STATCON NOTES

I. Validity, effect and operation of statues, nature and purpose of construction, power to
construe and its limitations

Law
- is a set of rules on conduct, promulgated by a competent authority and is binding.
- Authority must have right to promulgate and enforce.
- Comes from the reasonable conduct of humanity
- Presumption of reasonableness. That makers of law had good reason, and in enacting
said law, desired that justice and rights shall prevail

Kinds of Law
1. Mandatory
2. Prohibitory
3. Permissive

There should be a philosophy behind the interpretation of law. This is based on the nature and
purpose of law.

Purpose of law is the common good

Law is by nature reactionary.

Laws can only be effective if they arise from people’s experience.

Laws = general term for all legislation (statues, case law, e.o.s)

Statutes
- What comes out of the legislature
- CONVENTIONAL LEGSILATION

Law must reflect what the people believe is good for them. Constitution identifies certain
principles and policies to serve as guiding principles for legislature i.e. no laws in violation of
BOR, ex post facto law, no laws that violate due process

Any law repugnant to the Constitution. Whether or not law is valid is based on repugnancy to
constitution. Invalidity of such law must be declared by the Court. Only judiciary has this
power. Even lower courts can declare rule unconstitutional, but most times SC does it. Unless
challenged, the law is presumed valid. Complainant must specifically point out what principle is
in contravention to the Constitution. Court is very hesitant to rule law as unconstitutional. They
would prefer to rule on the controversy without declaring law unconstitutional they will. This is
due to separation of powers.

Law is presumed constitutional. Founded on principle of separation of powers

2 instances where Court did not invalidate law but refused to apply it on principle that
legislators intended right and justice to prevail. Court found in these instances, applying law
under circumstances of facts of case, would lead to injustice.

When law is declared null on unconstitutional grounds, it is as if it never existed. However,

everything that happened before the declaration of nullity is not necessarily wiped away.
Vested rights cannot be taken away.

Sometimes laws are declared invalid, not always due to unconstitutionality, but because the
need for them has expired. For examples, emergency legislation.

Laws can also be declared partially invalid. Like RH law.

Unless otherwise provided, statute is valid 15 days after publication in Official Gazette or any
newspaper of general circulation. If there is conflict between newspaper and OG, OG will be
favored.

Interpretation = Intrinsic to the language of the statute. What does it say? Interpret according
to the plain meaning of the words that have been used. Derived from four corners of Statute:
(1) title; (2) language; (3) punctuation marks; (4) headings

Construction = When the meaning cannot be discerned from the actual words and language
used in the statute. Extrinsic aids are now needed. This is Construction. Construction is the art
or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the
law with the purpose of applying it to cases. Only construe when intention of legislatures is
doubtful. If there is no doubt as to its meaning, just apply the law. Most important element is
legislative intent. Where there is ambiguity it is assumed that right and justice should prevail.
Guided by certain criteria: (1) What is the policy that the law seeks to implement; (2) Purpose
of the law, good that law is seeking to promote, or evil or mischief that it wants to eradicate
or minimize; (3) Consequences, when several interpretations can be given the court shall
choose the interpretation that will best serve the purpose of the law, choose which is more
just and avoid that which will cause injustice; (4) Court must keep in mind existing legal
presumptions, always presume law is valid; (5) prospectivity of laws

Black Letter vs Spirit

- Black letter is black and white, what the law says
- Spirit is the intention, purpose, and reason behind the law.
- There is still spirit in black letter. It is possible that black letter already contains spirit. It
is only when doubtful that you go to other sources
- Philosophers say spirit is more important than letter

Judicial review
- Power of judiciary to construe and interpret the law
 - Cannot be overturned by other branches
- Intepreations become part of the law
- Not unlimited.
- Plain meaning rule Cannot interpret when law is clear or Verba legis. Built on premise
that words employed by legislature correctly express its intention. Speech is the index of
intention. Verba Legis Non Est Residentum = from the words of the law there should be
no departure
- When court declares something unconstitutional, they are barred from revising said
legislation

II. Presumption of Validity

Morfe v Mutuc
- Requiring public officials to submit SALN is not unconstitutional because it is the job of
the government to protect people from corruption. This is in pursuit of the common
good.
- Is requirement to submit SALN is unconstitutional because it violates due process? 2
requisites. Substantive and Procedural. Substantive = valid law that requires or prohibits
you from doing something. Procedural = (1) notice; and (2) hearing. Right to know what
you’re being accused of and having your day in court.
- Cannot be denied of life, liberty and property without due process
- No violation of substantive due process as long as statute is valid and constitutional
- Validity of government acts is subject to stricter standards when it involves the person
or the conscience of the mind of the persons. Stricter on freedom of speech, life, and
liberty. Less strict in terms of property.

Salas v Jarencio
- It must be clearly shown that what the Constitution prohibits, the statute allows.

IBP v Zamora
- W/N law violates the principle in the Constitution of Civil Supremacy
- President’s discretion to call on services of AFP is not confined to emergencies. Can help
with other things as long as it’s to keep the peace
- It was clear in the instruction that AFP would be under the PNP
- PNP = peace keeping. AFP = warfare
- Parameters are clear. AFP cannot act without clearance of PNP
- Acts of executive are presumed valid
Estrada v Sandiganbayan
- Void for (1) vagueness, (2) abolishes quantum for evidence in proving guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, and (3) mens ria = criminal intent
- Void for vagueness doctrine exists because it violates due process. Substantive due
process particularly. How can one violate the law if they are incapable of
understanding it
- Law can only be void for vagueness if a man or woman of common knowledge cannot
understand it
- Imprecise language does not automatically void a law under the void for vagueness
doctrine. In this case the court used extrinsic aid to find the definition of the words they
needed.

III. Power to construe laws and its limitations

- This power belongs to the judiciary only
- Only SC can overturn its decisions
- Has limitations: (1) can only construe when there is ambiguity (verba legis); (2) it
cannot add or subtract from laws. Cannot amend laws and only suggest; (3)
declaration of nullity of law cannot affect vested rights. No retroactive effect insofar
as they impair vested rights.

Endencia v David
- Only judiciary can interpret or overturn its own interpretations. Congress and Executive
cannot.

Angara v Electoral Commission

- Judicial review doesn’t put the judiciary above the other branches. Only the judiciary
can have jurisdiction over a conflict between constitutional organs
- The intent and purpose of the Constitution is to make the Electoral Commission
independent from the National Assembly.

IV. Aids to Construction: Intrinsic Aids

Ebarle v Sucaldito
- Non-compliance with E.O. 264
- Whether or not E.O. 264 is applicable to the petitioner
- E.O. 264 refers to the administrative procedures that should be exhausted before
proceeding to criminal action
- Had E.O. 264 wanted to apply to criminal actions they would have used terms such as
“convicted” and “acquitted” which are terms associated with criminal proceedings
- Since above ^^ words weren’t used it does not refer to criminal cases. Words are
important in construing the law (duh)
- Penalties prescribed in laws promulgated by the President cannot be criminal in nature.
Parts of a Statute
1. Title
- Can only have one title
- Bill must only have one subject and that subject must be expressed in the Title
- Anything in the law foreign to the Title is not part of said law. Struck down as
unconstitutional

Commissioner v Relunia
- This case is the exception to above ^^ rule
- Whether or not Philippine navy need submit manifest upon arrival
- Notwithstanding the use of the term “engaged in foreign trade” in the title. The RAC is a
voluminous enactment of congress. RAC applies to all activities of executive branch. One
of the books of the RAC refers to customs. One of the provisions requires the
submission of manifest for all vessels engaged in foreign trade. However, upon reading
and construing the text as well as the intent, the conclusion can be arrived to that the
term vessels “engaged in foreign trade”, refers to all vessesl that come from foreign
ports whether owned by government or not. If law is interpretd in the former manner,
any ship owned by government not technically engaged in foreign trade need not
submit manifest. This makes it too easy for government ships to smuggle. This cannot
have been the intent of the lawmakers.

Preamble is not an essential part of a law. Many laws do not have preamble. Preamble is
commonly used for controversial laws, or laws that are perceived to have no value. Preamble
formerly known as “whereas clauses”.

People v Purisima
- Body of P.D. 9 made it unlawful to carry blunt and sharp objects outside of your
residence if it has nothing to do with the source of your livelihood
- Preamble says that it is in line with P.D. 1081 and other laws that had for its object the
suppression of rebellion, sedition, and insurrection and other lawless violence. Petition
against Purisima for P.D. 9. Does P.D. 9 apply to Purisima? No. No evidence in the case
that Purisma and co. were going to use the weapons for rebellion, sedition, insurrection
and other lawless violence. AG says preamble shouldn’t be considered because it is not
really a part of the law. SC said no because preamble gives intent of legislation.
Preamble says P.D. 9 against crimes of rebellion, sedition and lawless violence.
Whatever is within the spirit of the law is within the law. Preamble is not strictly part of
statute, when statue is ambiguous preamble can be resorted to.
 2. Text Itself
- Words, phrases, sentences, clauses, TAKEN AS A WHOLE and IN RELATION TO EACH
OTHER. Cannot take one line out of context

Municipality of Nueva Era v Municipality of Marcos

- Territorial dispute.
- What is not expressed is intended to be excluded. When legislators makes specific
enumerations they do so because they want to confine and limit the statute to the
enumeration already made.
- Since certain parts were not included in the territory of Marcos then that was the
intention.
- Ambiguity of the one part of the statue in section 2 which defined boundaries was saved
by the clear language in section 1.
- When the legislation intends to omit something then that is their intention.
- Law must be given a reasonable interpretation to avoid absurdity. Municipality of
Marcos just used one section to interpret the law in such a way that allowed them more
territory. That cannot be done. Law must be interpreted as a whole.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v TMX Sales

- What is interpreted is word “payment”. CIR says you have to pay every quarter. File
returns every quarter whether you earn something or not. When does 2 year
prescription period for claiming refund start? Is it from first payment or final payment?
Section 292 which gives the period was interpreted in relation to Section 321 which
requires corporations to have an annual audit at the end of its fiscal year.
- SC agreed with CTA that you cannot determine how much taxes you are supposed to
pay during the year if you do not have the annual audit reported. So logically, since you
cannot take Section 292 separately from the other periods of the tax code, payment
refers to final payment after the final assessment of the taxes you need to pay.

