased
emoluments for health workers, and wider coverage for full value-added tax benefits … these are the
reasons why Republic Act No. 9337 (R.A. No. 9337)1 was enacted. Reasons, the wisdom of which, the
Court even with its extensive constitutional power of review, cannot probe. The petitioners in these cases,
however, question not only the wisdom of the law, but also perceived constitutional infirmities in its
passage.

Every law enjoys in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Their arguments notwithstanding,
petitioners failed to justify their call for the invalidity of the law. Hence, R.A. No. 9337 is not
unconstitutional.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

R.A. No. 9337 is a consolidation of three legislative bills namely, House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705, and
Senate Bill No. 1950.

House Bill No. 35552 was introduced on first reading on January 7, 2005. The House Committee on
Ways and Means approved the bill, in substitution of House Bill No. 1468, which Representative (Rep.)
Eric D. Singson introduced on August 8, 2004. The President certified the bill on January 7, 2005 for
immediate enactment. On January 27, 2005, the House of Representatives approved the bill on second
and third reading.

House Bill No. 37053 on the other hand, substituted House Bill No. 3105 introduced by Rep. Salacnib F.
Baterina, and House Bill No. 3381 introduced by Rep. Jacinto V. Paras. Its "mother bill" is House Bill No.
3555. The House Committee on Ways and Means approved the bill on February 2, 2005. The President
also certified it as urgent on February 8, 2005. The House of Representatives approved the bill on second
and third reading on February 28, 2005.

Meanwhile, the Senate Committee on Ways and Means approved Senate Bill No. 19504 on March 7,
2005, "in substitution of Senate Bill Nos. 1337, 1838 and 1873, taking into consideration House Bill Nos.
3555 and 3705." Senator Ralph G. Recto sponsored Senate Bill No. 1337, while Senate Bill Nos. 1838
and 1873 were both sponsored by Sens. Franklin M. Drilon, Juan M. Flavier and Francis N. Pangilinan.
The President certified the bill on March 11, 2005, and was approved by the Senate on second and third
reading on April 13, 2005.

On the same date, April 13, 2005, the Senate agreed to the request of the House of Representatives for a
committee conference on the disagreeing provisions of the proposed bills.

Before long, the Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 3555, House Bill
No. 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950, "after having met and discussed in full free and conference,"
recommended the approval of its report, which the Senate did on May 10, 2005, and with the House of
Representatives agreeing thereto the next day, May 11, 2005.

On May 23, 2005, the enrolled copy of the consolidated House and Senate version was transmitted to the
President, who signed the same into law on May 24, 2005. Thus, came R.A. No. 9337.

July 1, 2005 is the effectivity date of R.A. No. 9337. 5 When said date came, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining respondents from
enforcing and implementing the law.

Oral arguments were held on July 14, 2005. Significantly, during the hearing, the Court speaking through
Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, voiced the rationale for its issuance of the temporary restraining order
on July 1, 2005, to wit:

J. PANGANIBAN : . . . But before I go into the details of your presentation, let me just tell you a little
background. You know when the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO at about 5
o’clock in the afternoon. But before that, there was a lot of complaints aired on television and on radio.
Some people in a gas station were complaining that the gas prices went up by 10%. Some people were
complaining that their electric bill will go up by 10%. Other times people riding in domestic air carrier were
complaining that the prices that they’ll have to pay would have to go up by 10%. While all that was being
aired, per your presentation and per our own understanding of the law, that’s not true. It’s not true that the
e-vat law necessarily increased prices by 10% uniformly isn’t it?

ATTY. BANIQUED : No, Your Honor.

J. PANGANIBAN : It is not?

ATTY. BANIQUED : It’s not, because, Your Honor, there is an Executive Order that granted the
Petroleum companies some subsidy . . . interrupted

J. PANGANIBAN : That’s correct . . .

ATTY. BANIQUED : . . . and therefore that was meant to temper the impact . . . interrupted

J. PANGANIBAN : . . . mitigating measures . . .

ATTY. BANIQUED : Yes, Your Honor.

J. PANGANIBAN : As a matter of fact a part of the mitigating measures would be the elimination of the
Excise Tax and the import duties. That is why, it is not correct to say that the VAT as to petroleum dealers
increased prices by 10%.

ATTY. BANIQUED : Yes, Your Honor.

J. PANGANIBAN : And therefore, there is no justification for increasing the retail price by 10% to cover
the E-Vat tax. If you consider the excise tax and the import duties, the Net Tax would probably be in the
neighborhood of 7%? We are not going into exact figures I am just trying to deliver a point that different
industries, different products, different services are hit differently. So it’s not correct to say that all prices
must go up by 10%.

ATTY. BANIQUED : You’re right, Your Honor.

J. PANGANIBAN : Now. For instance, Domestic Airline companies, Mr. Counsel, are at present imposed
a Sales Tax of 3%. When this E-Vat law took effect the Sales Tax was also removed as a mitigating
measure. So, therefore, there is no justification to increase the fares by 10% at best 7%, correct?

ATTY. BANIQUED : I guess so, Your Honor, yes.

J. PANGANIBAN : There are other products that the people were complaining on that first day, were
being increased arbitrarily by 10%. And that’s one reason among many others this Court had to issue
TRO because of the confusion in the implementation. That’s why we added as an issue in this case, even
if it’s tangentially taken up by the pleadings of the parties, the confusion in the implementation of the E-
vat. Our people were subjected to the mercy of that confusion of an across the board increase of 10%,
which you yourself now admit and I think even the Government will admit is incorrect. In some cases, it
should be 3% only, in some cases it should be 6% depending on these mitigating measures and the
location and situation of each product, of each service, of each company, isn’t it?

ATTY. BANIQUED : Yes, Your Honor.

J. PANGANIBAN : Alright. So that’s one reason why we had to issue a TRO pending the clarification of all
these and we wish the government will take time to clarify all these by means of a more detailed
implementing rules, in case the law is upheld by this Court. . . .6

The Court also directed the parties to file their respective Memoranda.

G.R. No. 168056

Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for
prohibition on May 27, 2005. They question the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337,
amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on
importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of
properties. These questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006,
after any of the following conditions have been satisfied, to wit:

. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1,
2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has
been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year
exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or

(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half
percent (1 ½%).

Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its
exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.

G.R. No. 168207

On June 9, 2005, Sen. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al., filed a petition for certiorari likewise assailing the
constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337.

Aside from questioning the so-called stand-by authority of the President to increase the VAT rate to 12%,
on the ground that it amounts to an undue delegation of legislative power, petitioners also contend that
the increase in the VAT rate to 12% contingent on any of the two conditions being satisfied violates the
due process clause embodied in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, as it imposes an unfair and
additional tax burden on the people, in that: (1) the 12% increase is ambiguous because it does not state
if the rate would be returned to the original 10% if the conditions are no longer satisfied; (2) the rate is
unfair and unreasonable, as the people are unsure of the applicable VAT rate from year to year; and (3)
the increase in the VAT rate, which is supposed to be an incentive to the President to raise the VAT
collection to at least 2 4/5 of the GDP of the previous year, should only be based on fiscal adequacy.

Petitioners further claim that the inclusion of a stand-by authority granted to the President by the
Bicameral Conference Committee is a violation of the "no-amendment rule" upon last reading of a bill laid
down in Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.

G.R. No. 168461

Thereafter, a petition for prohibition was filed on June 29, 2005, by the Association of Pilipinas Shell
Dealers, Inc., et al., assailing the following provisions of R.A. No. 9337:

1) Section 8, amending Section 110 (A)(2) of the NIRC, requiring that the input tax on depreciable goods
shall be amortized over a 60-month period, if the acquisition, excluding the VAT components, exceeds
One Million Pesos (₱1, 000,000.00);

2) Section 8, amending Section 110 (B) of the NIRC, imposing a 70% limit on the amount of input tax to
be credited against the output tax; and

3) Section 12, amending Section 114 (c) of the NIRC, authorizing the Government or any of its political
subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies, including GOCCs, to deduct a 5% final withholding tax on
gross payments of goods and services, which are subject to 10% VAT under Sections 106 (sale of goods
and properties) and 108 (sale of services and use or lease of properties) of the NIRC.

Petitioners contend that these provisions are unconstitutional for being arbitrary, oppressive, excessive,
and confiscatory.

Petitioners’ argument is premised on the constitutional right of non-deprivation of life, liberty or property
without due process of law under Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. According to petitioners, the
contested sections impose limitations on the amount of input tax that may be claimed. Petitioners also
argue that the input tax partakes the nature of a property that may not be confiscated, appropriated, or
limited without due process of law. Petitioners further contend that like any other property or property
right, the input tax credit may be transferred or disposed of, and that by limiting the same, the government
gets to tax a profit or value-added even if there is no profit or value-added.

Petitioners also believe that these provisions violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the
law under Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, as the limitation on the creditable input tax if: (1) the
entity has a high ratio of input tax; or (2) invests in capital equipment; or (3) has several transactions with
the government, is not based on real and substantial differences to meet a valid classification.

Lastly, petitioners contend that the 70% limit is anything but progressive, violative of Article VI, Section
28(1) of the Constitution, and that it is the smaller businesses with higher input tax to output tax ratio that
will suffer the consequences thereof for it wipes out whatever meager margins the petitioners make.

G.R. No. 168463

Several members of the House of Representatives led by Rep. Francis Joseph G. Escudero filed this
petition for certiorari on June 30, 2005. They question the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 on the
following grounds:

1) Sections 4, 5, and 6 of R.A. No. 9337 constitute an undue delegation of legislative power, in violation of
Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution;

2) The Bicameral Conference Committee acted without jurisdiction in deleting the no pass on provisions
present in Senate Bill No. 1950 and House Bill No. 3705; and

3) Insertion by the Bicameral Conference Committee of Sections 27, 28, 34, 116, 117, 119, 121,
125,7 148, 151, 236, 237 and 288, which were present in Senate Bill No. 1950, violates Article VI, Section
24(1) of the Constitution, which provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives

G.R. No. 168730

On the eleventh hour, Governor Enrique T. Garcia filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on July 20,
2005, alleging unconstitutionality of the law on the ground that the limitation on the creditable input tax in
effect allows VAT-registered establishments to retain a portion of the taxes they collect, thus violating the
principle that tax collection and revenue should be solely allocated for public purposes and expenditures.
Petitioner Garcia further claims that allowing these establishments to pass on the tax to the consumers is
inequitable, in violation of Article VI, Section 28(1) of the Constitution.

RESPONDENTS’ COMMENT

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of respondents. Preliminarily,
respondents contend that R.A. No. 9337 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality and petitioners failed
to cast doubt on its validity.

Relying on the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA

630 (1994), respondents argue that the procedural issues raised by petitioners, i.e., legality of the
bicameral proceedings, exclusive origination of revenue measures and the power of the Senate
concomitant thereto, have already been settled. With regard to the issue of undue delegation of legislative
power to the President, respondents contend that the law is complete and leaves no discretion to the
President but to increase the rate to 12% once any of the two conditions provided therein arise.
Respondents also refute petitioners’ argument that the increase to 12%, as well as the 70% limitation on
the creditable input tax, the 60-month amortization on the purchase or importation of capital goods
exceeding ₱1,000,000.00, and the 5% final withholding tax by government agencies, is arbitrary,
oppressive, and confiscatory, and that it violates the constitutional principle on progressive taxation,
among others.

Finally, respondents manifest that R.A. No. 9337 is the anchor of the government’s fiscal reform agenda.
A reform in the value-added system of taxation is the core revenue measure that will tilt the balance
towards a sustainable macroeconomic environment necessary for economic growth.

ISSUES

The Court defined the issues, as follows:

PROCEDURAL ISSUE

Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates the following provisions of the Constitution:

a. Article VI, Section 24, and

b. Article VI, Section 26(2)

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

1. Whether Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108 of the NIRC,
violate the following provisions of the Constitution:

a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and

b. Article VI, Section 28(2)

2. Whether Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110(A)(2) and 110(B) of the NIRC; and
Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 114(C) of the NIRC, violate the following provisions of the
Constitution:

a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and

b. Article III, Section 1

RULING OF THE COURT

As a prelude, the Court deems it apt to restate the general principles and concepts of value-added tax
(VAT), as the confusion and inevitably, litigation, breeds from a fallacious notion of its nature.

The VAT is a tax on spending or consumption. It is levied on the sale, barter, exchange or lease of goods
or properties and services.8 Being an indirect tax on expenditure, the seller of goods or services may pass
on the amount of tax paid to the buyer,9 with the seller acting merely as a tax collector.10 The burden of
VAT is intended to fall on the immediate buyers and ultimately, the end-consumers.

In contrast, a direct tax is a tax for which a taxpayer is directly liable on the transaction or business it
engages in, without transferring the burden to someone else.11 Examples are individual and corporate
income taxes, transfer taxes, and residence taxes.12
In the Philippines, the value-added system of sales taxation has long been in existence, albeit in a
different mode. Prior to 1978, the system was a single-stage tax computed under the "cost deduction
method" and was payable only by the original sellers. The single-stage system was subsequently
modified, and a mixture of the "cost deduction method" and "tax credit method" was used to determine
the value-added tax payable.13 Under the "tax credit method," an entity can credit against or subtract from
the VAT charged on its sales or outputs the VAT paid on its purchases, inputs and imports.14

It was only in 1987, when President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 273, that the VAT
system was rationalized by imposing a multi-stage tax rate of 0% or 10% on all sales using the "tax credit
method."15

E.O. No. 273 was followed by R.A. No. 7716 or the Expanded VAT Law,16 R.A. No. 8241 or the Improved
VAT Law,17 R.A. No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997,18 and finally, the presently beleaguered R.A.
No. 9337, also referred to by respondents as the VAT Reform Act.

The Court will now discuss the issues in logical sequence.

PROCEDURAL ISSUE

I.

Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates the following provisions of the Constitution:

a. Article VI, Section 24, and

b. Article VI, Section 26(2)

A. The Bicameral Conference Committee

Petitioners Escudero, et al., and Pimentel, et al., allege that the Bicameral Conference Committee
exceeded its authority by:

1) Inserting the stand-by authority in favor of the President in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of R.A. No. 9337;

2) Deleting entirely the no pass-on provisions found in both the House and Senate bills;

3) Inserting the provision imposing a 70% limit on the amount of input tax to be credited against the
output tax; and

4) Including the amendments introduced only by Senate Bill No. 1950 regarding other kinds of taxes in
addition to the value-added tax.

Petitioners now beseech the Court to define the powers of the Bicameral Conference Committee.

It should be borne in mind that the power of internal regulation and discipline are intrinsic in any
legislative body for, as unerringly elucidated by Justice Story, "[i]f the power did not exist, it would be
utterly impracticable to transact the business of the nation, either at all, or at least with decency,
deliberation, and order."19 Thus, Article VI, Section 16 (3) of the Constitution provides that "each House
may determine the rules of its proceedings." Pursuant to this inherent constitutional power to promulgate
and implement its own rules of procedure, the respective rules of each house of Congress provided for
the creation of a Bicameral Conference Committee.
Thus, Rule XIV, Sections 88 and 89 of the Rules of House of Representatives provides as follows:

Sec. 88. Conference Committee. – In the event that the House does not agree with the Senate on the
amendment to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be settled by the conference committees of
both chambers.

In resolving the differences with the Senate, the House panel shall, as much as possible, adhere to and
support the House Bill. If the differences with the Senate are so substantial that they materially impair the
House Bill, the panel shall report such fact to the House for the latter’s appropriate action.

Sec. 89. Conference Committee Reports. – . . . Each report shall contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit
statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure.

...

The Chairman of the House panel may be interpellated on the Conference Committee Report prior to the
voting thereon. The House shall vote on the Conference Committee Report in the same manner and
procedure as it votes on a bill on third and final reading.

Rule XII, Section 35 of the Rules of the Senate states:

Sec. 35. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives on the provision
of any bill or joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a conference committee of both Houses
which shall meet within ten (10) days after their composition. The President shall designate the members
of the Senate Panel in the conference committee with the approval of the Senate.

Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of the
changes in, or amendments to the subject measure, and shall be signed by a majority of the members of
each House panel, voting separately.

A comparative presentation of the conflicting House and Senate provisions and a reconciled version
thereof with the explanatory statement of the conference committee shall be attached to the report.

...

The creation of such conference committee was apparently in response to a problem, not addressed by
any constitutional provision, where the two houses of Congress find themselves in disagreement over
changes or amendments introduced by the other house in a legislative bill. Given that one of the most
basic powers of the legislative branch is to formulate and implement its own rules of proceedings and to
discipline its members, may the Court then delve into the details of how Congress complies with its
internal rules or how it conducts its business of passing legislation? Note that in the present petitions, the
issue is not whether provisions of the rules of both houses creating the bicameral conference committee
are unconstitutional, but whether the bicameral conference committee has strictly complied with the
rules of both houses, thereby remaining within the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Congress.

In the recent case of Fariñas vs. The Executive Secretary,20 the Court En Banc, unanimously reiterated
and emphasized its adherence to the "enrolled bill doctrine," thus, declining therein petitioners’ plea for
the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. Assailed in said case was Congress’s creation of two
sets of bicameral conference committees, the lack of records of said committees’ proceedings, the
alleged violation of said committees of the rules of both houses, and the disappearance or deletion of one
of the provisions in the compromise bill submitted by the bicameral conference committee. It was argued
that such irregularities in the passage of the law nullified R.A. No. 9006, or the Fair Election Act.
Striking down such argument, the Court held thus:

Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate
President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are
conclusive of its due enactment. A review of cases reveals the Court’s consistent adherence to the
rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the
irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g.,
creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. This Court is not the
proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate.
Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern.
Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be resolved in
its favor.The Court reiterates its ruling in Arroyo vs. De Venecia, viz.:

But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the
power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with
its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or
the rights of private individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared
that ‘the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them.’ And it has been said that "Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body." Consequently, "mere failure to conform to parliamentary
usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of
members have agreed to a particular measure."21 (Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing declaration is exactly in point with the present cases, where petitioners allege irregularities
committed by the conference committee in introducing changes or deleting provisions in the House and
Senate bills. Akin to the Fariñas case,22 the present petitions also raise an issue regarding the actions
taken by the conference committee on matters regarding Congress’ compliance with its own internal
rules. As stated earlier, one of the most basic and inherent power of the legislature is the power to
formulate rules for its proceedings and the discipline of its members. Congress is the best judge of how it
should conduct its own business expeditiously and in the most orderly manner. It is also the sole

concern of Congress to instill discipline among the members of its conference committee if it believes that
said members violated any of its rules of proceedings. Even the expanded jurisdiction of this Court cannot
apply to questions regarding only the internal operation of Congress, thus, the Court is wont to deny a
review of the internal proceedings of a co-equal branch of government.

Moreover, as far back as 1994 or more than ten years ago, in the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of
Finance,23 the Court already made the pronouncement that "[i]f a change is desired in the practice [of
the Bicameral Conference Committee] it must be sought in Congress since this question is not
covered by any constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of each house." 24 To date,
Congress has not seen it fit to make such changes adverted to by the Court. It seems, therefore, that
Congress finds the practices of the bicameral conference committee to be very useful for purposes of
prompt and efficient legislative action.

Nevertheless, just to put minds at ease that no blatant irregularities tainted the proceedings of the
bicameral conference committees, the Court deems it necessary to dwell on the issue. The Court
observes that there was a necessity for a conference committee because a comparison of the provisions
of House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 on one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950 on the other, reveals that there
were indeed disagreements. As pointed out in the petitions, said disagreements were as follows:

House Bill No. 3555 House Bill No.3705 Senate Bill No. 1950
With regard to "Stand-By Authority" in favor of President
Provides for 12% VAT on
every sale of goods or
properties (amending Sec.
106 of NIRC); 12% VAT on
importation of goods
(amending Sec. 107 of NIRC);
and 12% VAT on sale of
services and use or lease of
properties (amending Sec.
108 of NIRC)
With regard to the "no pass-on" provision
No similar provision
With regard to 70% limit on input tax credit
Provides that the input tax
credit for capital goods on
which a VAT has been paid
shall be equally distributed
over 5 years or the
depreciable life of such capital
goods; the input tax credit for
goods and services other than
capital goods shall not exceed
5% of the total amount of
such goods and services; and
for persons engaged in retail
trading of goods, the
allowable input tax credit shall
not exceed 11% of the total
amount of goods purchased.
With regard to amendments to be made to NIRC provisions regarding income and excise taxes
No similar provision
Provides for 12% VAT in general
on sales of goods or properties
and reduced rates for sale of
certain locally manufactured
goods and petroleum products
and raw materials to be used in
the manufacture thereof
(amending Sec. 106 of NIRC);
12% VAT on importation of goods
and reduced rates for certain
imported products including
petroleum products (amending
Sec. 107 of NIRC); and 12% VAT
on sale of services and use or
lease of properties and a reduced
rate for certain services including
power generation (amending Sec.
108 of NIRC)
Provides that the VAT imposed on
power generation and on the sale
of petroleum products shall be
absorbed by generation
companies or sellers, respectively, companies and distribution
and shall not be passed on to
consumers
No similar provision
No similar provision
Provides for a single rate of
10% VAT on sale of goods or
properties (amending Sec. 106
of NIRC), 10% VAT on sale of
services including sale of
electricity by generation
companies, transmission and
distribution companies, and
use or lease of properties
(amending Sec. 108 of NIRC)
Provides that the VAT imposed
on sales of electricity by
generation companies and
services of transmission
companies, as well as those of
franchise grantees of electric
utilities shall not apply to
residential
end-users. VAT shall be
absorbed by generation,
transmission, and distribution
companies.
Provides that the input tax
credit for capital goods on
which a VAT has been paid
shall be equally distributed
over 5 years or the depreciable
life of such capital goods; the
input tax credit for goods and
services other than capital
goods shall not exceed 90% of
the output VAT.
Provided for amendments to
several NIRC provisions
regarding corporate income,
 percentage, franchise and
excise taxes

The disagreements between the provisions in the House bills and the Senate bill were with regard to (1)
what rate of VAT is to be imposed; (2) whether only the VAT imposed on electricity generation,
transmission and distribution companies should not be passed on to consumers, as proposed in the
Senate bill, or both the VAT imposed on electricity generation, transmission and distribution companies
and the VAT imposed on sale of petroleum products should not be passed on to consumers, as proposed
in the House bill; (3) in what manner input tax credits should be limited; (4) and whether the NIRC
provisions on corporate income taxes, percentage, franchise and excise taxes should be amended.

There being differences and/or disagreements on the foregoing provisions of the House and Senate bills,
the Bicameral Conference Committee was mandated by the rules of both houses of Congress to act on
the same by settling said differences and/or disagreements. The Bicameral Conference Committee acted
on the disagreeing provisions by making the following changes:

1. With regard to the disagreement on the rate of VAT to be imposed, it would appear from the
Conference Committee Report that the Bicameral Conference Committee tried to bridge the gap in the
difference between the 10% VAT rate proposed by the Senate, and the various rates with 12% as the
highest VAT rate proposed by the House, by striking a compromise whereby the present 10% VAT rate
would be retained until certain conditions arise, i.e., the value-added tax collection as a percentage of
gross domestic product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5%, or National Government deficit as a
percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 1½%, when the President, upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance shall raise the rate of VAT to 12% effective January 1, 2006.

2. With regard to the disagreement on whether only the VAT imposed on electricity generation,
transmission and distribution companies should not be passed on to consumers or whether both the VAT
imposed on electricity generation, transmission and distribution companies and the VAT imposed on sale
of petroleum products may be passed on to consumers, the Bicameral Conference Committee chose to
settle such disagreement by altogether deleting from its Report any no pass-on provision.

3. With regard to the disagreement on whether input tax credits should be limited or not, the Bicameral
Conference Committee decided to adopt the position of the House by putting a limitation on the amount of
input tax that may be credited against the output tax, although it crafted its own language as to the
amount of the limitation on input tax credits and the manner of computing the same by providing thus:

(A) Creditable Input Tax. – . . .

...

Provided, The input tax on goods purchased or imported in a calendar month for use in trade or business
for which deduction for depreciation is allowed under this Code, shall be spread evenly over the month of
acquisition and the fifty-nine (59) succeeding months if the aggregate acquisition cost for such goods,
excluding the VAT component thereof, exceeds one million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00): PROVIDED,
however, that if the estimated useful life of the capital good is less than five (5) years, as used for
depreciation purposes, then the input VAT shall be spread over such shorter period: . . .

(B) Excess Output or Input Tax. – If at the end of any taxable quarter the output tax exceeds the input tax,
the excess shall be paid by the VAT-registered person. If the input tax exceeds the output tax, the excess
shall be carried over to the succeeding quarter or quarters: PROVIDED that the input tax inclusive of
input VAT carried over from the previous quarter that may be credited in every quarter shall not exceed
seventy percent (70%) of the output VAT: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT any input tax attributable to
zero-rated sales by a VAT-registered person may at his option be refunded or credited against other
internal revenue taxes, . . .
4. With regard to the amendments to other provisions of the NIRC on corporate income tax, franchise,
percentage and excise taxes, the conference committee decided to include such amendments and
basically adopted the provisions found in Senate Bill No. 1950, with some changes as to the rate of the
tax to be imposed.

Under the provisions of both the Rules of the House of Representatives and Senate Rules, the Bicameral
Conference Committee is mandated to settle the differences between the disagreeing provisions in the
House bill and the Senate bill. The term "settle" is synonymous to "reconcile" and "harmonize."25 To
reconcile or harmonize disagreeing provisions, the Bicameral Conference Committee may then (a) adopt
the specific provisions of either the House bill or Senate bill, (b) decide that neither provisions in the
House bill or the provisions in the Senate bill would

be carried into the final form of the bill, and/or (c) try to arrive at a compromise between the disagreeing
provisions.

In the present case, the changes introduced by the Bicameral Conference Committee on disagreeing
provisions were meant only to reconcile and harmonize the disagreeing provisions for it did not inject any
idea or intent that is wholly foreign to the subject embraced by the original provisions.

The so-called stand-by authority in favor of the President, whereby the rate of 10% VAT wanted by the
Senate is retained until such time that certain conditions arise when the 12% VAT wanted by the House
shall be imposed, appears to be a compromise to try to bridge the difference in the rate of VAT proposed
by the two houses of Congress. Nevertheless, such compromise is still totally within the subject of what
rate of VAT should be imposed on taxpayers.

The no pass-on provision was deleted altogether. In the transcripts of the proceedings of the Bicameral
Conference Committee held on May 10, 2005, Sen. Ralph Recto, Chairman of the Senate Panel,
explained the reason for deleting the no pass-on provision in this wise:

. . . the thinking was just to keep the VAT law or the VAT bill simple. And we were thinking that no sector
should be a beneficiary of legislative grace, neither should any sector be discriminated on. The VAT is an
indirect tax. It is a pass on-tax. And let’s keep it plain and simple. Let’s not confuse the bill and put a no
pass-on provision. Two-thirds of the world have a VAT system and in this two-thirds of the globe, I have
yet to see a VAT with a no pass-though provision. So, the thinking of the Senate is basically simple, let’s
keep the VAT simple.26 (Emphasis supplied)

Rep. Teodoro Locsin further made the manifestation that the no pass-on provision "never really enjoyed
the support of either House."27

With regard to the amount of input tax to be credited against output tax, the Bicameral Conference
Committee came to a compromise on the percentage rate of the limitation or cap on such input tax credit,
but again, the change introduced by the Bicameral Conference Committee was totally within the intent of
both houses to put a cap on input tax that may be

credited against the output tax. From the inception of the subject revenue bill in the House of
Representatives, one of the major objectives was to "plug a glaring loophole in the tax policy and
administration by creating vital restrictions on the claiming of input VAT tax credits . . ." and "[b]y
introducing limitations on the claiming of tax credit, we are capping a major leakage that has placed our
collection efforts at an apparent disadvantage."28

As to the amendments to NIRC provisions on taxes other than the value-added tax proposed in Senate
Bill No. 1950, since said provisions were among those referred to it, the conference committee had to act
on the same and it basically adopted the version of the Senate.
Thus, all the changes or modifications made by the Bicameral Conference Committee were germane to
subjects of the provisions referred

to it for reconciliation. Such being the case, the Court does not see any grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the Bicameral Conference Committee. In the
earlier cases of Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado29 and Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance,30 the
Court recognized the long-standing legislative practice of giving said conference committee ample latitude
for compromising differences between the Senate and the House. Thus, in the Tolentino case, it was held
that:

. . . it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is
not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the committee can propose an amendment
consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions,
collectively considered as an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," so long as such amendment is
germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the
approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department. The charge
that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a third legislative chamber is thus without
any basis.31 (Emphasis supplied)

B. R.A. No. 9337 Does Not Violate Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution on the "No-Amendment
Rule"

Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution, states:

No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days,
and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its
passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the
vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

Petitioners’ argument that the practice where a bicameral conference committee is allowed to add or
delete provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill after these had passed three readings is in effect a
circumvention of the "no amendment rule" (Sec. 26 (2), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution), fails to convince
the Court to deviate from its ruling in the Tolentino case that:

Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committee’s Report in these cases must have undergone
three readings in each of the two houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to negotiation since
each house may seek modification of the compromise bill. . . .

Art. VI. § 26 (2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first time
in either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report. 32 (Emphasis supplied)

The Court reiterates here that the "no-amendment rule" refers only to the procedure to be followed
by each house of Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of said respective houses, before
said bill is transmitted to the other house for its concurrence or amendment. Verily, to construe said
provision in a way as to proscribe any further changes to a bill after one house has voted on it would lead
to absurdity as this would mean that the other house of Congress would be deprived of its constitutional
power to amend or introduce changes to said bill. Thus, Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution cannot be
taken to mean that the introduction by the Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and
modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills that have been acted upon by both houses of Congress is
prohibited.

C. R.A. No. 9337 Does Not Violate Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution on Exclusive Origination of
Revenue Bills
Coming to the issue of the validity of the amendments made regarding the NIRC provisions on corporate
income taxes and percentage, excise taxes. Petitioners refer to the following provisions, to wit:

Section 27 Rates of Income Tax on Domestic Corporation

28(A)(1) Tax on Resident Foreign Corporation
28(B)(1) Inter-corporate Dividends
34(B)(1) Inter-corporate Dividends
116 Tax on Persons Exempt from VAT
117 Percentage Tax on domestic carriers and keepers of Garage
119 Tax on franchises
121 Tax on banks and Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries
148 Excise Tax on manufactured oils and other fuels
151 Excise Tax on mineral products
236 Registration requirements
237 Issuance of receipts or sales or commercial invoices
288 Disposition of Incremental Revenue

Petitioners claim that the amendments to these provisions of the NIRC did not at all originate from the
House. They aver that House Bill No. 3555 proposed amendments only regarding Sections 106, 107,
108, 110 and 114 of the NIRC, while House Bill No. 3705 proposed amendments only to Sections 106,
107,108, 109, 110 and 111 of the NIRC; thus, the other sections of the NIRC which the Senate amended
but which amendments were not found in the House bills are not intended to be amended by the House
of Representatives. Hence, they argue that since the proposed amendments did not originate from the
House, such amendments are a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.

The argument does not hold water.

Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution reads:

Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments.

In the present cases, petitioners admit that it was indeed House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 that initiated the
move for amending provisions of the NIRC dealing mainly with the value-added tax. Upon transmittal of
said House bills to the Senate, the Senate came out with Senate Bill No. 1950 proposing amendments
not only to NIRC provisions on the value-added tax but also amendments to NIRC provisions on other
kinds of taxes. Is the introduction by the Senate of provisions not dealing directly with the value- added
tax, which is the only kind of tax being amended in the House bills, still within the purview of the
constitutional provision authorizing the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to a revenue bill
that originated from the House?

The foregoing question had been squarely answered in the Tolentino case, wherein the Court held, thus:

. . . To begin with, it is not the law – but the revenue bill – which is required by the Constitution to
"originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill
originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a
rewriting of the whole. . . . At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a
distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute – and not only the bill which initiated
the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law – must substantially be the same
as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to "concur with amendments" but
also to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two
houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.

…Given, then, the power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate can propose its own
version even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House.

...

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the
House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the
House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand,
the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the
national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such
laws.33 (Emphasis supplied)

Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the
Senate was acting within its

constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill
No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Verily, Article VI,
Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the
amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill.

Furthermore, the amendments introduced by the Senate to the NIRC provisions that had not been
touched in the House bills are still in furtherance of the intent of the House in initiating the subject revenue
bills. The Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 1468, the very first House bill introduced on the floor, which
was later substituted by House Bill No. 3555, stated:

One of the challenges faced by the present administration is the urgent and daunting task of solving the
country’s serious financial problems. To do this, government expenditures must be strictly monitored and
controlled and revenues must be significantly increased. This may be easier said than done, but our fiscal
authorities are still optimistic the government will be operating on a balanced budget by the year 2009. In
fact, several measures that will result to significant expenditure savings have been identified by the
administration. It is supported with a credible package of revenue measures that include measures
to improve tax administration and control the leakages in revenues from income taxes and the
value-added tax (VAT). (Emphasis supplied)

Rep. Eric D. Singson, in his sponsorship speech for House Bill No. 3555, declared that:

In the budget message of our President in the year 2005, she reiterated that we all acknowledged that on
top of our agenda must be the restoration of the health of our fiscal system.

In order to considerably lower the consolidated public sector deficit and eventually achieve a balanced
budget by the year 2009, we need to seize windows of opportunities which might seem poignant in
the beginning, but in the long run prove effective and beneficial to the overall status of our
economy. One such opportunity is a review of existing tax rates, evaluating the relevance given
our present conditions.34 (Emphasis supplied)

Notably therefore, the main purpose of the bills emanating from the House of Representatives is to bring
in sizeable revenues for the government
to supplement our country’s serious financial problems, and improve tax administration and control of the
leakages in revenues from income taxes and value-added taxes. As these house bills were transmitted to
the Senate, the latter, approaching the measures from the point of national perspective, can introduce
amendments within the purposes of those bills. It can provide for ways that would soften the impact of the
VAT measure on the consumer, i.e., by distributing the burden across all sectors instead of putting it
entirely on the shoulders of the consumers. The sponsorship speech of Sen. Ralph Recto on why the
provisions on income tax on corporation were included is worth quoting:

All in all, the proposal of the Senate Committee on Ways and Means will raise ₱64.3 billion in additional
revenues annually even while by mitigating prices of power, services and petroleum products.

However, not all of this will be wrung out of VAT. In fact, only ₱48.7 billion amount is from the VAT on
twelve goods and services. The rest of the tab – ₱10.5 billion- will be picked by corporations.

What we therefore prescribe is a burden sharing between corporate Philippines and the consumer. Why
should the latter bear all the pain? Why should the fiscal salvation be only on the burden of the
consumer?

The corporate world’s equity is in form of the increase in the corporate income tax from 32 to 35 percent,
but up to 2008 only. This will raise ₱10.5 billion a year. After that, the rate will slide back, not to its old rate
of 32 percent, but two notches lower, to 30 percent.

Clearly, we are telling those with the capacity to pay, corporations, to bear with this emergency provision
that will be in effect for 1,200 days, while we put our fiscal house in order. This fiscal medicine will have
an expiry date.

For their assistance, a reward of tax reduction awaits them. We intend to keep the length of their sacrifice
brief. We would like to assure them that not because there is a light at the end of the tunnel, this
government will keep on making the tunnel long.

The responsibility will not rest solely on the weary shoulders of the small man. Big business will be there
to share the burden.35

As the Court has said, the Senate can propose amendments and in fact, the amendments made on
provisions in the tax on income of corporations are germane to the purpose of the house bills which is to
raise revenues for the government.

Likewise, the Court finds the sections referring to other percentage and excise taxes germane to the
reforms to the VAT system, as these sections would cushion the effects of VAT on consumers.
Considering that certain goods and services which were subject to percentage tax and excise tax would
no longer be VAT-exempt, the consumer would be burdened more as they would be paying the VAT in
addition to these taxes. Thus, there is a need to amend these sections to soften the impact of VAT.
Again, in his sponsorship speech, Sen. Recto said:

However, for power plants that run on oil, we will reduce to zero the present excise tax on bunker fuel, to
lessen the effect of a VAT on this product.

For electric utilities like Meralco, we will wipe out the franchise tax in exchange for a VAT.

And in the case of petroleum, while we will levy the VAT on oil products, so as not to destroy the VAT
chain, we will however bring down the excise tax on socially sensitive products such as diesel, bunker,
fuel and kerosene.
...

What do all these exercises point to? These are not contortions of giving to the left hand what was taken
from the right. Rather, these sprang from our concern of softening the impact of VAT, so that the people
can cushion the blow of higher prices they will have to pay as a result of VAT. 36

The other sections amended by the Senate pertained to matters of tax administration which are
necessary for the implementation of the changes in the VAT system.

To reiterate, the sections introduced by the Senate are germane to the subject matter and purposes of
the house bills, which is to supplement our country’s fiscal deficit, among others. Thus, the Senate acted
within its power to propose those amendments.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

I.

Whether Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108 of the NIRC, violate
the following provisions of the Constitution:

a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and

b. Article VI, Section 28(2)

A. No Undue Delegation of Legislative Power

Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., Pimentel, Jr., et al., and Escudero, et al. contend in
common that Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of
the NIRC giving the President the stand-by authority to raise the VAT rate from 10% to 12% when a
certain condition is met, constitutes undue delegation of the legislative power to tax.

The assailed provisions read as follows:

SEC. 4. Sec. 106 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

SEC. 106. Value-Added Tax on Sale of Goods or Properties. –

(A) Rate and Base of Tax. – There shall be levied, assessed and collected on every sale, barter or
exchange of goods or properties, a value-added tax equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the gross selling
price or gross value in money of the goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged, such tax to be paid
by the seller or transferor: provided, that the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary
of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent
(12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied.

(i) value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous
year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%) or

(ii) national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-
half percent (1 ½%).

SEC. 5. Section 107 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 107. Value-Added Tax on Importation of Goods. –

(A) In General. – There shall be levied, assessed and collected on every importation of goods a value-
added tax equivalent to ten percent (10%) based on the total value used by the Bureau of Customs in
determining tariff and customs duties, plus customs duties, excise taxes, if any, and other charges, such
tax to be paid by the importer prior to the release of such goods from customs custody: Provided, That
where the customs duties are determined on the basis of the quantity or volume of the goods, the value-
added tax shall be based on the landed cost plus excise taxes, if any: provided, further, that the
President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006,
raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%) after any of the following conditions has
been satisfied.

(i) value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous
year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%) or

(ii) national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-
half percent (1 ½%).

SEC. 6. Section 108 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

SEC. 108. Value-added Tax on Sale of Services and Use or Lease of Properties –

(A) Rate and Base of Tax. – There shall be levied, assessed and collected, a value-added tax equivalent
to ten percent (10%) of gross receipts derived from the sale or exchange of services: provided, that the
President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006,
raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has
been satisfied.

(i) value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous
year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%) or

(ii) national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-
half percent (1 ½%). (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners allege that the grant of the stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate is a
virtual abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not within the
purview of Section 28 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:

The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the government.

They argue that the VAT is a tax levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well
as on the sale or exchange of services, which cannot be included within the purview of tariffs under the
exempted delegation as the latter refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to
the government and usually imposed on goods or merchandise imported or exported.

Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., further contend that delegating to the President the
legislative power to tax is contrary to republicanism. They insist that accountability, responsibility and
transparency should dictate the actions of Congress and they should not pass to the President the
decision to impose taxes. They also argue that the law also effectively nullified the President’s power of
control, which includes the authority to set aside and nullify the acts of her subordinates like the Secretary
of Finance, by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance.

Petitioners Pimentel, et al. aver that the President has ample powers to cause, influence or create the
conditions provided by the law to bring about either or both the conditions precedent.

On the other hand, petitioners Escudero, et al. find bizarre and revolting the situation that the imposition
of the 12% rate would be subject to the whim of the Secretary of Finance, an unelected bureaucrat,
contrary to the principle of no taxation without representation. They submit that the Secretary of Finance
is not mandated to give a favorable recommendation and he may not even give his recommendation.
Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are provided in the law on what basis and as to how he
will make his recommendation. They claim, nonetheless, that any recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance can easily be brushed aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter,
such that, ultimately, it is the President who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not.

A brief discourse on the principle of non-delegation of powers is instructive.

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has
exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated
sphere.37 A logical

corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as

expressed in the Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest which means "what has been
delegated, cannot be delegated."38 This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such as delegated
power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality
of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.39

With respect to the Legislature, Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "the Legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives." The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly,
or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power, which can never be delegated, has
been described as the authority to make a complete law – complete as to the time when it shall take
effect and as to whom it shall be applicable – and to determine the expediency of its
enactment.40 Thus, the rule is that in order that a court may be justified in holding a statute
unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power, it must appear that the power involved is purely
legislative in nature – that is, one appertaining exclusively to the legislative department. It is the nature of
the power, and not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise, which determines the validity of its
delegation.

Nonetheless, the general rule barring delegation of legislative powers is subject to the following
recognized limitations or exceptions:

(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and

(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.

In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is
valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate;41 and (b) fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate
and determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. 42 A
sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected.43 Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority
to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power
essentially legislative.44

In People vs. Vera,45 the Court, through eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel, expounded on the concept and
extent of delegation of power in this wise:

In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to
inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.

...

‘The true distinction’, says Judge Ranney, ‘is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot
be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.’

...

It is contended, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after it leaves the hands
of the legislature. It is true that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation
of the executive or the adoption by the people of a particular community. In Wayman vs. Southard, the
Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the legislature may delegate a power not legislative which
it may itself rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be
delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or
conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process common to all
branches of the government. Notwithstanding the apparent tendency, however, to relax the rule
prohibiting delegation of legislative authority on account of the complexity arising from social and
economic forces at work in this modern industrial age, the orthodox pronouncement of Judge Cooley in
his work on Constitutional Limitations finds restatement in Prof. Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution
of the United States in the following language — speaking of declaration of legislative power to
administrative agencies: The principle which permits the legislature to provide that the
administrative agent may determine when the circumstances are such as require the application
of a law is defended upon the ground that at the time this authority is granted, the rule of public
policy, which is the essence of the legislative act, is determined by the legislature. In other words,
the legislature, as it is its duty to do, determines that, under given circumstances, certain
executive or administrative action is to be taken, and that, under other circumstances, different or
no action at all is to be taken. What is thus left to the administrative official is not the legislative
determination of what public policy demands, but simply the ascertainment of what the facts of
the case require to be done according to the terms of the law by which he is governed. The
efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative will must, of course, come from Congress, but
the ascertainment of the contingency upon which the Act shall take effect may be left to such
agencies as it may designate. The legislature, then, may provide that a law shall take effect upon
the happening of future specified contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power
to determine when the specified contingency has arisen. (Emphasis supplied).46

In Edu vs. Ericta,47 the Court reiterated:

What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal
them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the hands of
the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry
must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislative does not
abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the
scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may be the only way in which the legislative
process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to
make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which
constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to
be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can be made. The
Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility
and practicability. (Emphasis supplied).48

Clearly, the legislature may delegate to executive officers or bodies the power to determine certain facts
or conditions, or the happening of contingencies, on which the operation of a statute is, by its terms,
made to depend, but the legislature must prescribe sufficient standards, policies or limitations on their
authority.49 While the power to tax cannot be delegated to executive agencies, details as to the
enforcement and administration of an exercise of such power may be left to them, including the power to
determine the existence of facts on which its operation depends.50

The rationale for this is that the preliminary ascertainment of facts as basis for the enactment of
legislation is not of itself a legislative function, but is simply ancillary to legislation. Thus, the duty of
correlating information and making recommendations is the kind of subsidiary activity which the
legislature may perform through its members, or which it may delegate to others to perform. Intelligent
legislation on the complicated problems of modern society is impossible in the absence of accurate
information on the part of the legislators, and any reasonable method of securing such information is
proper.51 The Constitution as a continuously operative charter of government does not require that
Congress find for itself

every fact upon which it desires to base legislative action or that it make for itself detailed determinations
which it has declared to be prerequisite to application of legislative policy to particular facts and
circumstances impossible for Congress itself properly to investigate.52

In the present case, the challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and
6 which reads as follows:

That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1,
2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has
been satisfied:

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year
exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or

(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half
percent (1 ½%).

The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of
ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is
contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent
upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon
factual matters outside of the control of the executive.

No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that
the word shall is used in the common proviso. The use of the word shall connotes a mandatory order. Its
use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.53 Where
the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no
choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed.54

Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of
any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty which cannot be evaded by the President.
Inasmuch as the law specifically uses the word shall, the exercise of discretion by the President does not
come into play. It is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are
present. The time of taking into effect of the 12% VAT rate is based on the happening of a certain
specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a person or body other
than the legislature itself.

The Court finds no merit to the contention of petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al. that the law
effectively nullified the President’s power of control over the Secretary of Finance by mandating the fixing
of the tax rate by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance. The Court cannot
also subscribe to the position of petitioners

Pimentel, et al. that the word shall should be interpreted to mean may in view of the phrase "upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance." Neither does the Court find persuasive the submission of
petitioners Escudero, et al. that any recommendation by the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed
aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter.

When one speaks of the Secretary of Finance as the alter ego of the President, it simply means that as
head of the Department of Finance he is the assistant and agent of the Chief Executive. The multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, such as the Department of Finance,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by
the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. The Secretary of Finance, as such,
occupies a political position and holds office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas
Jefferson, "should be of the President's bosom confidence" and, in the language of Attorney-General
Cushing, is "subject to the direction of the President."55

In the present case, in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two
conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her
subordinate. In such instance, he is not subject to the power of control and direction of the President. He
is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its
expressed will is to take effect.56 The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which
legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather
data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to
gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions
laid out by Congress is present. His personality in such instance is in reality but a projection of that of
Congress. Thus, being the agent of Congress and not of the President, the President cannot alter or
modify or nullify, or set aside the findings of the Secretary of Finance and to substitute the judgment of
the former for that of the latter.

Congress simply granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact,
namely, whether by December 31, 2005, the value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (24/5%) or the national
government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent
(1½%). If either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by legislative mandate,
must submit such information to the President. Then the 12% VAT rate must be imposed by the President
effective January 1, 2006. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the
discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible.57 Congress does not
abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it,
and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which
the legislative process can go forward.58

As to the argument of petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al. that delegating to the President the
legislative power to tax is contrary to the principle of republicanism, the same deserves scant
consideration. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law. The
intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress and the task of the President is to
simply execute the legislative policy. That Congress chose to do so in such a manner is not within the
province of the Court to inquire into, its task being to interpret the law. 59

The insinuation by petitioners Pimentel, et al. that the President has ample powers to cause, influence or
create the conditions to bring about either or both the conditions precedent does not deserve any merit as
this argument is highly speculative. The Court does not rule on allegations which are manifestly
conjectural, as these may not exist at all. The Court deals with facts, not fancies; on realities, not
appearances. When the Court acts on appearances instead of realities, justice and law will be short-lived.

B. The 12% Increase VAT Rate Does Not Impose an Unfair and Unnecessary Additional Tax Burden

Petitioners Pimentel, et al. argue that the 12% increase in the VAT rate imposes an unfair and additional
tax burden on the people. Petitioners also argue that the 12% increase, dependent on any of the 2
conditions set forth in the contested provisions, is ambiguous because it does not state if the VAT rate
would be returned to the original 10% if the rates are no longer satisfied. Petitioners also argue that such
rate is unfair and unreasonable, as the people are unsure of the applicable VAT rate from year to year.

Under the common provisos of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, if any of the two conditions set forth
therein are satisfied, the President shall increase the VAT rate to 12%. The provisions of the law are
clear. It does not provide for a return to the 10% rate nor does it empower the President to so revert if,
after the rate is increased to 12%, the VAT collection goes below the 24/5 of the GDP of the previous year
or that the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year does not exceed
1½%.

Therefore, no statutory construction or interpretation is needed. Neither can conditions or limitations be

introduced where none is provided for. Rewriting the law is a forbidden ground that only Congress may
tread upon.60

Thus, in the absence of any provision providing for a return to the 10% rate, which in this case the Court
finds none, petitioners’ argument is, at best, purely speculative. There is no basis for petitioners’ fear of a
fluctuating VAT rate because the law itself does not provide that the rate should go back to 10% if the
conditions provided in Sections 4, 5 and 6 are no longer present. The rule is that where the provision of
the law is clear and unambiguous, so that there is no occasion for the court's seeking the legislative
intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. 61

Petitioners also contend that the increase in the VAT rate, which was allegedly an incentive to the
President to raise the VAT collection to at least 2 4/5 of the GDP of the previous year, should be based on
fiscal adequacy.

Petitioners obviously overlooked that increase in VAT collection is not the only condition. There is another
condition, i.e., the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one
and one-half percent (1 ½%).

Respondents explained the philosophy behind these alternative conditions:

1. VAT/GDP Ratio > 2.8%

The condition set for increasing VAT rate to 12% have economic or fiscal meaning. If VAT/GDP is less
than 2.8%, it means that government has weak or no capability of implementing the VAT or that VAT is
not effective in the function of the tax collection. Therefore, there is no value to increase it to 12%
because such action will also be ineffectual.

2. Nat’l Gov’t Deficit/GDP >1.5%

The condition set for increasing VAT when deficit/GDP is 1.5% or less means the fiscal condition of
government has reached a relatively sound position or is towards the direction of a balanced budget
position. Therefore, there is no need to increase the VAT rate since the fiscal house is in a relatively
healthy position. Otherwise stated, if the ratio is more than 1.5%, there is indeed a need to increase the
VAT rate.62

That the first condition amounts to an incentive to the President to increase the VAT collection does not
render it unconstitutional so long as there is a public purpose for which the law was passed, which in this
case, is mainly to raise revenue. In fact, fiscal adequacy dictated the need for a raise in revenue.

The principle of fiscal adequacy as a characteristic of a sound tax system was originally stated by Adam
Smith in his Canons of Taxation (1776), as:

IV. Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets of the people as
little as possible over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the state.63

It simply means that sources of revenues must be adequate to meet government expenditures and their
variations.64

The dire need for revenue cannot be ignored. Our country is in a quagmire of financial woe. During the
Bicameral Conference Committee hearing, then Finance Secretary Purisima bluntly depicted the
country’s gloomy state of economic affairs, thus:

First, let me explain the position that the Philippines finds itself in right now. We are in a position where 90
percent of our revenue is used for debt service. So, for every peso of revenue that we currently raise, 90
goes to debt service. That’s interest plus amortization of our debt. So clearly, this is not a sustainable
situation. That’s the first fact.

The second fact is that our debt to GDP level is way out of line compared to other peer countries that
borrow money from that international financial markets. Our debt to GDP is approximately equal to our
GDP. Again, that shows you that this is not a sustainable situation.

The third thing that I’d like to point out is the environment that we are presently operating in is not as
benign as what it used to be the past five years.

What do I mean by that?

In the past five years, we’ve been lucky because we were operating in a period of basically global growth
and low interest rates. The past few months, we have seen an inching up, in fact, a rapid increase in the
interest rates in the leading economies of the world. And, therefore, our ability to borrow at reasonable
prices is going to be challenged. In fact, ultimately, the question is our ability to access the financial
markets.

When the President made her speech in July last year, the environment was not as bad as it is now, at
least based on the forecast of most financial institutions. So, we were assuming that raising 80 billion
would put us in a position where we can then convince them to improve our ability to borrow at lower
rates. But conditions have changed on us because the interest rates have gone up. In fact, just within this
room, we tried to access the market for a billion dollars because for this year alone, the Philippines will
have to borrow 4 billion dollars. Of that amount, we have borrowed 1.5 billion. We issued last January a
25-year bond at 9.7 percent cost. We were trying to access last week and the market was not as
favorable and up to now we have not accessed and we might pull back because the conditions are not
very good.

So given this situation, we at the Department of Finance believe that we really need to front-end our
deficit reduction. Because it is deficit that is causing the increase of the debt and we are in what we call a
debt spiral. The more debt you have, the more deficit you have because interest and debt service eats
and eats more of your revenue. We need to get out of this debt spiral. And the only way, I think, we can
get out of this debt spiral is really have a front-end adjustment in our revenue base.65

The image portrayed is chilling. Congress passed the law hoping for rescue from an inevitable
catastrophe. Whether the law is indeed sufficient to answer the state’s economic dilemma is not for the
Court to judge. In the Fariñas case, the Court refused to consider the various arguments raised therein
that dwelt on the wisdom of Section 14 of R.A. No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), pronouncing that:

. . . policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of
the political branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of
legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound
economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the
legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for
the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within
the range of judicial cognizance.66

In the same vein, the Court in this case will not dawdle on the purpose of Congress or the executive
policy, given that it is not for the judiciary to "pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation."67

II.

Whether Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110(A)(2) and 110(B) of the NIRC; and Section
12 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 114(C) of the NIRC, violate the following provisions of the
Constitution:

a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and

b. Article III, Section 1

A. Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses

Petitioners Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al. argue that Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337,
amending Sections 110 (A)(2), 110 (B), and Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 114 (C) of
the NIRC are arbitrary, oppressive, excessive and confiscatory. Their argument is premised on the
constitutional right against deprivation of life, liberty of property without due process of law, as embodied
in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.

