World Cup 2018 Tactical Analysis

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World Cup
Tactical Analysis
Report
by
Keith Scarlett
Published by
WORLD CLASS COACHING
First published July, 2018 by

WORLD CLASS COACHING 12851 Flint St Overland Park, KS 66213
Copyright © WORLD CLASS COACHING 2018
All rights reserved. No parts of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or
transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise,
without prior written permission of the publisher.
Edited by Tom Mura

Authors: Keith Scarlett
Cover Art: Barrie Bee
©WORLD CLASS COACHING 2 World Cup Tactical Analysis Report
Table of Contents
1. Introduction Page 4
2. A More Detailed Look at the Tournament Field Page 10
3. Argentina Page 12
4. Australia Page 15
5. Belgium Page 17
6. Brazil Page 19
7. Colombia Page 21
8. Costa Rica Page 23
9. Croatia Page 24
10. Denmark Page 26
11. Egypt Page 28
12. England Page 30
13. France Page 32
14. Germany Page 34
15. Iceland Page 36
16. Iran Page 37
17. Japan Page 38
18. Korea Republic Page 39
19. Mexico Page 41
20. Morocco Page 43
21. Nigeria Page 45
22. Panama Page 46
23. Peru Page 47
24. Poland Page 48
25. Portugal Page 49
26. Russia Page 51
27. Saudi Arabia Page 53
28. Senegal Page 54
29. Serbia Page 55
30. Spain Page 56
31. Sweden Page 58
32. Switzerland Page 60
33. Tunisia Page 62
34. Uruguay Page 63
©WORLD CLASS COACHING 3 World Cup Tactical Ana
2018 FIFA World Cup

…Oh Russia, what a tournament you gave us!
Introduction
Well we made it. 30 days of unrelenting emotional twists and 64 matches to keep us on
the edge of our seats. It is all over for this go around and a new Champion has been
crowned. History has been buffed and we have seen things that we thought we would
never see and some things we probably wished we had not.
Therefore, a question that may be bouncing around in the back of your mind about now
is, “how do we break down this World Cup now that it’s over and what do we take from
it?” Analysts, sports casters, networks and amateurs alike have been and will continue
to do just that for the next four years until the world reconvenes once again in Qatar, but
for now see what we can draw from what has transpired this summer.
Therefore, read on to find out everything you need to know concerning the 2018 FIFA
World Cup in Russia; as we break down every nation including trends, adaptations and
even some nuances that you may want to keep an eye on as the game continually
develops.
Let us Begin by Taking a Broad and General Overall Look at the Entire
Tournament
It was one entire month of an exhilarating football extravaganza at the 2018 FIFA World
Cup in Russia. The world’s most prestigious stage for football featured spectacular
plays and performances from both football juggernauts and football underdogs. Tears of
joy as well as the salty tears of distraught were ultimately shed from all of the
participating nations over the course of the tournament. France secured just their
second title ever with a thrilling 4-2 win over Croatia, capping a month of thrilling, edge
of your seat football.
Here are some initial and general thoughts on some of the triumphs and failures; as well
as what the future holds for the World Cup participants.
The standard of international football is on the decline
It is a shame to begin with a negative, but aside from Portugal vs. Spain and France vs.
Belgium, we did not see too many genuinely high quality games of football at this
tournament.
That is not to say a football match can’t be entertaining unless both teams are firing on
all cylinders, and sometimes the best spectacles are riddled with defensive errors and
poor finishing, but it’s hard to deny that international football has fallen some way
behind its club equivalent of late.
The ‘big’ teams don’t need to perform to have a good tournament
On paper, nations like Russia, Denmark and Sweden should have no right to make it as
far as a World Cup quarter-final, but the lack of quality across the board meant it felt like
anyone could beat anyone at this tournament, and that randomness made things a lot
more interesting.
A 48-team World Cup would be a bad idea
Participating at a World Cup is a wonderful thing and the opportunity to be involved

should be open to as many nations as possible.
But, that doesn’t mean we should dilute the quality of the competition even further by
inviting an extra 16 teams to future tournaments.
When it comes to the World Cup, 32 is the magic number and this year, only one or two
whipping boys were present at the party (Panama and Saudi Arabia).
If anything, FIFA should probably be looking to reduce the number of teams at the
World Cup, and they only need to look at what expanding the European Championship
from 16 to 24 did to that tournament two years ago.
VAR isn’t such an awful idea after all
When FIFA announced, mere months before the tournament began, that they’d be
diving head first into VAR at the 2018 World Cup, it seemed like a recipe for disaster.
But in reality, it actually worked pretty well. The disruption to the flow of play was
minimal; it gave referees more conviction in their decision-making and brought a greater
degree of fairness to the game.
There are still a few flaws to be ironed out, but even the staunchest VAR sceptics must
admit that it’s worked a lot better than expected.
And …
It’s going to lead to lots more penalties
Like it or not, VAR is here to stay and if penalties are your thing, it seems there are
going to be a lot more of more of them in future.
In total, there were 29 penalties awarded at the 2018 World Cup, which is a whopping
16 more than we saw in Brazil four years ago.
The worst thing you can be at a World Cup is the reigning champion
Germany became the third World Cup holder in a row – after Spain and Italy – to be
eliminated at the group stage this year.
It’s a curious phenomenon. How can a team go from greatness to hopeless in just four
short years? Is it complacency?
Whatever it is, France had better guard against it when they head to Qatar in 2022.
We’re still no closer to settling the Ronaldo v Messi debate
What with Lionel Messi’s struggles with Argentina and Cristiano Ronaldo’s goals for
Portugal, the early part of the tournament was dominated by talk of which of them
deserves to go down as the greatest footballer of all time.
In the end, neither of them added a World Cup winners’ medal to their extensive
collections, and there’s a good chance they never well.
Kylian Mbappé will be the star of the next generation
He’s won two Ligue 1 titles, the Coupe de France, the Coupe de la Ligue and now the
World Cup.
He’s the most expensive teenager ever, the first teenager to score in a World Cup final
since Pelé in 1958 and this year, he was awarded Young Player of the Tournament.
126 senior games, 56 goals, 33 assists. Kylian Mbappé is still only 19-years-old.
Luka Modrić is the best midfielder in the world
Modrić brought his excellent Real Madrid form to football’s biggest stage this summer,
and though he’ll have been devastated to end the final on the losing side, his Golden
Ball award offered a small crumb of comfort.
He thoroughly deserved it too. The 32-year-old played more minutes and covered more
ground than anyone else at the tournament covered, and was an absolute class act
every time he stepped onto the pitch. You’ll do well to find a better midfield performance
than his against Argentina in the group stage.
Europe rules the world in football terms
France’s triumph this summer means 12 of the 21 World Cups staged throughout
history have now been won by European nations, with the other nine going to teams
from South America.
Given the amount money that’s been pumped into the development of football in Europe
over the years, it’s hardly a surprise that it currently rules the roost.
But the big question remains, just who will be the first nation to break Europe’s and
South America’s World Cup hegemony?
Set-pieces have become even more important
Possibly with the help of VAR, referees seem to be less tolerant of holding at corners
and free kicks which could give more opportunities for attacking players from dead-ball
situations.
This became a set-piece World Cup and two of the best at it - winners France and
fourth-placed England - went deep in the competition.
If arbiters continue to clamp down on defensive misdemeanours there could well