Blay v Bana
- A rule says that if there is such a counter claim dismissal shall be limited to the
complaint. The court, based on this rule, said that the counter claim can proceed. The
dismissal of the complaint shall be without prejudice to the filing of a separate
counterclaim in a separate action. This means that the complaint has been dismissed,
the counterclaim can be instituted again by the defendant in a separate action. Where
does the adjudication of the counter claim take place? Separate action or same action?
Ruling is a separate action. If it is not within the 15 days of notice of dismissal of the
complaint or motion to dismiss, Bana can only adjudicate in a separate action, not in the
same action. RTC and CA did not read until the third paragraph. This case is confusing.
Moral of the story is read the whole section and text. Take it as a whole
 3. Punctuation marks
- Very low value. When there is no controversy, courts typically ignore punctuation parks
- Unless provision cannot be interpreted without the punctuation mark
- Issues in punctuation marks usually come from commas

Aquino III v Comelec

- Whether or not 250,000 is a controlling factor in creating a new legislative district for a
province
- The comma “a city with a population of at least 250,000, or province” meant that the
250,000 requirement is only for cities not provinces

Atong Paglaum v Comelec

- National, regional, and sectoral parties. Only sectoral parties can represent the
marginalized and underrepresented. National and regional parties need not represent
the marginalized and underrepresented.
- Court looked at punctuation marks “national, regional, sectoral…”

Capitalization is given the same valuation as punctuation marks. Typically ignored unless there
is controversy.

In re Johnson
- 2 issues. Citizenship and residence. No question as to Johnson’s U.S. citizenship and that
when he died, he was a resident of the Philippines. The question is in regard to wills
made by aliens here in the Philippines. Alien is free to make a will based on Philippine
law but he can still make one under his laws. As long as it is valid under his country’s
laws then it can be probated here. Johnson’s daughter said that he is not an alien since
the “state” in the section is not capitalized it cannot include the United States. SC says it
applies to all states other than the Philippines.

4. Headings
- Headnotes or epigraphs do not have the same value as the title. Can still be considered
though in determining the meaning of vague or ambiguous sections that they cover.

V. Aids to Construction: Extrinsic Aids

- Something that is outside the 4 corners of the statute

1. Intent and spirit of the law

- Has many sources
- They look at policy the law is seeking to implement, purpose of the law (look at social
and political situation), and the consequence of interpreting the law in such a manner.
Interpretation that will promote justice and right is preferred.
 - Certain legal presumptions such as constitutionality are also adhered to

City of Baguio v Marcos

- After 40 years can no longer reopen a case.
- Conflict in the title that says “rendered decision” and Section 1 which says “decision that
was instituted”. This is off because while decisions are rendered, it is judicial
proceedings that are instituted. Issue is whether or not the 40 year period starts after
the decision or upon initiation of judicial proceedings.
- Looking at the spirit of the law, the time being referred to is the after the rendering of
decision. Therefore, the case can be reopened.
- Court said that the title is controlling (intrinsic aid). Title contained the spirit of the law.
Title is a source of legislative intent.
- Court also looked at consequence of taking title as more valid expression of legislative
intent, rather than Section 1. Because at the point of instituting judicial proceedings,
you have no idea how the case will end. It is simply more logical to peg the prescriptive
period after the rendering of a decision, not during the proceedings or at the outset of
institution of proceedings
- They used logic and gave more value to the title

Central Capiz v Ramirez

- Happened in the 1920s. During the time, there was no constitutional prohibition against
foreigners acquiring real property. A law was passed requiring foreigners and
corporations that do not comply with the 61% Filipino ownership cannot own lands of
public domain. Private respondent was scared that her lands would be taken away
because it did not comply with this. However, her land is of private domain. The law
does not refer to her land, only lands of public domain. Prosecution tried to argue that
the phrase “as for other purposes” located in the title, allows for the inclusion of the
lands owned by the private petitioner. SC said “as for other purposes” is meaningless.
Matters not included in the purview of the law cannot be included in it. Law clearly only
referred to lands of public domain because had the law referred to lands of private
domain it would have been declared unconstitutional at the time

People v Echaves
- Ejusdem Generis = of the same kind. According to SC, This is merely a tool of statutory
construction and only resorted to when legislative intent is the concern.
- Whether or not PD 772 applies to the land in question
- Only 2 kinds of land in Philippines: agricultural and non-agricultural. However, the point
in the case is location of the land.
- PD 772 is for squatting in urban communities. Directed to letter of instruction directing
local government units to clear away structures created through squatting as well as
another letter of instruction talking about how illegal constructions were becoming a
problem.
 - Through looking at the preamble of PD 772 it can be concluded that only urban
communities are being referred to. Not rural which is the brand of the land in question.
The land in question was a pastoral land.

2. Legislative History
- All antecedents (everything that happened from conception of law to enactment, all
bills filed on the same subject) are included as well as prior laws if it is an amending or
repealing law. Why it was changed? Why something was omitted?
- If law was adopted or borrowed from a foreign jurisdiction, the foreign law becomes
part of its legislative history as well as decisions rendered based on said foreign law.
- Consideration of historical, political, social and economic conditions of the country at
the time of enactment are a part of the history.

City of Baguio v Marcos

- Court raised the predecessor law of RA 931 which had the same title and the same
language. The court noted that if the legislators had intended what was in the text, they
had the opportunity to correct the title in the old law, they would have changed it when
they amended it. They did not. This means that the title is what they intended it to be.

Central Capiz v Ramirez

- Court noted that in Section 2 of the law, it exempted what was known at the time as
“friar lands” and laws held by government in its patrimonial capacity. The law which was
a public land act, exempted these friar lands because they were private lands. So clearly,
the act did not mean to include private lands.

People v Enchavez
- Court noted the social and economic situation described in the preamble. Where illegal
construction was becoming rampant in public and private properties in urban areas

Agcaqoili v Suguitan
- Judge was 65 and being told to retire. He didn’t want to. Law said that he is supposed to
retire when he was 65. Judge says it does not apply to him because it was not the law in
effect at the time he was appointed. Law at the time of the appointment says that as
long as he maintains “good behavior” he can stay in office.
- Is provision telling Justices to retire at 65 valid? This is not valid because upon looking at
the title of the Act it does not say anything about the appointment or retirement of
Justices. They also says that law cannot apply retroactively to Justice Agcaoili

Florentino V PNB
- Petitioners owe money to PNB. They offered to pay through “backpay certificates”
issued by RP using a law that says they are allowed to do so. This law was enacted after
the Japanese occupation. Government could not give cash so backpay certificates were
given.
 - Whether or not PNB can be compelled to accept the backpay certificates as a mode of
payment.
- SC ruled that paying through backpay certificates cannot apply to private corporations
because it would be unconstitutional. It would impair the obligations of contracts.
Looking at the language also private citizens and corporations were government owned
and controlled corporations were separated via comma. Meaning that private citizens
and corporations cannt be compelled. Congress also went into history on why backpay
certificates must be honored by the government and why private citizens and
corporations cannot be compelled to. Some soldiers and guerillas who served during the
time of the Japanese occupation could not be paid through cash and were given
backpay certificates. Therefore, government MUST honor the backpay certificates in
recognition of the service they have rendered. At the time, PNB was government owned
and controlled and must accept such certificates.

Kare v Platon
- Petitioner contends that he has the right to choose between giving personal bond or
cash deposit. While respondent judge says court shall be the one to require which one
he will give. Caption of law says “bond or cash deposit required” so it is confusing
- Upon examining provisions it says the bond shall be fixed by the court but not that it can
fix the cash deposit. Deposit of cash is in the discretion of the person filing the election
contest. Whether or not court can fix the cash deposit
- Court looked into the history of the provision stating that court cannot require cash
bond, only personal bond. However, order given by the court said cash bond but they
actually meant cash deposit. Judge is within his authority acquire cash deposit. Election
contests are very expensive and expenses need be defrayed. Therefore whoever brings
the election contest needs to pay for it.

3. Contemporary Construction

- Interpretation of law made by administrative agencies in charge of implementation of

a law. Kind of interpretation made by these agencies are accorded great respect by the
courts. Will not be overturned unless obviously erroneous. If can be upheld it will. Based
on presumption that these officials in the agencies have acquired an accumulated
expertise in the particular subject.