Petitioners also contend that these provisions violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of
the law.
The doctrine is that where the due process and equal protection clauses are invoked, considering that
they are not fixed rules but rather broad standards, there is a need for proof of such persuasive character
as would lead to such a conclusion. Absent such a showing, the presumption of validity must prevail. 68

Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 110(B) of the NIRC imposes a limitation on the amount of
input tax that may be credited against the output tax. It states, in part: "[P]rovided, that the input tax
inclusive of the input VAT carried over from the previous quarter that may be credited in every quarter
shall not exceed seventy percent (70%) of the output VAT: …"

Input Tax is defined under Section 110(A) of the NIRC, as amended, as the value-added tax
due from or paid by a VAT-registered person on the importation of goods or local purchase of good and
services, including lease or use of property, in the course of trade or business, from a VAT-registered
person, and Output Tax is the value-added tax due on the sale or lease of taxable goods or properties or
services by any person registered or required to register under the law.

Petitioners claim that the contested sections impose limitations on the amount of input tax that may be
claimed. In effect, a portion of the input tax that has already been paid cannot now be credited against the
output tax.

Petitioners’ argument is not absolute. It assumes that the input tax exceeds 70% of the output tax, and
therefore, the input tax in excess of 70% remains uncredited. However, to the extent that the input tax is
less than 70% of the output tax, then 100% of such input tax is still creditable.

More importantly, the excess input tax, if any, is retained in a business’s books of accounts and remains
creditable in the succeeding quarter/s. This is explicitly allowed by Section 110(B), which provides that "if
the input tax exceeds the output tax, the excess shall be carried over to the succeeding quarter or
quarters." In addition, Section 112(B) allows a VAT-registered person to apply for the issuance of a tax
credit certificate or refund for any unused input taxes, to the extent that such input taxes have not been
applied against the output taxes. Such unused input tax may be used in payment of his other internal
revenue taxes.

The non-application of the unutilized input tax in a given quarter is not ad infinitum, as petitioners
exaggeratedly contend. Their analysis of the effect of the 70% limitation is incomplete and one-sided. It
ends at the net effect that there will be unapplied/unutilized inputs VAT for a given quarter. It does not
proceed further to the fact that such unapplied/unutilized input tax may be credited in the subsequent
periods as allowed by the carry-over provision of Section 110(B) or that it may later on be refunded
through a tax credit certificate under Section 112(B).

Therefore, petitioners’ argument must be rejected.

On the other hand, it appears that petitioner Garcia failed to comprehend the operation of the 70%
limitation on the input tax. According to petitioner, the limitation on the creditable input tax in effect allows
VAT-registered establishments to retain a portion of the taxes they collect, which violates the principle
that tax collection and revenue should be for public purposes and expenditures

As earlier stated, the input tax is the tax paid by a person, passed on to him by the seller, when he buys
goods. Output tax meanwhile is the tax due to the person when he sells goods. In computing the VAT
payable, three possible scenarios may arise:

First, if at the end of a taxable quarter the output taxes charged by the seller are equal to the input taxes
that he paid and passed on by the suppliers, then no payment is required;
Second, when the output taxes exceed the input taxes, the person shall be liable for the excess, which
has to be paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR);69 and

Third, if the input taxes exceed the output taxes, the excess shall be carried over to the succeeding
quarter or quarters. Should the input taxes result from zero-rated or effectively zero-rated transactions,
any excess over the output taxes shall instead be refunded to the taxpayer or credited against other
internal revenue taxes, at the taxpayer’s option.70

Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337 however, imposed a 70% limitation on the input tax. Thus, a person can credit
his input tax only up to the extent of 70% of the output tax. In layman’s term, the value-added taxes that a
person/taxpayer paid and passed on to him by a seller can only be credited up to 70% of the value-added
taxes that is due to him on a taxable transaction. There is no retention of any tax collection because the
person/taxpayer has already previously paid the input tax to a seller, and the seller will subsequently
remit such input tax to the BIR. The party directly liable for the payment of the tax is the seller. 71 What
only needs to be done is for the person/taxpayer to apply or credit these input taxes, as evidenced by
receipts, against his output taxes.

Petitioners Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al. also argue that the input tax partakes the
nature of a property that may not be confiscated, appropriated, or limited without due process of law.

The input tax is not a property or a property right within the constitutional purview of the due process
clause. A VAT-registered person’s entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere statutory privilege.

The distinction between statutory privileges and vested rights must be borne in mind for persons have no
vested rights in statutory privileges. The state may change or take away rights, which were created by the
law of the state, although it may not take away property, which was vested by virtue of such rights. 72

Under the previous system of single-stage taxation, taxes paid at every level of distribution are not
recoverable from the taxes payable, although it becomes part of the cost, which is deductible from the
gross revenue. When Pres. Aquino issued E.O. No. 273 imposing a 10% multi-stage tax on all sales, it
was then that the crediting of the input tax paid on purchase or importation of goods and services by VAT-
registered persons against the output tax was introduced.73 This was adopted by the Expanded VAT Law
(R.A. No. 7716),74 and The Tax Reform Act of 1997 (R.A. No. 8424).75 The right to credit input tax as
against the output tax is clearly a privilege created by law, a privilege that also the law can remove, or in
this case, limit.

Petitioners also contest as arbitrary, oppressive, excessive and confiscatory, Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337,
amending Section 110(A) of the NIRC, which provides:

SEC. 110. Tax Credits. –

(A) Creditable Input Tax. – …

Provided, That the input tax on goods purchased or imported in a calendar month for use in trade or
business for which deduction for depreciation is allowed under this Code, shall be spread evenly over the
month of acquisition and the fifty-nine (59) succeeding months if the aggregate acquisition cost for such
goods, excluding the VAT component thereof, exceeds One million pesos (₱1,000,000.00): Provided,
however, That if the estimated useful life of the capital goods is less than five (5) years, as used for
depreciation purposes, then the input VAT shall be spread over such a shorter period: Provided, finally,
That in the case of purchase of services, lease or use of properties, the input tax shall be creditable to the
purchaser, lessee or license upon payment of the compensation, rental, royalty or fee.
The foregoing section imposes a 60-month period within which to amortize the creditable input tax on
purchase or importation of capital goods with acquisition cost of ₱1 Million pesos, exclusive of the VAT
component. Such spread out only poses a delay in the crediting of the input tax. Petitioners’ argument is
without basis because the taxpayer is not permanently deprived of his privilege to credit the input tax.

It is worth mentioning that Congress admitted that the spread-out of the creditable input tax in this case
amounts to a 4-year interest-free loan to the government.76 In the same breath, Congress also justified its
move by saying that the provision was designed to raise an annual revenue of 22.6 billion.77 The
legislature also dispelled the fear that the provision will fend off foreign investments, saying that foreign
investors have other tax incentives provided by law, and citing the case of China, where despite a 17.5%
non-creditable VAT, foreign investments were not deterred.78 Again, for whatever is the purpose of the
60-month amortization, this involves executive economic policy and legislative wisdom in which the Court
cannot intervene.

With regard to the 5% creditable withholding tax imposed on payments made by the government for
taxable transactions, Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, which amended Section 114 of the NIRC, reads:

SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax. –

(C) Withholding of Value-added Tax. – The Government or any of its political subdivisions,
instrumentalities or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) shall,
before making payment on account of each purchase of goods and services which are subject to the
value-added tax imposed in Sections 106 and 108 of this Code, deduct and withhold a final value-added
tax at the rate of five percent (5%) of the gross payment thereof: Provided, That the payment for lease or
use of properties or property rights to nonresident owners shall be subject to ten percent (10%)
withholding tax at the time of payment. For purposes of this Section, the payor or person in control of the
payment shall be considered as the withholding agent.

The value-added tax withheld under this Section shall be remitted within ten (10) days following the end
of the month the withholding was made.

Section 114(C) merely provides a method of collection, or as stated by respondents, a more simplified
VAT withholding system. The government in this case is constituted as a withholding agent with respect
to their payments for goods and services.

Prior to its amendment, Section 114(C) provided for different rates of value-added taxes to be withheld --
3% on gross payments for purchases of goods; 6% on gross payments for services supplied by
contractors other than by public works contractors; 8.5% on gross payments for services supplied by
public work contractors; or 10% on payment for the lease or use of properties or property rights to
nonresident owners. Under the present Section 114(C), these different rates, except for the 10% on lease
or property rights payment to nonresidents, were deleted, and a uniform rate of 5% is applied.

The Court observes, however, that the law the used the word final. In tax usage, final, as opposed to
creditable, means full. Thus, it is provided in Section 114(C): "final value-added tax at the rate of five
percent (5%)."

In Revenue Regulations No. 02-98, implementing R.A. No. 8424 (The Tax Reform Act of 1997), the
concept of final withholding tax on income was explained, to wit:

SECTION 2.57. Withholding of Tax at Source

(A) Final Withholding Tax. – Under the final withholding tax system the amount of income tax withheld by
the withholding agent is constituted as full and final payment of the income tax due from the payee on
the said income. The liability for payment of the tax rests primarily on the payor as a withholding agent.
Thus, in case of his failure to withhold the tax or in case of underwithholding, the deficiency tax shall be
collected from the payor/withholding agent. …

(B) Creditable Withholding Tax. – Under the creditable withholding tax system, taxes withheld on certain
income payments are intended to equal or at least approximate the tax due of the payee on said income.
… Taxes withheld on income payments covered by the expanded withholding tax (referred to in Sec.
2.57.2 of these regulations) and compensation income (referred to in Sec. 2.78 also of these regulations)
are creditable in nature.

As applied to value-added tax, this means that taxable transactions with the government are subject to a
5% rate, which constitutes as full payment of the tax payable on the transaction. This represents the net
VAT payable of the seller. The other 5% effectively accounts for the standard input VAT (deemed input
VAT), in lieu of the actual input VAT directly or attributable to the taxable transaction.79

The Court need not explore the rationale behind the provision. It is clear that Congress intended to treat
differently taxable transactions with the government.80 This is supported by the fact that under the old
provision, the 5% tax withheld by the government remains creditable against the tax liability of the seller
or contractor, to wit:

SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax. –

(C) Withholding of Creditable Value-added Tax. – The Government or any of its political subdivisions,
instrumentalities or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) shall,
before making payment on account of each purchase of goods from sellers and services rendered by
contractors which are subject to the value-added tax imposed in Sections 106 and 108 of this Code,
deduct and withhold the value-added tax due at the rate of three percent (3%) of the gross payment for
the purchase of goods and six percent (6%) on gross receipts for services rendered by contractors on
every sale or installment payment which shall be creditable against the value-added tax liability of the
seller or contractor: Provided, however, That in the case of government public works contractors, the
withholding rate shall be eight and one-half percent (8.5%): Provided, further, That the payment for lease
or use of properties or property rights to nonresident owners shall be subject to ten percent (10%)
withholding tax at the time of payment. For this purpose, the payor or person in control of the payment
shall be considered as the withholding agent.

The valued-added tax withheld under this Section shall be remitted within ten (10) days following the end
of the month the withholding was made. (Emphasis supplied)

As amended, the use of the word final and the deletion of the word creditable exhibits Congress’s
intention to treat transactions with the government differently. Since it has not been shown that the class
subject to the 5% final withholding tax has been unreasonably narrowed, there is no reason to invalidate
the provision. Petitioners, as petroleum dealers, are not the only ones subjected to the 5% final
withholding tax. It applies to all those who deal with the government.

Moreover, the actual input tax is not totally lost or uncreditable, as petitioners believe. Revenue
Regulations No. 14-2005 or the Consolidated Value-Added Tax Regulations 2005 issued by the BIR,
provides that should the actual input tax exceed 5% of gross payments, the excess may form part of the
cost. Equally, should the actual input tax be less than 5%, the difference is treated as income.81

Petitioners also argue that by imposing a limitation on the creditable input tax, the government gets to tax
a profit or value-added even if there is no profit or value-added.

Petitioners’ stance is purely hypothetical, argumentative, and again, one-sided. The Court will not engage
in a legal joust where premises are what ifs, arguments, theoretical and facts, uncertain. Any disquisition
by the Court on this point will only be, as Shakespeare describes life in Macbeth,82 "full of sound and fury,
signifying nothing."

What’s more, petitioners’ contention assumes the proposition that there is no profit or value-added. It
need not take an astute businessman to know that it is a matter of exception that a business will sell
goods or services without profit or value-added. It cannot be overstressed that a business is created
precisely for profit.

The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that "no person or class of persons shall be
deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same
place and in like circumstances."83

The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has
long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be
levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the State’s
power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power
absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness. 84

Petitioners point out that the limitation on the creditable input tax if the entity has a high ratio of input tax,
or invests in capital equipment, or has several transactions with the government, is not based on real and
substantial differences to meet a valid classification.

The argument is pedantic, if not outright baseless. The law does not make any classification in the subject
of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied or the amounts to be raised, the methods of
assessment, valuation and collection. Petitioners’ alleged distinctions are based on variables that bear
different consequences. While the implementation of the law may yield varying end results depending on
one’s profit margin and value-added, the Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down and
interfere with the affairs of business.

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things
without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection. What the clause requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in
these same particulars.85

Petitioners brought to the Court’s attention the introduction of Senate Bill No. 2038 by Sens. S.R.
Osmeña III and Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. – Madrigal on June 6, 2005, and House Bill No. 4493 by Rep.
Eric D. Singson. The proposed legislation seeks to amend the 70% limitation by increasing the same to
90%. This, according to petitioners, supports their stance that the 70% limitation is arbitrary and
confiscatory. On this score, suffice it to say that these are still proposed legislations. Until Congress
amends the law, and absent any unequivocal basis for its unconstitutionality, the 70% limitation stays.

B. Uniformity and Equitability of Taxation

Article VI, Section 28(1) of the Constitution reads:

The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation.

Uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed
at the same rate. Different articles may be taxed at different amounts provided that the rate is uniform on
the same class everywhere with all people at all times.86
In this case, the tax law is uniform as it provides a standard rate of 0% or 10% (or 12%) on all goods and
services. Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the
NIRC, provide for a rate of 10% (or 12%) on sale of goods and properties, importation of goods, and sale
of services and use or lease of properties. These same sections also provide for a 0% rate on certain
sales and transaction.

Neither does the law make any distinction as to the type of industry or trade that will bear the 70%
limitation on the creditable input tax, 5-year amortization of input tax paid on purchase of capital goods or
the 5% final withholding tax by the government. It must be stressed that the rule of uniform taxation does
not deprive Congress of the power to classify subjects of taxation, and only demands uniformity within the
particular class.87

R.A. No. 9337 is also equitable. The law is equipped with a threshold margin. The VAT rate of 0% or 10%
(or 12%) does not apply to sales of goods or services with gross annual sales or receipts not exceeding
₱1,500,000.00.88Also, basic marine and agricultural food products in their original state are still not
subject to the tax,89 thus ensuring that prices at the grassroots level will remain accessible. As was stated
in Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. vs. Tan:90

The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of goods or services by persons
engaged in business with an aggregate gross annual sales exceeding ₱200,000.00. Small corner sari-
sari stores are consequently exempt from its application. Likewise exempt from the tax are sales of farm
and marine products, so that the costs of basic food and other necessities, spared as they are from the
incidence of the VAT, are expected to be relatively lower and within the reach of the general public.

It is admitted that R.A. No. 9337 puts a premium on businesses with low profit margins, and unduly favors
those with high profit margins. Congress was not oblivious to this. Thus, to equalize the weighty burden
the law entails, the law, under Section 116, imposed a 3% percentage tax on VAT-exempt persons under
Section 109(v), i.e., transactions with gross annual sales and/or receipts not exceeding ₱1.5 Million. This
acts as a equalizer because in effect, bigger businesses that qualify for VAT coverage and VAT-exempt
taxpayers stand on equal-footing.

Moreover, Congress provided mitigating measures to cushion the impact of the imposition of the tax on
those previously exempt. Excise taxes on petroleum products 91 and natural gas92 were reduced.
Percentage tax on domestic carriers was removed.93 Power producers are now exempt from paying
franchise tax.94

Aside from these, Congress also increased the income tax rates of corporations, in order to distribute the
burden of taxation. Domestic, foreign, and non-resident corporations are now subject to a 35% income
tax rate, from a previous 32%.95 Intercorporate dividends of non-resident foreign corporations are still
subject to 15% final withholding tax but the tax credit allowed on the corporation’s domicile was increased
to 20%.96 The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is not exempt from income
taxes anymore.97 Even the sale by an artist of his works or services performed for the production of such
works was not spared.

All these were designed to ease, as well as spread out, the burden of taxation, which would otherwise
rest largely on the consumers. It cannot therefore be gainsaid that R.A. No. 9337 is equitable.

C. Progressivity of Taxation

Lastly, petitioners contend that the limitation on the creditable input tax is anything but regressive. It is the
smaller business with higher input tax-output tax ratio that will suffer the consequences.

Progressive taxation is built on the principle of the taxpayer’s ability to pay. This principle was also lifted
from Adam Smith’s Canons of Taxation, and it states:
I. The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as
possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they
respectively enjoy under the protection of the state.

Taxation is progressive when its rate goes up depending on the resources of the person affected.98

The VAT is an antithesis of progressive taxation. By its very nature, it is regressive. The principle of
progressive taxation has no relation with the VAT system inasmuch as the VAT paid by the consumer or
business for every goods bought or services enjoyed is the same regardless of income. In

other words, the VAT paid eats the same portion of an income, whether big or small. The disparity lies in
the income earned by a person or profit margin marked by a business, such that the higher the income or
profit margin, the smaller the portion of the income or profit that is eaten by VAT. A converso, the lower
the income or profit margin, the bigger the part that the VAT eats away. At the end of the day, it is really
the lower income group or businesses with low-profit margins that is always hardest hit.

Nevertheless, the Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes, like the VAT. What
it simply provides is that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation." The Court stated in
the Tolentino case, thus:

The Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are
regressive. What it simply provides is that Congress shall ‘evolve a progressive system of taxation.’ The
constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean simply that ‘direct taxes are . . . to be preferred
[and] as much as possible, indirect taxes should be minimized.’ (E. FERNANDO, THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE PHILIPPINES 221 (Second ed. 1977)) Indeed, the mandate to Congress is not to prescribe, but
to evolve, a progressive tax system. Otherwise, sales taxes, which perhaps are the oldest form of indirect
taxes, would have been prohibited with the proclamation of Art. VIII, §17 (1) of the 1973 Constitution from
which the present Art. VI, §28 (1) was taken. Sales taxes are also regressive.

Resort to indirect taxes should be minimized but not avoided entirely because it is difficult, if not
impossible, to avoid them by imposing such taxes according to the taxpayers' ability to pay. In the case of
the VAT, the law minimizes the regressive effects of this imposition by providing for zero rating of certain
transactions (R.A. No. 7716, §3, amending §102 (b) of the NIRC), while granting exemptions to other
transactions. (R.A. No. 7716, §4 amending §103 of the NIRC) 99

CONCLUSION

It has been said that taxes are the lifeblood of the government. In this case, it is just an enema, a first-aid
measure to resuscitate an economy in distress. The Court is neither blind nor is it turning a deaf ear on
the plight of the masses. But it does not have the panacea for the malady that the law seeks to remedy.
As in other cases, the Court cannot strike down a law as unconstitutional simply because of its yokes.

Let us not be overly influenced by the plea that for every wrong there is a remedy, and that the judiciary
should stand ready to afford relief. There are undoubtedly many wrongs the judicature may not correct,
for instance, those involving political questions. . . .

Let us likewise disabuse our minds from the notion that the judiciary is the repository of remedies for all
political or social ills; We should not forget that the Constitution has judiciously allocated the powers of
government to three distinct and separate compartments; and that judicial interpretation has tended to the
preservation of the independence of the three, and a zealous regard of the prerogatives of each, knowing
full well that one is not the guardian of the others and that, for official wrong-doing, each may be brought
to account, either by impeachment, trial or by the ballot box.100
The words of the Court in Vera vs. Avelino101 holds true then, as it still holds true now. All things
considered, there is no raison d'être for the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9337.

WHEREFORE, Republic Act No. 9337 not being unconstitutional, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 168056,
168207, 168461, 168463, and 168730, are hereby DISMISSED.

There being no constitutional impediment to the full enforcement and implementation of R.A. No. 9337,
the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on July 1, 2005 is LIFTED upon finality of herein
decision.

SO ORDERED.

Social Justice Society v. DDB and PDEA

G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner

vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY
(PDEA), respondents.

x-----------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 158633 November 3, 2008

ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., petitioner

vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, respondents.

x-----------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 161658 November 3, 2008

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioner

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing
of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of
public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses,
among other personalities, is put in issue.

As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:

 SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government
forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the
DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among
others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well
as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x
x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:

xxxx

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall,
pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and
with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and employees of public and
private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test
as contained in the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk
in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt
with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the
provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

xxxx

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory
drug test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs
use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.

G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)

On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486,
prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in
connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the
said resolution read as follows:

WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - x x x

xxxx

(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local government shall undergo a
mandatory drug test.

WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency;
 WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the public will know the
quality of candidates they are electing and they will be assured that only those who can serve
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency would be elected x x x.

NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested in it under the
Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other election
laws, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the following rules and regulations on
the conduct of mandatory drug testing to candidates for public office[:]

SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates for public office, both national and local, in the May
10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in
government forensic laboratories or any drug testing laboratories monitored and accredited by the
Department of Health.

SEC. 3. x x x

On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their respective offices, the
Comelec Offices and employees concerned shall submit to the Law Department two (2) separate
lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the
mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply x
x x.

SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates. - Before the start of the campaign
period, the [COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist
of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist
of those candidates who failed to comply with said drug test. x x x

SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test certificate. - No person
elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test and filed with the offices enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test
certificate herein required. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re - election in the May
10, 2004 elections,1filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already
provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No.
6486.

Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural - born citizen of the Philippines,
and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty - five years of age, able to read and write, a
registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately
preceding the day of the election.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be
a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and
COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other
candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for
senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution
authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for
senator.
 G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political
party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are
constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they
give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another,
the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or
an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person's constitutional right against unreasonable
searches is also breached by said provisions.

G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous

Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional
for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and
the right against self - incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection
guarantees.

The Issue on Locus Standi

First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the matter of the standing of
petitioners SJS and Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna failed to
allege any incident amounting to a violation of the constitutional rights mentioned in their separate
petitions.2

It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona
fide controversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed.3 But even with the presence of an
actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional
question is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge it. 4 To have standing,
one must establish that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.5

The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non - traditional
plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest.6 There is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and candidate for the May
10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing since he has substantial interests in the subject
matter of the petition, among other preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this Court is
wont to relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the paramount
public interest involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.

The Consolidated Issues

The principal issues before us are as follows:

(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution? and
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these
paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the
equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative power?

Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally
impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions
on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3,
Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5)
residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any
other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The
Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard,
evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate,7 or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby
declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all
laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. 8 In the discharge of their
defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the
commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.9

Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as
1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in
the following wise:

Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the
boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as
governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are
limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department
can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers. The
Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative enactment
may dash, but over which it cannot leap.10

Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional
limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of
legislation.11 The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights 12 and other
provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for
senators.

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates
for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for
senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The
right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions
of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.13

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively
enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched,
said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal - drug clean, obviously
as a pre - condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a
condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator - elect. The COMELEC
resolution completes the chain with the proviso that "[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter
upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test." Viewed, therefore, in its proper
context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification
layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or
not the drug - free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is
really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non -
compliance with the drug - testing requirement.

It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not
expressly state that non - compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work
to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the drug test
requirement is optional. But the particular section of the law, without exception, made drug - testing on
those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse
consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And since the provision deals with candidates
for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and
revolve around the election and the assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other construal
would reduce the mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and
effect whatsoever.

While it is anti - climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer
enforceable, for by its terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and
the candidates running in that electoral event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it
appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity as an implementing issuance.

It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is
rooted on its having infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility
requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.

SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)

The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level
students and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless
arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process "the well being of
[the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs." This statutory purpose,
per the policy - declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via the pursuit by the state of "an intensive
and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated
system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti - drug abuse policies, programs and
projects."14 The primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal
drug use as a result of this random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be
exempt from criminal liability should the illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and
55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point:

Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and

Rehabilitation. - A drug dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of this Act may, by
himself/herself or through his/her parent, [close relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x x for
treatment and rehabilitation of the drug dependency. Upon such application, the Board shall bring
forth the matter to the Court which shall order that the applicant be examined for drug
dependency. If the examination x x x results in the certification that the applicant is a drug
dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and rehabilitation in a
Center designated by the Board x x x.

xxxx
 Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission Program. - A drug
dependent under the voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged from confinement,
shall be exempt from the criminal liability under Section 15 of this Act subject to the following
conditions:

xxxx

School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the physical, psychological, and
addictive effects of drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the young are more critically impaired by
intoxicants and are more inclined to drug dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly low rate.15

The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by
the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure16 under Sec. 2, Art. III17 of the Constitution. But
while the right to privacy has long come into its own, this case appears to be the first time that the validity
of a state - decreed search or intrusion through the medium of mandatory random drug testing among
students and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these
proceedings is veritably one of first impression.

US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With respect to random drug
testing among school children, we turn to the teachings of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton
(Vernonia) and Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al.
v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education),18 both fairly pertinent US Supreme Court - decided cases involving
the constitutionality of governmental search.

In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address the drug menace in their
respective institutions following the discovery of frequent drug use by school athletes. After consultation
with the parents, they required random urinalysis drug testing for the school's athletes. James Acton, a
high school student, was denied participation in the football program after he refused to undertake the
urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming that the school's drug testing policy violated, inter
alia, the Fourth Amendment19 of the US Constitution.

The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised in Vernonia, considered the
following: (1) schools stand in loco parentis over their students; (2) school children, while not shedding
their constitutional rights at the school gate, have less privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights
than non - athletes since the former observe communal undress before and after sports events; (4) by
joining the sports activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected themselves to a higher degree of school
supervision and regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not invade a student's privacy since a
student need not undress for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is need for the drug testing because
of the dangerous effects of illegal drugs on the young. The US Supreme Court held that the policy
constituted reasonable search under the Fourth20 and 14th Amendments and declared the random drug -
testing policy constitutional.

In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test
for high school students desiring to join extra - curricular activities. Lindsay Earls, a member of the show
choir, marching band, and academic team declined to undergo a drug test and averred that the drug -
testing policy made to apply to non - athletes violated the Fourth and 14th Amendments. As Earls argued,
unlike athletes who routinely undergo physical examinations and undress before their peers in locker
rooms, non - athletes are entitled to more privacy.

The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug testing even among non -
athletes on the basis of the school's custodial responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said court made no
distinction between a non - athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and teachers act in place of
the parents with a similar interest and duty of safeguarding the health of the students. And in holding that
the school could implement its random drug - testing policy, the Court hinted that such a test was a kind
of search in which even a reasonable parent might need to engage.

In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this jurisdiction are:
(1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor
students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of
their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the
health and well - being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary
to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission
that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.

Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of
RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional.
Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission,
compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not
absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.

The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the
well - being of the people,21 particularly the youth and school children who usually end up as victims.
Accordingly, and until a more effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing
of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the
safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be
promoted and protected. To borrow from Vernonia, "[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren is
as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation's laws against the importation of drugs"; the
necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug - infested school are visited
not just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty. 22 Needless to stress, the random
testing scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that the testing aims to incriminate
unsuspecting individual students.

Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test
prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable,
albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than
saying that "subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an
unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy,"23 has failed to show how the mandatory, random,
and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and
constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the
Constitution.24 Petitioner Laserna's lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not
merit serious consideration. Consider what he wrote without elaboration:

The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made various rulings on the
constitutionality of mandatory drug tests in the school and the workplaces. The US courts have
been consistent in their rulings that the mandatory drug tests violate a citizen's constitutional right
to privacy and right against unreasonable search and seizure. They are quoted extensively
hereinbelow.25

The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.26 In context, the right to privacy means the right to be
free from unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from intrusion into one's private activities in such a
way as to cause humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities. 27 And while there has been general
agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, "translation of the
abstract prohibition against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures' into workable broad guidelines for the
decision of particular cases is a difficult task," to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court.28 Authorities
are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to
the state's exercise of police power.29
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held,
"reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion.30 And whether a
search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government -
mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state
interest.31 In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be personally
determined by a judge. Given that the drug - testing policy for employees--and students for that matter--
under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what was referred to in Vernonia as
"swift and informal disciplinary procedures," the probable - cause standard is not required or even
practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged
administrative search in question.

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which
the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes.
In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of
the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an
office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective bargaining
agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the
employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated
office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.

Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law.
Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated
in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"? 32

The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules
and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation
that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating experience. While every
officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may
be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to
discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be
observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing
that the employees concerned shall be subjected to "random drug test as contained in the company's
work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place."

For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much
as possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the
procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless
to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration
lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access - controlled laboratories
monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an
accurate chain of custody.33 In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug
results shall be on the "need to know" basis;34 that the "drug test result and the records shall be [kept]
confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test
results."35 Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting
agencies any information or evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the
employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against
embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.

To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus protect
the well - being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The
law intends to achieve this through the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a
national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory random drug test. 36 To the Court, the need
for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individual's
privacy interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across
gender, age group, and social - economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the sale,
manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would be an investor's dream were it
not for the illegal and immoral components of any of such activities. The drug problem has hardly abated
since the martial law public execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid
back stance with respect to this modern - day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory
random drug test to be an effective way of preventing and deterring drug use among employees in private
offices, the threat of detection by random testing being higher than other modes. The Court holds that the
chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the
employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well - defined limits set
forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the
challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
constitutional.

Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under
reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public
officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. 37 And if RA 9165 passes
the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil
servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and
to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.38

Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the ground of undue delegation
of power hardly commends itself for concurrence. Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not
so extensively drawn as to give unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the manner of
drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools
and officers/employees of public/private offices should be conducted. It enumerates the persons who
shall undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in accordance with the school
rules as contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of officers/employees,
the testing shall take into account the company's work rules. In either case, the random procedure shall
be observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an
unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the
test results are established.

Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in consultation with the DOH,
Department of the Interior and Local Government, Department of Education, and Department of Labor
and Employment, among other agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then, the
participation of schools and offices in the drug testing scheme shall always be subject to the IRR of RA
9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and employers have unchecked discretion to determine
how often, under what conditions, and where the drug tests shall be conducted.

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the constitutional landscape. 39 In the
face of the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the increasing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power,
or entrusting to administrative agencies the power of subordinate legislation, has become imperative, as
here.

Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],

[f], and [g] of RA 9165)

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for
mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability
of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver
by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily
submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public
employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office
with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative
concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of persons
charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or
suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.
When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded
against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office
and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to
the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.40 To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused
is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated
objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed
under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to
incriminate themselves.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY
GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165
CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are,
accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g)of RA 9165. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cordora v. Comelec

G.R. No. 176947 February 19, 2009

GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and GUSTAVO S. TAMBUNTING, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

In EO Case No. 05-17, Gaudencio M. Cordora (Cordora) accused Gustavo S. Tambunting (Tambunting)
of an election offense for violating Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) En Banc dismissed Cordora’s complaint in a
Resolution1 dated 18 August 2006. The present petition seeks to reverse the 18 August 2006 Resolution
as well as the Resolution2 dated 20 February 2007 of the COMELEC En Banc which denied Cordora’s
motion for reconsideration.
 The Facts

In his complaint affidavit filed before the COMELEC Law Department, Cordora asserted that Tambunting
made false assertions in the following items:

That Annex A [Tambunting’s Certificate of Candidacy for the 2001 elections] and Annex B [Tambunting’s
Certificate of Candidacy for the 2004 elections] state, among others, as follows, particularly Nos. 6, 9 and
12 thereof:

1. No. 6 – I am a Natural Born/Filipino Citizen

2. No. 9 – No. of years of Residence before May 14, 2001.

36 in the Philippines and 25 in the Constituency where I seek to be elected;

3. No. 12 – I am ELIGIBLE for the office I seek to be elected.3 (Boldface and capitalization in the
original)

Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office because Tambunting lacked
the required citizenship and residency requirements.

To disprove Tambunting’s claim of being a natural-born Filipino citizen, Cordora presented a certification
from the Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an
American: upon arrival in the Philippines on 16 December 2000 and upon departure from the Philippines
on 17 June 2001. According to Cordora, these travel dates confirmed that Tambunting acquired American
citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii on 2 December 2000. Cordora concluded:

That Councilor Gustavo S. Tambunting contrary to the provision of Sec 74 (OEC): [sic] Re: CONTENTS
OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY: which requires the declarant/affiant to state, among others, under
oath, that he is a Filipino (No. 6), No. 9- residence requirement which he lost when [he was]
naturalized as an American Citizen on December 2, 2000 at [sic] Honolulu, Hawaii, knowingly and
willfully affirmed and reiterated that he possesses the above basic requirements under No. 12 – that
he is indeed eligible for the office to which he seeks to be elected, when in truth and in fact, the
contrary is indubitably established by his own statements before the Philippine Bureau of Immigration x
x x.4 (Emphases in the original)

Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make any misrepresentation in his certificates
of candidacy. To refute Cordora’s claim that Tambunting is not a natural-born Filipino, Tambunting
presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed that he was born of a Filipino mother and an
American father. Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an American citizen. The
certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government after Tambunting’s father petitioned him through
INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) merely confirmed Tambunting’s citizenship which he acquired at
birth. Tambunting’s possession of an American passport did not mean that Tambunting is not a Filipino
citizen. Tambunting also took an oath of allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant to Republic Act No.
9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.

Tambunting further stated that he has resided in the Philippines since birth. Tambunting has imbibed the
Filipino culture, has spoken the Filipino language, and has been educated in Filipino schools. Tambunting
maintained that proof of his loyalty and devotion to the Philippines was shown by his service as councilor
of Parañaque.
To refute Cordora’s claim that the number of years of residency stated in Tambunting’s certificates of
candidacy is false because Tambunting lost his residency because of his naturalization as an American
citizen, Tambunting contended that the residency requirement is not the same as citizenship.

The Ruling of the COMELEC Law Department

The COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of Cordora’s complaint against Tambunting
because Cordora failed to substantiate his charges against Tambunting. Cordora’s reliance on the
certification of the Bureau of Immigration that Tambunting traveled on an American passport is not
sufficient to prove that Tambunting is an American citizen.

The Ruling of the COMELEC En Banc

The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and the resolution of the COMELEC Law Department. The
COMELEC En Banc was convinced that Cordora failed to support his accusation against Tambunting by
sufficient and convincing evidence.

The dispositive portion of the COMELEC En Banc’s Resolution reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of
evidence to establish probable cause.

SO ORDERED.5

Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento (Commissioner Sarmiento) wrote a separate opinion which concurred
with the findings of the En Banc Resolution. Commissioner Sarmiento pointed out that Tambunting could
be considered a dual citizen. Moreover, Tambunting effectively renounced his American citizenship when
he filed his certificates of candidacy in 2001 and 2004 and ran for public office.

Cordora filed a motion for reconsideration which raised the same grounds and the same arguments in his
complaint. In its Resolution promulgated on 20 February 2007, the COMELEC En Banc dismissed
Cordora’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

The Issue

Cordora submits that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it declared that there is no sufficient evidence to support probable cause that may
warrant the prosecution of Tambunting for an election offense.

Cordora’s petition is not an action to disqualify Tambunting because of Tambunting’s failure to meet
citizenship and residency requirements. Neither is the present petition an action to declare Tambunting a
non-Filipino and a non-resident. The present petition seeks to prosecute Tambunting for knowingly
making untruthful statements in his certificates of candidacy.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit. We affirm the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc.

Whether there is Probable Cause to Hold Tambunting for Trial for Having Committed an Election
Offense
There was no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC En Banc’s ruling that there is no sufficient and
convincing evidence to support a finding of probable cause to hold Tambunting for trial for violation of
Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Probable cause constitutes those facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed. Determining probable cause is an
intellectual activity premised on the prior physical presentation or submission of documentary or
testimonial proofs either confirming, negating or qualifying the allegations in the complaint. 6

Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code reads as follows:

Contents of certificate of candidacy. — The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is
announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; x x x the
political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all
election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders and
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant
to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the
best of his knowledge.

xxx

The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph, passport size; a
statement in duplicate containing his bio-data and program of government not exceeding one hundred
words, if he so desires.

Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other hand, provides that violation of Section 74,
among other sections in the Code, shall constitute an election offense.

Tambunting’s Dual Citizenship

Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American father. Neither does he
deny that he underwent the process involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) because of his
father’s citizenship. Tambunting claims that because of his parents’ differing citizenships, he is both
Filipino and American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists that Tambunting is a naturalized
American citizen.

We agree with Commissioner Sarmiento’s observation that Tambunting possesses dual citizenship.
Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo the
naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130 only
served to confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from the
Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two trips where Tambunting claimed that he is
an American. However, the same certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he
is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy
before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from
running for public office.7

Requirements for dual citizens from birth who desire to run for public office

We deem it necessary to reiterate our previous ruling in Mercado v. Manzano, wherein we ruled that dual
citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local position.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are
citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently
considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is
possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle
of jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be
also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions
on citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is
the result of an individual’s volition.

xxx

[I]n including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with
dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin
even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A.
No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere
dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who
must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional
Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of
the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not
she is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control."

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that,
from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced
his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on §40(d) between Senators
Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:

SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: "Any person with
dual citizenship" is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the present Constitution, Mr.
President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-
born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural-born citizen, upon reaching the
age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of his or her
father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the person to
run for a local government position?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he would want
to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.

SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or the country
of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen,? No one can renounce. There are such
countries in the world.1avvphi1

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be an
election for him of his desire to be considered a Filipino citizen.

SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election. Under
the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any
overt act to claim the citizenship.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentleman’s example, if
he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if he is really
interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino
citizen, and I have only one citizenship."

SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He will always
have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the Constitution of the
Republic.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he also
acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification. 8 (Emphasis
supplied)

We have to consider the present case in consonance with our rulings in Mercado v. Manzano,9 Valles v.
COMELEC,10 and AASJS v. Datumanong.11 Mercado and Valles involve similar operative facts as the
present case. Manzano and Valles, like Tambunting, possessed dual citizenship by the circumstances of
their birth. Manzano was born to Filipino parents in the United States which follows the doctrine of jus soli.
Valles was born to an Australian mother and a Filipino father in Australia. Our rulings
in Manzano and Valles stated that dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance both by cause and, for
those desiring to run for public office, by effect. Dual citizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a
person with dual citizenship who seeks public office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the
oath of allegiance contained therein. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the
individual’s active participation in the naturalization process. AASJS states that, under R.A. No. 9225, a
Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship
by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of
allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen’s foreign citizenship.

R.A. No. 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, was enacted years after the
promulgation of Manzano and Valles. The oath found in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 reads as follows:

I __________ , solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of
the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but
with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after
their naturalization.12 Section 5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who reacquire Filipino
citizenship and desire to run for elective public office in the Philippines shall "meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of filing the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath" aside from the oath of allegiance prescribed in Section
3 of R.A. No. 9225. The twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship served as the bases for our recent rulings in Jacot v. Dal and
COMELEC,13 Velasco v. COMELEC,14 and Japzon v. COMELEC,15 all of which involve natural-born
Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter ran for elective office in
the Philippines. In the present case, Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become a
naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.

Tambunting’s residency

Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed to meet the residency requirement because of Tambunting’s
naturalization as an American. Cordora’s reasoning fails because Tambunting is not a naturalized
American. Moreover, residency, for the purpose of election laws, includes the twin elements of the fact of
residing in a fixed place and the intention to return there permanently,16 and is not dependent upon
citizenship.

In view of the above, we hold that Cordora failed to establish that Tambunting indeed willfully made false
entries in his certificates of candidacy. On the contrary, Tambunting sufficiently proved his innocence of
the charge filed against him. Tambunting is eligible for the office which he sought to be elected and
fulfilled the citizenship and residency requirements prescribed by law.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolutions of the Commission on

Elections En Banc dated 18 August 2006 and 20 February 2007 in EO Case No. 05-17.

SO ORDERED.

Tobias v. Abalos

G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994

ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO
R. TOBIAS, JR. petitioners,
vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.

Estrella, Bautista & Associates for petitioners.

BIDIN, J.:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."

Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged
to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this
legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed
R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994.

Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of
Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong
into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only
14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of
these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.

Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49
thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution.

Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:

As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district
with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage
of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall
become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected
at the same election.

Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes the "one
subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to wit:

Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall
be expressed in the title thereof.

Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter
embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city;
and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.

Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of R.A. No.
7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as
expressed in the title of the law. Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in
the title of the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been complied with.

Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the Constitution, which
provide, to wit:

Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations.
 Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this
section.

Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts
under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of
Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners
contend that said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities
have attained the minimum population requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has
the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as
aforecited.

The contentions are devoid of merit.

Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the statutory conversion
of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand
indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution:

. . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).

Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation of a separate
congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No.
7675.

Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not
a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a
natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No.
7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong"
necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a
separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.

Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this
court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we
ruled that the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a
practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if
the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."

The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v.
Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:

Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of
the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the
subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation" (emphasis supplied).

Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the effect that there is no
mention in the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the
minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, the
same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of
having passed through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the members
of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any
rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data
considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws.

As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as
set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted,
shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the
House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided
by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be
increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in
congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.

Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to have separate legislative
districts, the assailed Section 49 of R.A.
No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.

As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to
reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the
glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law,
including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.

Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present further arguments against
the validity thereof.

Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on
R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit
since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the
inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with
the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.

Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted in "gerrymandering," which is
the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of
credence. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora,
the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong
district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's
constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to
him.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Senator Aquino III v. Comelec

G.R. No. 189793 April 7, 2010

SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its
Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO
VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. In this original action, petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse
Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic
Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd)
Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District
From Such Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently pray that the respondent Commission on
Elections be restrained from making any issuances and from taking any steps relative to the
implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.

Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following its
publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation. 1 In substance, the said law
created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing
first and second legislative districts of the province.

Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of
1,693,821,2distributed among four (4) legislative districts in this wise:

District Municipalities/Cities Population

1st District Del Gallego Libmanan 417,304
Ragay Minalabac
Lupi Pamplona
Sipocot Pasacao
Cabusao San Fernando
2nd District Gainza Canaman 474,899
Milaor Camaligan
Naga Magarao
Pili Bombon
Ocampo Calabanga
3rd District Caramoan Sangay 372,548
Garchitorena San Jose
Goa Tigaon
Lagonoy Tinamba
Presentacion Siruma
4th District Iriga Buhi 429,070
Baao Bula
Balatan Nabua
Bato

Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were
reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district
municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the
second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. The following
table3 illustrates the reapportionment made by Republic Act No. 9716:
 District Municipalities/Cities Population
1st District Del Gallego 176,383
Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao
2nd District Libmanan San Fernando 276,777
Minalabac Gainza
Pamplona Milaor
Pasacao
3rd District (formerly 2nd District) Naga Camaligan 439,043
Pili Magarao
Ocampo Bombon
Canaman Calabanga
4th District (formerly 3rd District) Caramoan Sangay 372,548
Garchitorena San Jose
Goa Tigaon
Lagonoy Tinamba
Presentacion Siruma
5th District (formerly 4th District) Iriga Buhi 429,070
Baao Bula
Balatan Nabua
Bato

Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both parties of the origins of the
bill that became the law show that, from the filing of House Bill No. 4264 until its approval by the Senate
on a vote of thirteen (13) in favor and two (2) against, the process progressed step by step, marked by
public hearings on the sentiments and position of the local officials of Camarines Sur on the creation of a
new congressional district, as well as argumentation and debate on the issue, now before us, concerning
the stand of the oppositors of the bill that a population of at least 250,000 is required by the Constitution
for such new district.4

Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval of the Bill by the Senate. His
co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City, which was a part of the former second district from
which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion in the new second district. No other
local executive joined the two; neither did the representatives of the former third and fourth districts of the
province.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the
explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.5 The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by
Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the
proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum
population standard.6 The provision reads:

Article VI

Section 5. (1) x x x x
 (2) x x x x

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.

(4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied).

The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited provision is the minimum
population requirement for the creation of a legislative district.7 The petitioners theorize that, save in the
case of a newly created province, each legislative district created by Congress must be supported by a
minimum population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid.8 Under this view, existing legislative districts
may be reapportioned and severed to form new districts, provided each resulting district will represent a
population of at least 250,000. On the other hand, if the reapportionment would result in the creation of a
legislative seat representing a populace of less than 250,000 inhabitants, the reapportionment must be
stricken down as invalid for non-compliance with the minimum population requirement.

In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution to adopt a population minimum of 250,000 in the creation of additional legislative seats.9 The
petitioners argue that when the Constitutional Commission fixed the original number of district seats in the
House of Representatives to two hundred (200), they took into account the projected national population
of fifty five million (55,000,000) for the year 1986.10 According to the petitioners, 55 million people
represented by 200 district representatives translates to roughly 250,000 people for every one (1)
representative.11 Thus, the 250,000 population requirement found in Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution is actually based on the population constant used by the Constitutional Commission in
distributing the initial 200 legislative seats.

Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts independently from the creation of
a province, Congress is bound to observe a 250,000 population threshold, in the same manner that the
Constitutional Commission did in the original apportionment.

Verbatim, the submission is that:

1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first district of Camarines
Sur failed to meet the population requirement for the creation of the legislative district as explicitly
provided in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended thereto; and

2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation as provided in Article VI,
Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the Constitution.12

The provision subject of this case states:

Article VI

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations.

(2) x x x x
 (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.

On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, seek the dismissal of the
present petition based on procedural and substantive grounds.

On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty of two (2) fatal technical
defects: first, petitioners committed an error in choosing to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
9716 via the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and second, the
petitioners have no locus standi to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.

On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction between cities and
provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The respondents concede the
existence of a 250,000 population condition, but argue that a plain and simple reading of the questioned
provision will show that the same has no application with respect to the creation of legislative districts in
provinces.13 Rather, the 250,000 minimum population is only a requirement for the creation of a legislative
district in a city.

In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population requirement for the reapportionment of
districts in provinces. Therefore, Republic Act No. 9716, which only creates an additional legislative
district within the province of Camarines Sur, should be sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment
law.

We first pass upon the threshold issues.

The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of the remedies of Certiorari and Prohibition,
the petitioners have committed a fatal procedural lapse. The respondents cite the following reasons:

1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the respondents had acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.1avvphi1

2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed against a tribunal, board, officer or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. Respondents maintain
that in implementing Republic Act No. 9716, they were not acting as a judicial or quasi-judicial
body, nor were they engaging in the performance of a ministerial act.

3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. Considering that the main thrust of the instant petition is the
declaration of unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, the same could have been ventilated
through a petition for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has only appellate, not
original jurisdiction.

The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to show that they had sustained, or is in
danger of sustaining any substantial injury as a result of the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.
The respondents, therefore, conclude that the petitioners lack the required legal standing to question the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.

This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when confronted with issues that, by reason
of constitutional importance, need a direct focus of the arguments on their content and substance.
The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the application of procedural rules, 14 as
well as relaxed the requirement of locus standi whenever confronted with an important issue of
overreaching significance to society.15

Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)16 and Jaworski v.
PAGCOR,17 this Court sanctioned momentary deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of courts, and
took original cognizance of cases raising issues of paramount public importance. The Jaworski case
ratiocinates:

Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical
defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised
herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the
youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the
well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
(Emphasis supplied)

Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in Kilosbayan v.
Guingona,18 Tatad v. Executive Secretary,19 Chavez v. Public Estates Authority20 and Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan v. Zamora,21 just to name a few, that absence of direct injury on the part of the party seeking
judicial review may be excused when the latter is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance. In
Lim v. Executive Secretary,22 this Court held that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must
be settled promptly and definitely, and so, the standing requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance
has been echoed in the more recent decision on Chavez v. Gonzales. 23

Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing principles must apply. The
beaten path must be taken. We go directly to the determination of whether or not a population of 250,000
is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.

We deny the petition.

We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of
constitutionality.24Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear
showing that a specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated or transgressed. When there is
neither a violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such a
violation, the presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to
sustain.25

There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must
compose a legislative district.

As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a
minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district.

The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative."

The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one
hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least
a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of
250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.

The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than
that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province. 26

Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be
entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.

The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was, in turn, the subject of
interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC.27

In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854, which was the law that
converted the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City. As it happened, Republic Act No. 7854
created an additional legislative district for Makati, which at that time was a lone district. The petitioners in
that case argued that the creation of an additional district would violate Section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution, because the resulting districts would be supported by a population of less than 250,000,
considering that Makati had a total population of only 450,000. The Supreme Court sustained the
constitutionality of the law and the validity of the newly created district, explaining the operation of the
Constitutional phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand," to wit:

Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of
Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred
fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum
population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional
representative.28 (Emphasis supplied)

The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities only to
its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city
to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase
its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.

There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district within a
city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district
created within a city is not required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid,
neither should such be needed for an additional district in a province, considering moreover that a
province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its population.

Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province
which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the
Local Government Code states:

Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified
by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991
constant prices and either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau; or
 (ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by
the National Statistics Office.

Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely

an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.

Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran through the deliberations on
the words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.

The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least two hundred fifty thousand"
may be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional Commission which, upon framing the provisions of
Section 5 of Article VI, proceeded to form an ordinance that would be appended to the final document.
The Ordinance is captioned "APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN
PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA." Such records would show that
the 250,000 population benchmark was used for the 1986 nationwide apportionment of legislative
districts among provinces, cities and Metropolitan Manila. Simply put, the population figure was used to
determine how many districts a province, city, or Metropolitan Manila should have. Simply discernible too
is the fact that, for the purpose, population had to be the determinant. Even then, the requirement of
250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an absolute minimum for one legislative district. And, closer to the
point herein at issue, in the determination of the precise district within the province to which, through the
use of the population benchmark, so many districts have been apportioned, population as a factor
was not the sole, though it was among, several determinants.

From its journal,29 we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally divided the entire country into
two hundred (200) districts, which corresponded to the original number of district representatives. The
200 seats were distributed by the Constitutional Commission in this manner: first, one (1) seat each was
given to the seventy-three (73) provinces and the ten (10) cities with a population of at least
250,000;30 second, the remaining seats were then redistributed among the provinces, cities and the
Metropolitan Area "in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio."31 Commissioner Davide, who later became a Member and then Chief Justice of the
Court, explained this in his sponsorship remark 32 for the Ordinance to be appended to the 1987
Constitution:

Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative seats which are, in turn,
apportioned among provinces and cities with a population of at least 250, 000 and the Metropolitan Area
in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio. The population is based on the 1986 projection, with the 1980 official enumeration as the point of
reckoning. This projection indicates that our population is more or less 56 million. Taking into account the
mandate that each city with at least 250, 000 inhabitants and each province shall have at least one
representative, we first allotted one seat for each of the 73 provinces, and each one for all cities with a
population of at least 250, 000, which are the Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo,
Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to increase
whenever appropriate the number of seats for the provinces and cities in accordance with the number of
their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. (Emphasis supplied).

Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city. Differentiated from this, the
determination of the districts within the province had to consider "all protests and complaints formally
received" which, the records show, dealt with determinants other than population as already mentioned.

Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional Commission narrates:

INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO:

Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in the northern towns when it was more
affinity with the southern town of Aborlan, Batarasa, Brooke’s Point, Narra, Quezon and Marcos. He
stated that the First District has a greater area than the Second District. He then queried whether
population was the only factor considered by the Committee in redistricting.

Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into account the standards set in Section
5 of the Article on the Legislative Department, namely: 1) the legislative seats should be apportioned
among the provinces and cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with their inhabitants on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio; and 2) the legislative district must be compact, adjacent and
contiguous.

Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto Princesa was included with the
northern towns. He then inquired what is the distance between Puerto Princesa from San Vicente.

xxxx

Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population of 75,480 and based on the
apportionment, its inclusion with the northern towns would result in a combined population of 265,000 as
against only 186,000 for the south. He added that Cuyo and Coron are very important towns in the
northern part of Palawan and, in fact, Cuyo was the capital of Palawan before its transfer to Puerto
Princesa. He also pointed out that there are more potential candidates in the north and therefore if Puerto
Princesa City and the towns of Cuyo and Coron are lumped together, there would be less candidates in
the south, most of whose inhabitants are not interested in politics. He then suggested that Puerto
Princesa be included in the south or the Second District.

Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the period of amendments. He requested
that the COMELEC staff study said proposal.33

"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO

On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was explained in the interpellations that
District I has a total population of 265,358 including the City of Puerto Princesa, while the Second District
has a total population of 186,733. He proposed, however, that Puerto Princesa be included in the Second
District in order to satisfy the contiguity requirement in the Constitution considering that said City is nearer
the southern towns comprising the Second District.

In reply to Mr. Monsod’s query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the proposed transfer of Puerto Princesa
City to the Second District, the First District would only have a total population of 190,000 while the
Second District would have 262,213, and there would be no substantial changes.

Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledo’s proposal to insert Puerto Princesa City before the Municipality of
Aborlan.

There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was approved by the Body.

APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF PALAWAN

There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the apportionment
and districting for the province of Palawan was approved by the Body.34

The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure. It was decided by the importance of
the towns and the city that eventually composed the districts.
Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further narrates:

At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado made a reservation with the Committee
for the possible reopening of the approval of Region I with respect to Benguet and Baguio City.

REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO

Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio City and Tuba are placed in one
district. He stated that he was toying with the idea that, perhaps as a special consideration for Baguio
because it is the summer capital of the Philippines, Tuba could be divorced from Baguio City so that it
could, by itself, have its own constituency and Tuba could be transferred to the Second District together
with Itogon. Mr. Davide, however, pointed out that the population of Baguio City is only 141,149.

Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be lower during certain times of the
year, but the transient population would increase the population substantially and, therefore, for purposes
of business and professional transactions, it is beyond question that population-wise, Baguio would more
than qualify, not to speak of the official business matters, transactions and offices that are also there.

Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Lima’s statement that unless Tuba and Baguio City are united, Tuba
will be isolated from the rest of Benguet as the place can only be reached by passing through Baguio
City. He stated that the Committee would submit the matter to the Body.

Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment, Mr. Regalado stated that the Body
should have a say on the matter and that the considerations he had given are not on the demographic
aspects but on the fact that Baguio City is the summer capital, the venue and situs of many government
offices and functions.

On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body approved the reconsideration of the earlier
approval of the apportionment and districting of Region I, particularly Benguet.

Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the amendment of Mr. Regalado was put to
a vote. With 14 Members voting in favor and none against, the amendment was approved by the Body.

Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment, Benguet with Baguio City will have
two seats. The First District shall comprise of the municipalities of Mankayan, Buguias, Bakun, Kabayan,
Kibungan, Bokod, Atok, Kapangan, Tublay, La Trinidad, Sablan, Itogon and Tuba. The Second District
shall comprise of Baguio City alone.

There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment and districting of Region I. 35

Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor.

It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was divided into districts based on the
distribution of its three cities, with each district having a city: one district "supposed to be a fishing area;
another a vegetable and fruit area; and the third, a rice growing area," because such consideration
"fosters common interests in line with the standard of compactness."36 In the districting of Maguindanao,
among the matters discussed were "political stability and common interest among the people in the area"
and the possibility of "chaos and disunity" considering the "accepted regional, political, traditional and
sectoral leaders."37 For Laguna, it was mentioned that municipalities in the highland should not be
grouped with the towns in the lowland. For Cebu, Commissioner Maambong proposed that they should
"balance the area and population."38
Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district apportionment, we stated in
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC39 that:

x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The Constitution,
however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of
representation. x x x. To ensure quality representation through commonality of interests and ease of
access by the representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative
district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (Emphasis
supplied).

This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising stand of petitioner that an
additional provincial legislative district, which does not have at least a 250,000 population is not allowed
by the Constitution.

The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson.

Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution can, the petition find
support. And the formulation of the Ordinance in the implementation of the provision, nay, even the
Ordinance itself, refutes the contention that a population of 250,000 is a constitutional sine qua non for
the formation of an additional legislative district in a province, whose population growth has increased
beyond the 1986 numbers.

Translated in the terms of the present case:

1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is ─ based
on the formula and constant number of 250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in
nationally apportioning legislative districts among provinces and cities ─ entitled to two (2)
districts in addition to the four (4) that it was given in the 1986 apportionment. Significantly,
petitioner Aquino concedes this point.40 In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as clearly
written allows and does not prohibit an additional district for the Province of Camarines Sur, such
as that provided for in Republic Act No. 9786;

2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the protests and complaints
against strict conformity with the population standard, and more importantly based on the final
districting in the Ordinance on considerations other than population, the reapportionment or the
recomposition of the first and second legislative districts in the Province of Camarines Sur that
resulted in the creation of a new legislative district is valid even if the population of the new district
is 176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted upon by the petitioners.

3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264, were:

(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;

(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped municipalities;

(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the discussion from the
reconfigured District One; and

(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the redistricting of
Districts One and Two.41
Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with the increased population of
the erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the utter absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave
abuse of discretion,42 that would warrant the invalidation of Republic Act No. 9716.

To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the first and second
legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional district should
not be considered. Our ruling is that population is not the only factor but is just one of several other
factors in the composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the
Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on the
exact issue presented by this petition.1avvphi1

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act Reapportioning
the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur
and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.

SO ORDERED.

Mariano, Jr. v. Comelec

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995

JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE
MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995

JOHN R. OSMEÑA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY,
MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional.
R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati
Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati."1

G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito
Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita
Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only
Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the
following grounds:
 1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial
jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code;

2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term"
limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI
of the Constitution.

3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:

(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the
Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general
reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years
following the return of every census;

(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the
bill; and

(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord

with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey
(1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmeña as senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen.
Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated.

We find no merit in the petitions.

Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati, thus:

Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly
urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which
shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila
Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond
by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the
municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the
Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.

The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate
agency or forum of existing boundary disputes or cases involving questions of territorial
jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the adjoining local government units.
(Emphasis supplied)

In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code which require that the area of a local government unit should be made by metes and
bounds with technical descriptions.2

The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government
cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial
jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the
limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government
units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the
people's welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the
land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions.

Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by the
description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of
the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said
delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality.
Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that
cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the
municipality."

The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the
proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of
the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig
over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department
of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to
foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. This would have
ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions.3 We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes
and bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary disputes.4

We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty
which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed
City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts.
Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is
unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the Solicitor General in this regard, viz.:

Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil that
the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or
converted cities should be described by meted and bounds, with technical descriptions"
— was made in order to provide a means by which the area of said cities may be
reasonably ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes and bounds was
meant merely as tool in the establishment of local government units. It is not an end in
itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably
ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as
in this case, then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been
sufficiently served.

Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must contain therein
detailed technical descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners
seem to imply. To require such description in the law as a condition sine qua non for its
validity would be to defeat the very purpose which the Local Government Code to seeks
to serve. The manifest intent of the Code is to empower local government units and to
give them their rightful due. It seeks to make local governments more responsive to the
needs of their constituents while at the same time serving as a vital cog in national
development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of
description was used in the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It
then becomes a case of the master serving the slave, instead of the other way around.
This could not be the intendment of the law.

Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained, although it may
not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of the
 statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. (Torres v.
Limjap, 56 Phil., 141; Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA
1105). Legislation is an active instrument of government, which, for purposes of
interpretation, means that laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so
construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes (Bocolbo v.
Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule must indubitably apply to the case at bar.

II

Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854.
Section 51 states:

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The represent elective officials of the
Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall
exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and the
duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The
new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees
of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be
automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati.

They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution
which provide:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three
years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following their election.

No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the House of
Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than
three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate
existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of
Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point that section 51
favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2)
consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win as city
mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year
consecutive term since his previous three-year consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be
counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political
ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.

We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a litigant
can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case
or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the
constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. 5

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of
many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he
would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998
elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a
hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents
of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist
this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

III

Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52, Article X of R.A.
No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:

Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. — Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city, Makati
shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative districts that shall initially correspond to
the two (2) existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No. 7166 as
implemented by the Commission on Elections to commence at the next national elections
to be held after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmariñas
and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall
form part of the second district. (emphasis supplied)

They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1)
reapportionment6cannot made by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in
the title of the bill7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred fifty
thousand (450,000).

These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos.8 In said case, we ruled that
reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a
new city. The Constitution9 clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two
hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and
providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only
be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each
local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province
created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. 10 The
intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their
sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever
whole or it is not sovereignty.

Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of
Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia, that a city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative.
Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population
requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative. 14
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional legislative district in
Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op
cit., we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule
so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, with Constitution does not command that the title of a law
should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be
sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such
general subject."

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Abayon v. HRET

G.R. No. 189466 February 11, 2010

DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C.
LUCABAN, JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ and AGUSTIN C. DOROGA, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 189506

CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET), DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR.,
CRISTINA PALABAY, RENATO M. REYES, JR., ERLINDA CADAPAN, ANTONIO FLORES and
JOSELITO USTAREZ,Respondents.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

These two cases are about the authority of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to
pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of
Congress.

The Facts and the Case

In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list
organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections.

Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin C. Doroga, all registered voters,
filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against Aangat Tayo and its nominee, petitioner
Abayon, in HRET Case 07-041. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the
House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Respondent Lucaban and the others with him further pointed out that petitioner Abayon herself was not
qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee since she did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative. She
moreover lost her bid as party-list representative of the party-list organization called An Waray in the
immediately preceding elections of May 10, 2004.

Petitioner Abayon countered that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had already confirmed the
status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral party-list organization representing the workers,
women, youth, urban poor, and elderly and that she belonged to the women sector. Abayon also claimed
that although she was the second nominee of An Waray party-list organization during the 2004 elections,
she could not be regarded as having lost a bid for an elective office.

Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the petition for quo
warranto since respondent Lucaban and the others with him collaterally attacked the registration of
Aangat Tayo as a party-list organization, a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. It was
Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its
nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of
Aangat Tayo.

On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as against Aangat Tayo but
upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon.1 The latter moved for reconsideration
but the HRET denied the same on September 17, 2009,2 prompting Abayon to file the present petition for
special civil action of certiorari.

In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that
won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Respondents
Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes, Jr., Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and
Joselito Ustarez are members of some other party-list groups.

Shortly after the elections, respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed with respondent HRET a
petition for quowarranto against Bantay and its nominee, petitioner Palparan, in HRET Case 07-040.
Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as
party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that
Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units
(CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Lesaca and the others said that Palparan committed gross
human rights violations against marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations.

Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the
party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of Representatives.
Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility
as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before that
party-list group, not before the HRET.

On July 23, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order dismissing the petition against Bantay for the reason
that the issue of the ineligibility or qualification of the party-list group fell within the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC pursuant to the Party-List System Act. HRET, however, defended its jurisdiction over the
question of petitioner Palparan’s qualifications.3 Palparan moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied
it by a resolution dated September 10, 2009,4 hence, the recourse to this Court through this petition for
special civil action of certiorari and prohibition.

Since the two cases raise a common issue, the Court has caused their consolidation.

The Issue Presented

The common issue presented in these two cases is:

Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon
and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list organizations, respectively, who took the
seats at the House of Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007 elections.

The Court’s Ruling

Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common theory: Republic Act (R.A.) 7941, the Party-List System
Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine which parties or organizations have the
qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House of Representatives during the elections. Indeed, the
HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of
Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners Abayon and Palparan were not elected into office but were
chosen by their respective organizations under their internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire
into and adjudicate their qualifications as nominees.

If at all, says petitioner Abayon, such authority belongs to the COMELEC which already upheld her
qualification as nominee of Aangat Tayo for the women sector. For Palparan, Bantay’s personality is so
inseparable and intertwined with his own person as its nominee so that the HRET cannot dismiss the quo
warranto action against Bantay without dismissing the action against him.

But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that
sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution,5 identifies who the "members" of that House are:

Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: "members x x x who shall be
elected from legislative districts" and "those who x x x shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." This means that, from the
Constitution’s point of view, it is the party-list representatives who are "elected" into office, not their parties
or organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through that peculiar party-list system that
the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where the voters cast their votes for the
organizations or parties to which such party-list representatives belong.

Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like
manner. They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in the
making of laws that will directly benefit their legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the
same term limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.

It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as
"members of the House of Representatives," thus:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party
system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature,
and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (Underscoring supplied)

As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on Elections,6 a party-list
representative is in every sense "an elected member of the House of Representatives." Although the vote
cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees,
who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.

Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for disqualification
of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution, states:

Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. – No person shall be nominated as party-list

representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident
of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five
(25) years of age on the day of the election.1avvphi1

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than
thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains
the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.

In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan
claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they ought to
represent. The Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a "bona fide member of the party
or organization which he seeks to represent."7

It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee—the need for him
or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organization—in the context of the
facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparan’s relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay,
respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.

Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to determine the qualifications of a
party-list nominee belongs to the party or organization that nominated him. This is true, initially. The right
to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five from among them after all
belongs to the party or organization that nominates them.8 But where an allegation is made that the party
or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list representative in
the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of the dispute is
taken out of its hand.

Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the COMELEC seems to believe,
when it resolved the challenge to petitioner Abayon, that it has the power to do so as an incident of its
authority to approve the registration of party-list organizations. But the Court need not resolve this
question since it is not raised here and has not been argued by the parties.

What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House
of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the
House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear
and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or
organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. 10

The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the
petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction
over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions and AFFIRMS the Order dated July 16,
2009 and Resolution 09-183 dated September 17, 2009 in HRET Case 07-041 of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal as well as its Order dated July 23, 2009 and Resolution 09-178 dated
September 10, 2009 in HRET Case 07-040.

SO ORDERED.

Amores v. HRET

G.R. No. 189600 June 29, 2010

MILAGROS E. AMORES, Petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and EMMANUEL JOEL J.
VILLANUEVA,Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Via this petition for certiorari, Milagros E. Amores (petitioner) challenges the Decision of May 14, 2009
and Resolution No. 09-130 of August 6, 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (public
respondent), which respectively dismissed petitioner’s Petition for Quo Warranto questioning the legality
of the assumption of office of Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva (private respondent) as representative of the
party-list organization Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) in the House of Representatives, and
denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

In her Petition for Quo Warranto1 seeking the ouster of private respondent, petitioner alleged that, among
other things, private respondent assumed office without a formal proclamation issued by the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC); he was disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since, at the
time of the filing of his certificates of nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond
the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-
List System Act; and his change of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers
and their families sector was not effected at least six months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to
be qualified to represent the new sector under Section 15 of RA No. 7941.

Not having filed his Answer despite due notice, private respondent was deemed to have entered a
general denial pursuant to public respondent’s Rules.2

As earlier reflected, public respondent, by Decision of May 14, 2009,3 dismissed petitioner’s Petition for
Quo Warranto, finding that CIBAC was among the party-list organizations which the COMELEC had
partially proclaimed as entitled to at least one seat in the House of Representatives through National
Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 2007. It also found the petition which was
filed on October 17, 2007 to be out of time, the reglementary period being 10 days from private
respondent’s proclamation.

Respecting the age qualification for youth sectoral nominees under Section 9 of RA No. 7941, public
respondent held that it applied only to those nominated as such during the first three congressional terms
after the ratification of the Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered
exclusively as representing the youth sector, which CIBAC, a multi-sectoral organization, is not.

In the matter of private respondent’s shift of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino
workers and their families sector, public respondent held that Section 15 of RA No. 7941 did not apply as
there was no resultant change in party-list affiliation.

Her Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution No. 09-130 dated August 6,
2009,4 petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari.5

Petitioner contends that, among other things, public respondent created distinctions in the application of
Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 that are not found in the subject provisions, fostering interpretations at
war with equal protection of the laws; and NBC Resolution No. 07-60, which was a partial proclamation of
winning party-list organizations, was not enough basis for private respondent to assume office on July 10,
2007, especially considering that he admitted receiving his own Certificate of Proclamation only on
December 13, 2007.

In his Comment,6 private respondent avers in the main that petitioner has not substantiated her claims of
grave abuse of discretion against public respondent; and that he became a member of the overseas
Filipinos and their families sector years before the 2007 elections.

It bears noting that the term of office of party-list representatives elected in the May, 2007 elections will
expire on June 30, 2010. While the petition has, thus, become moot and academic, rendering of a
decision on the merits in this case would still be of practical value.7

The Court adopts the issues framed by public respondent, to wit: (1) whether petitioner’s Petition for Quo
Warranto was dismissible for having been filed unseasonably; and (2) whether Sections 9 and 15 of RA
No. 7941 apply to private respondent.

On the first issue, the Court finds that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
considering petitioner’s Petition for Quo Warranto filed out of time. Its counting of the 10-day
reglementary period provided in its Rules8 from the issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-60 on July 9,
2007 is erroneous.

To be sure, while NBC Resolution No. 07-60 partially proclaimed CIBAC as a winner in the May, 2007
elections, along with other party-list organizations,9 it was by no measure a proclamation of private
respondent himself as required by Section 13 of RA No. 7941.

Section 13. How Party-List Representatives are Chosen. Party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by
the COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or coalitions
to the COMELEC according to their ranking in said list.

AT ALL EVENTS, this Court set aside NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency v. COMELEC10 after revisiting the formula for allocation of additional
seats to party-list organizations.

Considering, however, that the records do not disclose the exact date of private respondent’s
proclamation, the Court overlooks the technicality of timeliness and rules on the merits. Alternatively,
since petitioner’s challenge goes into private respondent’s qualifications, it may be filed at anytime during
his term.

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the
required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. 11

On the second and more substantial issue, the Court shall first discuss the age requirement for youth
sector nominees under Section 9 of RA No. 7941 reading:

Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list

representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to
read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day
of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty
(30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)

The Court finds no textual support for public respondent’s interpretation that Section 9 applied only to
those nominated during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution or until
1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as representing the youth sector.

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity,
there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application. 12

As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at least be twenty-five
(25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election, so it must be that a candidate
who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee. Since this mandate is
contained in RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act, it covers ALL youth sector nominees vying for party-
list representative seats.

As petitioner points out, RA No. 7941 was enacted only in March, 1995. There is thus no reason to apply
Section 9 thereof only to youth sector nominees nominated during the first three congressional terms after
the ratification of the Constitution in 1987. Under this interpretation, the last elections where Section 9
applied were held in May, 1995 or two months after the law was enacted. This is certainly not sound
legislative intent, and could not have been the objective of RA No. 7941.

There is likewise no rhyme or reason in public respondent’s ratiocination that after the third congressional
term from the ratification of the Constitution, which expired in 1998, Section 9 of RA No. 7941 would apply
only to sectoral parties registered exclusively as representing the youth sector. This distinction is nowhere
found in the law. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. When the law does not distinguish,
we must not distinguish.13

Respecting Section 15 of RA No. 7941, the Court fails to find even an iota of textual support for public
respondent’s ratiocination that the provision did not apply to private respondent’s shift of affiliation from
CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector as there was no resultant
change in party-list affiliation. Section 15 reads:
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who changes his political
party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes
his political party orsectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for
nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)

What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both political party and sectoral
affiliation. And the latter may occur within the same party since multi-sectoral party-list organizations are
qualified to participate in the Philippine party-list system. Hence, a nominee who changes his sectoral
affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the
change has been effected at least six months before the elections. Again, since the statute is clear and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This
is the plain meaning rule or verba legis, as expressed in the maxim index animi sermo or speech is the
index of intention.14

It is, therefore, beyond cavil that Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private respondent.

The Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee of either the youth sector or the
overseas Filipino workers and their families sector in the May, 2007 elections.

The records disclose that private respondent was already more than 30 years of age in May, 2007, it
being stipulated that he was born in August, 1975.15 Moreover, he did not change his sectoral affiliation at
least six months before May, 2007, public respondent itself having found that he shifted to CIBAC’s
overseas Filipino workers and their families sector only on March 17, 2007.161avvphi1

That private respondent is the first nominee of CIBAC, whose victory was later upheld, is of no moment. A
party-list organization’s ranking of its nominees is a mere indication of preference, their qualifications
according to law are a different matter.

It not being contested, however, that private respondent was eventually proclaimed as a party-list
representative of CIBAC and rendered services as such, he is entitled to keep the compensation and
emoluments provided by law for the position until he is properly declared ineligible to hold the same. 17

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 14, 2009 and Resolution No. 09-130
dated August 6, 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal are SET ASIDE. Emmanuel
Joel J. Villanueva is declared ineligible to hold office as a member of the House of Representatives
representing the party-list organization CIBAC.

SO ORDERED.

Atong Paglaum v. Comelec

G.R. No. 203766

CARPIO, J.:
The Cases

These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition[1] filed by 52
party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by
denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration
and accreditation as party-list organizations.

This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13 November 2012, [2] 20
November 2012,[3] 27 November 2012,[4] 4 December 2012,[5] 11 December 2012,[6] and 19 February
2013.[7]

The Facts

Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366
and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

The COMELEC, however, denied the petitions for registration of the following groups and organizations:

G.R. No. SPP No. Group Grounds for Denial

A. Via the COMELEC En Banc's automatic review of the COMELEC Division's resolutions approving
registration of groups/organizations
Resolution dated 23 November 2012[8]
1 204379 12-099 (PLM)
Omnibus Resolution dated 27 November 2012[9]
2 204455 12-041 (PLM)
3 204426 12-011 (PLM)
Resolution dated 27 November 2012[10]
4 204435 12-057 (PLM)
Resolution dated 27 November 2012[11]
5 204367 12-104 (PL)
Resolution dated 29 November 2012[12]
6 204370 12-011 (PP)
- The "artists" sector is not
considered marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove track record;
Alagad ng Sining (ASIN)
and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify under RA 7941 and Ang
Bagong Bayani.
- A non-stock savings and loan
association cannot be
Manila Teachers Savings and considered marginalized and
Loan Association, Inc. (Manila underrepresented; and
Teachers) - The first and second
nominees are not teachers by
profession.
- Failure to show that its
Association of Local Athletics members belong to the
Entrepreneurs and Hobbyists, marginalized; and
Inc. (ALA-EH) - Failure of the nominees to
qualify.
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify: although registering as
a regional political party, two of
1 Alliance
the nominees are not residents
Advocating Autonomy Party
of the region; and four of the
(1AAAP)
five nominees do not belong to
the marginalized and
underrepresented.
- Failure of the group to show
Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN), Inc. that its nominees belong to the
urban poor sector.
- Failure to represent a
Ako An Bisaya (AAB)
marginalized sector of society,
 despite the formation of a
sectoral wing for the benefit of
farmers of Region 8;
- Constituency has district
representatives;
- Lack of track record in
representing peasants and
farmers; and
- Nominees are neither farmers
nor peasants.
Resolution dated 4 December 2012[13]
- Failure to show that the party
represents a marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as the
Province of Iloilo has district
12-009 (PP), 12-165
7 204436 Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI) representatives;
(PLM)
- Untruthful statements in the
memorandum; and
- Withdrawal of three of its five
nominees.
Resolution dated 4 December 2012[14]
- Failure to establish that the
group can represent 14 sectors;
- The sectors of homeowners'
associations, entrepreneurs
Alliance of Organizations, and cooperatives are not
8 204485 12-175 (PL) Networks and Associations of marginalized and
the Philippines, Inc. (ALONA) underrepresented; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
B. Via the COMELEC En Banc's review on motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC Division's
resolutions denying registration of groups and organizations
Resolution dated 7 November 2012[15]
- Failure to prove track record
as an organization;
- Failure to show that the group
actually represents the
Alab ng Mamamahayag marginalized and
9 204139 12-127 (PL)
(ALAM) underrepresented; and
- Failure to establish that the
group can represent all sectors
it seeks to represent.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012[16]
- The group reflects an
advocacy for the environment,
and is not representative of the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
Kalikasan Party-List
10 204402 12-061 (PP) - There is no proof that
(KALIKASAN)
majority of its members belong
to the marginalized and
underrepresented;
- The group represents sectors
with conflicting interests; and
 - The nominees do not belong
to the sector which the group
claims to represent.
Resolution dated 14 November 2012[17]
- Failure to prove membership
Association of Guard, Utility base and track record;
Helper, Aider, Rider, - Failure to present activities
Driver/Domestic Helper, that sufficiently benefited its
11 204394 12-145 (PL)
Janitor, Agent and Nanny of intended constituency; and
the Philippines, Inc. - The nominees do not belong
(GUARDJAN) to any of the sectors which the
group seeks to represent.
Resolution dated 5 December 2012[18]
- Failure to show that the group
represents a marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as
Region 12 has district
12 204490 12-073 (PLM) Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP) representatives; and
- Failure to show a track record
of undertaking programs for
the welfare of the sector the
group seeks to represent.

In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012,[19] the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second
Division's resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida's (PBB) registration and accreditation as a
political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector; PBB
failed to apply for registration as a party-list group; and PBB failed to establish its track record as an
organization that seeks to uplift the lives of the "marginalized and underrepresented." [20]

These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA, ALAM,
KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from this
Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604,[21]and excluded the names of these
13 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

Pursuant to paragraph 2[22] of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary
evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of
intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have continually complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC[23] (Ang Bagong
Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the following groups and organizations from participating in the 13
May 2013 party-list elections:

G.R. No. SPP No. Group Grounds for Denial

Resolution dated 10 October 2012[24]
Retained registration and
accreditation as a political
party, but denied participation
in the May 2013 party-list
elections
203818- 12-154 (PLM) AKO Bicol Political Party
1 - Failure to represent any
19 12-177 (PLM) (AKB)
marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- The Bicol region already has
representatives in Congress;
and
 - The nominees are not
marginalized and
underrepresented.
Omnibus Resolution dated 11 October 2012[25]
Cancelled registration and
accreditation
- The nominees do not belong
to the sectors which the party
Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong
2 203766 12-161 (PLM) represents; and
Paglaum)
- The party failed to file its
Statement of Contributions and
Expenditures for the 2010
Elections.
Cancelled registration and
accreditation
- Failure to comply, and for
violation of election laws;
Association for Righteousness - The nominees do not
3 203981 12-187 (PLM) Advocacy on Leadership represent the sectors which the
(ARAL) party represents; and
- There is doubt that the party
is organized for religious
purposes.
Cancelled registration and
accreditation
- Failure of the nominees to
Alliance for Rural Concerns qualify; and
4 204002 12-188 (PLM)
(ARC) - Failure of the party to prove
that majority of its members
belong to the sectors it seeks to
represent.
Cancelled registration and
accreditation
- The sectors of drug
counsellors and lecturers,
veterans and the youth, are not
marginalized and
United Movement Against
5 204318 12-220 (PLM) underrepresented;
Drugs Foundation (UNIMAD)
- Failure to establish track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify as representatives of the
youth and young urban
professionals.
Omnibus Resolution dated 16 October 2012[26]
Cancelled registration
- Failure to define the sector it
1-Bro Philippine Guardians
seeks to represent; and
6 204100 12-196 (PLM) Brotherhood, Inc. (1BRO-
- The nominees do not belong
PGBI)
to a marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
Cancelled registration
1 Guardians Nationalist - The party is a military
7 204122 12-223 (PLM) Philippines, Inc. fraternity;
(1GANAP/GUARDIANS) - The sector of community
volunteer workers is too broad
 to allow for meaningful
representation; and
- The nominees do not appear
to belong to the sector of
community volunteer workers.
Cancelled registration
- Three of the seven nominees
do not belong to the sector of
farmers and fishermen, the
Blessed Federation of Farmers
sector sought to be
8 204263 12-257 (PLM) and Fishermen International,
represented; and
Inc. (A BLESSED Party-List)
- None of the nominees are
registered voters of Region XI,
the region sought to be
represented.
Resolution dated 16 October 2012[27]
Cancelled registration
- The sector of rural energy
consumers is not marginalized
and underrepresented;
- The party's track record is
1st Consumers Alliance for
9 203960 12-260 (PLM) related to electric cooperatives
Rural Energy, Inc. (1-CARE)
and not rural energy
consumers; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector of rural energy
consumers.
Resolution dated 16 October 2012[28]
Cancelled registration and
accreditation
- Failure to represent a
Association of Philippine marginalized and
10 203922 12-201 (PLM)
Electric Cooperatives (APEC) underrepresented sector; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector that the party
claims to represent.
Resolution dated 23 October 2012[29]
Cancelled registration and
accreditation
- The incumbent representative
in Congress failed to author or
sponsor bills that are beneficial
Aangat Tayo Party-List Party
11 204174 12-232 (PLM) to the sectors that the party
(AT)
represents (women, elderly,
youth, urban poor); and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized sectors that
the party seeks to represent.
Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 2012[30]
Cancelled registration and
accreditation
- The interests of the peasant
Alliance for Rural and Agrarian and urban poor sectors that the
12 203976 12-288 (PLM)
Reconstruction, Inc. (ARARO) party represents differ;
- The nominees do not belong
to the sectors that the party
seeks to represent;
 - Failure to show that three of
the nominees are bona fide
party members; and
- Lack of a Board resolution to
participate in the party-list
elections.
Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 2012[31]
Cancelled registration
- The party ceased to exist for
more than a year immediately
after the May 2010 elections;
- The nominees do not belong
Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa to the sector of peasants and
13 204240 12-279 (PLM) Magsasaka ng Pilipinas farmers that the party seeks to
Movement (AGRI) represent;
- Only four nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
and
- Failure to show meaningful
activities for its constituency.
Cancelled registration
- Failure to show that majority
of its members are
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that four of
Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido
14 203936 12-248 (PLM) its nine nominees actually
Tinig ng Masa (AKMA-PTM)
belong to the farmers sector;
and
- Failure to show that five of its
nine nominees work on
uplifting the lives of the
members of the sector.
Cancelled registration
- The Manifestation of Intent
and Certificate of Nomination
were not signed by an
appropriate officer of the party;
Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang - Failure to show track record
15 204126 12-263 (PLM) Agilang Pilipinong Magsasaka for the farmers and peasants
(KAP) sector; and
- Failure to show that nominees
actually belong to the sector, or
that they have undertaken
meaningful activities for the
sector.
Cancelled registration
Adhikain at Kilusan ng - Failure to show that nominees
Ordinaryong Tao Para sa Lupa, actually belong to the sector, or
16 204364 12-180 (PLM)
Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at that they have undertaken
Kaunlaran (AKO-BAHAY) meaningful activities for the
sector.
Cancelled registration
The True Marcos Loyalist (for
- Failure to show that majority
God, Country and People)
17 204141 12-229 (PLM) of its members are
Association of the Philippines,
marginalized and
Inc. (BANTAY)
underrepresented; and
 - Failure to prove that two of its
nominees actually belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented.
Cancelled registration
- Change of sector (from urban
poor youth to urban poor)
necessitates a new application;
- Failure to show track record
Pilipino Association for for the marginalized and
Country Urban Poor Youth underrepresented;
18 204408 12-217 (PLM)
Advancement and Welfare - Failure to prove that majority
(PACYAW) of its members and officers are
from the urban poor sector;
and
- The nominees are not
members of the urban poor
sector.
Cancelled registration
- The party represents drivers
Pasang Masda Nationwide and operators, who may have
19 204153 12-277 (PLM)
Party (PASANG MASDA) conflicting interests; and
- Nominees are either operators
or former operators.
Cancelled registration
- Failure to prove that majority
of its officers and members
belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented;
- The incumbent representative
in Congress failed to author or
sponsor bills that are beneficial
Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na to the sector that the party
20 203958 12-015 (PLM)
Walang Sala, Inc. (KAKUSA) represents (persons imprisoned
without proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt);
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not appear
to be marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 30 October 2012[32]
Cancelled registration and
accreditation
- Failure to attend the
summary hearing;
- Failure to show track record
21 204428 12-256 (PLM) Ang Galing Pinoy (AG)
for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not appear
to be marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012[33]
Cancelled registration and
Alliance for Nationalism and
22 204094 12-185 (PLM) accreditation
Democracy (ANAD)
- Failure to represent an
 identifiable marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- Only three nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- Failure to submit its
Statement of Contribution and
Expenditures for the 2007
Elections.
Omnibus Resolution dated 7 November 2012 [34]
Cancelled registration and
accreditation
- The party is an advocacy
Green Force for the group and does not represent
Environment Sons and the marginalized and
23 204239 12-060 (PLM)
Daughters of Mother Earth underrepresented;
(GREENFORCE) - Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized citizens.
Cancelled registration and
accreditation
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector that the party
seeks to represent (urban poor
Firm 24-K Association, Inc. and peasants of the National
24 204236 12-254 (PLM)
(FIRM 24-K) Capital Region);
- Only two of its nominees
reside in the National Capital
Region; and
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement.
Cancelled registration and
accreditation
- Failure to establish that its
nominees are members of the
indigenous people in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras
Action League of Indigenous sector that the party seeks to
25 204341 12-269 (PLM)
Masses (ALIM) represent;
- Only two of the party's
nominees reside in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras; and
- Three of the nominees do not
appear to belong to the
marginalized.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012[35]
Cancelled registration
- The sector it represents is a
Alliance of Advocates in Mining specifically defined group
26 204358 12-204 (PLM) Advancement for National which may not be allowed
Progress (AAMA) registration under the party-list
system; and
- Failure to establish that the
 nominees actually belong to the
sector.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012[36]
Cancelled registration
- The nominees are disqualified
from representing the sectors
that the party represents;
Social Movement for Active
- Failure to comply with the
27 204359 12-272 (PLM) Reform and Transparency
track record requirement; and
(SMART)
- There is doubt as to whether
majority of its members are
marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012[37]
Cancelled registration and
accreditation
- Defective registration and
accreditation dating back to
2010;
Alliance of Bicolnon Party
28 204238 12-173 (PLM) - Failure to represent any
(ABP)
sector; and
- Failure to establish that the
nominees are employed in the
construction industry, the
sector it claims to represent.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012[38]
Cancelled registration and
accreditation
- Failure to prove a track record
of trying to uplift the
marginalized and
29 204323 12-210 (PLM) Bayani Party List (BAYANI)
underrepresented sector of
professionals; and
- One nominee was declared
unqualified to represent the
sector of professionals.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012[39]
Cancelled registration and
accreditation
- Failure to establish a track
record of enhancing the lives of
the marginalized and
Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong
30 204321 12-252 (PLM) underrepresented farmers
(AANI)
which it claims to represent;
and
- More than a majority of the
party's nominees do not belong
to the farmers sector.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012[40]
Cancelled registration and
accreditation
- Failure to prove that its five
Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples nominees are members of the
31 204125 12-292 (PLM)
Rights Alliance, Inc. (A-IPRA) indigenous people sector;
- Failure to prove that its five
nominees actively participated
in the undertakings of the
 party; and
- Failure to prove that its five
nominees are bona fide
members.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012[41]
Cancelled registration and
accreditation
- The party is affiliated with
private and government
agencies and is not
marginalized;
Philippine Coconut Producers
32 204216 12-202 (PLM) - The party is assisted by the
Federation, Inc. (COCOFED)
government in various projects;
and
- The nominees are not
members of the marginalized
sector of coconut farmers and
producers.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012[42]
Cancelled registration
- Failure to establish a track
record of continuously
representing the peasant
farmers sector;
- Failure to show that its
members actually belong to the
Abang Lingkod Party-List
33 204220 12-238 (PLM) peasant farmers sector; and
(ABANG LINGKOD)
- Failure to show that its
nominees are marginalized and
underrepresented, have
actively participated in
programs for the advancement
of farmers, and adhere to its
advocacies.
Resolution dated 14 November 2012[43]
Cancelled registration and
accreditation
- Failure to show that the party
is actually able to represent all
of the sectors it claims to
Action Brotherhood for Active represent;
34 204158 12-158 (PLM)
Dreamers, Inc. (ABROAD) - Failure to show a complete
track record of its activities
since its registration; and
- The nominees are not part of
any of the sectors which the
party seeks to represent.
Resolution dated 28 November 2012[44]
Cancelled registration and
accreditation
- The party receives assistance
Binhi-Partido ng mga from the government through
35 204374 12-228 (PLM) Magsasaka Para sa mga the Department of Agriculture;
Magsasaka (BINHI) and
- Failure to prove that the
group is marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 28 November 2012[45]
Cancelled registration and
accreditation
- Failure to establish that the
agriculture and cooperative
sectors are marginalized and
36 204356 12-136 (PLM) Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL) underrepresented; and
- The party's nominees neither
appear to belong to the sectors
they seek to represent, nor to
have actively participated in the
undertakings of the party.
Resolution dated 3 December 2012[46]
Cancelled registration and
accreditation
- Declaration of untruthful
statements;
1st Kabalikat ng Bayan - Failure to exist for at least one
37 204486 12-194 (PLM) Ginhawang Sangkatauhan (1st year; and
KABAGIS) - None of its nominees belong
to the labor, fisherfolk, and
urban poor indigenous cultural
communities sectors which it
seeks to represent.
Resolution dated 4 December 2012[47]
Cancelled accreditation
- The party represents drivers
and operators, who may have
1-United Transport Koalisyon
38 204410 12-198 (PLM) conflicting interests; and
(1-UTAK)
- The party's nominees do not
belong to any marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
Resolution dated 4 December 2012[48]
Cancelled registration
Coalition of Senior Citizens in
204421, 12-157 (PLM), 12-191 - The party violated election
39 the Philippines, Inc. (SENIOR
204425 (PLM) laws because its nominees had
CITIZENS)
a term-sharing agreement.

These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI, 1GANAP/GUARDIANS,
A BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI, AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY,
PACYAW, PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG, ANAD, GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART,
ABP, BAYANI, AANI, A-IPRA, COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-
UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS) were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the
COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May
2013 party-list elections.

Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. This Decision governs only the 54
consolidated petitions that were granted Status Quo Ante Orders, namely:

G.R. No. SPP No. Group

Resolution dated 13 November 2012
12-154 (PLM)
203818-19 AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB)
12-177 (PLM)
203981 12-187 (PLM) Association for Righteousness Advocacy on Leadership (ARAL)
204002 12-188 (PLM) Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC)
203922 12-201 (PLM) Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC)
203960 12-260 (PLM) 1st Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy, Inc. (1-CARE)
203936 12-248 (PLM) Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa (AKMA-PTM)
203958 12-015 (PLM) Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang Sala, Inc. (KAKUSA)
203976 12-288 (PLM) Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc. (ARARO)
Resolution dated 20 November 2012
204094 12-185 (PLM) Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD)
204125 12-292 (PLM) Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance, Inc. (A-IPRA)
204100 12-196 (PLM) 1-Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (1BRO-PGBI)
Resolution dated 27 November 2012
The True Marcos Loyalist (for God, Country and People)
204141 12-229 (PLM)
Association of the Philippines, Inc. (BANTAY)
Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa Magsasaka ng Pilipinas
204240 12-279 (PLM)
Movement (AGRI)
204216 12-202 (PLM) Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED)
204158 12-158 (PLM) Action Brotherhood for Active Dreamer, Inc. (ABROAD)
Resolutions dated 4 December 2012
1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines, Inc.
204122 12-223 (PLM)
(1GANAP/GUARDIANS)
203766 12-161 (PLM) Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum)
204318 12-220 (PLM) United Movement Against Drugs Foundation (UNIMAD)
Blessed Federation of Farmers and Fishermen International,
204263 12-257 (PLM)
Inc. (A BLESSED Party-List)
204174 12-232 (PLM) Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT)
Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang Pilipinong Magsasaka
204126 12-263 (PLM)
(KAP)
Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa Lupa,
204364 12-180 (PLM)
Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran (AKO-BAHAY)
204139 12-127 (PL) Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM)
204220 12-238 (PLM) Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG LINGKOD)
204236 12-254 (PLM) Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K)
204238 12-173 (PLM) Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)
Green Force for the Environment Sons and Daughters of
204239 12-060 (PLM)
Mother Earth (GREENFORCE)
204321 12-252 (PLM) Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI)
204323 12-210 (PLM) Bayani Party List (BAYANI)
204341 12-269 (PLM) Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)
Alliance of Advocates in Mining Advancement for National
204358 12-204 (PLM)
Progress (AAMA)
Social Movement for Active Reform and Transparency
204359 12-272 (PLM)
(SMART)
204356 12-136 (PLM) Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)
Resolution dated 11 December 2012
204402 12-061 (PL) Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN)
Association of Guard, Utility Helper, Aider, Rider,
204394 12-145 (PL) Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent and Nanny of the
Philippines, Inc. (GUARDJAN)
Pilipino Association for Country Urban Poor Youth
204408 12-217 (PLM)
Advancement and Welfare (PACYAW)
204428 12-256 (PLM) Ang Galing Pinoy (AG)
204490 12-073 (PLM) Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)
204379 12-099 (PLM) Alagad ng Sining (ASIN)
204367 12-104 (PL) Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN)
Association of Local Athletics Entrepreneurs and Hobbyists,
204426 12-011 (PLM)
Inc. (ALA-EH)
 Manila Teachers Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (Manila
204455 12-041 (PLM)
Teachers)
Binhi-Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para sa mga Magsasaka
204374 12-228 (PLM)
(BINHI)
204370 12-011 (PP) Ako An Bisaya (AAB)
204435 12-057 (PLM) 1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party (1AAAP)
1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang Sangkatauhan (1st
204486 12-194 (PLM)
KABAGIS)
204410 12-198 (PLM) 1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK)
12-157 (PLM) Coalition of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (SENIOR
204421, 204425
12-191 (PLM) CITIZENS)
12-009 (PP), 12-165
204436 Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI)
(PLM)
Alliance of Organizations, Networks and Associations of the
204485 12-175 (PL)
Philippines, Inc. (ALONA)
204484 11-002 Partido ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB)
Resolution dated 11 December 2012
204153 12-277 (PLM) Pasang Masda Nationwide Party (PASANG MASDA)

The Issues

We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by
cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; and second,
whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on
Elections[49] (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

The Court's Ruling

We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of
this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional,
and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied
by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for
the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in
the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.

The Party-List System

The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the party-
list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in
legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives.[50] The voter elects two
representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another for his
or her party-list group or organization of choice. The 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 5, Article VI

(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall
be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of
this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by
law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C

Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those
registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.

Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be
represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other
similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.

Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the party-
list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation." [51] The constitutional
provisions on the party-list system should be read in light of the following discussion among its framers:

MR. MONSOD: x x x.

I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the party list system is
not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to
avoid the dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the members of the sectors. In making the
proposal on the party list system, we were made aware of the problems precisely cited by Commissioner
Bacani of which sectors will have reserved seats. In effect, a sectoral representation in the Assembly would
mean that certain sectors would have reserved seats; that they will choose among themselves who would
sit in those reserved seats. And then, we have the problem of which sector because as we will notice in
Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were the farmers, fishermen, workers, students, professionals,
business, military, academic, ethnic and other similar groups. So these are the nine sectors that were
identified here as "sectoral representatives" to be represented in this Commission. The problem we had in
trying to approach sectoral representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors or
include other sectors. And we went through the exercise in a caucus of which sector should be included
which went up to 14 sectors. And as we all know, the longer we make our enumeration, the more limiting
the law become because when we make an enumeration we exclude those who are not in the enumeration.
Second, we had the problem of who comprise the farmers. Let us just say the farmers and the laborers.
These days, there are many citizens who are called "hyphenated citizens." A doctor may be a farmer; a
lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of the person to say "I am a farmer" so he
would be included in that sector.

The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of sectoral representation in the
Assembly, we are, in effect, giving some people two votes and other people one vote. We sought to avoid
these problems by presenting a party list system. Under the party list system, there are no reserved seats
for sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can form a sectoral party or a sectoral organization that will
then register and present candidates of their party. How do the mechanics go? Essentially, under the party
list system, every voter has two votes, so there is no discrimination. First, he will vote for the
representative of his legislative district. That is one vote. In that same ballot, he will be asked: What party
or organization or coalition do you wish to be represented in the Assembly? And here will be attached a
list of the parties, organizations or coalitions that have been registered with the COMELEC and are
entitled to be put in that list. This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO,
Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he wants the farmers'
party to be represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the
COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had been garnered by each party or each organization one
does not have to be a political party and register in order to participate as a party and count the votes and
from there derive the percentage of the votes that had been cast in favor of a party, organization or
coalition.

When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of the 250 seats will be for the
party list system. So, we have a limit of 30 percent of 50. That means that the maximum that any party
can get out of these 50 seats is 15. When the parties register they then submit a list of 15 names. They have
to submit these names because these nominees

have to meet the minimum qualifications of a Member of the National Assembly. At the end of the day,
when the votes are tabulated, one gets the percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets 10 percent or 15 percent of
the votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a women's party gets 2 1/2 percent and anybody who has at least 2 1/2
percent of the vote qualifies and the 50 seats are apportioned among all of these parties who get at least 2
1/2 percent of the vote.

What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say, 500,000
nationwide gets a seat in the National Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we allocate
legislative districts, we are saying that any district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no reason
why a group that has a national constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special interest group, should not
have a voice in the National Assembly. It also means that, let us say, there are three or four labor groups,
they all register as a party or as a group. If each of them gets only one percent or five of them get one
percent, they are not entitled to any representative. So, they will begin to think that if they really have a
common interest, they should band together, form a coalition and get five percent of the vote and,
therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those are the dynamics of a party list system.

We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at the same time
making sure that those who really have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance
to have a seat in the National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have the constituency to
win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may not be able to win a seat on a district basis but surely,
they will have votes on a nationwide basis.

The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain
groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide; have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But
they were always third place or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the
Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not
win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of
the party list system.

BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak now of party list
system though we refer to sectors, we would be referring to sectoral party list rather than sectors and
party list?

MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do not even have to
mention sectors because the sectors would be included in the party list system. They can be sectoral
parties within the party list system.

xxxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system
because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x
x We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be
there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of
representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party
list system. x x x.

xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political
parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and
Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must
they be under the district legislation side of it only?

MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner
mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives.
Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent,
whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can
also participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding
only sectoral candidates.

MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the
different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.

MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents
the farmers, would he qualify?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.

MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a
farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?

MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly
minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they
can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is
precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all
sectors are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?

MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will
dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang
party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized
sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.

MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner
Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned
from running under the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition
alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?

MR. TADEO. The same.

MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD: Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi talagang labor leader or
isang laborer? Halimbawa, abogado ito.

MR. TADEO: Iyong mechanics.

MR. MONSOD: Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an inherent problem of sectoral
representation. My question is: Suppose UNIDO fields a labor leader, would he qualify?

MR. TADEO: The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a political party is
really organized along a specific sectoral line. If such is verified or confirmed, the political
party may submit a list of individuals who are actually members of such sectors. The lists
are to be published to give individuals or organizations belonging to such sector the chance
to present evidence contradicting claims of membership in the said sector or to question
the claims of the existence of such sectoral organizations or parties. This proceeding shall
be conducted by the COMELEC and shall be summary in character. In other words,
COMELEC decisions on this matter are final and unappealable. [52] (Emphasis supplied)

Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only
sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a
part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo
Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system "[F]or as long as they
field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate
in this Constitution."[53]

In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to sectoral parties in the
House of Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the party-list system exclusively to sectoral parties.
As clearly explained by Justice Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang Bagong Bayani:

The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of the 1987 Constitution
took off from two staunch positions the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20
per centum of the total seats in Congress to be allocated to party-list representatives half were to be
reserved to appointees from the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The proposal was opposed
by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the difficulty in delimiting the sectors that needed
representation. He was of the view that reserving seats for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
would stunt their development into full-pledged parties equipped with electoral machinery potent enough
to further the sectoral interests to be represented. The Villacorta group, on the other hand, was
apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral contest would
be like placing babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and more established political parties
ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized this concern when it banned the first five major
political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives from participating in
the party-list system for the first party-list elections held in 1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting
with the 2001 elections). The advocates for permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort
towards a compromise that the party-list system be open only to underrepresented and marginalized
sectors. This proposal was further whittled down by allocating only half of the seats under the party-list
system to candidates from the sectors which would garner the required number of votes. The majority was
unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in the alternative the
reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups, was voted down. The only
concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was an assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors
for three consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by which time they would be
expected to gather and solidify their electoral base and brace themselves in the multi-party electoral
contest with the more veteran political groups.[54] (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted. Instead,
the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first three consecutive
terms.[55] There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected
the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly
intended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in
legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes
that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list system will be the entry
point to membership in the House of Representatives for both these non-traditional parties that could not
compete in legislative district elections.

The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list system both
sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution, which
states:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations. Emphasis supplied)

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The commas after the
words "national[,]" and "regional[,]" separate national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the
framers of the 1987 Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral,
they would have stated "national and regional sectoral parties." They did not, precisely because it was
never their intention to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.

What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the
party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the
three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional
parties are separate from sectoral parties.

Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations;
(2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional
parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional
parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular
sector.

Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the party-list
system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.

First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to non-
sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively for
sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented." Second, the reservation of one-
half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first
three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class
or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.

Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1)
and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not
for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.

Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the party-list system
prescribed in the Constitution, provides:

Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in
the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of
which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or

platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the
most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority
of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at
least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector.

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share
similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations for political and/or election purposes. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No.
7941 further provides that a "political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government." On
the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an organized
group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides
different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from
each other.

R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties
under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and
exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will
these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections,
participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from
the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only
option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously
senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No.
7941.

Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a
sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any
particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must
represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of
citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and
policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals."[56] The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily "marginalized and
underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by definition "marginalized and underrepresented,"
not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth
may "lack well-defined political constituencies," and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties in
advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective sectors.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not require
national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented." Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or
cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due notice and hearing.

Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration
of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.

None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the "marginalized
and underrepresented."

The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in Section 2
on Declaration of Policy.[57]Section 2 seeks "to promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through the party-list system," which will enable Filipinos
belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and
who lack well-defined political constituencies," to become members of the House of
Representatives. While the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to
"marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties," the specific implementing
provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require that the sectors, organizations or parties must be
"marginalized and underrepresented." On the contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors mentioned in
Section 5 are "marginalized and underrepresented" would lead to absurdities.

How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 with its specific
implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the
matter?
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in Section 5
that are, by their nature, economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These sectors
are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the
sectoral party must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees of
the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy
for the sector represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not
mean one must "wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector,
is below the middle class. More specifically, the economically "marginalized and underrepresented" are
those who fall in the low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.[58]

The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly,
women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based
and cause-oriented parties who lack "well-defined political constituencies" a chance to win seats in the
House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and underrepresented"
the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the
margins of society, will give the "marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats
in the House of Representatives.

This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a multi-
party system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic and ideological
status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the House of Representatives. This
interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent, eliminating the need for
relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as "wallowing in poverty, destitution and
infirmity," even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.

The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major
political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack "well-defined political
constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national or
regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily those that do not belong to
major political parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the party-
list system to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have
members in the House of Representatives.

To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the accreditation of parties
under the party-list system, that "while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and
the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory
policy of enabling 'Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors xxx to be
elected to the House of Representatives.' " However, the requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its
second guideline, that "the political party xxx must represent the marginalized and underrepresented,"
automatically disqualified major political parties from participating in the party-list system.
This inherent inconsistency in Ang Bagong Bayani has been compounded by the COMELEC's refusal
to register sectoral wings officially organized by major political parties. BANAT merely formalized the
prevailing practice when it expressly prohibited major political parties from participating in the party-
list system, even through their sectoral wings.

Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political parties on the basis
of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress" from
participating in the May 1988 party-list elections.[59] Thus, major political parties can participate
in subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988
party-list elections. However, major political parties should participate in party-list elections only
through their sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties through their sectoral wings, a
majority of whose members are "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack
well-defined political constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list elections
so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies." The participation of
major political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House
of Representatives, of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies," giving them a voice in law-making. Thus, to participate in party-list elections, a major
political party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like
a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the
party-list system.

Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or program
of government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector represented. The
sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and islinked to a major political party through a
coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that "component parties or
organizations of a coalition may participate independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition
of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system."

Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision prescribes a
special qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector.

Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list

representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to
read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day
of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30)
during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.

A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to
represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must
either belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.

In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those who desire to
participate in the party-list system:

First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x

Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling
"Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House
of Representatives." x x x.

xxxx

Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x x.

xxxx

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates
the grounds for disqualification as follows:

"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered."
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or
assisted by, the government. x x x.

xxxx

Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so.
Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:

"SEC 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative

unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a
bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30)
during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. x x x.

Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. (Emphasis supplied)

In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling further.
In BANAT, the majority officially excluded major political parties from participating in party-list
elections,[60] abandoning even the lip-service that Ang Bagong Bayaniaccorded to the 1987 Constitution
and R.A.No. 7941 that major political parties can participate in party-list elections.

The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in the party-list
system through their sectoral wings. The minority expressed that "[e]xcluding the major political parties
in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission,
and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the
exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and
the law."[61] The experimentations in socio-political engineering have only resulted in confusion and
absurdity in the party-list system. Such experimentations, in clear contravention of the 1987 Constitution
and R.A. No. 7941, must now come to an end.
We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying
petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave abuse
of discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must now impose and
mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and
R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a new formula in the allocation of party-list seats, reversing
the COMELEC's allocation which followed the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong Bayani. In BANAT,
however, the Court did not declare that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. Similarly,
even as we acknowledge here that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, we declare
that it would not be in accord with the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang
Bagong Bayani and BANAT in determining who are qualified to participate in the coming 13 May
2013 party-list elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule[62] that a party may appeal to this
Court from decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion.

Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following
parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major
or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections
only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The
sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a
coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in

"well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and
underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
"well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of
sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that
represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not
satisfy these two criteria: (1) allnational, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) allnominees must belong to the "marginalized
and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC
because as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they
represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors.
Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any
sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to
qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed above, the
disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from
engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained.
Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should
be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13
May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.

WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have been granted
Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the names of petitioners in the
printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections only for determination whether
petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system under the parameters prescribed in this
Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. The 41 petitions, which have
been granted mandatory injunctions to include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are
remanded to the Commission on Elections for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register
under the party-list system and to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the parameters
prescribed in this Decision. The Commission on Elections may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for
this purpose. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

BANAT v. Comelec

G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY

(BANAT), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers), Respondent.
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.
AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR
CITIZENS),Intervenor.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179295 April 21, 2009

BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION

AND HARMONY TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., and ABONO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 — Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) — in a petition for certiorari and mandamus,1 assails the Resolution2 promulgated on 3 August
2007 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELEC’s resolution
in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National
Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT filed
before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution.

The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science Professionals (ABS),
Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior
Citizens).

Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 — Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment
Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) — in a petition for
certiorari with mandamus and prohibition,3 assails NBC Resolution No. 07-604 promulgated on 9 July
2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of parties, organizations and coalitions that obtained at
least two percent of the total votes cast under the Party-List System. The COMELEC announced that,
upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the total number of seats of
each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v.
COMELEC5 (Veterans).

Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans Freedom Party, filed a
motion to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.

The Facts

The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC
counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System.6

On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives
Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition
because "[t]he Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national
papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply
the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."7 There were no intervenors in BANAT’s petition
before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007.