be more to come from the set-piece aces with France grabbing the all-important first
goal from either a set-piece or penalty in every knockout match.
No point obsessing over managerial ability
All four semi-finalists had question marks regarding their managers heading into the
tournament but a harmonious squad is probably more important than a tip-top tactical
guru.
We have become obsessed with the superstar managers and their philosophies in club
football, particularly in the Premier League, yet international football tends to be
different.
Arguably the best club boss was Argentina's Jorge Sampaoli and he was a shambles in
Russia, whereas the likes of Gareth Southgate, Roberto Martinez and Zlatko Dalic
managed to create a unity that made up for misgivings about other parts of their
managerial ability.
Martinez can probably count himself most unlucky as he barely put a foot wrong,
changing his approach when needed and Belgium just fell on the wrong side of the
draw.
There is still enough time for the third-placed Belgians to turn from the bronze
generation to the golden generation and compensation could come in the inaugural
2018-19 Nations League with the 11-2 Red Devils in a soft group alongside Switzerland
and Iceland.
African countries were unlucky
No continent gets a rougher deal from the qualification process than Africa but the fact
that none of their teams made the last 16 was down to misfortune rather than a lack of
ability.
Egypt were handicapped by not having a fully-fit Mohamed Salah, Morocco played
some magical football for the reward of one paltry point, Nigeria (the youngest squad at
the tournament) grew into the finals to suggest their future is bright, Tunisia were
decimated by injuries but still scored five goals and Senegal were mugged by the
terrible rule of separating deadlocked sides on a yellow card count.
A More Detailed Look at the Tournament Field
At the end, France were the worthy winners of a magnificent World Cup, which the FIFA
president Gianni Infantino described as the “best-ever”. Croatia punched above their
weight and had a golden run in the tournament, and they might still be smarting over the
controversial penalty that tilted the balance in France’s favour in the final. But when the
dust settles, Zlatko Dalic and his boys would admit that they lost to a superior side.
Croatia were the better team in the first half. But they eventually ran out of legs.
From the fans’ point of view, it was indeed a World Cup to remember. A total of 169
goals had been scored in 64 matches – an average 2.6 goals per match. The
tournament gave us only one goalless draw – a group league fixture between France
and Denmark, where both sides had been booed off. And exhilaratingly, unlike the
previous two editions, the final, too, wasn’t a cagey affair. This World Cup actually
revelled in the trickle-down effect of the positive and forward-thinking approach in club
football in the top European leagues. The philosophy of the Guardiolas, the Klopps and
the Sarris has changed the whole outlook towards the game. Winning without style is no
longer appreciated.
This World Cup also ushered in a generational shift. Kylian Mbappe, only 19, and the
young player of the tournament, sizzled. Lionel Messi’s dreams, on the other hand,
fizzled. Cristiano Ronaldo, too, slowed down a bit after a scintillating start. Messi would
be 35 in 2022, while Ronaldo would turn 37. So even if the two greats turn up in Qatar,
their best years would be behind them.
France, though, should build on their World Cup triumph and dominate world football for
the next few years. A side that boasts of the likes of Paul Pogba, Antoine Griezmann,
N’Golo Kante, Benjamin Pavard, Lucas Hernandez, Raphael Varane, Samuel Umtiti –
all in their 20s – will only get better. Mbappe, the kid, has the world at his feet.
Brazil can match France, talent-wise. They were a tad unlucky to lose against Belgium
in the quarterfinal. Belgium had only three shots on target and they scored twice. Brazil,
on the other hand, had 23 goal-scoring attempts. After being taken aback by the
Belgium manager Roberto Martinez’s formation switch – Kevin de Bruyne as a false-
nine, with Romelu Lukaku in a wide role – the Selecao came back strongly in the
second half. At one point, it became Team Brazil versus Thibaut Courtois. Woodwork
denied them once. Another referee might have awarded them a penalty for Vincent
Kompany’s mistimed challenge on Gabriel Jesus inside the Belgian box. Brazil didn’t
get the rub of the green, but the young team have a bright future ahead.
Uruguay, too, impressed. They badly missed Edinson Cavani against France in the
quarterfinal. But their performance showed serious progress. Argentina, however, will
have to get out of Messi’s shadow. This is their biggest challenge, going into the next
World Cup. And Germany must reboot, like they did following their Euro 2000 group
stage elimination.
Belgium thrived on their golden generation, but they are not yet a complete side like
France or Brazil. Gareth Southgate unfettered England and took the Three Lions to the
semifinal. A corner has been turned but this is just the beginning.
The Asian teams gave a good account of themselves. Japan reached the knockout
stage and had Belgium on the brink. South Korea beat Germany. But the Asian teams
still have a long way to go to be a on a par with the world elite. Africa had a
disappointing World Cup.
Now let us take a better look at every team in the field of the 2018 FIFA World Cup.
ARGENTINA
Formations: 4-2-3-1, 4-4-2, 4-3-3
How they fared:
Finished 2nd in Group D
Lost to France 3-4 in Round of 16
Draw 1-1 Iceland
Loss 0-3 Croatia
Won 2-1 Nigeria
Loss 3-4 France (Round of 16)
Argentina’s coach Jorge Sampaoli lined Messi up in a false nine position with Gonzalo
Higuain trading time with Pavon.
Throughout this tournament, Argentina were unable to settle on either a single line up or
system for any two games, sometimes even changing systems within games. Usually,
Sampaoli chose to start Messi in a false nine position while playing Angel Di Maria and
Pavon on either side of him. In theory, this was to bypass the defensive overload and
then make use of Messi’s dropping movements to overload the midfield and progress
the ball forward. The problem was that they were trying to replicate the role that Messi
played for Barcelona under Pep Guardiola and they were unsuccessful because at
Barcelona they would use inverted wingers to attack the space behind the defence and
Argentina played with wide wingers hugging the touchline. What happened was that
when Messi came into midfield, he was man marked. Messi would then have to move
out wide and was no direct threat to goal.
Argentina played so much from wide areas that sometimes even their central
midfielders moved wide. This also had an impact on their ability to control any counter
attacks.
When Aguero was brought on for Pavon, Argentina’s shape shifted to a 4-2-3-1 with
Messi playing behind the striker. Di Maria would switch to the right and began to dribble
inside more. This would open up more outlets for Messi
Here we can see a passmap that shows their focus on wide build up with