AFP General Insurance Corp v Molina

- 2 laws in question. Insurance code and labor code. There is a conflict in the insurance
code in application with the labor code. In the labor code, the perfection of an appeal
happens only when you post a supersedeas bond guaranteed by a surety. Under
insurance code non-payment of premium and installments thereof cancels the
insurance policy or the surety. The employer who appealed and filed the supersedeas
bond does not pay the premium then the insurance would be canceled. This is in conflict
with the NLRC rule that says that once it is filed, the supersedeas bond subsists until the
end of litigation. Since this is a labor dispute, the court said that the insurance code is
 not applicable. What is applicable is the NLRC rule because it is a contemporaneous
construction of the labor code.
- Principle that interpretation that will lead to right and justice should prevail

Nestle Philippines v CA
- Nestle seeking exemption from reportorial and payment of fees requirements under
Section 6 of some code. Section 6 of said code allows for exemption only when there is
an increase in capital stock. The phrase “increase in capital stock” is ambiguous. The SC
ruled that the exemption applies only to increase capital stock when you add new
shares. That is when you are exempted from the reportorial and payment of fees
requirements. Not when shares that have already been issued and approved in the past
are being issued again or are just reissuing stock. This was the contemporaneous
construction of the SEC under their rules that the court gave great credence to. Nestle
was seeking exemption for the one that isn’t allowed. SC said that it should be like this
for the protection of the investing public. Court said that public will be protected that
SEC requires that they show their previous financial statements so investors will be
warry. Investors would think there is increase in capitalization when they could just be
issuing previously authorized shares.

Energy Regulatory Board v CA

- Two agencies tasked with implementing oil regulations. When one of the agencies was
still existing, the rule was regulation. Part of regulation is study of market forces. If area
is saturated and there are too many people digging then they will, at such a time,
regulate the industry. However, when the former agency was succeeded by the
succeeding agency as the regulatory agency, it was shown that the market forces had
changed. The area developed, populous and traffic became more voluminous. The
policy of the state also changed from regulation to deregulation and liberalization.
Contemporary construction of both agencies are valid. It is just that one was more
fitting for the period they were in.

4. Language of the Statute

- Not the same as verba legis. Verba legis = clear meaning. This is language as an intrinsic
aid. However, in extrinsic aid, it is not clear. Language being referred to is the language
as Spanish, Filipino etc. This is used particularly when statute is taken from a foreign
law. Court may look at the original enactment of the statute in comparison to the one
promulgated by us. For example, if there is ambiguity in the Filipino translation of our
constitution, the English text will be looked at.

People v Yabut
- Issue is the definition of recidivism. For example this guy is service sentence for rape-
murder and caught pedaling drugs. This is recidivism according to Yabut. However,
when you are serving a sentence for homicide and you kill another person it is not
 recidivism. The word “another” in the RPC’s definition of recidivism was construed by
the accused to mean a different crime other than the one committed. Under his
interpretation, he is not a recidivist since he killed someone while he was service a
sentence for homicide since it is not a different crime. Court said this is not the case.
They went to the Codego Penal which was the original law. In this Codego Penal, they
use the word “nuevo delicto”. Literally translated it means a new offense. So the word
another actually means new. Therefore it doesn’t matter if the offense committed was
the same or different, as long as it is a new offense he is a recidivist.

People v Rivera
- Court read Article 363 of RPC. OSG was saying that the accused are guilty under Article
363 should be construed to include Article 326 of the Codego Penal is the parent code
for malicious prosecution. OSG even went so far as to include another article, article
452. Article 326 and 452 was no longer part of the Revised Penal Code. SC said no
because the elements of 326 and 452 are not present in Art 363.

Cubillo v SSS
- When someone retires, the government freezes an item. You have to justify getting
back that item in order to hire somebody because they want to rationalize. SSS
Rationalization Plan was issued offering big retirement benefits for those retiring before
the age of 65. CUbillo did not retire under the SSS rationalization plan and was already
retired. She was asking to recompute the incentive benefits because the time when she
was a contractual employee was not included in the calculation. She was asking for this
on a basis of a Civil Service Commission Resolution. S said that the Resolution (English) is
clear in that if you retire you are no longer eligible unless you retire under the SSS
rationalization plan. Secondly, under E.O., which provides for an exemption only applies
to those who have defective appointments.

VI. Application of Principles of Interpretation

1. Cessante Ratione Legis, Cessat Ipsa Lex (The reason for law seasong, the law itself
ceases)

People v Almuete
- Court held that accused should not be charged based on a similar case. No more need to
apply pre-threshing because there is no longer shared tenancy. Since shared tenancy
was abolished by subsequent legislation, no more need to apply the rules on pre-
threshing. Pre-thresh no longer happens. In old system, there was a percentage which
was why pre-threshing was needed. 70% to owner and 30% to the guy threshing for
example. Under new system guy threshing gets fixed amount so pre-threshing no longer
happens. There was no express repeal of laws regarding pre-threshing but court said
there was implied repeal due to the legal maxim cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex.
 2. Legislative omissions and clerical errors

Matabuena v Cervantes
- Conflict is in regards to statute that husband and wife couldn’t donate to each other and
whether or not the same restriction applies to common law relationships. SC said yes
because for the same reasons that they disallow donation between husband and wife
also exist in a common law relationship. The public policy regarding family and marriage
as a social institution would be violated. Those who do get married and live together
would be in a better position since the prohibition would not apply to them. In light of
legislative intent of the provision, the SC read into the statute the inclusion of common
law relationships in the prohibition.

Farinas v Barba
- There was an ambiguity as in the LGU code as to who is the “local chief executive” that
could make an appointment in the case a sanggunian member leaves office and which
sanggunian can make recommendations as to who to appoint. In order to solve problem
they looked at the previous article where an enumeration was made as to who the
government officials were that had appointment authority. SC concluded that the use of
the term “local chief executive” was done for stylistic reasons and so that the
enumeration didn’t have to be repeated again and again. They also said that it could not
be given it’s literal meaning because in the case of a Sanggunian Barangay member
leaving, it would mean that the barangay captain has the authority to appoint. SC said
that there is no way that that was the intent of the legislators when they used the term
“local chief executive”. In deciding which Sanggunian could give recommendations for
the appointment they also looked at previous articles in the LGU code embracing the
same subject. They concluded it is the Sanggunian where the vacancy is that can make
the recommendation.

Lagarda v Masagana
- Justice of the Peace (old position) appointed someone’s guardian. Opposition says that
that isn’t within his power. There is enumeration of powers of Justice of the Peace in a
law. Part of the enumeration is matters over which he has no jurisdiction. Not included
in the enumeration is the appointing of guardians. The Secretary of Justice said this was
a mere oversight and appointing someone as guardian should have been included in
enumeration where they say what duties aren’t included. The section says that the
jurisdiction of Justice of the Peace does not extend to civil actions where the subject of
the controversy is not capable of putting a money value on the subject of litigation.
Another part is that they have “no jurisdiction over matters regarding probate
(reviewing a will), the appointment of guardians, trustees, and receivers.” The
restriction against appointing a guardian only applies when it is in matters regarding
probate since wills already trustees or receivers who take care of the appointment of
guardians for minors. Secretary of Justice said it was there but you could ignore it. SC
said that Secretary of Justice said otherwise the mistake can only be rectified by the
legislative. Since the provision is clear the ruling is presumed to be valid. Congress
 eventually did. However, in the case at bar, the law as it is will govern meaning the court
ruled for the case that the appointment of guardianship is NOT allowed.

Demafiles v COMELEC
- There was a phrase “shall have qualified” which was causing controversy was causing
controversy. It was in regards to election law and when one can hold office. Trying to
construe what “shall have qualified” means. Court said that this is mere jargon. Doesn’t
mean anything. The Court applied the general rule in elections that they start on Jan. 1
of the following year. Court said that the law did not say how the winning candidates
could “qualify”. Therefore, the law is devoid of meaning as far as this provision is
concerned. Court also acknowledges that this could have been the intent of the
legislative, however since there was no clear meaning the court cannot supply its own
meaning. Atty compared “shall have qualified” to the phrase “and for other purposes” in
terms of how meaningless they are and how they carry no weight in terms of
construction. It is a superfluity and should be ignored.

3. Avoiding absurdity

U.S. Paguirigan

- Two provisions where there is conflict. One which refers to “grave threats”. Another
refers to “threats made in the heat of anger”. The latter is a misdemeanor and will result
in a fine. The first would result in arresto mayor. Another part of the latter provision
though is “subsequent actions show that you persisted”. Court said if you take literal
meaning it would be absurd since the latter law which is more serious crime has a lower
penalty than the previous (less serious) crime. So the Court decided that the latter
provision shall be read as “showed through their subsequent actions that they have NOT
persisted”
- Is this judicial amendment? NO. Still interpretation. Not amending. Unless congress does
something about it, it will remain in its defective form. However, the court’s
interpretation becomes part of the law so similar cases will be ruled in this way.
Subsequent cases will read the latter provision in the negative.

People v Duque
- Guy was being charged for violation of labor law (illegal recruitment). Labor code
specifies a prescription period of 3 years but did not say when it starts. So they went to
general rule which says “3 years upon the commission of the crime or if is not known
the discovery and institution of proceedings”. Issue is about prescription period. SC said
that the effect must be in the intention of the law to avoid absurdity. What was absurd
was the literal reading that in order that the prescriptive period begin the “discovery
AND institution of proceedings” need occur at the same time. Basically prescription will
never run since the two never happen at the same time. So the victim can institute the
proceedings anytime after the commission of the crime if he never institutes
 proceedings. Institution of proceedings stops the prescriptive period (since you already
filed). Court read it as that case must be filed 3 years after discovery. Conjunction used
should’ve been “until” and not “and”. Court even said that the inclusion of institution of
proceedings is unnecessary since it is a given that the prescriptive period ends when the
proceedings are instituted.

