G.R. No.
72706 October 27, 1987 (F) As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest and standing to file the
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, Petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
(Third Special Cases Division), VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA
DIONGSON, Respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent. Court of
Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 05744 promulgated on August 30, 1985 (Rollo, p. 108)
ordering the dismissal of the petition in Special Proceedings No, 591 ACEB and its
Resolution issued on October 23, 1985 (Rollo, p. 72) denying respondents' (petitioners
herein) motion for reconsideration. library
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and respondent Regional Trial Court of
the Seventh Judicial Region, Branch XIII (Cebu City), is hereby ordered to dismiss the
petition in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB No special pronouncement is made as to
costs.
The antecedents of the case, based on the summary of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, now Court of Appeals, (Rollo, pp. 108-109) are as follows:
On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for
the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 591 ACEB (Rollo, p. 29), on the premise that Nemesio Acain died
leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his
sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly
executed by Nemesio Acain on February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya (Rollo, p. 27)
with a translation in English (Rollo, p. 31) submi'tted by petitioner without objection
raised by private respondents. The will contained provisions on burial rites, payment
of debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor
of the testament. On the disposition of the testator's property, the will provided:
THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties. house, lands and money
which I earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to my
brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino, widower, of legal age and presently residing at 357-
C Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In case my brother Segundo Acain pre-deceased me,
all the money properties, lands, houses there in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which
constitute my share shall be given to me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino,
Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain.
Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo who are
claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner in Special Proceedings No. 591
ACEB les virtual law library
After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25, 1984 the
oppositors (respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of
tile deceased and the latter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain filed a motion to
dismiss on the following grounds for the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute
these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted
daughter have been pretirited. (Rollo, p. 158). Said motion was denied by the trial
judge.
After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower court,
respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate
Court by Resolution of the Court dated March 11, 1985 (Memorandum for Petitioner,
p. 3; Rollo, p. 159).
Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and
ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio
Acain in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this present
petition for the review of respondent Court's decision on December 18, 1985 (Rollo,
p. 6). Respondents' Comment was filed on June 6, 1986 (Rollo, p. 146).
On August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo, p.
153). Respondents' Memorandum was filed on September 22, 1986 (Rollo, p. 157);
the Memorandum for petitioner was filed on September 29, 1986 (Rollo, p. 177).
Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for petitioner, p. 4):
(A) The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction is not the proper remedy under the premises;
(B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring into the extrinsic
validity of the will sought to be probated and it cannot pass upon the intrinsic validity
thereof before it is admitted to probate; les virtual law library
(C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore, be admitted to probate. The
preterition mentioned in Article 854 of the New Civil Code refers to preterition of
"compulsory heirs in the direct line," and does not apply to private respondents who
are not compulsory heirs in the direct line; their omission shall not annul the
institution of heirs; les virtual law library
(D) DICAT TESTATOR ET MERIT LEX. What the testator says will be the law; les virtual
law library
(E) There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code, that suggests that mere
institution of a universal heir in the will would give the heir so instituted a share in the
inheritance but there is a definite distinct intention of the testator in the case at bar,
explicitly expressed in his will. This is what matters and should be in violable.
petition in Sp. Proc. No. 591 ACEB for probate of the will of Nemesio Acain and
(G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder. It is therefore
unconstitutional and ineffectual.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private respondents have been
pretirited.
Article 854 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in
the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the
death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies
shall be valid insofar as they are not; inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall he
effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone
of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they
are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17
SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]). Insofar as the
widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend
or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise,
even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is
omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil code)
however, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez,
whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner
(.Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known
as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same
rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted
person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and
preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were
deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not
expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted
child.
Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate
succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto
en virtual de legado mejora o donacion" Maniesa as cited in Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra;
Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982]). The only provisions which do not
result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand
valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the
entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the
nullification of such institution of universal heirs-without any other testamentary
disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.
Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no leeway for
inferential interpretation (Nuguid v. Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises having
been provided in the will the whole property of the deceased has been left by universal
title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the "Institution
of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy (Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil.
185 [1943]) except that proper legacies and devises must, as already stated above, be
respected.
We now deal with another matter. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene
in a probate proceeding he must have an interest iii the estate, or in the will, or in the
property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an
interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one
who has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA
1369/1967). Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee
there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual
item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive (Article 782, Civil Code).
At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined under
Article 782 of the Civil Code as a person called to the succession either by the provision
of a will or by operation of law. However, intestacy having resulted from the
preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs,
petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition
for the probate of the will left by the deceased and Special Proceedings No. 591 A-CEB
must be dismissed.
As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, except when the
questioned order is an oppressive exercise of j judicial authority (People v. Villanueva,
110 SCRA 465 [1981]; Vda. de Caldito v. Segundo, 117 SCRA 573 [1982]; Co Chuan Seng
v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 308 [1984]; and Bautista v. Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587
[1985]). It is axiomatic that the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are not available
where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the course of law (DD Comendador Construction Corporation v.
Sayo (118 SCRA 590 [1982]). They are, however, proper remedies to correct a grave
abuse of discretion of the trial court in not dismissing a case where the dismissal is
founded on valid grounds (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 137 [1983]).
Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by respondent
Court, the general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the
extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary
1
capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The
intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the Court has declared that the
will has been duly authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not
called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will
(Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 [1966]; Sumilang v. Ramagosa, supra; Maninang v.
Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]; Cayetano v. Leonides, 129 SCRA 522 [1984];
and Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 206 [1985]).
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances,
the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and
pass upon certain provisions of the will (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra). In
Nuguid v. Nuguid the oppositors to the probate moved to dismiss on the ground of
absolute preteriton The probate court acting on the motion held that the will in
question was a complete nullity and dismissed the petition without costs. On appeal
the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the probate court, induced by practical
considerations. The Court said:
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing
will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that
appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability
exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic
validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety.
These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well
meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. After
all there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
In Saguimsim v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to dismiss the petition by
the surviving spouse was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute
the proceedings which was fully substantiated by the evidence during the hearing held
in connection with said motion. The Court upheld the probate court's order of
dismissal.
In Cayetano v. Leonides, supra one of the issues raised in the motion to dismiss the
petition deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. Respondent Judge allowed
the probate of the will. The Court held that as on its face the will appeared to have
preterited the petitioner the respondent judge should have denied its probate
outright. Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions be passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the
probate court should meet the issue. (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra; Nuguid
v. Nuguid, supra).
In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in Sp.
Proceedings No. 591 ACEB of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the following
grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is
merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been
preterited (Rollo, p. 158). It was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 21,
1985 for the reason that "the grounds for the motion to dismiss are matters properly
to be resolved after a hearing on the issues in the course of the trial on the merits of
the case (Rollo, p. 32). A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the
trial court on February 15, 1985 (Rollo, p. 109).
For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case
to progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and
his brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs coupled with the obvious
fact that one of the private respondents had been preterited would have been an
exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added
futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed
upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity
of the will was resolved (Cayetano v. Leonides, supra; Nuquid v. Nuguid, supra. The
remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private
respondents.
Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the
defendants had the right to resort to the more speedy, and adequate remedies of
certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not dismissing the case, (Vda. de Bacang
v. Court of Appeals, supra) and even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal,
the Court harkens to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a petition for
certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and
adequate relief. (Maninang Court of Appeals, supra).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the
questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on August 30, 1985
and its Resolution dated October 23, 1985 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 164108 : May 8, 2009]
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS HOLDING
CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
HONORABLE AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
21 and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000.
He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto
(administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino.1 At the
time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the
petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the
plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC of
Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers
Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.2
On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of
Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor, pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. The petition was raffled to Branch 21,
presided by respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes. Said petition acknowledged the value
of the assets of the decedent to be P5 Million, "net of liabilities."3 On 2 August 2000,
the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as administrator of the
estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her favor. 4 In
January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of
Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband.5 In
the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent included as among
the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then being litigated before
the Bacolod City courts.6 Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability
corresponding to the two cases as P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137
and P35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.7 Thereafter, the Manila RTC required
private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and appraisal report
pertaining to the estate.8
On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion
Ex Abundanti Cautela,9 praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and
orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the
manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of her husband. Even before the Manila RTC acted on the
manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that the Manila
RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of the required inventory
of the decedent's estate.10 Petitioners also filed other pleadings or motions with the
Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private respondent in her administration of
the estate, and assailing the inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified,
incomplete and inaccurate.
On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion,
on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of
the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings.11 After the Manila RTC
had denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed
with the Court of Appeals. The petition argued in general that petitioners had the right
to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the
defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.
On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision12 dismissing the
petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings. The allowance or
disallowance of a motion to intervene, according to the appellate court, is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited the fact that the claims
of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as these
were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts.
Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts erred
in denying them the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the estate of
Roberto Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in support of their
argument is not the rule on intervention, but rather various other provisions of the
Rules on Special Proceedings.13
To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the courts
a quo. First, they prayed that they be henceforth furnished "copies of all processes
and orders issued" by the intestate court as well as the pleadings filed by
administratrix Benedicto with the said court.14 Second, they prayed that the intestate
court set a deadline for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a
verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof, order the
inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to assist in the appraisal
of the fair market value of the same.15 Third, petitioners moved that the intestate
court set a deadline for the submission by the administrator of her verified annual
account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath
with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the
collation, preservation and disposition of the estate.16
The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by
the rule on intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of Appeals on that point.
Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor
"has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties,
or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x" While
the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from
intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal
interest required of an intervenor "must be actual and material, direct and immediate,
and not simply contingent and expectant."17
2
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil
Procedure necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of
estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the
Rules of Court,18 not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides
that "[i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions
shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings."
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set
forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based
on a contingent claim. The definition of "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not
accommodate contingent claims.
Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene
in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then
before the RTC, and also now before us, do not square with their recognition as
intervenors. In short, even if it were declared that petitioners have no right to
intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean the disallowance
of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the right to intervene is not one of
those reliefs.
To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us
now turn our focus to the Rules on Special Proceedings.
In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any interested persons"
or "any persons interested in the estate" to participate in varying capacities in the
testate or intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely:
(1) Section 1, Rule 79, which recognizes the right of "any person interested" to oppose
the issuance of letters testamentary and to file a petition for administration;" (2)
Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the petition for
letters of administration to the known heirs, creditors, and "to any other persons
believed to have interest in the estate;" (3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a "person
interested in the estate" to petition for the allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule
87, which allows an individual interested in the estate of the deceased "to complain
to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the
decedent, or of evidence of the decedent's title or interest therein;" (5) Section 10 of
Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the examination and allowance
of the Administrator's account "to persons interested;" (6) Section 7(b) of Rule 89,
which requires the court to give notice "to the persons interested" before it may hear
and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the
estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the estate"
to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the
decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.
Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether
express or implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent, under
the aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by the court immediately after granting
letters of administration and published by the administrator immediately after the
issuance of such notice.19 However, it appears that the claims against Benedicto were
based on tort, as they arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra
and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class
of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86.20 These
actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be
commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the
records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by its
administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other
civil case21 was already pending review before this Court at the time of Benedicto's
death.
Evidently, the merits of petitioners' claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the
civil cases where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the event
the claims for damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the right to
enforce the judgment against the estate. Yet until such time, to what extent may they
be allowed to participate in the intestate proceedings?cralawred
Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,22 and it does
provide us with guidance on how to proceed. A brief narration of the facts therein is
in order. Dinglasan had filed an action for reconveyance and damages against
respondents, and during a hearing of the case, learned that the same trial court was
hearing the intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan had sold the
property years earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his complaint to implead Ang Chia,
administrator of the estate of her late husband. He likewise filed a verified claim-in-
intervention, manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying that a co-
administrator be appointed, the bond of the administrator be increased, and that the
intestate proceedings not be closed until the civil case had been terminated. When
the trial court ordered the increase of the bond and took cognizance of the pending
civil case, the administrator moved to close the intestate proceedings, on the ground
that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. The trial
court refused to close the intestate proceedings pending the termination of the civil
case, and the Court affirmed such action.
If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only
pursuant to their desire to protect their interests it appearing that the property in
litigation is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the only property of the estate
left subject of administration and distribution; and the court is justified in taking
cognizance of said civil case because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is
determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and have a far reaching
consequence in the determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking
cognizance of civil case No. V-331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction over
the case but merely makes of record its existence because of the close interrelation of
the two cases and cannot therefore be branded as having acted in excess of its
jurisdiction.
Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the
intestate proceedings pending determination of the separate civil action for the
reason that there is no rule or authority justifying the extension of administration
proceedings until after the separate action pertaining to its general jurisdiction has
been terminated, cannot be entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court,
expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal property from the estate or
to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executor or administrator."
What practical value would this provision have if the action against the administrator
cannot be prosecuted to its termination simply because the heirs desire to close the
intestate proceedings without first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case?
This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which declares that questions concerning
ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by another person
should be determined in a separate action and should be submitted to the court in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules would be rendered nugatory if we are
to hold that an intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim and
caprice of the heirs x x x23 (Emphasis supplied) [Citations omitted]
It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an
action-in-intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can partake of the
spirit behind such pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court, citing
Dinglasan, stated: "[t]he rulings of this court have always been to the effect that in the
special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, persons not
heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed to do so to protect the
same, but not for a decision on their action."24
Petitioners' interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they
are viable interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special Proceedings
allows not just creditors, but also "any person interested" or "persons interested in
the estate" various specified capacities to protect their respective interests in the
estate. Anybody with a contingent claim based on a pending action for quasi-delict
against a decedent may be reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is
rendered in their favor, the estate of the decedent would have already been
distributed, or diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer be enforced
against it.
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor
or any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the
testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such
persons may accordingly act in those proceedings, we deem that while there is no
general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek
certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the
Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate,
and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be
protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three prayers sought by
petitioners.
The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued
in connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the
administrator of the estate. There is no questioning as to the utility of such relief for
the petitioners. They would be duly alerted of the developments in the intestate
proceedings, including the status of the assets of the estate. Such a running account
would allow them to pursue the appropriate remedies should their interests be
compromised, such as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate
court if property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.
At the same time, the fact that petitioners' interests remain inchoate and contingent
counterbalances their ability to participate in the intestate proceedings. We are
mindful of respondent's submission that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with
service of all processes and pleadings of the intestate court, then anybody claiming to
be a creditor, whether contingent or otherwise, would have the right to be furnished
such pleadings, no matter how wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose
a precedent that would mandate the service of all court processes and pleadings to
anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent claims, would unduly
complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and would ultimately offend the
guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition of cases.
Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by
this Court, with respect to the petitioners herein, that addresses the core concern of
petitioners to be apprised of developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v.
Judge Reyes,25 the Court heard a petition for mandamus filed by the same petitioners
herein against the RTC judge, praying that they be allowed access to the records of the
intestate proceedings, which the respondent judge had denied from them. Section 2
of Rule 135 came to fore, the provision stating that "the records of every court of
justice shall be public records and shall be available for the inspection of any interested
3
person x x x." The Court ruled that petitioners were "interested persons" entitled to
access the court records in the intestate proceedings. We said:
Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records to monitor prompt
compliance with the Rules governing the preservation and proper disposition of the
assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the
submission by the Administratrix of an annual accounting' appears legitimate, for, as
the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money against Roberto Benedicto, et al.,
they have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in
fact "interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x26
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate
proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of court
processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in
seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed of in accordance with the
rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the records, rather than
entitling them to the service of every court order or pleading no matter how relevant
to their individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the
administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable means by which
the interests of the creditors in the estate are
preserved.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice
to any or all "interested parties" the petitioners as "interested parties" will be entitled
to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are
provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining and
allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89
concerning the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal
estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule
90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the estate
residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted
inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.
We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set for
the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete
inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to assist in the appraisal of the fair
market value of the same; and that the intestate court set a deadline for the
submission by the administratrix of her verified annual account, and, upon submission
thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due
notice to them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and
disposition of the estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.
Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory
and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within three (3)
months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to
render an account of his administration within one (1) year from receipt of the letters
testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to
compel an administrator to perform either duty, but a person whose claim against the
estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator
did delay in the performance of these duties in the context of dissipating the assets of
the estate, there are protections enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the
interests of those with contingent claims against the estate.
Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the
proper remedy is to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance with Section
2, Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the removal
of the administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one, would
have the personality to seek such relief. After all, the interest of the creditor in the
estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the
general competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such
purpose.
All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct.
Nonetheless, as we have explained, petitioners should not be deprived of their
prerogatives under the Rules on Special Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as
persons interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such
notices and rights as provided for such interested persons in the Rules on Settlement
of Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special Proceedings. No
pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 174680 : March 24, 2008]
VICTORIA C. TAYAG, Petitioner, v. FELICIDAD A. TAYAG-GALLOR, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals dated 29 May 2006, and its Resolution2 dated 28 August 2006 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 79205.
The antecedents are as follows:
On 15 January 2001, respondent herein, Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor, filed a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag.3 Respondent
alleged in the petition, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 5994 (SP 5994), that she is
one of the three (3) illegitimate children of the late Ismael Tayag and Ester C. Angeles.
The decedent was married to petitioner herein, Victoria C. Tayag, but the two allegedly
did not have any children of their own.
On 7 September 2000, Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving behind two (2) real
properties both of which are in the possession of petitioner, and a motor vehicle which
the latter sold on 10 October 2000 preparatory to the settlement of the decedent's
estate. Petitioner allegedly promised to give respondent and her
brothers P100,000.00 each as their share in the proceeds of the sale. However,
petitioner only gave each of them half the amount she promised.
Respondent further averred that on 20 November 2000, petitioner has caused the
annotation of 5 September 1984 affidavit executed by Ismael Tayag declaring the
properties to be the paraphernal properties of petitioner. The latter allegedly intends
to dispose of these properties to the respondent's and her brothers' prejudice.
Petitioner opposed the petition, asserting that she purchased the properties subject
of the petition using her own money. She claimed that she and Ismael Tayag got
married in Las Vegas, Nevada, USA on 25 October 1973, and that they have an adopted
daughter, Carmela Tayag, who is presently residing in the USA. It is allegedly not true
that she is planning to sell the properties. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the
suit because respondent failed to state a cause of action.4
In a Motion5 dated 31 August 2001, petitioner reiterated her sole ownership of the
properties and presented the transfer certificates of title thereof in her name. She also
averred that it is necessary to allege that respondent was acknowledged and
recognized by Ismael Tayag as his illegitimate child. There being no such allegation,
the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought after the
death of the putative father. To prevent further encroachment upon the court's time,
petitioner moved for a hearing on her affirmative defenses.
The Motion was denied in an Order6 dated 3 April 2003. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order7 dated 16 July 2003.
The appellate court, in a Decision8 dated 29 May 2006, upheld the denial of
petitioner's motion and directed the trial court to proceed with the case with dispatch.
The Court of Appeals ruled, in essence, that the allegation that respondent is an
illegitimate child suffices for a cause of action, without need to state that she had been
recognized and acknowledged as such. However, respondent still has to prove her
allegation and, correspondingly, petitioner has the right to refute the allegation in the
course of the settlement proceedings.
The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration in a Resolution9 dated 28 August 2006.
In her Petition10 17 dated September 2006, petitioner asserts that respondent should
not be allowed to prove her filiation in the settlement of Ismael Tayag's estate. If,
following the case of Uyguanco v. Court of Appeals,11 the claim of filiation may no
longer be proved in an action for recognition, with more reason that it should not be
allowed to be proved in an action for the settlement of the decedent's estate. Thus,
petitioner claims, respondent may no longer maintain an action to prove that she is
the illegitimate child of the decedent after the latter's death.
Unfortunately, the two-page Comment,12 dated 17 April 2007, fails to shed any more
light on the present controversy.
The Reply13 dated 3 September 2007 reiterates the arguments in the petition.
The main issue in this case is deceptively simple. As crafted by the Court of Appeals, it
is whether respondent's petition for the issuance of letters of administration
sufficiently states a cause of action considering that respondent merely alleged
therein that she is an illegitimate child of the decedent, without stating that she had
been acknowledged or recognized as such by the latter. The appellate court held that
the mere allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child suffices.
Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person. In Saguinsin v. Lindayag,14 the
Court defined an interested party as one who would be benefited by the estate, such
as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. This interest,
furthermore, must be material and direct, not merely indirect or contingent.
Hence, where the right of the person filing a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration is dependent on a fact which has not been established or worse, can
no longer be established, such contingent interest does not make her an interested
party. Here lies the complication in the case which the appellate court had not
discussed, although its disposition of the case is correct. les virtual law library
Essentially, the petition for the issuance of letters of administration is a suit for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Ismael Tayag. The right of respondent to maintain
such a suit is dependent on whether she is entitled to successional rights as an
illegitimate child of the decedent which, in turn, may be established through voluntary
or compulsory recognition.
Voluntary recognition must be express such as that in a record of birth appearing in
the civil register, a final judgment, a public instrument or private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned.15 The voluntary recognition of an
illegitimate child by his or her parent needs no further court action and is, therefore,
not subject to the limitation that the action for recognition be brought during the
lifetime of the putative parent.16 Judicial or compulsory recognition, on the other
hand, may be demanded by the illegitimate child of his parents and must be brought