absolutely no central threat. Pavon is more or less on the same line with Messi
with no diagonal movement
AUSTRALIA
Formations: 4-2-3-1
How they fared:
Finished Last in Group C
Loss 1-2 France
Draw 1-1 Denmark
Loss 0-2 Peru
Australia was deployed in a 4-2-3-1. Aaron Mooy and Mile Jedinak protected the back
line while Andrew Nabbout was lead the attack, supported by Tom Rogic, who played
the number 10 role.
Initially, it looked as though Australia may have been outclassed. However, after a
steady start, they never really looked to be out of their comfort zone. They were
intelligent in possession and did not force the issue.
In their game against France, their full-backs moved higher and they looked to build
short from goalkeeper Mat Ryan. Mooy and Jedinak helped create a central box of four.
Initially their build-up was clean. Intelligent movement from left-winger Robbie Kruse
pulled right-backs out of position. This allowed Aziz Behich to go forward from left-back.
Despite this, they lacked the creativity and pace needed to trouble anyone’s back line.
When on defense, Australia maintained a mid-block. They would rarely press, instead
looking to shield and cover. This did frustrated opponents, as they would throw both full-
backs forward and create maximum attacking width. In doing this, they were able to
counter-attack.
When their front line failed to recover, both full-backs would pushed forward and overlap
the wingers. Kruse’s movement was vital in pulling the opposite right-back out, which
allowed Nabbout to attack crosses with more space.
Australia had a problem maintaining any possession, yet it was a decent effort from
Australia, and they should take confidence from this performance in to their next
tournament.
BELGIUM
Formations: 3-4-3, 5-4-1, 5-3-2
How they fared:
Finished First in Group G
Beat England 2-0 for 3rd Place
Won 3-0 Panama
Won 5-2 Tunisia
Won 1-0 England
Won 3-2 Japan (Round of 16)
Won 2-1 Brazil (Quarterfinals)
Loss 0-1 France (Semifinals)
Won 2-0 England (Consolation)
Belgium won their opening five games. Eden Hazard and Romelu Lukaku scored a
significant amount of goals and Kevin de Bruyne played the playmaker role.
Belgium played with a 3-4-3 that was fluid and savvy.
To make use of Kevin de Bruyne's play making skills, one of the central
midfielders needs to take on the defensive duties, otherwise the team is left vulnerable
and with slow centre-backs like Vertonghen and Alderweireld, it becomes easier to be
countered. Axel Witsel was the perfect supplement for de Bruyne in the center of the
park.
When on defense, they drop into a 5-4-1 or a 5-3-2. Yannick Carrasco and Thomas
Meunier usually drop to the backline while De Bruyne creates from a deeper position.
This allows them to keep defensive shape and deny spaces between the lines.
Belgium has fabulous midfielders. Witsel and de Bryune starter while Youri Tielemans,
Moussa Dembele, Nacer Chadli and Marouane Fellaini come off the bench.
Their wingbacks are Thomas Meunier on the right and Yannick Carrasco on the left.
Carrasco is actually a left-winger playing as a left backs due Martinez choosing no left-
backs in his 23-man squad.
Meunier is able to get forward, which enables Dries Merten to take a central role behind
Romelu Lukaku.
De Bruyne plays in behind which allows him to pick-off passes and create.
Witsel is slightly advanced to de Bruyne and serves as linkage between the two
wingbacks. He wins balls centrally which protects the backline, helps stops counter-
attacks and initiates transition/counters of their own.
Dembele can dribble past opponents and set the pace of the game as can Fellaini.
They also have an outstanding attack with Romelu Lukaku, Dries Mertens and Eden
Hazard up front in their 3-4-3. This trio has speed, positioning, physicality and
movement and are supported by Meunier and Carrasco on the wings who. The three of
them link up pretty well and play close to each other.
Hazard had a free role to roam behind Lukaku, made possible by Carrasco and
Vertonghen taking a defensive responsibility on the left.
Lukaku runs the channels and along with Mertens takes up a central role in the final
third.
BRAZIL
Formations: 4-3-3
How they fared:
Finished First in Group E
Lost to Belgium 1-2 in Quarterfinals
Draw 1-1 Switzerland
Won 2-0 Costa Rica
Won 2-0 Serbia
Won 2-0 Mexico (Round of 16)
Loss 1-2 Belgium (Quarterfinals)
Brazil played a 4-3-3 with a staggered midfield of holding player, box-to-box player, plus
a playmaker or attacking midfielder. One wide man works and creates, while the other
looks to become the second striker and is often the most advanced player.
The average positions often show the striker at the top of a diamond midfield with Jesus
as deep as Philippe Coutinho, with Neymar the furthest forward.
When Brazil introduced Firmino, they added him to the Neymar and Jesus mix, rather
than him replacing one of them. However, this meant removing the impressive Willian
who was equally vital to the overall plan or even Coutinho, who is their best player.
This graphic shows just how stingy Brazil was defensively against Mexico.
COLOMBIA
Formations: 4-2-3-1, 3-2-4-1, 3-4-2-1
How they fared:
Finished First in Group H
Draw with England 1-1 in Round of 16 (England advanced on penalties)
Lost 1-2 Japan
Won 3-0 Poland
Won 1-0 Senegal
Draw 1-1 England (Round of 16) *England advanced on penalties
Jose Pekerman favoured the 4-2-3-1 during this World Cup with James Rodriquez
taking up the left side of the three attacking mids in behind the lone striker Radamel
Falcao. Quintero maintained his position as the #10 in the side.
Juan Cuadrado is very important as the main source of crosses. He is the main outlet,
looking to build-up through the center and isolate him on the right.
Colombia push their fullbacks high to provide width. They play high tempo once they
enter the opposition half and are very direct. Though he started out wide left, Rodriguez
rarely stayed on the flanks consistently moved centrally. He had to be careful, however,
not to interfere with Quintero’s positioning. They would each play off each other with
James mostly on the left and Quintero on the right. Quintero would drop for James
creating space. They both seemed to have the same role in terms of possession,
looking to play the final ball or spread the ball out wide. Either one, depending on the
location of the ball, would drop to receive. When James dropped this allowed Mojica,
the Colombian left back, to move higher compensating for the width that Rodriguez was
not providing.
Quintero was Colombia’s best player of the tournament. He is a good playmaker and
carries the ball well. These attributes where exemplified when James’ was added to the
mix. Quintero would drop deeper trying to link up with James.
When Colombia tried to build-up from the back they would resemble a 3-2-4-1 or a 3-4-
2-1. Barrios would drop into the backline while Quintero dropped deeper along with
Aguilar/Uribe.
They were unafraid to cross the ball even if Falcao was the only target. They focused on
wining the ball back centrally with Quintero and James lead the first line of pressure.
COSTA RICA
Formations: 5-2-3, 5-4-1
How they fared:
Finished Last in Group E
Loss 0-1 Serbia