4. Avoiding injustice
- Courts did not do anything about the provision of law or said there was something
wrong. More in terms of how law should or shouldn’t be applied. In deciding
controversies, the purpose of the law is that right and justice should prevail. IF the
application of the law will lead to injustice then the law may refuse to apply the law in
such a manner.

Amatan v Aujero
- The rule was not invalidated. SC said that if you’re a judge and you apply the rules, you
should be guided by your common sense and sense of justice. Given this, the
interpretation given by the judge lacked both. What happened was he gave a convict a
lower penalty because there was a law allowing him too if the defendants allow. It was
very broadly stated and is subject to liberalization according to dumb judge. Convict was
convicted for homicide but he decreased the sentence to attempted homicide(?).
Administrative case was made against the judge since verdict can no longer be changed.
Judge is now administrally liable for ignorance of the law.

Salvacion v Central Bank

- Issue regarding bank secrecy laws. Foreign dollar accounts are exempt from
garnishment etc. Issue is whether or not that exemption is applicable to tourists and
franchises whose dollar accounts are maintained for a short time. SC said that the
purpose of the bank secrecy law and the provisions regarding foreign deposit accounts
is to boost the economy since the bank secrecy law was enacted when our economy
sucked. However, the law failed to anticipate the illicit effects, injustice and inequality
that the law would result in. Law only applies to foreign investors and not to mere
tourists and franchises that are here for a short period of time. Because of that, the
deposit accounts should not be exempt from the garnishment. Also if it applies to
tourists than injustice would occur. The petitioners had also already managed to escape
payment so in order that justice may take shape they had to give the respondents some
form of recourse and they did so through allowing the garnishment of the foreign dollar
accounts.

People v Gutierrez

- Guy burned two barangays. They wanted a change of venue because there was a
miscarriage of justice impending. Witnesses felt their lives would be in danger if they
testified in the original venue. There were threats. Court ruled transfer is necessary
 because to compel prosecution to make their witnesses testify in a venue where they
could not be open and honest as to their knowledge of the case would result in a
miscarriage of justice. There is a rule where changes of venue can only be done through
the instance of the accused. Judge Gutierrez said that he was merely following the rule
since it was not the accused who asked for it. SC said in the interest of justice they
should look at the facts. ^^

5. Law does not require the impossible

Akbayan v Comelec
- Party wasn’t able to meet deadline to register. They said that because Comelec has
standby powers they should hold special registration for them or else they would be
disenfranchising the whatever marginalized group the party represented. Court
enumerated everything Comelec has to do prior to election. If they allow registration
after the deadline, then it will not be possible to hold the elections at May since
everything will be delayed. In giving the Comelec standby powers, it did not mean that it
should do the impossible. Court upheld Comelec resolution not to hold special
registration beyond the period

VII. Doctrine of Necessary Application

- Self-explanatory. It means that every statutory grant of a right or privilege or authority

is deemed to include all the incidental powers, rights or privileges even if it is not
expressed in the provision of law. It is deemed to be included when it is necessary for
the implementation or effectives of the power or authority granted.
- Rationale is that when legislators enact statutes they cannot foresee all possibilities.
Sometimes weird things happen that are not explicitly explained by the statute but
when you look at the wording and spirit of the statute then you can say the weird thing
is necessary or impliedly included by what is provided by the statute.
- Fills in the gap between the words of a statute and the subsequent circumstances that
had not been thought about at the time when the legislation was passed which would
be necessarily implied in what had actually been said.
- Every statute according to this doctrine is understand by implication to contain all
provisions as may be necessary to effectuate the purpose of the statute which is all
the collateral and subsidiary consequences that may that may be logically inferred
from the terms of the statute

Macalintal v Presidential Electoral Tribunal

- Whether or not SC can create a Presidential Electronal Tribunal. Art 7 Sec 4 of Consti
states that the SC sitting en banc shall be sole judge of all contests of all the elections,
returns and qualifications for president and vice president and may promulgate its rules
for the purpose. SC decided that instead of sitting en banc they would first form a
committee which is the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (consisting of SC Justices).
Macalintal said it cannot do that because it was not specified in Art 7. Sec. 4 they cannot
 do it. SC said under doctrine of necessary implication the jurisdiction was accorded to
the SC to do such an act by the very fact that the consi made the SC the sole judge of
this kind of contests and it is allowed to promulgate rules and regulations to make it
effective. Court cited an American case with same doctrine. McCulloch v Maryland.

Chua v Civil Service Commission

- It is not a grant of power but a grant of privilege. The National Irrigation Administration
(NIA) was reorganizing or restructuring and they offered early retirement benefits to
those who would voluntarily retire or separate from the service. This is in keeping with
RA 683 which was streamlining the bureaucracy. In this streamlining, the section 2 of
that law says that “all appointed officials and employees of the government including
government owned and controlled corporations with original charters as well as the
personnel of all Local Government Units all regular, temporary or casual employees can
benefit from the early retirement and voluntary separation”. Their retirement package
is bigger than the ordinary one. Chua was an employee of NIA but she was appointed to
a foreign funded project. The appointment is contractual and coterminous with the
project. Should foreign funding cease the project will cease. This is why the personnel of
the project cannot get a regular appointment. Chua had been there for 15 years. She
applied for the benefits and was denied because she did not fall under the enumeration
in section 2. She was a contractual employee coterminous to the project. SC said when
you look at the enumeration you can assume that the spirit of the law’s intent is to
include all employees. Why? What is difference between contractual from casual and
emergency. Legislators simply failed to include contractual in the enumeration. SC said
only two kinds of employment. Regular or temporary. Lots of kinds for temporary. Since
they included from both kinds why not contractual employee who was still in service at
the time when the law was implemented. Doctrine here is not the one where
enumerations are exclusive, it is necessary implication.

COA v Province of Cebu

- Issue was whether the province of Cebu can disburse funds from the special education
fund to pay the salaries of teachers who had been appointed to teach extension classes
and fund scholarships. The special education fund was created by a Republic Act and
comes from additional levy on real property taxes. When the law was passed,
scholarships and compensation were included but it was effectively amended by the
Local Government Code of 1991. In this amendment, there was an enumeration as to
where the special education fund can be used. In this enumeration, compensation of
teachers for extension classes and scholarships are not included. So the COA disallowed
the disbursement. SC said that when you read the statute that when you read the LGU
code it discusses budget and what they can allocate their fund to. One of the
enumerations is the “establishment and maintenance of extension classes” where
necessary. Given this provision, even if the compensation of teachers is not explicitly
mentioned, it is implied in that in order to have extension classes there must be
 teachers who must be compensated. Nothing about scholarships though so COA was
right to deny that. Because of this the disbursement for the classes was allowed.

Shioji v Harvey
- About procedure. What was being questioned here Is the authority or power of the
Philippine SC to issue rules of procedure. According to SHioji, in 1922 (American
colonization), the SC of the Philippines cannot promulgate rules outside of what is given
to it by the US Congress. SC said independent of any statutory provision, every court has
the inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of
justice. Since they are tasked by the Organic Law with the administration of justice, the
court has the inherent power to promulgate rules of procedure for the conduct of
proceedings.

Luciano v Provincial Governor

- Who has the power to suspend elective officials charged with corruption under the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Act)? When an official is charged under this act he is
charged in a criminal proceeding filed under the RTC. The Act says that the official can
be preventively suspended once the information against the official is filed with the RTC.
Then the official can be preventively suspended. Later on if found innocent can be
reinstated. But if found guilty then he shall be removed and held ineligible to be
reappointed to any other office in the government including government owner or
controlled corporations. According to the court, law does not saw who has power to
suspend. However, since it is the court who has the power to find the accused guilty or
innocent, then it is also the court who will rule whether they should be removed or not.
The power to remove necessarily implies the power to suspend. If they can remove why
not suspend. So court said the RTC has the power to suspend the official not the
Provincial Governor. If official is charged administratively, only penalty is removal from
office. It is only in this circumstance where he may be suspended by the next ranking
supervisor or official.

Angara V Electoral Commission

- Because constitution had included the organization or establishment of the electoral
commission then it means that election contests including the right to promulgate rules
and procedures for the dealing of these disputes. This means that it is already taken
away from the national assembly and power belongs to electoral commission. So even
though National Assembly already set a deadline for filing of contests it can still be
overruled by the Electoral commission. Especially if National Assembly is no longer in
session. Since Electoral Commission is created by the constitution it is vested with the
necessary authority for the performance and execution of its function. Otherwise that
grant of power to sit on election contests would be ineffective.

American Tobacco v Director of Patents

- Validity of rule issued by Philippine Patent Office which authorized the Director of
Patents to designate any ranking officer of the office to hear inter partes proceedings.
 Many cases brought before patent office before going to SC. Patent office possess quasi-
judicial power ruling on the claims in patent and trademark cases. Patent Office issued
in its Revised Rules and Practice the previously stated rule. It also says that all
judgements determining the merits of the case shall personally and directly be prepared
by the Director assigned therein. According to American Tobacco this violates that
trademark law because under the Trademark Law the director of patents is vested with
jurisdiction over the cases. This means that it is their opinion that since the law vests
jurisdiction on the Director of Patents not the office it is the Director of Patents who
should sit in the hearings of the cases. SC said that the Director of Patents is also
empowered by the same law to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the
conduct of all business in the office. One of the rules he decided to promulgate together
with the other officers of the office was to allow the director to designate an official for
the hearing of treadmark and patent cases. SC said that while the power to decide
resides solely in the administrative agency, this does not preclude the delegation of
power. It will not violate the provision that it is the Director of Patents that has
jurisdiction since he is still the one making the final decision. Designated official merely
holds the hearing and then makes the necessary and findings but it is still the Director
who will make the final decision. This authority of the Director of Patents to promulgate
said rule to appoint officials is necessarily implied. Matter of convenience and
impossibility. NO way Director can hear ALL the cases.

