Commentary: Academic Learning, Worker Learning, and the Hawthorne Studies

Author(s): Jeffrey Sonnenfeld

Source: Social Forces, Vol. 61, No. 3 (Mar., 1983), pp. 904-909
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2578143 .
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Commentary:Academic Learning, Worker
Learning, and the Hawthome Studies

JEFFREY SONNENFELD, HarvardBusinessSchool

After 50 years, the debate over the significance of the Hawthorne Studies
(Roethlisbergerand Dickson;Whitehead)rages on in our professionaljour-
nals. These studies have been credited with inspiring major redirectionin
the disciplines of sociology, psychology, ard social anthropology,as well as
helping to precipitate the emerging fields of social psychology, industrial
relations, and organizationbehavior. Nonetheless, this researchdeveloped
two schools of hardened critics. The ideological critics complained about
the treatmentof class conffict(e.g., Bell;Kerr;Mills), whereas the method-
ological criticscomplained about the study conditions, the researchdesign,
and the data analysis (e.g., Carey;Frankeand Kaul;Parsons,a, b). Pitcher's
recent article in SocialForcescogently used the arguments of Hawthorne
defenders Schlaifer and Wardwellto refute the charges of the prominent
methodological critics Frankeand Kaul and Carey.He further discredited
these criticsthrough an interesting reinspection of the original study data.
Pitcher supported the Hawthorne conclusion that the increased produc-
tivity of the workers studied in the famed Relay Assembly Testroom phase
of the researchwas best explained as a consequence of the passage of time.
Unfortunately, however, he used passage of time as a surrogate for in-
creased task experience, and thus explained the continuous trend upward
in worker productivity as the result of greater worker competence or task
learning. A review of the official Hawthorne records and conversations
with the surviving study participants, however, casts a shadow of doubt
on this learning hypothesis.

Background

The learning hypothesis was best clarifiedby H. M. Parsons(a, b) when he

suggested that the output trends in the Relay Assembly Test Room were
due to increased skill and competence ratherthan due to the sheer desire to
work harderas induced by the the growing social conmmitment to the work
group and the research project. The original study report (Roethlisberger
?
1983 The University of North Carolina Press. 0037-77321831030904-09$00.60
904

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 Commentary/ 905

and Dickson) suggested that employee participationin decision-making,

friendlier,less draconiansupervision, and cooperative group norms were
the sort of conditions which, over time, contributedmore to the increasing
productivity than any of the more intended physical and extrinisiccondi-
tions (e.g., rest breaks, and the length of the day). Counter theories, how-
ever, based on "ManagerialDiscipline" and the Great Depression as ex-
planatory conditions have been offered by Cary and Frankeand Kaul and
continue to be recycled (e.g., Bartlemand Locke).
These critics, however, have been thoroughly discredited on both
statistical grounds (Pitcher; Schlaifer) and on their historical accuracy
(Shepard;Wardwell).For example, the Great Depression had not yet hit at
the time of these Relay Assembly Test Room findings. In fact, this period
was a boom period for the company and was markedby massive expansion
of production capacity (Sonnenfeld, a). A second variableinvoked by the
critics suffers similar factual confusion. This was the "managerial disci-
pline" charge, implying that two workers were dismissed for not cooperat-
ing with the study. The records, however, show that these two workers
were unhappy in the study and were merely returned to their old jobs on
the main shop floor. Rather than threaten the remaining workers, it was
likely that this move was to their delight. The frictions between the two
replaced workers and those who remained was so great that this second
clique actually requested this transferof their colleagues. Finally,the indi-
vidual worker output records indicate no noticeable change in pattern
around the time of the transfer(Sonnenfeld, b).

The Leaming Hypothesis

The learning hypothesis advanced by Parsons, however, has not yet been
so weakened. He too looked at extrinsic variables, in this case, the im-
proved reinforcementconditions and the regularperformancefeedbackas
the source of the increased worker output. The use of the piece rate pay-
ment, a smallergroup, and a novel mechanicalrecordingdevice to measure
output, were the conditions thus highlighted.
With regard to the incentive scheme, when a second relay assembly
group was formed on the main shop floor and put on a similarsmall group
piece rate, productionquickly increased by 12 percent and then leveled off.
Even in the Relay Assembly Test Room, the new incentive scheme was in
place for six months before there was any substantial increase in output.
With the second condition of the learning hypothesis, the regular perfor-
mance feedback, we again see a good deal of ambiguity. The workers
received as much feedback on performance before the study as they did
during the study. While still on the main shop floor, workers knew how
many blocks they started with on a given day and knew what they had