Loss 0-2 Brazil
Draw 2-2 Switzerland
Costa Rica played in a 5-2-3, with David Guzman and Celso Borges in central midfield
and while Bryan Ruiz, Johan Venegas and Marco Urena in attack.
This made it easier to transition into their defensive shape. They would end-up playing
rather direct with the first pass from Keylor Navas going to a center-back and the next
pass almost always going direct to one of the forwards.
None of opponents had trouble dealing with this. The deeper they got into the
tournament, the more possession and space they conceded. Their only method of
attack was via the counter-attack.
Unfortunately, to counter they would need to commit bodies forward which left them
open to a counter-attack themselves.
Never-the-less, Costa Rica were quite organized and compact when they didn’t have
the ball. They would drop into a 5-4-1 with Bryan Oviedo and Cristian Gamboa played
out wide of the three center-backs. Venegas and Ruiz would drop in with Guzman and
Borges to make a midfield four behind Urena.
Costa Rica were content with conceding possession in their offensive half only pressing
to force mistakes rather than winning the ball.
CROATIA
Formations: 4-3-3
How they fared:
Finished First in Group D
Lost 2-4 to France in the Final
Won 2-0 Nigeria
Won 3-0 Argentina
Won 2-1 Iceland
Draw 1-1 Denmark (Round of 16) *Croatia advances on penalties
Draw 2-2 Russia (Quarterfinals) *Croatia advances on penalties
Won 2-1 England (Semifinals)
Loss 2-4 France (Final)
Croatia succeeded with their 4-3-3 structure using Sime Vrsaljko as a high right-back to
combine with Ante Rebic ahead of him.
While free to go wherever, Luka Modric and Ivan Rakitic would usually drop into deeper
central positions where they could both receive inside of and drive around the sides of
the forwards. This is how they would penetrate the first line of defense. This would free-
up the Croatian full-backs, who could then combine with their wingers.
Strinic in particular made this work along the left-side, and as a result, was often an
unattached passing target during attacking transitions.
Here we see how wide-open Strinic often was:
DENMARK
Formations: 4-2-3-1, 4-4-2
How they fared:
Finished 2nd in Group C
Draw with Croatia 1-1 in Round of 16 (Croatia advanced on penalties)
Won 1-0 Peru
Draw 1-1 Australia
Draw 0-0 France
Draw 1-1 Croatia (Round of 16) *Croatia advances on penalties
Denmark used a 4-2-3-1 with Thomas Delaney and Andreas Christensen as the deep
central midfielders. Martin Braithwaite and Yussuf Poulsen supported Andreas
Cornelius from width, while Christian Eriksen played in the number 10 position.
They were very direct, either sending the ball long for Cornelius, Braithwaite or Poulsen
to run in behind or sending the ball directly to Cornelius, with Eriksen dropping a few
yards deeper look to receive the knockdown and create from a more advanced position.
Unfortunately, Eriksen rarely got on the ball in deeper positions.
The only other way they attacked was through Jonas Knudsen’s long throw.
When Denmark dropped attacking players in between the lines they had more control of
proceedings. Passing options opened-up and space in behind was created.
When they lost the ball they would drop into a 4-4-2 formation, with Eriksen paired with
Cornelius in the front two. They would try and get opponents to play direct while
restricting supply into any playmakers.
They were very compact between units which made it difficult for a team to receive
between the lines, which encouraged more direct play. With their size, Denmark were
more confident in dealing with those types of balls.
EGYPT
Formations: 4-2-3-1, 4-1-4-1, 4-4-2
How they fared:
Finished Last in Group A
Loss 0-1 Uruguay
Loss 1-3 Russia
Loss 1-2 Saudi Arabia
Egypt used a 4-2-3-1 formation with Mohamed Elneny and Tarek Hamed playing deep
centrally. Amr Warda, Abdallah Said and Trezeguet supported Marwan Mohsen
(against Uruguay) and then Mo Salah (vs. Russia and Saudi Arabia) in attack.
Extremely cautious in possession and very reluctant to commit numbers forward in fear
of being hit by a counter-attack, only one full-back at a time would join, leaving three
defenders and the two deep central midfielders behind. These two would operate either
on the ball or behind but never in front, unless the center-backs had possession.
All Egypt did was sit-back, defend and look to counter. Because they were very rigid
defensively opponents committed more numbers forward, making the counter a real
possibility.
Egypt looked clueless when in possession. If not on the counter, they would try to serve
from deep and wide positions.
On the other-hand, Egypt showed a little more quality when defending. They would drop
into a 4-1-4-1 formation or a 4-4-2 formation. The differences between the two were
key.
When in a 4-1-4-1, they dominated central areas and any ability to play between the
lines. However, when in a 4-4-2, there were more gaps between the defensive and
midfield lines that opponents would try and exploit. This would cause Hamed to drop
from the midfield to a holding position pulling Said into his place and leaving Mohsen or
Salah to lead the first line alone. When Said either joined them in pressing or did not
recover, Hamed had to join Elneny in the midfield.
Egypt’s strating 11:
ENGLAND
How they fared:
Finished 2nd in Group G
Lost to Belgium 0-2 in Consolation
Won 2-1 Tunisia
Won 6-1 Panama
Loss 0-1 Belgium
Draw 1-1 Colombia (Round of 16) *England advance on penalties
Won 2-0 Sweden (Quarterfinals)
Lost 1-2 Croatia (Semifinals)
Lost 0-2 Belgium (Consolation)
Setting up in a 3-5-2 formation, Gareth Southgate instilled playing out from the back.
This was the reason why Kyle Walker was a right-sided center back with John Stones
and Maguire on his sides. John Stones’ passing ability helped determine the direction in
which the ball progressed either to Walker or Jordan Henderson, or by playing a line
breaking pass into the midfield.
When there was no pressure on the English backline Walker and Maguire were able to
dribble forwards and advance the ball.
Lingard’s role as the #8 is critical as the most sought players in build-up. His interaction
with Alli (or Loftus-Cheek) as well as the wingbacks is key to how England progress the
ball.
The midfield showed variation at times dropping in and out, especially on the right side
to open space for Trippier. This ensured whoever was marking him followed, not always
to take the vacant space, but sometimes to force the opposing fullback to choose how
to defend.
Running a moderated press that aimed at winning the ball out wide, England dropped
into a 5-3-2 when on defense. The nearside center mid pressed once they crossed
midfield, supported by the wingback who would mark the opposite winger. Using the
touchline as an extra defender, England would try to win the ball back and then break.
Jordan Henderson’s role centrally was to great effect as he consistently set his
teammates up with quick passes once the ball was retrieved.
Harry Maguire’s body positioning when receiving the ball and then preparing to play it
forward made him a liability when England tried to play out of the back. With only three