People v Conception
- The application of the doctrine here is that you cannot do indirectly what you are
forbidden to do directly. The indirect act which results in the same conclusion is implied
in the provision. Officer of Bank cannot acquire a loan from the bank. Reasons are
obvious. Conception who was the president of the PNB (government owned at the time)
authorized an extension of credit to a partnership where his wife was 50% partner.
Criminal act. When he was charged and sentenced he appealed. In defense he said that
the prohibition is irrelevant because the prohibition is against a bank not a person. He
says the penal clause shouldn’t exist because the statute, when read literally, holds
criminally liable the entire bank and not a natural person. SC said that obviously, when a
juridical entity is prohibited from doing something and there is a penal clause, it is the
officers who would be held liable. Juridical entity acts through its officers. His next
defense was that he gave an extension of credit and not a “loan” as contemplated by
the statute. SC decided that we gave was a loan even if it was labeled as an extension of
credit. His next defense is that you cannot extend a loan to an officer of the bank and
that the loan was not actually extended to an officer of the bank but an exterior
partnership not related to the bank. Court said that when the law says that you cannot
extend loan to an officer or member of a bank it is necessarily implied that members of
the family, especially wife, are included. Objective of the law is to prevent officer from
taking advantage of his position to benefit himself. The benefit granted to the wife
necessarily benefits the husband. Therefore, he was found guilty and his conviction
affirmed. Loan to wife is an indirect loan to husband. What you cannot do directly you
cannot do indirectly.
Tantuico v Domingo
- The issues is the legality of withholding ½ of the petitioners retirement benefits.
Tantuico was COA chair at the time of President Marcos. After EDSA revolution he
retired. He had already applied for clearance to get retirement benefits. It was granted
but the benefits were not released despite the fact that he was given clearance twice.
When Domingo took over he ordered a reinventory. The committee doing the inventory
spotted irregularities or errors. Not saying Tantuico is corrupt. Some disbursement were
approved that are being questioned and stuff like that. Domingo wrote letter to
Tantuico saying that completed the reinventory and said that he owes government
money. When there are disbursements that you approve and are questioned, you are
liable not the office where you held the position. So ½ of his retirement benefits were
held by the government to answer for the liability he incurred. Tantuico brought action.
Court looked at the law concerning retirement benefits and the law is very clear under
the administrative code that retirement benefits and gratuities cannot be attached or
levied in execution. In other words when someone has a debt the SSS or other
government agency cannot hold your retirement benefits. This is because retirement
benefits is an act of liberality from the State and it is designed to help him live. All the
more that retirement benefits cannot be used to pay indebtedness to the government.
COA cannot hold half of Tantuico’s retirement benefits. They had no legal basis for the
holding of his benefits.

Robustum Agricultural Corp v DAR

- Robustum Corp is the owner of a parcel of land which used to part of a bigger parcel of
land which is called the mother estate of its predecessor in interest Kuyas Abro(?). It so
happened the mother estate is 300 sqm(?) is covered by the DAR. Robustum acquired
50,000sqm of land. Robusum received a letter informing them that what they had
bought is covered by the Agrarian Land Reform which has a 7000 sqm maximum.
Corporation filed a petition for quieting of title. Quieting of title is where your name is
on a title and someone else is making a claim towards that land so you go to court so
the court can say that you are the rightful owner and that no other person can lay claim
on that property. Robustum filed this in RTC. DAR and Land Bank of Philippines
questioned jurisdiction of RTC because Agrarian Reform matters are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform. Corporation said that the action they
filed is not for agrarian reform but for quieting of title. Court said though that upon
examining the petition it is clear that it has something to do with the application of the
Agrarian Reform Law therefore it is in jurisdiction of DAR not RTC. Another contention is
that Sec 30 of RA 9700 on the resolution of cases says that any case or proceeding
involving the implementation of provisions Republic Act 6657 “Agrarian Reform Law”
which may remain pending on June 30. 2014 shall be allowed to proceed. Rombusto
said that they applied it after June 30, 2014. The argument of Rombusto is that only
cases pending on June 30, 2014 are under the jurisdiction of the DAR. After June 30,
2014 they lose jurisdiction. Court said they completely misread it. June 30, 2014 is not a
cut-off date for DAR jurisdiction, it just means that cases filed before June 30, 2014 must
 still be completed by the DAR. Any case filed afer though is still under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the DAR. Atty Vyva questioned the arguments of DAR as very dumb. Court
said that the authority given by the DAR to conclude any Agrarian Reform Proceeding
pending as of June 30, 2014 by necessity includes an authority to continue exercising
its quasi-judicial powers after. That grant of authority to conclude the proceedings
implementing Agrarian Reform law must be deemed to include such powers that are not
expressly stated but are necessary to effectuate the law. RTC correctly dismissed action.

VIII. Relation to Other Statutes: Harmonizing all laws, Special and General Laws
- Relation of new law to previous laws of the same subject matter. Sometimes particular
or certain laws will have topics that can be applied on a certain set of same
circumstances. How do courts decide which is better to apply?
- Special law cannot be repealed or modified by a subsequently enacted general law in
the absence of an express provision repealing regardless of when the law was enacted.
NO implied repeal of general law due to enactment of general law.
- In case of reconcilable conflict between two laws, the later law shall apply.

People v Ejercito
- When two penal laws may both theoretically apply to a given case then the one that is
more special in nature will prevail. Special laws prevail over general laws. Applies to
both criminal and civil laws. Girl was raped when very young and was threatened that if
she said anything her and her parents would be killed. She kept quiet and became the
sex slave of the man despite transferring somewhere else. Wife of man found out and
brought charges against the girl for adultery. Defense of man is that the girl is the
mistress and not without consent. Girl reached age of majority but at the first rape she
was only 15. What law should be used? Rape of a child will lead to application of RA
7610 connected with child prostitution or sexual misconduct or abuse committed on a
child. On the other hand, Article 266 of RPC which has been amended with the Rape law
of 1997 also penalized rape including a provision on statutory rape or sex with a minor
unable to give consent. Rape in the case was repeated. Man said it was no longer rape
because the girl was allowing it but of course not the girl was helpless from the
intimidation. Court said RA 7610 is more general law and deals with all kinds of abuse
against children. While anti-rape law which was incorporated in RPC is more special
because it deals particularly with rape. Penalty for rape of minor in RPC had a higher
penalty. RPC is general law but the provision on rape is special therefore it prevailed
over RA 7610.
CIR v Semirara Mining Corp
- Semirara was enjoying exemption from VAT. Under PD 972 or Cole Development Act,
operators of mining companies were given incentives. One of which is exemption from
all taxes except income tax. Later on tax laws were amended which identified what
would be exempt from VAT. NIRC also expressly repealed certain laws but did not
expressly repeal PD 972. No implied real. PD 972 is special law. NIRC’s law was a general
law and without express repeal in said law cannot be deemed to have repealed the
incentives of the Cole Development Act. VAT Exemption of Semirara Mining is valid

Pension Gratuity and Management Center v AAA

- Issue here is whether or not trial court can order PGMC to withhold a certain
percentage of the pension of the husband who was a retired military man for
remittance to the spouse for support. In this particular case court said that
Commonwealth Act had already been revised which prohibited levy or attachment of
pension or retirement benefits. Court said that was a general law and what applied to
the withholding of pension or income in order to be remitted to an estranged wife is RA
9262. Question is not whether special or general. It is a question of what came first.
Court said that RA 9262 which identifies non-support of wife and kids as economic
violence prevails over the laws prohibiting attachment or levy of pension or retirement
benefits. Pension and retirement benefits may be withheld to be remitted for the
support of the wife and children. Later law prevailed over earlier law (very Malabo
explanation by m’am)

IX. Interpretation of words and phrases

a. In general:
- In general, words and phrases can be interpreted in two ways: (1) ordinary meaning, in
their generic sense or (2) a technical definition. Can be commercial, scientific, political,
or legal depending on legislative intent.
- When reading a phrase in a law, don’t take it by itself or out of context. Always interpret
in light of the subject of the law
- General Rule: Words and phrases must be interpreted in their well-accepted meaning or
usage. They are usually given their plain and ordinary meaning. People would
understand the way a man and woman of average, ordrinary intelligence could
understand it
- Exception: (1) when law itself defines the word in which case they should be read with
the definition given. Normally when statute has a very technical subject there is always
a subject called: Definition of Terms. Even when there is none though, the law can still
and does define certain words used in the law; (2) When the context in which the word
 or phrase is employed dictates a different meaning than the ordinary meaning normally
used. Latin Maxim: a word is to be understood in the context in which it is used.
- Exception to Exception: Even when already defined in the law, its definition may not
apply where the application will be obviously incongruitous in the language of the
statute. Will destroy one of its major purpose or become illogical.