On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay
Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabriela’s
Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan!
Citizen’s Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network
Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub-
Committee for Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a
total of fifteen million two hundred eighty three thousand six hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes
under the Party-List System of Representation, in connection with the National and Local Elections
conducted last 14 May 2007;

WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the National Board of
Canvassers reveals that the projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher than sixteen
million seven hundred twenty three thousand one hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the
following statistical data:

Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections

i. Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated 15,283,659

ii. Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/ 1,337,032

untabulated (i.e. canvass deferred)

iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100% outcome) 102,430

from areas not yet submitted for canvass (Bogo, Cebu;
Bais City; Pantar, Lanao del Norte; and Pagalungan,
Maguindanao)

Maximum Total Party-List Votes 16,723,121

WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in part:

The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than two percent
(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: provided,
finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-list votes, the presumptive
two percent (2%) threshold can be pegged at three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-
two (334,462)votes;

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC,
reiterated its ruling in Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC adopting a formula for the additional
seats of each party, organization or coalition receving more than the required two percent (2%) votes,
stating that the same shall be determined only after all party-list ballots have been completely canvassed;

WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered at least three hundred
thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes are as follows:

RANK PARTY/ORGANIZATION/ VOTES

COALITION RECEIVED

1 BUHAY 1,163,218

2 BAYAN MUNA 972,730

3 CIBAC 760,260

4 GABRIELA 610,451
 5 APEC 538,971

6 A TEACHER 476,036

7 AKBAYAN 470,872

8 ALAGAD 423,076

9 BUTIL 405,052

10 COOP-NATCO 390,029

11 BATAS 386,361

12 ANAK PAWIS 376,036

13 ARC 338,194

14 ABONO 337,046

WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against
which an URGENT PETITION FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND
DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has
been filed before the Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all the parties, organizations and
coalitions included in the aforementioned list are therefore entitled to at least one seat under the party-list
system of representation in the meantime.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code,
Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other election laws, the Commission
on Elections, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY
PROCLAIM, subject to certain conditions set forth below, the following parties, organizations and
coalitions participating under the Party-List System:

1 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong BUHAY

2 Bayan Muna BAYAN MUNA

3 Citizens Battle Against Corruption CIBAC

4 Gabriela Women’s Party GABRIELA

5 Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives APEC

6 Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through A TEACHER

Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards
Educational Reforms, Inc.

7 Akbayan! Citizen’s Action Party AKBAYAN

8 Alagad ALAGAD

9 Luzon Farmers Party BUTIL

10 Cooperative-Natco Network Party COOP-NATCCO

11 Anak Pawis ANAKPAWIS

12 Alliance of Rural Concerns ARC

 13 Abono ABONO

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or coalitions which may later
on be established to have obtained at least two percent (2%) of the total actual votes cast under the
Party-List System.

The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant
to Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list
results.

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby

deferred until final resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in order not to render the proceedings therein moot and
academic.

Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending
disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.

Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.8 (Emphasis in the original)

Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No.
07-72, which declared the additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from the
COMELEC’s interpretation of the Veterans formula as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72:

WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the National Board of
Canvassers proclaimed thirteen (13) qualified parties, organization[s] and coalitions based on the
presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of 334,462 votes from the projected maximum total number of
party-list votes of 16,723,121, and were thus given one (1) guaranteed party-list seat each;

WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the National Board of
Canvassers, the projected maximum total party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes actually
canvassed, votes canvassed but not included in Report No. 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and
maximum votes expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and that the projected maximum
total votes for the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalition[s] are as follows:

Party-List Projected total number of votes

1 BUHAY 1,178,747

2 BAYAN MUNA 977,476

3 CIBAC 755,964

4 GABRIELA 621,718

5 APEC 622,489

6 A TEACHER 492,369

7 AKBAYAN 462,674

8 ALAGAD 423,190
 9 BUTIL 409,298

10 COOP-NATCO 412,920

11 ANAKPAWIS 370,165

12 ARC 375,846

13 ABONO 340,151

WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest number
of votes among the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, making it the "first party" in
accordance with Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC, reiterated in Citizen’s Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC;

WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the party-list system of
representation that have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an additional seat or seats
based on the formula prescribed by the Supreme Court in Veterans;

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the "first party", the correct formula as expressed
in Veterans, is:

Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of first

= party relative to total votes for
Total votes for party-list system party-list system

wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall entitle it to additional
seats:

Proportion of votes received Additional seats

by the first party

Equal to or at least 6% Two (2) additional seats

Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6% One (1) additional seat

Less than 4% No additional seat

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage:

1,178,747
= 0.07248 or 7.2%
16,261,369

which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties, organizations and
coalitions, the correct formula as expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:
 No. of votes of
concerned party No. of additional
Additional seats for
= x seats allocated
a concerned party
No. of votes of to first party
first party

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:

Party List Percentage Additional Seat

BAYAN MUNA 1.65 1

CIBAC 1.28 1

GABRIELA 1.05 1

APEC 1.05 1

A TEACHER 0.83 0

AKBAYAN 0.78 0

ALAGAD 0.71 0

BUTIL 0.69 0

COOP-NATCO 0.69 0

ANAKPAWIS 0.62 0

ARC 0.63 0

ABONO 0.57 0

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Omnibus Election Code,
Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and other elections laws, the Commission
on Elections en bancsitting as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to proclaim the following parties, organizations or coalitions as entitled to additional seats, to
wit:

Party List Additional Seats

BUHAY 2

BAYAN MUNA 1

CIBAC 1

GABRIELA 1

APEC 1

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions which may later
on be established to have obtained at least two per cent (2%) of the total votes cast under the party-list
system to entitle them to one (1) guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes to entitle
them to one (1) additional seat.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending
disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.

Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.9

Acting on BANAT’s petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August 2007, which
reads as follows:

This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
Constitution filed by the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).

Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal Group submitted
his comments/observations and recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)], which reads:

COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:

Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its Petition to
Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution prayed for the
following reliefs, to wit:

1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-List representatives as mandated by
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution shall be proclaimed.

2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be
harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA
7941 in that it should be applicable only to the first party-list representative seats to be allotted on
the basis of their initial/first ranking.

3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and

4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to every 2% of
the votes they received and the additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12
of RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the percentage of votes obtained by each party-list group in
relation to the total nationwide votes cast in the party-list election, after deducting the
corresponding votes of those which were allotted seats under the 2% threshold rule. In fine, the
formula/procedure prescribed in the "ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX "A" of
COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June 1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of
determining how many seats shall be proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled to
representative seats and how many of their nominees shall seat [sic].

5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 and that
the procedure in allocating seats for party-list representative prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941
shall be followed.

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N:

The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.

The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re "In the Matter of the
Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating
Under the Party-List System During the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections" resolved among
others that the total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined
pursuant to the Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of
the party-list results."1awphi1

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby

RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal
Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT for being moot and academic.

Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.

SO ORDERED.10

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider
its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because
the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the
same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC. 11

Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC proclaimed
three other party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-
List System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP), 12 Anak Mindanao (AMIN),13 and
An Waray.14 Per the certification15by COMELEC, the following party-list organizations have been
proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:

Party-List No. of Seat(s)

1.1 Buhay 3
1.2 Bayan Muna 2
1.3 CIBAC 2
1.4 Gabriela 2
1.5 APEC 2
1.6 A Teacher 1
1.7 Akbayan 1
1.8 Alagad 1
1.9 Butil 1
1.10 Coop-Natco [sic] 1
1.11 Anak Pawis 1
1.12 ARC 1
1.13 Abono 1
1.14 AGAP 1
 1.15 AMIN 1

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against

which an Urgent Petition for Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification of Party-list
Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the COMELEC, was
deferred pending final resolution of SPC No. 07-250.

Issues

BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article VI
of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?

2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA
7941 constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?16

Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in their petition:

I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of Canvassers, committed

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified
party-list organizations as said rule:

A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation.

B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:

1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating additional seats
for the "First Party" violates the principle of proportional representation under RA
7941.

2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one for the "First
Party" and another for the qualifying parties, violates Section 11(b) of RA 7941.

3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are different from
those required under RA 7941;

C. Violates the "Four Inviolable Parameters" of the Philippine party-list system as

provided for under the same case of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC.

II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it implemented the First-Party Rule in the
allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations, the same being merely in consonance with
the ruling in Veterans Federations Party, et al. v. COMELEC, the instant Petition is a justiciable
case as the issues involved herein are constitutional in nature, involving the correct interpretation
and implementation of RA 7941, and are of transcendental importance to our nation. 17
 Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we
defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI
of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?

2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one
seat constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?

5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-
list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the
party-list elections?18

The Ruling of the Court

The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least four
inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:

First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not
exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party list;

Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of
the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional
seats;

Fourth, proportional representation— the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."19

However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term
"proportional representation," this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional
seats to party-list organizations.

Number of Party-List Representatives:

The Formula Mandated by the Constitution

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection
or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty
per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those
under the party-list.

xxx

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the "House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law." The House of
Representatives shall be composed of district representatives and party-list representatives. The
Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of the House of
Representatives.1avvphi1.zw+

Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list representatives
to the total number of representatives. We compute the number of seats available to party-list
representatives from the number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first
formula in Veterans, thus:

Number of seats
available to legislative districts Number of seats available to
x .20 = party-list representatives
.80

This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list
representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the
Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives.

220
x .20 = 55
.80

After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of
representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list
representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.

Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:

The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap

All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under the Party-List
System, as well as on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at
least two-percent of the total party-list votes. However, there are numerous interpretations of the
provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of "additional seats" under the Party-List
System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule,20 and Justice Vicente V. Mendoza’s dissent
in Veterans presented Germany’s Niemeyer formula21 as an alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for party-list
representatives. Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12
of which provide:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — x x x

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,22 the following procedure shall be observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering
more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion
to their total number of votes:Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall
be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. — The COMELEC shall tally all
the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the
number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the
percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide
votes cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)

In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate party-list
representative seats.

The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2% requirement with
Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure as follows:

(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total Members of the
House of Representatives including those from the party-list groups as prescribed by Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941 and Comelec Resolution No. 2847
dated 25 June 1996. Since there are 220 District Representatives in the 14th Congress, there
shall be 55 Party-List Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed.

(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per centum (2%) of the
total party-list votes they obtained; provided, that no party-list groups shall have more than three
(3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).

(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list groups under
the immediately preceding paragraph and after deducting from their total the votes corresponding
to those seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted proportionately to all the party-list groups
which have not secured the maximum three (3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in accordance
with Section 12 of RA 7941.23

Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT’s first interpretation.

The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is declared
unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No.
7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:

(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis;
 (b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,

(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes

obtained by each party, organization or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the
party-list system.24

BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional percentage of the
votes received by each party as against the total nationwide party-list votes, and the other is "by making
the votes of a party-list with a median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of
seats."25 Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT’s second interpretation.

In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELEC’s original 2-4-6
formula and the Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up.
They claim that both formulas do not factor in the total number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List
System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After
determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is generated by dividing the votes of a qualified
party by the total votes of all qualified parties only. The number of seats allocated to a qualified party is
computed by multiplying the total party-list seats available with the second percentage. There will be a
first round of seat allocation, limited to using the whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats
allocated to the concerned party-list. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second round of
seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the whole integers are ranked from
highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are allocated until all the seats are
filled up.26

We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives.

Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
garnered during the elections.27

Votes Votes
Rank Party Rank Party
Garnered Garnered

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 48 KALAHI 88,868

2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 49 APOI 79,386

3 CIBAC 755,686 50 BP 78,541

4 GABRIELA 621,171 51 AHONBAYAN 78,424

5 APEC 619,657 52 BIGKIS 77,327

6 A TEACHER 490,379 53 PMAP 75,200

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 54 AKAPIN 74,686

8 ALAGAD 423,149 55 PBA 71,544

9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 56 GRECON 62,220

10 BUTIL 409,160 57 BTM 60,993

11 BATAS 385,810 58 A SMILE 58,717

12 ARC 374,288 59 NELFFI 57,872

13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60 AKSA 57,012

14 ABONO 339,990 61 BAGO 55,846

15 AMIN 338,185 62 BANDILA 54,751

16 AGAP 328,724 63 AHON 54,522

17 AN WARAY 321,503 64 ASAHAN MO 51,722

18 YACAP 310,889 65 AGBIAG! 50,837

19 FPJPM 300,923 66 SPI 50,478

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67 BAHANDI 46,612

21 ABS 235,086 68 ADD 45,624

22 KAKUSA 228,999 69 AMANG 43,062

23 KABATAAN 228,637 70 ABAY PARAK 42,282

24 ABA-AKO 218,818 71 BABAE KA 36,512

25 ALIF 217,822 72 SB 34,835

26 SENIOR CITIZENS 213,058 73 ASAP 34,098

27 AT 197,872 74 PEP 33,938

28 VFP 196,266 75 ABA ILONGGO 33,903

29 ANAD 188,521 76 VENDORS 33,691

30 BANAT 177,028 77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896

31 ANG KASANGGA 170,531 78 ALMANA 32,255

32 BANTAY 169,801 79 AANGAT KA PILIPINO 29,130

33 ABAKADA 166,747 80 AAPS 26,271

34 1-UTAK 164,980 81 HAPI 25,781

35 TUCP 162,647 82 AAWAS 22,946

36 COCOFED 155,920 83 SM 20,744

37 AGHAM 146,032 84 AG 16,916

38 ANAK 141,817 85 AGING PINOY 16,729

39 ABANSE! PINAY 130,356 86 APO 16,421

40 PM 119,054 87 BIYAYANG BUKID 16,241

41 AVE 110,769 88 ATS 14,161

42 SUARA 110,732 89 UMDJ 9,445

 43 ASSALAM 110,440 90 BUKLOD FILIPINA 8,915

44 DIWA 107,021 91 LYPAD 8,471

45 ANC 99,636 92 AA-KASOSYO 8,406

46 SANLAKAS 97,375 93 KASAPI 6,221

47 ABC 90,058 TOTAL 15,950,900

The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that "parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
seat each." This clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20
party-list candidates for illustration purposes. The percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived
at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast
for all party-list candidates.

Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes garnered over the total
votes for the party-list.28

Votes Garnered over

Votes Guaranteed
Rank Party Total Votes for Party-
Garnered Seat
List, in %

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1

2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1

3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1

4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1

5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1

6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1

8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1

9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1

10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1

11 BATAS29 385,810 2.42% 1

12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1

13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1

14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1

15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1

16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1

17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1

 Total 17

18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0

19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0

From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from the total number
of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the
party-list candidates that are "entitled to one seat each," or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat
allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.

The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes." This is where petitioners’ and intervenors’ problem with the formula
in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in proportion to their total number of votes" to be in
proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A.
No. 7941.

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent
threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A.
No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically
impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available
party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House
of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100
participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes,
gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50
parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent
threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and
even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two
percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to
exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.

We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional
seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold
presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution
and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives."30

In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the
following procedure shall be observed:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats
are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have
already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for
allocation as "additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941
allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in
Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is
arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of
votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the
percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55
maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters.
The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a
party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties
next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38
seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number
of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:

Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Votes
Garnered
Guaranteed Additional (B) plus
over Applying
Seat Seats (C), in
Votes Total the three
Rank Party (First (Second whole
Garnered Votes for seat cap
Round) Round) integers
Party List, (E)
(B) (C) (D)
in %
(A)

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.

BAYAN
2 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.
MUNA

3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.

4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.

5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.

6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A.

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A.

8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.

COOP-
931 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
NATCCO

10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.

 11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.

12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A.

13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A.

14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.

15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.

16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A.

17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A.

18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A.

19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A.

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A.

21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A.

22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A.

23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A.

24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.

25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.

SENIOR
26 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A.
CITIZENS

27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A.

28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A.

29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A.

30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A.

ANG
31 170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A.
KASANGGA

32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A.

33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A.

34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.

35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A.

36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A.

Total 17 55

Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list
representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The
additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to
exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown in column (D).
 Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections

The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to
participate in the party-list elections. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly bear
this out, thus:

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system
because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x
x We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That
is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any
single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.

xxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My
question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as
political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they be under the district legislation
side of it only?

MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field
candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field
sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we
are allocating under the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also
participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only
sectoral candidates.

MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.

MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents
the farmers, would he qualify?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.

MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a
farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?

MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly
minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can
prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is
precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all
sectors are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?

MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will
dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang
party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized
sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.

MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner
Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned
from running under the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone,
UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?

MR. TADEO. The same.

MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.

xxxx

MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass
organizations to seek common ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no
reason why they should not be able to make common goals with mass organizations so that the very
leadership of these parties can be transformed through the participation of mass organizations. And if this
is true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like the Partido ng Bayan which is now being
formed. There is no question that they will be attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition
parties to which we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that with their
participation, the policies of such parties can be radically transformed because this amendment will create
conditions that will challenge both the mass organizations and the political parties to come together. And
the party list system is certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is understood that the
parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of representatives of mass organizations affiliated
with them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent system that they have in Europe where labor
organizations and cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party
and the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there has a transforming effect
upon the philosophies and the leadership of those parties.

It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always vote with the Democratic
Party. But the businessmen, most of them, always vote with the Republican Party, meaning that there is
no reason at all why political parties and mass organizations should not combine, reenforce, influence
and interact with each other so that the very objectives that we set in this Constitution for sectoral
representation are achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more institutionalized way. Therefore, I support
this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the
same time, it challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being elected representatives later on through
a party list system; and even beyond that, to become actual political parties capable of contesting political
power in the wider constitutional arena for major political parties.

x x x 32 (Emphasis supplied)

R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional Commission.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election
of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component
parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they
form part does not participate in the party-list system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate
means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a
majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical
territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and
concerns of their sector,

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who
share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations for political and/or election purposes.

Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating the
party-list elections.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-
list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to
participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional
Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of
the party-list system to the sectoral groups.33In defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as
either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties
will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is
manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This
Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political
parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.

Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major
political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or
political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the
party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other
major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further
illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and
this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the
same for the urban poor.

The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:

Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. — No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless

he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period
of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the elections, able to read and write, bona
fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty
(30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.

Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organization’s nominee "wallow in
poverty, destitution and infirmity"34 as there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the
nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors,35 that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee
represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the
determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: "The House
of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, x x x." The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list
representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we
cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the
constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a
limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid
statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list
representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.

However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political
parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue
disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his
separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with
this ponencia.

WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC
dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-
60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats.
The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance with the procedure
used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are disallowed from participating in party-list
elections. This Decision is immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Agapito Aquino v. Comelec

G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995

AGAPITO A. AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MOVE MAKATI, MATEO BEDON and JUANITO ICARO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:

The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our nascent democracy is to be
preserved. In any challenge having the effect of reversing a democratic choice, expressed through the
ballot, this Court should be ever so vigilant in finding solutions which would give effect to the will of the
majority, for sound public policy dictates that all elective offices are filled by those who have received the
highest number of votes cast in an election. When a challenge to a winning candidate's qualifications
however becomes inevitable, the ineligibility ought to be so noxious to the Constitution that giving effect to
the apparent will of the people would ultimately do harm to our democratic institutions.

On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. Among others, Aquino provided the
following information in his certificate of candidacy, viz:.

(7) RESIDENCE (Complete Address): 284 AMAPOLA COR. ADALLA STS., PALM
VILLAGE, MAKATI.

xxx xxx xxx

(8) RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED

IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: ______ Years and 10 Months.

xxx xxx xxx

THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said Office; That I will support and defend the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I
will obey the law, rules and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; That
the obligation imposed to such is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion, and that the facts therein are true to the best of my knowledge. 1

On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the
LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino2 on
the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under
Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the Constitution, should be for a period not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 95-113 and was
assigned to the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).

On April 25, 1995, a day after said petition for disqualification was filed, petitioner filed another certificate
of candidacy amending the certificate dated March 20, 1995. This time, petitioner stated in Item 8 of his
certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he sought to be elected for one (l) year and
thirteen (13) days.3

On May 2, 1995, petitioner filed his Answer dated April 29, 1995 praying for the dismissal of the
disqualification case.4

On the same day, May 2, 1995, a hearing was conducted by the COMELEC wherein petitioner testified
and presented in evidence, among others, his Affidavit dated May 2, 1995,5 lease contract between
petitioner and Leonor Feliciano dated April 1, 1994,6 Affidavit of Leonor Feliciano dated April
28,19957 and Affidavit of Daniel Galamay dated April 28, 1995.8

After hearing of the petition for disqualification, the Second Division of the COMELEC promulgated a
Resolution dated May 6, 1995, the decretal portion of which reads:
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Commission (Second Division) RESOLVES
to DISMISS the instant: petition for Disqualification against respondent AGAPITO
AQUINO and declares him ELIGIBLE to run for the Office of Representative in the
Second Legislative District of Makati City.

SO ORDERED.9

On May 7, 1995, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May 6, 1995
resolution with the COMELEC en banc.

Meanwhile, on May 8, 1995, elections were held. In Makati City where three (3) candidates vied for the
congressional seat in the Second District, petitioner garnered thirty eight thousand five hundred forty
seven (38,547) votes as against another candidate, Agusto Syjuco, who obtained thirty five thousand nine
hundred ten (35,910) votes.10

On May 10, 1995, private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to
Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the
COMELEC's Second Division resolution dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to
Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.

On May 15, 1995, COMELEC en banc issued an Order suspending petitioner's proclamation. The
dispositive portion of the order reads:

WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the
Board of Canvassers of the City of Makati is hereby directed to complete the canvassing
of election returns of the Second District of Makati, but to suspend the proclamation of
respondent Agapito A. Aquino should he obtain the winning number of votes for the
position of Representative of the Second District of the City of Makati, until the motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners on May 7, 1995, shall have been resolved by the
Commission.

The Executive Director, this Commission, is directed to cause the immediate

implementation of this Order. The Clerk of Court of the Commission is likewise directed to
inform the parties by the fastest means available of this Order, and to calendar the
hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration on May 17, 1995, at 10:00 in the morning,
PICC Press Center, Pasay City.

SO ORDERED.11

On May 16, 1995, petitioner filed his Comment/Opposition with urgent motion to lift order of suspension of
proclamation.

On June 1, 1995, petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Motion to Resolve
Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation" wherein he manifested his intention
to raise, among others, the issue of whether of not the determination of the qualifications of petitioner
after the elections is lodged exclusively in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Resolving petitioner's motion to lift suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC en banc issued an
Order on June 2, 1995, the decretal portion thereof residing:

Pursuant to the said provisions and considering the attendant circumstances of the case,
the Commission RESOLVED to proceed with the promulgation but to suspend its rules,
 to accept the filing of the aforesaid motion, and to allow the parties to be heard thereon
because the issue of jurisdiction now before the Commission has to be studied with more
reflection and judiciousness. 12

On the same day, June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution reversing the resolution of
the Second Division dated May 6, 1995. The fallo reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the

Resolution of the Second Division, promulgated on May 6, 1995, is GRANTED.
Respondent Agapito A. Aquino is declared ineligible and thus disqualified as a candidate
for the Office of Representative of the Second Legislative District of Makati City in the
May 8, 1995 elections, for lack of the constitutional qualification of residence.
Consequently, the order of suspension of proclamation of the respondent should he
obtain the winning number of votes, issued by this Commission on May 15, 1995 is now
made permanent.

Upon the finality of this Resolution, the Board of Canvassers of the City of Makati shall
immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass of election returns,
determine the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates, who shall be immediately
be proclaimed.

SO ORDERED. 13

Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari 14 assailing the orders dated May 15, 1995 and June 2, 1995, as
well as the resolution dated June 2, 1995 issued by the COMELEC en banc. Petitioner's raises the
following errors for consideration, to wit:

THE COMELEC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE AND ADJUDGE THE

DISQUALIFICATION ISSUE INVOLVING CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES AFTER
THE MAY 8, 1995 ELECTIONS, SUCH DETERMINATION BEING RESERVED TO AND
LODGE EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION, SAID

JURISDICTION CEASED IN THE INSTANT CASE AFTER THE ELECTIONS, AND THE
REMEDY/IES AVAILABLE TO THE ADVERSE PARTIES LIE/S IN ANOTHER FORUM
WHICH, IT IS SUBMITTED, IS THE HRET CONSISTENT WITH SECTION 17, ARTICLE
VI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT

PROCEEDED TO PROMULGATE ITS QUESTIONED DECISION (ANNEX "C",
PETITION) DESPITE IT OWN RECOGNITION THAT A THRESHOLD ISSUE OF
JURISDICTION HAS TO BE JUDICIOUSLY REVIEWED AGAIN,
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION, THE COMELEC
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AND SERIOUS ERROR IN
DIRECTING WITHOUT NOTICE THE SUSPENSION OF THE PROCLAMATION OF
THE PETITIONER AS THE WINNING CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATE AND DESPITE
 THE MINISTERIAL NATURE OF SUCH DUTY TO PROCLAIM (PENDING THE
FINALITY OF THE DISQUALIFICATION CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER) IF ONLY
NOT TO THWART THE PEOPLE'S WILL.

THE COMELEC'S FINDING OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESIDENCY

REQUIREMENT OF ONE YEAR AGAINST THE PETITIONER IS CONTRARY TO
EVIDENCE AND TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE.

IN ANY CASE, THE COMELEC CRITICALLY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE

THE LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF ENFORCING THE ONE YEAR RESIDENCY
REQUIREMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES IN NEWLY CREATED
POLITICAL DISTRICTS WHICH WERE ONLY EXISTING FOR LESS THAN A YEAR AT
THE TIME OF THE ELECTION AND BARELY FOUR MONTHS IN THE CASE OF
PETITIONER'S DISTRICT IN MAKATI OF CONGRESSIONAL.

THE COMELEC COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR AMOUNTING TO LACK OF

JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS TO
"DETERMINE AND PROCLAIM THE WINNER OUT OF THE REMAINING QUALIFIED
CANDIDATES" AFTER THE ERRONEOUS DISQUALIFICATION OF YOUR
PETITIONER IN THAT SUCH DIRECTIVE IS IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE WELL
SETTLED DOCTRINE THAT A SECOND PLACE CANDIDATE OR PERSON WHO WAS
REPUDIATED BY THE ELECTORATE IS A LOSER AND CANNOT BE PROCLAIMED
AS SUBSTITUTE
WINNER.15

In his first three assignments of error, petitioner vigorously contends that after the May 8, 1995 elections,
the COMELEC lost its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications to run for member of the
House of Representatives. He claims that jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification is exclusively
lodged with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Given the yet unresolved question
of jurisdiction, petitioner avers that the COMELEC committed serious error and grave abuse of discretion
in directing the suspension of his proclamation as the winning candidate in the Second Congressional
District of Makati City. We disagree.

Petitioner conveniently confuses the distinction between an unproclaimed candidate to the House of
Representatives and a member of the same. Obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does
not automatically vest the position in the winning candidate. Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution reads:

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
their respective Members.

Under the above-stated provision, the electoral tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all contests
relative to the election, returns and qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or the House only
when the latter become members of either the Senate or the House of Representatives. A candidate who
has not been proclaimed 16 and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the
House of Representatives subject to Section. 17 of the Constitution. While the proclamation of a winning
candidate in an election is ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction with Sec 6 of R.A. 6646 allows suspension
of proclamation under circumstances mentioned therein. Thus, petitioner's contention that "after the
conduct of the election and (petitioner) has been established the winner of the electoral exercise from the
moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass upon the question of
qualification" finds no basis, because even after the elections the COMELEC is empowered by Section 6
(in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and decide questions relating to qualifications of
candidates Section 6 states:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate, who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.

Under the above-quoted provision, not only is a disqualification case against a candidate allowed to
continue after the election (and does not oust the COMELEC of its jurisdiction), but his obtaining the
highest number of votes will not result in the suspension or termination of the proceedings against him
when the evidence of guilt is strong. While the phrase "when the evidence of guilt is strong" seems to
suggest that the provisions of Section 6 ought to be applicable only to disqualification cases under
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, Section 7 of R.A. 6646 allows the application of the provisions
of Section 6 to cases involving disqualification based on ineligibility under Section 78 of B.P. 881. Section
7 states:

Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. — The

procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy based on Sec. 78 of Batas Pambansa 881.

II

We agree with COMELEC's contention that in order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City the latter "must prove that he has established not just
residence but domicile of choice. 17

The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives should be
a resident of the district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than one (l) year prior to the
elections. 18 Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives 19 this Court held that the term "residence"
has always been understood as synonymous with "domicile" not only under the previous Constitutions but
also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court there held: 20

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of

residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to remain the
same as that of domicile, to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971

Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in
the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of
 elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of
domicile or constructive residence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the

National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely
provides, among others, and a resident thereof', that is, in the district, for
a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This
was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to
it was domicile (emphasis ours) Records of the 1987 Constitutional
Convention, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 87).

xxx xxx xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on section 7, page 2. I think

Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has
been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual
residence.

Mr. De Los Reyes: Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper
time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But We might encounter some difficulty especially

considering that the provision in the Constitution in the Article on
Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law.
So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile
and not physical and actual residence. (Records of the 1987
Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 110).

The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word
"residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.

Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home," 21 where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election
law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as explained
in Gallego vs. Vera at 22 is "to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs
of the community" from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for
electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong with the practice of establishing residence in a given area for
meeting election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to
place through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district,
if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose could
be obviously best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period
or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice. It would, therefore, be
imperative for this Court to inquire into the threshold question as to whether or not petitioner actually was
a resident for a period of one year in the area now encompassed by the Second Legislative District of
Makati at the time of his election or whether or not he was domiciled in the same.

As found by the COMELEC en banc petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy for the May 11, 1992
elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he
was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that election. 23 At the time, his certificate
indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. 24 His birth certificate places
Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno and Aurora. 25 Thus, from data
furnished by petitioner himself to the COMELEC at various times during his political career, what stands
consistently clear and unassailable is that this domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his
most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.

Petitioner's alleged connection with the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of
condominium unit in the area. As the COMELEC, in its disputed Resolution noted:

The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a
condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of
respondent's intention to reside in Makati City it does not engender the kind of
permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile especially since,
by its terms, it is only for a period of two (2) years, and respondent Aquino himself
testified that his intention was really for only one (l) year because he has other
"residences" in Manila or Quezon City. 26

While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon,
the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short
length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati (and the fact, of his stated
domicile in Tarlac) "indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical residence" 27 is
not to acquire's new residence or domicile "but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the
Second District of Makati City." 28 The absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful
abandonment of domicile under the conditions stated above, the lack of identification — sentimental,
actual or otherwise — with the area, and the suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement
was effected all belie petitioner's claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution, in the
Second District of Makati. As the COMELEC en banc emphatically pointed out:

[T]he lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence
requirement as a qualification for a candidate of Representative, by establishing a
commencement date of his residence. If a perfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by
itself establish; a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot do better. 29

Moreover, his assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion
which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change
of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one
and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.30 These requirements are hardly met by the
evidence adduced in support of petitioner's claims of a change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second
District of Makati. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin be deemed to continue
requirements are hardly met by the evidence adduced in support of petitioner's claims of a change of
domicile from Tarlac to the Second District of Makati. In the absence of clear and positive proof,
the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one year residency
requirement in a newly created political district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A new political district
is not created out of thin air. It is carved out from part of a real and existing geographic area, in this case
the old Municipality of Makati. That people actually lived or were domiciled in the area encompassed by
the new Second District cannot be denied. Modern-day carpetbaggers cannot be allowed take advantage
of the creation of new political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts,
prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of existing conditions in these
areas. It will be noted, as COMELEC did in its assailed resolution, that petitioner was disqualified from
running in the Senate because of the constitutional two-term limit, and had to shop around for a place
where he could run for public office. Nothing wrong with that, but he must first prove with reasonable
certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by
law. This he has not effectively done.
 III

The next issue here is whether or not the COMELEC erred in issuing it Order instructing the Board of
Canvassers of Makati City to proclaim as winner the candidate receiving the next higher number of votes.
The answer must be in the negative.

To contend that Syjuco should be proclaimed because he was the "first" among the qualified candidates
in the May 8, 1995 elections is to misconstrue the nature of the democratic electoral process and the
sociological and psychological underpinnings behind voters' preferences. The result suggested by private
respondent would lead not only to our reversing the doctrines firmly entrenched in the two cases
of Labo vs. Comelec 31 but also to a massive disenfranchisement of the thousands of voters who cast
their vote in favor of a candidate they believed could be validly voted for during the elections. Had
petitioner been disqualified before the elections, the choice, moreover, would have been different. The
votes for Aquino given the acrimony which attended the campaign, would not have automatically gone to
second placer Syjuco. The nature of the playing field would have substantially changed. To simplistically
assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment
for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was
repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified
candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have
substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under such circumstances.

In these cases, the pendulum of judicial opinion in our country has swung from one end to the other. In
the early case of Topacio v. Paredes. 32 we declared as valid, votes cast in favor of a disqualified,
ineligilble or dead candidate provided the people who voted for such candidate believed in good faith that
at the time of the elections said candidate was either qualified, eligible or alive. The votes cast in favor of
a disqualified, ineligible or dead candidate who obtained the next higher number of votes cannot be
proclaimed as winner. According to this Court in the said case, "there is not, strictly speaking, a contest,
that wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the
sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving the plurality of the legally cast ballots."

Then in Ticson v. Comelec, 33 this Court held that votes cast in favor of a non-candidate in view of his
unlawful change of party affiliation (which was then a ground for disqualification) cannot be considered in
the canvassing of election returns and the votes fall into the category of invalid and nonexistent votes
because a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all and is not a candidate in the eyes of the law. As a
result, this Court upheld the proclamation of the only candidate left in the disputed position.

In Geronimo v. Ramos 34 we reiterated our ruling in Topacio v. Paredes that the candidate who lost in an
election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event the candidate who ran for the portion is ineligible.
We held in Geronimo:

[I]t would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed
right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of
which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the
highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure
can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes
cast in the elections. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)

However, in Santos v. Comelec 35 we made a turnabout from our previous ruling in Geronimo
v. Ramos and pronounced that "votes cast for a disqualified candidate fall within the category of invalid or
non-existent votes because a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law," reverting
to our earlier ruling in Ticson v. Comelec.

In the more recent cases of Labo, Jr. v. Comelec 36 Abella v. Comelec; 37 and Benito v. Comelec, 38 this
Court reiterated and upheld the ruling in Topacio v. Paredes and Geronimo v. Ramos to the effect that the
ineligibility of a candidate receiving the next higher number of votes to be declared elected, and that a
minority or defeated candidate cannot be declared elected to the office. In these cases, we put emphasis
on our pronouncement in Geronimo v. Ramos that:

The fact that a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to
be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily
entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the
winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible
person may be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the
absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the
matter, if the votes were cast in sincere belief that candidate was alive, qualified, or
eligible; they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.

Synthesizing these rulings we declared in the latest case of Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC that: 39

While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of city
mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will. Petitioner Labo
was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in the belief that he
was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification
does not make respondent Ortega the mayor-elect. This is the import of the recent case
of Abella v. Comelec (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), wherein we held that:

While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due
course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before
Larrazabal could be proclaimed the fact remains that the local
elections of Feb. 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with
Larrazabal considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the
province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified
candidate for the position of governor.Her votes was counted and she
obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is that petitioner lost
in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. . . What matters is
that in the event a candidate for an elected position who is voted for and
who obtains the highest number of votes is disqualified for not
possessing the eligibility, requirements at the time of the election as
provided by law, the candidate who obtains the second highest number
of votes for the same position cannot assume the vacated position.
(Emphasis supplied).

Our ruling in Abella applies squarely to the case at bar and we see no compelling reason
to depart therefrom. Like Abella, petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was repudiated
by the electorate. He was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.

Thus, while respondent Ortega (G.R. No. 105111) originally filed a disqualification case
with the Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to deny due course to petitioner's
(Labo's) candidacy, the same did not deter the people of Baguio City from voting for
petitioner Labo, who, by then, was allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon,
the resolution for his disqualification having yet to attain the degree of finality (Sec. 78,
Omnibus Election Code).
 And in the earlier case of Labo v. Comelec. (supra), We held:

Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent,

who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor.
He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second
highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice
of the people of Baguio City.

The latest ruling of the Court in this issue is Santos v. Commission on

Election, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate
who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his
winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-
candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer won
by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the Court
then (Cuevas J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin,
Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay, and Aquino, JJ., concurring) with three
dissenting (Teehankee, acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera)
and another two reserving their votes (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr.). One
was on official leave (Fernando, C.J.)

Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in
favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Santos (136 SCRA 435), which represents the
more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first
announced in 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members
of the Court. . . .

The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.

Indeed, this has been the rule in the United States since 1849 (State ex rel. Dunning v.
Giles, 52 Am. Dec. 149).

It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been disqualified, the votes
intended for the disqualified candidate should, in effect, be considered null and void. This
would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom, sovereignty resides. At the risk
of being repetitious, the people of Baguio City opted to elect petitioner Labo bona
fide without any intention to missapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that Labo
was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the
powers of the government. Unfortunately, petitioner Labo turned out to be disqualified
and cannot assume the office.

Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or cannot be installed,
under no circumstances can a minority or defeated candidate be deemed elected to the
office. Surely, the 12,602 votes cast for petitioner Ortega is not a larger number than the
27,471 votes cast for petitioner Labo (as certified by the Election Registrar of Baguio
City; rollo, p. 109; G.R. No. 105111).

This, it bears repeating, expresses the more logical and democratic view. We cannot, in another shift of
the pendulum, subscribe to the contention that the runner-up in an election in which the winner has been
disqualified is actually the winner among the remaining qualified candidates because this clearly
represents a minority view supported only by a scattered number of obscure American state and English
court decisions. 40 These decisions neglect the possibility that the runner-up, though obviously qualified,
could receive votes so measly and insignificant in number that the votes they receive would be
tantamount to rejection. Theoretically, the "second placer" could receive just one vote. In such a case, it is
absurd to proclaim the totally repudiated candidate as the voters' "choice." Moreover, even in instances
where the votes received by the second placer may not be considered numerically insignificant, voters
preferences are nonetheless so volatile and unpredictable that the result among qualified candidates,
should the equation change because of the disqualification of an ineligible candidate, would not be self-
evident. Absence of the apparent though ineligible winner among the choices could lead to a shifting of
votes to candidates other than the second placer. By any mathematical formulation, the runner-up in an
election cannot be construed to have obtained a majority or plurality of votes cast where an "ineligible"
candidate has garnered either a majority or plurality of the votes.

In fine, we are left with no choice but to affirm the COMELEC's conclusion declaring herein petitioner
ineligible for the elective position of Representative of Makati City's Second District on the basis of
respondent commission's finding that petitioner lacks the one year residence in the district mandated by
the 1987 Constitution. A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican
government those laws are themselves ordained by the people. Through their representatives, they
dictate the qualifications necessary for service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks
one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of Representatives, not even
the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a
requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Our Order restraining
respondent COMELEC from proclaiming the candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in the
congressional elections for the Second District of Makati City is made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Melo, Puno and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I agree with the conclusion reached by the majority that petitioner Aquino has not shown by clear and
convincing evidence that he had established his residence in the second district of Makati City for a
period of not less than one (1) year prior to the 8 May 1995 elections. However, I do not fully subscribe to
its proposition that petitioner's residence (in Makati) should be his "domicile of choice".

Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution provides that:

No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-

born citizen of the Philippines and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years
of age, able to read and write, and, except the party list representatives, a registered
 voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not
less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election. (emphasis supplied).

In G.R. No. 119976, Marcos vs. Comelec, I have maintained that the phrase "a resident thereof for a
period of not less than one year" means actual and physical presence in the legislative district of the
congressional candidate, and that said period of one year must be satisfied regardless of whether or not a
person's residence or domicile coincides.

To my mind, petitioner should be declared disqualified to run as representative in the 2nd district of
Makati City in the 8 May 1995 elections not because he failed to prove his residence therein as his
domicile of choice, but because he failed altogether to prove that he had actually and physically resided
therein for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the 8 May 1995 elections.

Noteworthy is the established fact before the Comelec that petitioner admits having maintained other
residences in Metro Manila apart from his leased condominium unit in Makati's 2nd district.1 This clear
admission made by petitioner against his interest weakens his argument that "where a party decides to
transfer his legal residence so he can qualify for public office, he is free to do so." (see p. 20, Petition).

Petitioner evidently wants to impress the Court that his other residences in Metro Manila could never
have become his domicile of choice because it never entered his mind and suddenly, seemingly not
contented with these other residences, he rents a condominium unit in Makati, and calls it his domicile of
choice — all these without adding clear and convincing evidence that he did actually live and reside in
Makati for at least one year prior to 8 May 1995 — and that he no longer lived and resided in his other
residences during said one year period.

It follows, likewise, that the lease contract relied upon by petitioner, standing alone, established only the
alleged date (April 25, 1994) of its due execution. Stated otherwise, the lease contract tells us that
petitioner had been leasing a condominium unit in Makati City for more than a year prior to 8 May 1995,
but it does not prove that petitioner actually and physically resided therein for the same period, in the light
of his admission that he maintained other residences in Metro Manila.

In light of petitioner's disqualification, the corrollary issue to be resolved is whether or not jurisdiction
continued to be vested in the Comelec to order the Makati Board of Canvassers" to determine and
proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates" after petitioner had been declared post 8
May 1995 as disqualified.

I agree with the proposition advanced by the Solicitor General that sec. 6 of R.A. 6646 clearly provides
that votes cast for a disqualified candidate shall not be counted, thus:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

There can be no dispute that if a final judgment is rendered before the election, declaring a particular
candidate as disqualified, such disqualified candidate shall not be voted for and votes cast for him shall
not be counted, thus posing no problem in proclaiming the candidate who receives the highest number of
votes among the qualified candidates.
But what about after the election? Sec. 6 appears categorical enough in stating: "if any reason" no final
judgment of disqualification is rendered before the elections, and the candidate facing disqualification is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes, the Comelec or the Court is not ousted of its
jurisdiction to hear and try the case up to final judgment, hence, the power to even suspend the
proclamation of the erstwhile winning candidate when evidence of his guilt is strong.

It thus appears clear that the law does not dichotomize the effect of a final judgment of disqualification in
terms of time considerations. There is only one natural and logical effect: the disqualified candidate shall
not be voted and, if voted, the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus (where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.)

At this point, what I said in Marcos, supra, follows:

What happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared disqualified? Then,
votes cast for him "shall not be counted" and in legal contemplation, he no longer
received the highest number of votes.

It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the
winner simply because a "winning candidate is disqualified," but that the law considers
him as the candidate who had obtained the highest number of votes as a result of the
votes cast for the disqualified candidate not being counted or considered.

As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason
why this Court should not re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun
Labo case. It has been stated that "the qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot
be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the vice of ineligibility" most especially when it is mandated by no less than
the Constitution.

Therefore the candidate who received the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates,
should be proclaimed

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

FRANCISCO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur with the well written ponencia of my most esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Kapunan. I wish,
however, to express my views on some issues raised by the petitioner, viz., (1) jurisdiction over the
disqualification suit, (2) domicile, (3) theory of legal impossibility, and (4) "second placer rule".

Petitioner emphatically maintains that only the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) can
declare his disqualification, especially after the elections. To bolster this stand, the cases of Co v. HRET,
199 SCRA 692 (1991); Robles v. HRET, 181 SCRA 780 (1990); Lazatin v. HRET, 168 SCRA 391 (1988);
and Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 (1968), have been cited as supporting authorities. To my mind, this
position is untenable. Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is clear and unambiguous that
HRET jurisdiction applies only to the members of the House of Representatives. The operative acts
necessary for an electoral candidate's rightful assumption of the office for which he ran are his
proclamation and his taking an oath of office. Petitioner cannot in anyway be considered as a member of
the House of Representatives for the purpose of divesting the Commission on Elections of jurisdiction to
declare his disqualification and invoking instead HRET's jurisdiction, it indubitably appearing that he has
yet to be proclaimed, much less has he taken an oath of office. Clearly, petitioner's reliance on the
aforecited cases which when perused involved Congressional members, is totally misplaced, if not wholly
inapplicable. That the jurisdiction conferred upon HRET extends only to Congressional members is
further established by judicial notice of HRET Rules of procedure, 1 and HRET decisions2 consistently
holding that the proclamation the essential requisite vesting jurisdiction on the HRET.

Moreover, a perusal of the records shows that the question on COMELEC's jurisdiction is now barred by
estoppel. It is to be noted that in his May 2, 1995 Answer, as well as in his Memorandum and
Supplemental Memorandum filed before the COMELEC's Second Division, petitioner never assailed
COMELEC's lacks of jurisdiction to rule on his qualification. On the contrary, he asked that the
disqualification suit against him be dismissed on the following grounds: that it was filed outside the
reglementary period; that the one year residence requirement of the 1987 Constitution is inapplicable due
to the recent conversion of the municipality of Makati into a city under R.A. No. 7854; that he committed a
simple inadvertence in filing up his certificate of candidacy; that the proper procedure to attack his
qualification is by a quo warranto proceeding; that he had actually and physically resided in Makati for
more than a year; and for lack of merit, the case should be outrightly dismissed. In a hearing conducted
by the COMELEC on May 2, 1995, petitioner even submitted his evidence (e.g. affidavits, amended
certificate of candidacy, copy of the lease contract) to prove that he is qualified for the position.
Subsequently, on May 16, 1995, in response to the COMELEC En Banc's May 15, 1995 Order
suspending the proclamation of the winner, petitioner filed his Comment/Opposition with Urgent Motion
To Lift Order of Suspension of Proclamation asking for the lifting of the COMELEC's order of suspension.
On May 19, 1995, petitioner again filed a Memorandum and averred that the recent conversion of Makati
into a city made the one-year residence requirement inapplicable; that he resided in Makati for more than
a year; that quo warranto is the right remedy to question his qualification. In passing, petitioner also
alleged that the issue on his qualification should be "properly" ventilated in a full-dress hearing before the
HRET, albeit praying for the dismissal of the motion for reconsideration for utter lack of merit (and not for
lack of jurisdiction), and for lifting the suspension of his proclamation. It was only on June 01, 1995, in his
Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of
Proclamation, when the petitioner raised COMELEC's alleged lack of jurisdiction to resolve the question
on his qualification. Clearly then, petitioner has actively participated in the proceedings both before the
COMELEC's Second Division and the COMELEC En Banc asking therein affirmative reliefs. The settled
rule is that a party who objects to the jurisdiction of the court and alleges at the same time any non-
jurisdictional ground for dismissing the action is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court.3 Where a party voluntary submits to the jurisdiction of the court and thereafter loses on the
merits, he may not thereafter be heard to say that the court had no
jurisdiction.4 In Jimenezv. Macaraig,5 the Court, citing Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals, 32 SCRA 54, 60
(1970), elaborated on the rationale for this doctrine in this wise:

The petitioners, to borrow the language of Mr. Justice Bautista Angelo (People vs.
Archilla, G.R. No. L-15632, February 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 699, 700-701), cannot adopt a
posture of double-dealing without running afoul of the doctrine of estoppel. The principle
of estoppel is in the interest of a sound administration of the laws. It should deter those
who are disposed to trifle with the courts by taking inconsistent positions contrary to the
elementary principles of right dealing and good faith (People v. Acierto, 92 Phil. 534, 541,
[1953]).6

It is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular
matter to secure an affirmative relief to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape an
adverse decision.7Perforce, petitioner's asseveration that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to
rule on his qualification must fail.

Petitioner insists that domicile is a matter of personal intention. Thus, petition asserts that if he decides to
transfer his legal residence so he can qualify for public office then he is entirely free to do so. Thus
argument to hold water, must be supported by a clear and convincing proofs that petitioner has effectively
abandoned his former domicile and that his intention is not doubtful. Indeed, domicile once established is
considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established (Co v. Electoral
Tribunal House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 711 [1991]). Petitioner from childhood until his last
election as senator has consistently maintained Concepcion, Tarlac, as his domicile. He moved to
Amapola Street, Palm Village, Makati, and thereafter claimed the same to be his new domicile. This
claim, however, is dismally unsupported by the records. The lease contract entered into by petitioner for a
period of two years on the third floor condominium unit in Palm Village, Makati, in my view, does not
prove his intent to abandon his domicile of origin. The intention to establish domicile must be an intention
to remain indefinitely or permanently in the new place.8 This element is lacking in this instance. Worse,
public respondent Commission even found that "respondent Aquino himself testified that his intention was
really for only one (1) year because he has other 'residences' in Manila or in Quezon City ([citing] TSN,
May 2, 1995,
p. 92)".9 Noting that petitioner is already barred from running for senator due to the constitutional
consecutive two-term limit, his search for a place where he could further and continue his political career
and sudden transfer thereto make his intent suspect. The best test of intention to establish legal
residence
comes from one's acts and not by mere declarations alone. 10 To acquire, or effect a change of domicile,
the intention must be bonafide and unequivocal (28 C.J.S. §11). Petitioner, in my view, miserably failed to
show a bonafide and unequivocal intention to effect the change of his domicile.

The theory of legal impossibility is advanced to justify non-compliance with the constitutional qualification
on residency. Petitioner explains his theory in this wise:

. . . THE COMELEC CRITICALLY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE LEGAL

IMPOSSIBILITY OF ENFORCING THE ONE YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF
CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES IN NEWLY CREATED POLITICAL DISTRICTS
WHICH WERE ONLY EXISTING FOR LESS THAN A YEAR AT THE TIME OF THE
ELECTION AND BARELY FOUR MONTHS IN THE CASE OF PETITIONER'S DISTRICT
IN MAKATI. 11

Apparently, this theory is an offshoot of Republic Act. No. 7854, an act converting the municipality
of Makati into a highly urbanized city. This law enacted on January 2, 1995, established a second
Congressional district in Makati in which petitioner ran as a Congressional candidate. Since the
second district, according to petitioner, is barely four (4) months old then the one (1) year
residence qualification provided by the Constitution is inapplicable. Petitioner's acts, however, as
borne by the records, belie his own theory. Originally, he placed in his certificate of candidacy an
entry of ten (10) months residence in Makati. Petitioner then had it amended to one (1) year and
thirteen (13) days to correct what claims as a mere inadvertent mistake. I doubt the sincerity of
this representation. If petitioner is indeed persuaded by his own theory, the ten months residence
he initially wrote would have more than sufficiently qualified him to run in the barely four-month
old Makati district. The amendment only reveals the true intent of petitioner to comply with one
year constitutional requirement for residence, adding an extra thirteen (13) days full measure.
Petitioner apparently wanted to argue one way (theory of legal impossibility), but at the same time
played it safe in the other (the constitutional one year residence requirement). And that is not all.
If we were to adhere to petitioner's theory of legal impossibility, then residents in that district
shorn of the constitutional six months residence requirement for prospective voters (Article V,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution) would have certainly qualified to vote. That would have
legitimized the entry and electoral exercise of flying voters — one of the historic nemeses of a
clean and honest election. Furthermore, to subscribe to petitioner's contention that the
constitutional qualification of candidates should be brushed aside in view of the enactment of R.A.
No. 7854 will indubitably violate the manner and procedure for the amendment or revision of the
constitution outlined under Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. A legislative enactment, it has to
be emphasized, cannot render nugatory the constitution. The constitution is superior to a statute.
It is the fundamental and organic law of the land to which every statute must conform and
harmonize.
Finally, it has been contended that a second place candidate cannot be proclaimed a substitute winner. I
find the proposition quite unacceptable. A disqualified "candidate" is not a candidate and the votes which
may have been cast in his favor are nothing but stray votes of no legal consequence. A disqualified
person like the petitioner receives no vote or zero vote. In short,
no-candidate-no vote. Petitioner had therefore no right, in fact and in law, to claim first place for he has
nothing to base his right. The legislative intent is clear as provided by R.A. 6646, Section 6, in that votes
cast for a disqualified candidate shall not be counted as they are considered stray (Section 211, Rule 24,
Omnibus Election Code). It is only from the ranks of qualified candidates can one be chosen as first
placer and not from without. Necessarily, petitioner, a disqualified candidate, cannot be a first placer as
he claims himself to be. To count the votes for a disqualified candidate would, in my view, disenfranchise
voters who voted for a qualified candidate. Legitimate votes cast for a qualified candidate should not be
penalized alongside a disqualified candidate. With this in mind, the other qualified candidate who
garnered the highest number of votes should be proclaimed the duly elected representative of the district.
I feel that the Labo doctrine ought to be abandoned.

I therefore vote to deny the petition and to lift the temporary restraining order issued by the Court dated
June 6, 1995.

DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:

In sustaining the COMELEC's acts of suspending the proclamation of petitioner Agapito A. Aquino and of
proceeding to hear the disqualification case against him, the majority opinion relies on Section 6 of R.A.
No. 6646 which it claims to be applicable by virtue of Section 7 thereof to petitions to deny due course to
or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881).

I disagree.

In the first place, the petition to disqualify the petitioner in SPA No. 95-113 is not a petition to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78, which reads:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein
as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and
shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election. (emphasis supplied)

Nowhere in the petition in SPA No. 95-113 is it alleged by the private respondents that a material
representation contained in the petitioner's certificate of candidacy is false. What is being attacked therein
is the petitioner's lack of the one-year residence qualification in the new Second Legislative District of
Makati City where he sought to he elected for the office of Congressman.

The rule governing disqualification cases on the ground of ineligibility, which is also invoked by the private
respondents, is Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended on 15 February 1993. The
amendment allows the, filing of a petition to disqualify a candidate on the ground that he does not
possess all the qualifications provided for by the Constitution or by existing laws. In its original form, the
rule only applied to petitions for disqualification based on the commission of any act declared by law to be
a ground for disqualification. The rule as thus amended now reads as follows:

Rule 25 — Disqualification of Candidates

 Sec. 1. Grounds for Disqualification. — Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who
commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified
from continuing as a candidate.