defenders, there was not enough cover to support him when he lost the ball.
Here we see the ever important distribution from John Stones:
FRANCE
How they fared:
Finished 1st in Group C
Defeated Croatia 4-2 in Final
Won 2-1 Australia
Won 1-0 Peru
Draw 0-0 Denmark
Won 4-3 Argentina (Round of 16)
Won 2-0 Uruguay (Quarterfinals)
Won 1-0 Belgium (Semifinals)
Won 4-2 Croatia (Final)
France played a 4-3-3 with Kylian Mbappe on the right of a front three, Antoine
Griezmann on the left and Olivier Giroud in the middle. N’Golo Kante was holding
flanked by Blaise Matuidi and Paul Pogba.
France’s wanted to play an early ball in behind, looking for the runs of Mbappe, Giroud
and Griezmann or to patiently build, moving the ball across the pitch in an attempt to
create gaps between the defensive block.
Able to engage the opposition by dribbling between the lines, France created space for
a free player to receive the ball. Their full-backs used this often, receiving the ball in
dangerous areas.
When they lost the ball they dropped into an extremely tight and compact 4-3-3. If
opponents where going to try and possess they wanted to make it so difficult for a ball
played into the feet of a midfielder that their only option was to play backwards.
When forced, one of the midfield three would drop into the back line, while Mbappe or
Griezmann also would drop deeper to effectively create a 5-4-1.
GERMANY
Formations: 4-2-3-1
How they fared:
Finished Last in Group F
Loss 0-1 Mexico
Won 2-1 Sweden
Loss 0-2 Korea Republic
Using a 4-2-3-1, Joachim Low tried to deploy Thomas Muller as a wide attacking player,
having him joining the center-forward from his position on the right. However, this shape
didn’t seem to work and Germany finished games in a much less organised fashion
than they started.
Low’s tactical task, then, was to get Germany firing from the start of games.
Unfortunately, he was unable to do so.
Everything Germany did went through Toni Kroos.
His 144 possessions against Sweden were far more than any other player on his team
and more than most other players in most games of football. Only Javier Mascherano’s
153 touches against Iceland beat it in this tournament.
Though Kroos’ job may have been to create, Low might have better off moving him up
the pitch in exchange for a pair of Sebastian Rudy, Leon Goretzka, or Ilkay Gundogan
in the deeper roles, or even forgo the double pivot entirely.
Being that Kroos was Germany’s main influence, it was to be expected that the top
passing combinations would be to him from one or all of the defenders. However, the
most regularly used passing route was from Rudiger to Boateng. The next was
frequented was Kimmich to Boateng and then after that was Boateng to Kimmich. This
does not bode well for trying to build-up from the back with a purpose.
Julian Brandt was brought on to counter this lacklustre possession and add a sense of
directness, but more often than not quick distribution from Manuel Neuer was either
launched aimlessly up field or given short to a centre-back.
ICELAND
Formations: 4-4-2, 4-1-3-2
How they fared:
Finished Last in Group D
Draw 1-1 Argentina
Loss 0-2 Nigeria
Loss 1-2 Croatia
Iceland set up in a 4-4-2 with Gylfi Sigurdsson playing deep and Aron Gunnarsson just
in front of his own back line. Gunnarsson’s job defensively was to man-mark any
opponent who operated between the lines. At times, Sigurdsson and the two wide
midfielders would push, creating a 4-1-3-2. However, this was more to protect and
defend transition than to possess.
Iceland was very direct sending balls to Bodvarsson and Alfred Finnbogason. They
would look to win second balls and then move the play out wide with the aim of sending
a cross into the box. They also looked to win fouls to make use of Sigurdsson’s set-
piece delivery and utilized any throw-in opportunities by sending the ball directly into the
box.
Because they were so direct they were vulnerable to transition.
IRAN
How they fared:
Finished 3rd in Group B
Won 1-0 Morocco
Loss 0-1 Spain
Draw 1-1 Portugal
Iran used a 4-3-3 formation.
They looked to counter-attack and use set-pieces.
It was when on defense that they showed some promise dropping into a 4-5-1 patiently
waiting for the ball to be played into feet before pressing and making sure they couldn’t
be turned for the worse in possession. They were not trying to win the ball, but instead
to prevent forward progress. They would maintain shape, trying to deny centrally when
the ball was sent out wide.
Their low defensive block was a real strength. There were several occasions when they
set up in a 6-3-1 formation in an attempt to deny any opportunity to penetrate their back
line and force shots to be taken from distance.
Iran fighting to keep Spain from scoring:
JAPAN
Formations: 4-2-3-1
How they fared:
Finished 2nd in Group H
Lost to Belgium 2-3 in the Round of 16
Won 2-1 Colombia
Draw 2-2 Senegal
Loss 0-1 Poland
Loss 2-3 Belgium (Round of 16)
Japan played in a high-pressure 4-2-3-1. They used a very high defensive back line that
squeezed teams into their own half.
They would made good use of their full-backs, initially from deeper positions, both
playing diagonal forward passes into the feet of Shinji Kagawa, as the central #10
position and the lone forward Yuya Osako.
Regardless of this, they struggled to penetrate the final defensive line. They lacked runs
in behind and the majority of their attacking combinations, although fast, were largely
predictable.
Shinji Kagawa’s passing chart against Belgium:
KOREA REPUBLIC
Formations: 4-4-2
How they fared:
Finished 3rd in Group F
Loss 0-1 Sweden
Loss 1-2 Mexico
Won 2-0 Germany
Head coach Shin Tae-yong deployed a 4-4-2 structure with Koo Ja-Cheol to accompany
Son Heung-Min centrally in attack.
They were aggressive in the midfield which obviously led to fouls and free-kicks, often in
dangerous positions.
They would try to build short from the goalkeeper, but they lacked the quality central
options to make it work effectively. Jung Woo-Young was often caught out in
possession, which left them open to the counter-attack. Instead, they played more direct
trying to find Son in behind.
The relatively inaccessible Son chased down hopeless clearances and long balls to no
avail. They couldn’t get him the ball in advanced positions and he had little impact.
They had their most success when winning the ball in transition. Quickly turning the ball
to the offensive usually meant there were fewer players blocking Son and they were
able to counter-attack. It is was when they were able to link up with their most
dangerous player that Son became increasingly more active and they looked more
capable.
Korea Republic’s starting 11:
MEXICO
Formations: 4-2-3-1, 4-3-3
How they fared:
Finished 2nd in Group F
Lost to Brazil 0-2 in Round of 16
Won 1-0 Germany
Won 2-1 Korea Republic
Loss 0-2 Sweden
Loss 0-2 Brazil (Round of 16)
Mexico opened up the World Cup against Germany in a 4-2-3-1 trying to play on the
counter.
“Mexico manager Juan Carlos Osorio has been criticised for his constant chopping and
changing, but while he might be reactive, that doesn’t mean he’s defensive,” Michael
Cox, wrote for the Independent.
Toni Kroos, Germany’s deep lying midfielder was marked-out of the game by Carlos