during the lifetime of the presumed parents.17
4
Petitioner's thesis is essentially based on her contention that by Ismael Tayag's death,
respondent's illegitimate filiation and necessarily, her interest in the decedent's estate
which the Rules require to be material and direct, may no longer be established.
Petitioner, however, overlooks the fact that respondent's successional rights may be
established not just by a judicial action to compel recognition but also by proof that
she had been voluntarily acknowledged and recognized as an illegitimate child.
In Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals, supra, Graciano Uyguangco, claiming to be an
illegitimate child of the decedent, filed a complaint for partition against the latter's
wife and legitimate children. However, an admission was elicited from him in the
course of his presentation of evidence at the trial that he had none of the documents
mentioned in Article 27818 of the 1950 Civil Code to show that he was the illegitimate
son of the decedent. The wife and legitimate children of the decedent thereupon
moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that he could no longer prove his
alleged filiation under the applicable provision of the Civil Code.
The Court, applying the provisions of the Family Code which had then already taken
effect, ruled that since Graciano was claiming illegitimate filiation under the second
paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, i.e., open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child, the action was already barred by the death of the
alleged father.
In contrast, respondent in this case had not been given the opportunity to present
evidence to show whether she had been voluntarily recognized and acknowledged by
her deceased father because of petitioner's opposition to her petition and motion for
hearing on affirmative defenses. There is, as yet, no way to determine if her petition
is actually one to compel recognition which had already been foreclosed by the death
of her father, or whether indeed she has a material and direct interest to maintain the
suit by reason of the decedent's voluntary acknowledgment or recognition of her
illegitimate filiation.
We find, therefore, that the allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child of the
decedent suffices even without further stating that she has been so recognized or
acknowledged. A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action
in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged
therein.19 Assuming the fact alleged to be true, i.e., that respondent is the
decedent's illegitimate child, her interest in the estate as such would definitely be
material and direct. The appellate court was, therefore, correct in allowing the
proceedings to continue, ruling that, "respondent still has the duty to prove the
allegation (that she is an illegitimate child of the decedent), just as the petitioner has
the right to disprove it, in the course of the settlement proceedings."
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 29 May 2006 and its Resolution dated 28 August 2006 are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 167321 : July 31, 2006]
EPIFANIO SAN JUAN, JR., Petitioner, v. JUDGE RAMON A. CRUZ, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 224, QUEZON CITY and ATTY. TEODORICO A.
AQUINO, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Resolution1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87458 dismissing the Petition for Certiorari with
Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction of petitioner Epifanio San Juan, Jr., as well as its Resolution2 denying the
motion for reconsideration thereof.
The Antecedents
Loreto Samia San Juan executed a Last Will and Testament naming Oscar Casa as one
of the devisees therein. Upon Loreto's death on October 25, 1988, Atty. Teodorico A.
Aquino filed a petition for the probate of the will in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City. The case was raffled to Branch 224 of the court and was docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 98-36118.
While the petition was pending, Oscar Casa died intestate on May 24, 1999. The firm
of Aquino, Galang, Lucas, Espinoza, Miranda & Associates entered their appearance as
counsel of Federico Casa, Jr., who claimed to be one of the heirs of Oscar Casa and
their representative.
On August 14, 2002, the probate court issued an Order denying the entry of
appearance of said law firm, considering that Federico Casa, Jr. was not the executor
or administrator of the estate of the devisee, hence, cannot be substituted for the
deceased as his representative as required by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
On November 22, 2002, the court issued an order directing Aquino to secure the
appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar Casa in order that
the appointee be substituted in lieu of the said deceased.
On February 26, 2003, Aquino filed a pleading entitled "Appointment of
Administrator" signed by Candelaria, Jesus, Arlyn, Nestor, Edna, Benhur, Federico,
Rafael and Ma. Eden, all surnamed Casa, on February 24, 2003, praying that one of
them, Federico Casa, Jr., be designated as administrator of the estate of the deceased
and that he be substituted for the deceased.
NOW THEREFORE, in compliance with the ORDER of the Probate Court, cited above,
we, the legal heirs of the deceased OSCAR CASA, unanimously designate and appoint
FEDERICO CASA, JR., as the ADMINISTRATOR of the property to be inherited by the
deceased OSCAR CASA, in the WILL of the late LORETO SAMIA SAN JUAN, considering
that FEDERICO CASA, JR., is the nearest accessible heir to attend the hearing of the
probate of the will and is most competent to assume the responsibilities and the
duties of the ADMINISTRATOR. We authorize him to represent us the heirs of the
deceased OSCAR CASA, on the hearing of the probate of the will of the testatrix and
to perform such duties as might be required by the Probate Court; to take possession
of the properties designated in the WILL upon distribution by the appointed
ADMINISTRATOR of the Estate of LORETO SAMIA SAN JUAN. (emphasis supplied)3
In compliance with the order of the court, Epifanio San Juan filed a "Motion to Declare
Appointment of Administrator As Inadequate or Insufficient."4 He maintained that the
heirs should present an administrator of the estate of Oscar Casa as the representative
of the estate in the case.
In his reply, Aquino stated that, under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the
heirs of Oscar Casa may be substituted for the deceased without need for
appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate. He also claimed that the
court is enjoined to require the representative to appear before the court and be
substituted within the prescribed period.
On December 2, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion of San Juan.
Contrary to its Order dated November 22, 2002, the court held that there was, after
all, no need for the appointment of an administrator or executor as substitute for the
deceased devisee. It is enough, the court declared, that a representative be appointed
as provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.5
San Juan received a copy of the December 2, 2003 Order on December 15, 2003 and
filed, on December 30, 2003, a motion for reconsideration thereof. Citing the ruling of
this Court in Lawas v. Court of Appeals,6 he averred that, under Section 16, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, while the court may allow the heirs of the deceased to be
substituted in cases of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or
administrator, or where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement of the estate,
priority is still given to the legal representative of the deceased, that is, the executor
or administrator of the estate. Moreover, in case the heirs of the deceased will be
substituted, there must be a prior determination by the probate court of who the
rightful heirs are. He opined that this doctrine is in line with Article 1058 of the New
Civil Code, and the provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 and Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules
of Court. In this case, however, the alleged heirs of Oscar Casa did not file any petition
for the appointment of an administrator of his estate; hence, Federico Casa, Jr. is not
qualified to be appointed as substitute for the deceased devisee. San Juan pointed out
that the December 2, 2003 Order of the probate court contravened its August 14, 2002
and November 22, 2002 Orders.7
The motion for reconsideration was denied on February 27, 2004 where the probate
court declared that it had carefully evaluated the arguments raised by the parties and
found no compelling ground or cogent reason to set aside its December 2, 2003
Order.8 Petitioner received a copy of the Order on March 18, 2004.
On May 7, 2004, San Juan filed a Motion to Admit his second motion for
reconsideration dated May 6, 2004, appending thereto the December 2, 2003 Order
of the RTC.9 He cited Torres, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,10 where it was held that the
purpose behind the rule on substitution of parties is the protection of the right of
every party to due process, to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be
properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his
estate. The need for substitution of heirs is based on the right to due process accruing
to every party in any proceeding, and the exercise of judicial power to hear and
determine a cause presupposes that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the
persons of the parties.
San Juan emphasized that it is only in the absence of an executor or administrator that
the heirs may be allowed by the court to substitute the deceased party. He averred
that the purported heirs simply agreed among themselves to appoint a representative
to be substituted for the deceased, which is contrary to the requirement of a prior
hearing for the court to ascertain who the rightful heirs are. The Orders of the Court
dated December 2, 2003 and February 27, 2004 may be used by purported heirs in
order to "inherit" properties from estates of deceased parties, which will then allow
the rules of procedure to be used as an instrument for fraud and undermining due
process.11 San Juan reiterated the rulings of this Court in Dela Cruz v. Court of
Appeals12 and Lawas v. Court of Appeals,13 that court proceedings conducted or
continued without a valid substitution of a deceased party cannot be accorded validity
and binding effect. He prayed that the February 27, 2004 Order be reconsidered and
a new order be issued as follows:
(a) declaring the "Appointment of Administrator" dated February 14, 2003 insufficient
or inadequate compliance with the rules of procedure on substitution of a deceased
party;
(b) directing petitioner to secure from the appropriate court the appointment of an
administrator of the estate of the deceased Oscar Casa; andcralawlibrary
(c) directing that further proceedings in the case be deferred until after the
substitution of the deceased Oscar Casa by the court-appointed administrator or
executor of his estate.
Oppositor prays for other and further reliefs which may be just and equitable.14
5
On June 11, 2004, the probate court issued an order denying the second motion for
reconsideration of San Juan. It noted that the motion merely reiterated the same
arguments in his first motion for reconsideration which had already been passed upon.
Citing the rulings in Montañano v. Suesa15 and Riera v. Palmanori,16 it concluded that
there was no need for the appointment of an administrator of the estate of the
deceased Oscar Casa at that stage of the proceedings since a legatee is not considered
either as an indispensable or necessary party in the probate of a will.17
When San Juan received a copy of the June 11, 2004 Order of the trial court, he filed,
on July 23, 2004, a motion for reconsideration thereof. He took exception to the
probate court's reliance in the Montañano and Riera cases, as claiming that said
rulings were not relevant to the issue of the validity of the appointment of Federico
Casa Jr., by the alleged heirs of Oscar Casa, as administrator and substitute for the
deceased devisee. He insisted that the cases dealt only with the question of whether
or not the probate court can rule on the validity of the provisions of the will; they do
not involve the same issue presented by the oppositor, namely, whether or not a
substitution of a legatee under the will who died during the probate proceedings may
be done by simply submitting an "Appointment of Administrator," or whether or not
there is a need for a deceased legatee to be substituted by his/her duly appointed
legal representative or administrator of his estate.
San Juan further posited that the estate court, sitting as a probate court, does not only
decide on the questions of identity and testamentary capacity of the testator and the
due execution of the will; it is likewise charged with the settlement of the estate of
the testator after the will has been approved. Thus, the probate court must not only
determine the validity of the will, but also the rightful heirs, legatees and devisees for
the purpose of settling the estate of the testator.18
Aquino opposed the motion, contending that it was, in fact, a third motion for
reconsideration, a prohibited pleading under Section 3, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.19
On September 8, 2004, the probate court issued an Order sustaining Aquino's
argument and denied the motion for reconsideration of San Juan.20
San Juan, now petitioner, filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA on November 22,
2004 for the nullification of the orders issued by the probate court on the following
grounds:
A. THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHICH AMOUNTS TO LACK, OR IN EXCESS, OF JURISDICTION IN RULING
THAT THE "APPOINTMENT OF ADMINISTRATOR" DATED FEBRUARY 14, 2003 MADE BY
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE ON
PROPER SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES.
B. THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHICH AMOUNTS TO LACK, OR IN EXCESS, OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING
DUE COURSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON THE GROUND
THAT SAID MOTION IS A THIRD MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHICH IS A
PROHIBITED PLEADING UNDER SEC. 5, RULE 37 OF THE RULES OF COURT.21
On December 1, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed
beyond the 60-day period counted from notice to petitioner of the trial court's
February 27, 2004 Order. The appellate court declared that the May 6, 2004 motion
for reconsideration of petitioner was a pro forma motion because it was a second
motion for reconsideration which sought the same relief as the first motion, hence,
did not toll the running of the 60-day period.22 The appellate court cited the ruling of
this Court in University of Immaculate Concepcion v. Secretary of Labor and
Employment.23
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the CA, contending
that the orders sought to be reconsidered by him were interlocutory, hence, cannot
be considered pro forma or forbidden by the Rules of Court. He cited the rulings of
this Court in Dizon v. Court of Appeals,24 Philgreen Trading Construction Corporation v.
Court of Appeals,25 and the cases cited in the latter decision.26 However, on February
24, 2005, the CA resolved to deny the motion of petitioner.27
Petitioner now seeks relief from this Court, via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, for
the reversal of the resolutions of the appellate court. He raises the following issues:
(A)
WHETHER OR NOT THE SIXTY-DAY PERIOD FOR FILING A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS RECKONED FROM NOTICE OF DENIAL OF
THE FIRST MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER EVEN
THOUGH A SECOND AND THIRD MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (WHICH ARE NOT
PROHIBITED MOTIONS) OF THE SAME INTERLOCUTORY ORDER HAD BEEN FILED AND
WERE LATER DENIED.
(B)
WHETHER OR NOT A PERSON NOMINATED AS "ADMINISTRATOR" BY PURPORTED
HEIRS OF A DEVISEE OR LEGATEE IN A WILL UNDER PROBATE MAY VALIDLY
SUBSTITUTE FOR THAT DEVISEE OR LEGATEE IN THE PROBATE PROCEEDINGS DESPITE
THE FACT THAT SUCH "ADMINISTRATOR" IS NOT THE COURT-APPOINTED
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED DEVISEE OR LEGATEE.28
On the first issue, petitioner avers that the reckoning of the 60-day period for filing a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court from the notice of denial of
the first motion for reconsideration is applicable only if the subject of the petition is a
judgment, final resolution, or order. It does not apply if the subject of the petition is
merely an interlocutory order. He points out that the reason for this is that only one
motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final order is allowed under Section 5,
Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. A second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or
final order is a prohibited pleading; hence, the period for filing a Petition
for Certiorari may not be reckoned from notice of denial of such second and
prohibited motion for reconsideration. Petitioner asserts that a second (or even a
third) motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order is not prohibited; hence,
the 60-day period for filing a Petition for Certiorari may be reckoned from notice of
denial of subsequent motions for reconsideration.
Petitioner further claims that the Orders dated December 2, 2003, February 27, 2004,
June 11, 2004 and September 8, 2004 issued by the RTC are only interlocutory orders.
They deal solely with the issue concerning the proper substitution of the deceased
Oscar Casa who is one of the devisees and legatees named in the purported will of the
testatrix, Loreto San Juan, which is the subject matter of the probate proceedings
pending with the respondent court. Said orders did not terminate or finally dispose of
the case but left something to be done by the respondent court before the case is
finally decided on the merits. The assailed orders do not go into the merits of the
probate case, particularly on the due execution and validity of the will. It pertains only
to the proper substitution of the parties. Thus, the orders are not final orders from
which no second or third motion for reconsideration may be filed.29 It cannot also be
said that the second motion for reconsideration did not toll the running of the
reglementary period for filing a Petition for Certiorari, considering that there is no
prohibition in the filing of a second motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory
order. Furthermore, there is no intention on the part of petitioner to delay
proceedings before the lower court when he filed the third motion for
reconsideration, as he only sought to correct the probate court's patently erroneous
application of the law. Petitioner emphasizes that he filed the Petition
for Certiorari with the CA in view of the grave abuse of discretion which amounted to
lack of or excess of jurisdiction committed by respondent trial court when it wrongfully
assumed in its Order denying the third motion for reconsideration that the order
sought to be reconsidered is a final order on the merits of the case and that the motion
for reconsideration is a third motion for reconsideration of a final order.30
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
We agree with the ruling of the CA that the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner in
the appellate court was time-barred. However, the raison d'etre for its ruling is
incorrect.
Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the proscription against a pro forma motion applies
only to a final resolution or order and not to an interlocutory one. The ruling of this
Court in University of Immaculate Concepcion v. Secretary of Labor and
Employment31 involved a final order of the NLRC and not an interlocutory order.
In this case, the December 2, 2003 Order of the trial court denying the motion of
petitioner to consider insufficient or inadequate respondent's compliance with its
November 22, 2002 Order is interlocutory. The order does not finally dispose of the
case, and does not end the task of the court of adjudicating the parties' contentions
and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other but obviously
indicates that other things remain to be done. Such order may not be questioned
except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment
rendered in the case.32 It bears stressing however that while the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner assailing the December 2, 2003 Order of the trial
court based on the same grounds as those alleged in his first motion is not pro forma,
such second motion for reconsideration can nevertheless be denied on the ground
that it is merely a rehash or a mere reiteration of grounds and arguments already
passed upon and resolved by the court. Such a motion cannot be rejected on the
ground that a second motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order is forbidden
by law or by the Rules of Court.33
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by the resolution of the
Court in Bar Matter No. 00-2-03-SC which took effect on September 1, 2000, reads:
Sec. 4. Where and when petition filed. - The petition shall be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not,
the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions
of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court.
It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in the aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided
by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of
Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason
and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.
Thus, there are three essential dates that must be stated in a Petition
for Certiorari brought under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of a
judgment, resolution or order: (1) the date when notice of the judgment, resolution
or order was received; (2) when a motion for a new trial or reconsideration of the
6
judgment, order or resolution was submitted; and (3) when notice of the denial
thereof was received by petitioner.
The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is for the purpose of determining its timeliness,
considering that a petition is required to be filed not later than 60 days from notice of
the judgment, order or resolution sought to be nullified.34
We agree with the ruling of the CA that the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner
with the CA on November 22, 2004 was filed beyond the 60-day period therefor.
Petitioner received, on March 18, 2004, the February 27, 2004 Order of the court
denying his motion for reconsideration of the December 2, 2003 Order. Petitioner had
60 days from March 18, 2004 or until May 17, 2004 within which to file his Petition
for Certiorari. However, petitioner filed his Petition for Certiorari with the CA only on
November 22, 2004.
The 60-day period should not be reckoned from petitioner's receipt on June 11, 2004
of the denial of his May 7, 2004 second motion for reconsideration. The 60-day period
shall be reckoned from the trial court's denial of his first motion for reconsideration,
otherwise indefinite delays will ensue.35
We note that the parties articulated their stance in their respective pleadings not only
on the timeliness of the Petition for Certiorari in the CA but also on the validity of the
assailed December 2, 2003 Order of the trial court. Ordinarily, in view of the dismissal
of the petition because it was time-barred, the Court will no longer delve into and
resolve the other issues raised in the petition. However, in this case, we find it
appropriate and necessary to resolve once and for all the issue of whether there is a
need for the appointment of an administrator of the estate of Oscar Casa, or whether
it is enough that he be substituted by his heirs.
Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. - Whenever a party to a pending action dies,
and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform
the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the
name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to
comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint
a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear
and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one
so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the
opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or
administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear
for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment,
if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
The rule is a revision of Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Death of party. - After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court
shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear
and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within
such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said
time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the
representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the
deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by
the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be
allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.36
The second paragraph of the rule is plain and explicit: the heirs may be allowed to be
substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an administrator
or executor. However, if within the specified period a legal representative fails to
appear, the court may order the opposing counsel, within a specified period, to
process the appointment of an administrator or executor who shall immediately
appear for the estate of the deceased.37 The pronouncement of this Court in Lawas v.
Court of Appeals38 (relied upon by petitioner), that priority is given to the legal
representative of the deceased (the executor or administrator) and that it is only in
case of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator, or in
cases where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement of the estate that the court
may adopt the alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for
the deceased, is no longer true.39 In Gochan v. Young,40 a case of fairly recent vintage,
the Court ruled as follows:
The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to represent
or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing
the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has
already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in which
special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet
no administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected
to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the
administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the
interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the
properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated.
The Rules are to be interpreted liberally in order to promote their objective of securing
a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. They cannot
be interpreted in such a way as to unnecessarily put undue hardships on litigants. For
the protection of the interests of the decedent, this Court has in previous instances
recognized the heirs as proper representatives of the decedent, even when there is
already an administrator appointed by the court. When no administrator has been
appointed, as in this case, there is all the more reason to recognize the heirs as the
proper representatives of the deceased. Since the Rules do not specifically prohibit
them from representing the deceased, and since no administrator had as yet been
appointed at the time of the institution of the Complaint with the SEC, we see nothing
wrong with the fact that it was the heirs of John D. Young, Sr. who represented his
estate in the case filed before the SEC. (Emphasis supplied)41
The heirs of the estate of Oscar Casa do not need to first secure the appointment of
an administrator of his estate, because from the very moment of his death, they
stepped into his shoes and acquired his rights as devisee/legatee of the deceased
Loreto San Juan. Thus, a prior appointment of an administrator or executor of the
estate of Oscar Casa is not necessary for his heirs to acquire legal capacity to be
substituted as representatives of the estate.42 Said heirs may designate one or some
of them as their representative before the trial court.
Hence, even on the threshold issue raised in the RTC and in the Petition
for Certiorari in the CA, the assailed order of the RTC is correct.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. L-21938-39. May 29, 1970.]
VICENTE URIARTE, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL (12th Judicial District) THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA,
BRANCH IV, JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA and HIGINIO URIARTE, Respondents.
Norberto J . Quisumbing for Petitioner.
Tañada, Teehankee & Carreon for Respondents.
DIZON, J.:
On October 3, 1963 petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed an original petition for certiorari —
docketed as G.R. L-21938 — against the respondents Juan Uriarte Zamacona, Higinio
Uriarte, and the Courts of First Instance of Negros Occidental and of Manila, Branch
IV, who will be referred to hereinafter as the Negros Court and the Manila Court,
respectively — praying:jgc: les.com.ph
". . . that after due proceedings judgment be rendered annulling the orders of 19 April
1963 (Annex ‘H’) and 11 July 1963 (Annex ‘I’) of respondent Negros court dismissing
the first instituted Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, and the order of 1 July 1963
(Annex ‘K’) of respondent Manila court denying petitioner’s omnibus motion to
intervene and to dismiss the later-instituted Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra,
both special proceedings pertaining to the settlement of the same estate of the same
deceased, and consequently annulling all proceedings had in Special Proceeding No.
51396; supra of the respondent Manila court as all taken without jurisdiction.
"For the preservation of the rights of the parties pending these proceedings, petitioner
prays for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondents Manila
court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona and Higinio Uriarte from proceeding with Special
Proceeding No. 51396, supra, until further orders of this Court."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Reasons in support of said petition are stated therein as follows:jgc: les.com.ph
"6. Respondent Negros court erred in dismissing its Special Proceeding No. 6344,
supra, and failing to declare itself ‘the court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of’ the deceased Don Juan Uriarte y Goite as prescribed in Rule 75 section
1 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Manila court erred in failing to dismiss its Special
Proceeding No. 51396, supra, notwithstanding proof of prior filing of Special
Proceeding No. 6344, supra, in the Negros court."cralaw virtua1aw library
The writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was granted and issued by this Court on
October 24, 1963.
On April 22, 1964 petitioner filed against the same respondents a pleading entitled
SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR MANDAMUS — docketed in this Court as G.R. No. L-
21939 — praying, for the reasons therein stated, that judgment be rendered annulling
the orders issued by the Negros Court on December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964,
7
the first disapproving his record on appeal and the second denying his motion for
reconsideration, and further commanding said court to approve his record on appeal
and to give due course to his appeal. On July 15, 1964 We issued a resolution deferring
action on this Supplemental Petition until the original action for certiorari (G.R. L-
21938) is taken up on the merits.
On October 21, 1963 the respondents in G.R. L-21938 filed their answer traversing
petitioner’s contention that the respondent courts had committed grave abuse of
discretion in relation to the matters alleged in the petition for certiorari.
It appears that on November 6, 1961 petitioner filed with the Negros Court a petition
for the settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite (Special
Proceeding No. 6344) alleging therein, inter alia, that, as a natural son of the latter, he
was his sole heir, and that, during the lifetime of said decedent, petitioner had
instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the same Court for his compulsory acknowledgment
as such natural son. Upon petitioner’s motion the Negros Court appointed the
Philippine National Bank as special administrator on November 13, 1961 and two days
later it set the date for the hearing of the petition and ordered that the requisite
notices be published in accordance with law. The record discloses, however, that, for
one reason or another, the Philippine National Bank never actually qualified as special
administrator. les.com : virtual law library
On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the two private respondents herein,
filed an opposition to the above-mentioned petition alleging that he was a nephew of
the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite who had "executed a Last Will and Testament in
Spain, a duly authenticated copy whereof has been requested and which shall be
submitted to this Honorable Court upon receipt thereof," and further questioning
petitioner’s capacity and interest to commence the intestate proceeding.
On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent,
commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396 in the Manila Court for the probate of a
document alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the
same date he filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to
dismiss the same on the following grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan Uriarte y
Goite had left a last will, there was no legal basis to proceed with said intestate
proceedings, and (2) that petitioner Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and
interest to initiate said intestate proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural
son of the decedent. A copy of the Petition for Probate and of the alleged Will were
attached to the Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the Negros
Court was first to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased Juan
Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the same pursuant to Rule
75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
On April 19, 1963, the Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona’s motion to
dismiss and dismissed the Special Proceeding No. 6344 pending before it. His motion
for reconsideration of said order having been denied on July 27, 1963, petitioner
proceeded to file his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal for the
purpose of appealing from said orders to this court on questions of law. The
administrator with the will annexed appointed by the Manila Court in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 objected to the approval of the record on appeal, and under
date of December 7, 1963 the Negros Court issued the following order:jgc: les.com.ph
"Oppositor prays that the record on appeal filed by the petitioner on July 27, 1963, be
dismissed for having been filed out of time and for being incomplete. In the meantime,
before the said record on appeal was approved by this Court, the petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court entitled Vicente Uriarte, Petitioner, v.
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Et Al., G.R. No. L-21938, bringing this case
squarely before the Supreme Court on questions of law which is tantamount to
petitioner’s abandoning his appeal from this Court.cralawnad
"WHEREFORE, in order to give way to the certiorari, the record on appeal filed by the
petitioner is hereby disapproved."cralaw virtua1aw library
In view of the above-quoted order, petitioner filed the supplemental petition for
mandamus mentioned heretofore.
On April 15, 1963 Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding No.
51396 pending in the Manila Court, asking for leave to intervene therein; for the
dismissal of the petition and the annulment of the proceedings had in said special
proceeding. This motion was denied by said court in its order of July 1 of the same
year.
It is admitted that, as alleged in the basic petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344
of the Negros Court, Vicente Uriarte filed in the same court, during the lifetime of Juan
Uriarte y Goite, Civil Case No. 6142 to obtain judgment for his compulsory
acknowledgment as his natural child. Clearly inferrable from this is that at the time he
filed the action, as well as when he commenced the aforesaid special proceeding, he
had not yet been acknowledged as natural son of Juan Uriarte y Goite. Up to this time,
no final judgment to that effect appears to have been rendered.
The record further discloses that the special proceeding before the Negros Court has
not gone farther than the appointment of a special administrator in the person of the
Philippine National Bank who, as stated heretofore, failed to qualify.
On the other hand, it is not disputed that, after proper proceedings were had in Special
Proceeding No. 51396, the Manila Court admitted to probate the document submitted
to it as the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite, the petition for probate appearing not to
have been contested. It appears further that, as stated heretofore, the order issued
by the Manila Court on July 1, 1963 denied petitioner Vicente Uriarte’s Omnibus
Motion for Intervention, Dismissal of Petition and Annulment of said proceedings.
les.com.ph : virtual law library
Likewise, it is not denied that to the motion to dismiss the special proceeding pending
before the Negros Court filed by Higinio Uriarte were attached a copy of the alleged
last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite and of the petition filed with the Manila Court for its
probate. It is clear, therefore, that almost from the start of Special Proceeding No.
6344, the Negros Court and petitioner Vicente Uriarte knew of the existence of the
aforesaid last will and of the proceedings for its probate.
The principal legal questions raised in the petition for certiorari are (a) whether or not
the Negros Court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6644, on the one hand,
and on the other, (b) whether the Manila Court similarly erred in not dismissing Special
Proceeding No. 51396 notwithstanding proof of the prior filing of Special Proceeding
No. 6344 in the Negros Court.
Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)], Courts of First Instance
have original exclusive jurisdiction over "all matters of probate," that is, over special
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons — whether they
died testate or intestate. While their jurisdiction over such subject matter is beyond
question, the matter of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the
special proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by former Rule 75, Section 1
of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the
province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had estate.
Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that of a non-resident alien — like the
deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite — the Courts of First Instance in provinces where the
deceased left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
proper special proceeding for the settlement of his estate. In the case before Us, these
Courts of First Instance are the Negros and the Manila Courts — province and city
where the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite left considerable properties. From this
premise petitioner argues that, as the Negros Court had first taken cognizance of the
special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of said decedent (Special
Proceeding No. 6344), the Manila Court no longer had jurisdiction to take cognizance
of Special Proceeding No. 51396 intended to settle the estate of the same decedent
in accordance with his alleged will, and that consequently, the first court erred in
dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, while the second court similarly erred in not
dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396. lesvirtual|awlibrary
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of
the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate
succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the
settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled
jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same
purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate
proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had
left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate
proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the
latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession
to the executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without
prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding
shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that
proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
Upon the facts before Us the question arises as to whether Juan Uriarte Zamacona
should have filed the petition for the probate of the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite
with the Negros Court — particularly in Special Proceeding No. 6344 — or was entitled
to commence the corresponding separate proceedings, as he did, in the Manila Court.
8