Sec. 2. Who May File Petition for Disqualification. — Any citizen of voting age, or duly
registered political party, organization or coalition of political parties may file with the Law
Department of the Commission a petition to disqualify a candidate on grounds provided
by law.

Sec. 3. Period to File Petition. — The petition shall be filed any day after the last day for
filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.

Sec. 4. Summary Proceeding. — The petition shall be heard summarily after due notice.

Sec. 5. Effect of Petition if Unresolved Before Completion of Canvass. — If the petition,

for reasons beyond the control of the Commission, cannot be decided before the
completion of the canvass, the votes cast for the respondent may be included in the
counting and in the canvassing; however, if the evidence of guilt is strong, his
proclamation shall be suspended notwithstanding the fact that he received the winning
number of votes in such election.

The underscored portion is the amendment to Rule 25, which the COMELEC must have deemed
necessary to fill up a procedural hiatus in cases of disqualifications based on other grounds in the
light of this Court's interpretation in Loong vs. Commission on Elections (216 SCRA 760 [1992])
that Rule 25 refers only to disqualifications under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code. This Court explicitly stated therein as follows:

We do not agree with private respondent Ututalum's contention that the petition for
disqualification, as in the case at bar, may be filed at any time after the last day for filing a
certificate of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation, applying Section 3,
Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.

Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure refers to Disqualification of Candidates; and

Section 1 of said rule provides that any candidate who commits any act declared by law
to be a ground for disqualification maybe disqualified from continuing as a candidate. The
grounds for disqualification as expressed in Sections 12 and 68 of the Code, are the
following:

Sec. 12. Disqualification. — Any person who has been declared by

competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by
final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for
which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months
or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a
candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary
pardon or granted amnesty.

Sec. 63 DisquaIifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest

in which he is a party is declared by final decision of 4 competent court
guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other
material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to
enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in
excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
 contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v,
and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person
who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall
not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said
person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided
for in the election laws.

The petition filed by private respondent Ututalum with the respondent Comelec to
disqualify petitioner Loong on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his
certificate of candidacy as to his age, clearly does not fall under the grounds of
disqualification as provided for in Rule 25 but is expressly covered by Rule 23 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure governing petitions to cancel certificate of candidacy.
Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 which allows the filing of the petition at any time after the
last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation, is merely a procedural rule issued by respondent Commission which,
although a constitutional body, has no legislative powers. Thus, it can not supersede
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which is a legislative enactment.

Second, even if we assume for the sake of argument that the petition in SPA No. 95-113 fall under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, still Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 cannot be applied by virtue of
Section 7 thereof. Sections 6 and 7 reads:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Sec. 71 Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. — The

procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

The "procedure hereinabove provided" mentioned in Section 7 cannot be construed to refer to Section 6
which does not provide for a procedure but for the EFFECTS of disqualification cases. It can only refer to
the procedureprovided in Section 5 of the said Act on nuisance candidates which reads as follows:

Sec. 5. Procedure in Cases of Nuisance Candidates. — A verified petition to declare a

duly registered candidate as a nuisance candidate under Section 69 .f Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881 shall be filed personally or through duly authorized representative with the
Commission by any registered candidate for the same office within five (5) days from the
last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy. Filing by mail shall not be allowed.

(b) Within three (3) days from the filing of the petition, the Commission shall issue
summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition and its
enclosures, if any.

(c) The respondent shall be given three (3) days from receipt of the summons within
which to file his verified answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition, serving copy
 thereof upon the petitioner. Grounds for a motion to dismiss may be raised as affirmative
defenses.

(d) The Commission may designate any of its officials who are lawyers to hear the case
and receive evidence. The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of oral
testimonies, the parties may be required to submit position papers together with affidavits
or counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence. The hearing officer shall
immediately submit to the Commission his findings, reports, and recommendations within
five (5) days from the completion of such submission of evidence. The Commission shall
render its decision within five (5) days from receipt thereof.

(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days from receipt
of a copy thereof by the parties, be final and executory unless stayed by the Supreme
Court.

(f) The Commission shall within twenty-four hours, through the fastest available means,
disseminate its decision or the decision of the Supreme Court or the city or municipal
election registrars, boards of election inspectors, and the general public in the political
subdivision concerned.

and which is the only procedure that precedes Section 7 of the said Act. Heretofore, no law
provided for the procedure to govern cases under Section 78. Applying to such cases, through
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6646, the procedure applicable to cases of nuisance candidates is prudent
and wise, for both cases necessarily require that they be decided before the day of the election;
hence, only summary proceedings thereon can adequately respond to the urgency of the matter.

Third, Section 6 merely supplements Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code providing as follows:

Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. — The Commission and the courts
shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end
that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in
which the disqualification is sought.

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason,
a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he
is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the
provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to
office.

by granting the COMELEC or the Court the authority to continue hearing the case and to suspend
the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong. As observed by this Court in its majority "the
phrase 'when the evidence of guilt is strong' seems to suggest that the provisions of Section 6
ought to be applicable only to disqualification cases under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code."

Fourth, the amended Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which is the only rule governing
petitions filed before election or proclamation for the disqualification of a candidate on the ground that he
lacks the qualifications provided for by the Constitution or by law, does not, as can be gathered from
Section 5 thereof, authorize the COMELEC to continue hearing the case after the election.

Fifth, even assuming that the second sentence of Section 6 of R.A. to No. 6646 is applicable to
disqualification cases based on the ground of lack of qualification, it cannot be applied to a case does not
involve elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and where suspension of proclamation is not
warranted because of the absence of strong evidence of guilt or ineligibility. In such a case the candidate
sought to be disqualified but who obtains the highest number of votes has to be proclaimed. Once he is
proclaimed, the COMELEC cannot continue with the case, and the remedy of the opponent is to contest
the winning candidate's eligibility within ten days from proclamation in a quo warranto proceeding which is
within the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts, in the case of barangay officials; the
regional trial courts, in case of municipal officials (Section 2(2), Article IX-C, Constitution; Section 253,
paragraph 2, B.P. Blg. 881); the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, in the case of
Congressmen; the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case of Senators (Section 17, Article VI,
Constitution); and the Supreme Court en banc, in the case of the President or Vice-President (Section 4,
Article VII, Constitution).

If what is involved is an elective regional, provincial, or city official, and the case cannot be decided before
the election, the COMELEC can, even after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified,
proceed with the case by treating it as a petition for quo warranto, since such a case properly pertains to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC (Section 2(2), Article IX-C, Constitution; Section 253, B.P. Blg.
881).

But even granting for the sake of argument that Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. No. 6646, in relation to Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code and the amended Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, are
applicable, the order of suspension of the petitioner's proclamation issued on 15 May 1995 is null and
void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. What was before the COMELEC en banc at
that stage was the decision of the Second Division of 6 May 1995 dismissing the petition to disqualify the
petitioner and declaring him qualified for the position. That decision is a direct and positive rejection of
any claim that the evidence of the petitioner's guilt is strong. Note that it was only on 2 June 1995, when
the COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of the Second Division, that it was found that the evidence
of the petitioner's ineligibility is strong. It would have been otherwise if the Second Division had
disqualified the petitioner.

Besides, at the time the questioned order was issued, there was no hearing yet on the private
respondents' motions for the suspension of the petitioner's proclamation. In fact, in that order the
COMELEC en banc admitted that the said motions could not be resolved without hearing, thus:

Pending the resolution of the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 7,
1995; Urgent Motion Ad Cautelam to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent (May 10,
1995) filed on May 10, 1995; and OMNIBUS MOTION (For Reconsideration of the
Honorable Commission's [Second Division] Resolution dated May 6, 1995, and 2nd
Urgent Motion Ad Cautelam to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent Aquino, which
cannot be resolved without hearing, without violating the right of the respondent to due
process. . . .

For being void from the beginning; it is as if the order of 15 May 1995 had not existed and could not,
therefore, be made permanent by the COMELEC en banc through its resolution of 2 June 1995 whose
dispositive portion reads in part: [c]onsequently, the order of suspension of the respondent should he
obtain the winning number of votes, issued by this Commission on 15 May 1995 is now made
permanent."

Absent a valid finding before the election or after the canvass of election returns that the evidence of the
petitioner's guilt or ineligibility is strong, the COMELEC should not have suspended the proclamation of
the petitioner. After the completion of the canvass the petitioner should have been proclaimed.

This case then must be distinguished from that of Imelda Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 119976, where the COMELEC en banc affirmed before the elections, or on 7 May
1995, the Second Division's resolution of 24 April 1995 disqualifying Mrs. Marcos.
Accordingly, the order of 15 May 1995 and the resolution of 2 June 1995 of the COMELEC en banc must
be annulled and set aside, and the COMELEC, through its City Board of Canvassers of Makati, must be
ordered to immediately proclaim the petitioner, without prejudice to the right of his opponents to file a
petition for quo warranto with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which is the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives (Section 17, Article VI, Constitution).

In view of the foregoing, a disquisition on the merits of the ground for the petitioner's disqualification will
no longer be proper.

I vote to GRANT the instant petition, to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the challenged order and resolution of
the Commission on Elections en banc, and to DIRECT the Board of Canvassers of Makati City to
reconvene and proclaim the petitioner as the winning candidate, without prejudice on the part of any
aggrieved party to file the appropriate action in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.

Romero and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

VITUG, J., separate opinion:

I find what I would consider as the relevant issues in this petition as similar in almost all material respects
to those obtaining in G.R. No. 119976 (Imelda Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections and
Cirilo Roy Montejo). Let me then here just reiterate what I have there said in my separate opinion.

The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.

The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that sets up ideals and
directions and render steady our strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure that mistakes in the
past are not repeated. A complaint transience of a constitution belittles its basic function and weakens its
goals. A constitution may well become outdated by the realities of time. When it does, it must be changed
but while it remains, we owe it respect and allegiance. Anarchy, open or subtle, has never been, nor must
it ever be, the answer to perceived transitory needs, let alone societal attitudes, or the Constitution might
lose its very essence.

Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express statement
or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51).

The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of Article VI of the fundamental
law. These provisions read:

Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a

natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-
five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated
by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
 representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under
the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.

The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and administer "all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that, there
being nothing said to the contrary, should include its authority to pass upon the qualification and
disqualification prescribed by law of candidates to an elective office. Indeed, pre-proclamation
controversies are expressly placed under the COMELEC's jurisdiction to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C,
Sec. 3, Constitution).

The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year residency
requirement. This issue (whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a
question of fact or at least inextricably linked to such determination. The findings and judgment of the
COMELEC, in accordance with the long established rule and subject only to a number of exceptions
under the basic heading of "grave abuse of discretion," are not reviewable by this Court.

I do not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a plain matter. Generally,
the term "residence" has a broader connotation that mean permanent (domicile), official (place where
one's official duties may require him to stay) or temporary (the place where he sojourns during a
considerable length of time). For Civil law purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence
(see Article 50, Civil Code). In election cases, the controlling rule is that heretofore announced by this
Court in Romualdez vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408, 409); thus:

In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus:
"(t)he term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which
imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." "Domicile" denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons,
one intends to return. . . . Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting
another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there
must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to
remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must
basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain
in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary, and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile
must be actual.

Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with having
committed grave abuse of discretion in its assailed resolution.

The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of the
Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore been duly
proclaimed and has since become a "member" of the Senate or the House of Representatives. The
question can be asked on whether or not the proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial function of
the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number of votes cast in an election exercise. I
believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of which, being adequately defined,
does not allow the use of further judgment or discretion. The COMELEC; in its particular case, is tasked
with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be required by law
before a proclamation is properly done.

The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment on the ultimate
exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are
explicitly within their exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were otherwise, would be the effect of
the Court's peremptory pronouncement on the ability of the Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its
own judgment in a contest "relating to the election, returns and qualification" of its members.

Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the applicability to this case of
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, each providing
thusly:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. — The Commission and the courts
shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end
that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in
which the disqualification is sought.

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason,
a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified, and he
is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the
provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to
office.

I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so much the
specific instances they ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly convey. Thus, I will not scoff at
the argument that it should be sound to say that votes cast in favor of the disqualified candidate,
whenever ultimately declared as such, should not be counted in his or her favor and must accordingly be
considered to be stray votes. The argument, nevertheless, is far outweighed by the rationale of the now
prevailing doctrine first enunciated in the case of Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238 (1912]) which,
although later abandoned in Ticzon vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687 [1981]), and Santos vs. COMELEC (137
SCRA 740 [1985]), was restored, along with the interim case of Geronimo vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435
[1985]), by the Labo (176 SCRA 1 [1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992])
and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 (1994]) rulings. Benito vs. Comelec was a unanimous decision
penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in by Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were
on official leave). For easy reference, let me quote from the first Labo decision:

Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo
warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is
 that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was
obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.

The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, (137
SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was
proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat
and considered a non-candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect, the second placer
won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the Court then,
(Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente,
Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with three dissenting (Teehankee, Acting C.J.,
Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and another two reserving their vote. (Plana and
Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.) One was on official leave. (Fernando, C.J.)

Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in
favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which represents the
more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first
announced in 1912 in Topacio v. Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members
of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera,
Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any
dissent, although one reserved his vote,
(Makasiar, J.) another took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave.
(Fernando, C.J. and Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the Court held:

. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the

constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not
acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and
imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which
have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose
him.

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who
have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that
office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government
that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared
carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes
cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 234, p. 676.)

The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is
later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he
was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the
second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective
office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may
not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However,
in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and
legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief
that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be
treated as stray, void or meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)

Accordingly, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition.

MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:

For the reasons expressed in my separate opinion in the companion case. G.R. No. 119976. Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections. I am of the opinion that the Commission on Elections
has no jurisdiction over petitions for disqualification of candidates based on alleged ineligibility for the
office to which they seek election.

The May 15, 1995 resolution of the COMELEC en banc, suspending he obtain the highest number of
votes of Representative of the Second District of Makati, Metro Manila, purports to have been issued
pursuant to §6 of R.A. No. 6646. This provision authorizes the COMELEC to order the suspension of the
proclamation "whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong." As explained in my separate opinion in G.R.
No. 119976, however, this provision refers to proceedings under §68 of the Omnibus Election Code which
provides for the disqualification of candidates found guilty of using what in political parlance have been
referred to as "guns goons or gold" to influence the outcome of elections. Since the disqualification of
petitioner in this case was not sought on this ground, the application of §6 of R.A.. No. 6646 is clearly a
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.

Nor may the petition to disqualify petitioner in the COMELEC be justified under §78 of the OEC which
authorizes the filing of a petition for the cancellation of certificates of candidacy since such a petition
maybe filed "exclusively on the ground that a material representation contained [in the certificate] as
required under section 74 is false." There was no allegation that in stating in his certificate of candidacy
that he is a resident of Amapola St., Palm Village, Guadalupe Viejo, Makati, Metro Manila, petitioner
made any false representation.

For this reason, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95-113; that its
proceedings in SPA No. 95-113, including the questioned orders, are void; and that the qualifications of
petitioner Agapito A. Aquino for the position of Representative of the Second District of the City of Makati
may only be inquired into by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.

This conclusion makes it unnecessary for me to express my view at this time on the question whether, in
the event the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is declared ineligible, the one who
received the next highest number of votes is entitled to be declared the winner.

Accordingly, I vote (1) to grant the petition in this case and (2) to annul the proceedings of the
Commission on Elections in SPA No. 95-113, including the questioned orders, dated May 6, 1995. May
15, 1995, and the two orders both dated June 2, 1995, so far as they declare petitioner Agapito A. Aquino
to be ineligible for the position of Representative of the Second District of the City of Makati and direct the
City Board of Canvassers of Makati to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified
candidates.

Narvasa, J., concurs.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I agree with the conclusion reached by the majority that petitioner Aquino has not shown by clear and
convincing evidence that he had established his residence in the second district of Makati City for a
period of not less than one (1) year prior to the 8 May 1995 elections. However, I do not fully subscribe to
its proposition that petitioner's residence (in Makati) should be his "domicile of choice".

Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution provides that:

 No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years
of age, able to read and write, and, except the party list representatives, a registered
voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not
less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election. (emphasis supplied).

In G.R. No. 119976, Marcos vs. Comelec, I have maintained that the phrase "a resident thereof for a
period of not less than one year" means actual and physical presence in the legislative district of the
congressional candidate, and that said period of one year must be satisfied regardless of whether or not a
person's residence or domicile coincides.

To my mind, petitioner should be declared disqualified to run as representative in the 2nd district of
Makati City in the 8 May 1995 elections not because he failed to prove his residence therein as his
domicile of choice, but because he failed altogether to prove that he had actually and physically resided
therein for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the 8 May 1995 elections.

Noteworthy is the established fact before the Comelec that petitioner admits having maintained other
residences in Metro Manila apart from his leased condominium unit in Makati's 2nd district. 1 This clear
admission made by petitioner against his interest weakens his argument that "where a party decides to
transfer his legal residence so he can qualify for public office, he is free to do so." (see p. 20, Petition).

Petitioner evidently wants to impress the Court that his other residences in Metro Manila could never
have become his domicile of choice because it never entered his mind and suddenly, seemingly not
contented with these other residences, he rents a condominium unit in Makati, and calls it his domicile of
choice — all these without adding clear and convincing evidence that he did actually live and reside in
Makati for at least one year prior to 8 May 1995 — and that he no longer lived and resided in his other
residences during said one year period.

It follows, likewise, that the lease contract relied upon by petitioner, standing alone, established only the
alleged date (April 25, 1994) of its due execution. Stated otherwise, the lease contract tells us that
petitioner had been leasing a condominium unit in Makati City for more than a year prior to 8 May 1995,
but it does not prove that petitioner actually and physically resided therein for the same period, in the light
of his admission that he maintained other residences in Metro Manila.

In light of petitioner's disqualification, the corrollary issue to be resolved is whether or not jurisdiction
continued to be vested in the Comelec to order the Makati Board of Canvassers" to determine and
proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates" after petitioner had been declared post 8
May 1995 as disqualified.

I agree with the proposition advanced by the Solicitor General that sec. 6 of R.A. 6646 clearly provides
that votes cast for a disqualified candidate shall not be counted, thus:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

There can be no dispute that if a final judgment is rendered before the election, declaring a particular
candidate as disqualified, such disqualified candidate shall not be voted for and votes cast for him shall
not be counted, thus posing no problem in proclaiming the candidate who receives the highest number of
votes among the qualified candidates.

But what about after the election? Sec. 6 appears categorical enough in stating: "if any reason" no final
judgment of disqualification is rendered before the elections, and the candidate facing disqualification is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes, the Comelec or the Court is not ousted of its
jurisdiction to hear and try the case up to final judgment, hence, the power to even suspend the
proclamation of the erstwhile winning candidate when evidence of his guilt is strong.

It thus appears clear that the law does not dichotomize the effect of a final judgment of disqualification in
terms of time considerations. There is only one natural and logical effect: the disqualified candidate shall
not be voted and, if voted, the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus (where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.)

At this point, what I said in Marcos, supra, follows:

What happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared disqualified? Then,
votes cast for him "shall not be counted" and in legal contemplation, he no longer
received the highest number of votes.

It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the
winner simply because a "winning candidate is disqualified," but that the law considers
him as the candidate who had obtained the highest number of votes as a result of the
votes cast for the disqualified candidate not being counted or considered.

As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason
why this Court should not re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun
Labo case. It has been stated that "the qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot
be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the vice of ineligibility" most especially when it is mandated by no less than
the Constitution.

Therefore the candidate who received the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates,
should be proclaimed

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

FRANCISCO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur with the well written ponencia of my most esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Kapunan. I wish,
however, to express my views on some issues raised by the petitioner, viz., (1) jurisdiction over the
disqualification suit, (2) domicile, (3) theory of legal impossibility, and (4) "second placer rule".

Petitioner emphatically maintains that only the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) can
declare his disqualification, especially after the elections. To bolster this stand, the cases of Co v. HRET,
199 SCRA 692 (1991); Robles v. HRET, 181 SCRA 780 (1990); Lazatin v. HRET, 168 SCRA 391 (1988);
and Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 (1968), have been cited as supporting authorities. To my mind, this
position is untenable. Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is clear and unambiguous that
HRET jurisdiction applies only to the members of the House of Representatives. The operative acts
necessary for an electoral candidate's rightful assumption of the office for which he ran are his
proclamation and his taking an oath of office. Petitioner cannot in anyway be considered as a member of
the House of Representatives for the purpose of divesting the Commission on Elections of jurisdiction to
declare his disqualification and invoking instead HRET's jurisdiction, it indubitably appearing that he has
yet to be proclaimed, much less has he taken an oath of office. Clearly, petitioner's reliance on the
aforecited cases which when perused involved Congressional members, is totally misplaced, if not wholly
inapplicable. That the jurisdiction conferred upon HRET extends only to Congressional members is
further established by judicial notice of HRET Rules of procedure, 1 and HRET decisions2 consistently
holding that the proclamation the essential requisite vesting jurisdiction on the HRET.

Moreover, a perusal of the records shows that the question on COMELEC's jurisdiction is now barred by
estoppel. It is to be noted that in his May 2, 1995 Answer, as well as in his Memorandum and
Supplemental Memorandum filed before the COMELEC's Second Division, petitioner never assailed
COMELEC's lacks of jurisdiction to rule on his qualification. On the contrary, he asked that the
disqualification suit against him be dismissed on the following grounds: that it was filed outside the
reglementary period; that the one year residence requirement of the 1987 Constitution is inapplicable due
to the recent conversion of the municipality of Makati into a city under R.A. No. 7854; that he committed a
simple inadvertence in filing up his certificate of candidacy; that the proper procedure to attack his
qualification is by a quo warranto proceeding; that he had actually and physically resided in Makati for
more than a year; and for lack of merit, the case should be outrightly dismissed. In a hearing conducted
by the COMELEC on May 2, 1995, petitioner even submitted his evidence (e.g. affidavits, amended
certificate of candidacy, copy of the lease contract) to prove that he is qualified for the position.
Subsequently, on May 16, 1995, in response to the COMELEC En Banc's May 15, 1995 Order
suspending the proclamation of the winner, petitioner filed his Comment/Opposition with Urgent Motion
To Lift Order of Suspension of Proclamation asking for the lifting of the COMELEC's order of suspension.
On May 19, 1995, petitioner again filed a Memorandum and averred that the recent conversion of Makati
into a city made the one-year residence requirement inapplicable; that he resided in Makati for more than
a year; that quo warranto is the right remedy to question his qualification. In passing, petitioner also
alleged that the issue on his qualification should be "properly" ventilated in a full-dress hearing before the
HRET, albeit praying for the dismissal of the motion for reconsideration for utter lack of merit (and not for
lack of jurisdiction), and for lifting the suspension of his proclamation. It was only on June 01, 1995, in his
Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of
Proclamation, when the petitioner raised COMELEC's alleged lack of jurisdiction to resolve the question
on his qualification. Clearly then, petitioner has actively participated in the proceedings both before the
COMELEC's Second Division and the COMELEC En Banc asking therein affirmative reliefs. The settled
rule is that a party who objects to the jurisdiction of the court and alleges at the same time any non-
jurisdictional ground for dismissing the action is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court.3 Where a party voluntary submits to the jurisdiction of the court and thereafter loses on the
merits, he may not thereafter be heard to say that the court had no
jurisdiction.4 In Jimenezv. Macaraig,5 the Court, citing Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals, 32 SCRA 54, 60
(1970), elaborated on the rationale for this doctrine in this wise:

The petitioners, to borrow the language of Mr. Justice Bautista Angelo (People vs.
Archilla, G.R. No. L-15632, February 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 699, 700-701), cannot adopt a
posture of double-dealing without running afoul of the doctrine of estoppel. The principle
of estoppel is in the interest of a sound administration of the laws. It should deter those
who are disposed to trifle with the courts by taking inconsistent positions contrary to the
elementary principles of right dealing and good faith (People v. Acierto, 92 Phil. 534, 541,
[1953]).6

It is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular
matter to secure an affirmative relief to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape an
adverse decision.7Perforce, petitioner's asseveration that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to
rule on his qualification must fail.

Petitioner insists that domicile is a matter of personal intention. Thus, petition asserts that if he decides to
transfer his legal residence so he can qualify for public office then he is entirely free to do so. Thus
argument to hold water, must be supported by a clear and convincing proofs that petitioner has effectively
abandoned his former domicile and that his intention is not doubtful. Indeed, domicile once established is
considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established (Co v. Electoral
Tribunal House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 711 [1991]). Petitioner from childhood until his last
election as senator has consistently maintained Concepcion, Tarlac, as his domicile. He moved to
Amapola Street, Palm Village, Makati, and thereafter claimed the same to be his new domicile. This
claim, however, is dismally unsupported by the records. The lease contract entered into by petitioner for a
period of two years on the third floor condominium unit in Palm Village, Makati, in my view, does not
prove his intent to abandon his domicile of origin. The intention to establish domicile must be an intention
to remain indefinitely or permanently in the new place.8 This element is lacking in this instance. Worse,
public respondent Commission even found that "respondent Aquino himself testified that his intention was
really for only one (1) year because he has other 'residences' in Manila or in Quezon City ([citing] TSN,
May 2, 1995,
p. 92)".9 Noting that petitioner is already barred from running for senator due to the constitutional
consecutive two-term limit, his search for a place where he could further and continue his political career
and sudden transfer thereto make his intent suspect. The best test of intention to establish legal
residence
comes from one's acts and not by mere declarations alone. 10 To acquire, or effect a change of domicile,
the intention must be bonafide and unequivocal (28 C.J.S. §11). Petitioner, in my view, miserably failed to
show a bonafide and unequivocal intention to effect the change of his domicile.

The theory of legal impossibility is advanced to justify non-compliance with the constitutional qualification
on residency. Petitioner explains his theory in this wise:

. . . THE COMELEC CRITICALLY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE LEGAL

IMPOSSIBILITY OF ENFORCING THE ONE YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF
CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES IN NEWLY CREATED POLITICAL DISTRICTS
WHICH WERE ONLY EXISTING FOR LESS THAN A YEAR AT THE TIME OF THE
ELECTION AND BARELY FOUR MONTHS IN THE CASE OF PETITIONER'S DISTRICT
IN MAKATI. 11

Apparently, this theory is an offshoot of Republic Act. No. 7854, an act converting the municipality
of Makati into a highly urbanized city. This law enacted on January 2, 1995, established a second
Congressional district in Makati in which petitioner ran as a Congressional candidate. Since the
second district, according to petitioner, is barely four (4) months old then the one (1) year
residence qualification provided by the Constitution is inapplicable. Petitioner's acts, however, as
borne by the records, belie his own theory. Originally, he placed in his certificate of candidacy an
entry of ten (10) months residence in Makati. Petitioner then had it amended to one (1) year and
thirteen (13) days to correct what claims as a mere inadvertent mistake. I doubt the sincerity of
this representation. If petitioner is indeed persuaded by his own theory, the ten months residence
he initially wrote would have more than sufficiently qualified him to run in the barely four-month
old Makati district. The amendment only reveals the true intent of petitioner to comply with one
year constitutional requirement for residence, adding an extra thirteen (13) days full measure.
Petitioner apparently wanted to argue one way (theory of legal impossibility), but at the same time
played it safe in the other (the constitutional one year residence requirement). And that is not all.
If we were to adhere to petitioner's theory of legal impossibility, then residents in that district
shorn of the constitutional six months residence requirement for prospective voters (Article V,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution) would have certainly qualified to vote. That would have
legitimized the entry and electoral exercise of flying voters — one of the historic nemeses of a
clean and honest election. Furthermore, to subscribe to petitioner's contention that the
constitutional qualification of candidates should be brushed aside in view of the enactment of R.A.
No. 7854 will indubitably violate the manner and procedure for the amendment or revision of the
constitution outlined under Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. A legislative enactment, it has to
be emphasized, cannot render nugatory the constitution. The constitution is superior to a statute.
 It is the fundamental and organic law of the land to which every statute must conform and
harmonize.

Finally, it has been contended that a second place candidate cannot be proclaimed a substitute winner. I
find the proposition quite unacceptable. A disqualified "candidate" is not a candidate and the votes which
may have been cast in his favor are nothing but stray votes of no legal consequence. A disqualified
person like the petitioner receives no vote or zero vote. In short,
no-candidate-no vote. Petitioner had therefore no right, in fact and in law, to claim first place for he has
nothing to base his right. The legislative intent is clear as provided by R.A. 6646, Section 6, in that votes
cast for a disqualified candidate shall not be counted as they are considered stray (Section 211, Rule 24,
Omnibus Election Code). It is only from the ranks of qualified candidates can one be chosen as first
placer and not from without. Necessarily, petitioner, a disqualified candidate, cannot be a first placer as
he claims himself to be. To count the votes for a disqualified candidate would, in my view, disenfranchise
voters who voted for a qualified candidate. Legitimate votes cast for a qualified candidate should not be
penalized alongside a disqualified candidate. With this in mind, the other qualified candidate who
garnered the highest number of votes should be proclaimed the duly elected representative of the district.
I feel that the Labo doctrine ought to be abandoned.

I therefore vote to deny the petition and to lift the temporary restraining order issued by the Court dated
June 6, 1995.

DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:

In sustaining the COMELEC's acts of suspending the proclamation of petitioner Agapito A. Aquino and of
proceeding to hear the disqualification case against him, the majority opinion relies on Section 6 of R.A.
No. 6646 which it claims to be applicable by virtue of Section 7 thereof to petitions to deny due course to
or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881).

I disagree.

In the first place, the petition to disqualify the petitioner in SPA No. 95-113 is not a petition to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78, which reads:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein
as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and
shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election. (emphasis supplied)

Nowhere in the petition in SPA No. 95-113 is it alleged by the private respondents that a material
representation contained in the petitioner's certificate of candidacy is false. What is being attacked therein
is the petitioner's lack of the one-year residence qualification in the new Second Legislative District of
Makati City where he sought to he elected for the office of Congressman.

The rule governing disqualification cases on the ground of ineligibility, which is also invoked by the private
respondents, is Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended on 15 February 1993. The
amendment allows the, filing of a petition to disqualify a candidate on the ground that he does not
possess all the qualifications provided for by the Constitution or by existing laws. In its original form, the
rule only applied to petitions for disqualification based on the commission of any act declared by law to be
a ground for disqualification. The rule as thus amended now reads as follows:
 Rule 25 — Disqualification of Candidates

Sec. 1. Grounds for Disqualification. — Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who
commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified
from continuing as a candidate.

Sec. 2. Who May File Petition for Disqualification. — Any citizen of voting age, or duly
registered political party, organization or coalition of political parties may file with the Law
Department of the Commission a petition to disqualify a candidate on grounds provided
by law.

Sec. 3. Period to File Petition. — The petition shall be filed any day after the last day for
filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.

Sec. 4. Summary Proceeding. — The petition shall be heard summarily after due notice.

Sec. 5. Effect of Petition if Unresolved Before Completion of Canvass. — If the petition,

for reasons beyond the control of the Commission, cannot be decided before the
completion of the canvass, the votes cast for the respondent may be included in the
counting and in the canvassing; however, if the evidence of guilt is strong, his
proclamation shall be suspended notwithstanding the fact that he received the winning
number of votes in such election.

The underscored portion is the amendment to Rule 25, which the COMELEC must have deemed
necessary to fill up a procedural hiatus in cases of disqualifications based on other grounds in the
light of this Court's interpretation in Loong vs. Commission on Elections (216 SCRA 760 [1992])
that Rule 25 refers only to disqualifications under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code. This Court explicitly stated therein as follows:

We do not agree with private respondent Ututalum's contention that the petition for
disqualification, as in the case at bar, may be filed at any time after the last day for filing a
certificate of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation, applying Section 3,
Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.

Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure refers to Disqualification of Candidates; and

Section 1 of said rule provides that any candidate who commits any act declared by law
to be a ground for disqualification maybe disqualified from continuing as a candidate. The
grounds for disqualification as expressed in Sections 12 and 68 of the Code, are the
following:

Sec. 12. Disqualification. — Any person who has been declared by

competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by
final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for
which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months
or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a
candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary
pardon or granted amnesty.

Sec. 63 DisquaIifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest

in which he is a party is declared by final decision of 4 competent court
guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other
material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to
 enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in
excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v,
and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person
who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall
not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said
person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided
for in the election laws.

The petition filed by private respondent Ututalum with the respondent Comelec to
disqualify petitioner Loong on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his
certificate of candidacy as to his age, clearly does not fall under the grounds of
disqualification as provided for in Rule 25 but is expressly covered by Rule 23 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure governing petitions to cancel certificate of candidacy.
Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 which allows the filing of the petition at any time after the
last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation, is merely a procedural rule issued by respondent Commission which,
although a constitutional body, has no legislative powers. Thus, it can not supersede
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which is a legislative enactment.

Second, even if we assume for the sake of argument that the petition in SPA No. 95-113 fall under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, still Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 cannot be applied by virtue of
Section 7 thereof. Sections 6 and 7 reads:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Sec. 71 Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. — The

procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

The "procedure hereinabove provided" mentioned in Section 7 cannot be construed to refer to Section 6
which does not provide for a procedure but for the EFFECTS of disqualification cases. It can only refer to
the procedureprovided in Section 5 of the said Act on nuisance candidates which reads as follows:

Sec. 5. Procedure in Cases of Nuisance Candidates. — A verified petition to declare a

duly registered candidate as a nuisance candidate under Section 69 .f Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881 shall be filed personally or through duly authorized representative with the
Commission by any registered candidate for the same office within five (5) days from the
last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy. Filing by mail shall not be allowed.

(b) Within three (3) days from the filing of the petition, the Commission shall issue
summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition and its
enclosures, if any.
 (c) The respondent shall be given three (3) days from receipt of the summons within
which to file his verified answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition, serving copy
thereof upon the petitioner. Grounds for a motion to dismiss may be raised as affirmative
defenses.

(d) The Commission may designate any of its officials who are lawyers to hear the case
and receive evidence. The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of oral
testimonies, the parties may be required to submit position papers together with affidavits
or counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence. The hearing officer shall
immediately submit to the Commission his findings, reports, and recommendations within
five (5) days from the completion of such submission of evidence. The Commission shall
render its decision within five (5) days from receipt thereof.

(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days from receipt
of a copy thereof by the parties, be final and executory unless stayed by the Supreme
Court.

(f) The Commission shall within twenty-four hours, through the fastest available means,
disseminate its decision or the decision of the Supreme Court or the city or municipal
election registrars, boards of election inspectors, and the general public in the political
subdivision concerned.

and which is the only procedure that precedes Section 7 of the said Act. Heretofore, no law
provided for the procedure to govern cases under Section 78. Applying to such cases, through
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6646, the procedure applicable to cases of nuisance candidates is prudent
and wise, for both cases necessarily require that they be decided before the day of the election;
hence, only summary proceedings thereon can adequately respond to the urgency of the matter.

Third, Section 6 merely supplements Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code providing as follows:

Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. — The Commission and the courts
shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end
that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in
which the disqualification is sought.

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason,
a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he
is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the
provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to
office.

by granting the COMELEC or the Court the authority to continue hearing the case and to suspend
the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong. As observed by this Court in its majority "the
phrase 'when the evidence of guilt is strong' seems to suggest that the provisions of Section 6
ought to be applicable only to disqualification cases under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code."

Fourth, the amended Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which is the only rule governing
petitions filed before election or proclamation for the disqualification of a candidate on the ground that he
lacks the qualifications provided for by the Constitution or by law, does not, as can be gathered from
Section 5 thereof, authorize the COMELEC to continue hearing the case after the election.
Fifth, even assuming that the second sentence of Section 6 of R.A. to No. 6646 is applicable to
disqualification cases based on the ground of lack of qualification, it cannot be applied to a case does not
involve elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and where suspension of proclamation is not
warranted because of the absence of strong evidence of guilt or ineligibility. In such a case the candidate
sought to be disqualified but who obtains the highest number of votes has to be proclaimed. Once he is
proclaimed, the COMELEC cannot continue with the case, and the remedy of the opponent is to contest
the winning candidate's eligibility within ten days from proclamation in a quo warranto proceeding which is
within the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts, in the case of barangay officials; the
regional trial courts, in case of municipal officials (Section 2(2), Article IX-C, Constitution; Section 253,
paragraph 2, B.P. Blg. 881); the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, in the case of
Congressmen; the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case of Senators (Section 17, Article VI,
Constitution); and the Supreme Court en banc, in the case of the President or Vice-President (Section 4,
Article VII, Constitution).

If what is involved is an elective regional, provincial, or city official, and the case cannot be decided before
the election, the COMELEC can, even after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified,
proceed with the case by treating it as a petition for quo warranto, since such a case properly pertains to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC (Section 2(2), Article IX-C, Constitution; Section 253, B.P. Blg.
881).

But even granting for the sake of argument that Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. No. 6646, in relation to Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code and the amended Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, are
applicable, the order of suspension of the petitioner's proclamation issued on 15 May 1995 is null and
void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. What was before the COMELEC en banc at
that stage was the decision of the Second Division of 6 May 1995 dismissing the petition to disqualify the
petitioner and declaring him qualified for the position. That decision is a direct and positive rejection of
any claim that the evidence of the petitioner's guilt is strong. Note that it was only on 2 June 1995, when
the COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of the Second Division, that it was found that the evidence
of the petitioner's ineligibility is strong. It would have been otherwise if the Second Division had
disqualified the petitioner.

Besides, at the time the questioned order was issued, there was no hearing yet on the private
respondents' motions for the suspension of the petitioner's proclamation. In fact, in that order the
COMELEC en banc admitted that the said motions could not be resolved without hearing, thus:

Pending the resolution of the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 7,
1995; Urgent Motion Ad Cautelam to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent (May 10,
1995) filed on May 10, 1995; and OMNIBUS MOTION (For Reconsideration of the
Honorable Commission's [Second Division] Resolution dated May 6, 1995, and 2nd
Urgent Motion Ad Cautelam to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent Aquino, which
cannot be resolved without hearing, without violating the right of the respondent to due
process. . . .

For being void from the beginning; it is as if the order of 15 May 1995 had not existed and could not,
therefore, be made permanent by the COMELEC en banc through its resolution of 2 June 1995 whose
dispositive portion reads in part: [c]onsequently, the order of suspension of the respondent should he
obtain the winning number of votes, issued by this Commission on 15 May 1995 is now made
permanent."

Absent a valid finding before the election or after the canvass of election returns that the evidence of the
petitioner's guilt or ineligibility is strong, the COMELEC should not have suspended the proclamation of
the petitioner. After the completion of the canvass the petitioner should have been proclaimed.
This case then must be distinguished from that of Imelda Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 119976, where the COMELEC en banc affirmed before the elections, or on 7 May
1995, the Second Division's resolution of 24 April 1995 disqualifying Mrs. Marcos.

Accordingly, the order of 15 May 1995 and the resolution of 2 June 1995 of the COMELEC en banc must
be annulled and set aside, and the COMELEC, through its City Board of Canvassers of Makati, must be
ordered to immediately proclaim the petitioner, without prejudice to the right of his opponents to file a
petition for quo warranto with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which is the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives (Section 17, Article VI, Constitution).

In view of the foregoing, a disquisition on the merits of the ground for the petitioner's disqualification will
no longer be proper.

I vote to GRANT the instant petition, to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the challenged order and resolution of
the Commission on Elections en banc, and to DIRECT the Board of Canvassers of Makati City to
reconvene and proclaim the petitioner as the winning candidate, without prejudice on the part of any
aggrieved party to file the appropriate action in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.

Romero and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

VITUG, J., separate opinion:

I find what I would consider as the relevant issues in this petition as similar in almost all material respects
to those obtaining in G.R. No. 119976 (Imelda Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections and
Cirilo Roy Montejo). Let me then here just reiterate what I have there said in my separate opinion.

The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.

The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that sets up ideals and
directions and render steady our strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure that mistakes in the
past are not repeated. A complaint transience of a constitution belittles its basic function and weakens its
goals. A constitution may well become outdated by the realities of time. When it does, it must be changed
but while it remains, we owe it respect and allegiance. Anarchy, open or subtle, has never been, nor must
it ever be, the answer to perceived transitory needs, let alone societal attitudes, or the Constitution might
lose its very essence.

Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express statement
or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51).

The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of Article VI of the fundamental
law. These provisions read:

Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a

natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-
five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
 qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated
by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under
the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.

The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and administer "all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that, there
being nothing said to the contrary, should include its authority to pass upon the qualification and
disqualification prescribed by law of candidates to an elective office. Indeed, pre-proclamation
controversies are expressly placed under the COMELEC's jurisdiction to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C,
Sec. 3, Constitution).

The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year residency
requirement. This issue (whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a
question of fact or at least inextricably linked to such determination. The findings and judgment of the
COMELEC, in accordance with the long established rule and subject only to a number of exceptions
under the basic heading of "grave abuse of discretion," are not reviewable by this Court.

I do not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a plain matter. Generally,
the term "residence" has a broader connotation that mean permanent (domicile), official (place where
one's official duties may require him to stay) or temporary (the place where he sojourns during a
considerable length of time). For Civil law purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence
(see Article 50, Civil Code). In election cases, the controlling rule is that heretofore announced by this
Court in Romualdez vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408, 409); thus:

In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus:
"(t)he term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which
imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." "Domicile" denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons,
one intends to return. . . . Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting
another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there
must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to
remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must
basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain
in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary, and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile
must be actual.

Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with having
committed grave abuse of discretion in its assailed resolution.

The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of the
Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore been duly
proclaimed and has since become a "member" of the Senate or the House of Representatives. The
question can be asked on whether or not the proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial function of
the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number of votes cast in an election exercise. I
believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of which, being adequately defined,
does not allow the use of further judgment or discretion. The COMELEC; in its particular case, is tasked
with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be required by law
before a proclamation is properly done.
The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment on the ultimate
exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are
explicitly within their exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were otherwise, would be the effect of
the Court's peremptory pronouncement on the ability of the Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its
own judgment in a contest "relating to the election, returns and qualification" of its members.

Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the applicability to this case of
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, each providing
thusly:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. — The Commission and the courts
shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end
that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in
which the disqualification is sought.

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason,
a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified, and he
is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the
provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to
office.

I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so much the
specific instances they ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly convey. Thus, I will not scoff at
the argument that it should be sound to say that votes cast in favor of the disqualified candidate,
whenever ultimately declared as such, should not be counted in his or her favor and must accordingly be
considered to be stray votes. The argument, nevertheless, is far outweighed by the rationale of the now
prevailing doctrine first enunciated in the case of Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238 (1912]) which,
although later abandoned in Ticzon vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687 [1981]), and Santos vs. COMELEC (137
SCRA 740 [1985]), was restored, along with the interim case of Geronimo vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435
[1985]), by the Labo (176 SCRA 1 [1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992])
and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 (1994]) rulings. Benito vs. Comelec was a unanimous decision
penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in by Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were
on official leave). For easy reference, let me quote from the first Labo decision:
 Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo
warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is
that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was
obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.

The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, (137
SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was
proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat
and considered a non-candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect, the second placer
won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the Court then,
(Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente,
Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with three dissenting (Teehankee, Acting C.J.,
Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and another two reserving their vote. (Plana and
Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.) One was on official leave. (Fernando, C.J.)

Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in
favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which represents the
more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first
announced in 1912 in Topacio v. Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members
of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera,
Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any
dissent, although one reserved his vote,
(Makasiar, J.) another took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave.
(Fernando, C.J. and Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the Court held:

. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the

constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not
acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and
imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which
have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose
him.

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who
have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that
office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government
that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared
carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes
cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 234, p. 676.)

The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is
later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he
was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the
second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective
office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may
not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However,
in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and
legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief
that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be
treated as stray, void or meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)

Accordingly, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition.

MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:

For the reasons expressed in my separate opinion in the companion case. G.R. No. 119976. Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections. I am of the opinion that the Commission on Elections
has no jurisdiction over petitions for disqualification of candidates based on alleged ineligibility for the
office to which they seek election.

The May 15, 1995 resolution of the COMELEC en banc, suspending he obtain the highest number of
votes of Representative of the Second District of Makati, Metro Manila, purports to have been issued
pursuant to §6 of R.A. No. 6646. This provision authorizes the COMELEC to order the suspension of the
proclamation "whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong." As explained in my separate opinion in G.R.
No. 119976, however, this provision refers to proceedings under §68 of the Omnibus Election Code which
provides for the disqualification of candidates found guilty of using what in political parlance have been
referred to as "guns goons or gold" to influence the outcome of elections. Since the disqualification of
petitioner in this case was not sought on this ground, the application of §6 of R.A.. No. 6646 is clearly a
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.

Nor may the petition to disqualify petitioner in the COMELEC be justified under §78 of the OEC which
authorizes the filing of a petition for the cancellation of certificates of candidacy since such a petition
maybe filed "exclusively on the ground that a material representation contained [in the certificate] as
required under section 74 is false." There was no allegation that in stating in his certificate of candidacy
that he is a resident of Amapola St., Palm Village, Guadalupe Viejo, Makati, Metro Manila, petitioner
made any false representation.

For this reason, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95-113; that its
proceedings in SPA No. 95-113, including the questioned orders, are void; and that the qualifications of
petitioner Agapito A. Aquino for the position of Representative of the Second District of the City of Makati
may only be inquired into by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.

This conclusion makes it unnecessary for me to express my view at this time on the question whether, in
the event the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is declared ineligible, the one who
received the next highest number of votes is entitled to be declared the winner.

Accordingly, I vote (1) to grant the petition in this case and (2) to annul the proceedings of the
Commission on Elections in SPA No. 95-113, including the questioned orders, dated May 6, 1995. May
15, 1995, and the two orders both dated June 2, 1995, so far as they declare petitioner Agapito A. Aquino
to be ineligible for the position of Representative of the Second District of the City of Makati and direct the
City Board of Canvassers of Makati to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified
candidates.

Narvasa, J., concurs.

Makil Pundaodaya v. Comelec

[G.R. NO. 179313 : September 17, 2009]

MAKIL U. PUNDAODAYA, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSN and ARSENIO

DENSING NOBLE, Respondents.

DECISION
 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition1 for certiorari under Rule 65 assails the August 3, 2007 Resolution2 of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 07-202, which declared private
respondent Arsenio Densing Noble (Noble) qualified to run for municipal mayor of
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental, in the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local
Elections.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Makil U. Pundaodaya (Pundaodaya) is married to Judith Pundaodaya, who ran

against Noble for the position of municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the
2007 elections.

On March 27, 2007, Noble filed his Certificate of Candidacy, indicating therein that he has
been a resident of Purok 3, Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental for 15 years.

On April 3, 2007, Pundaodaya filed a petition for disqualification3 against Noble docketed as
SPA No. 07-202, alleging that the latter lacks the residency qualification prescribed by
existing laws for elective local officials; that he never resided nor had any physical presence
at a fixed place in Purok 3, Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; and that he
does not appear to have the intention of residing therein permanently. Pundaodaya claimed
that Noble is in fact a resident of Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, where he also maintains a
business called OBERT Construction Supply.

In his Answer,4 Noble averred that he is a registered voter and resident of Barangay
Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; that on January 18, 1992, he married Bernadith
Go, the daughter of then Mayor Narciso Go of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; that he has
been engaged in electoral activities since his marriage; and that he voted in the said
municipality in the 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections.

In a resolution dated May 13, 2007,5 the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled in favor of
Pundaodaya and disqualified Noble from running as mayor, thus:

Respondent Noble's claim that he is a registered voter and has actually voted in the past
three (3) elections in the said municipality does not sufficiently establish that he has
actually elected residency at Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. Neither does campaigning in
previous elections sufficiently establish residence.

Respondent Noble failed to show that he has indeed acquired domicile at Kinoguitan,
Misamis Oriental. He failed to prove not only his bodily presence in the new locality but has
likewise failed to show that he intends to remain at Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental and
abandon his residency at Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition to Disqualify Aresnio Densing Noble
is hereby GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.6
Noble filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution. In the meantime, he
garnered the highest number of votes and was proclaimed the winning candidate on May
15, 2007. Pundaodaya then filed an Urgent Motion to Annul Proclamation.7

On August 3, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc reversed the decision of the Second Division and
declared Noble qualified to run for the mayoralty position.

The COMELEC En Banc held that when Noble married Bernadith Go on January 18, 1992,
the couple has since resided in Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; that he was a registered voter
and that he participated in the last three elections; and although he is engaged in business
in Cagayan de Oro City, the fact that he resides in Kinoguitan and is a registered voter and
owns property thereat, sufficiently meet the residency requirement.8 Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (en banc) RESOLVED, as it hereby

RESOLVES, to GRANT the instant Motion for Reconsideration and to REVERSE AND SET
ASIDE the Resolution promulgated on May 13, 2007 issued by the Commission (Second
Division).

ACCORDINGLY, respondent ARSENIO DENSING NOBLE is QUALIFIED to run for the local
elective position of Municipal Mayor of the Municipality of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the
May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections.

SO ORDERED.9

Pundaodaya filed the instant petition for certiorari, alleging that the COMELEC En Banc acted
with grave abuse of discretion when it declared Noble qualified to run; when it did not annul
Noble's proclamation; and when it failed to proclaim the true winning candidate, Judith
Pundaodaya.

In a resolution dated November 13, 2007,10 the Court required the respondents to comment
on the petition.

Public respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Manifestation and
Motion11 praying that it be excused from filing a separate comment and that the said
pleading be considered sufficient compliance with the November 13, 2007 Resolution.

Meanwhile, for Noble's failure to comply, the Court issued Resolutions 12 dated July 15, 2008
and December 9, 2008 requiring him to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt
with or held in contempt, imposing a fine of P1,000.00, and requiring him to file a comment.
On June 2, 2009, the Court deemed Noble to have waived the filing of the comment. 13

The issues for resolution are: whether the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion:
1) in declaring Noble qualified to run for the mayoralty position; and 2) in failing to order
the annulment of Noble's proclamation and refusing to proclaim Judith Pundaodaya as the
winning candidate.

Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code,
requires that an elective local official must be a resident in the barangay, municipality, city
or province where he intends to serve for at least one year immediately preceding the
election.14
In Japzon v. Commission on Elections,15 it was held that the term "residence" is to be
understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but
rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."

In Domino v. Commission on Elections,16 the Court explained that domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other
reasons, one intends to return. It is a question of intention and circumstances. In the
consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man
must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a
new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a
time.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

If one wishes to successfully effect a change of domicile, he must demonstrate an actual

removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one, and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose.17 Without clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these three requirements,
the domicile of origin continues.18

Records show that Noble's domicile of origin was Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. However,
he claims to have chosen Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental as his new domicile. To substantiate
this, he presented before the COMELEC his voter registration records;19 a Certification dated
April 25, 2007 from Election Officer II Clavel Z. Tabada;20 his Marriage Certificate;21 and
affidavits of residents of Kinoguitan22 attesting that he established residence in the
municipality after his marriage to Bernadith Go. In addition, he presented receipts 23 from
the Provincial Treasurer for payment of his water bills, and Certifications from the Municipal
Treasurer and Municipal Engineer that he has been a consumer of the Municipal Water
System since June 2003. To prove ownership of property, he also presented a Deed of
Sale24 over a real property dated June 3, 1996.

The above pieces of documentary evidence, however, fail to convince us that Noble
successfully effected a change of domicile. As correctly ruled by the COMELEC Second
Division, private respondent's claim that he is a registered voter and has actually voted in
the past 3 elections in Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental do not sufficiently establish that he has
actually elected residency in the said municipality. Indeed, while we have ruled in the past
that voting gives rise to a strong presumption of residence, it is not conclusive evidence
thereof.25 Thus, in Perez v. Commission on Elections,26 we held that a person's registration
as voter in one district is not proof that he is not domiciled in another district. The
registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin is not sufficient to
consider him to have abandoned or lost his residence.27

To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with
conduct indicative of that intention. It requires not only such bodily presence in that place
but also a declared and probable intent to make it one's fixed and permanent place of
abode.28

In this case, Noble's marriage to Bernadith Go does not establish his actual physical
presence in Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. Neither does it prove an intention to make it his
permanent place of residence. We are also not persuaded by his alleged payment of water
bills in the absence of evidence showing to which specific properties they pertain. And while
Noble presented a Deed of Sale for real property, the veracity of this document is belied by
his own admission that he does not own property in Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. 29

On the contrary, we find that Noble has not abandoned his original domicile as shown by the
following: a) Certification dated April 12, 2007 of the Barangay Kagawad of Barangay
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City stating that Noble is a resident of the barangay; 30 b)
Affidavit31 of the Barangay Kagawad of Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental dated April
14, 2007, attesting that Noble has not resided in Barangay Esperanza in Kinoguitan; c)
photos32 and official receipts33 showing that Noble and his wife maintain their residence and
businesses in Lapasan; d) tax declarations34 of real properties in Cagayan de Oro City under
the name of Noble; and e) the "Household Record of Barangay Inhabitants"35 of Mayor
Narciso Go, which did not include Noble or his wife, Bernadith Go, which disproves Noble's
claim that he resides with his father-in-law.

From the foregoing, we find that Noble's alleged change of domicile was effected solely for
the purpose of qualifying as a candidate in the 2007 elections. This we cannot allow. In
Torayno, Sr. v. Commission on Elections, 36 we held that the one-year residency
requirement is aimed at excluding outsiders "from taking advantage of favorable
circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain." Establishing residence in a
community merely to meet an election law requirement defeats the purpose of
representation: to elect through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to
the needs of the community.37 Thus, we find Noble disqualified from running as municipal
mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007 elections.