Vela with Javier Hernandez coming back to help as well.
Having made Kroos a spectator, Mexico’s focus turned to Jerome Boateng who sprayed
diagonal balls into the final third, unsuccessfully, while forgetting about Germany’s left-
back, Martin Plattenhard. In doing so, Miguel Layun kept sneaking inside from the right
flank to assist the central midfielders which left Plattenhard alone.
Germany never attacked down that side, instead choosing to go down the opposite side
through Joshus Kimich, who overlapped Muller and attacked with crosses. This opened-
up space for Herving Lozano, playing on Mexico’s left side to attack the space Kimmich
would leave.
For the rest of the tournament, Mexico would play in a 4-3-3 formation with Rafael
Marquez in the center of the midfield and Andres Guardado and Hector Herrera in front
of him.
Mexico tried to build out wide and then play balls in behind. The addition of Edson
Alvarez for Marquez was too often a defensive-minded move and usually just stalled
proceedings.
It wasn’t until Giovani dos Santos was brought on that more energy, technical quality
and fluidity arrived. With dos Santos, Mexico could better move the ball through the
center of the field and possess between the lines.
Defensively, Mexico looked to press high.
Mexico’s high press:
MOROCCO
Formations: 4-3-3, 3-4-3, 4-1-4-1
How they fared:
Finished Last in Group B
Loss 0-1 Iran
Loss 0-1 Portugal
Draw 2-2 Spain
Morocco played in a 4-3-3 that at times became a 3-4-3. Karim El Ahmadi played in
between the center-backs and Nabil Dirar and Achraf Hakimi joined Moubarak
Boussoufa and Younes Belhanda in the midfield.
Morocco was quite direct looking for Nordin Amrabat when they won possession, often
trying to overload the flanks.
El Ahmadi was essential whenever the ball was with a back. He would look to receive
the ball from or drop in with the two center-backs to make a line of three. This allowed
the full-backs freedom to release and push higher up the park.
Defensively, Morocco would drop into a 4-1-4-1 with Amrabat and Ziyech falling back as
midfielders and El Ahmadi slotting in between his own defense and midfield. They
would try and force the ball wide and then press.
Morocco’s starting 11:
NIGERIA
How they fared:
Finished 3rd in Group D
Loss 0-2 Croatia
Won 2-0 Iceland
Loss 1-2 Argentina
Salisu Yusuf lined up his side in a 3-5-2 with Victor Moses and Brian Idowu providing
the width and Ahmed Musa and Kelechi Iheanacho centrally.
They wanted to find Iheanacho and Musa in behind trying to force mistakes and attack
on the counter.
When they lost the ball, Moses and Idowu would drop back and they would switch into a
5-3-2. John Obi Mikel, Wilfred Ndidi and Oghenekaro Etebo formed the midfield with
Musa and Iheanacho settling in as the front two.
PANAMA
Formations: 4-3-3, 4-1-4-1, 4-5-1
How they fared:
Finished Last in Group G
Loss 0-3 Belgium
Loss 1-6 England
Loss 1-2 Tunisia
Panama tried to play in a 4-3-3 with Gabriel Gomez as the holding midfielder in front of
a back line that consisted of Michael Murillo, Roman Torres, Fidel Escobar and Eric
Davis. Anibal Godoy and Armando Cooper played just in front of Gomez, while Edgar
Barcenas and Jose Luis Rodriguez joined Blas Perez up front.
Panama looked to play very direct.
When under pressure they would drop into 4-1-4-1 or a 4-5-1.
Panama’s starting 11:
PERU
Formations: 4-2-3-1
How they fared:
Finished 3rd in Group C
Loss 0-1 Denmark
Loss 0-1 France
Won 2-0 Australia
Peru played a 4-2-3-1 with Pablo Guerrero as the lone striker.
They were direct trying to find Guerrero in behind with Carillo picking up second balls in
the midfield. Carillo was able to relieve some of the pressure at times.
They sent their wingers wide trying to build down the flanks.
Cueva and Flores were bright spots centrally.
Peru’s starting 11:
POLAND
Formations: 4-2-3-1, 3-4-3, 5-2-3, 5-4-1
How they fared:
Finished Last in Group H
Loss 1-2 Senegal
Loss 0-3 Colombia
Won 1-0 Japan
Adam Nawalka used both a 4-2-3-1 and a 3-4-3, but he made sure to always have two
defensive central midfielders in front of defenders, regardless of what system they were
in. When they went to more than one striker, they would bring on Milik.
When pressed they drop into a 5-2-3 or a 5-4-1. In the 5-2-3 they are quite suspect out
wide.
They tried to play out from the back, but usually didn’t get enough movement from their
central players to make it worthwhile, so they would resort to playing more direct down
the flanks. When they were able to build through the midfield, Krychowiak was the key
cog centrally.
Robert Lewandowski was their main target up front.
PORTUGAL
Formations: 4-4-2
How they fared:
Finished 2nd in Group B
Lost to Uruguay 1-2 in Round of 16
Draw 3-3 Spain
Won 1-0 Morocco
Draw 1-1 Iran
Loss 1-2 Uruguay (Round of 16)
Portugal ran a 4-4-2 with William Carvalho and Joao Moutinho serving as the center
midfielders with Bernardo Silva and Bruno Fernandes on their flanks. Cristiano Ronaldo
joined Goncalo Guedes up top.
Portugal tried to do everything through Ronaldo. They would attempt to overload one
side of the field with the outside mid, wing back and Ronaldo. When this didn’t work,
they would sit back and look to spring the counter, again trying to go through Ronaldo.
The other way they would attack was direct play from the goalkeeper to one of the
defenders who would then look for Ronaldo.
They stayed disciplined in their shape when they didn’t have the ball.
RUSSIA
Formations: 4-2-3-1, 4-4-2
How they fared:
Finished 2nd in Group A
Drew with Croatia 2-2 in Quarterfinals (Croatia advanced on penalties)
Won 5-0 Saudi Arabia
Won 3-1 Egypt
Loss 0-3 Uruguay
Draw 1-1 Spain (Round of 16) *Russia advance on penalties
Draw 2-2 Croatia (Quarterfinals) *Croatia advance on penalties
Russia played in a 4-2-3-1 with Artem Dzyuba as their lone striker and Fyodor Smolov
patrolling the center.
Russia played very direct usually being sprung forward by midfielder Yuri Gazinsky.
There were times when their direct play allowed them to toss more bodies forward and
look more like a 4-4-2.
Russia’s starting 11:
SAUDI ARABIA
Formations: 4-1-4-1
How they fared:
Finished 3rd in Group A
Loss 0-5 Russia
Lost 0-1 Uruguay
Won 2-1 Egypt
Saudi Arabia played in a 4-1-4-1 and even though they actually had their fair share of
possession in the midfield, they lacked much creativity and thus any ignition for their
attack. They tried to build from the back, but lacked the technical ability to make it work.
Therefore, they had their best success when able to build on the flanks. They would
send their fullbacks forward, but due to lack of penetrating passes from the midfield,
those runs were usually for naught.
Because their possession achieved nothing, they were forced to play direct from the
goalkeeper. This too, was ineffective as the front runners lacked the precise movement
to free up the needed space in behind.
SENEGAL
Formations: 4-4-2, 4-2-4, 3-3-4
How they fared:
Finished 3rd in Group H
Won 2-1 Poland
Draw 2-2 Japan
Loss 0-1 Colombia
Senegal used a 4-4-2, with Cheikhou Kouyate and Idrissa Gueye in the middle with
Ismaila Sarr and Keita Balde out wide. M’Baye Niang and Sadio Mane played up front.