The following considerations and the facts of record would seem to support the view
that he should have submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, either in a
separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the
already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344. In the first place, it is not in accord with
public policy and the orderly and inexpensive administration of justice to
unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several courts would be involved. This, in
effect, was the result of the submission of the will aforesaid to the Manila Court. In
the second place, when respondent Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to Vicente
Uriarte’s petition for the issuance of letters of administration, he had already informed
the Negros Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a will in Spain, of
which a copy had been requested for submission to said court; and when the other
respondent, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, filed his motion to dismiss Special Proceeding No.
6344, he had submitted to the Negros Court a copy of the alleged will of the decedent,
from which fact it may be inferred that, like Higinio Uriarte, he knew before filing the
petition for probate with the Manila Court that there was already a special proceeding
pending in the Negros Court for the settlement of the estate of the same deceased
person. As far as Higinio Uriarte is concerned, it seems quite clear that in his opposition
to petitioner’s petition in Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had expressly promised to
submit said will for probate to the Negros Court.
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the
Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the
Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner’s contention in this regard that the latter
court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not the
proper venue therefor. les law library
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural
defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of
the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right to raise such objection
or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that
petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since
December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed
in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice of the
existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the
petition for its probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte
Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these
notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in
Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and
for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date;
thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will
annexed but also to admit said will to probate more than five months earlier, or more
specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction
over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings
had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence.
Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings
regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if
the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court
of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against
said proceedings is raised too late.
In his order of April 19, 1963 dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, Judge Fernandez
of the Negros Court said that he was "not inclined to sustain the contention of the
petitioner that inasmuch as the herein petitioner has instituted Civil Case No. 6142 for
compulsory acknowledgment by the decedent such action justifies the institution by
him of this proceedings. If the petitioner is to be consistent with the authorities cited
by him in support of his contention, the proper thing for him to do would be to
intervene in the testate estate proceedings entitled Special Proceedings No. 51396 in
the Court of First Instance of Manila instead of maintaining an independent action, for
indeed his supposed interest in the estate of the decedent is of his doubtful character
pending the final decision of the action for compulsory acknowledgment."cralaw
virtua1aw library
We believe in connection with the above matter that petitioner is entitled to
prosecute Civil Case No. 6142 until it is finally determined, or intervene in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 of the Manila Court, if it is still open, or to ask for its reopening
if it has already been closed, so as to be able to submit for determination the question
of his acknowledgment as natural child of the deceased testator, said court having, in
its capacity as a probate court, jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the
deceased testator and whether or not a particular party is or should be declared his
acknowledged natural child (II Moran on Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., p. 476; Conde v.
Abaya, 13 Phil. 249; Severino v. Severino, 44 Phil. 343; Lopez v. Lopez, 68 Phil. 227,
and Jimoga-on v. Belmonte, 47 O.G. 1119).
Coming now to the supplemental petition for mandamus (G.R. No. L-21939), We are
of the opinion, and so hold, that in view of the conclusions heretofore stated, the same
has become moot and academic. If the said supplemental petition is successful, it will
only result in compelling the Negros Court to give due course to the appeal that
petitioner was taking from the orders of said court dated December 7, 1963 and
February 26, 1964, the first being the order of said court dismissing Special Proceeding
No. 6344, and the second being an order denying petitioner’s motion for the
reconsideration of said order of dismissal. Said orders being, as a result of what has
been said heretofore, beyond petitioner’s power to contest, the conclusion can not be
other than that the intended appeal would serve no useful purpose, or, worse still,
would enable petitioner to circumvent our ruling that he can no longer question the
validity of said orders. les virtual lawlibrary
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered denying
the writs prayed for and, as a result, the petition for certiorari filed in G.R. No. L-21938,
as well as the supplemental petition for mandamus docketed as G.R. No. L-21939, are
hereby dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is set aside.
With costs against petitioner.
[G.R. No. L-23445. June 23, 1966.]
REMEDIOS NUGUID, Petitioner-Appellant, v. FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA
NUGUID, Oppositors-Appellees.
Custodio O. Partade for Petitioner-Appellant.
Beltran, Beltran & Beltran for oppositors-appellees.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix
Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and 6 brothers and sisters namely: Alfredo, Federico,
Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951,
some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to
probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her.
On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate
father and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the
probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner
Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors — who are compulsory
heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line — were illegally preterited and that
in consequence the institution is void.
On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and
objection thereto, oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition.
On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to dismiss.
The court’s order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete
nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid"
and dismissed the petition without costs.
A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on
appeal.
1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for
the probate of a will. The court’s area of inquiry is limited — to an examination of, and
resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the
testatrix’s testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be represented, and to be
acted upon, by the court. Said court — at this stage of the proceedings — is not called
upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality
of any devise or legacy therein. 1
A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of
whether or not the will should he allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is
the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared
that the will been duly authenticated. 2 But petitioner and oppositors, in the court
below and here on appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically
a nullity?
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing
9
will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly,
appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is
exists that the case will come once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic a clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of Manresa "anulara siempre
validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. la institución de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este ordenamiento," referring
These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. 9 The one- sentence will here
meet head-on the issue of the nullity of the provisions of the will in question. 3 After institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No specific legacies or
all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution. bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is
complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa:jgc: les.com.ph
2. Petitioner’s sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the conclusion
below that the will is a complete nullity. This exacts from us a study of the disputed "En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de existir, en
will and the applicable statute. todo o en parte? No se añade limitacion alguna, como en el articulo 851, en el que se
expresa que se anulara la institucion de heredero en cuanto perjudique a la legitima
Reproduced hereunder is the will:jgc: les.com.ph del desheredado. Debe, pues, entenderse que la anulacion es completa o total, y que
este articulo como especial en el caso que le motiva, rige con preferencia al 817." 10
"Nov. 17, 1951.
The same view is expressed by Sanches Roman: —
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed
a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property "La consequencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por
which I may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing pretericion de uno, varios o todos los forzosos en linea recta, es la apertura de la
with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day sucesion intestada, total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el testador que comete la
of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one. pretericion, hubiere dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo universal de herencia en
favor de los herederos instituidos, cuya institucion se anula, porque asi lo exige la
(Sgd.) Illegible generalidad del precepto legal del art. 814, al determinar, como efecto de la
pretericion el de que ‘anulara la institucion de heredero’. . ." 11
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID"
Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the
The statute we are called upon to apply is Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, conclusion that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results
provides:jgc: les.com.ph in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such institution of universal
heir — without any other testamentary disposition in the will — amounts to a
"Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article
the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the 854 offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will
death of the testator. shall annul the institution of heir; the devises and legacies shall tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute. On this point, Sanchez Roman cites the
be valid insofar as they are not inofficious . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library "Memoria annual del Tribunal Supremo, correspondiente a 1908," which in our
opinion expresses the rule of interpretation, viz:jgc: les.com.ph
Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of Article
814 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889, which is similarly herein copied, thus — ". . . El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la institucion
de heredero no consiente interpretacion alguno favorable a lo persona instituida en
"Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether el sentido antes expuesto, aun cuando parezca, y en algun caso pudiera ser, mas o
living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, menos equitativa, porque una nulidad no significa en Derecho sino la suposicion de
shall void the institution of heir; but the legacies and betterments 4 shall be valid, in que el hecho o el acto no se ha realizado debiendo; por lo tanto, procederse sobre tal
so far as they are not inofficious. . ."cralaw virtua1aw library base o supuesto, y consiguientemente, en un testamento donde falte la institucion, es
obligado llamar a los herederos forzosos en todo caso, como habria que llamar a los
A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the law becomes de otra clase, cuando el testador no hubiese distribuido todos sus bienes en legados,
a necessity. On this point Manresa comments:jgc: les.com.ph siendo tanto mas obligada esta consecuencia legal cuanto que, en materia de
testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia, con repeticion, que
"La pretericion consiste en omitir al heredero en el testamento. O no se le nombra no basta que seo conocida la voluntad de quien testa si esta voluntad no aparece en
siquiera, o aun nombrandole como padre, hijo, etc., no se leinstituye heredero ni se le la forma y en las condiciones que la ley ha exigido para que sea valido y eficaz, por lo
deshereda expresamente, ni se le asigna parte alguna de los bienes, resultando que constituiria una interpretacion arbitraria, dentro del derecho positivo, reputar
privado de un modo tacito de su derecho a legitima. como legatario a un heredero cuya institucion fuese anulada con pretexto de que esto
se acomodaba mejor a la voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando asi fuese, sera esto
Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el testamento razon para modificar la ley, pero que no outoriza a una interpretacion contraria a sus
omita el testador a uno cualquiera de aquelloa a quienes por su muerte corresponda terminos y a los principios que informan la testamentifaccion, pues no porque parezca
la herencia forzosa. mejor una cosa en el terreno del Derecho constituyente, hay razon para convertir este
juicio en regla de interpretación, desvirtuando y anulando por este procedimiento lo
Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso.) b) Que la que el legislador quiere establecer." 12
omision sea completa; que el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el testamento. 5
3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annulment
It may now appear trite but nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective of the notwithstanding, "the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
problem before us, to have on hand a clear-cut definition of the word annul:jgc: inofficious." Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly
les.com.ph given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a
universal heir in a will — void because of preterition — would give the heir so
"To ‘annul’ means to abrogate, to make void;. . .In re Morrow’s Estate, 54 A. 342, 343, instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in
204 Pa. 484." 6 addition to such institution, a testamentary disposition granting him bequests or
legacies apart and separate from the nullified institution of heir. Sanchez Roman,
"The word ‘annul’ as used in the statute requiring court to annul alimony provisions speaking of the two component parts of Article 814, now 854, states that preterition
of divorce decree upon wife’s remarriage means to reduce to nothing; to annihilate; annuls the institution of the heir "totalmente por la preterición" ; but added (in
obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish. N.J.S.A. 2:50 — reference to legacies and bequests), "pero subsistiendo, . . . todas aquellas otras
38 (now N.J.S.2A:34-25). Madden v. Madden, 40 A.2d 611, 614, 136 N.J. Eq. 132." 7 disposiciones que no se refieren a la institución de heredero . . ." 13 As Manresa puts
it, annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance including la
"ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to porción libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejora o donación." 14
nullify; to abolish; to do away with. Ex parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va. 283, S.E. 2d. 771,
774." 8 As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of
petitioner as universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate
And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no succession ensues.
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending
line — her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will 4. Petitioner’s mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance
10
rather than one of preterition." 15 From this, petitioner draws the conclusion that
Article 854 "does not apply to the case at bar." This argument fails to appreciate the
distinction between preterition and disinheritance.
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone
of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they
are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in
turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the
legitime for a cause authorized by law." 17 In Manresa’s own words: "La privación
expresa de la legitima constituye le desheredación. La privación tacita de la misma se
denomina preterición. 18 Sanchez Roman emphasizes the distinction by stating that
disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria" ; preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed
to be "involuntaria." 19 Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be
supported by a legal cause specified in the will itself. 20
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix’s parents, the forced heirs. It
simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective
disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.
On top of this the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different
from those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat,
"shall annul the institution of heir." This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there
are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In
ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance
shall also "annul the institution of heirs," but only "insofar as it may prejudice the
person disinherited," which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. 21
Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate
of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. Manresa’s expressive
language, in commenting on the rights of the preterited heirs in the case of preterition
on the one hand and legal disinheritance on the other, runs thus: "Preteridos,
adquieren el derecho a todo; deshereda dos, solo les corresponde un tercio o dos
tercios, 22 según el caso." 23
5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to
receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although
the inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes. 24
This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Justice Moran in the Neri
case heretofore cited, viz:jgc: les.com.ph
"But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of the
children by the second marriage should be treated as legado and mejora and,
accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but merely reduced. This theory, if
adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code.
If every case of institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and
betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of articles 814 and
851 regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would be absolutely
meaningless and will]l never have application at all. And the remaining provisions
contained in said articles concerning the reduction of inofficious legacies or
betterments would be a surplusage because they would be absorbed by article 817.
Thus, instead of construing, we would be destroying integral provisions of the Civil
Code.
The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to
distinguish institution of heirs from legacies and betterments, and a general from a
special provision. With reference to Article 814, which is the only provision material
to the disposition of this case, it must be observed that the institution of heirs is
therein dealt with a thing separate and distinct from legacies or betterment. And they
are separate and distinct not only because they are distinctly and separately treated
in said article but because they are in themselves different. Institution of heirs is a
bequest by universal title of property that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific
property bequeathed by a particular or special title. . . But again an institution of heirs
cannot be taken as a legacy,"25cralaw:red
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity."
Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir."
Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for the institution of
petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will
is null.
Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is
hereby affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered.
[G.R. No. L-39247. June 27, 1975.]
In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX
BALANAY, JR., Petitioner, v. HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Davao Branch VI; AVELINA B. ANTONIO and DELIA B.
LANABAN, Respondents.
Roberto M. Sarenas for Petitioner.
Jose B. Guyo for Private Respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Leodegaria Julian, in her will, partitioned her paraphernal as well as all the conjugal
properties as if they were all owned by her, disposing of her husband’s one-half share,
and providing that the properties should not be divided during her husband’s lifetime
but should remain intact and that the legitimes should be paid in cash to be satisfied
out of the fruits of the properties. Felix Balanay, Jr. filed a petition for the approval of
his mother’s will which was opposed by the husband and some of her children. During
the pendency of the probate proceedings petitioner submitted to the court a
document showing his father’s conformity to the testamentary distribution,
renouncing his hereditary rights in favor of his children in deference to the memory of
his wife. The Court denied the opposition, set for hearing the probate of the will and
gave effect to the affidavit and conformity of the surviving spouse.
Meanwhile, a certain Atty. David Montaña, Sr. allegedly, in behalf of the petitioner,
moved to dismiss the probate proceedings and requested authority to proceed by
intestate proceedings on the ground that the will was void, which motion was granted
by the probate court. The Court, however, did not abrogate its prior orders to proceed
with the probate proceedings. Subsequently, the court appointed the branch clerk as
special administrator, and notice to creditors was issued and published in the Davao
Star.
Petitioner impugned the order of dismissal claiming that Atty. Montaña had no
authority to ask for the dismissal of the petition for allowance of will and that the court
erred in declaring the will void before resolving the question of its formal validity.
The Supreme Court set aside the order dismissing the petition for probate of the will
directed the lower court to proceed with the hearing of the case with costs against
private respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Felix Balanay, Jr. appealed by certiorari from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Davao dated February 28, ‘974, declaring illegal and void the will of his mother,
Leodegaria Julian, converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding and
ordering the issuance of the corresponding notice to creditors (Special Case No.’808).
The antecedents of the appeal are as follows: 1es virtual 1aw library
Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February ‘2, ‘973 in Davao
City at the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and
by their six legitimate children named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B.
Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition dated February 27, ‘973 for the
probate of his mother’s notarial will dated September 5, ‘970 which is written in
English. In that will Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that she was the owner of the
"southern half" of nine conjugal lots (par. II); (b) that she was the absolute owner of
two parcels of land which she inherited from her father (par. III), and (c) that it was
her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her
husband’s lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her
properties (Par. IV).
Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband’s death (he was
eighty-two years old in ‘973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which
she described as "my properties") should be divided and distributed in the manner set
forth in that part of her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they
were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband’s one-half share of the
conjugal assets. *
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the
grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband
and alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate. The oppositors claimed that
Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate certain properties which he had received from the
testatrix.
Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply to the opposition, attached thereto an affidavit of Felix
Balanay, Sr. dated April ‘8, ‘973 wherein he withdrew his opposition to the probate of
11
the will and affirmed that he was interested in its probate. On the same date Felix
Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument captioned "Conformation (sic) of Division and
Renunciation of Hereditary Rights" wherein he manifested that out of respect for his
wife’s will he "waived and renounced" his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of
their six children. In that same instrument he confirmed the agreement, which he and
his wife had perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties would be
partitioned in the manner indicated in her will.
Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and
"conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void. The lower court in its order of June ‘8,
‘973 "denied" the opposition and reset for hearing the probate of the will. It gave
effect to the affidavit and conformity of Felix Balanay, Sr. In an order dated August 28,
‘973 it appointed its branch clerk of court as special administrator of the decedent’s
estate.
Mrs. Antonio moved for the reconsideration of the lower court’s order of June ‘8, ‘973
on the grounds (a) that the testatrix illegally claimed that she was the owner of the
southern half of the conjugal lots and (b) that she could not partition the conjugal
estate by allocating portions of the nine lots to her children. Felix Balanay, Jr., through
his counsel, Hermenegildo Cabreros, opposed that motion. The lower court denied it
in its order of October ‘5, ‘973.
In the meanwhile, another lawyer appeared in the case. David O. Montaña, Sr.,
claiming to be the lawyer of petitioner Felix Balanay, Jr. (his counsel of record was
Atty. Cabreros), filed a motion dated September 25, ‘973 for "leave of court to
withdraw probate of alleged will of Leodegaria Julian and requesting authority to
proceed by intestate estate proceeding." In that motion Montaña claimed to be the
lawyer not only of the petitioner but also of Felix Balanay, Sr., Beatriz B. Solamo,
Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Montaña in his motion assailed the provision of the will which partitioned the conjugal
assets or allegedly effected a compromise of future legitimes. He prayed that the
probate of the will be withdrawn and that the proceeding be converted into an
intestate proceeding. In another motion of the same date he asked that the
corresponding notice to creditors be issued.
Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban, through Atty. Jose B. Guyo, in their comments
dated October ‘5, ‘973 manifested their conformity with the motion for the issuance
of a notice to creditors. They prayed that the will be declared void for being contrary
to law and that an intestacy be declared.
The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Montaña, assumed that the issuance
of a notice to creditors was in order since the parties had agreed on that point. It
adopted the view of Attys. Montaña and Guyo that the will was void. So, in its order
of February 28, ‘974 it dismissed the petition for the probate, converted the testate
proceeding into an intestate proceeding, ordered the issuance of a notice to creditors
and set the intestate proceeding for hearing on April ‘ and 2, ‘974. The lower court did
not abrogate its prior orders of June ‘8 and October ‘5, ‘973. The notice to creditors
was issued on April ‘, ‘974 and published on May 2, 9 and ‘6 in the Davao Star in spite
of petitioner’s motion of April ‘7, ‘974 that its publication be held in abeyance.
Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, in a verified motion
dated April ‘5, ‘974, asked for the reconsideration of the lower court’s order of
February 28, ‘974 on the ground that Atty. Montaña had no authority to withdraw the
petition for the allowance of the will. Attached to the motion was a copy of a letter
dated March 27, ‘974 addressed to Atty. Montaña and signed by Felix Balanay, Jr.,
Beatriz V. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon, wherein they
terminated Montana’s services and informed him that his withdrawal of the petition
for the probate of the will was without their consent and was contrary to their
repeated reminder to him that their mother’s will was "very sacred’ to them.
Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban opposed the motion for reconsideration. The
lower court denied the motion in its order of June 29, ‘974. It clarified that it declared
the will void on the basis of its own independent assessment of its provisions and not
because of Atty. Montaña’s arguments.
The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity
of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.
We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are
of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate
(which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner’s
authorization), the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will’s intrinsic validity
even before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might
become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,
even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 64
O.G.’527, ‘7 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang v. Ramagosa, L-23’35, December 26,
‘967, 2’ SCRA ‘369; Cacho v. Udan, L-’9996, April 30, ‘965, ‘3 SCRA 693).
But the probate court erred in declaring in its order of February 28, ‘974 that the will
was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding
notwithstanding the fact that in its order of June ‘8, ‘973 it gave effect to the surviving
husband’s conformity to the will and to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which
presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal estate.
The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does
not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that
the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition
had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where some of the provisions of a will are
valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from
the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the
general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries" (95 C.J.S. 873).
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half" of the conjugal
lands is contrary to law because, although she was a coowner thereof, her share was
inchoate and proindiviso (Art.’43, Civil Code; Madrigal and Paterno v. Rafferty and
Concepcion, 38 Phil. 4’4). But that illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It
may be disregarded.
The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided
among her heirs during her husband’s lifetime but should be kept intact and that the
legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to article ‘080 of the Civil Code which
reads:jgc: les.com.ph
"ART.’080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by
will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of
the compulsory heirs.
"A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, desires to keep any agricultural,
industrial, or manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail himself of the right granted
him in this article, by ordering that the legitime of the other children to whom the
property is not assigned, be paid in cash. (’056a)"
The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate among her six
children (her husband had renounced his hereditary rights and his one-half conjugal
share). She did not assign the whole estate to one or more children as envisaged in
article ‘080. Hence, she had no right to require that the legitimes be paid in cash. On
the other hand, her estate may remain undivided only for a period of twenty years.
So, the provision that the estate should not be divided during her husband’s lifetime
would at most be effective only for twenty years from the date of her death unless
there are compelling reasons for terminating the coownership (Art.’083, Civil Code).
Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of
the conjugal partnership (Arts.’79[’] and ‘04’, Civil Code) but insofar as said
renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in
the conjugal estate (Art.’050[’] Civil Code), it should be subject to the limitations
prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should be
adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime
should be respected.
Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is intrinsically
valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors
and impair the legitimes. The distribution and partition would become effective upon
the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably
divided among the children and the surviving spouse.
It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband’s conformity to his wife’s
will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share be a part
of his deceased wife’s estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the partition
made in paragraph V of the will without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the
creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs.
Article 793 of the Civil Code provides that "property acquired after the making of a will
shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had possessed it at the time of making the
will, should it expressly appear by the will that such was his intention." Under article
930 of the Civil Code "the legacy or devise of a thing belonging to another person is
void, if the testator erroneously believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the
thing bequeathed, though not belonging to the testator when he made the will,
afterwards becomes his, by whatever title, the disposition shall take effect."cralaw
virtua1aw library
12
In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to devote his official time to his official duties and should not have as a sideline the
partition the conjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is administration of a decedent’s estate.
true that she could dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal estate (Art.’70, Civil
Code) but since the husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had WHEREFORE, the lower court’s orders of February 28, and June 29, ‘974 are set aside
assented to her testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such partition has and its order of June ‘8, ‘973, setting for hearing the petition for probate, is affirmed.
become valid, assuming that the will may be probated. The lower court is directed to conduct further proceedings in Special Case No.’808 in
consonance with this opinion. Costs, against the private respondents.
The instant case is different from the Nuguid case, supra, where the testatrix instituted
as heir her sister and preterited her parents. Her will was intrinsically void because it SO ORDERED.
preterited her compulsory heirs in the direct line. Article 854 of the Civil Code provides
that "the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the [G.R. No. L-62952. October 9, 1985.]
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the
death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA
shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious." Since the preterition of the parents GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO ANG CARMELITA JUGO, Respondents.
annulled the institution of the sister of the testatrix and there were no legacies and
devises, total intestacy resulted (Art. 960[2], Civil Code).
DECISION
In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did
not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife’s will and
renounced his hereditary rights. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will as
contemplated in its uncancelled order of June ‘8, ‘97’3. Save in an extreme case where This is a petition for certiorari to set aside that portion of the decision of the
the will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate court’s duty to pass first upon respondent Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate Court) dated June 3, 1982,
the formal validity of the will. Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838, as amended by the resolution dated August 10, 1982, declaring as null and void the
Civil Code; Guevara v. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Fernandez v. Dimagiba, devise in favor of the petitioner and the resolution dated December 28, 1982 denying
L-23638, October ‘2, ‘967, 2’ SCRA 428). petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