Mataguina Integrated Wood Products (MIWP) v CA

- MIWP is a successor in interest of Mataguina Logging Enterprises (MLE). MLE is owned
exclusively by a lady. MLE was charged with encroachment on the logging concession of
another company called DAVENCOR. Located in Davao Oriental. Found guilty of
encroachment. Court pierced the Corporate Veil. Corporation is separate and distinct
from shareholders. Obligations and liabilities of corporation cannot be charged to the
shareholders. This is the corporate veil. Common practice for people to place property
under a corporation in the name of an heir in order to do away with estate tax. In some
instances, when court finds that organization of corporation is merely to shield owner
from liabilities that would be otherwise personal, the court will pierce the corporate veil
and do away with the distinction. Especially if it is solely owned. Court can make owner
liable for wrongdoing. She was personally liable and dissolved MLE and created MIWP.
Lady held lion’s share. DAVENCOR cannot proceed now against MLE and proceeded to
sue MIWP. RTC ruled in favor of DAVENCOR but went up on appeal and was reversed
because CA said MIWP is only alter-ego. CA made MIWP liable for the obligation of MLE.
Basis is PD 705 Section 6 saying that when there is a transfer of assets from one corp to
another, the transferee shall assume all the obligations of the transferor. What is being
defined is: “all the obligations”. Term “obligation” as used in the law is construed to
mean: those obligations incurred by transferor in the ordinary course of business.
Cannot be construed to mean incurred by transferor as a result of transgression which is
the case in the case at bar. Lady owner’s penal transgression cannot be transferred.
MIWP cannot be held liable because liability was not incurred in the ordinary course of
business

Ernesto V CA
- Phrase being defined is: “majority of planters” in a sugar central. RA 809 Section 1 that
“in the absence of a milling agreement between the majority of planters and dealers of
sugarcane any milling district in the Philippines… product will be divided between hem
as follows:…”. It defined the manner in which the sugarcane will be divided among
planters and hacienda owners. The percentages defined therein only apply if there is NO
milling agreement between majority of planters and millers. So what is the basis of
determining majority. According to law it is defined only as those who have a contract
or are regular planters in the sugar central. If majority of said planters do not have the
milling agreement then the percentages will apply. If there is written agreement then
the written agreement will apply. In interpreting the meaning of “majority of planters”
discussed history of the sugar central and the sugar contracts. Arrived at ff conclusion:
The limitation from the beginning, we had a sugar agreement with US where we had a
quota. If we failed to meet it we would be penalized. So hacienda owners at the time
 were hell-bent in meeting the sugar quotas. We needed to export 7 tons of sugar to the
US and sugar in the Philippines became very expensive. Worst part is exploitation of
sugar planters. Many rumors of how the sugar farmers were oppressed and not paid
enough. They were dying of hunger because they couldn’t even plant other crops. A
Jesuit Priest actually went and pretended to be a sugar farmer and got first-hand
knowledge of all the atrocities happening. So nowadays, people aren’t as crazy about
sugar. Haciendas no longer employed regular planters or very few of them. Many of the
planters now are other kinds of planters. No written contracts. So if the application of
the definition of the law is applied, none of the sugar centrals will have a majority of
planters due there being very few regular planters. Court said with change in situation it
wouldn’t make any sense to use the definition in the law. Court is of the opinion that
when the quota ceased that the definition of planters in Section 1 should be changed to
all planters, not just those with written agreements.

Amadora v CA
- Issue here was liability or damages caused by students, pupils and apprentices? Who is
liable? Amadora is a student of a college. He was mortally wounded by a student who
fired a gun in the premises of the school. Happened during semestral break. They were
doing a project in school. Amadora was going to school to submit his project. The
parents of the victim sued the principal of the school and the teacher. Article 2180 of
civil code being interpreted. Reads: “teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trade shall be liable for damages caused by their students, pupils and apprentices so
long as they remain in their custody”. What does “as long as they remain their custody
mean? School says since it’s sembreak no longer in custody. SC said no still in their
custody because the student was in the custody of school authorities as long as he is
under the control and influence of the school and within the premises. Kids were in their
custody. Does this article cover the school in particular? It only says establishments of
arts and trades? School is not one of arts and trades says the school. They were an
academic institution. However, SC said that they are covered because it said “caused by
their students, pupils and apprentices”. Apprentices is for arts and trade while students
and pupils are for regular schools. Therefore, the provision still applies to them. So if
caused by student or pupil the teacher is liable If caused by apprentice the head of the
school is liable. According to the court the provision does not distinguish between
schools whether academic or vocational. Principal and vice-principal were not liable.
Only the teacher in the case was held liable. Teacher proved though she wasn’t
negligent and was not penalized.

b. General or restricted meaning

- Words and phrases can have general or restricted meaning.
- GR: General statement is understood in a general way. (Latin maxim)
- When a word in a statute has both a restricted and general meaning unless the nature
of the subject matter or the context employed clearly indicates that a restrictive
meaning is intended than the general meaning will prevail. For example, when court
 says judge they also mean justices. Or when law says government it means national and
local government. Also if it says person it means natural and juridical persons.
- Progressive construction: a rule of construction. It means that a generic term contains
things that arise therefrom. Interpretation extends to future subjects that can fall under
the situation. The law sill not become ephemeral and transitory just because it did not
foresee future things.
- Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish = latin maxim. Rule
assumes that legislature made not qualifications.

c. Associated words

(i. Associated words

Carandang v Santiago
- Respendent here found guilty of frustrated homicide against Carandang. Carandang
filed a separate petition appealing the conviction. After appealing, respondent filed an
action invoking Article 33 of NCC for damages. Asking for damages for physical injuries.
Judge here said you have to wait for the criminal case on appeal first before asking for
damages. If criminal case fails his damages action will have no leg to stand on. However,
not asking for damages under RPC. He wasn’t asking for damages though under RPC, he
was asking them under NCC. In NCC it says: “In cases of defamation, fraud and physical
injuries a civil action for damages entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action
may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently from
the criminal procecution”. Is physical injuries in this provision same as the one in the
RPC? SC said no. These are two distinct crimes. Physical injury in NCC v RPC is different.
The one in RPC has elements. In NCC it’s just bodily harm. It is said in the same breath as
defamation and fraud which were given their ordinary meaning so same should apply to
physical injuries. Not the technical meaning in the one in RPC.

Co Kim Chah v Valdez Tah Keh

- Issue is the proclamation of General McAurthur which invalidated all laws, regulations,
and processes of any other government in the Philippines other than the
commonwealth. Did this invalidate all judgements and judicial acts and proceedings of
Philippine SC? No distinction made. SC said no. First it would lead to great
inconvenience. Known principle of international law that territory when occupied by an
 enemy does not wipe out the effects and acts done by the government. A statute ought
never to be construed to violate the law. The word “process” in the proclamation refers
to other processes. Not judicial ones.

(ii. Ejusdem Generis

- Same topic
- To apply following must occur: (1) enumeration of particular and specific words
followed by a general word or phrase; (2) the particular and specific words must
constitute a class or be of the same kind, otherwise how do you determine what is
included; (3) enumeration should not be exhaustive. Should not encompass or embrace
all persons and objects of the same class. Should not be merely by example (no “such
as”). (4) no indication of legislative intent to give the general words meaning(?)
- Caution: Not a universal principle. Court can choose not to apply.

Cornejo v Naval
- Municipal President of Pasay was found guilty of falsification of private document.
Nothing to do with is function as municipal president. Suspended by provisional
governor using his jurisdiction. Allowed him to do this if they neglect their duty,
oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office. Cornejo claim that
“other” and “in office” would limit the jurisdiction of the provisional governor to only
the conducts involved. Cornejo was found guilty. Court said he was right. Provisional
governor said that his offense constitutes corruption. He meant corruption in the
general sense. Falsification of a document being a corrupt act in the general sense of the
word. Corrupt in regular life. However, the SC said that it is a penal provision and must
be strictly construed. It is found in association with neglection of duty and
maladministration of office the corruption contemplated by the section is one done in
official functions or office.

(iii. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius

- Where the statute by its terms is expressly limited to a certain matter. It may not by
interpretation or construction be extended to other matters
- General rule followed by exceptions means that those not under the exceptions fall
under the general rule
- Expression of one or more things in a class implies the exclusion of all not expressed
- What is not in the exception is in the general rule
- Not applicable if enumeration is by way of example
- Not of universal application. Only guides.

Escribano v Avila
- Issue was if it was intended by RA 4363 which amended the RPC to exclude the court of
first instance from conducting preliminary investigation. Said RA enumerated those who
may conduct preliminary investigation in cases of defamation. RA said may be
conducted by city or provisional fiscal where criminal action filed. Court said that the
enumeration must not touch the CFI at all. Merely intended to protect the accused from
 being harassed by the complainant by filing the action elsewhere other than the
province or city of where the crime took place. The maxim ^^ is not a rule of law just a
tool of construction. CFI cannot be deprived of its jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation. Not mentioned at all in RA.