Notwithstanding Noble's disqualification, we find no basis for the proclamation of Judith

Pundaodaya, as mayor. The rules on succession under the Local Government Code,
explicitly provides:

SECTION 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor,
and Vice-Mayor. - If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the xxx mayor, the xxx
vice-mayor concerned shall become the xxx mayor.

xxx

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills
a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify or is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of
his office.

x x x x (Emphasis ours)

Thus, considering the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis
Oriental occasioned by Noble's disqualification, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor shall then
succeed as mayor.38

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The August 3, 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc in SPA No. 07-202 declaring respondent Arsenio Densing Noble qualified to run as
Mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental, is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. In view of the
permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental, the
proclaimed Vice-Mayor is ORDERED to succeed as Mayor.
SO ORDERED.

People v Jalosjos

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This Court has declared that the state policy on the heinous offense of rape is clear and unmistakable.
Under certain circumstances, some of them present in this case, the offender may be sentenced to a long
period of confinement, or he may suffer death. The crime is an assault on human dignity. No legal system
worthy of the name can afford to ignore the traumatic consequences for the unfortunate victim and
grievous injury to the peace and good order of the community.1

Rape is particularly odious, one which figuratively scrapes the bottom of the barrel of moral depravity,
when committed against a minor.2

In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant is always scrutinized with extreme caution. 3

In the present case, there are certain particulars which impelled the court to devote an even more
painstaking and meticulous examination of the facts on record and a similarly conscientious evaluation of
the arguments of the parties. The victim of rape in this case is a minor below twelve (12) years of age. As
narrated by her, the details of the rape are mesmerically sordid and repulsive. The victim was peddled for
commercial sex by her own guardian whom she treated as a foster father. Because the complainant was
a willing victim, the acts of rape were preceded by several acts of lasciviousness on distinctly separate
occasions. The accused is also a most unlikely rapist. He is a member of Congress. Inspite of his having
been charged and convicted by the trial court for statutory rape, his constituents liked him so much that
they knowingly re-elected him to his congressional office, the duties of which he could not perform.

Statutory rape committed by a distinguished Congressman on an eleven (11) year old commercial sex
worker is bound to attract widespread media and public attention. In the words of accused-appellant, "he
has been demonized in the press most unfairly, his image transmogrified into that of a dastardly, ogre, out
to get his slimy hands on innocent and naïve girls to satiate his lustful desires."4 This Court, therefore,
punctiliously considered accused-appellant’s claim that he suffered "invidiously discriminatory treatment."
Regarding the above allegation, the Court has ascertained that the extensive publicity generated by the
case did not result in a mistrial; the records show that the accused had ample and free opportunity to
adduce his defenses.

This is an appeal from the decision5 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62, in Criminal Case
Nos. 96-1985 and 96-1986, convicting accused-appellant Romeo Jalosjos of two (2) counts of statutory
rape, and in Criminal Case Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 96-1992, and 96-1993, for six (6)
counts of acts of lasciviousness defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, also known as the Child Abuse Law.

There were six (6) other cases, Criminal Case Nos. 96-1991, 96-1994, 96-1995, 96-1996, 96-1997, and
96-1998, where the accused-appellant was acquitted of the charges of acts of lasciviousness for failure of
the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On December 16, 1996, two (2) informations for the crime of statutory rape; and twelve (12) for acts of
lasciviousness defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section
5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, were filed against accused-appellant. The accusatory portion of said
informations for the crime of statutory rape state:

In Criminal Case No. 96-1985:

The undersigned, upon prior sworn complaint by the offended party, eleven (11) year old minor
ROSILYN DELANTAR, accuses ROMEO JALOSJOS of the crime of RAPE defined and
penalized under Art. 335 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about June 18, 1996 at Room No.1702, Ritz Towers, Makati City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with (sic) eleven year old minor Rosilyn
Delantar against her will, with damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

In Criminal Case No. 96-1986:

The undersigned, upon prior sworn complaint by the offended party, eleven (11) year old minor
ROSILYN DELANTAR, accuses ROMEO JALOSJOS of the crime of RAPE defined and
penalized under Art. 335 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about June 20, 1996 at Room No. 1702, Ritz Towers, Makati City, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with (sic) eleven year old
minor Rosilyn Delantar against her will, with damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

For acts of lasciviousness, the informations8 under which accused-appellant was convicted were identical
except for the different dates of commission on June 14, 1996; June 15, 1996; June 16, 1996; June 20,
1996; June 21, 1996; and June 22, 1996, to wit:

The undersigned, upon prior sworn complaint by the offended party, eleven (11)-year old minor
ROSILYN DELANTAR accuses ROMEO JALOSJOS of the crime of ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise
known as the Special Protection of Children against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act,
committed as follows:

That in the evening of June 14, 1996, or thereabout, in Room No. 1702, Ritz Towers,
Makati City, Metro-Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with lewd design, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kiss, caress and fondle said complainant's face, lips, neck, breasts, whole body, and
vagina, suck her nipples and insert his finger and then his tongue into her vagina, place
himself on top of her, then insert his penis in between her thighs until ejaculation, and
other similar lascivious conduct against her will, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1988; 96-1990; and 96-1993, there were added averments that on the different
dates, the accused gave the complainant P10,000.00, P5,000.00 and P5,000.00 respectively.
Upon arraignment on January 29, 1997, accused-appellant refused to enter a plea. Hence, the trial court
entered a plea of not guilty for him. At the trial, the prosecution presented eight (8) main witnesses and
seven (7) rebuttal witnesses as well as documentary evidences marked as Exhibits A to EEEE, inclusive
of submarkings. The defense, on the other hand presented twenty-six (26) witnesses. Its documentary
evidence consists of Exhibits 1 to 153, inclusive of submarkings. The records of the case are extremely
voluminous.

The People’s version of the facts, culled mainly from the testimony of the victim, are as follows:

Maria Rosilyn Delantar was a slim, eleven-year old lass with long, straight black hair and almond-shaped
black eyes. She grew up in a two-storey apartment in Pasay City under the care of Simplicio Delantar,
whom she treated as her own father. Simplicio was a fifty-six year old homosexual whose ostensible
source of income was selling longganiza and tocino and accepting boarders at his house. On the side, he
was also engaged in the skin trade as a pimp.

Rosilyn never got to see her mother, though she had known a younger brother, Shandro, who was also
under the care of Simplicio. At a very young age of 5, fair and smooth-complexioned Rosilyn was
exposed by Simplicio to his illicit activities. She and her brother would tag along with Simplicio whenever
he delivered prostitutes to his clients. When she turned 9, Rosilyn was offered by Simplicio as a prostitute
to an Arabian national known as Mr. Hammond. Thus begun her ordeal as one of the girls sold by
Simplicio for sexual favors.

Rosilyn first met accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, sometime in February 1996 at his office located
near Robinson’s Galleria. Rosilyn and Simplicio were brought there and introduced by a talent manager
by the name of Eduardo Suarez. Accused-appellant promised to help Rosilyn become an actress. When
he saw Rosilyn, accused-appellant asked how old she was. Simplicio answered, "10. She is going to be
11 on May 11." Accused-appellant inquired if Rosilyn knows how to sing. Simplicio told Rosilyn to sing, so
she sang the song, "Tell Me You Love Me." Accused-appellant then asked if Rosilyn has nice legs and
then raised her skirt up to the mid-thighs. He asked if she was already menstruating, and Simplicio said
yes. Accused-appellant further inquired if Rosilyn already had breasts. When nobody answered, accused-
appellant cupped Rosilyn’s left breast. Thereafter, accused-appellant assured them that he would help
Rosilyn become an actress as he was one of the producers of the TV programs, "Valiente" and "Eat
Bulaga."

Simplicio and Suarez then discussed the execution of a contract for Rosilyn’s movie career. Accused-
appellant, on the other hand, said that he would adopt Rosilyn and that the latter would have to live with
him in his condominium at the Ritz Towers. Before Simplicio and Rosilyn went home, accused-appellant
gave Rosilyn P2,000.00.

The second time Rosilyn met accused-appellant was at his condominium unit, located at Room 1702, Ritz
Towers, Makati City. Accused-appellant and Simplicio discussed the contract and his plan to finance
Rosilyn’s studies. Accused-appellant gave Simplicio P500.00, thereafter, Rosilyn, Shandro and Simplicio
left.

The third meeting between Rosilyn and accused-appellant was also at Ritz Towers to discuss her acting
career. Accused-appellant referred the preparation of Rosilyn’s contract to his lawyer, who was also
present. After the meeting, Simplicio and Rosilyn left. As they were walking towards the elevator,
accused-appellant approached them and gave Rosilyn P3,000.00.

On June 14, 1996, at about 8:30 to 9:00 p.m., Simplicio and Rosilyn returned to accused-appellant’s
condominium unit at Ritz Towers. When accused-appellant came out of his bedroom, Simplicio told
Rosilyn to go inside the bedroom, while he and accused-appellant stayed outside. After a while, accused-
appellant entered the bedroom and found Rosilyn watching television. He walked towards Rosilyn and
kissed her on the lips, then left the room again. Simplicio came in and bid her goodbye. Rosilyn told
Simplicio that accused-appellant kissed her to which Simplicio replied, "Halik lang naman."

Rosilyn was left alone in the bedroom watching television. After some time, accused-appellant came in
and entered the bathroom. He came out clad in a long white T-shirt on which was printed the word,
"Dakak." In his hand was a plain white T-shirt. Accused-appellant told Rosilyn that he wanted to change
her clothes. Rosilyn protested and told accused-appellant that she can do it herself, but accused-
appellant answered, "Daddy mo naman ako." Accused-appellant then took off Rosilyn’s blouse and skirt.
When he was about to take off her panties, Rosilyn said, "Huwag po." Again, accused-appellant told her,
"After all, I am your Daddy." Accused-appellant then removed her panties and dressed her with the long
white T-shirt.

The two of them watched television in bed. After sometime, accused-appellant turned off the lamp and
the television. He turned to Rosilyn and kissed her lips. He then raised her shirt, touched her breasts and
inserted his finger into her vagina. Rosilyn felt pain and cried out, "Tama na po." Accused-appellant
stopped. He continued to kiss her lips and fondle her breasts. Later, accused-appellant told Rosilyn to
sleep.

The following morning, Rosilyn was awakened by accused-appellant whom she found bent over and
kissing her. He told her to get up, took her hand and led her to the bathroom. He removed Rosilyn’s shirt
and gave her a bath. While accused-appellant rubbed soap all over Rosilyn’s body, he caressed her
breasts and inserted his finger into her vagina. After that, he rinsed her body, dried her with a towel and
applied lotion on her arms and legs. Then, he dried her hair and told her to dress up. Rosilyn put on her
clothes and went out of the bathroom, while accused-appellant took a shower.

Accused-appellant ate breakfast while Rosilyn stayed in the bedroom watching television. When accused-
appellant entered the room, he knelt in front of her, removed her panties and placed her legs on his
shoulders. Then, he placed his tongue on her vagina. Thereafter, he gave Rosilyn P10,000.00 and told
his housemaid to take her shopping at Shoemart. When she returned to the Ritz Towers, Simplicio was
waiting for her. The two of them went home. Rosilyn narrated to Simplicio what accused-appellant did to
her, and pleaded for him not to bring her back to the Ritz Towers. Simplicio told her that everything was
alright as long as accused-appellant does not have sexual intercourse with her.

That same evening, at around 9:00 to 9:30 in the evening, Simplicio again brought Rosilyn to the Ritz
Towers. After Simplicio left, accused-appellant removed Rosilyn’s clothes and dressed her with the same
long T-shirt. They watched television for a while, then accused-appellant sat beside Rosilyn and kissed
her on the lips. He made Rosilyn lie down, lifted her shirt above her breasts, and inserted his finger into
her vagina. Then, accused-appellant removed his own clothes, placed his penis between Rosilyn’s thighs
and made thrusting motions until he ejaculated on her thighs. Thereafter, accused-appellant kissed her
and told her to sleep.

The next day, June 16, 1996, accused-appellant roused her from sleep and bathed her. Again, he rubbed
soap all over her body, washed her hair, and thereafter rinsed her body and dried her hair. While
accused-appellant was bathing Rosilyn, he asked her to fondle his penis while he caressed her breasts
and inserted his finger into her vagina. After their shower, accused-appellant ate breakfast. He gave
Rosilyn P5,000.00 and told her to just wait for Simplicio in the condominium unit. On their way home,
Simplicio told Rosilyn that if accused-appellant tries to insert his penis into her vagina, she should refuse.

At around 8:00 p.m. of June 18, 1996, Simplicio brought Rosilyn to the Ritz Towers. They found accused-
appellant sitting on the bed in his bedroom. Simplicio told Rosilyn to approach accused-appellant, then he
left. Accused-appellant took off Rosilyn’s clothes and dressed her with a long T-shirt on which was printed
a picture of accused-appellant and a woman, with the caption, "Cong. Jalosjos with his Toy." They
watched television for a while, then accused-appellant lay beside Rosilyn and kissed her on the lips. He
raised her shirt and parted her legs. He positioned himself between the spread legs of Rosilyn, took off
his own shirt, held his penis, and poked and pressed the same against Rosilyn’s vagina. This caused
Rosilyn pain inside her sex organ. Thereafter, accused-appellant fondled her breasts and told her to
sleep.

When Rosilyn woke up the following morning, June 19, 1996, accused-appellant was no longer around
but she found P5,000.00 on the table. Earlier that morning, she had felt somebody touching her private
parts but she was still too sleepy to find out who it was. Rosilyn took a bath, then went off to school with
Simplicio, who arrived to fetch her.

The next encounter of Rosilyn with accused-appellant was on June 21, 1996, at about 9:00 o’clock in the
evening in his bedroom at the Ritz Towers. Accused-appellant stripped her naked and again put on her
the long shirt he wanted her to wear. After watching television for a while, accused-appellant knelt beside
Rosilyn, raised her shirt, caressed her breasts and inserted his finger into her vagina. Then, he clipped
his penis between Rosilyn’s thighs, and made thrusting motions until he ejaculated. Thereafter, Rosilyn
went to sleep.

The next day, June 22, 1996, Rosilyn was awakened by accused-appellant who was kissing her and
fondling her sex organ. She, however, ignored him and went back to sleep. When she woke up, she
found the P5,000.00 which accused-appellant left and gave the same to Simplicio Delantar, when the
latter came to pick her up.

On June 29, 1996, Rosilyn again went to the Ritz Towers. During that visit, accused-appellant took
photographs of Rosilyn. He asked her to pose with her T-shirt pulled down thereby exposing her breasts.
He also took her photographs with her T-shirt rolled up to the pelvis but without showing her pubis, and
finally, while straddled on a chair facing the backrest, showing her legs.

Before Rosilyn went to sleep, accused-appellant kissed her lips, fondled her breasts and inserted his
finger into her vagina. The following morning, she woke up and found the P5,000.00 left by accused-
appellant on the table. She recalled that earlier that morning, she felt somebody caressing her breasts
and sex organ.

On July 2, 1996 at 7:00 p.m., Rosilyn and Simplicio returned to the Ritz Towers. Rosilyn had to wait for
accused-appellant, who arrived between 12:00 to 1:00 a.m. He again dressed her with the long white shirt
similar to what he was wearing. While sitting on the bed, accused-appellant kissed her lips and inserted
his tongue into her mouth. He then fondled her breasts and inserted his finger into her vagina, causing
her to cry in pain. Accused-appellant stopped and told her to sleep.

The next morning, accused-appellant bathed her again. While he soaped her body, he fondled her
breasts and inserted his finger in her vagina. Rosilyn felt pain and shoved his hand away. After bathing
her, accused-appellant had breakfast. Before he left, he gave Rosilyn P5,000.00. As soon as Simplicio
arrived, Rosilyn gave her the money and then they left for school.

On July 20, 1996, Simplicio again brought Rosilyn to the Ritz Towers. Accused-appellant was waiting in
his bedroom. He took off Rosilyn’s clothes, including her panties, and dressed her with a long T-shirt
similar to what he was wearing. After watching television, accused-appellant kissed Rosilyn on the lips,
inserted his tongue in her mouth and fondled her breasts. Then, he made Rosilyn lie on the bed, spread
her legs apart and placed a pillow under her back. He inserted his finger in her vagina and mounted
himself between her legs with his hands rested on her sides. After that, he lifted his shirt, then pointed
and pressed his penis against her vagina. Accused-appellant made thrusting motions, which caused
Rosilyn pain. Thereafter, accused-appellant told her to sleep.

In the early morning of July 21, 1996, Rosilyn felt somebody touching her sex organ, but she did not wake
up. When she woke up later, she found P5,000.00 on the table, and she gave this to Simplicio when he
came to fetch her.
On August 15, 1996, Rosilyn and Simplicio went to the Ritz Towers at around 7:00 p.m. Accused-
appellant was about to leave, so he told them to come back later that evening. The two did not return.

The following day, Rosilyn ran away from home with the help of Yamie Estreta, one of their boarders.
Yamie accompanied Rosilyn to the Pasay City Police, where she executed a sworn statement against
Simplicio Delantar. Rosilyn was thereafter taken to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD). The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an investigation, which
eventually led to the filing of criminal charges against accused-appellant.

On August 23, 1996, Rosilyn was examined by Dr. Emmanuel L. Aranas at Camp Crame. The
examination yielded the following results:

EXTERNAL AND EXTRAGENITAL

Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female subject. Breasts are conical with pinkish
brown areola and nipples from which no secretions could be pressed out. Abdomen is flat and
soft

GENITAL

There is moderate growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with the
pinkish brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same disclosed an elastic,
fleshy type hymen, with shallow healed laceration at 3 o'clock position and deep healed
laceration at 8 o'clock position. External vaginal orifice offers moderate resistance to the
introduction of the examining index finger and the virgin sized vaginal speculum. Vaginal canal is
narrow with prominent rugosities. Cervix is firm and closed.

CONCLUSION:

Subject is in non-virgin state physically.

There are no external signs of application of any form of violence.9

During the trial, accused-appellant raised the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that it was his
brother, Dominador "Jun" Jalosjos, whom Rosilyn had met, once at accused-appellant’s Dakak office and
twice at the Ritz Towers. Accused-appellant insisted that he was in the province on the dates Rosilyn
claimed to have been sexually abused. He attributed the filing of the charges against him to a small group
of blackmailers who wanted to extort money from him, and to his political opponents, particularly Ex-
Congressman Artemio Adaza, who are allegedly determined to destroy his political career and boost their
personal agenda.

More specifically, accused-appellant claims that on June 16, 1996, he was on the Philippine Airlines
(PAL) 9:40 a.m. flight from Manila to Dipolog. He stayed in Dipolog until June 18, 1996. He submitted in
evidence airline ticket no. 10792424,10 showing that he was on board Flight PR 165; the said flight’s
passenger’s manifest,11 where the name JALOSJOS/RM/MR appears; and photographs showing
accused-appellant’s constituents welcoming his arrival and showing accused-appellant talking with former
Mayor Hermanico Carreon and Fiscal Empainado.

Accused-appellant further alleges that on June 28, 1996, he again took the 9:40 a.m. flight from Manila to
Dipolog City. On the same flight, he met Armando Nocom of the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Upon arrival
and after talking to his representatives, he proceeded to his residence known as "Barangay House" in
Taguinon, Dapitan, near Dakak Beach resort, and spent the night there.
On June 29, 1996, accused-appellant attended the fiesta at Barangay San Pedro. He stayed in the house
of Barangay Captain Mila Yap until 5:30 p.m. Then, together with some friends, he visited the Rizal
Shrine and the Pirate Bar at Dakak Beach Resort. Thereafter, he retired in the "Barangay House" in
Taguilon.

On June 30, 1996, accused-appellant alleges that he attended a city-wide consultation with his political
leaders at the Blue Room of Dakak, which lasted till the afternoon. In the evening, he went home and
slept in the "Barangay House."

On July 1, 1996, he attended the whole day celebration of Dipolog Day. He spent the night in the
"Barangay House."

On July 2, 1996, he attended the inauguration of the reception hall of Dakak Beach Resort. The blessing
ceremony was officiated by Assistant Parish Priest Adelmo Laput.

On July 3, 1996, he was the guest in the inaguration of the 3rd Engineering District of Dapitan City. After
the mass, he visited the Jamboree site in Barangay Taguilon, Dapitan City.

He further contended that after his arrival in Dipolog on June 28, 1996, there was never an instance when
he went to Manila until July 9, 1996, when he attended a conference called by the President of the
Philippines.

Accused-appellant likewise alleged that on July 21, 1996, he took the 5:00 a.m. flight of PAL from Manila
to Dumaguete City. From there, he was flown by a private plane to Dipolog, where he stayed until the
President of the Philippines arrived.

To buttress the theory of the defense, Dominador "Jun" Jalosjos testified that he was the one, and not
accused-appellant, whom Rosilyn met on three occasions. These occurred once during the first week of
May 1996, at accused-appellant’s Dakak office where Rosilyn and Simplicio Delantar were introduced to
him by Eduardo Suarez, and twice at the Ritz Towers when he interviewed Rosilyn, and later when
Rosilyn and Simplicio followed up the proposed entry of Rosilyn into the show business.

Dominador’s admission of his meetings with Rosilyn on three instances were limited to interviewing her
and assessing her singing and modeling potentials. His testimony made no mention of any sexual
encounter with Rosilyn.

After trial, the court rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1985 and 96-1986, the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of the accused, ROMEO JALOSJOS y GARCIA, as principal in the two (2) counts
of statutory rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. He is
hereby declared CONVICTED in each of these cases.

2. Accordingly, he is sentenced to:

2a. suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each of these cases.

2b. indemnify the victim, MA. ROSILYN DELANTAR, in the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as moral damages for each of the cases.
 3. In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 96-1992 and 96-1993, the
prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, ROMEO JALOSJOS y
GARCIA, as principal in six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness defined under Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code and penalized under Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610 otherwise known as the
Child Abuse Law. He is hereby declared CONVICTED in each of these cases;

4. Accordingly he is sentenced to:

4.a. suffer in each of the cases an indeterminate prison term of from eight (8) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum, to fifteen
(15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal in its medium
period, as maximum;

4.b. indemnify the victim, MA ROSILYN DELANTAR, in the amount of TWENTY

THOUSAND (P20,000.00) as moral damages for each of the cases;

5. In Criminal Case Nos. 96-1991, 96-1994, 96-1995, 96-1996, 96-1997 and 96-1998, the
prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, ROMEO
JALOSJOS y GARCIA, in six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness. Therefore, on the ground of
reasonable doubt, the accused in these cases is hereby ACQUITTED.

SO ORDERED.12

Hence, the instant appeal. Accused-appellant contends:

A.

THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BASED ON

TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, CONSIDERING THE ATTENDANT INDICIA OF
INCONSISTENCIES AND UNTRUTHS.

B.

THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE

CONFLICTING STATEMENTS GIVEN BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.

C.

THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PRIVATE

COMPLAINANT’S FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

D.

THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WAS A
MINOR LESS THAN TWELVE YEARS OF AGE WHEN THE CLAIMED INCIDENTS ALLEGEDLY TOOK
PLACE.

E.

THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RAPE WAS COMMITTED AGAINST
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.13
In this jurisdiction, the testimony of the private complainant in rape cases is scrutinized with utmost
caution. The constitutional presumption of innocence requires no less than moral certainty beyond any
scintilla of doubt. This applies with more vigor in rape cases where the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merits and is not allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of
the defense. As an inevitable consequence, it is the rape victim herself that is actually put on trial. The
case at bar is no exception. Bent on destroying the veracity of private complainant’s testimony, the errors
assigned by accused-appellant, particularly the first three, are focused on the issue of credibility.

Accused-appellant makes much of his acquittal in Criminal Case Nos. 96-1991, 96-1994, 96-1995, 96-
1996, 96-1997, and 96-1998, for acts of lasciviousness. According to him, the fact that the trial court
sustained his defense of alibi in the said cases only shows that Rosilyn concocted her stories and the rest
of her testimony ought not to be believed. Stated differently, accused-appellant urges the application of
the doctrine of "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" (false in part, false in everything).14

The contention is without merit. Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not an absolute rule of law and is in
fact rarely applied in modern jurisprudence.15 Thus, in People v. Yanson-Dumancas,16 citing People v. Li
Bun Juan,17 this Court held that:

... In this connection it must be borne in mind that the principle falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is
not an absolute one, and that it is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with
respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts. In People vs. Keller, 46 O.G.
No. 7, pp. 3222-3223, the following was quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals from 1
Moore on Facts, p. 23:

"18. Testimony may be partly credited and partly rejected. --- Trier of facts are not bound
to believe all that any witness has said; they may accept some portions of his testimony
and reject other portions, according to what seems to them, upon other facts and
circumstances to be the truth… Even when witnesses are found to have deliberately
falsified in some material particulars, the jury are not required to reject the whole of their
uncorroborated testimony, but may credit such portions as they deem worthy of belief."
(p. 945)18

Being in the best position to discriminate between the truth and the falsehood, the trial court's assignment
of values and weight on the testimony of Rosilyn should be given credence. Significantly, it should be
borne in mind that the issue at hand hinges on credibility, the assessment of which, as oft-repeated, is
best made by the trial court because of its untrammeled opportunity to observe her demeanor on the
witness stand.

On the demeanor and manner of testifying shown by the complainant, the trial court stated:

Guided by the foregoing principles, this court found no reason why it should not believe Rosilyn
when she claimed she was raped. Testimonies of rape victims especially those who are young
and immature deserve full credence (People v. Liquiran, 228 SCRA 62 (1993) considering that
"no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and
thereafter allow herself to be perverted in a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the
desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished." (People v. Buyok, 235 SCRA 622 [1996]).

When asked to describe what had been done to her, Rosilyn was able to narrate spontaneously
in detail how she was sexually abused. Her testimony in this regard was firm, candid, clear and
straightforward, and it remained to be so even during the intense and rigid cross-examination
made by the defense counsel.19

Accused-appellant next argues that Rosilyn’s direct and redirect testimonies were rehearsed and lacking
in candidness. He points to the supposed hesitant and even idiotic answers of Rosilyn on cross and re-
cross examinations. He added that she was trained to give answers such as, "Ano po?", "Parang po,"
"Medyo po," and "Sa tingin ko po."

Accused-appellant’s arguments are far from persuasive. A reading of the pertinent transcript of
stenographic notes reveals that Rosilyn was in fact firm and consistent on the fact of rape and lascivious
conduct committed on her by accused-appellant. She answered in clear, simple and natural words
customary of children of her age. The above phrases quoted by accused-appellant as uttered by Rosilyn
are, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, typical answers of child witnesses like her.

At any rate, even assuming that Rosilyn, during her lengthy ordeals on the witness stand, may have given
some ambiguous answers, they refer merely to minor and peripheral details which do not in any way
detract from her firm and straightforward declaration that she had been molested and subjected to
lascivious conduct by accused-appellant. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that even the most candid
witness oftentimes makes mistakes and confused statements. At times, far from eroding the effectiveness
of the evidence, such lapses could, indeed, constitute signs of veracity.20

Then, too, accused-appellant capitalizes on the alleged absence of any allegation of rape in the five (5)
sworn statements executed by Rosilyn as well as in the interviews and case study conducted by the
representatives of the DSWD. In particular, accused-appellant points to the following documents:

(1) Sworn statements dated August 22 and 26, 1996, executed before SPO5 Milagros A.
Carrasco of the Pasay City Police;

(2) Sworn statements dated September 5, 11, and 19, 1996, executed before NBI Agents Cynthia
L. Mariano and Supervising NBI Agent Arlis E. Vela;

(3) The Initial Interview of Rosilyn by the DSWD dated August 30, 1996;

(4) DSWD Final Case Study Report dated January 10, 1997.

It must be stressed that "rape" is a technical term, the precise and accurate definition of which could not
have been understood by Rosilyn. Indeed, without the assistance of a lawyer, who could explain to her
the intricacies of rape, she expectedly could not distinguish in her affidavits and consequently disclose
with proficient exactitude the act or acts of accused-appellant that under the contemplation of law
constitute the crime of rape. This is especially true in the present case where there was no exhaustive
and clear-cut evidence of full and complete penetration of the victim’s vagina. It may well be that Rosilyn
thought, as any layman would probably do, that there must be the fullest penetration of the victim’s vagina
to qualify a sexual act to rape.

In People v. Campuhan,21 we ruled that rape is consummated "by the slightest penetration of the female
organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis." There need not be full and complete
penetration of the victim’s vagina for rape to be consummated. There being no showing that the foregoing
technicalities of rape was fully explained to Rosilyn on all those occasions that she was interviewed by
the police, the NBI agents and DSWD social workers, she could not therefore be expected to intelligibly
declare that accused-appellant’s act of pressing his sex organ against her labia without full entry of the
vaginal canal amounted to rape.

In the decision of the trial court, the testimony on one of the rapes is cited plus the court’s mention of the
jurisprudence on this issue, to wit:

Q: You said that when Congressman Jalosjos inserted his finger into your vagina, your back
was rested on a pillow and your legs were spread wide apart, what else did he do?
 A: He lifted his shirt, and held his penis; and again "idinikit-dikit niya ang ari niya sa ari ko."
(Italics supplied)

Q: And, after doing that: "Idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko"; what else did he do?

A: After that, "Itinutok niya po yong ari niya at idiniin-diin niya ang ari niya sa ari ko."
(underscoring supplied)

(pp. 23, 25 to 30, TSN, 16 April 1997)

It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that rape can be committed even without full penetration of
the male organ into the vagina of the woman. It is enough that there be proof of the entrance of
the male organ within the labia of the pudendum of the female organ. (People vs. Mangalino, 182
SCRA 329; People vs. Tismo, 204 SCRA 535; People vs. Bacani, 181 SCRA 393). "Penetration
of the penis by entry into the lips of the female organ suffices to warrant a conviction." (People vs.
Galimba, G.R. No. 111563-64, February 20, 1996 citing People vs. Abonada, 169 SCRA 530).
Hence, with the testimony of Rosilyn that the accused pressed against ("idiniin") and pointed to
("itinutok") Rosilyn’s vagina his sexual organ on two (2) occasions, two (2) acts of rape were
consummated.22

Moreover, it must be borne in mind that Rosilyn’s purpose in executing the affidavits on August 22 and
26, 1996 before the Pasay City Police was to charge Simplicio Delantar, not accused-appellant. As aptly
pointed out by the trial court, it is preposterous to expect Rosilyn to make an exhaustive narration of the
sexual abuse of accused-appellant when he was not the object of the said complaint.

Additionally, Rosilyn’s statements, given to the NBI on September 11 and 19, 1996, concerned mainly the
identification of pictures. There was thus no occasion for her to narrate the details of her sexual encounter
with accused-appellant.

As to the interviews and studies conducted by the DSWD, suffice it to state that said meetings with
Rosilyn were specially focused on the emotional and psychological repercussions of the sexual abuse on
Rosilyn, and had nothing to do with the legal actions being prepared as a consequence thereof. Thus, the
documents pertaining to said interviews and studies cannot be relied upon to reveal every minute aspect
of the sexual molestations complained of.

At any rate, the inconsistencies between the affidavits and Rosilyn’s testimony, if at all they existed,
cannot diminish the probative value of Rosilyn’s declarations on the witness stand. The consistent ruling
of this Court is that, if there is an inconsistency between the affidavit of a witness and her testimonies
given in open court, the latter commands greater weight than the former.23

In the third assigned error, accused-appellant attempts to impress upon this Court that Rosilyn gave the
name Congressman Romeo Jalosjos as her abuser only because that was the name given to her by the
person to whom she was introduced. That same name, accused-appellant claims, was merely picked up
by Rosilyn from the name plate, plaque, and memo pad she saw on accused-appellant’s office desk.
Accused-appellant presented his brother, Dominador "Jun" Jalosjos, in an attempt to cast doubt on his
culpability. It was Dominador "Jun" Jalosjos who allegedly met and interviewed Rosilyn at the Dakak
office. In advancement of this theory, accused-appellant cites the fact that out of a total of 16 pictures
presented to Rosilyn for identification, she picked up only 4, which depict Dominador "Jun" Jalosjos. In
the same vein, accused-appellant claims that the resulting cartographic sketch from the facial
characteristics given by Rosilyn to the cartographer, resembles the facial appearance of Dominador "Jun"
Jalosjos. Accused-appellant also points out that Rosilyn failed to give his correct age or state that he has
a mole on his lower right jaw.
Contrary to the contentions of accused-appellant, the records reveal that Rosilyn positively and
unhesitatingly identified accused-appellant at the courtroom. Such identification during the trial cannot be
diminished by the fact that in her sworn statement, Rosilyn referred to accused-appellant as her abuser
based on the name she heard from the person to whom she was introduced and on the name she saw
and read in accused-appellant’s office. Verily, a person’s identity does not depend solely on his name, but
also on his physical features. Thus, a victim of a crime can still identify the culprit even without knowing
his name. Similarly, the Court, in People v. Vasquez,24 ruled that:

It matters little that the eyewitness initially recognized accused-appellant only by face… [the
witness] … acted like any ordinary person in making inquiries to find out the name that matched
[appellant’s] face. Significantly, in open court, he unequivocally identified accused-appellant as
their assailant.

Even in the case of People v. Timon,25 relied upon by accused-appellant to discredit his identification, this
Court said that even assuming that the out-of-court identification of accused-appellant was defective, their
subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have initially attended it.

In light of the foregoing, Rosilyn’s failure to identify accused-appellant out of the 16 pictures shown to her
does not foreclose the credibility of her unqualified identification of accused-appellant in open court. The
same holds true with the subject cartographic sketch which, incidentally, resembles accused-appellant.
As noted by the trial court, accused-appellant and his brother Dominador Jalosjos have a striking
similarity in facial features. Naturally, if the sketch looks like Dominador, it logically follows that the same
drawing would definitely look like accused-appellant.

Likewise, Rosilyn’s failure to correctly approximate the age of accused-appellant and to state that he has
a mole on the lower right jaw, cannot affect the veracity of accused-appellant’s identification. At a young
age, Rosilyn cannot be expected to give the accurate age of a 56 year-old person. As to accused-
appellant’s mole, the Solicitor General is correct in contending that said mole is not so distinctive as to
capture Rosilyn’s attention and memory. When she was asked to give additional information about
accused-appellant, Rosilyn described him as having a "prominent belly." This, to our mind, is indeed a
more distinguishing feature that would naturally catch the attention of an eleven year-old child like
Rosilyn.

In his fifth assigned error, accused-appellant insists that the words "idinikit," "itinutok," and "idiniin-diin,"
which Rosilyn used to describe what accused-appellant did to her vagina with his genitals, do not
constitute consummated rape. In addition, the defense argued that Rosilyn did not actually see accused-
appellant’s penis in the supposed sexual contact. In fact, they stressed that Rosilyn declared that
accused-appellant’s semen spilled in her thighs and not in her sex organ.

Moreover, in his Reply Brief, accused-appellant, citing People v. Campuhan, argued that, assuming that
his penis touched or brushed Rosilyn’s external genitals, the same is not enough to establish the crime of
rape.

True, in People v. Campuhan,26 we explained that the phrase, "the mere touching of the external genitalia
by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge," means
that the act of touching should be understood here as inherently part of the entry of the penis into the
labia of the female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum. We further
elucidated that:

The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the
perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal
orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is
instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the
female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer
 convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin
skin which does not have any hairs but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia
majora is the labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape
to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus,
a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not
sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the
female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no
consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.27

In the present case, there is sufficient proof to establish that the acts of accused-appellant went beyond
"strafing of the citadel of passion" or "shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency," as depicted in
the Campuhan case, and progressed into "bombardment of the drawbridge [which] is invasion
enough,"28 there being, in a manner of speaking, a conquest of the fortress of ignition. When the accused-
appellant brutely mounted between Rosilyn’s wide-spread legs, unfetteredly touching, poking and
pressing his penis against her vagina, which in her position would then be naturally wide open and ready
for copulation, it would require no fertile imagination to belie the hypocrisy claimed by accused-appellant
that his penis or that of someone who looked like him, would under the circumstances merely touch or
brush the external genital of Rosilyn. The inevitable contact between accused-appellant’s penis, and at
the very least, the labia of the pudendum of Rosilyn, was confirmed when she felt pain inside her vagina
when the "idiniin" part of accused appellant’s sex ritual was performed.

The incident on June 18, 1996 was described by Rosilyn as follows:

PROS. ZUNO:

Q. And, after kissing your lips; after kissing you in your lips, what else did he do?

A. After that, he was lifting my shirt.

Q. Now, while he was lifting your shirt, what was your position; will you tell the court?

A. I was lying, sir.

Q. Lying on what?

A. On the bed, sir.

Q. And, after lifting your shirt, what else did he do?

A. He spread my legs sir.

Q. And, after spreading your legs apart; what did he do?

A. After that, he lifted his shirt and held his penis.

Q. And while he was holding his penis; what did he do?

A. He pressed it in my vagina.

ATTY. FERNANDEZ:

May we request that the vernacular be used?

A. Tapos po, idinikit-dikit po niya yong ari niya sa ari ko.

PROS. ZUNO:

May I respectfully move that the word: "idinikit-dikit niya ang ari niya sa ari ko," be incorporated?

Q. And while he was doing that; according to you, "idinikit-dikit niya ang ari niya sa ari mo;"
what did you feel?

A. I was afraid and then, I cried.

Q. Will you tell the Court why you felt afraid and why you cried?

A. Because I was afraid he might insert his penis into my vagina.

Q. And, for how long did Congressman Jalosjos perform that act, which according to you,
"idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko?"

COURT:

Place the Tagalog words, into the records.

A. Sandali lang po yon.

Q. What part of your vagina, or "ari" was being touched by the ari or penis?

xxx xxx xxx

Q. You said that you felt… I withdraw that question. How did you know that Congressman
Jalosjos was doing, "idinikit-dikit niya yung ari niya sa ari ko?"

A. Because I could feel it, sir.

Q. Now, you said you could feel it. What part of the vagina… in what part of your vagina was
Congressman Jalosjos, according to you, "idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari mo?"

A. In front of my vagina, sir.

Q. In front of your vagina? O.K.; will you tell the Court the position? Will you describe the
position of Congressman Jalosjos when he was doing that. "Idinikit-dikit niya sa ari ko?"

A. Ide-demonstrate ko po ba?

FISCAL ZUNO:

Q. Can you demonstrate?

xxx xxx xxx

A. He was holding me like this with his one hand; and was holding his penis while his other
hand, or his free hand was on the bed.
xxx xxx xxx

PROS. ZUNO:

Now, according to you, you don’t know how to say it; or what was done to you. Now, will
you tell the Court how can you describe what was done to you?

A. After he "dinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko; itinutok naman niya ito."

Q. O.K. you said "itinutok niya ito;" what else did he do?

PROS. ZUNO:

She is now trying to describe.

COURT:

Translate.

A. He seems to be "parang idinidiin po niya."

Q. Now, what did you feel, when according to you; as I would quote: "parang idinidiin niya?"

A. Masakit po.

Q. And, just to make it clear in Tagalog: Ano itong idinidiin niya?

COURT:

Q. Sabi mo itinutok. Nakita mo bang itinutok?

A. I saw him na nakaganuon po sa ano niya.

PROS. ZUNO:

Q. O.K., clarify. You said "nakaganuon siya" what do you mean by "nakaganuon siya?"

A. He was holding his penis, and then, that was the one which he itinutok sa ari ko.

PROS. ZUNO:

Q. And, when you said "idinidiin po niya;" to which you are referring? What is this "idinidiin
niya?"

A. Idinidiin niya ang ari niya sa ari ko.

Q. And what did you feel when you said: he was "idinidiin niya ang ari niya sa ari ko?"

A. Masakit po.

COURT:
 The answer is "masakit po."

Proceed.

PROS. ZUNO:

Q. Where did you feel the pain?

A. Inside my ari po. (Sa loob po ng ari ko.)

xxx xxx xxx

PROS. ZUNO:

Q. And then, after that, what else did he do

A. After that, he touched my breast, sir.

Q. And, after touching your breast, what did he do?

A. And after that I felt that he was (witness demonstrating to the court, with her index finger,
rubbing against her open left palm)

Q. And after doing that, what else did he do?

A. After that, he instructed me to go to sleep.

xxx xxx xxx

A. I put down my clothes and then, I cried myself to sleep, sir.

Q. Why did you cry? Will you tell the court, why did you cried after putting down your clothes?

A. Because I felt pity for myself. (Naaawa po ako sa sarili ko.)

xxx xxx x x x.

(Emphasis supplied.)29

Even the July 20, 1996 encounter between Rosilyn and accused-appellant would not tax the sketchy
visualization of the naïve and uninitiated to conclude that there was indeed penile invasion by accused-
appellant of Rosilyn’s labia. On that occasion, accused-appellant was similarly ensconced between the
parted legs of Rosilyn, except that, this time, Rosilyn was conveniently rested on, and elevated with a
pillow on her back while accused-appellant was touching, poking and pressing his penis against her
vagina. Topped with the thrusting motions employed by accused-appellant, the resulting pain felt by
Rosilyn in her sex organ was no doubt a consequence of consummated rape.

The pertinent portions of Rosilyn’s account of the July 20, 1996 incident is as follows:

PROS. ZUNO:
xxx xxx xxx

Q. The moment when Cong. Jalosjos inserted his finger into your vagina, what was your
position?

INTERPRETER:

The witness is asking he (sic) she has to demonstrate?

FISCAL ZUNO:

Q. Ipaliwanag mo lang?

A. My back was rested on a pillow and my legs were spread apart.

Q. You said that when Congressman Jalosjos inserted his finger into your vagina, your back
was rested on a pillow and your legs were spread wide apart, what else did he do?

A. He lifted his shirt, and held his penis; and again "idinikit-dikit niya ang ari niya sa ari ko."

Q. And what did you feel when he was doing that which according to you and I would quote in
Tagalog: "idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko?"

A. I was afraid sir.

Q. And, after doing that: "idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko," what else did he do?

A. After that, "itinutok niya po yong ari niya at idiniin-diin niya ang ari niya sa ari ko."

Q. You said: "Congressman Jalosjos itinutok niya yong ari niya sa ari ko; at idiniin-diin niya
yong ari niya sa ari ko;" Now, while he was doing that act, what was the position of Congressman
Jalosjos?

A. His two (2) hands were on my side and since my legs were spread apart; he was in-
between them, and doing an upward and downward movement.

(Witness demonstrated a pushing, or pumping movement)

Q. For how long did Congressman Jalosjos perform that act, pushing or pumping movement
while his penis, or "ang ari niya ay nakatutok at idinidiin-diin yong ari niya sa ari mo?"

A. I don’t know.

Q. And what did you feel when Congressman Jalosjos was making that movement, pushing,
or pumping?

A. I felt pain and then I cried.

Q. Where did you feel the pain?

A. Inside my vagina, sir.

 xxx xxx x x x.30

The child’s narration of the rape sequence is revealing. The act of "idinikit-dikit niya" was followed by
"itinutok niya xxx at idiniin-diin niya." The "idiniin-diin niya" was succeeded by "Masakit po." Pain inside
her "ari" is indicative of consummated penetration.

The environmental circumstances displayed by the graphic narration of what took place at the appellant’s
room from June 14 to June 16 and June 21 to June 22, 1996 are consistent with the complainant’s
testimony which shows that rape was legally consummated.

In the case of People v. Campuhan, the victim put up a resistance --- by putting her legs close together ---
which, although futile, somehow made it inconvenient, if not difficult, for the accused-appellant to attempt
penetration. On the other hand, the ease with which accused-appellant herein perpetrated the sexual
abuse, not to mention the absence of time constraint, totally distinguishes the instant case
from Campuhan. Here, the victim was passive and even submissive to the lecherous acts of accused-
appellant. Thus, even assuming that his penis then was flaccid, his act of holding, guiding and assisting
his penis with his one hand, while touching, poking and pressing the same against Rosilyn's vagina,
would surely result in even the slightest contact between the labia of the pudendum and accused-
appellant's sex organ.

Considering that Rosilyn is a self-confessed sex worker, and the circumstances of the alleged sexual
assault at bar, the defense argued that it is highly improbable and contrary to human experience that
accused-appellant exercised a Spartan-like discipline and restrained himself from fully consummating the
sexual act when there was in fact no reason for him not to do so. In the same light, the defense likewise
branded as unnatural the testimony of Rosilyn that accused-appellant contented himself with rubbing his
penis clipped between her thighs until he reached orgasm and desisted from fully penetrating her, when
Rosilyn was then entirely at his disposal.

The defense seems to forget that there is no standard form of behavior when it comes to gratifying one’s
basic sexual instinct. The human sexual perversity is far too intricate for the defense to prescribe certain
forms of conduct. Even the word "perverse" is not entirely precise, as what may be perverse to one may
not be to another. Using a child of tender years who could even pass as one’s granddaughter, to unleash
what others would call downright bestial lust, may be utterly nauseating and repulsive to some, but may
peculiarly be a festive celebration of salacious fantasies to others. For all we know, accused-appellant
may have found a distinct and complete sexual gratification in such kind of libidinous stunts and
maneuvers.

Nevertheless, accused-appellant may not have fully and for a longer period penetrated Rosilyn for fear of
perpetrating his name through a child from the womb of a minor; or because of his previous agreement
with his "suking bugaw," Simplicio Delantar, that there would be no penetration, otherwise the latter would
demand a higher price. This may be the reason why Simplicio Delantar gave his mocking fatherly advice
to Rosilyn that it is bad if accused-appellant inserts his penis into her sex organ, while at the same time
ordering her to call him if accused-appellant would penetrate her. Such instance of penile invasion would
prompt Simplicio to demand a higher price, which is, after all, as the Solicitor General calls it, the
peculiarity of prostitution.

The defense contends that the testimony of Rosilyn that accused-appellant ejaculated on her thighs and
not in her vagina, only proves that there was no rape. It should be noted that this portion of Rosilyn’s
testimony refers to the June 15 and 21, 1996 charges of acts of lasciviousness, and not the rape charges.
In any event, granting that it occurred during the twin instances of rape on June 18 and July 20, 1996, the
ejaculation on the victim’s thighs would not preclude the fact of rape.

There is no truth to the contention of the defense that Rosilyn did not see the penis of accused-appellant.
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted portions of the transcripts, Rosilyn unequivocally testified that
accused-appellant held his penis then poked her vagina with it. And even if she did not actually see
accused-appellant’s penis go inside her, surely she could have felt whether it was his penis or just his
finger.

We now come to the issue of whether or not Rosilyn was below twelve (12) years of age at the time the
rape complained of occurred. To bolster the declaration of Rosilyn that she was then eleven years old,
the prosecution presented the following documents:

(1) Rosilyn’s birth certificate showing her birthday as May 11, 1985; 31

(2) Rosilyn’s baptismal certificate showing her birthday as May 11, 1985; 32

(3) Master List of Live Births stating that Ma. Rosilyn Delantar was born on May 11, 1985 to
Librada Telen as the mother;33

(4) Marked pages of the Cord Dressing Room Book;34

(5) Summary of the Cord Dressing Book, showing her birthday as May 11, 1985 and her parents’
(Librada Telen and Simplicio Delantar) patient file number (39-10-71);35

(6) Record of admission showing her parents’ patient number (39-10-71) and confinement at the
Jose Fabella Memorial Hospital from May 5-14, 1985.36

It is settled that in cases of statutory rape, the age of the victim may be proved by the presentation of her
birth certificate. In the case at bar, accused-appellant contends that the birth certificate of Rosilyn should
not have been considered by the trial court because said birth certificate has already been ordered
cancelled and expunged from the records by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38, in Special
Proceedings No. 97-81893, dated April 11, 1997.37 However, it appears that the said decision has been
annulled and set aside by the Court of Appeals on June 10, 1999, in CA-G.R. SP No. 45289. The
decision of the Court of Appeals was appealed to this Court by petition for review, docketed as G.R. No.
140305. Pending the final outcome of that case, the decision of the Court of Appeals is presumed valid
and can be invoked as prima facie basis for holding that Rosilyn was indeed eleven years old at the time
she was abused by accused-appellant.

However, even assuming the absence of a valid birth certificate, there is sufficient and ample proof of the
complainant’s age in the records.

Rosilyn’s Baptismal Certificate can likewise serve as proof of her age. In People v. Liban,38 we ruled that
the birth certificate, or in lieu thereof, any other documentary evidence that can help establish the age of
the victim, such as the baptismal certificate, school records, and documents of similar nature, can be
presented.

And even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the birth and baptismal certificates of Rosilyn are
inadmissible to prove her age, the Master List of Live Births and the Cord Dressing Book of Dr. Jose
Fabella Memorial Hospital where Rosilyn was born are sufficient evidence to prove that her date of birth
was May 11, 1985. These documents are considered entries in official records, admissible as prima
facie evidence of their contents and corroborative of Rosilyn’s testimony as to her age.

Thus, Rule 130, Section 44, of the Rules of Court states:

Entries in official records. --- Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty especially enjoined
by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
In Africa v. Caltex, et al., (Phil), Inc., et al.,39 the Court laid down the requisites for the application of the
foregoing rule, thus:

(a) That the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to
do so;

(b) That it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties or by such other person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and

(c) That the public office or the other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated,
which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.

In order for a book to classify as an official register and admissible in evidence, it is not necessary that it
be required by an express statute to be kept, nor that the nature of the office should render the book
indispensable; it is sufficient that it be directed by the proper authority to be kept. Thus, official registers,
though not required by law, kept as convenient and appropriate modes of discharging official duties, are
admissible.40

Entries in public or official books or records may be proved by the production of the books or records
themselves or by a copy certified by the legal keeper thereof.41 It is not necessary to show that the person
making the entry is unavailable by reason of death, absence, etc., in order that the entry may be
admissible in evidence, for his being excused from appearing in court in order that public business be not
deranged, is one of the reasons for this exception to the hearsay rule. 42

Corollary thereto, Presidential Decree No. 651, as amended by P.D. No. 766, 43 mandates hospitals to
report and register with the local civil registrar the fact of birth, among others, of babies born under their
care. Said Decree imposes a penalty of a fine of not less that P500.00 nor more than P1,000.00 or
imprisonment of not less than three (3) months nor more than six (6) months, or both, in the discretion of
the court, in case of failure to make the necessary report to the local civil registrar.

Hence, under the above-cited P.D. 651, as amended, in connection with Rule 30, Section 44, of the Rules
of Court, it is clear that the Cord Dressing Room Book where the fact of birth, name of the mother and
other related entries are initially recorded, as well as the Master List of Live Births of the hospital, are
considered entries in official record, being indispensable to and appropriate modes of recording the births
of children preparatory to registration of said entries with the local civil registrar, in compliance with a duty
specifically mandated by law.

It matters not that the person presented to testify on these hospital records was not the person who
actually made those entries way back in 1985, but Amelita Avenante, the records custodian of the
hospital in 1995. To reiterate, these records may be proved by the presentation of the record itself or by a
certified copy or the legal keeper thereof. Proof of the unavailability of the person who made those entries
is not a requisite for their admissibility. What is important is that the entries testified to by Avenante were
gathered from the records of the hospital which were accomplished in compliance with a duty specifically
mandated by law.

Therefore, the Cord Dressing Room Book and the Master List of Live Births of the hospital are admissible
as evidence of the facts stated therein.

The preparation of these hospital documents preceded that of the birth and baptismal certificates of
Rosilyn. They establish independent and material facts prepared by unbiased and disinterested persons
under environmental circumstances apart from those that may have attended the preparation of the birth
and baptismal certificates. Hence, these hospital records, to reiterate, are sufficient to support the
testimony of Rosilyn as to her age.
Consequently, the testimony of Simplicio Delantar that the entries in the birth certificate of Rosilyn are
false and that he merely made them up, particularly her date of birth, was correctly disregarded by the
trial court. It should be noted that the criminal charges for child abuse filed by Rosilyn against him was the
direct cause of his incarceration. This raises a possibility that Simplicio falsely testified in the present
case, to get even with Rosilyn.

Likewise, the trial court correctly disregarded the testimonies of Gloria Binay and Angelito Intruzo
because the defense failed to prove that they were knowledgeable as to the circumstances of Rosilyn’s
birth. Their testimonies consist mainly of observations tending to show that Rosilyn’s appearance belie
her claim that she was born on May 11, 1985.

In the four instances of acts of lasciviousness allegedly committed on June 29, June 30, July 2, and July
3, 1996 (Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1994, 96-1995, 96-1996, and 96-1997, respectively), the trial court
acquitted accused-appellant on the ground of reasonable doubt as the defense was able to prove that
accused-appellant was not in Manila but either in Dipolog or Dapitan City at the time the lascivious acts
were supposedly committed. The evidence of the defense established that accused-appellant flew to
Dipolog on June 28, 1996, and stayed there until July 9, 1996.

In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1991 and 96-1998, for two counts of acts of lasciviousness allegedly
committed both in the early mornings of June 19 and July 21, 1996, Rosilyn merely testified that she felt
somebody touching her private part but failed to identify the person who was performing those lecherous
acts as she was too sleepy to wake up. Hence, accused-appellant was likewise acquitted in these cases
on the ground of reasonable doubt.

With respect, however, to the acts of lasciviousness committed in the morning of June 15 and 22, 1996,
and in the evening of June 14, 15, 18, and 21, 1996, as well as the rape perpetrated on June 18, 1996
and July 20, 1996, accused-appellant failed to account for his whereabouts. A careful review of the
pertinent transcript of stenographic notes reveals that accused-appellant did not give any testimony as to
where he was at the time these crimes were committed. Clearly, therefore, the trial court correctly
disregarded his unsubstantiated defense of denial, which cannot prevail over his positive identification by
Rosilyn as the culprit.