As aptly stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, "the very existence of a purported testament Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and Testament
is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed testator has willed that his estate should duly signed by him at the end of the Will on page three and on the left margin of pages
be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, 1, 2 and 4 thereof in the presence of Celestina Alejandro, Myrna C. Cortez, and Leandro
if legally tenable, such desire be given effect independent of the attitude of the parties Leaño, who in turn, affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the
affected thereby" (Resolution, Vda. de Precilla v. Narciso, L-27200, August ‘8, ‘972, 46 left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 of the Will in the presence of the testator and of each
SCRA 538, 565). other and the Notary Public. The Will was acknowledged before the Notary Public
Romeo Escareal by the testator and his three attesting witnesses.
To give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is the first and principal law
in the matter of testaments (Dizon-Rivera v. Dizon, L-2456’, June 30, ‘970, 33 SCRA In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J.
554, 56’). Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An interpretation that will render a Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will
testamentary disposition operative takes precedence over a construction that will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two
nullify a provision of the will (Arts. 788 and 79’, Civil Code). legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from
his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In
Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J.
evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The
estate. So compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and that the testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his
wishes of the testator should prevail that sometimes the language of the will can be children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein
varied for the purpose of giving it effect (Austria v. Reyes, L-23079, February 27, ‘970, petitioner. The Will reads in part: les.com:cralaw:red
3’ SCRA 754, 762).
"Art. III. That I have the following legal heirs, namely: my aforementioned legal wife,
As far as is legally possible, the expressed desire of the testator must be followed and Rufina Gomez, and our son, Oscar, and daughter Carmelita, both surnamed Jugo,
the dispositions of the properties in his will should be upheld (Estorque v. Estorque, L- whom I declare and admit to be legally and properly entitled to inherit from me; that
’9573, June 30, ‘970, 33 SCRA 540, 546). while I have been estranged from my above-named wife for so many years, I cannot
deny that I was legally married to her or that we have been separated up to the
The law has a tender regard for the wishes of the testator as expressed in his will present for reasons and justifications known fully well by them;
because any disposition therein is better than that which the law can make (Castro v.
Bustos, L-259’3, February 28, ‘969, 27 SCRA 327, 34’). "Art IV. That since 1952, I have been living, as man and wife, with one Sofia J.
Nepomuceno, whom I declare and avow to be entitled to may love and affection, for
Two other errors of the lower court may be noticed. It erred in issuing a notice to all the things which she has done for me, now and in the past; that while Sofia J.
creditors although no executor or regular administrator has been appointed. The Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and consent, did comport and represent
record reveals that it appointed a special administrator. A notice to creditors is not in myself as her own husband, in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I
order if only a special administrator has been appointed. Section ‘, Rule 86 of the Rules could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because of my
of Court, in providing that "immediately after granting letters of testamentary or of aforementioned previous marriage;"
administration, the court shall issue a notice requiring all persons having money claims
against the decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of said court" clearly On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and
contemplates the appointment of an executor or regular administrator and not that Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
of a special administrator. XXXIV, Caloocan City and asked for the issuance to her of letters testamentary.