(iv. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est

- A person or object omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally
- Only applies if omission has been clearly established
- Can’t just be because of clerical error. Legislative intent must be clear

(v. Doctrine of last antecedent

- Importance of comma.
- GR rule is comma applies to the last antecedent
- Generally qualifying words restrict or modify only words or phrases to which they are
immediately associated. Unless the context otherwise dictates

People v Tamani
- What is being interpreted here was Section 6 Rule 122 of ROC. Appeal must be taken
within 15 days of promulgation of notice of judgement or order being appealed.
Promulgation refers to judgement. Notice refers to order. Tamani convicted of murder.
He appealed and filed motion for reconsideration was denied on certain date. Attorney
thought he had 15 days after denial of his motion for reconsideration to appeal. Court
said no. Applicable phrase is promulgation. Therefore he must count 15 days from the
promulgation, not 15 days from when the notice that the motion for reconsideration
was denied.
d. Provisions, exceptions, saving clauses:
- Common function is to restrain or qualify the generality of a clause or section to which it
refers. Primary purpose is to limit or restrict. Usually starts with “Provided that”
- Can also enlarge scope of statute sometimes
- GR: Proviso qualifies only the phrase immediately proceeding it. Unless there is
legislative intent showing otherwise
- In case of conflict between proviso and main provision of statute? That which is located
in the later portion of the statute subject to the exception of legislative intent.
- Exceptions: usually expressed such as “unless otherwise”, “shall not apply”. Just read it
and look at the context
- Saving clauses usually save a statute from the effect of a repealing clause.
Pendon v Diasnes
- Concerns the restoration of the right of suffrage and to be voted on. Diasnes was
convicted of estafa. Later on, he received a plenary pardon. Section 99 of RA 180 as
amended enumerated persons not qualified to vote. Letter a of said section says: any
person who has been sentenced to suffer one year or more of imprisonment such
disability not having been revoked by plenary pardon. Letter b said: any person who has
been declared by final judgement of any crime against property. Diasnes ran for public
office. Petitioner Pendon filed an action against him. Said that he falls under Section 99.
Estafa is a crime against property. Letter b said nothing about plenary pardon unlike
paragraph a. Court said that such an interpretation would be ridiculous. Someone who
has been convicted of murder (which is more than one year imprisonment) and was
given a plenary pardon can again vote. But a person convicted of estafa which is a crime
against property would not be able to run. Court said letter a is all encompassing and
the effect of pardon should apply to the two letters. It would be more logical to say that
if congress had intended the crimes against property from the benefits of a plenary
pardon it would have said so directly. Court said in construing a & b together it is more
logical to construe it in this way: absolute pardon for any crime which is one year of
imprisonment or more restores the person’s political rights, when less than one year
disqualification does not attach unless it is one against property. Both cases enjoy the
benefit of plenary pardon

X. Strict or liberal construction

a. In general
- Laws may be construed or interpreted strictly or liberally depending on the purpose of
the legislation
- Exceptions: test of whether or to apply strictly or liberally depends on legislative intent.
- Strict construction is like verba legis. Construction according to letter of statute.
Interpretation does not extend or enlarge the statute by implication or equitable
considerations. Just stick to what law says
- Certain types of legislation strictly construed. Can be strictly construed against one party
in favour of state and liberally for the party. For example, penal statutes or those with
penal clause. This means court may not include or exclude matters or cases not included
or excluded from the provision. It means that only persons, things, offenses, penalties
that are clearly included beyond any reasonable doubt will be considered in the
operation of the statute. Must come clearly from the language and intent of the statute.
Where there is reasonable doubt, it must be resolved in favor of the accused.
- Strict construction does not mean narrow construction. Courts musts safeguard the
rights of defendants and at the same time preserve the obvious intention of the
legislature in enacting the law
- IF ambiguous and leads to several reasonable but contradictory contradictions, that
which is in favor of the accused will be preferred
 - Rule of strict construction: acts cannot be considered unlawful or criminal unless there
is clear and unequivocal expression of legislative intent making them such. This goes
into the heart of substantive due process
- Statutes with derogate rights are strictly construed. Statues which affect rights are
strictly construed and rigidly confined to cases clearly within their scope or purpose. For
example, statues authorizing expropriation.
- Statutes imposing taxes or custom duties are strictly construed against the government.
However, statutes granting tax exemptions are strictly construed against tax payer. J
- Statutes granting privileges are constructed strictly against the person to whom the
privilege is granted. Don’t want to violate equal protection clause. Those granted
privileges must strictly comply with the provisions of the statute granting said
priveleges. Privileges are to be interpreted according to the will of the one who grants
them which is the state.
- Naturalization laws are strictly construed.
- Statues concerning a sovereign are strictly construed. Restrictive statutes that impose
burdens on the national treasury are strictly construed. For example, when PD 851 was
issued requiring 13th month pay. 13th month pay is not bonus it is legislation and a part
of your compensation. In the PD, they forgot to include government employees. A case
was brought. Court said that since government employees were not included, they
cannot receive the bonus. Law was later on amended to include government
employees. It was strictly construed because the paying of 13th month pay would have
burdened the public treasury.
- Cannot sue state unless state waives right. No right against the entity that makes the
law from which that right depends.
- When government enters into a contract with a private person it is deemed to have
waived its immunity.
- Remedial or procedural laws cannot prevail over substantive justice. For example, if no
certification of non-forum shopping judges throw it out. Not anymore. SC said that if the
issue is very substantive, the lack of certification is a mere formal requirement. You can
ask the lawyer to simply comply.
- Statutes prescribing formalities of execution of a last will and testament, the formalities
are indispensable. This is to protect the will of the testator.
-

b. Strict construction

People v Subido
- Accused convicted of libel and sentenced to 3 months of arresto mayor with accessory
penalties. Was asked to pay a fine and indemnify the offended party with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Law was amended and took away the subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unfortunately for accused, said portion was
removed after he was imprisoned. Court said he would still have to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency because the amendment only refers to the removal
 of the imprisonment for inability to indemnify the offended party and NOT for inability
to pay the fine.

People v Purisima
- Body of P.D. 9 made it unlawful to carry blunt and sharp objects outside of your
residence if it has nothing to do with the source of your livelihood
- Preamble says that it is in line with P.D. 1081 and other laws that had for its object the
suppression of rebellion, sedition, and insurrection and other lawless violence. Petition
against Purisima for P.D. 9. Does P.D. 9 apply to Purisima? No. No evidence in the case
that Purisma and co. were going to use the weapons for rebellion, sedition, insurrection
and other lawless violence. AG says preamble shouldn’t be considered because it is not
really a part of the law. SC said no because preamble gives intent of legislation.
Preamble says P.D. 9 against crimes of rebellion, sedition and lawless violence.
Whatever is within the spirit of the law is within the law. Preamble is not strictly part of
statute, when statue is ambiguous preamble can be resorted to.

Canteno v Villlalon-Pornillos
- Involves senior citizens who are members of an organization. They launched a drive for
solicitation for renovation of their chapel. One of the persons they solicited from
happened to be a judge. The judge asked for their permit. PD 1564 which is the
solicitation permit law. Mandates that solicitations for charitable or public welfare
purposes require a permit from DSWD. They didn’t have. Judge brought a case against
them. They were found guilty and fined. There was a recommendation for pardon
because they didn’t know. Seniors filed motion for reconsideration. The motion landed
on respondent judge’s desk and he not only increased the fine, he sentenced them to 6
months imprisonment. He described their act of solicitation as perverse. Main issue is:
whether or not charitable purposes include religious purposes. Strict construction.
Charitable=public welfare purposes. SC said they are NOT one and the same. They
looked at constitution where charitable and religious purposes were mentioned
separately. This means they are not one and the same. While some religious purposes
may be construed as charitable, it does not always go the other way around. It is well-
entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed in favor of accused and strictly
against state. Since religious purpose not mentioned in PD 1564, it is not included in the
list of solicitations that require permit from DSWD.

c. Liberal Construction
- Such equitable construction that would enlarge the letter of the statute to accomplish
its intended purpose or promote justice.
- Construction that expands the meaning of the statute to meet cases that are clearly
within its spirit intended by legislature.
- However, even liberal construction cannot read into the law something that is clearly
and plainly rejected by its language
 - Statues that promote social justice, general welfare, or growth of civilization are liberally
construed. Commonly called general welfare legislation. Liberally construed in favor of
intended beneficiaries. Labor laws for example construed in favor of laborer.
- Procedural rules also are liberally construed under the principle that technical rules
cannot be allowed to override substantive justice.
- Tan v CA: enumerated a lot of instances when procedural rules may be relaxed: (1)
where the rigid application will result in manifest failure or miscarriage of justice; (2)
when the interest of substantial justice will be served better; (3) what is prayed for is
addressed to the discretion of the tribunal court and the tribunal court should make use
of its discretion favorably to the parties; (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is
not commensurate to the degree of thoughtless or non-compliance.

Quibuyen v CA
- Lawyer of petitioner made a mistake in attaching a wrong older of the trial judge when
they field their petition to appeal to the CA. Otherwise, petition for certiorari filed with
CA was sufficient in substance. Court held that it is a mere lapse on the part of the
lawyer. CA should not have dismissed the appeal on the ground that the wrong order
was attached. Remedial laws should be construed in order that the litigants may have
ample opportunity to prove their case and a possible denial of substantive justice due to
these technicalities be avoided.

XI. Mandatory and directory Statues

- Mandatory Statue: commands either (1) positively be done or performed in a particular
way or (2) negatively that something not be done.
- When statute is mandatory there is no choice but to obey. Court has no power to
distinguish between material and immaterial breach. The law must be obeyed under
pain of sanctions or declaration of nullity of what has been done.
- Directory statutes are permissive and discretionary in nature. Non-performance can
sometimes constitute an irregularity but it will not vitiate the proceedings.
- Classification of mandatory or directory is important because of the effect that be given
to the statue.
- Tests to determine: (1) language used like shall and may. Shall for mandatory, may for
directory but can see in cases that that can get turned around; (2) what are the
consequences for compliance or non-compliance. Consequence express spirit. If injury
will result or will substantial rights be effective.