As regards the charge of acts of lasciviousness committed in the morning of June 16, 1996, accused-
appellant claimed that it was impossible for him to have committed the same because he flew to Dipolog
on that day. The records disclose, however, that accused-appellant’s flight was at 9:40 a.m. The
possibility, therefore, of accused-appellant’s having performed the lascivious acts on the victim before he
went off to the airport is not at all precluded. For his failure to prove the physical impossibility of his
presence at the Ritz Towers in the morning of June 16, 1996, when the sexual abuse of Rosilyn was
committed, his defense of alibi must fail.

Article III, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610, states:

Child Prostitution and other Sexual Abuse. --- Children, whether male or female, who for money
or profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon the following:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve
 (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraphs 3, for rape
and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious
conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x . (Emphasis
supplied.)

In People v. Optana,44 the Court, citing the case of People v. Larin,45 explained the elements of the
offense of violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, or the Child Abuse Law, as follows:

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.

2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected other sexual abuse.

3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child
indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group. Under RA
7610, children are "persons below eighteen years of age or those unable to fully take care of
themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of their age or mental disability or condition."

"Lascivious conduct" is defined under Article XIII, Section 32 of the Implementing Rules and Regulation of
R.A. 7610, as follows:

[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast,
inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any
person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade,
or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition
of the genitals or pubic area of a person.

In the case at bar, accused-appellant’s acts of kissing Rosilyn on the lips, fondling her breast, inserting
his finger into her vagina and placing his penis between her thighs, all constitute lascivious conduct
intended to arouse or gratify his sexual desire. Hence, the trial court correctly convicted accused-
appellant of violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, or the Child Abuse Law, in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-
1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 96-1992, and 96-1993, charging him with the above-described
lascivious acts.

The penalty for violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, or the Child Abuse Law, where the victim is below
12 years of age, is reclusion temporal in its medium period.

The records show that on at least nine (9) separate occasions, the accused-appellant inserted his finger
into the complainant’s vagina. These insertions took place in 1996. A year later, Congress enacted
Republic Act No. 8353, the Anti-Rape law of 1997. It does not apply to this case but it indicates state
policy on rape. The Revised Penal Code is now amended to read as follows:

Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –

1. By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

 c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal
orifice or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Indicative of the continuing state policy towards rape, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 now classifies the crime
as an offense against persons. Any public prosecutor, not necessarily the victim or her parents, can
prosecute the case.

The penalties for the crime of rape in the light of various circumstances, which are now set forth and
contained in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, have also been increased.

Considering that there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the trial court correctly
imposed on accused-appellant the maximum penalty of fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20)
days of reclusion temporal, which is within the medium period of reclusion temporal medium, pursuant to
our ruling in Dulla v. Court of Appeals.46 Notwithstanding that R.A. 7610 is a special law, accused-
appellant may enjoy a minimum term of the indeterminate sentence to be taken within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code. 47However, the trial court erroneously fixed the
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence at eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of prision mayor in its medium period. In the aforesaid case of Dulla,48 we held that the penalty next lower
in degree to reclusion temporal medium is reclusion temporal minimum, the range of which is from twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. Hence, for violation of Article III,
Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate sentence of twelve years (12)
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20)
days of reclusion temporal as maximum.

At the time of commission of the crimes complained of herein in 1996, statutory rape was penalized under
Section 11 of R.A. 7659, which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

When and how rape is committed. --- Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. xxx.

In statutory rape, mere sexual congress with a woman below twelve years of age consummates the crime
of statutory rape regardless of her consent to the act or lack of it. The law presumes that a woman of
tender age does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act.
Thus, it was held that carnal knowledge of a child below twelve years old even if she is engaged in
prostitution is still considered statutory rape. The application of force and intimidation or the deprivation of
reason of the victim becomes irrelevant. The absence of struggle or outcry of the victim or even her
passive submission to the sexual act will not mitigate nor absolve the accused from liability.49
In the case at bar, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant had
carnal knowledge of Rosilyn. Moreover, the prosecution successfully proved that Rosilyn was only eleven
years of age at the time she was sexually abused. As such, the absence of proof of any struggle, or for
that matter of consent or passive submission to the sexual advances of accused-appellant, was of no
moment. The fact that accused-appellant had sexual congress with eleven year-old Rosilyn is sufficient to
hold him liable for statutory rape, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

As to accused-appellant's civil liability, the amount of moral damages awarded by the trial court for each
count of acts of lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610 should be increased from P20,000.00 to
P50,000.00.50 On the other hand, the award of the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages for each
count of statutory rape was correct.

In People v. Lor,51 citing the cases of People v. Victor,52 and People v. Gementiza,53 we held that the
indemnity authorized by our criminal law as civil indemnity ex delicto for the offended party, in the amount
authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and aside from other proven actual damages, is itself
equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law. Said civil indemnity is mandatory upon finding
of the fact of rape; it is distinct from and should not be denominated as moral damages which are based
on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound judicial
discretion.54 Hence, accused-appellant should be ordered to pay the offended party another P50,000.00
as civil indemnity for each count of rape and acts of lasciviousness.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62, in Criminal Case Nos. 96-
1985 and 96-1986 finding accused-appellant Romeo Jalosjos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of statutory rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, is
AFFIRMED. Likewise, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62 in Criminal
Case Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 96-1992, and 96-1993, finding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of acts of lasciviousness in six counts, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As
modified, accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer, for each count of acts of lasciviousness, the
indeterminate penalty of twelve years (12) and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen
(15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal as maximum. Further, accused-
appellant is ordered to pay the victim, Ma. Rosilyn Delantar, the additional amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for each count of statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness. Finally, the award of moral
damages for each count of acts of lasciviousness is increased to P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Antero Pobre v. Miriam Defensor

[A.C. NO. 7399 : August 25, 2009]

ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant, v. Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre
invites the Court's attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago's
speech delivered on the Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal.
I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be
living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer
interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would
rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.

To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker
towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and
constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings
or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.

In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel,
does not deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those
statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being
part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its
committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open
controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She
averred that she wanted to expose what she believed "to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar
Council [JBC]," which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be
vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent
justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should
have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her,
would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.

The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI,
Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of
Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned
nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any committee thereof." Explaining the import of the underscored portion of the
provision, the Court, in Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege

cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English
Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that
he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from
resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may
occasion offense."1

As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience
and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative
department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would
degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from
deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private
indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little value if they could be
subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the
pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judge's speculation as
to the motives.2
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the
institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court
lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that
enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of government,
investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are
being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they
perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an
unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member
of the Congress does not destroy the privilege.3 The disciplinary authority of the
assembly4 and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses
committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.5

For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for
disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable
criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that
this could not be the last word on the matter.

The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a
member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the
Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional
conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly
improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted "to spit on
the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court," and
calling the Court a "Supreme Court of idiots."

The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.6 We draw her attention to the ensuing
passage in Sotto that she should have taken to heart in the first place:

x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this Court and
believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into
their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the
result.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be
allowed to erode the people's faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly
violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
respectively provide:

Canon 8, Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Canon 11. A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for
themselves. She was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited
authority on constitutional and international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and
an elected senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the
Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public
service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice. 7 Senator Santiago
should have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make on
the people's faith in the integrity of the courts.

As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting
remedial legislation on the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light
of the insulting tenor of what she said. We quote the passage once more:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am

suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing
up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the
face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no
longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by
idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x
x. (Emphasis ours.)

A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were
expressions of personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief
Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official
parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a
vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor
as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary
immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual members of the Parliament or
Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and
the institution that represents them.

To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in
insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities.

Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiago's outburst was directly traceable to what she
considered as an "unjust act" the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the
position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC functions under the Court's supervision, its
individual members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as the JBC's ex-
officiochairperson,8 have no official duty to nominate candidates for appointment to the
position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiago's
wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical
and defamatory words against all of them.

At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the
Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of the law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)

The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing the
Integrated Bar with the end in view that the integration of the Bar will, among other things:
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum,
from the assaults that politics and self interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its
integrity, impartiality and independence;

xxx

(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.9

In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda,10 we reiterated our
pronouncement in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer11 that the duty of attorneys to the
courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the
judicial office which they are bound to uphold. The Court wrote in Rheem of the Philippines:

x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is the duty of a
lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance." That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers
to support the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor." And more. The attorney's oath
solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be "with all good fidelity x x x to the courts."

Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v.
Cloribel12 that:

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to
advance the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to
which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the
courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous
to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people." Thus
has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty
to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts
so essential to the proper administration of justice."13

The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict
Code. Society has entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and
dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not
be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of
official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a
lawyer.14

Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as
long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor,15 a good character
being an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance
of such privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks
of "conduct" or "misconduct," the reference is not confined to one's behavior exhibited in
connection with the performance of lawyers' professional duties, but also covers any
misconduct, which albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession would show
them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law
invest in them.16

This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the people's faith in courts and trust in the
rule of law, has consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for
malevolent purpose or personal malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of
justice, trifle with the integrity of courts, and embarrass or, worse, malign the men and
women who compose them. We have done it in the case of former Senator Vicente Sotto in
Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B.
Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang17 who repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a most
insolent manner.

The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty.
Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part
towards the Court and its members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case,
however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic
constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition.

We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator's offensive and disrespectful
language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our
part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially
this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted
to members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit,
but to enable them, as the people's representatives, to perform the functions of their office
without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the
congressional hall.18 It is intended to protect members of Congress against government
pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of
Congress and its members.

The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and
Language that enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance, "offensive or
improper language against another Senator or against any public institution."19 But as to
Senator Santiago's unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not apparently
called her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for
appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such circumstance. 20 The lady
senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent
backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.

Finally, the lady senator questions Pobre's motives in filing his complaint, stating that
disciplinary proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree
with her more. We cannot overstress that the senator's use of intemperate language to
demean and denigrate the highest court of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect
lawyers owe to the courts.21

Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made
the statements in question. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has not
categorically denied making such statements, she has unequivocally said making them as
part of her privilege speech. Her implied admission is good enough for the Court.

WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam

Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
Vinzons-Chato v. Comelec

G.R. No. 172131 April 2, 2007

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RENATO J. UNICO, Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari1 filed by Liwayway Vinzons-Chato seeking to nullify the
Resolution2 dated March 17, 2006 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc in SPC No. 04-
096. The assailed resolution affirmed the Resolution3 dated April 13, 2005 of the COMELEC (First
Division) dismissing petitioner Chato’s "petition to correct/nullify the election returns in the municipality of
Labo, Camarines Norte, due to illegality of the proceedings before respondent Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Labo and for manifest errors in the election returns; to declare null and void and without
legal effect the proclamation of respondent candidate; and to declare and proclaim petitioner as the
candidate with the highest number of votes received for the lone congressional district of the Province of
Camarines Norte."

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

Petitioner Chato and respondent Renato J. Unico were among the candidates for the lone congressional
district of Camarines Norte during the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections.

In her petition filed with the COMELEC, petitioner Chato alleged that during the canvassing of the election
returns before the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Labo (MBC Labo) from May 10 to 12, 2004, her
counsel raised several objections and pointed to manifest errors or obvious discrepancies in the election
returns from various precincts of the municipality of Labo. Prior to the suspension of proceedings on May
12, 2004, the MBC Labo gave her twenty-four (24) hours, or until 6:00 p.m. of May 13, 2004, to prove her
allegations.

Allegedly in violation of the procedure prescribed in Section 204 of Republic Act No. 7166 (An Act
Providing for Synchronized National and

Local Elections and For Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and For Other
Purposes), before the expiration of the period granted and without notice to petitioner Chato or her
counsel, the MBC Labo concluded the canvassing of votes and hastily forwarded the results of its
canvass to the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) of Camarines Norte. At that time, which was around
4:00 p.m. of May 13, 2004, petitioner Chato’s counsel was supposed to deliver to the MBC Labo her letter
enumerating the election returns allegedly containing manifest errors and discrepancies.

Petitioner Chato’s counsel was thus constrained to appear before the PBC and moved for the suspension
of its proceedings on the ground that there were still pending incidents before the MBC Labo. The PBC,
however, denied the said motion. Upon instruction of the PBC, petitioner Chato filed therewith a letter-
petition for reconsideration of the denial of her request to remand the matter to the MBC. However, on
May 14, 2004, at around 10:00 a.m., petitioner Chato’s counsel received a Resolution, of even date, of
the PBC denying with finality her letter-petition for reconsideration. In so ruling, the PBC stated that pre-
proclamation controversy was not allowed for the election of Members of the House of Representatives. It
noted that the matters raised by petitioner Chato, which formed part of the proceedings of the PBC, were
proper for an election protest before the competent tribunal. Further, according to the PBC, it had no
authority to direct the MBC Labo to reconvene for the purpose of receiving petitioner Chato’s written
objections and supporting documents and re-canvassing the election returns.

Likewise on May 14, 2004, at 11:30 a.m., the PBC proclaimed respondent Unico as representative-elect
of the lone congressional district of Camarines Norte.1awphi1.nét

Petitioner Chato forthwith filed with the COMELEC a Petition alleging manifest errors in that –

1) Total number of ballots found in the compartment for valid ballots is more than the number of
voters who actually voted in Barangays Anamea[m], Bagong Silang III, Bakiad, Malangcao Basud
and Submakin;

2) Total number of votes counted is less than the number of voters who actually voted in
Barangays Gumamela, Pinya, Dalas, Anameam, Baay, Bagacay, Bagong Silang I, II & III, Bakiad,
Bautista, Bayan-Bayan, Bulhao, Cabusay, Calabasa, Cabatuhan, Canapwan, Daguit I,
Dumagmang, Exciban, Fundado, Gumacutan, Guisican, Iberica, Lugui, Mabilo I & II, Macogon,
Mahan-hawan, Malanggan Masalong, Napaod, Pag-asa, Pangpang, San Antonio, Sta. Cruz,
Submakin, Talobalib and Tulay na Lupa;

3) The entries in some election returns coming from different precincts in Barangays Tulay na
Lupa, Baay and Lugui, all of Labo, Camarines Norte, appear to have been written by one
person;1a\^/phi1.net

4) No data on number of voters who actually voted and of ballots found in compartment for valid
ballots from Barangays Bulhao, San Antonio, Tulay na Lupa, Daguit, Pinya, Cabusay, Napaod,
Pag-asa and Dalas; and

5) One election return is supposedly an election return from Barangay Del Carmen, Labo, but
there is apparently no Barangay Del Carmen and does not appear to be part of the series of
election returns assigned to Labo.5

Petitioner Chato insisted that correction of manifest errors in the certificates of canvass or election
returns, questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the boards of canvassers, or noting of
objections on election returns or certificates of canvass were allowed before the MBC. She further
claimed that with all the manifest errors and obvious discrepancies appearing on the face of the election
returns, it could not be said that the canvassing of votes in Labo reflected the true and correct number of
votes that she received in the said municipality.

On July 2, 2004, the COMELEC (First Division) ordered the suspension of the effects of the proclamation
of respondent Unico. On July 23, 2004, it lifted the said order on the ground that respondent Unico’s
proclamation and taking of oath of office had not only divested the Commission of any jurisdiction to pass
upon his election, returns, and qualifications, but also automatically conferred jurisdiction to another
electoral tribunal.

Subsequently, the COMELEC (First Division) issued the Resolution dated April 13, 2005, dismissing the
petition for lack of merit. It stated preliminarily that the MBC is precluded from entertaining pre-
proclamation controversies on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody, and
appreciation of the election returns or certificates of canvass involving the positions of President, Vice-
President, Senators, and Members of the House of Representatives and Party-List.

The COMELEC (First Division) found that the relief sought by petitioner Chato was actually for the re-
counting of votes, not merely correction of manifest errors in the election returns. Further, in seeking to
nullify respondent Unico’s proclamation, petitioner Chato alleged manifest errors in the election returns
and that they were tampered with and prepared under duress.

Addressing these contentions, the COMELEC (First Division) explained that a re-count of votes is not
within the province of a pre-proclamation controversy, which is generally limited to an examination of the
election returns on their face. It observed that under Section 316 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6669
(General Instructions for Municipal/City/Provincial and District Board of Canvassers in connection with the
May 10, 2004 Elections), objections to the election returns or certificates of canvass were to be
specifically noted in the minutes of the board. With respect to the manifest errors alleged by petitioner
Chato, the COMELEC (First Division) stated that her objections were general in character as they failed to
specify the election return(s) containing these alleged manifest errors as well as the precinct(s) from
which they came. Under the circumstances, the MBC Labo could not immediately rule on petitioner
Chato’s bare allegations for to do so would have resulted in a fishing expedition.

The COMELEC (First Division) mentioned that even her petition for reconsideration filed with the PBC
was bereft of evidence to support her claim of manifest errors. It was only in her petition filed with the
COMELEC that petitioner Chato specifically enumerated the election returns that allegedly contained
infirmities or manifest errors. However, according to the COMELEC (First Division), the resolution of the
matters raised by petitioner Chato, e.g., correction of the votes garnered by the candidates and reflected
in the election returns, would require the opening of the ballots. This could only be done in an election
protest considering that petitioner Chato likewise alleged fraud, substitution, and vote padding.

The COMELEC (First Division) also held that the MBC or PBC had no discretion on matters pertaining to
the proclamation of the winning candidates because they were simply performing a ministerial
function.1ªvvphi1.nét Absent a lawful order from the COMELEC to suspend or annul a proclamation, the
PBC of Camarines Norte, in particular, was mandated to comply with its duties and functions including the
proclamation of respondent Unico as the winning candidate for the lone congressional district of
Camarines Norte. The decretal portion of the Resolution dated April 13, 2005 of the COMELEC (First
Division) stated:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for utter LACK OF
MERIT.

SO ORDERED.7

Aggrieved, petitioner Chato filed a motion for reconsideration thereof which was elevated to the
COMELEC en banc for resolution.

In the assailed Resolution dated March 17, 2006, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner Chato’s
motion for reconsideration ruling that the Commission already lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the
fact that respondent Unico had already taken his oath as a Member of the Thirteenth (13th) Congress. It
reasoned, thus:

In Pangilinan vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 105278, November 18, 1993), the Supreme Court
made a categorical pronouncement that:

The Senate and the House of Representatives now have their respective Electoral Tribunals which are
the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members, thereby divesting the Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution
over election cases pertaining to the election of the Members of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress). It
follows that the COMELEC is now bereft of jurisdiction to hear and decide the pre-proclamation
controversies against members of the House of Representatives as well as of the Senate.
The Honorable Court reiterated the aforequoted ruling in the recent case of Aggabao vs. COMELEC, et
al. (G.R. No. 163756, January 26, 2005), where it held that:

The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives,
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends,
and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

Considering that private respondent Renato Unico had already taken his oath and assumed office as
member of the 13th Congress, the Commission had already lost jurisdiction over the case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. The Resolution of this Commission (First Division) promulgated last April 13, 2005 is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioner Chato now seeks recourse to the Court alleging that:

THE SOLE ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION BY THIS HONORABLE COURT IS WHETHER OR NOT THE
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN PROMULGATING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION
ON MARCH 17, 2006.9

Petitioner Chato essentially contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
ruled that it had already been divested of jurisdiction upon respondent Unico’s assumption of office as a
Member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner Chato vigorously asserts that respondent Unico’s
proclamation was void because it was based on doctored election documents and not through the
legitimate will of the electorate. As such, it can allegedly be challenged even after respondent Unico had
assumed office.

Petitioner Chato further submits that the COMELEC possesses the authority to pass upon issues
involving manifest errors in the certificates of canvass and the composition of the board or its
proceedings. It also has the authority to pass upon the nullity of what otherwise is a null and void
proclamation.

With respect to petitioner Chato’s case, the MBC allegedly violated Section 20 of RA 7166 by failing to
rule on her objections during the canvassing of votes. The PBC allegedly confounded this error by
refusing to correct the alleged manifest errors in the election returns or certificate of canvass before it.
The COMELEC, for its part, allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion when it did not annul the
proclamation of respondent Unico even as it allegedly possessed such authority as well as to correct
manifest errors in the election returns and certificates of canvass, and order the re-counting of the ballots.
Petitioner Chato emphasized that the COMELEC has the power of supervision and control over boards of
canvassers, including the power to review, revise and/or set aside their rulings. Although the COMELEC,
through the First Division in its earlier order suspending the effects of respondent Unico’s proclamation,
ordered the examination of the evidence and documents submitted by the parties, petitioner Chato avers
that the COMELEC never disclosed the outcome of this supposed examination.

She thus urges the Court to order the COMELEC to direct the examination of the election returns of the
municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte, or release the results thereof if one had already been undertaken;
constitute and convene a new MBC, and direct the same to prepare a new election return, accomplish a
new certificate of canvass and submit it to the PBC; direct the PBC to reconvene and canvass the new
certificate of canvass, and subsequently proclaim the winning candidate for the lone congressional district
of Camarines Norte.
The petition is bereft of merit.

Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution reads:

SEC. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices
of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of
the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

Construing this provision in Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections, 10 the Court held that:

x x x The Senate and the House of Representatives now have their respective Electoral Tribunals which
are the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members," thereby divesting the Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution
over election cases pertaining to the election of the Members of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress). x x
x

With respect to the House of Representatives, it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) that has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over contests relative to the election, returns and
qualifications of its members. The use of the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in
Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’
jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.11

Further, the phrase "election, returns, and qualifications" has been interpreted in this wise:

The phrase "election, returns, and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all
matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that
"election" referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral
campaign, and the casting and counting of votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns and the
proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers
and the authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo
warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the
inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy. 12 (Emphasis supplied).

The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction
begins.13 Stated in another manner, where the candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the
congressional elections, the remedy of the petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the HRET.14

In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has already been proclaimed and taken his
oath of office as a Member of the House of Representatives (Thirteenth Congress); hence, the
COMELEC correctly ruled that it had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato’s petition. The issues
raised by petitioner Chato essentially relate to the canvassing of returns and alleged invalidity of
respondent Unico’s proclamation. These are matters that are best addressed to the sound judgment and
discretion of the HRET. Significantly, the allegation that respondent Unico’s proclamation is null and void
does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction:

x x x [I]n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken
his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the
HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of
jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people’s mandate. 15

Further, for the Court to take cognizance of petitioner Chato’s election protest against respondent Unico
would be to usurp the constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET.16 Petitioner Chato’s remedy
would have been to file an election protest before the said tribunal, not this petition for certiorari. The
special civil action of certiorari is available only if there is concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit:
(1) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and (b) there is
no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to annul or modify the
proceeding. There must be capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for certiorari to
prosper.17

All told, the COMELEC en banc clearly did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it issued the
assailed Resolution dated March 17, 2006 holding that it had lost jurisdiction upon respondent Unico’s
proclamation and oath-taking as a Member of the House of Representatives. On the contrary, it
demonstrated fealty to the constitutional fiat that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of its members.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Dueñas Jr v HOR Electoral Tribunal

G.R. No. 185401 July 21, 2009

HENRY "JUN" DUEÑAS, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ANGELITO "JETT" P.
REYES, Respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J:

Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodies? (But who is to guard the guardians themselves?)1

Under our constitutional scheme, the Supreme Court is the ultimate guardian of the Constitution,
particularly of the allocation of powers, the guarantee of individual liberties and the assurance of the
people’s sovereignty.2 The Court has the distinguished but delicate duty of determining and defining
constitutional meaning, divining constitutional intent and deciding constitutional disputes. Nonetheless, its
judicial supremacy is never judicial superiority (for it is co-equal with the other branches) or judicial
tyranny (for it is supposed to be the least dangerous branch). 3 Instead, judicial supremacy is the
conscious and cautious awareness and acceptance of its proper place in the overall scheme of
government with the objective of asserting and promoting the supremacy of the Constitution. Thus,
whenever the Court exercises its function of checking the excesses of any branch of government, it is
also duty-bound to check itself. Otherwise, who will guard the guardian?

The Court should exercise judicial restraint as it resolves the two interesting issues that confront it in this
petition: first, whether the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioner Henry "Jun" Dueñas, Jr.’s motion to withdraw or abandon his
remaining 75% counter-protested precincts and second, whether the HRET committed grave abuse of
discretion when it ordered that its own funds be used for the revision of the ballots from said 75% counter-
protested precincts.ten.1ihpwa1

Factual Backdrop

Petitioner Henry "Jun" Dueñas, Jr. and private respondent Angelito "Jett" P. Reyes were rival candidates
for the position of congressman in the 2nd legislative district of Taguig City in the May 14, 2007
synchronized national and local elections. After the canvass of the votes, petitioner was proclaimed the
winner, having garnered 28,564 votes4as opposed to private respondent’s 27,107 votes.5

Not conceding defeat, private respondent filed an election protest ad cautelam,6 docketed as HRET Case
No. 07-27, in the HRET on June 4, 2007. He prayed for a revision/recount in 1707 of the 732 precincts in
the 2nd legislative district of Taguig City so that the true and real mandate of the electorate may be
ascertained.8 In support of his protest, he alleged that he was cheated in the protested precincts through
insidious and well-orchestrated electoral frauds and anomalies which resulted in the systematic reduction
of his votes and the corresponding increase in petitioner’s votes. 9

Petitioner filed his answer10 on June 25, 2007. Not to be outdone, he also counter-protested 560 precincts
claiming that massive fraud through deliberate misreading, miscounting and misappreciation of ballots
were also committed against him in said precincts resulting in the reduction of his votes in order to favor
private respondent.11

After the issues were joined, the HRET ordered that all ballot boxes and other election materials involved
in the protest and counter-protest be collected and retrieved, and brought to its offices for custody.

In the preliminary conference held on July 26, 2007, petitioner and private respondent agreed that, since
the total number of the protested precincts was less than 50% of the total number of the precincts in the
2nd legislative district of Taguig City, all of the protested precincts would be revised without need of
designation of pilot precints by private respondent pursuant to Rule 88 of the HRET Rules. 12

The HRET thereafter directed the revision of ballots starting September 18, 2007.13 Reception of
evidence of the contending parties followed after the revision of ballots in 100% of the protested precincts
and 25% pilot of the counter-protested precincts. The case was then submitted for resolution upon
submission by the parties of their memoranda.

In an order dated September 25, 2008, the HRET directed the continuation of the revision and
appreciation of the remaining 75% of the counter-protested precincts pursuant to Rule 88 of the HRET
Rules, "[i]t appearing that the [HRET] cannot determine the true will of the electorate from the initial
revision and appreciation of the 100% protested precincts and 25% counter-protested precincts and in
view of the discovery of fake/spurious ballots in some of the protested and counter-protested precincts."14

Petitioner moved for reconsideration15 but the HRET denied his motion in an order dated October 21,
2008.16 On the same day, the HRET issued another order directing petitioner to augment his cash deposit
in the amount of ₱320,000 to cover the expenses of the revision of ballots in the remaining 75% counter-
protested precincts within a non-extendible period of ten days from notice.17

Instead of complying with the order, petitioner filed an urgent motion to withdraw/abandon the remaining
75% counter-protested precincts on October 27, 2008.18 This was denied by the HRET in Resolution No.
08-353 dated November 27, 2008, reiterating its order directing the continuation of the revision of ballots
in the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts and recalling its order requiring petitioner to augment
his cash deposit. The Tribunal instead ordered the use of its own funds for the revision of the remaining
75% counter-protested precincts.19
In issuing Resolution No. 08-353 dated November 27, 2008, the HRET invoked Rule 88 of the HRET
Rules and settled jurisprudence, ruling that it had the discretion either to dismiss the protest or counter-
protest, or to continue with the revision if necessitated by reasonable and sufficient grounds affecting the
validity of the election. This was with the end in view of ascertaining the true choice of the electorate. It
was the HRET’s position that the mere filing of a motion to withdraw/abandon the unrevised precincts did
not automatically divest the HRET of its jurisdiction over the same. Moreover, it ruled that its task of
determining the true will of the electorate was not confined to the examination of contested ballots. Under
its plenary power, it could motu propio review the validity of every ballot involved in a protest or counter-
protest and the same could not be frustrated by the mere expedient of filing a motion to
withdraw/abandon the remaining counter-protested precincts. Convinced that it could not determine the
true will of the electorate of the 2nd legislative district of Taguig City on the basis alone of the initial
revision of the 100% protested precincts and the 25% counter-protested precincts, it had no other
recourse but to continue the revision and appreciation of all the remaining 75% counter-protested
precincts.20

Aggrieved by the HRET’s Resolution No. 08-353 dated November 27, 2008, petitioner elevated the
matter to this Court.

Central Issue To be Resolved

The core issue for our determination is whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing Resolution No. 08-353 dated November 27, 2008.

Contentions Of The Parties

Petitioner argues mainly that private respondent as protestant in the election protest at the HRET had the
burden of proving his cause. Failing to do so, the protest should have been dismissed promptly and not
unduly prolonged. For petitioner, the HRET’s declaration of its failure to ascertain the true will of the
electorate after the complete revision of all protested precincts demonstrated private respondent’s failure
to discharge his burden. Thus, the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
continuation of the revision of ballots in the remaining unrevised precincts as its acts amounted to giving
private respondent the undeserved chance to prevail by assisting him in his search for evidence to
support his case. The HRET in effect took the cudgels for him and thereby compromised its impartiality
and independence.

Petitioner also avers that private respondent’s failure to prove his contentions and his (petitioner’s)
concomitant exercise of his right to withdraw his counter-protest made the continued revision irrelevant.
He claims that, since a counter-protest is designed to protect and advance the interest of the protestee,
private respondent should not expect to derive any benefit therefrom. This justified the allowance of the
withdrawal of the counter-protest.21

Petitioner also labels as grave abuse of discretion the HRET’s assumption of the burden of the costs of
the continued revision. For him, the funds of the HRET should not be used for the benefit of a private
party, specially when its only objective was to speculate whether "the failed protestant can win." 22 Also,
the HRET’s act amounted to an illegal and unconstitutional disbursement of public funds which is
proscribed under Section 29 (1),23 Article VI of the Constitution.24

Petitioner adds that the discretion extended to the HRET pursuant to Rule 88 of the HRET Rules
(whether or not to continue with the revision) may be exercised only when the results of the initial revision
show that the same reasonably affected the officially-proclaimed results of the contested election.
However, the HRET never made any determination that the results of the revision showed private
respondent to have made substantial recoveries in support of his cause but simply directed the
continuation of the revision on the premise of its failure to determine the true will of the electorate as well
as in its discovery of fake/spurious ballots. Yet, the total number of alleged fake/spurious ballots was only
75, or a little over 5% of his 1,457 lead votes; hence, it could not reasonably be inferred to have affected
the officially proclaimed results. Thus, for petitioner, the fake/spurious ballots could not be made the basis
for the continuation of revision of ballots.25

In his comment,26 private respondent counters that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the
HRET in issuing the assailed resolution. The HRET had every right to order the continuation of the
revision of ballots after its discovery of fake/spurious ballots in favor of petitioner. Its pronouncement that
it could not determine the true will of the electorate centered on this discovery. Thus, its constitutional
mandate dictated that it ferret out the truth by completing the said revision. 27

Private respondent further argues that, under Rule 88 of its Rules, the HRET had the discretion to either
dismiss the counter-protest or continue with the revision based on the outcome of the initial revision and
appreciation proceedings and initial evidence presented by the parties. The mere filing of a motion to
withdraw the protest on the remaining unrevised precincts did not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction over
the electoral protest.28

Furthermore, the HRET could use its available funds to shoulder the cost of revision as this was merely
an incident to its discretion under Rule 88 and of its plenary powers under the Constitution. To hold
otherwise would render its mandated functions meaningless and nugatory.29

For its part, the HRET insists in its comment30 that it did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. It
contends that there was a sufficient and legitimate reason to proceed with the revision of the remaining
75% counter-protested precincts. The discovery of fake/spurious ballots created serious doubts about the
sanctity of the ballots subject matter of the protest and counter-protest. Thus, the HRET had no other
choice but to open the ballot boxes in the counter-protested precincts and continue with its revision in
order to ascertain and determine the true will of the electorate. Moreover, its discretion under the HRET
Rules gave it the imprimatur to order the continuation of the revision if, based on its independent
evaluation of the results of the initial revision, the same affected the officially proclaimed results of the
contested election. Since the discovery of fake/spurious ballots, to its mind, had a bearing on the true
results of the election, the HRET submits that it was justified in issuing said order.31

The HRET also points out that the withdrawal of the revision of ballots was not a vested right of any party
but must give way to the higher dictates of public interest, that of determining the true choice of the
people. This determination did not depend on the desire of any party but was vested solely on the
discretion of the HRET as the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Moreover, under the HRET’s plenary powers,
it could motu proprio review the validity of every ballot involved in a protest or counter-protest.32

The HRET further claims that petitioner had no reason to worry or to object to its disbursement of its
funds for the continuation of the revision since it had the allotted budget for the same under paragraph I,
(C.1) of RA33 No. 9498,34 or the General Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2008.35

Ruling Of The Court

The petition has no merit.

We base our decision not only on the constitutional authority of the HRET as the "sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications"36 of its members but also on the limitation of
the Court’s power of judicial review.

The Court itself has delineated the parameters of its power of review in cases involving the HRET –
... so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action
taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court …. the
power granted to the Electoral Tribunal x x x excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this
Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same.37 (emphasis supplied)

Guided by this basic principle, the Court will neither assume a power that belongs exclusively to the
HRET nor substitute its own judgment for that of the Tribunal.

The acts complained of in this case pertain to the HRET’s exercise of its discretion, an exercise which
was well within the bounds of its authority.

Power of HRET to Deny the Motion

To Withdraw/Abandon Counter-Protest

Petitioner submits that there was no point in continuing with the revision of the remaining 75% of the
counter-protested precincts because, notwithstanding the revision of 100% of the protested precincts and
25% of the counter-protested precincts, petitioner’s margin over private respondent was still more than a
thousand votes.

Petitioner is wrong.

First, there are 732 precincts in the 2nd Legislative District of Taguig City, where respondent protested
the election results in 170 precincts and petitioner counter-protested 560 precincts.38 All in all, therefore,
730 precincts were the subject of the revision proceedings. While 100% of the protested precincts were
already revised, only 25% or 140 of the counter-protested precincts (or a total of 310 precincts) were
actually done. Yet, with 420 more precincts to go had the HRET only been allowed to continue its
proceedings, petitioner claims that respondents were only speculating that a sufficient number of
fake/spurious ballots would be discovered in the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts and that
these fake/spurious ballots would overturn the result of the election.

This is ironic because, while petitioner faults the HRET for allegedly engaging in speculation, his position
is itself based on conjectures. He assumes that revising the 420 remaining precincts will not substantially
or significantly affect the original result of the election which will remain the same. As such, he speculates
that, if revised, the 420 remaining precincts will only yield the same or similar finding as that generated in
the 310 precincts already subjected to revision. He presupposes that the HRET can determine the true
will of the electorate even without the 420 or 75% of counter-protested precincts. (This in fact constitutes
57% of all 730 precincts in the legislative district.)

Petitioner may have assumed too much.

Indeed, due regard and respect for the authority of the HRET as an independent constitutional body
require that any finding of grave abuse of discretion against that body should be based on firm and
convincing proof, not on shaky assumptions. Any accusation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the HRET must be established by a clear showing of arbitrariness and improvidence. 39 But the Court finds
no evidence of such grave abuse of discretion by the HRET.

In Co v. HRET,40 we held that:

The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent
branches of the Government. It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct
an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial
action.41 (emphasis supplied)

Second, the Constitution mandates that the HRET "shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications"42 of its members. By employing the word "sole," the Constitution is
emphatic that the jurisdiction of the HRET in the adjudication of election contests involving its members is
exclusive and exhaustive.43Its exercise of power is intended to be its own — full, complete and
unimpaired.44

Protective of its jurisdiction and assertive of its constitutional mandate, the Tribunal adopted Rule 7 of the
HRET Rules:

RULE 7. Control of Own Functions. — The Tribunal shall have exclusive control, direction and
supervision of all matters pertaining to its own functions and operation. (emphasis supplied)

In this connection and in the matter of the revision of ballots, the HRET reserved for itself the discretion to
continue or discontinue the process. Rule 88 of the HRET Rules provides:

RULE 88. Pilot Precincts; Initial Revision. — Any provision of these Rules to the contrary notwithstanding,
as soon as the issues in any contest before the Tribunal have been joined, it may direct and require the
protestant and counter-protestant, in case the protest or counter-protest involves more than 50% of the
total number of precincts in the district, to state and designate in writing within a fixed period at most
twenty-five (25%) percent of the total number of precincts involved in the protest or counter-protest, as
the case may be, which said party deems as best exemplifying or demonstrating the electoral
irregularities or frauds pleaded by him; and the revision of the ballots and/or reception of evidence shall
begin with such pilot precincts designated. Upon the termination of such initial revision and/or reception of
evidence, which presentation of evidence should not exceed ten (10) days, and based upon what
reasonably appears therefrom as affecting or not the officially-proclaimed results of the contested
election, the Tribunal may direct motu propio the continuation of the revision of ballots in the remaining
contested precincts, or dismiss the protest, or the counter-protest, without further proceedings. (emphasis
supplied)

The meaning of Rule 88 is plain. The HRET could continue or discontinue the revision proceedings ex
propio motu, that is, of its own accord.45 Thus, even if we were to adopt petitioner’s view that he ought to
have been allowed by HRET to withdraw his counter-protest, there was nothing to prevent the HRET from
continuing the revision of its own accord by authority of Rule 88.

The only prerequisite to the exercise by the HRET of its prerogative under Rule 88 was its own
determination that the evidence thus far presented could affect the officially proclaimed results. Much like
the appreciation of contested ballots and election documents, the determination of whether the evidence
could influence the officially proclaimed results was a highly technical undertaking, a function best left to
the specialized expertise of the HRET. In Abubakar v. HRET,46 this Court declined to review the ruling of
the HRET on a matter that was discretionary and technical. The same sense of respect for and deference
to the constitutional mandate of the HRET should now animate the Court in resolving this case.

On this specific point, the HRET held that it "[could] not determine the true will of the electorate from the
[result of the] initial revision and appreciation."47 It was also "convinced that the revision of the 75%
remaining precincts … [was] necessary under the circumstances in order to attain the objective of
ascertaining the true intent of the electorate and to remove any doubt as to who between [private
respondent] and [petitioner] obtained the highest number of votes in an election conducted in a fair,
regular and honest manner."48

At the risk of unduly encroaching on the exclusive prerogative of the HRET as the sole judge of election
contests involving its members, the Court cannot substitute its own sense or judgment for that of
the HRET on the issues of whether the evidence presented during the initial revision could affect
the officially proclaimed results and whether the continuation of the revision proceedings could
lead to a determination of the true will of the electorate. Regrettably, that is what petitioner actually
wants the Court to do. But in the exercise of its checking function, the Court should merely test whether or
not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not
that it erred or had a different view.49

Petitioner’s position disregards, or at least waters down, Rules 7 and 88 of the HRET Rules. If the Court
will dictate to the HRET on how to proceed with these election protest proceedings, the Tribunal will no
longer have "exclusive control, direction and supervision of all matters pertaining to its own functions and
operation." It will constitute an intrusion into the HRET’s domain and a curtailment of the HRET’s power to
act of its own accord on its own evaluation of the evidentiary weight and effect of the result of the initial
revision.

Libanan v. HRET50 expressed the Court’s recognition of the limitation of its own power vis-à-vis the extent
of the authority vested by the Constitution on the HRET as sole judge of election contests involving its
members. The Court acknowledged that it could not restrict, diminish or affect the HRET’s authority with
respect to the latter’s exercise of its constitutional mandate. Overturning the HRET’s exercise of its power
under Rule 88 will not only emasculate its authority but will also arrogate unto this Court that body’s
purely discretionary function.

Finally, it is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost at the instance of the parties but
continues until the case is terminated.51 Thus, in Robles v. HRET,52 the Court ruled:

The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested precincts, without any
action on the part of respondent tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the
case. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case
is terminated. We agree with respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal when it held:

We cannot agree with Protestee's contention that Protestant's 'Motion to Withdraw Protest on Unrevised
Precincts' effectively with drew the precincts referred to therein from the protest even before the Tribunal
has acted thereon. Certainly, the Tribunal retains the authority to grant or deny the Motion, and the
withdrawal becomes effective only when the Motion is granted. To hold otherwise would permit a party to
deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction already acquired.

We hold therefore that this Tribunal retains the power and the authority to grant or deny Protestant's
Motion to Withdraw, if only to insure that the Tribunal retains sufficient authority to see to it that the will of
the electorate is ascertained.

xxx xxx xxx

Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its orders upon all questions pertaining to the
cause are orders within its jurisdiction, and however erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by
certiorari. This rule more appropriately applies to respondent HRET whose independence as a
constitutional body has time and again been upheld by Us in many cases. As explained in the case of
Lazatin v. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Timbol, G.R. No. 84297, December 8,
1988, thus:

The use of the word 'sole' emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred [Angara v.
Electoral Commission, supra, at 162]. The exercise of the Power by the Electoral Commission under the
1935 Constitution has been described as `intended to be complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
originally in the legislature' [Id. at 175]. Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by
Justice Malcolm as 'full, clear and complete' [Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil.
886 (1919)]. Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the
Electoral Tribunal [Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948)] and it remained as full,
clear and complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission [Lachica v.
Yap, G.R. No. L-25379, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 140]. The same may be said with regard to the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution. Thus, 'judicial review of decisions or
final resolutions of the House Electoral Tribunal is (thus) possible only in the exercise of this Court's so-
called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the tribunal's decision or resolution was
rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or, paraphrasing
Morrera, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as
constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR,
manifestly constituting such a GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such
abuse.53 (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner’s argument will in effect deprive the HRET of the jurisdiction it has already acquired. It will also
hold the HRET hostage to the whim or caprice of the parties before it. If the HRET is the independent
body that it truly is and if it is to effectively carry out its constitutional mandate, the situation urged by
petitioner should not be allowed.

Discretion of HRET to Use Its

Own Funds In Revision Proceedings

When jurisdiction is conferred by law on a court or tribunal, that court or tribunal, unless otherwise
provided by law, is deemed to have the authority to employ all writs, processes and other means to make
its power effective.54Where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power
necessary for the exercise of one or the performance of the other is also conferred.55 Since the HRET
possessed the authority to motu propio continue a revision of ballots, it also had the wherewithal to carry
it out. It thus ordered the disbursement of its own funds for the revision of the ballots in the remaining
counter-protested precincts. We hark back to Rule 7 of the HRET Rules which provides that the HRET
has exclusive control, direction and supervision of its functions. The HRET’s order was but one aspect of
its power.

Moreover, Rule 8 of the HRET Rules provides:

RULE 8. Express and Implied Powers. — The Tribunal shall have and exercise all such powers as are
vested in it by the Constitution or by law, and such other powers as are necessary or incidental to the
accomplishment of its purposes and functions as set forth in the Constitution or as may be provided by
law. (emphasis supplied)

Certainly, the HRET’s order that its own funds be used for the revision of the ballots from the 75%
counter-protested precincts was an exercise of a power necessary or incidental to the accomplishment of
its primary function as sole judge of election protest cases involving its members.

Petitioner contends that, even if the HRET could lawfully order the continuation of the revision, RA 9498
did not authorize the Tribunal to use its own funds for the purpose. This belief is questionable on three
grounds.

First, if petitioner hypothetically admits that the HRET has the power to order the continuation of the
revision of the 75% remaining counter-protested precincts, then he should also necessarily concede that
there is nothing to prevent the HRET from using its own funds to carry out such objective. Otherwise, the
existence of such power on the part of the HRET becomes useless and meaningless.

Second, petitioner has a very restrictive view of RA 9498. He conveniently fails to mention that Section 1,
Chapter 1 of RA 9498 provides that the HRET has an allotted budget for the "Adjudication of Electoral
Contests Involving Members of the House of Representatives."56 The provision is general and
encompassing enough to authorize the use of the HRET’s funds for the revision of ballots, whether in a
protest or counter-protest. Being allowed by law, the use of HRET funds for the revision of the remaining
75% counter-protested precincts was not illegal, much less violative of Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code.

To reiterate, the law (particularly RA 9498) itself has appropriated funds for adjudicating election contests
in the HRET. As an independent constitutional body, and having received the proper appropriation for that
purpose, the HRET had wide discretion in the disbursement and allocation of such funds.

Third, even assuming that RA 9498 did not expressly authorize the HRET to use its own funds for the
adjudication of a protest or counter-protest, it had the inherent power to suspend its own rules57 and
disburse its funds for any lawful purpose it deemed best. This is specially significant in election contests
such as this where what is at stake is the vital public interest in determining the true will of the electorate.
In any event, nothing prevented the HRET from ordering any of the parties to make the additional
required deposit(s) to cover costs, as respondent in fact manifested in the HRET. 58 Petitioner himself
admits in his pleadings that private respondent filed a

Formal Manifestation with the respondent HRET informing respondent HRET that he [was] willing to make
the added cash deposit to shoulder the costs and expenses for the revision of [the] counter-protested
precincts.59

Such disbursement could not be deemed a giving of unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to a
party since the benefit would actually redound to the electorate whose true will must be determined.
Suffrage is a matter of public, not private, interest. The Court declared in Aruelo, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals60 that "[o]ver and above the desire of the candidates to win, is the deep public interest to
determine the true choice of the people."61 Thus, in an election protest, any benefit to a party would
simply be incidental.1avvphi1

Moreover, the action of the HRET was permitted by the HRET Rules. Rule 33 of the HRET Rules
provides:

RULE 33. Effect of Failure to Make Cash Deposit. — If a party fails to make the cash deposits or
additional cash deposits herein provided within the prescribed time limit, the Tribunal may dismiss the
protest, counter-protest, or petition for quo warranto, or take such action as it may deem equitable under
the premises. (emphasis supplied)

All told, it should be borne in mind that the present petition is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. It alleges that the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it promulgated Resolution No. 08-353 dated November 27, 2008. But what is "grave
abuse of discretion?" It is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack
of jurisdiction. Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The abuse of discretion must be grave, that is,
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It
must be so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of the law. In other words, for a petition for certiorari to
prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion. There is
also grave abuse of discretion when there is a contravention of the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence.62 Using the foregoing as yardstick, the Court finds that petitioner miserably failed to
discharge the onus probandi imposed on him.

In sum, the supremacy of the Constitution serves as the safety mechanism that will ensure the faithful
performance by this Court of its role as guardian of the fundamental law. Awareness of the proper scope
of its power of judicial review in cases involving the HRET, an independent body with a specific
constitutional mandate, behooves the Court to stay its hands in matters involving the exercise of
discretion by that body, except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion.
 A Final Word

We are not declaring any winner here. We do not have the authority to do so. We are merely remanding
the case to the HRET so that revision proceedings may promptly continue, precisely to determine the true
will of the electorate in the 2nd legislative district of Taguig City for the 2007-2010 congressional term.

Indeed, considering the paramount need to dispel the uncertainty now beclouding the choice of the
electorate and the lifting of the status quo ante order on June 16, 2009, the revision proceedings shall
resume immediately and the electoral case resolved without delay.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and Resolution No. 08-353 dated November 27, 2008
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Garcillano v. HOR Committee on Public Information

G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008

VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER
AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.

x----------------------x

G.R. No. 179275 December 23, 2008

SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, petitioners,

vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE
PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondents.

x----------------------x

MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention

x----------------------x

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M.

LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F.
TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between
the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
surfaced. They captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into a controversy that
placed the legitimacy of the present administration on the line, and resulted in the near-collapse of the
Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the
President’s instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results
of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative
hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress. 1

In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor Leader Francis G.
Escudero delivered a privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and set in motion a congressional
investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety,
National Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped
conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo
Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the
respondent House Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped
conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on the admissibility
and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the House. 2

On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the hearings indefinitely.
Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports based on the said recordings and the
testimonies of the resource persons.3

Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a
Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction4docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent House Committees
be restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their
committee reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any
reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House
Committees directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of the House proceedings. 5

Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the "Garci tapes" abruptly
stopped.

After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the slumbering issue with a
privilege speech, "The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness." In his discourse, Senator Lacson promised to
provide the public "the whole unvarnished truth – the what’s, when’s, where’s, who’s and why’s" of the
alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the perceived willingness of telecommunications providers to
participate in nefarious wiretapping activities.

On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacson’s speech was referred to the Senate
Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously
filed two bills6 seeking to regulate the sale, purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties. 7

In the Senate’s plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when Senator Richard
Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 42008 if the body were
to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago
delivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the
use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes. However, she
recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the
Philippine National Police or other government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials. 9
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court
of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, 10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar
the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended
legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.11

As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its public hearings on the "Hello
Garci" tapes on September 7,12 1713 and October 1,14 2007.

Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G.
Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes filed
their Comment16 on the petition on September 25, 2007.

The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.17

On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of the resource persons
summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R.
No. 179275.18

On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275. 19

It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they have different
objectives–the first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent
inclusion in the committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate
inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.

The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.

-I-

Before delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first resolve the issue on the parties’ standing,
argued at length in their pleadings.

In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "‘[l]egal standing’ or locus standi refers to a personal and
substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the
challenged governmental act x x x," thus,

generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to
be redressed by a favorable action.21

The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."22

However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has
relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo23 articulates that a "liberal policy has
been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute
actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings." 24 The fairly
recent Chavez v. Gonzales25 even permitted a non-member of the broadcast media, who failed to allege
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, to challenge the acts of the Secretary of Justice and
the National Telecommunications Commission. The majority, in the said case, echoed the current policy
that "this Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its
addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest, in keeping with the
Court’s duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of government have
kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them."26

In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate the petition by alleging that he is
the person alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his was publicly identified by the members of the
respondent committees as one of the voices in the recordings. 27 Obviously, therefore, petitioner
Garcillano stands to be directly injured by the House committees’ actions and charges of electoral fraud.
The Court recognizes his standing to institute the petition for prohibition.

In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by alleging that they are
concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP. They are of the firm conviction that any attempt
to use the "Hello Garci" tapes will further divide the country. They wish to see the legal and proper use of
public funds that will necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public hearings. They are worried by the
continuous violation of the laws and individual rights, and the blatant attempt to abuse constitutional
processes through the conduct of legislative inquiries purportedly in aid of legislation. 28

Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend
the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation
which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful
expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings. 29

Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of the laws and that
intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due process,30 they satisfy the requisite personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.

Following the Court’s ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,31 we find sufficient
petitioners Ranada’s and Agcaoili’s and intervenor Sagge’s allegation that the continuous conduct by the
Senate of the questioned legislative inquiry will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.32 It
should be noted that in Francisco, rights personal to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had been
injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, yet the Court granted
standing to the petitioners therein for, as in this case, they invariably invoked the vindication of their own
rights–as taxpayers, members of Congress, citizens, individually or in a class suit, and members of the
bar and of the legal profession–which were also supposedly violated by the therein assailed
unconstitutional acts.33

Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioners and intervenor Sagge
advance constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness,
novelty and weight as precedents. The issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only
to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for the guidance of all. 34

Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it has shown in prior cases
climaxing in the more recent case of Chavez, the Court recognizes the legal standing of petitioners
Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor Sagge.

- II -

The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic. Repeatedly stressed in
our prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the
determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies.35 By actual cases, we mean existing
conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the
decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not extend to
hypothetical questions because any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. 36 Neither will the Court determine a moot
question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose
has become stale.37 It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot
question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot
be enforced.38

In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as aforementioned, the issuance of an
injunctive writ to prohibit the respondent House Committees from playing the tape recordings and from
including the same in their committee report. He likewise prays that the said tapes be stricken off the
records of the House proceedings. But the Court notes that the recordings were already played in the
House and heard by its members.39 There is also the widely publicized fact that the committee reports on
the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent
committees.40 Having been overtaken by these events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for
being moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act
about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. 41

- III -

As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to
continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure,
in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended
to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.42 Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height
of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had
no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.43What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of
the Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."44

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of
general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006.45 With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress,
however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was
undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.

Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v. Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,46 we said:

Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated
Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the
"duly published rules of procedure." We quote the OSG’s explanation:

The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every Congress to
publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every
Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held
every three (3) years for one-half of the Senate’s membership, the composition of the
Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different
set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the
subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore,
procedurally infirm.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, reinforces this ruling with the
following rationalization:

The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative body. The
present Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of whom are elected every three years for a
term of six years each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators expires every three years, leaving
less than a majority of Senators to continue into the next Congress. The 1987 Constitution,
like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority of Senators to "constitute a quorum to do
business." Applying the same reasoning in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987
Constitution is not a continuing body because less than majority of the Senators continue into the
next Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of Procedure must be republished by the
Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators.47

The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution48 (On the Motion for Reconsideration) in
the same case, viz.:

On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue a clarification.
Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing," as it is not
dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its members.
However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately
and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself
confirms this when it states:

RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS

SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next
session in the same status.

All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1)
Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first time.

Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and
even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are
considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the
Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status,
but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily apparent
considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different
composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations
of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with respect to
the conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be deemed terminated with the
expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course, continue into the next Congress with
the same status.

This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the opposite nature of the
conduct of its business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senate’s main
rules of procedure) states:

RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES

SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the preceding
elections shall begin their term of office, the President may endorse the Rules to the
appropriate committee for amendment or revision.
 The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented at
least one day before its consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators
present in the session shall be required for its approval.

RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT

SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall remain in
force until they are amended or repealed.

Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition of the
Senate after an election and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at the start
of each session in which the newly elected Senators shall begin their term.

However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are intended to be valid
from the date of their adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language is
conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect
seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." The latter does not
explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or repealed. In
view of the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that
the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next
Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which come within the rule on
unfinished business.