It is the executor or regular administrator who is supposed to oppose the claims On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed
against the estate and to pay such claims when duly allowed (Sec.’0, Rule 86 and sec.’, an opposition alleging inter alia that the execution of the Will was procured by undue
Rule 88, Rules of Court). and improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the execution
of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her
We also take this occasion to point out that the probate court’s appointment of its living in concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus letters
branch clerk of court as special administrator (p. 30, Rollo) is not a salutary practice testamentary should not be issued to her.
because it might engender the suspicion that the probate Judge and his clerk of court
are in cahoots in milking the decedent’s estate. Should the branch clerk of court On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that
commit any abuse or devastavit in the course of his administration, the probate Judge as the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from December
might find it difficult to hold him to a strict accountability. A court employee should 1952 until his death on July 16, 1974, the Will’s admission to probate will be an idle
13
exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is x x x
evident.

The petitioner appealed to the respondent-appellate court. "True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate.
Probate is one thing; the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first
On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First decides the execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator;
Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the Will. The respondent court declared the the second relates to descent and distribution." (Sumilang v. Ramagosa 21 SCRA 1369).
Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void x x x
pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:jgc: les.com.ph
"To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will
"WHEREFORE, the decision a quo is hereby set aside, the will in question declared valid was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a
except the devise in favor of the appellant which is declared null and void. The condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code
properties so devised are instead passed on in intestacy to the appellant in equal for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625). The judgment in such proceedings determines and
shares, without pronouncement as to costs."cralaw virtua1aw library can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity
of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy
On June 15, 1982, oppositors Rufina Gomez and her children filed a "Motion for is void and another one valid. . . ." (Castañeda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426)
Correction of Clerical Error" praying that the word "appellant" in the last sentence of
the dispositive portion of the decision be changed to "appellees" so as to read: "The The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the
properties so devised are instead passed on intestacy to the appellees in equal shares, probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass
without pronouncement as to costs." The motion was granted by the respondent upon certain provisions of the Will.
court on August 10, 1982.
In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the testator instituted the
On August 23, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This was denied petitioner as universal heir and completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will
by the respondent court in a resolution dated December 28, 1982. les virtual lawlibrary of this nature, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, would be null and void.
Separate or latter proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not the respondent court acted provisions would be superfluous.
in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and Testament of the
deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of Even before establishing the formal validity of the will, the Court in Balanay, Jr. v.
the testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner. Martinez (64 SCRA 452) passed upon the validity of its intrinsic provisions.

The petitioner submits that the validity of the testamentary provision in her favor
cannot be passed upon and decided in the probate proceedings but in some other
proceedings because the only purpose of the probate of a Will is to establish
conclusively as against everyone that a Will was executed with the formalities required
by law and that the testator has the mental capacity to execute the same. The
petitioner further contends that even if the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 739 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines were applicable, the declaration of its nullity could
only be made by the proper court in a separate action brought by the legal wife for
the specific purpose of obtaining a declaration of the nullity of the testamentary
provision in the Will in favor of the person with whom the testator was allegedly guilty
of adultery or concubinage.
The respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that the last Will and
Testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship
between the testator and the petitioner and the fact that petitioner herself initiated
the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the
testator, which led private respondents to present contrary evidence, merits the
application of the doctrine enunciated in Nuguid v. Felix Nuguid, Et. Al. (17 SCRA 449)
and Felix Balanay, Jr. v. Hon. Antonio Martinez, et al (G.R. No. L-39247, June 27, 1975).
Respondents also submit that the admission of the testator of the illicit relationship
between him and the petitioner put in issue the legality of the devise.
We agree with the respondents.
Invoking "practical considerations", we stated:jgc: les.com.ph
"The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic
validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it
void.
"We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are
of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate
(which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner’s
authorization), the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will’s intrinsic validity
even before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might
become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,
even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 64 O.G.
1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang v. Ramagosa, L-23135, December 26,
1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho v. Udan, L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693).
There appears to be no more dispute at this time over the extrinsic validity of the Will.
Both parties are agreed that the Will of Martin Jugo was executed with all the
formalities required by law and that the testator had the mental capacity to execute
his Will. The petitioner states that she completely agrees with the respondent court
when in resolving the question of whether or not the probate court correctly denied
the probate of Martin Jugo’s last Will and Testament, it ruled:jgc: les.com.ph

The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be "This being so, the will is declared validly drawn." (Page 4, Decision, Annex A of
validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared Petition.)
the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void.
On the other hand the respondents pray for the affirmance of the Court of Appeals’
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to decision in toto.
an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule is expressed
thus: les law library The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the respondent court to declare the
x x x testamentary provision in favor of the petitioner as null and void.

We sustain the respondent court’s jurisdiction. As stated in Nuguid v. Nuguid,

". . . It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions (supra):jgc: les.com.ph
concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last
Will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or "We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing
otherwise." (Fernandez v. Dimagiba, 21 SCRA 428). will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that
appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability
"The petition below being for the probate of a Will, the court’s area of inquiry is limited exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic
to the extrinsic validity thereof. The testator’s testamentary capacity and the validity or nullity of the will. Result. waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety.
compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well
questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. (Section
validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court. Case, Et. Al. v. Jugo, Et Al., 77 Phil. 517, 522). After all, there
premature. exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
14
 "Clearly, the good faith of petitioner was by option of the parties made a decisive issue
We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified provision right at the inception of the case.
to the proper court in a separate action for that purpose simply because, in the
probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its "Confronted by the situation, the trial court had to make a ruling on the question.
provisions. les virtual lawlibrary
"When the court a quo held that the testator Martin Jugo and petitioner ‘were
Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:jgc: les.com.ph deemed guilty of adultery or concubinage’, it was a finding that petitioner was not the
innocent woman she pretended to be."cralaw virtua1aw library
"The following donations shall be void: 1es virtual 1aw library x x x

(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the
time of the donation; "3’ If a review of the evidence must be made nonetheless, then private respondents
respectfully offer the following analysis:jgc: les.com.ph
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in
consideration thereof; "FIRST: The secrecy of the marriage of petitioner with the deceased testator in a town
in Tarlac where neither she nor the testator ever resided. If there was nothing to hide
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by reason from, why the concealment? Of course, it maybe argued that the marriage of the
of his office. deceased with private respondent Rufina Gomez was likewise done in secrecy. But it
should be remembered that Rufina Gomez was already in the family way at that time
"In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought and it would seem that the parents of Martin Jugo were not in favor of the marriage
by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be so much so that an action in court was brought concerning the marriage. (Testimony
proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action. of Sebastian Jugo, TSN of August 18, 1975, pp. 29-30).

Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:jgc: les.com.ph
"The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall
apply to testamentary provisions."cralaw virtua1aw library
In Article III of the disputed Will, executed on August 15, 1968, or almost six years
before the testator’s death on July 16, 1974, Martin Jugo stated that respondent
Rufina Gomez was his legal wife from whom he had been estranged "for so many
years." He also declared that respondents Carmelita Jugo and Oscar Jugo were his
legitimate children. In Article IV, he stated that he had been living as man and wife
with the petitioner since 1952. Testator Jugo declared that the petitioner was entitled
to his love and affection. He stated that Nepomuceno represented Jugo as her own
husband but "in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her
to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous
marriage."cralaw virtua1aw library
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when
Martin Jugo executed his Will. There is also no dispute that the petitioner and Mr. Jugo
lived together in an ostensible marital relationship for 22 years until his death.
It is also a fact that on December 2, 1952, Martin Jugo and Sofia J. Nepomuceno
contracted a marriage before the Justice of the Peace of Victoria, Tarlac. The man was
then 51 years old while the woman was 48. Nepomuceno now contends that she acted
in good faith for 22 years in the belief that she was legally married to the testator.
les.com : virtual law library
The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith. As argued by the
private respondents:jgc: les.com.ph
"First. The last will and testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the
meretricious relationship between the testator and petitioner, the devisee.
"Second. Petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged
ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to
present contrary evidence.
"In short, the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validity of the legacy given in
the will to petitioner by the deceased testator at the start of the proceedings.
"Whether or not petitioner knew that testator Martin Jugo, the man he had lived with
as man and wife, as already married was an important and specific issue brought by
the parties before the trial court, and passed upon by the Court of Appeals.
"SECOND: Petitioner was a sweetheart of the deceased testator when they were still
both single. That would be in 1922 as Martin Jugo married respondent Rufina Gomez
on November 29, 1923 (Exh. 3). Petitioner married the testator only on December 5,
1952. There was a space of about 30 years in-between. During those 30 years, could
it be believed that she did not even wonder why Martin Jugo did not marry her nor
contact her anymore after November, 1923 — facts that should impel her to ask her
groom before she married him in secrecy, especially so when she was already about
50 years old at the time of marriage.
"THIRD: The fact that petitioner broke off from Martin Jugo in 1923 is by itself
conclusive demonstration that she knew that the man she had openly lived for 22
years as man and wife was a married man with already two children.
"FOURTH: Having admitted that she knew the children of respondent Rufina Gomez,
is it possible that she would not have asked Martin Jugo whether or not they were ms
illegitimate or legitimate children and by whom? That is un-Filipino.
"FIFTH: Having often gone to Pasig to the residence of the parents of the deceased
testator, is it possible that she would not have known that the mother of private
respondent Oscar Jugo and Carmelita Jugo was respondent Rufina Gomez, considering
that the houses of the parents of Martin Jugo (where he had lived for many years) and
that of respondent Rufina Gomez were just a few meters away?
"Such pretentions of petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno are unbelievable. They are, to say
the least, inherently improbable, for they are against the experience in common life
and the ordinary instincts and promptings of human nature that a woman would not
bother at all to ask the man she was going to marry whether or not he was already
married to another, knowing that her groom had children. It would be a story that
would strain human credulity to the limit if petitioner did not know that Martin Jugo
was already a married man in view of the irrefutable fact that it was precisely his
marriage to respondent Rufina Gomez that led petitioner to break off with the
deceased during their younger years."cralaw virtua1aw library
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a
donation between persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation
which becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the recipient may
receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator
admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living
in concubinage. les.com : virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

"Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic validity of the will, it was petitioner SO ORDERED.
who opted to present evidence on her alleged good faith in marrying the testator.
(Testimony of Petitioner, TSN of August 1, 1982, pp. 56-57 and pp. 62-64). [G.R. No. 169144 : January 26, 2011]

"Private respondents, naturally, presented evidence that would refute the testimony IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA
of petitioner on the point. PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR,
MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS AND BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS, Petitioners,
"Sebastian Jugo, younger brother of the deceased testator, testified at length on the v. ERNESTO PALAGANAS, Respondent.
meretricious relationship of his brother and petitioner. (TSN of August 18, 1975). DECISION
ABAD, J.:
15
This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed abroad by a
foreigner although it has not been probated in its place of execution.cralawlibrary
The Facts and the Case
On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a
naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and
testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas
(Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in
the U.S.cralawlibrary
On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of
Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for
the probate of Ruperta's will and for his appointment as special administrator of her
estate.1 On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas
(Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed
the petition on the ground that Ruperta's will should not be probated in the Philippines
but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming
Ruperta's will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having
been executed under duress and without the testator's full understanding of the
consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as
administrator of the estate.cralawlibrary
Meantime, since Ruperta's foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were on
separate occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a
motion with the RTC for leave to take their deposition, which it granted. On April, 13,
2004 the RTC directed the parties to submit their memorandum on the issue of
whether or not Ruperta's U.S. will may be probated in and allowed by a court in the
Philippines.cralawlibrary
On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order:2 (a) admitting to probate Ruperta's last will;
(b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio,
the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special
Administration to Ernesto.cralawlibrary
Aggrieved by the RTC's order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to
the Court of Appeals (CA),3 arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American
citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines.cralawlibrary
On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision,4 affirming the assailed order of the
RTC,5 holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to
respondent Ernesto's submission of the authenticated copies of the documents
specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The CA pointed out that
Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and allowance
of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in the
Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers to
a will already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules
or procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel and Benjamin came to this
Court.cralawlibrary
The Issue Presented
The key issue presented in this case is whether or not a will executed by a foreigner
abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously
probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.cralawlibrary
The Court's Ruling
Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners abroad
must first be probated and allowed in the country of its execution before it can be
probated here. This, they claim, ensures prior compliance with the legal formalities of
the country of its execution. They insist that local courts can only allow probate of
such wills if the proponent proves that: (a) the testator has been admitted for probate
in such foreign country, (b) the will has been admitted to probate there under its laws,
(c) the probate court has jurisdiction over the proceedings, (d) the law on probate
procedure in that foreign country and proof of compliance with the same, and (e) the
legal requirements for the valid execution of a will.cralawlibrary
But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad
although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their
execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of
the Civil Code states that the will of an alienwho is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the
place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.6
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he
has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2
of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any
other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator,
petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in
his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.cralawlibrary
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far
as known to the petitioner: (a)the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and
residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the
probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person
for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the
name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death
of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the
probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left
in such province.7 The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been
allowed and probated in the country of its execution.cralawlibrary
In insisting that Ruperta's will should have been first probated and allowed by the
court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the
procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-
authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different
from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent
court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary
to petitioners' stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot
be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as
binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the
matter can be established.cralawlibrary
Besides, petitioners' stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirs do not
have the means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them
outright of their inheritance, since our law requires that no will shall pass either real
or personal property unless the will has been proved and allowed by the proper court.8
Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing more than an initial ruling
that the court can take cognizance of the petition for probate of Ruperta's will and
that, in the meantime, it was designating Ernesto as special administrator of the
estate. The parties have yet to present evidence of the due execution of the
will, i.e. the testator's state of mind at the time of the execution and compliance with
the formalities required of wills by the laws of California. This explains the trial court's
directive for Ernesto to submit the duly authenticated copy of Ruperta's will and the
certified copies of the Laws of Succession and Probate of Will of
California.cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals
decision in CA-G.R. CV 83564 dated July 29, 2005.cralawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NOS. 140371-72 : November 27, 2006]
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D.
SEANGIO, Petitioners, v. HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO
D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO,
ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and
JAMES D. SEANGIO, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari1 with application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeking the nullification of
the orders, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the petition for probate on the ground of
preterition, in the consolidated cases, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP.
Proc. No. 99-93396, and entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Segundo C.
Seangio v. Alfredo D. Seangio, et al." and "In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of
Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio."
The facts of the cases are as follows:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 98 90870 of
the RTC, and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D.
Seangio'Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng
Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the
petition. They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of
her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor
of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and supervision over
his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve
as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public
accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995,
16
disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the
purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found
to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and
replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. 99 93396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC. They
likewise reiterated that the probate proceedings should take precedence over SP.
Proc. No. 98 90870 because testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority
over intestate proceedings.2
The document that petitioners refer to as Segundo's holographic will is quoted, as
follows:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Tantunin ng sinuman
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita,
Manila at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang
inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio
dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama
harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko
at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na
ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw.
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para
makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China
Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay
nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders ng China
Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r]
ng Travel Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong
inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya
anak at hindi siya makoha mana.
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng
tatlong saksi.3
(signed)
Segundo Seangio
Nilagdaan sa harap namin
(signed)
Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi
(signed)
ikatlong saksi
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners' motion, SP. Proc. No. 98 90870 and SP. Proc. No.
99 93396 were consolidated.4
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate
proceedings5 primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the
holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the
deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil
Code. According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of
disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all
other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee,
hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being the case, private
respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to rule only
on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic
validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on
the face of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the
property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1)
generally, the authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the
extrinsic validity of the will; 2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the
extrinsic validity of the will; 3) disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of
a decedent; and, 4) the rule on preterition does not apply because Segundo's will does
not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory
heirs.6
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for
probate proceedings:
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng
Seangio, et al., clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned
thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the
New Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is
concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she not being a compulsory heir in the direct
line.
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would amount
to an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate
Appellate Court [155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its position clear: "for - respondents
to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when, on
its face, the will appears to be intrinsically void - would have been an exercise in
futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The
trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the
intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will
was resolved (underscoring supplied).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. Special Proceedings No. 99 93396 is hereby DISMISSED
without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order dated
October 14, 1999.
Petitioners contend that:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND
DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999
(ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF) CONSIDERING THAT:
I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF
RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE
CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS,
DISMISSED THE TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE TESTATOR'S WILL
IS VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO
THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE
THAT THE AUTHORITY OF PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY TO A DETERMINATION
OF THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF, THE
TESTATOR'S TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES
OR SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;
II
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO
RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS
INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE OF THE TESTATOR'S WILL THAT NO PRETERITON EXISTS
AND THAT THE WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE
INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE
PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
Petitioners argue, as follows:
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules
of Court which respectively mandate the court to: a) fix the time and place for proving
the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause
notice of such time and place to be published three weeks successively previous to the
appointed time in a newspaper of general circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of said
notice to the heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as
its title clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a
disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedent's will
and the holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private
respondents alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line of Segundo were preterited in the holographic will
since there was no institution of an heir;
Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is
both intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed
with the hearing of the testate case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to
petitioners, and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was
dated, signed and written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of
preterition, private respondents did not raise any issue as regards the authenticity of
the document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed
Segundo's intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the
reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must
be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With
regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his
document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered
a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents
a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of
the Civil Code:
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children
and descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of
the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law
prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found
groundless;
17
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with
the spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence
causes the testator to make a will or to change one already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who
disinherit such child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;8
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by
Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other
form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Segundo's document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance
instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is
written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis
causa[9] can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does
not make an affirmative disposition of the latter's property, the disinheritance of
Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the
disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in
favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.10
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator,
expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as
the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and
give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to
law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.11
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the
law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the
ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator.12 In this regard, the
Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng
Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by
him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is
probated,13 the disinheritance cannot be given effect.14
With regard to the issue on preterition,15 the Court believes that the compulsory heirs
in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court's opinion,
Segundo's last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the
sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir16 to the exclusion of
his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners,
Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her
name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his
son, Alfredo.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Considering that the questioned document is Segundo's holographic will, and that the
law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with.
Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus,
unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be
rendered nugatory.17
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the
holographic will to be probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings
for the same purpose.18
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside.
Respondent judge is directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the
allowance of the holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc.
No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the termination of the aforesaid testate
proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-29300. June 21, 1978.]
PEDRO D. H. GALLANOSA, CORAZON GRECIA-GALLONOSA and ADOLFO FORTAJADA,
the deceased Pedro Gallanosa being substituted by his legal heirs, namely, his
above-named widow and his children, ISIDRO GALLANOSA and LEDY GALLANOSA,
and grandchildren named IMELDA TECLA GALLANOSA and ROSARIO BRIGIDA
GALLANOSA, children of the late SIKATUNA GALLANOSA. son of Pedro D.H.
GALLONOSA, Petitioners, v. HON. UBALDO Y. ARCANGEL, Judge of Branch I of the
Court of First Instance of Sorsogon and FLORENTINO G. HITOSIS, CASIANO G.
HITOSIS, TEOTIMO G. HITOSIS, VICTORIO G. HITOSIS, EMILIA G. HITOSIS VDA. DE
CRUZ, JOAQUIN R. HITOSIS VDA. DE CRUZ, JOAQUIN R. HITOSIS, FLORENTINO R.
HITOSIS, VIRGINIA R. HITOSIS, DEBORAH R. HITOSIS, EDILBERTO R. HITOSIS, LEONOR
R. HITOSIS, NORMA R. HITOSIS-VILLANUEVA, LEONCIO R. HITOSIS, minors ANGEL R.
HITOSIS and RODOLFO R. HITOSIS, represented by their legal guardian and mother
LOURDES RELUCIO VDA. DE HITOSIS, PETRONA HITOSIS-BALBIDO, MODESTO
HITOSIS-GACILO, CLETO HITOSIS, AGUSTIN HITOSIS-FORTES, TOMASA HITOSIS-
BANARES VDA. DE BORRAS, CONRADA HITOSIS-BANARES FRANCHE, RESTITUTO
HITOSIS-BANARES, DAMIAN HITOSIS-BANARES, FIDEL HITOSIS-BANARES, SUSANA
HITOSIS-BANARES RODRIGUEZ, JOSE HITOSIS, LOLITA HITOSIS-BANEGA, minors
MILAGROS HITOSIS-BANEGA, ALICIA HITOSIS-BANEGA AND ELISA HITOSIS-BANEGA,
represented by their legal guardian and father ERNESTO BANEGA, FELICITAS
HITOSIS-PENAFLOR, GENOVEVA HITOSIS-ADRIATICO, MANUEL HITOSIS, PEDRO
HITOSIS, LIBRATA HITOSIS-BALMES, JUANITA HITOSIS-GABITO VDA. DE GABAS,
MAURA HITOSIS-GABITO VDA. DE GANOLA and LEONA HITOSIS-GABITO
GAMBOA, Respondents.
Haile Frivaldo, for Petitioners.
Joaquin R. Hitosis for Private Respondents.
SYNOPSIS
After the will of Florentino Hitosis was duly probated and the project of partition
among his testamentary heirs was approved by the court, the legal heirs who appealed
neither from the decree of probate nor from the order of partition and distribution
instituted an action for the recovery of 61 parcels of land adjudicated under the
probated will. The action was dismissed on ground of res judicata. Again, the legal
heirs did not appeal, but in 1967, fifteen years after the said dismissal and twenty-
eight years after the probate of the will, they filed another action in the same court
for the "annulment" of the will and for the recovery of the 61 parcels of land.
Respondent judge dismissed the action but thereafter granted plaintiffs’ motion for
reconsideration and set aside the dismissed order.
On petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in reconsidering its order of dismissal and ignoring the decrees of
probate and distribution as well as the order of dismissal of the civil case for recovery
of the 61 parcels of land, which are the same as the instant case, and which therefore
constitute bars by former judgment.
Impugned order set aside and order of dismissal affirmed
DECISION
AQUINO, J.:
In this special civil action of certiorari, filed on July 29, 1968, the petitioners seek to
annul the orders of respondent Judge dated May 3 and June 17, 1968, wherein he
reconsidered his order of January 10, 1968, dismissing, on the ground of prescription,
the complaint in Civil Case No. 2233 of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon.
The case involves the sixty-one parcels of land in Sorsogon left by Florentino Hitosis,
with an estimated value of P50,000, and claims for damages exceeding one million
pesos. The undisputed facts are as follows: 1es virtual 1aw library
1. Florentino Hitosis executed a will in the Bicol dialect on June 19, 1938 when he was
eighty years old. He died on May 26, 1939 at Irosin, Sorsogon. A childless widower, he
as survived by his brother, Leon Hitosis. His other brothers, named Juan Tito (Juancito),
Leoncio (Aloncio) and Apolonio and only sister, Teodora, were all dead.
2. On June 24, 1939 a petition for the probate of his will was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Sorsogon (Special Proceeding No. 3171). The notice of hearing was duly
published In that will. Florentino bequeathed his one-half share in the conjugal estate
to his second wife, Tecla Dollentas, and, should Tecla predecease him, as was the case,
his one-half share would be assigned to the spouses Pedro Gallanosa and Corazon
Grecia, the reason being that Pedro, Tecla’s son by her first marriage, grew up under
the care of Florentino: he had treated Pedro as his foster child, and Pedro has
rendered services to Florentino and Tecla. Florentino likewise bequeathed his
separate properties consisting of three parcels of abaca land and parcel of riceland to
his protege (sasacuyang ataman) Adolfo Fortajada, a minor.
3. Opposition to the probate of the will was registered by the testator’s legal heirs,
namely, his surviving brother, Leon, and his nephews and nieces. After a hearing,
wherein the oppositors did not present any evidence in support of their opposition,
Judge Pablo S. Rivera, in his decision of October 27, 1939, admitted the will to probate
and appointed Gallanosa as executor. Judge Rivera specifically found that the testator
executed his last will "gozando de buena salud y facultades mentales y no obrando en
virtud de amenaza, fraude o influencia indebida."
4. On October 24, 1941, the testamentary heirs, the Gallanosa spouses and Adolfo
18
Fortajada, submitted a project of partition covering sixty-one parcels of land located court has no jurisdiction to set aside the 1939 decree of probate and the 1952 order
in various parts of Sorsogon, large cattle and several pieces of personal property which of dismissal in Civil Case No. 696 and that it acted with grave abuse of discretion in not
were distributed in accordance with Florentino’s will. The heirs assumed the dismissing private respondents’ 1967 complaint.cralawnad
obligations of the estate amounting to P7,129.27 in the portion of P2,376.42 for Adolfo
Fortajada and P4,752.85 for the Gallanosa spouses. The project of partition was The issue is whether, under the facts set forth above, the private respondents have a
approved by Judge Doroteo Amador in his order of March 13, 1943, thus confirming cause of action for the "annulment" of the will of Florentino Hitosis and for the
the heirs’ possession of their respective shares. The testator’s legal heirs did not recovery of the sixty-one parcels of land adjudicated under that will to the petitioners.
appeal from the decree of probate and from the order of partition and distribution.
We hold that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in reconsideration
5. On February 20, 1952, Leon Hitosis and the heirs of Florentino’s deceased brothers its order of dismissal and in ignoring the 1939 testamentary case and the 1952 Civil
and sisters instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon against Pedro Case No. 696 which is the same as the instant 1967 case.
Gallanosa for the recovery of the said sixty-one parcels of land. They alleged that they,
by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in continuous A rudimentary knowledge of substantive law and procedure is sufficient for an
possession of those lands en concepto de dueño and that Gallanosa entered those ordinary lawyer to conclude upon a causal perusal of the 1967 complaint that it is
lands in 1951 and asserted ownership over the lands. They prayed that they be baseless and unwarranted.
declared the owners of the lands and that they be restored to the possession thereof.
They also claimed damages (Civil Case No. 696). What the plaintiffs seek is the "annulment" of a last will and testament duly probated
in 1939 by the lower court itself. The proceeding is coupled with an action to recover
6. Gallanosa moved to dismiss the above complaint for lack of cause of action and on the lands adjudicated to the defendants by the same court in 1943 by virtue of the
the ground of bar by the prior judgment in the probate proceeding, Judge Anatolio C. probated will, which action is a resuscitation of the complaint of the same parties that
Mañalac dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata in his order of August the same court dismissed in 1952.
14, 1952 wherein he said:jgc: les.com.ph
It is evident from the allegations of the complaint and from defendants’ motion to
"It also appears that the plaintiffs and or their predecessors-in-interest had intervened dismiss that plaintiffs’ 1967 action is barred by res judicata a double-barrelled defense,
in the testate proceedings in Civil Case No. 3171 of this Court for the purpose of and by prescription, acquisitive and extinctive, or by what are known in the jus civile
contesting the probate of the will of (the) late Florentino Hitosis; and had their and the jus gentium as usucapio, longi temporis possesio and praescriptio (See Ramos
opposition prospered and the will denied of probate, the proceedings would have v. Ramos, L-19872, December 3, 1974, 61 SCRA 284).
been converted into one of intestacy (Art. 960 Civil Code) and the settlement of the
estate of the said deceased would have been made in accordance with the provisions Our procedural law does not sanction an action for the "annulment" of a will. In order
of law governing legal or intestate succession . . ., in which case the said plaintiffs, as that a will may take effect, it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper
the nearest of kin or legal heirs of said Florentino Hitosis, would have succeeded to testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code,
the ownership and possession of the 61 parcels of land in question forming part of his sec. 1, Rule 75, formerly sec. 1, Rule 76, Rules of Court; Guevara v. Guevara, 74 Phil.
estate (art. 1003, Civil Code). 479; Guevara v. Guevara, 98 Phil. 249).