In re Guarina
- Word being construed is “may”. Relevant law is section 2 of Act 1597. The law allows
the giving of the right to practice law to someone without taking the BAR provided that
person had been appointed to the position of a Justice or Judge under the American
Period including prosecuting attorney for city of Manila. Guarina was already a
prosecutor in Manila. He took the BAR and failed. He was already insisting that he
 should be allowed to practice under Section 2 because he had already been practicing as
a prosecutor. The law uses the word “may be license to practice law”. Court said verb
used was may therefore they can use their discretion. They chose not to allow him to
practice law because he failed the BAR showing his lack of qualification even though he
already served as a fiscal.

Dizon v Encarnacion
- Court said that the word “may” should be taken as “must” or “shall” when the intention
of the lawmaker is to give it a mandatory or compulsory meaning and that meaning is
patent or manifest but not otherwise.
- Plaintive is resident of Pamapangga and wanted to recover from respondent damages
for libelous and derogatory statements against him. Pleading was done in Zambales
where the libelous statements were issued. They are both residents of Pampangga
though. Art 363 of RPC says that “criminal and civil action for damages in cases of
written defamation shall be filed with the CFI where any of the accused or offended
parties reside at the time provided however that when the libel is exhibited in a
province or city where neither of the parties reside, the criminal and civil actions MAY
be brought in CFI of that place.” Dizon filed in Zambales. Encarnacion questioned that.
DIzon said that according to Art. 363 he can. Court said “may” is discretionary. But
“may” is not a blanket approval of whatever claimant wants to do. It merely gives him or
her an option. Have to look at the reason for the rule. One of the reasons is that you
cannot unduly burden the accused by filing an action very far from where you live when
you both live in the same place anyway. The court said “may” is an option but not a
blanket option. Look at intent and do not file where it would be very convenient.

De Mesa v v Mencias
- Court emphasized that where the statute provides for the doing of some act which is
required for justice or public duty or it invests the authority with power to take action
which concerns public interest or rights of individuals the permissive language will be
construed as mandatory and the execution of the power may be insisted upon as a duty.
- Election contest case. One of the contestants was assassinated during the pendency of
the case. Election code has no procedure when one party dies. Not even the Rules of
Proceudre of the electoral body have. Due to the absence, the Court applied Section 17
Rule 3 of ROC: Death of Party. It said there that “when party dies and claim is not
extinguished the court shall order upon proper notice the legal representative of the
deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased within a period of 30 days or
within such time as may be granted. IF the legal representative fails to appear in said
time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative.” Trial court did not apply the second sentence. Ordered the widow and
children to be the legal representatives and to appear. They were still grieving and it
was an election contest and they didn’t show up. 30 days passed and the court instead
of asking opposing party to procure a representative appointed somebody and ruled in
favor of the party they appointed. CA said second sentence does not apply to election
contests affirming lower court ruling. SC said second sentence applies to all litigations
 where one of the parties died including election contests to the same extent and the
same course as an ordinary civil action.

Diokno v Rehabilitation Finance Corp.

- Plaintive is holder of backpay certificate of indebtedness issued by treasurer of the
Philippines under RA 304. Under Section 2 of said law: “investment funds of banks or
other financial institutions owned or controlled by the Government shall subject to
availability of funds or any provisions of their charters etc etc accept or discount but not
more than 2% per annum for 10 years such certificate for purposes only of…” Diokno
had an indebtedness with respondent. He was giving his backpay certificate to pay his
indebtedness. RFC was government owned corp. RFC refused though. They said that if
they accept all the backpay certificates they would go bankrupt. Word used is shall so
Diokno said mandatory. Court said though that word shall is qualified by phrase:
“subject to availability of funds” and also qualified by the phrase: “discount is not more
than 2% per annum for 10 years”. The modifiers/qualifiers rendered the word into a
directory and not mandatory law. Now subject to certain requirements.

XII. Prospective and retroactive effect of statutes

- Prospective means it operates upon facts or transactions that occur after the statute
takes effect.
- Retroactive creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability
with respect to transactions already passed.
- Generally, laws operate prospectively unless a retroactive effect is expressly declared or
necessarily implied from the language of the law. Exception to this is: (1) penal laws
favorable to the accused unless accused is habitual offender; (2) procedural laws (all
procedure, no substantive content is presumptively applicable to all actions, even
pending actions except when law itself excludes application to pending statutes or if
would lead to injustice or impairing vested rights)
- Punitive statues are remedial by curing defects in earlier laws and adding to the means
of enforcing existing obligations can also be retroactively applied unless thkey impair
obligations of contracts or disturb veted rights. Exception to exception is police power
legislations. Autonomy of contracts and vested rights must yield to the legitimate
exercise of the power of legislator to prescribe regulations to promote health, welfare,
due order, safety etc.
- NCC Art 4
- Laws with retroactive application may be passed subject to limitations: (1) ex post facto
law; (2) non-impairment of obligations clause

Ferrer v Pacson
 - Accused disregarded a law that would have benefitted and kept invoking a prior statute
(Motor Vehicle Law) under which he was prosecuted. Another issue is jurisdiction (more
important). IF new law applied, the court that had acquired jurisdiction over the case
would’ve lost jurisdiction. At the time the complaint was filed the MTC had jurisdiction.

Ortigas v Feati Bank

- Ortigas and a bunch of places were being desitngated as parcels of land owned by
someone. When they sold it they had a contract with the buyers that even when it’s
transferred would still be kept as residential. Only residential houses may be built in said
areas. Developments occurred and the municipal council of Mandaluyong passed a
reolution designating the area as commercial. Meanwhile in the transfer of title, Feati
Bank bought one of the parcels of land and started to construct a bank. Ortigas and co.
sought to enjoin construction of said bank that their contract is specific and can only
make residential houses. SC said that the municipal resolution prevails over the
contract. It is a legitimate exercise of police power. Municipality of Mandaluyong merely
responded to a felt public need.

XIII. Effect of amendment, revision, codification and repeal

- Codification is a process of enacting laws. Putting laws of the same subject together and
reenacting such into a code. When a lot of laws have been passed regarding a singular
subject, congress finds it more expedient to gather all the laws and organize them in
such a way by titles. When revisions of this type are done, all other laws which were not
included in the new revised or codified law are deemed repealed. Exception to this is
the later law must cover the whole subject of the earlier law. It must be clear that the
new law is intended to be the substitute. Example is Administrative Code of 1987. It did
not cover all the topics in the old Admin Code so it cannot be said to have repealed it.
All matters not included in the Administratice Code of 1987 still stand in the old
Administrative Code. If the new Admin Code had included everything then the old code
would have been completely repealed. Used to have Katarungang Pangbaranggay law.
When the LGC code was included it included Baranggays the Katraungang
Pangbaranggay was impliedly repealed by the LGU code
- Laws are repealed only by later laws. NCC Art. 7
- Two kinds of repeal: Express and Implied. “All laws inconsistent with this act are
repealed” is an express repeal. Courts need only see if old law repugnant with new law.
- Repealed law ceases to exist.
- In implied repeal court still has to evaluate and see if the law is repugnant with old law.

XIV. Construction of Constitution

- Main rule is verba legis. Primary source from which to ascertain the intent of the laws of
the constitution is in the language of the provision itself. What it says. It is to be
assumed that words are couched to express the objective sought to be attained by the
provision. How do you look at the language of a constitution? Unless technical terms are
used, words must be given their ordinary meaning. The constitution is not drafted for
lawyers. It is drafted for the people as a whole. People need to ratify the constitution.
 How can we understand and ratify if the law is too technical. It is assumed that words
used In the Constitution should be interpreted in their ordinary meaning because that it
was the people who ratified it understood them to be. Also all the framers were not
lawyers.
- Second rule is: in case of ambiguity that’s when you go to ratio legis est anima doctrine.
Reason for law is its spirit. Legislative intent. Intention of framers.
- Constitution must be interpreted as a whole. One mandate in the constitution must not
be given more importance than the others except when the primacy of one over the
others is clear.
- Constitutional provisions are given prospective application.
- When penal laws are more favorable to accused can be given retroactive application.
Does this apply to the constitution? Court says no. Constitution is not a penal statute.
- Rule that waiver of counsel must be made in the assistance of counsel was held not to
be applicable to custodian investigations before ratification of 1987 Constitution
because it was not present in the previous constitution.
- Court recognized constitutional provisions are generally mandatory it also held that
there are exceptions. Such as “as may be provided by law”. Many provisions that have
not been implemented due to congress.
- Provisions generally self-executing. Unless provision itself says “as provided by law” you
don’t need the law to apply the provision.
- If consti says torture is crule punishment, consti said it’s not allowed so it still shouldn’t
be allowed. Anti-Torture Law merely provided penalties.

Sarmiento v MIson
- Mison appointed by Pres Cory as commissioner of bureau of customs. Taxpayers,
lawyers, members of IBP with class suit sought to enjoin Mison from performing his
functions saying his appointment should’ve passed through Commission on
Appointment. In the provision it is clear. President shall nominate with help of CA etc
etc… including officers of the armed forces from rank of colonel up. Second sentence
said “he shall also appoint all other officers of the government whose appointment are
not otherwise provided for by law and those he may be authorized by law to appoint.
Third sentence said congress may by law vest the appointment on other officers lower
in rank in the President alone. Complainants said second had “also” and that second
sentence applied to first sentence in that officers mentioned in the second sentence
also required concurrence of CA. Their argument is bolstered by that the third sentence
said “President alone” in that only the third group of appointees need not seek
concurrence from the CA. SC said that’s just style. Does not mean that President’s
appointment in the first sentences should pass through CA. SC made big discussion on
CA how 1987 Consti is middle ground of Marcos and 1935 where the President could
appoint anyone and the latter where every appointment needed concurrence. Only the
first sentence required CA approval.