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906 / Social Forces Volume 61:3, March 1983

achieved. Furthermore,they received verbal performancefeedback from a

supervisor each day.
In accepting these faulty factual presumptions, Pitcher contributed
to the learning hypothesis by fitting a standard learning curve to the out-
put data for each worker. Pitcher suggested that such learning could be
modeled through the equation:
dLIL= h dPIP
which"... assumes simply that the relative improvement in performance
(dLlL) is a constant proportion (h) of relative increases in practice(dP/P)"
(138). To operationalize these variables, he substituted the output data for
learning (L) and the passage of time for accumulatedpractice(P).
One might question this procedure first on the assumption of a
constant rate of learning and second on the substitution of time for the
variableseeking to represent accumulatedpractice. In particular,did prac-
tice really increase with time? Although very young women, each of the
workers was already an experienced assembler. This assembly process was
not a very complex task, but involved 50 different movements. Even so,
the relays were frequently varied throughout the study. A change in relay
meant a radical change in movement, thus suggesting discontinuities in
the learning curve-a finding not suggested by either the originalresearch
reports or by Pitcher.
In addition, such learning curve performanceimprovements imply
a looseness in the projected piece rates. The possibility of some looseness
in piece rates was acknowledged by Roethlisbergerand Dickson, but dis-
carded as an unlikely inference since the piecework rate used to convert all
the relays to a standard relay were older well-tested conversions. White-
head devoted an entire chapter to the discussion of the effects of changing
types of relays and found no relationship between weekly type changes
and weekly output rate. Thus it is less likely that increased competence
explains increased output.
This lack of increase in potential skills challenges the logic of Par-
sons' information feedback explanation. Parsons had also speculated on
the test room's special output recording device as an instrument which
contributed more performance feedback, thereby aiding learning curve
effects. But Parsons' interpretationis also challenged on this assumption.
Even on the main shop floor, such informationwas provided, although by
an instructressratherthan a machine. Wrege has presented inany research
reports and company records from the earlier illumination studies which
indicated increased productivitywithout the benefit of any special record-
ing devices.

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 Commentary/ 907

Views of the Participants

Finally,my recent interviews with the relay assembly test room supervisor,
Donald Chipman, and three of the five workers, WandaBeilfus, Theresa
Zajonc, and Mary Volango, raise further doubts about the uniqueness of
the test room as a learning environment. The supervisor commented that
even back in the main department, each worker had a good deal of perfor-
mance feedback:
... each girl knew at the end of the day or the following morning, firstthing
the next morning, what her output had been for the day before .. . and they knew
what the norm was and they knew what the output was, and what poor perfor-
mance was ... everybody knew what the day's output was....
Similarly, the women commented that they always received performance
feedback out in the main department. One commented,
The instructressalways took care of your output . .. you also knew by the number
of blocks you started and ended with ... but the supervisor would still let you
know.
They denied getting any more information on performance personally
when they were in the test room. Another commented,
I think we always kept track of our work. We knew, of course, if we had
small lots. You see, they'd go by piece parts, how many piece parts in each, each
relay has a different amount of piece parts. You could time yourself by the box
of parts.
Finally, the women stated that they enjoyed playing games with the re-
cording machine. In particular,they tried to match up the punched-out
dots tracingthe output of each worker. Mary Volango confided,
Theresa and I were kind of young, always goofing. So Theresa would drop
her relay and say, let's wait for another, so until they got wise to us, those little dots
were just even.

Conclusions

Thus the fundamental components of the learning hypothesis are highly

questionable. The different wage incentive had dubious results in the other
study conditions and never contributed to a steady increase in output.
Similarly,the notion of daily performancefeedback to the workers was not
novel or superior for workers in the relay assembly test room. It is tempt-
ing, at this point, to quote Pitcher's own wise admonition to Franke and
Kaulback to him and others of this approach, "Statisticalanalysis is mean-

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908 / Social Forces Volume 61:3, March1983

ingless, however, when the substantive evidence does not support the
assumptions underlying the analysis" (146).
The workers participating in the Hawthorne studies interviewed
here had never read any of the published manuscriptson the research,but
in their opinions, the importantconditions which contributedto their im-
proved performancewere the test room characteristicswhich encourageda
cooperative group culture. Pitcher's learning curve plot supports the im-
portantobservationof a steady, consistent upward trend in the output data
over time. This indisputable central issue is regularlyignored by scores of
other critics. But Pitcher has by no means demonstrated the legitimacy of
substituting accumulated practice for the passage of time. The passage of
time is the key variable, and any other surrogate is merely unsupported
speculation. The original Hawthorne reports, however, provided a good
deal of evidence to support the view that the social conditions of the study
led to increased effort, as opposed to increased competence over time.
Nonetheless, the Hawthome critics misunderstand the position on
financial incentives taken by the investigators. While critics have implied
that the Hawthorne investigators rejected the notion of financial rewards
in favor of social rewards, Roethlisbergerand Dickson only claimed that
financial rewards, physical factors, and social factors must all be consid-
ered as part of a total mix for their impact to be understood. They state this
multivariateapproach to incentive effectiveness as follows:
... such factors as hours of work and wage incentives were not things in
themselves having an independent effect upon employee efficiency, rather these
factors were no more than part of a total situation and their effects could not be
predictedapart from the total situation (185).
The Hawthorne Studies challenged the notions of scientific man-
agement which then prevailed in industry. Viewing the workplace as a
social system, rather than merely a production system, is unquestionably
useful from the points of view of social scientificaccuracy,researchuseful-
ness, managerialvalue, and social justice. Given such unusual breadth of
validity and significance, one must question just whose interest is truly
served by continuing this tired historical debate. Perhaps we should de-
velop a learning hypothesis about academicians which is different from
that for other workers.

References
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