"However, the decision of the Court was adverse to them, when it dismissed their The testamentary proceeding is a special proceeding for the settlement of the
opposition and ordered the probate of his will. From this decision (Annex K). legalizing testator’s estate. A special proceeding is distinct and different from an ordinary action
the said will, the oppositors did not file any appeal within the period fixed by law, (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 2 and sec. 1, Rule 72, Rules of Court).
despite the fact that they were duly notified thereof, so that the said decision had
become final and it now constitutes a bar to any action that the plaintiffs may institute We say that the defense of res judicata, as a ground for the dismissal of plaintiffs’ 1967
for the purpose of seeking a redetermination of their right to inherit the properties of complaint, is a two-pronged defense because (1) the 1939 and 1943 decrees of
the late Florentino Hitosis. probate and distribution in Special Proceeding No. 3171 and (2) the 1952 order of
dismissal in Civil Case No. 696 of the lower court constitute bars by former judgment.
"In other words, the said decision of this Court in Civil Case (Special Proceeding) No. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:jgc: les.com.ph
3171, in which the herein plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest had intervened as
parties oppositors, constitutes a final judicial determination of the issue that the said "SEC. 49. Effect of judgments. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a
plaintiffs, as ordinary heirs, have no legal rights to succeed to any of the properties of court or judge of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
the late Florentino Hitosis; consequently, their present claim to the ownership and order, may be as follows:jgc: les.com.ph
possession of the 61 parcels of land in question is without any legal merit or
basis."cralaw virtua1aw library "(a) In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate
of a will or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the
7. The plaintiffs did not appeal from that order of dismissal which should have set the personal political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his relationship
matter at rest. But the same plaintiffs or oppositors to the probate of the will, and to another, the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or
their heirs, with a persistence befitting a more meritorious case, filed on September administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the
21, 1967, or fifteen years after the dismissal of Civil Case No. 696 and twenty-eight probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie
years after the probate of the will, another action in the same court against the evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;
Gallanosa spouses and Adolfo Fortajada for the "annulment" of the will of Florentino
Hitosis and for the recovery of the same sixty-one parcels of land. They prayed for the "(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly
appointment of a receiver. adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to
8. As basis of their complaint, they alleged that the Gallanosa spouses, through fraud the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating of the same thing
and deceit, caused the execution and simulation of the document purporting to be the and under the same title and in the same capacity;
last will and testament of Florentino Hitosis. While in their 1952 complaint the same
plaintiffs alleged that they were in possession of the lands in question, in their 1967 "(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest,
complaint they admitted that since 1939, or from the death of Florentino Hitosis, the that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon
defendants (now the petitioners) have been in possession of the disputed lands (Par. its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included
XIV of the complaint, p. 70, Rollo in Civil Case No. 555, Gubat Branch, which was therein or necessary thereto."cralaw virtua1aw library
transferred to Branch I in Sorsogon town where Special Proceeding No. 3171 and Civil
Case No. 696 were decided and which was re-docketed as Civil Case No. 2233). The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of
the will (Sec. 625, Act 190; sec. 1, Rule 76, now sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court; Last par.
9. As already stated, that 1967 complaint, upon motion of the defendants, now the of art. 838, Civil Code).
petitioners, was dismissed by respondent Judge. The plaintiffs filed a motion for
reconsideration Respondent Judge granted it and set aside the order of dismissal. He That means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he
denied defendants’ motion for the reconsideration of his order setting aside that executed the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence;
dismissal order. that the will was signed by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses,
and that the will is genuine and is not a forgery. Accordingly, these facts cannot again
The petitioners or the defendants below contend in this certiorari case that the lower be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the forgery
19
of the will. (3 Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, p. 395; Manahan to the egregious error of plaintiffs’ counsel in arguing that article 1410 applies to wills.
v. Manahan, 58 Phil, 448). les virtual lawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the lower court’s orders of May 3 and June 17, 1968 are reversed and
After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its set aside and its order of dismissal dated January 10, 1968 is affirmed. Costs against
execution cannot be raised anymore (Santos v. De Buenaventura, L-22797, September the private respondents.
22, 1966, 18 SCRA 47).
SO ORDERED.
In Austria v. Ventenilla, 21 Phil. 180, a "petition for annulment of a will" was not
entertained after the decree of probate had become final. That case is summarized as
follows:jgc: les.com.ph [G.R. No. L-27421. September 12, 1986.]

"Wills; Probate; Alleged Fraudulent Will; Appeal. — V. died. His will was admitted to
probate without objection. No appeal was taken from said order. It was admitted that
due and legal notice had been given to all parties. Fifteen months after the date of
said order, a motion was presented in the lower court to have said will declared null
and void, for the reason that fraud had been practiced upon the deceased in the
making of his will.
"Held: That under section 625 of Act No. 190, the only time given parties who are
displeased with the order admitting to probate a will, for an appeal is the time given
for appeals in ordinary actions; but without deciding whether or not an order
admitting a will to probate will be opened for fraud, after the time allowed for an
appeal has expired, when no appeal is taken from an order probating a will, the heirs
can not, in subsequent litigation in the same proceedings, raise questions relating to
its due execution. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and as to
the testamentary capacity of the testator." (See Austria v. Heirs of Ventenilla, 99 Phil.
1069).
On the other hand, the 1943 decree of adjudication rendered by the trial court in the
testate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Florentino Hitosis, having been
rendered in a proceeding in rem, is under the above quoted section 49(a), binding
upon the whole world (Manalo v. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; In re Estate of Johnson, 39
Phil. 156; De la Cerna v. Potot, 120 Phil. 1361, 1364; McMaster v. Hentry Reissmann &
Co., 68 Phil. 142).
It is not only the 1939 probate proceeding that can be interposed as res judicata with
respect to private respondents complaint. The 1952 order of dismissal rendered by
Judge Mañalac in Civil Case No. 696, a judgment in personam, was an adjudication on
the merits (Sec. 4, Rule 30, old Rules of Court). It constitutes a bar by former judgment
under the aforequoted section 49(b). (Anticamara v. Ong, L-29689, April 14, 1978).
The plaintiffs or private respondents did not even bother to ask for the annulment of
the testamentary proceeding and the proceeding in Civil Case No. 696. Obviously, they
realized that the final adjudications in those cases have the binding force of res
judicata and that there is no ground, nor is it timely, to ask for the nullification of the
final orders and judgments in those two cases. lesvirtualawlibrary
It is a fundamental concept in the organization of every jural system, a principle of
public policy, that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become
final at some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litum. The very
object for which the courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies. (Dy
Cay v. Crossfield and O’ Brien, 38 Phil. 521; Peñalosa v. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303; De la
Cerna v. Potot, supra).
After the period for seeking relief from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the
Rules of Court has expired, a final judgment or order can be set aside only on the
grounds of (a) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law or (b) that the judgment
was obtained by means of extrinsic or collateral fraud. In the latter case, the period
for annulling the judgment is four years from the discovery of the fraud (2 Moran’s
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pp. 245-246 Mauricio v. Villanueva,
106 Phil. 1159).
To hurdle over the obstacle of prescription, the trial court, naively adopting the theory
of plaintiffs’ counsel, held that the action for the recovery of the lands had not
prescribed because the rule in article 1410 of the Civil Code, that "the action of
defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe",
applies to wills.
That ruling is a glaring error Article 1410 cannot possibly apply to last wills and
testaments. The trial court and plaintiffs’ counsel relied upon the case of Dingle v.
Guillermo, 48 O.G. 4410, allegedly decided by this Court, which cited the ruling in
Tipton v. Velasco, 6 Phil. 67, that mere lapse of time cannot give efficacy to void
contracts, a ruling elevated to the category of a codal provision in article 1410. The
Dingle case was decided by the Court of Appeals. Even the trial court did not take pains
to verify the misrepresentation of plaintiffs’ counsel that the Dingle case was decided
by this Court. An elementary knowledge of civil law could have alerted the trial court
ANITA MANG-OY, assisted by her husband, William Mangoy; LEONORA MIGUEL,
assisted by her husband, Miguel Olila; HELENA TAYNAN, and JOSE
TUMPAO, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, BANDO TUMPAO, LAMBIA
TUMPAO, married to Salming Pirazo, and ABITO TUMPAO, Respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
We are back to the early 1900’s in the cool regions of the Mountain Province, setting
of many legends of adventure and romance among the highlanders of the North. Our
story is not as fanciful, involving as it does not a rivalry for the hand of a beautiful
Igorot maiden but a prosaic dispute over a piece of land. Even so, as in those tales of
old, the issue shall be decided in favor of the just and deserving albeit according to the
dictates not of the heart but of the law.
The hero of this story we shall call Old Man Tumpao although at the time it all began
he was still a young and vigorous man. He had a first wife by whom he begot three
children, who are the private respondents in this case. 1 Upon her death, he took to
himself a second wife, by whom he had no issue but who had two children she had
"adopted" according to the practice of the Igorots then. 2 It is their children who, with
some others, are the petitioners in this case.
The facts are as simple as the ancient hills.
On September 4, 1937, Old Man Tumpao executed what he called a "last will and
testament" the dispositive portion of which declared:jgc: les.com.ph
"Lastly, I appoint my son BANDO TUMPAO, whom I named, that after departing from
this life, he shall be the one to carry or fulfill my Testament, and that he shall have the
power to see and dispose all what I have stated, he shall not change what I have
already stated in my Testament so that there is truth in my will, I will affix my right
thumbmark at the end of my written name because I do not know how to read and
write, after it has been read to me and affirm all what is my Will this 2:00 o’clock in
the afternoon this 4th day of September 1937, before those who are present and have
heard what I have stated, Pico La Trinidad, Benguet, 4th September, 1937." 3
The contents of this document were read to the beneficiaries named therein who at
the time were already occupying the portions respectively allotted to them. In
implementation of this document, they then, on September 7, 1937, executed an
agreement providing as follows:jgc: les.com.ph
"We who are named children and who will inherit from our father TUMPAO: BANDO
TUMPAO, LAMBIA, ABITO, JOSE and LABET, and we also whose lands are included,
SUCDAD BUTIOG, TULINGAN PUL-OT and ANTHONY MENECIO all of legal age and
residing in the town of La Trinidad, Sub-Province of Benguet we say in truth after
swearing under oath in accordance to law that the testament of our father TUMPAO
who is presently ill by virtue of our right to inherit and also acknowledge or recognize
the lands as included in the area of said land as appearing in Title No. 416 in the name
of our father TUMPAO here in La Trinidad, Barrio Pico, have heard and understood the
Will as told by him concerning our right to the land which we will inherit and also to
those whose lands which were included in the said Title No. 416 because we were all
called be present and hear his will. We heard and agreed to his will as appearing in his
testament regarding the land which we will inherit. We also recognized and agree to
the appointment of our brother BANDO to whom the parcels of land is to be delivered
and he will also be the one to deliver to us our shares as soon as we will demand the
partition in accordance with the will of our father TUMPAO as soon in the Testament
which we saw and have heard by all.
"It is also agreed upon among us in this confirmation that when our brother BANDO
who is appointed to distribute to us our shares we affirm in this instrument that will
answer for all the expenses when it shall be surveyed so the share of each will be
segregated so also with the approval of the title, which shall appear the name of each
of us and that we do not dispute the land which we are actually working shall pertain
to us as embodied in the said will of our father TUMPAO.
20