The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted
in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the
Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the
published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until
they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.

If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even
in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main
rules regarding effectivity.

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the
rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form
available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page. 49

The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s
defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic
law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction
whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to
publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.

Justice Carpio’s response to the same argument raised by the respondents is illuminating:

The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form
available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of
Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of publication. Publication in
accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because
 the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of
Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, 50 otherwise known as the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the
more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the
functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes.51 In other words, the law merely
recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or
electronic documents.52 It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the
Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure."

Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial
notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited
by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigation
subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no
published rules governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.

With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised in the
consolidated petitions.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is
GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines
and/or any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the "Hello Garci"
tapes.

SO ORDERED.

Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations

G.R. No. 180643 September 4, 2008

ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner,

vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS,
SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND SECURITY, respondents.

RESOLUTION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres to the Office of the President. It exists
to protect public interest, not to benefit a particular public official. Its purpose, among others, is to assure
that the nation will receive the benefit of candid, objective and untrammeled communication and
exchange of information between the President and his/her advisers in the process of shaping or forming
policies and arriving at decisions in the exercise of the functions of the Presidency under the Constitution.
The confidentiality of the President’s conversations and correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the
confidentiality of judicial deliberations. It possesses the same value as the right to privacy of all citizens
and more, because it is dictated by public interest and the constitutionally ordained separation of
governmental powers.

In these proceedings, this Court has been called upon to exercise its power of review and arbitrate a
hotly, even acrimoniously, debated dispute between the Court’s co-equal branches of government. In this
task, this Court should neither curb the legitimate powers of any of the co-equal and coordinate branches
of government nor allow any of them to overstep the boundaries set for it by our Constitution. The
competing interests in the case at bar are the claim of executive privilege by the President, on the one
hand, and the respondent Senate Committees’ assertion of their power to conduct legislative inquiries, on
the other. The particular facts and circumstances of the present case, stripped of the politically and
emotionally charged rhetoric from both sides and viewed in the light of settled constitutional and legal
doctrines, plainly lead to the conclusion that the claim of executive privilege must be upheld.

Assailed in this motion for reconsideration is our Decision dated March 25, 2008 (the "Decision"), granting
the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Romulo L. Neri against the respondent Senate Committees on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,1 Trade and Commerce,2 and National Defense and
Security (collectively the "respondent Committees").3

A brief review of the facts is imperative.

On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for about
eleven (11) hours on matters concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"), a project
awarded by the Department of Transportation and Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE"). Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the
NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("President
Arroyo") of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed
further on President Arroyo and petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking "executive privilege." To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a)
whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,4 (b) whether or not she directed him to
prioritize it,5 and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it.6

Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioner’s answers to these three questions by requiring
him to appear and testify once more on November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007, Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent Committees and requested them to dispense with
petitioner’s testimony on the ground of executive privilege.7The letter of Executive Secretary Ermita
pertinently stated:

Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing questions fall under conversations and
correspondence between the President and public officials which are considered executive
privilege (Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. 95637, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. PEA, G.R. 133250, July 9,
2002). Maintaining the confidentiality of conversations of the President is necessary in the
exercise of her executive and policy decision making process. The expectation of a President to
the confidentiality of her conversations and correspondences, like the value which we accord
deference for the privacy of all citizens, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in
candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. Disclosure of
conversations of the President will have a chilling effect on the President, and will hamper her in
the effective discharge of her duties and responsibilities, if she is not protected by the
confidentiality of her conversations.
 The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of
China. Given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the President,
he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing
the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.

In light of the above considerations, this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of
executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly.

Considering that Sec. Neri has been lengthily interrogated on the subject in an unprecedented
11-hour hearing, wherein he has answered all questions propounded to him except the foregoing
questions involving executive privilege, we therefore request that his testimony on 20 November
2007 on the ZTE / NBN project be dispensed with.

On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees upon orders of the
President invoking executive privilege. On November 22, 2007, the respondent Committees issued the
show-cause letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt. On November 29,
2007, in petitioner’s reply to respondent Committees, he manifested that it was not his intention to ignore
the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be
covered by executive privilege. He also manifested his willingness to appear and testify should there be
new matters to be taken up. He just requested that he be furnished "in advance as to what else" he
"needs to clarify."

Respondent Committees found petitioner’s explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to his request
for advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued the Order dated January 30,
2008; In Re: P.S. Res. Nos. 127,129,136 & 144; and privilege speeches of Senator Lacson and Santiago
(all on the ZTE-NBN Project), citing petitioner in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his
arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear
and give his testimony.

On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order. 8 He insisted that he had
not shown "any contemptible conduct worthy of contempt and arrest." He emphasized his willingness to
testify on new matters, but respondent Committees did not respond to his request for advance notice of
questions. He also mentioned the petition for certiorari he previously filed with this Court on December 7,
2007. According to him, this should restrain respondent Committees from enforcing the order dated
January 30, 2008 which declared him in contempt and directed his arrest and detention.

Petitioner then filed his Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (with Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary
Injunction) on February 1, 2008. In the Court’s Resolution dated February 4, 2008, the parties were
required to observe the status quo prevailing prior to the Order dated January 30, 2008.

On March 25, 2008, the Court granted his petition for certiorari on two grounds: first, the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions were covered by executive privilege; and second, respondent
Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order. Anent the first ground, we
considered the subject communications as falling under the presidential communications
privilege because (a) they related to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, (b) they
were received by a close advisor of the President, and (c) respondent Committees failed to adequately
show a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. As to the second ground, we found that
respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order because (a)
there was a valid claim of executive privilege, (b) their invitations to petitioner did not contain the
questions relevant to the inquiry, (c) there was a cloud of doubt as to the regularity of the proceeding that
led to their issuance of the contempt order, (d) they violated Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution
because their inquiry was not in accordance with the "duly published rules of procedure," and (e) they
issued the contempt order arbitrarily and precipitately.

On April 8, 2008, respondent Committees filed the present motion for reconsideration, anchored on the
following grounds:

CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURT’S DECISION, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE

ASSAILED ORDERS WERE ISSUED BY RESPONDENT COMMITTEES PURSUANT TO THE
EXERCISE OF THEIR LEGISLATIVE POWER, AND NOT MERELY THEIR OVERSIGHT
FUNCTIONS.

II

CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURT’S DECISION, THERE CAN BE NO

PRESUMPTION THAT THE INFORMATION WITHHELD IN THE INSTANT CASE IS
PRIVILEGED.

III

CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURT’S DECISION, THERE IS NO FACTUAL OR

LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD THAT THE COMMUNICATIONS ELICITED BY THE SUBJECT
THREE (3) QUESTIONS ARE COVERED BY EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, CONSIDERING THAT:

A. THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT THE MATTERS FOR WHICH EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IS

CLAIMED CONSTITUTE STATE SECRETS.

B. EVEN IF THE TESTS ADOPTED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE DECISION IS

APPLIED, THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT THE ELEMENTS OF PRESIDENTIAL
COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE ARE PRESENT.

C. ON THE CONTRARY, THERE IS ADEQUATE SHOWING OF A COMPELLING NEED TO

JUSTIFY THE DISCLOSURE OF THE INFORMATION SOUGHT.

D. TO UPHOLD THE CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IN THE INSTANT CASE WOULD

SERIOUSLY IMPAIR THE RESPONDENTS’ PERFORMANCE OF THEIR PRIMARY
FUNCTION TO ENACT LAWS.

E. FINALLY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO INFORMATION, AND THE

CONSTITUTIONAL POLICIES ON PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY
OUTWEIGH THE CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE.

IV

CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURT’S DECISION, RESPONDENTS DID NOT

COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED CONTEMPT ORDER,
CONSIDERING THAT:

A. THERE IS NO LEGITIMATE CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IN THE INSTANT CASE.

 B. RESPONDENTS DID NOT VIOLATE THE SUPPOSED REQUIREMENTS LAID DOWN
IN SENATE V. ERMITA.

C. RESPONDENTS DULY ISSUED THE CONTEMPT ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR

INTERNAL RULES.

D. RESPONDENTS DID NOT VIOLATE THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER ARTICLE VI, SECTION
21 OF THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRING THAT ITS RULES OF PROCEDURE BE DULY
PUBLISHED, AND WERE DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE COURT CONSIDERED THE
OSG’S INTERVENTION ON THIS ISSUE WITHOUT GIVING RESPONDENTS THE
OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT.

E. RESPONDENTS’ ISSUANCE OF THE CONTEMPT ORDER IS NOT ARBITRARY OR

PRECIPITATE.

In his Comment, petitioner charges respondent Committees with exaggerating and distorting the Decision
of this Court. He avers that there is nothing in it that prohibits respondent Committees from investigating
the NBN Project or asking him additional questions. According to petitioner, the Court merely applied the
rule on executive privilege to the facts of the case. He further submits the following contentions: first, the
assailed Decision did not reverse the presumption against executive secrecy laid down in Senate v.
Ermita; second, respondent Committees failed to overcome the presumption of executive privilege
because it appears that they could legislate even without the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions, and they admitted that they could dispense with petitioner’s testimony if certain NEDA
documents would be given to them; third, the requirement of specificity applies only to the privilege for
State, military and diplomatic secrets, not to the necessarily broad and all-encompassing presidential
communications privilege; fourth, there is no right to pry into the President’s thought processes or
exploratory exchanges; fifth, petitioner is not covering up or hiding anything illegal; sixth, the Court has
the power and duty to annul the Senate Rules; seventh, the Senate is not a continuing body, thus the
failure of the present Senate to publish its Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation (Rules) has a vitiating effect on them; eighth, the requirement for a witness to be furnished
advance copy of questions comports with due process and the constitutional mandate that the rights of
witnesses be respected; and ninth, neither petitioner nor respondent has the final say on the matter of
executive privilege, only the Court.

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that: (1) there is no categorical pronouncement
from the Court that the assailed Orders were issued by respondent Committees pursuant to their
oversight function; hence, there is no reason for them "to make much" of the distinction between Sections
21 and 22, Article VI of the Constitution; (2) presidential communications enjoy a presumptive privilege
against disclosure as earlier held in Almonte v. Vasquez9 and Chavez v. Public Estates Authority (PEA)10;
(3) the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege, because all
the elements of the presidential communications privilege are present; (4) the subpoena ad
testificandum issued by respondent Committees to petitioner is fatally defective under existing law and
jurisprudence; (5) the failure of the present Senate to publish its Rules renders the same void; and (6)
respondent Committees arbitrarily issued the contempt order.

Incidentally, respondent Committees’ objection to the Resolution dated March 18, 2008 (granting the
Office of the Solicitor General’s Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Memorandum) only
after the promulgation of the Decision in this case is foreclosed by its untimeliness.

The core issues that arise from the foregoing respective contentions of the opposing parties are as
follows:

(1) whether or not there is a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in our
legal system;
 (2) whether or not there is factual or legal basis to hold that the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege;

(3) whether or not respondent Committees have shown that the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are critical to the exercise of their functions; and

(4) whether or not respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
contempt order.

We shall discuss these issues seriatim.

There Is a Recognized Presumptive

Presidential Communications Privilege

Respondent Committees ardently argue that the Court’s declaration that presidential communications are
presumptively privileged reverses the "presumption" laid down in Senate v. Ermita11 that "inclines heavily
against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure." Respondent Committees then claim that the Court
erred in relying on the doctrine in Nixon.

Respondent Committees argue as if this were the first time the presumption in favor of the presidential
communications privilege is mentioned and adopted in our legal system. That is far from the truth. The
Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez,12 affirmed that the presidential communications
privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of
powers under the Constitution. Even Senate v. Ermita,13 the case relied upon by respondent Committees,
reiterated this concept. There, the Court enumerated the cases in which the claim of executive privilege
was recognized, among them Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG),14 and Chavez v. PEA.15 The Court articulated in these cases that "there are certain
types of information which the government may withhold from the public,16" that there is a "governmental
privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other
national security matters";17 and that "the right to information does not extend to matters recognized
as ‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential
conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings."18

Respondent Committees’ observation that this Court’s Decision reversed the "presumption that inclines
heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure" arises from a piecemeal interpretation of the
said Decision. The Court has repeatedly held that in order to arrive at the true intent and meaning of a
decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and resorted to, but the decision must be
considered in its entirety.19

Note that the aforesaid presumption is made in the context of the circumstances obtaining in Senate v.
Ermita, which declared void Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 464, Series of 2005. The
pertinent portion of the decision in the said case reads:

From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United
States and in this jurisprudence, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted
against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of
information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept,
a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context
in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from
the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the
extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines
 heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Obviously, the last sentence of the above-quoted paragraph in Senate v. Ermita refers to the "exemption"
being claimed by the executive officials mentioned in Section 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, solely by virtue of their
positions in the Executive Branch. This means that when an executive official, who is one of those
mentioned in the said Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, claims to be exempt from disclosure, there can be no
presumption of authorization to invoke executive privilege given by the President to said executive
official, such that the presumption in this situation inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor
of disclosure.

Senate v. Ermita 20 expounds on the premise of the foregoing ruling in this wise:

Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines that
a certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the President’s
authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject
only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such
official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.

Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege.
Executive privilege, as already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the
confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the
executive branch, or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the
discharge of highly important executive responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus
premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential
in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the
obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high
degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.

In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the
President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary
to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the
authority is "By order of the President", which means that he personally consulted with her. The
privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the
executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise
such power. There is even less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case where the
authorization is not explicit but by mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is further
invalid on this score.

The constitutional infirmity found in the blanket authorization to invoke executive privilege granted by the
President to executive officials in Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464 does not obtain in this case.

In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive Secretary Ermita, who invoked executive
privilege on a specific matter involving an executive agreement between the Philippines and China, which
was the subject of the three (3) questions propounded to petitioner Neri in the course of the Senate
Committees’ investigation. Thus, the factual setting of this case markedly differs from that passed upon in
Senate v. Ermita.

Moreover, contrary to the claim of respondents, the Decision in this present case hews closely to the
ruling in Senate v. Ermita,21 to wit:

Executive privilege
 The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior
to the promulgation of the 1986 Constitution. Being of American origin, it is best understood in
light of how it has been defined and used in the legal literature of the United States.

Schwart defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold information
from the public, the courts, and the Congress. Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the
President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the
courts, and ultimately the public." x x x In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was
recognized by this Court in Almonte v. Vasquez. Almonte used the term in reference to the same
privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted the following portion of the Nixon decision which explains the
basis for the privilege:

"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and

correspondences, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, he
has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those
values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or
harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be
free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so
in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations
justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is
fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of
powers under the Constitution x x x " (Emphasis and italics supplied)

Clearly, therefore, even Senate v. Ermita adverts to "a presumptive privilege for Presidential
communication," which was recognized early on in Almonte v. Vasquez. To construe the passage
in Senate v. Ermita adverted to in the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent Committees, referring to
the non-existence of a "presumptive authorization" of an executive official, to mean that the "presumption"
in favor of executive privilege "inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure" is to
distort the ruling in the Senate v. Ermita and make the same engage in self-contradiction.

Senate v. Ermita22 expounds on the constitutional underpinning of the relationship between the Executive
Department and the Legislative Department to explain why there should be no implied authorization or
presumptive authorization to invoke executive privilege by the President’s subordinate officials, as
follows:

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to
exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the
mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from
this power - the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of
Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on he being the highest official
of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of governments
which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. (Underscoring supplied)

Thus, if what is involved is the presumptive privilege of presidential communications when invoked by the
President on a matter clearly within the domain of the Executive, the said presumption dictates that the
same be recognized and be given preference or priority, in the absence of proof of a compelling or critical
need for disclosure by the one assailing such presumption. Any construction to the contrary will render
meaningless the presumption accorded by settled jurisprudence in favor of executive privilege. In
fact, Senate v. Ermita reiterates jurisprudence citing "the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege
for Presidential communications."23

II
 There Are Factual and Legal Bases to
Hold that the Communications Elicited by the
Three (3) Questions Are Covered by Executive Privilege

Respondent Committees claim that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are not
covered by executive privilege because the elements of the presidential communications privilege are
not present.

A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a "quintessential and non-delegable

presidential power."

First, respondent Committees contend that the power to secure a foreign loan does not relate to a
"quintessential and non-delegable presidential power," because the Constitution does not vest it in the
President alone, but also in the Monetary Board which is required to give its prior concurrence and to
report to Congress.

This argument is unpersuasive.

The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make such power less
executive. "Quintessential" is defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the concentrated
essence of substance.24 On the other hand, "non-delegable" means that a power or duty cannot be
delegated to another or, even if delegated, the responsibility remains with the obligor. 25 The power to
enter into an executive agreement is in essence an executive power. This authority of the President to
enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.26 Now, the fact that the President has to secure the prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a complete report of its decision
before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the power.

The inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of
government by no means prescribes absolute autonomy in the discharge by each branch of that part of
the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people. There is the corollary doctrine of checks
and balances, which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of
these three branches. Thus, by analogy, the fact that certain legislative acts require action from the
President for their validity does not render such acts less legislative in nature. A good example is the
power to pass a law. Article VI, Section 27 of the Constitution mandates that every bill passed by
Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President who shall approve or veto the
same. The fact that the approval or vetoing of the bill is lodged with the President does not render the
power to pass law executive in nature. This is because the power to pass law is generally a quintessential
and non-delegable power of the Legislature. In the same vein, the executive power to enter or not to enter
into a contract to secure foreign loans does not become less executive in nature because of conditions
laid down in the Constitution. The final decision in the exercise of the said executive power is still lodged
in the Office of the President.

B. The "doctrine of operational proximity" was laid down precisely to limit the scope of the
presidential communications privilege but, in any case, it is not conclusive.

Second, respondent Committees also seek reconsideration of the application of the "doctrine of
operational proximity" for the reason that "it maybe misconstrued to expand the scope of the presidential
communications privilege to communications between those who are ‘operationally proximate’ to the
President but who may have "no direct communications with her."

It must be stressed that the doctrine of "operational proximity" was laid down in In re: Sealed
Case27precisely to limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege. The U.S. court was aware
of the dangers that a limitless extension of the privilege risks and, therefore, carefully cabined its reach by
explicitly confining it to White House staff, and not to staffs of the agencies, and then only to White House
staff that has "operational proximity" to direct presidential decision-making, thus:

We are aware that such an extension, unless carefully circumscribed to accomplish the purposes
of the privilege, could pose a significant risk of expanding to a large swath of the executive
branch a privilege that is bottomed on a recognition of the unique role of the President. In order to
limit this risk, the presidential communications privilege should be construed as narrowly as is
consistent with ensuring that the confidentiality of the President’s decision-making process is
adequately protected. Not every person who plays a role in the development of presidential
advice, no matter how remote and removed from the President, can qualify for the
privilege. In particular, the privilege should not extend to staff outside the White House in
executive branch agencies. Instead, the privilege should apply only to communications
authored or solicited and received by those members of an immediate White House advisor’s
staff who have broad and significant responsibility for investigation and formulating the advice to
be given the President on the particular matter to which the communications relate. Only
communications at that level are close enough to the President to be revelatory of his
deliberations or to pose a risk to the candor of his advisers. See AAPS, 997 F.2d at 910 (it
is "operational proximity" to the President that matters in determining whether "[t]he
President’s confidentiality interests" is implicated). (Emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege "to a large swath of the executive branch" (a fear
apparently entertained by respondents) is absent because the official involved here is a member of the
Cabinet, thus, properly within the term "advisor" of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member of
her official family. Nevertheless, in circumstances in which the official involved is far too remote, this Court
also mentioned in the Decision the organizational test laid down in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of
Justice.28 This goes to show that the operational proximity test used in the Decision is not considered
conclusive in every case. In determining which test to use, the main consideration is to limit the
availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand proximate to the President, not only by reason
of their function, but also by reason of their positions in the Executive’s organizational structure. Thus,
respondent Committees’ fear that the scope of the privilege would be unnecessarily expanded with the
use of the operational proximity test is unfounded.

C. The President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely based on a generalized interest; and
in balancing respondent Committees’ and the President’s clashing interests, the Court did not
disregard the 1987 Constitutional provisions on government transparency, accountability and
disclosure of information.

Third, respondent Committees claim that the Court erred in upholding the President’s invocation, through
the Executive Secretary, of executive privilege because (a) between respondent Committees’ specific and
demonstrated need and the President’s generalized interest in confidentiality, there is a need to strike the
balance in favor of the former; and (b) in the balancing of interest, the Court disregarded the provisions of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution on government transparency, accountability and disclosure of
information, specifically, Article III, Section 7;29 Article II, Sections 2430 and 28;31 Article XI, Section
1;32 Article XVI, Section 10;33 Article VII, Section 20;34 and Article XII, Sections 9,35 21,36 and 22.37

It must be stressed that the President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely founded on her
generalized interest in confidentiality. The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita
specified presidential communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and economic relations
with another sovereign nation as the bases for the claim. Thus, the Letter stated:

The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to
be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s
Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which this information were conveyed to the
President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without
disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect. (emphasis supplied)
Even in Senate v. Ermita, it was held that Congress must not require the Executive to state the reasons
for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant
to protect. This is a matter of respect for a coordinate and co-equal department.

It is easy to discern the danger that goes with the disclosure of the President’s communication with her
advisor. The NBN Project involves a foreign country as a party to the agreement. It was actually a product
of the meeting of minds between officials of the Philippines and China. Whatever the President says
about the agreement - particularly while official negotiations are ongoing - are matters which China will
surely view with particular interest. There is danger in such kind of exposure. It could adversely affect our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. We reiterate the importance
of secrecy in matters involving foreign negotiations as stated in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 38 thus:

The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend on
secrecy, and even when brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all the measures, demands,
or eventual concessions which may have been proposed or contemplated would be extremely
impolitic, for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations or produce immediate
inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other powers. The necessity of such
caution and secrecy was one cogent reason for vesting the power of making treaties in the
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the principle on which the body was formed
confining it to a small number of members. To admit, then, a right in the House of
Representatives to demand and to have as a matter of course all the papers respecting a
negotiation with a foreign power would be to establish a dangerous precedent.

US jurisprudence clearly guards against the dangers of allowing Congress access to all papers relating to
a negotiation with a foreign power. In this jurisdiction, the recent case of Akbayan Citizens Action Party, et
al. v. Thomas G. Aquino, et al.39upheld the privileged character of diplomatic negotiations. In Akbayan,
the Court stated:

Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations

The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In
discussing valid limitations on the right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that
"information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest." Even
earlier, the same privilege was upheld in People’s Movement for Press Freedom (PMPF) v.
Manglapus wherein the Court discussed the reasons for the privilege in more precise terms.

In PMPF v. Manglapus, the therein petitioners were seeking information from the President’s
representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases
Agreement. The Court denied the petition, stressing that "secrecy of negotiations with foreign
countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press
nor of the freedom of access to information." The Resolution went on to state, thus:

The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of authority and expedition of

decision which are inherent in executive action. Another essential characteristic of
diplomacy is its confidential nature.Although much has been said about "open" and
"secret" diplomacy, with disparagement of the latter, Secretaries of State Hughes and
Stimson have clearly analyzed and justified the practice. In the words of Mr. Stimson:

"A complicated negotiation …cannot be carried through without many,

many private talks and discussion, man to man; many tentative
suggestions and proposals. Delegates from other countries come and tell
you in confidence of their troubles at home and of their differences with
 other countries and with other delegates; they tell you of what they would
do under certain circumstances and would not do under other
circumstances… If these reports… should become public… who would
ever trust American Delegations in another conference? (United States
Department of State, Press Releases, June 7, 1930, pp. 282-284)

xxxx

There is frequent criticism of the secrecy in which negotiation with foreign powers
on nearly all subjects is concerned. This, it is claimed, is incompatible with the
substance of democracy. As expressed by one writer, "It can be said that there is no
more rigid system of silence anywhere in the world." (E.J. Young, Looking Behind the
Censorship, J. B. Lipincott Co., 1938) President Wilson in starting his efforts for the
conclusion of the World War declared that we must have "open covenants, openly arrived
at." He quickly abandoned his thought.

No one who has studied the question believes that such a method of publicity is
possible. In the moment that negotiations are started, pressure groups attempt to
"muscle in." An ill-timed speech by one of the parties or a frank declaration of the
concession which are exacted or offered on both sides would quickly lead to a
widespread propaganda to block the negotiations. After a treaty has been drafted
and its terms are fully published, there is ample opportunity for discussion before
it is approved. (The New American Government and Its Works, James T. Young, 4th
Edition, p. 194) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Still in PMPF v. Manglapus, the Court adopted the doctrine in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp. that the President is the sole organ of the nation in its negotiations with foreign
countries,viz:

"x x x In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold
problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the
nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone
negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is
powerless to invade it. As Marshall said in his great arguments of March 7, 1800, in the
House of Representatives, "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations." Annals, 6th
Cong., col. 613… (Emphasis supplied; underscoring in the original)

Considering that the information sought through the three (3) questions subject of this Petition involves
the President’s dealings with a foreign nation, with more reason, this Court is wary of approving the view
that Congress may peremptorily inquire into not only official, documented acts of the President but even
her confidential and informal discussions with her close advisors on the pretext that said questions serve
some vague legislative need. Regardless of who is in office, this Court can easily foresee unwanted
consequences of subjecting a Chief Executive to unrestricted congressional inquiries done with increased
frequency and great publicity. No Executive can effectively discharge constitutional functions in the face
of intense and unchecked legislative incursion into the core of the President’s decision-making process,
which inevitably would involve her conversations with a member of her Cabinet.

With respect to respondent Committees’ invocation of constitutional prescriptions regarding the right of
the people to information and public accountability and transparency, the Court finds nothing in these
arguments to support respondent Committees’ case.

There is no debate as to the importance of the constitutional right of the people to information and the
constitutional policies on public accountability and transparency. These are the twin postulates vital to the
effective functioning of a democratic government. The citizenry can become prey to the whims and
caprices of those to whom the power has been delegated if they are denied access to information. And
the policies on public accountability and democratic government would certainly be mere empty words if
access to such information of public concern is denied.

In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect to three (3) specific questions,
did not in any way curb the public’s right to information or diminish the importance of public accountability
and transparency.

This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation.
There is nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits respondent Committees from inquiring into the
NBN Project. They could continue the investigation and even call petitioner Neri to testify again. He
himself has repeatedly expressed his willingness to do so. Our Decision merely excludes from the scope
of respondents’ investigation the three (3) questions that elicit answers covered by executive privilege
and rules that petitioner cannot be compelled to appear before respondents to answer the said questions.
We have discussed the reasons why these answers are covered by executive privilege. That there is a
recognized public interest in the confidentiality of such information is a recognized principle in other
democratic States. To put it simply, the right to information is not an absolute right.

Indeed, the constitutional provisions cited by respondent Committees do not espouse an absolute right to
information. By their wording, the intention of the Framers to subject such right to the regulation of the law
is unmistakable. The highlighted portions of the following provisions show the obvious limitations on the
right to information, thus:

Article III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Article II, Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest. (Emphasis supplied)

In Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,40 it was stated that there are no specific
laws prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty
may be obliged. Nonetheless, it enumerated the recognized restrictions to such rights, among them: (1)
national security matters, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other
confidential information. National security matters include state secrets regarding military and diplomatic
matters, as well as information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and
executive agreements. It was further held that even where there is no need to protect such state
secrets, they must be "examined in strict confidence and given scrupulous protection."

Incidentally, the right primarily involved here is the right of respondent Committees to obtain information
allegedly in aid of legislation, not the people’s right to public information. This is the reason why we
stressed in the assailed Decision the distinction between these two rights. As laid down in Senate v.
Ermita, "the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does
not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress" and "neither does
the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials." As pointed
out, these rights belong to Congress, not to the individual citizen. It is worth mentioning at this juncture
that the parties here are respondent Committees and petitioner Neri and that there was no prior request
for information on the part of any individual citizen. This Court will not be swayed by attempts to blur the
distinctions between the Legislature's right to information in a legitimate legislative inquiry and the public's
right to information.
For clarity, it must be emphasized that the assailed Decision did not enjoin respondent
Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. All that is expected from them is to respect
matters that are covered by executive privilege.

III.

Respondent Committees Failed to Show That

the Communications Elicited by the Three Questions
Are Critical to the Exercise of their Functions

In their Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Committees devote an unusually lengthy discussion on
the purported legislative nature of their entire inquiry, as opposed to an oversight inquiry.

At the outset, it must be clarified that the Decision did not pass upon the nature of respondent
Committees’ inquiry into the NBN Project. To reiterate, this Court recognizes respondent Committees’
power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. However, this Court cannot uphold the view that
when a constitutionally guaranteed privilege or right is validly invoked by a witness in the course of a
legislative investigation, the legislative purpose of respondent Committees’ questions can be sufficiently
supported by the expedient of mentioning statutes and/or pending bills to which their inquiry as a whole
may have relevance. The jurisprudential test laid down by this Court in past decisions on executive
privilege is that the presumption of privilege can only be overturned by a showing of compelling
need for disclosure of the information covered by executive privilege.

In the Decision, the majority held that "there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority." In the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Committees argue that
the information elicited by the three (3) questions are necessary in the discharge of their legislative
functions, among them, (a) to consider the three (3) pending Senate Bills, and (b) to curb graft and
corruption.

We remain unpersuaded by respondents’ assertions.

In U.S. v. Nixon, the U.S. Court held that executive privilege is subject to balancing against other interests
and it is necessary to resolve the competing interests in a manner that would preserve the essential
functions of each branch. There, the Court weighed between presidential privilege and the legitimate
claims of the judicial process. In giving more weight to the latter, the Court ruled that the President's
generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending
criminal trial.

The Nixon Court ruled that an absolute and unqualified privilege would stand in the way of the primary
constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions. The said Court further
ratiocinated, through its ruling extensively quoted in the Honorable Chief Justice Puno's dissenting
opinion, as follows:

"... this presumptive privilege must be considered in light of our historic commitment to the rule of
law. This is nowhere more profoundly manifest than in our view that 'the twofold aim (of criminal
justice) is that guild shall not escape or innocence suffer.' Berger v. United States, 295 U.S., at
88, 55 S.Ct., at 633. We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in which
the parties contest all issues before a court of law. The need to develop all relevant facts in the
adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice
would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative
presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in
the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of
evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that
 compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the
prosecution or by the defense.

xxx xxx xxx

The right to the production of all evidence at a criminal trial similarly has constitutional
dimensions. The Sixth Amendment explicitly confers upon every defendant in a criminal trial
the right 'to be confronted with the witness against him' and 'to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.' Moreover, the Fifth Amendment also guarantees
that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law. It is the manifest
duty of the courts to vindicate those guarantees, and to accomplish that it is essential that all
relevant and admissible evidence be produced.

In this case we must weigh the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of
Presidential communications in performance of the President's responsibilities against the
inroads of such a privilege on the fair administration of criminal justice. (emphasis
supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

...the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal
trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the
basic function of the courts. A President's acknowledged need for confidentiality in the
communications of his office is general in nature, whereas the constitutional need for
production of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding is specific and central to the fair
adjudication of a particular criminal case in the administration of justice. Without access to
specific facts a criminal prosecution may be totally frustrated. The President's broad interest
in confidentiality of communication will not be vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of
conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on the pending criminal cases.

We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for
use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot
prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of
criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific
need for evidence in a pending criminal trial. (emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, we are not confronted with a court’s need for facts in order to adjudge liability in a
criminal case but rather with the Senate’s need for information in relation to its legislative functions. This
leads us to consider once again just how critical is the subject information in the discharge of respondent
Committees’ functions. The burden to show this is on the respondent Committees, since they seek to
intrude into the sphere of competence of the President in order to gather information which, according to
said respondents, would "aid" them in crafting legislation.

Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon 41 expounded on the nature of a
legislative inquiry in aid of legislation in this wise:

The sufficiency of the Committee's showing of need has come to depend, therefore, entirely on
whether the subpoenaed materials are critical to the performance of its legislative functions.
There is a clear difference between Congress' legislative tasks and the responsibility of a grand
jury, or any institution engaged in like functions. While fact-finding by a legislative committee
is undeniably a part of its task, legislative judgments normally depend more on the
predicted consequences of proposed legislative actions and their political acceptability,
than on precise reconstruction of past events; Congress frequently legislates on the basis of
conflicting information provided in its hearings. In contrast, the responsibility of the grand jury
 turns entirely on its ability to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that certain
named individuals did or did not commit specific crimes. If, for example, as in Nixon v. Sirica, one
of those crimes is perjury concerning the content of certain conversations, the grand jury's need
for the most precise evidence, the exact text of oral statements recorded in their original form, is
undeniable. We see no comparable need in the legislative process, at least not in the
circumstances of this case. Indeed, whatever force there might once have been in the
Committee's argument that the subpoenaed materials are necessary to its legislative judgments
has been substantially undermined by subsequent events. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the need for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot be equated with the compelling or
demonstratively critical and specific need for facts which is so essential to the judicial power to adjudicate
actual controversies. Also, the bare standard of "pertinency" set in Arnault cannot be lightly applied to the
instant case, which unlike Arnault involves a conflict between two (2) separate, co-equal and coordinate
Branches of the Government.

Whatever test we may apply, the starting point in resolving the conflicting claims between the Executive
and the Legislative Branches is the recognized existence of the presumptive presidential communications
privilege. This is conceded even in the Dissenting Opinion of the Honorable Chief Justice Puno, which
states:

A hard look at Senate v. Ermita ought to yield the conclusion that it bestowed a qualified
presumption in favor of the Presidential communications privilege. As shown in the previous
discussion, U.S. v. Nixon, as well as the other related Nixon cases Sirica and Senate Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, et al., v. Nixon in the D.C. Court of Appeals,
as well as subsequent cases all recognize that there is a presumptive privilege in favor of
Presidential communications. The Almonte case quoted U.S. v. Nixon and recognized a
presumption in favor of confidentiality of Presidential communications.

The presumption in favor of Presidential communications puts the burden on the respondent Senate
Committees to overturn the presumption by demonstrating their specific need for the information to be
elicited by the answers to the three (3) questions subject of this case, to enable them to craft legislation.
Here, there is simply a generalized assertion that the information is pertinent to the exercise of the power
to legislate and a broad and non-specific reference to pending Senate bills. It is not clear what matters
relating to these bills could not be determined without the said information sought by the three (3)
questions. As correctly pointed out by the Honorable Justice Dante O. Tinga in his Separate Concurring
Opinion:

…If respondents are operating under the premise that the president and/or her executive
officials have committed wrongdoings that need to be corrected or prevented from
recurring by remedial legislation, the answer to those three questions will not necessarily
bolster or inhibit respondents from proceeding with such legislation. They could easily
presume the worst of the president in enacting such legislation.

For sure, a factual basis for situations covered by bills is not critically needed before legislatives bodies
can come up with relevant legislation unlike in the adjudication of cases by courts of law. Interestingly,
during the Oral Argument before this Court, the counsel for respondent Committees impliedly admitted
that the Senate could still come up with legislations even without petitioner answering the three (3)
questions. In other words, the information being elicited is not so critical after all. Thus:

CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO

So can you tell the Court how critical are these questions to the lawmaking function of the
Senate. For instance, question Number 1 whether the President followed up the NBN
 project. According to the other counsel this question has already been asked, is that
correct?

ATTY. AGABIN

Well, the question has been asked but it was not answered, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO

Yes. But my question is how critical is this to the lawmaking function of the Senate?

ATTY. AGABIN

I believe it is critical, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO

Why?

ATTY. AGABIN

For instance, with respect to the proposed Bill of Senator Miriam Santiago, she would like
to indorse a Bill to include Executive Agreements had been used as a device to the
circumventing the Procurement Law.

CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO

But the question is just following it up.

ATTY. AGABIN

I believe that may be the initial question, Your Honor, because if we look at this problem
in its factual setting as counsel for petitioner has observed, there are intimations of a
bribery scandal involving high government officials.

CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO

Again, about the second question, were you dictated to prioritize this ZTE, is that critical
to the lawmaking function of the Senate? Will it result to the failure of the Senate to
cobble a Bill without this question?

ATTY. AGABIN

I think it is critical to lay the factual foundations for a proposed amendment to the
Procurement Law, Your Honor, because the petitioner had already testified that he was
offered a P200 Million bribe, so if he was offered a P200 Million bribe it is possible that
other government officials who had something to do with the approval of the contract
would be offered the same amount of bribes.

CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO

Again, that is speculative.

 ATTY. AGABIN

That is why they want to continue with the investigation, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO

How about the third question, whether the President said to go ahead and approve the
project after being told about the alleged bribe. How critical is that to the lawmaking
function of the Senate? And the question is may they craft a Bill a remedial law without
forcing petitioner Neri to answer this question?

ATTY. AGABIN

Well, they can craft it, Your Honor, based on mere speculation. And sound legislation
requires that a proposed Bill should have some basis in fact. 42

The failure of the counsel for respondent Committees to pinpoint the specific need for the information
sought or how the withholding of the information sought will hinder the accomplishment of their legislative
purpose is very evident in the above oral exchanges. Due to the failure of the respondent Committees to
successfully discharge this burden, the presumption in favor of confidentiality of presidential
communication stands. The implication of the said presumption, like any other, is to dispense with the
burden of proof as to whether the disclosure will significantly impair the President’s performance of her
function. Needless to state this is assumed, by virtue of the presumption.

Anent respondent Committees’ bewailing that they would have to "speculate" regarding the questions
covered by the privilege, this does not evince a compelling need for the information sought.
Indeed, Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon 43 held that while fact-
finding by a legislative committee is undeniably a part of its task, legislative judgments normally depend
more on the predicted consequences of proposed legislative actions and their political acceptability than
on a precise reconstruction of past events. It added that, normally, Congress legislates on the basis of
conflicting information provided in its hearings. We cannot subscribe to the respondent Committees’ self-
defeating proposition that without the answers to the three (3) questions objected to as privileged, the
distinguished members of the respondent Committees cannot intelligently craft legislation.

Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it must be stressed that respondent Committees’ need for
information in the exercise of this function is not as compelling as in instances when the purpose of the
inquiry is legislative in nature. This is because curbing graft and corruption is merely an oversight function
of Congress.44 And if this is the primary objective of respondent Committees in asking the three (3)
questions covered by privilege, it may even contradict their claim that their purpose is legislative in nature
and not oversight. In any event, whether or not investigating graft and corruption is a legislative or
oversight function of Congress, respondent Committees’ investigation cannot transgress bounds set by
the Constitution.

In Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,45 this Court ruled:

The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under
the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "the political question doctrine neither
interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit
constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation
mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with the
applicability of the principle in appropriate cases.46 (Emphasis supplied)
There, the Court further ratiocinated that "the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not
really ‘in aid of legislation’ because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress,
since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr.
Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of R.A. No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a
matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the
Legislature."47 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3) questions is to trace the alleged bribery to the Office of
the President.48While it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the potential culpability of high
government officials, including the President, in a given government transaction, it is simply not a task for
the Senate to perform. The role of the Legislature is to make laws, not to determine anyone’s guilt of a
crime or wrongdoing. Our Constitution has not bestowed upon the Legislature the latter role. Just as the
Judiciary cannot legislate, neither can the Legislature adjudicate or prosecute.

Respondent Committees claim that they are conducting an inquiry in aid of legislation and a "search for
truth," which in respondent Committees’ view appears to be equated with the search for persons
responsible for "anomalies" in government contracts.

No matter how noble the intentions of respondent Committees are, they cannot assume the power
reposed upon our prosecutorial bodies and courts. The determination of who is/are liable for a crime or
illegal activity, the investigation of the role played by each official, the determination of who should be
haled to court for prosecution and the task of coming up with conclusions and finding of facts regarding
anomalies, especially the determination of criminal guilt, are not functions of the Senate. Congress is
neither a law enforcement nor a trial agency. Moreover, it bears stressing that no inquiry is an end in
itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress, i.e. legislation.
Investigations conducted solely to gather incriminatory evidence and "punish" those investigated are
indefensible. There is no Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure. 49 In this regard, the
pronouncement in Barenblatt v. United States50 is instructive, thus:

Broad as it is, the power is not, however, without limitations. Since Congress may only
investigate into the areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into
matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of the government.
Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into matters that are exclusively
the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it supplant the Executive in what exclusively belongs to
the Executive. (Emphasis supplied.)

At this juncture, it is important to stress that complaints relating to the NBN Project have already been
filed against President Arroyo and other personalities before the Office of the Ombudsman. Under our
Constitution, it is the Ombudsman who has the duty "to investigate any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient."51 The Office of the Ombudsman is the body properly equipped by the
Constitution and our laws to preliminarily determine whether or not the allegations of anomaly are true
and who are liable therefor. The same holds true for our courts upon which the Constitution reposes the
duty to determine criminal guilt with finality. Indeed, the rules of procedure in the Office of the
Ombudsman and the courts are well-defined and ensure that the constitutionally guaranteed rights
of all persons, parties and witnesses alike, are protected and safeguarded.

Should respondent Committees uncover information related to a possible crime in the course of their
investigation, they have the constitutional duty to refer the matter to the appropriate agency or branch of
government. Thus, the Legislature’s need for information in an investigation of graft and corruption cannot
be deemed compelling enough to pierce the confidentiality of information validly covered by executive
privilege. As discussed above, the Legislature can still legislate on graft and corruption even without the
information covered by the three (3) questions subject of the petition.
Corollarily, respondent Committees justify their rejection of petitioner’s claim of executive privilege on the
ground that there is no privilege when the information sought might involve a crime or illegal
activity, despite the absence of an administrative or judicial determination to that effect.
Significantly, however, in Nixon v. Sirica,52 the showing required to overcome the presumption favoring
confidentiality turned, not on the nature of the presidential conduct that the subpoenaed material
might reveal, but, instead, on the nature and appropriateness of the function in the performance of
which the material was sought, and the degree to which the material was necessary to its
fulfillment.

Respondent Committees assert that Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v.
Nixon does not apply to the case at bar because, unlike in the said case, no impeachment proceeding
has been initiated at present. The Court is not persuaded. While it is true that no impeachment
proceeding has been initiated, however, complaints relating to the NBN Project have already been filed
against President Arroyo and other personalities before the Office of the Ombudsman. As the Court has
said earlier, the prosecutorial and judicial arms of government are the bodies equipped and mandated by
the Constitution and our laws to determine whether or not the allegations of anomaly in the NBN Project
are true and, if so, who should be prosecuted and penalized for criminal conduct.

Legislative inquiries, unlike court proceedings, are not subject to the exacting standards of evidence
essential to arrive at accurate factual findings to which to apply the law. Hence, Section 10 of the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that "technical rules of evidence
applicable to judicial proceedings which do not affect substantive rights need not be observed by the
Committee." Court rules which prohibit leading, hypothetical, or repetitive questions or questions calling
for a hearsay answer, to name a few, do not apply to a legislative inquiry. Every person, from the highest
public official to the most ordinary citizen, has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in
proper proceedings by a competent court or body.

IV

Respondent Committees Committed Grave

Abuse of Discretion in Issuing the Contempt Order

Respondent Committees insist that they did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt
order because (1) there is no legitimate claim of executive privilege; (2) they did not violate the
requirements laid down in Senate v. Ermita; (3) they issued the contempt order in accordance with their
internal Rules; (4) they did not violate the requirement under Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution
requiring the publication of their Rules; and (5) their issuance of the contempt order is not arbitrary or
precipitate.

We reaffirm our earlier ruling.

The legitimacy of the claim of executive privilege having been fully discussed in the preceding pages, we
see no reason to discuss it once again.

Respondent Committees’ second argument rests on the view that the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, requiring
invitations or subpoenas to contain the "possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry"
along with the "usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance
thereof" is not provided for by the Constitution and is merely an obiter dictum.

On the contrary, the Court sees the rationale and necessity of compliance with these requirements.

An unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an unchecked Executive, generates its own
abuses. Consequently, claims that the investigative power of Congress has been abused (or has the
potential for abuse) have been raised many times.53 Constant exposure to congressional subpoena takes
its toll on the ability of the Executive to function effectively. The requirements set forth in Senate v.
Ermita are modest mechanisms that would not unduly limit Congress’ power. The legislative inquiry must
be confined to permissible areas and thus, prevent the "roving commissions" referred to in the U.S.
case, Kilbourn v. Thompson.54 Likewise, witnesses have their constitutional right to due process. They
should be adequately informed what matters are to be covered by the inquiry. It will also allow them to
prepare the pertinent information and documents. To our mind, these requirements concede too little
political costs or burdens on the part of Congress when viewed vis-à-vis the immensity of its power of
inquiry. The logic of these requirements is well articulated in the study conducted by William P.
Marshall,55 to wit:

A second concern that might be addressed is that the current system allows committees to
continually investigate the Executive without constraint. One process solution addressing this
concern is to require each investigation be tied to a clearly stated purpose. At present, the
charters of some congressional committees are so broad that virtually any matter involving the
Executive can be construed to fall within their province. Accordingly, investigations can proceed
without articulation of specific need or purpose. A requirement for a more precise charge in order
to begin an inquiry should immediately work to limit the initial scope of the investigation and
should also serve to contain the investigation once it is instituted. Additionally, to the extent
clear statements of rules cause legislatures to pause and seriously consider the
constitutional implications of proposed courses of action in other areas, they would serve
that goal in the context of congressional investigations as well.

The key to this reform is in its details. A system that allows a standing committee to
simply articulate its reasons to investigate pro forma does no more than imposes minimal
drafting burdens. Rather, the system must be designed in a manner that imposes actual
burdens on the committee to articulate its need for investigation and allows for meaningful
debate about the merits of proceeding with the investigation.(Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, petitioner’s request to be furnished an advance copy of questions is a reasonable demand that
should have been granted by respondent Committees.

Unfortunately, the Subpoena Ad Testificandum dated November 13, 2007 made no specific reference to
any pending Senate bill. It did not also inform petitioner of the questions to be asked. As it were, the
subpoena merely commanded him to "testify on what he knows relative to the subject matter under
inquiry."

Anent the third argument, respondent Committees contend that their Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (the "Rules") are beyond the reach of this Court. While it is true that this
Court must refrain from reviewing the internal processes of Congress, as a co-equal branch of
government, however, when a constitutional requirement exists, the Court has the duty to look into
Congress’ compliance therewith. We cannot turn a blind eye to possible violations of the Constitution
simply out of courtesy. In this regard, the pronouncement in Arroyo v. De Venecia56 is enlightening, thus:

"Cases both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to
inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own
rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the
rights of private individuals.

United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., the rule was stated thus: ‘The Constitution empowers each
House to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between
the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought
to be attained."
In the present case, the Court’s exercise of its power of judicial review is warranted because there
appears to be a clear abuse of the power of contempt on the part of respondent Committees. Section 18
of the Rules provides that:

"The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may punish for contempt any witness
before it who disobey any order of the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to testify or to answer
proper questions by the Committee or any of its members." (Emphasis supplied)

In the assailed Decision, we said that there is a cloud of doubt as to the validity of the contempt order
because during the deliberation of the three (3) respondent Committees, only seven (7) Senators were
present. This number could hardly fulfill the majority requirement needed by respondent Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations which has a membership of seventeen (17) Senators
and respondent Committee on National Defense and Security which has a membership of eighteen (18)
Senators. With respect to respondent Committee on Trade and Commerce which has a membership of
nine (9) Senators, only three (3) members were present.57 These facts prompted us to quote in the
Decision the exchanges between Senators Alan Peter Cayetano and Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. whereby the
former raised the issue of lack of the required majority to deliberate and vote on the contempt order.

When asked about such voting during the March 4, 2008 hearing before this Court, Senator Francis
Pangilinan stated that any defect in the committee voting had been cured because two-thirds of the
Senators effectively signed for the Senate in plenary session.58

Obviously the deliberation of the respondent Committees that led to the issuance of the contempt order is
flawed. Instead of being submitted to a full debate by all the members of the respondent Committees, the
contempt order was prepared and thereafter presented to the other members for signing. As a result, the
contempt order which was issued on January 30, 2008 was not a faithful representation of the
proceedings that took place on said date. Records clearly show that not all of those who signed the
contempt order were present during the January 30, 2008 deliberation when the matter was taken up.

Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The
rights of person appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis
supplied)

All the limitations embodied in the foregoing provision form part of the witness’ settled expectation. If the
limitations are not observed, the witness’ settled expectation is shattered. Here, how could there be a
majority vote when the members in attendance are not enough to arrive at such majority? Petitioner has
the right to expect that he can be cited in contempt only through a majority vote in a proceeding in which
the matter has been fully deliberated upon. There is a greater measure of protection for the witness when
the concerns and objections of the members are fully articulated in such proceeding. We do not believe
that respondent Committees have the discretion to set aside their rules anytime they wish. This is
especially true here where what is involved is the contempt power. It must be stressed that the Rules are
not promulgated for their benefit. More than anybody else, it is the witness who has the highest stake in
the proper observance of the Rules.

Having touched the subject of the Rules, we now proceed to respondent Committees’ fourth argument.
Respondent Committees argue that the Senate does not have to publish its Rules because the same was
published in 1995 and in 2006. Further, they claim that the Senate is a continuing body; thus, it is not
required to republish the Rules, unless the same is repealed or amended.

On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly,
there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing", as it is not dissolved as an entity with
each national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-
day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the
Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states:

RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS

SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in
the same status.

All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1)
Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first time.
(emphasis supplied)

Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e. unpassed bills and even
legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the
expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up
such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and
practicality of such a rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress
(which will typically have a different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound
by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body
even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be deemed terminated with
the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course, continue into the next Congress with the
same status.

This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the opposite nature of the conduct
of its business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senate’s main rules of
procedure) states:

RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES

SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the preceding elections
shall begin their term of office, the President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee
for amendment or revision.

The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented at least one
day before its consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators present in the session
shall be required for its approval. (emphasis supplied)

RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT

SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall remain in force
until they are amended or repealed. (emphasis supplied)

Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition of the Senate
after an election and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of each session
in which the newly elected Senators shall begin their term.

However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are intended to be valid from the
date of their adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from
the Rules. The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two
(2) newspapers of general circulation."59 The latter does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity
of such rules until they are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets
of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the
next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative
inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business.

The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in
accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate
to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules
clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or
repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.

If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in the
next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding
effectivity.

Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or proceedings
conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in violation of the rights
of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to
protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such
violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective.

Respondent Committees’ last argument is that their issuance of the contempt order is not precipitate or
arbitrary. Taking into account the totality of circumstances, we find no merit in their argument.

As we have stressed before, petitioner is not an unwilling witness, and contrary to the assertion of
respondent Committees, petitioner did not assume that they no longer had any other questions for him.
He repeatedly manifested his willingness to attend subsequent hearings and respond to new matters. His
only request was that he be furnished a copy of the new questions in advance to enable him to
adequately prepare as a resource person. He did not attend the November 20, 2007 hearing because
Executive Secretary Ermita requested respondent Committees to dispense with his testimony on the
ground of executive privilege. Note that petitioner is an executive official under the direct control and
supervision of the Chief Executive. Why punish petitioner for contempt when he was merely directed by
his superior? Besides, save for the three (3) questions, he was very cooperative during the September
26, 2007 hearing.

On the part of respondent Committees, this Court observes their haste and impatience. Instead of ruling
on Executive Secretary Ermita’s claim of executive privilege, they curtly dismissed it as unsatisfactory and
ordered the arrest of petitioner. They could have informed petitioner of their ruling and given him time to
decide whether to accede or file a motion for reconsideration. After all, he is not just an ordinary witness;
he is a high- ranking official in a co-equal branch of government. He is an alter ego of the President. The
same haste and impatience marked the issuance of the contempt order, despite the absence of the
majority of the members of the respondent Committees, and their subsequent disregard of petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration alleging the pendency of his petition for certiorari before this Court.

On a concluding note, we are not unmindful of the fact that the Executive and the Legislature are political
branches of government. In a free and democratic society, the interests of these branches inevitably
clash, but each must treat the other with official courtesy and respect. This Court wholeheartedly concurs
with the proposition that it is imperative for the continued health of our democratic institutions that we
preserve the constitutionally mandated checks and balances among the different branches of
government.

In the present case, it is respondent Committees’ contention that their determination on the validity of
executive privilege should be binding on the Executive and the Courts. It is their assertion
that their internal procedures and deliberations cannot be inquired into by this Court supposedly in
accordance with the principle of respect between co-equal branches of government. Interestingly, it is a
courtesy that they appear to be unwilling to extend to the Executive (on the matter of executive privilege)
or this Court (on the matter of judicial review). It moves this Court to wonder: In respondent Committees’
paradigm of checks and balances, what are the checks to the Legislature’s all-encompassing, awesome
power of investigation? It is a power, like any other, that is susceptible to grave abuse.

While this Court finds laudable the respondent Committees’ well-intentioned efforts to ferret out
corruption, even in the highest echelons of government, such lofty intentions do not validate or accord to
Congress powers denied to it by the Constitution and granted instead to the other branches of
government.

There is no question that any story of government malfeasance deserves an inquiry into its veracity. As
respondent Committees contend, this is founded on the constitutional command of transparency and
public accountability. The recent clamor for a "search for truth" by the general public, the religious
community and the academe is an indication of a concerned citizenry, a nation that demands an
accounting of an entrusted power. However, the best venue for this noble undertaking is not in the
political branches of government. The customary partisanship and the absence of generally accepted
rules on evidence are too great an obstacle in arriving at the truth or achieving justice that meets the test
of the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. We believe the people deserve a more exacting
"search for truth" than the process here in question, if that is its objective.

WHEREFORE, respondent Committees’ Motion for Reconsideration dated April 8, 2008 is

hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.