Senegal played quite direct and in doing so would push Sarr and Balde up and change
into a 4-2-4. They would keep Kouyate and Gueye back to protect against counter-
attacks.
Senegal are a physically strong and athletic team and they wanted to use these
attributes whenever possible. They would try and play the ball forward quickly and
isolate the opposition’s backs in 1 vs. 1 scenarios where their speed could shine.
At times, this direct play became even more so, especially when Gueye would drop
between the two center-backs, creating a back three, while the full-backs would push up
to join Kouyate in the next line, creating a 3-3-4.
They maintained an excellent level of organisation and discipline when they didn’t have
the ball. They didn’t really look to press, but rather force mistakes and then counter
quickly.
SERBIA
Formations: 4-2-3-1
How they fared:
Finished 3rd in Group E
Won 1-0 Costa Rica
Loss 1-2 Switzerland
Loss 0-2 Brazil
Serbia played in a 4-2-3-1with Milos Veljkovic in the center of the defense and Sergej
Milinkovic-Savic as the #10 role. Adem Ljajic also started in the middle with Aleksandar
Mitrovic as the striker.
Even though he wasn’t playing the #10, Dusan Tadic was Serbia’s main creative threat.
Tadic’s positioning was wide on the right side and he looked to cross early into Mitrovic.
Unfortunately, service into him was sparse at best. Still, Tadic’s movement and effort to
try and generate something positive were the only real bright spots for this team.
Defensively, they were slow to react and didn’t space properly. This hindered them
developing a real attacking prescience because so much time and effort was spent
defending.
SPAIN
Formations: 4-3-3, 4-1-2-2-1
How they fared:
Finished 1st in Group B
Drew with Russia in Round of 16 (Russia advanced on penalties)
Draw 3-3 Portugal
Won 1-0 Iran
Draw 2-2 Morocco
Draw 1-1 Russia (Round of 16) *Russia advanced on penalties
Fernando Hierro employed a 4-3-3 with Silva and Isco as the wide forwards; both
playing their opposite foot (right-footed Isco on the left and left-footed Silva on the right).
Because of this set-up, Isco and Silva would find themselves deeper and almost playing
on top of Iniesta and Koke. This would turn the team’s shape into a 4-1-2-2-1.
In addition, when Isco and Silva drop inside, the space is open to be taken by the full-
backs, Jordi Alba and Dani Carvajal.
While this is effective going forward, it placed a tremendous amount of pressure on the
defensive triumvirate of Sergio Busquets, Gerard Pique and Sergio Ramos.
SWEDEN
Formations: 4-2-3-1, 4-4-2, 4-3-3
How they fared:
Finished 1st in Group F
Lost to England 0-2 in Quarterfinals
Won 1-0 Korea Republic
Loss 1-2 Germany
Won 3-0 Mexico
Won 1-0 Switzerland (Round of 16)
Loss 0-2 England (Quarterfinals)
Sweden played a 4-2-3-1 with Emil Forsberg, Ola Toivonen and Viktor Claesson in the
midfield and Marcus Berg alone up top. Gustav Svensson and Albin Ekdal were the
deep lying central midfielders.
Sweden’s was very direct trying to find either Berg, Toivonen or Claesson or Forsberg.
You would find these four playing with in close proximity to each other as to be in a
better position to collect knockdowns and second balls. This formed a narrow shape
that would resemble a 4-3-3 at times. When Toivonen and Berg joined up with
whomever was the wide attacker their shape morphed into a 4-4-2.
The key to Sweden’s success was the relationship between Svensson and Ekdal. They
provided a screen for their center-backs but were also responsible for getting balls
forward to their attacking quartet.
Here we see the tightness of Sweden’s attacking shape:
SWITZERLAND
Formations: 4-2-3-1, 4-5-1
How they fared:
Finished 2nd in Group E
Lost to Sweden 0-1 in Round of 16
Draw 1-1 Brazil
Won 2-1 Serbia
Draw 2-2 Costa Rica
Loss 0-1 Sweden (Round of 16)
Switzerland played in a 4-2-3-1, with Valon Behrami playing in front of the back four and
Grany Xhaka playing a little higher.
Haris Seferovic played as the lone striker and alone he was for most of the time as the
Swiss struggled to play penetrating balls through from the midfield.
Xherdan Shaqiri played the #10 role and he was partnered with Blerim Dzemaili.
However, they were often wasteful with possession which forced Switzerland to resort
to service from left-back Ricardo Rodriguez.
They were most dangerous when transitioning down their right side when they could get
right-back Stephan Lichtsteiner into the proceedings.
When possession was lost, they would drop back into a 4-5-1.
TUNISIA
Formations: 4-2-3-1, 5-4-1
How they fared:
Finished 3rd in Group G
Loss 1-2 England
Loss 2-5 Belgium
Won 2-1 Panama
Tunisia opened up World Cup play in a 4-2-3-1, with Ellyes Skhiri and Anice Badri as
the two defensive midfielders.
They were direct in their approach to get the ball forward quickly. Usually this was via a
long-ball from either of the two goalkeepers, Mouez Hassen or Farouk Ben Mustapha,
ultimately trying to find Whabi Kharzi up high.
In the second half against Belgium, Tunisia switched to three centre-backs and two
wing-backs forming a 5-4-1 shape. There restraining line was deeper than it had been
previously, but was still ineffective.
When they realized they were unable to stop the opponent in the flow of the game, they
would resort to fouling. They were also content with pulling 10 men behind the ball and
defending services in from width/deep.
URUGUAY
Formations: 4-2-3-1, 4-4-2
How they fared:
Finished 1st in Group A
Lost to France 0-2 in Quarterfinals
Won 1-0 Egypt
Won 1-0 Saudi Arabia
Won 3-0 Russia
Won 2-1 Portugal (Round of 16)
Loss 0-2 France (Quarterfinals)
Uruguay played a 4-2-3-1, with Matias Vecino and Rodrigo Bentancur as the two deep
central midfielders in front of the center-back duo of Diego Godin and Jose Gimenez.
Nahitan Nandez and Giorgian de Arrascoeta were the wingers and Edinson Cavani or
Luis Suarez rotated as the #10 (at least until Cavani’s injury)
They often held Vecino and Betancur back which maintained a minimum of four or five
players and the goalkeeper behind the ball at all times. This had a direct bearing on
their attack as there were less players available to press forward and many times the
attack sizzled out due to being outnumbered.
Uruguay found their most success when they would play out quickly via transition,
because they passed the ball too slowly when they tried to build-up.
When pressed they would drop back into a 4-4-2, with Cavani and Suarez up front and
Nandez, de Arrascaeta, Vecino and Bentancur in the midfield. When in this shape they
would try and force the ball wide.
Uruguay’s starting 11:
The tactical gulf displayed over the course of this World Cup was tremendous. Teams lined up
anywhere from the traditional 4-4-2 all the way to the untraditional, 4-1-2-2-1, with many
changing from match-to-match, some even from half-to half (i.e. Mexico) and some even within
the flow of the match itself (i.e., Argentina). This tactical flexibility from both on and off the pitch
and during the match is something that we will see much more prevalent in the game of football
in the years to come.
The following chart breaks down the tactical choices of each team in the 2018 FIFA World Cup:

World Cup 2018 Tactical Analysis

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This ebook has been licensed to: Charles Brown (riverbendfc@yahoo.

First published July, 2018 by

Copyright © WORLD CLASS COACHING 2018

Edited by Tom Mura

©WORLD CLASS COACHING 2 World Cup Tactical Analysis Report

©WORLD CLASS COACHING 3 World Cup Tactical Ana

2018 FIFA World Cup

©WORLD CLASS COACHING 4 World Cup Tactical Analysis Report

The standard of international football is on the decline

The ‘big’ teams don’t need to perform to have a good tournament

A 48-team World Cup would be a bad idea

Participating at a World Cup is a wonderful thing and the opportunity to be involved

©WORLD CLASS COACHING 5 World Cup Tactical Ana

VAR isn’t such an awful idea after all

It’s going to lead to lots more penalties

©WORLD CLASS COACHING 6 World Cup Tactical Analysis Report

We’re still no closer to settling the Ronaldo v Messi debate

Kylian Mbappé will be the star of the next generation

Luka Modrić is the best midfielder in the world

©WORLD CLASS COACHING 7 World Cup Tactical Ana

Europe rules the world in football terms

Set-pieces have become even more important

If arbiters continue to clamp down on defensive misdemeanours there could well

No point obsessing over managerial ability

©WORLD CLASS COACHING 8 World Cup Tactical Analysis Report

African countries were unlucky

©WORLD CLASS COACHING 9 World Cup Tactical Ana

A More Detailed Look at the Tournament Field

©WORLD CLASS COACHING 10 World Cup Tactical Analysis Report

©WORLD CLASS COACHING 11 World Cup Tactical Ana

How they fared:

Finished 2nd in Group D

Lost to France 3-4 in Round of 16

Draw 1-1 Iceland

Loss 0-3 Croatia

Won 2-1 Nigeria

Loss 3-4 France (Round of 16)

©WORLD CLASS COACHING 12 World Cup Tactical Analysis Report

with no diagonal movement

©WORLD CLASS COACHING 13 World Cup Tactical Ana

©WORLD CLASS COACHING 14 World Cup Tactical Analysis Report

How they fared:

Finished Last in Group C

Loss 1-2 France

Draw 1-1 Denmark

Loss 0-2 Peru

©WORLD CLASS COACHING 15 World Cup Tactical Ana

©WORLD CLASS COACHING 16 World Cup Tactical Analysis Report

How they fared:

Finished First in Group G

Beat England 2-0 for 3rd Place

Won 3-0 Panama

Won 5-2 Tunisia

Won 1-0 England

Won 3-2 Japan (Round of 16)

Won 2-1 Brazil (Quarterfinals)

Loss 0-1 France (Semifinals)

Won 2-0 England (Consolation)

©WORLD CLASS COACHING 17 World Cup Tactical Ana

Belgium played with a 3-4-3 that was fluid and savvy.

©WORLD CLASS COACHING 18 World Cup Tactical Analysis Report

How they fared:

Finished First in Group E

Lost to Belgium 1-2 in Quarterfinals