"We execute this deed of confirmation in the presence of the Notary Public here in
Baguio so that this Will, be used as our agreement so also with the will of our father
so that they be one to be followed as regard upon by all and we affix our right
thumbmark at the end of our written name because we do not know how to read and
write this 7th day of September, 1937 in the City of Baguio." 4
Two days later, Old Man Tumpao died. les virtual lawlibrary
The parties remained in possession of the lots assigned to them, apparently in
obedience to the wish of Old Man Tumpao as expressed in his last "will" and affirmed
by the other above quoted instrument. But things changed unexpectedly in 1960,
twenty three years later, that brought this matter to the courts.
On November 4, 1960, the respondents executed an extrajudicial partition in which
they divided the property of Old Man Tumpao among the three of them only, to the
exclusion of the other persons mentioned in the above-quoted documents. 5 By virtue
of this partition, Old Man Tumpao’s title was cancelled and another one was issued in
favor of the three respondents. 6 general requiere. Ni aun sera preciso guardar las formalidades especiales de las
It is this title that is now being questioned by the petitioners, who are suing for
reconveyance. They had been sustained by the trial court, 7 which, however, was
reversed by the Court of Appeals. They are before this Court to challenge that reversal.
In deciding against them, the Court of Appeals held that the "will" executed by Old
Man Tumpao was null and void because it had not been probated. The agreement of
partition among the supposed beneficiaries of the will was nullified because it was a
partition inter vivos and had not been approved by the Director of the Bureau of Non-
Christian Tribes. It was likewise held that the land in dispute was acquired during Old
Man Tumpao’s first marriage although it was registered during his second marriage
and so the petitioners were liable in rentals for the lots occupied by them, as well as
attorney’s fees. 8 under Article 1080 of the new Civil Code, which replaced the word ‘testator’ in Article
After examining the musty records, we sustain the ruling — made both by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals — that the will, not having been probated as required
by law, was inoperative as such. The settled principle, as announced in a long line of
decisions in accordance with the Rules of Court, is that no will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved or allowed in court. 9
We find, however, that the document may be sustained on the basis of Article 1056
of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at the time the said document was
executed by Old Man Tumpao in 1937. The said article reads as follows:jgc: les.com.ph
"Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act inter
vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime
of the forced heirs."cralaw virtua1aw library
On this score, we agree with the trial court. The applicable decision is Albela v. Albela,
10 also decided by the Court of Appeals, with Justice J .B .L. Reyes as the ponente.
In this case, Agustin Albela executed on January 19, 1935, a deed of partition dividing
two parcels of land between his daughters, Eduarda and Restituta, who indicated their
conformity by signing the instrument. They took possession of their respective shares
upon his death, but fourteen years later, Restituta ejected Eduarda from her lot,
alleging title by purchase from a third party and denying the existence of the partition.
Eduarda sued for recovery and was upheld by the trial court on the basis of the deed
of partition.cralawnad
Let Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who later became a distinguished member of this Court, take
over at this point:jgc: les.com.ph
"In their argument, appellants do not question the authenticity of the above
document, but argue against its validity, on the grounds summarized in their brief (p.
7), as follows: 1es virtual 1aw library
‘Therefore the allegations of the plaintiff-appellee, Eduarda Albela, rest on a
document which defies classification. If it is a deed of partition, it is null and void
because it is not embodied in a public document; if it is a simple donation of realty, it
is also null and void, because it is not in a public document and there is no acceptance;
if it is a donation Mortis Causa, certainly it is null and void because it does not follow
the rules governing testamentary succession; and if ever it is to be classified as a will,
more so, it is still null and void because it does not conform to the requirements of
Section 618, Act 190 as amended by Act 2645.’
"None of these objections is valid in law. The appellants evidently fail to realize that
Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1889 authorizes a testator to partition inter vivos his
property, and distribute them among his heirs, and that this partition is not necessarily
either a donation nor a testament, but an instrument of a special character, sui
generis, which is revocable at any time by the causante during his lifetime, and does
not operate as a conveyance of title until his death. It derives its binding force on the
heirs from the respect due to the will of the owner of the property, limited only by his
creditors and the intangibility of the legitime of the forced heirs.’El testador es libre y
sus herederos han de pasar por lo que haga en cuanto no perjudique la legitima de los
forsozos. Inutil es soñar en otras limitaciones que no existen.’ (7 Manresa
Commentaries, 6th Ed., p. 639.
That such partition is not governed by the rules of wills or donations inter vivos is a
consequence of its special nature. Says the learned Manresa on this point: 1es virtual
1aw library
‘Con estas palabras (en acto entre vivos) la ley en el Articulo 1056, como en el 1057,
que despues examinaremos, alude a las formalidades con que puede practicarse la
particion, no a los efectos de esta, significando que para ella no es preciso que
intervengan las formas solemnes que todo testamento o acto de ultima voluntad en
donaciones, porque no se trata de disponer a titulo gratuito, sino de dividir aquellos
bienes de que ya anteriormente se dispuso en forma legal’ (Emphasis supplied. Op.
Cit., p. 635).
"It was sufficient, therefore, that the partition, Exhibit A, should be in writing. It does
not have to be in a public document except to affect third persons (Art. 1280), being
valid between the parties who signed it in its present form.
"If any invalidity could be alleged against the partition, it would he in the absence of a
previous testament preceding it (Legasto v. Verzosa, 54 Phil. 766). And even this may
not be indispensable in the present case, for the testator’s partition did not depart
from the shares allotted to his heirs by the law of intestacy. Nor is a prior will necessary
1056 of the Code of 1889 with the broader term ‘person.’
"Be that as it may, the nullity of the partition Exhibit A would not alter the result. There
being only two daughters surviving the deceased Agustin, each one of them would
necessarily be entitled to one-half of each of the two parcels he owned at his death,
and Agustin’s former ownership is no longer disputed by the appellants in this
instance. In addition, since both daughters signed the partition Exhibit A, its terms
would bind both, and estop them from asserting a different interest. Appellants’ act
in appropriating the whole inheritance and its fruits can find no support in law or
justice."cralaw virtua1aw library
There is no difference in legal effect between Agustin Albela’s deed of partition and
Old Man Tumpao’s "last will and testament." Both are sustainable under Article 1056
of the Civil Code, which was in force at the time they were executed. Even as Agustin
Albela’s partition was signed by the two daughters themselves, so was Old Man
Tumpao’s "will" affirmed by the beneficiaries in their agreement of September 7,
1937, which reiterated and recognized the terms of such "will." While not valid as a
partition inter vivos under Articles 816 and 1271 of the old Civil Code, it was
nevertheless binding on the parties as proof of their conformity to the dispositions
made by Old Man Tumpao in his "last will and testament."cralaw virtua1aw library
As the trial court put it: les.com:cralaw:red
"The will alone, ‘Exh. B’, would be inoperative for the simple reason that it was not
probated. However, when the persons who were named therein as heirs and
beneficiaries voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by its terms probably to save the
expenses of probate, and furthermore, carried out its terms after the death of the
testator until now, then it must be held to be binding between them.
"Said agreement was not a disposal of inheritance by a prospective heir before the
death of the testator, but an agreement to carry out the will. It was not contested by
the defendants and after the lapse of 25 years their right, if any, to assail it has
prescribed under Art. 1144 of the Civil Code.
"Art. 1144 — The following actions must be brought ten years from the time the right
of action accrues:jgc: les.com.ph
"1) Upon a written contract;
"2) Upon an obligation created by law;
"3) Upon a judgment.
"Any formal defect of the deed, ‘Exh.’C’, was cured by the lapse of time.
21
 there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be
"What the plaintiffs received had an aggregate area of less than 1/3 of the land of Old presumed that I predeceased her, and my estate shall be administered and
Tumpao. It covers about 11,000 square meters while the total area was more than distributed, in all respects, in accordance with such presumption" (Rollo, p. 41).
35,000 square meters. Under the old Civil Code, it was within the free disposable les.com:cralaw:red
portion of ones’ estate despite the existence of any forced heirs. (See old Civil Code,
Art. 808). Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and
testament containing the same provisions as that of the will of her husband. Article
"In view of the foregoing considerations, the defendants are ordered to execute a VIII of her will estates:jgc: les.com.ph
deed of conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs of the areas respectively owned and
occupied by them and to pay the costs. "If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that there
is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be
"Sucdad Butiog is ordered to pay the defendants P160.00 more as a reasonable presumed that he predeceased me, and my estate shall be administered and
amount of his additional share in the expenses of segregating his lot but they distributed in all respects, in accordance with such presumption" (Rollo, p. 31.)
(defendants) are ordered to execute a deed of conveyance in his favor of the said lot
owned by him. On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were
trapped by fire that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Jr. as trustee
"The expenses of survey and segregation must be borne by the plaintiffs."cralaw and substitute executor of the two wills, filed separate proceedings for the probate
virtua1aw library thereof with the Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. On April 7,
these two wills were admitted to probate and letters testamentary were issued in his
We may add that the agreement entered into by the parties in implementation of Old favor.
Man Tumpao’s "will" did not have to be approved by the Director of the Bureau of
Non-Christian Tribes because the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu was not On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan, and
extended to the Mountain Province. 11 Moreover, the document was not a petitioner herein, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan a petition for
conveyance of properties or property right. 12 the reprobate of the two wills ancillary to the probate proceedings in New York. She
also asked that she be appointed the special administratrix of the estate of the
It remains to state that the property in dispute having been registered in 1917, the deceased couple consisting primarily of a farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan.
presumption is that it was acquired during the second marriage and so cannot be
claimed by the respondents as the conjugal property of their mother and Old Man On March 9, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Malolos, Bulacan, presided by Judge
Tumpao. Hence, they are not entitled to retain the entire land as their exclusive Gualberto J. de la Llana, issued an order, directing the issuance of letters of special
inheritance or to collect rentals for the lots occupied by the petitioners. les lawlibrary administration in favor of petitioner upon her filing of a P10,000.00 bond. The
: rednad following day, petitioner posted the bond and took her oath as special administratrix.

The trial judge, the Hon. Feliciano Belmonte, was correct in ordering the reconveyance As her first act of administration, petitioner filed a motion, praying that the Philippine
to the petitioners of their respective shares. We affirm his decision in toto. Life Insurance Company be directed to deliver the proceeds in the amount of
P50,000.00 of the life insurance policy taken by Dr. Jose F. Cunanan with Dr. Evelyn
How much simpler was life among the natives in the North during the early days, when Perez-Cunanan and their daughter Jocelyn as beneficiaries. The trial Court granted the
right and wrong were weighed according to the primal code of the ancient hills. Even motion. les virtual lawlibrary
so, though that past is gone forever, justice now, as it was then, is still for the
deserving. Counsel for the Philippine American Life Insurance Company then filed a
manifestation, stating that said company had delivered to petitioner the amount of
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and that of the trial P49,765.85, representing the proceeds of the life insurance policy of Dr. Jose F.
court reinstated, with costs against the respondents. Cunanan.

SO ORDERED. In a motion dated May 19, 1983, petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be
ordered to deliver to her a Philippine Trust Company passbook with P25,594.00 in
[G.R. No. 76714. June 2, 1994.] savings deposit, and the Family Savings Bank time deposit certificates in the total
amount of P12,412.52.
SALUD TEODORO VDA.. DE PEREZ, Petitioner, v. HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC Bulacan, Respondent. On May 31, Atty. Federico Alday filed a notice of appearance as counsel for the heirs
of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, namely, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., Priscilla Cunanan Bautista,
Lydia Cunanan Ignacio, Felipe F. Cunanan and Loreto Cunanan Concepcion (Cunanan
QUIASON, J.: heirs). He also manifested that before receiving petitioner’s motion of May 19, 1983,
his clients were unaware of the filing of the testate estate case and therefore, "in the
interest of simple fair play," they should be notified of the proceedings (Records, p.
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside 110). He prayed for deferment of the hearing on the motion of May 19, 1983.
the Order dated November 19, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Bulacan
presided by respondent Judge Zotico A. Tolete, in Special Proceedings No. 1793-M. Petitioner then filed a counter manifestation dated June 13, 1983, asserting: (1) that
the "Cunanan collaterals are neither heirs nor creditors of the late Dr. Jose F. Cunanan"
We grant the petition. and therefore, they had "no legal or proprietary interests to protect" and "no right to
I intervene" ; (2) that the wills of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan,
being American citizens, were executed in accordance with the solemnities and
formalities of New York laws, and produced "effects in this jurisdiction in accordance
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American with Art. 16 in relation to Art. 816 of the Civil Code" ; (3) that under Article VIII of the
citizens, established a successful medical practice in New York, U.S.A. The Cunanans two wills, it was presumed that the husband predeceased the wife; and (4) that "the
lived at No. 2896 Citation Drive, Pompey, Syracuse, New York, with their children, Cunanan collaterals are neither distributees, legatees or beneficiaries, much less, heirs
Jocelyn, 18; Jacqueline, 16; and Josephine, 14. as heirship is only by institution" under a will or by operation of the law of New York
(Records, pp. 112-113).
On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to
his wife "all the remainder" of his real and personal property at the time of his death On June 23, the probate court granted petitioner’s motion of May 19, 1983. However,
"wheresoever situated" (Rollo, p. 35). In the event he would survive his wife, he on July 21, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion to nullify the proceedings and to set aside
bequeathed all his property to his children and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. the appointment of, or to disqualify, petitioner as special administratrix of the estates
Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan. The motion stated: (1) that being
testament and Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor. Article VIII of his will the "brothers and sisters and the legal and surviving heirs" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, they
states:jgc: les.com.ph had been "deliberately excluded" in the petition for the probate of the separate wills
of the Cunanan spouses thereby misleading the Bulacan court to believe that
"If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that petitioner was the sole heir of the spouses; that such "misrepresentation" deprived
22
them of their right to "due process in violation of Section 4, Rule 76 of the Revised
Rules of Court; (2) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr., the executor of the estate of the
Cunanan spouses, was likewise not notified of the hearings in the Bulacan court; (3)
that the "misrepresentation and concealment committed by" petitioner rendered her
unfit to be a special administratrix; (4) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had, by virtue of
a verified power of attorney, authorized his father, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., to be his
attorney-in-fact; and (5) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. is qualified to be a regular
administrator "as practically all of the subject estate in the Philippines belongs to their
brother, Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" (Records, pp. 118-122). Hence, they prayed: (1) that the
proceedings in the case be declared null and void; (2) that the appointment of
petitioner as special administratrix be set aside; and (3) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr.
be appointed the regular administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses.
les.com.ph : virtual law library
Thereafter, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion requiring petitioner to submit an
inventory or accounting of all monies received by her in trust for the estate.
In her opposition, petitioner asserted: (1) that she was the "sole and only heir" of her
daughter, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan to the exclusion of the "Cunanan collaterals" ;
hence they were complete strangers to the proceedings and were not entitled to
notice; (2) that she could not have "concealed" the name and address of Dr. Rafael G.
Cunanan, Jr. because his name was prominently mentioned not only in the two wills
but also in the decrees of the American surrogate court; (3) that the rule applicable to
the case is Rule 77, not Rule 76, because it involved the allowance of wills proved
outside of the Philippines and that nowhere in Section 2 of Rule 77 is there a mention
of notice being given to the executor who, by the same provision, should himself file
the necessary ancillary proceedings in this country; (4) that even if the Bulacan estate
came from the "capital" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, he had willed all his wordly goods to
his wife and nothing to his brothers and sisters; and (5) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr.
had unlawfully disbursed $215,000.00 to the Cunanan heirs, misappropriated
$15,000.00 for himself and irregularly assigned assets of the estates to his American
lawyer (Records, pp. 151-160).
In their reply, the Cunanan heirs stressed that on November 24, 1982, petitioner and
the Cunanan heirs had entered into an agreement in the United States "to settle and
divide equally the estates," and that under Section 2 of Rule 77 the "court shall fix a
time and place for the hearing and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an
original will presented for allowance" (Records, pp. 184-185). les law library
Petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. be cited for contempt of court for
failure to comply with the Order of June 23, 1983 and for appropriating money of the
estate for his own benefit. She also alleged that she had impugned the agreement of
November 24, 1982 before the Surrogate Court of Onondaga, New York which
rendered a decision on April 13, 1983, finding that "all assets are payable to Dr. Evelyn
P. Cunanan’s executor to be then distributed pursuant to EPTL4-1.1 subd [a] par [4]"
(Rollo, p. 52).
On their part, the Cunanan heirs replied that petitioner was estopped from claiming
that they were heirs by the agreement to divide equally the estates. They asserted
that by virtue of Section 2 of Rule 77 of the Rules of Court, the provision of Sections 3,
4 and 5 of Rule 76 on the requirement of notice to all heirs, executors, devisees and
legatees must be complied with. They reiterated their prayer: (1) that the proceedings
in the case be nullified; (2) that petitioner be disqualified as special administratrix: (3)
that she be ordered to submit an inventory of all goods, chattels and monies which
she had received and to surrender the same to the court; and (4) that Dr. Rafael
Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular administrator.
Petitioner filed a rejoinder, stating that in violation of the April 13, 1983 decision of
the American court Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. made "unauthorized disbursements
from the estates as early as July 7, 1982" (Records, p. 231). Thereafter, petitioner
moved for the suspension of the proceedings as she had "to attend to the settlement
proceedings" of the estate of the Cunanan spouses in New York (Records, p. 242). The
Cunanans heirs opposed this motion and filed a manifestation, stating that petitioner
had received $215,000.00 "from the Surrogate’s Court as part of legacy" based on the
aforesaid agreement of November 24, 1982 (Records, p. 248).
On February 21, 1984, Judge de la Llana issued an order, disallowing the reprobate of
the two wills, recalling the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix,
requiring the submission of petitioner of an inventory of the property received by her
as special administratrix and declaring all pending incidents moot and academic. Judge
de la Llana reasoned out that petitioner failed to prove the law of New York on
procedure and allowance of wills and the court had no way of telling whether the wills
were executed in accordance with the law of New York. In the absence of such
evidence, the presumption is that the law of succession of the foreign country is the
same as the law of the Philippines. However, he noted, that there were only two
witnesses to the wills of the Cunanan spouses and the Philippine law requires three
witnesses and that the wills were not signed on each and every page, a requirement
of the Philippine law. les virtual lawlibrary
On August 27, 1985, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated
February 21, 1984, where she had sufficiently proven the applicable laws of New York
governing the execution of last wills and testaments.
On the same day, Judge de la Llana issued another order, denying the motion of
petitioner for the suspension of the proceedings but gave her 15 days upon arrival in
the country within which to act on the other order issued that same day. Contending
that the second portion of the second order left its finality to the discretion of counsel
for petitioner, the Cunanans filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
objectionable portion of the said order so that it would conform with the pertinent
provisions of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the Interim Rules of Court.
On April 30, 1985, the respondent Judge of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court,
Malolos, to which the reprobate case was reassigned, issued an order stating that"
(W)hen the last will and testament . . . was denied probate," the case was terminated
and therefore all orders theretofore issued should be given finality. The same Order
amended the February 21, 1984 Order by requiring petitioner to turn over to the
estate the inventoried property. It considered the proceedings for all intents and
purposes, closed (Records, p. 302).
On August 12, petitioner filed a motion to resume proceedings on account of the final
settlement and termination of the probate cases in New York. Three days later,
petitioner filed a motion praying for the reconsideration of the Order of April 30, 1985
on the strength of the February 21, 1984 Order granting her a period of 15 days upon
arrival in the country within which to act on the denial of probate of the wills of the
Cunanan spouses. On August 19, respondent Judge granted the motion and
reconsidered the Order of April 30, 1985. les law library
On August 29, counsel for petitioner, who happens to be her daughter, Natividad, filed
a motion praying that since petitioner was ailing in Fort Lee, New Jersey, U.S.A. and
therefore incapacitated to act as special administratrix, she (the counsel) should be
named substitute special administratrix. She also filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the Order of February 21, 1984, denying probate to the wills of the
Cunanan spouses, alleging that respondent Judge "failed to appreciate the significant
probative value of the exhibits . . . which all refer to the offer and admission to probate
of the last wills of the Cunanan spouses including all procedures undertaken and
decrees issued in connection with the said probate" (Records, pp. 313-323).
Thereafter, the Cunanans heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order of
August 19, 1985, alleging lack of notice to their counsel.
On March 31, 1986, respondent Judge to which the case was reassigned denied the
motion for reconsideration holding that the documents submitted by petitioner
proved "that the wills of the testator domiciled abroad were properly executed,
genuine and sufficient to possess real and personal property; that letters testamentary
were issued; and that proceedings were held on a foreign tribunal and proofs taken
by a competent judge who inquired into all the facts and circumstances and being
satisfied with his findings issued a decree admitting to probate the wills in question.
"However, respondent Judge said that the documents did not establish the law of New
York on the procedure and allowance of wills (Records, p. 381). les virtualawlibrary
les.com: les.com.ph
On April 9, 1986, petitioner filed a motion to allow her to present further evidence on
the foreign law. After the hearing of the motion on April 25, 1986, respondent Judge
issued an order wherein he conceded that insufficiency of evidence to prove the
foreign law was not a fatal defect and was curable by adducing additional evidence.
He granted petitioner 45 days to submit the evidence to that effect.
However, without waiting for petitioner to adduce the additional evidence,
respondent Judge ruled in his order dated June 20, 1986 that he found "no compelling
reason to disturb its ruling of March 31, 1986" but allowed petitioner to "file anew the
appropriate probate proceedings for each of the testator" (Records, p. 391).
The Order dated June 20, 1986 prompted petitioner to file a second for
reconsideration stating that she was "ready to submit further evidence on the law
obtaining in the State of New York" and praying that she be granted "the opportunity
to present evidence on what the law of the State of New York has on the probate and
allowance of wills" (Records, p. 393).
On July 18, respondent Judge denied the motion holding that to allow the probate of
two wills in a single proceeding "would be a departure from the typical and established
mode of probate where one petition takes care of one will." He pointed out that even
in New York "where the wills in question were first submitted for probate, they were
23
dealt with in separate proceedings" (Records, p. 395). (l) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk on the genuineness and
authenticity of each other’s signatures in the exemplified copies of the decrees of
On August 13, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order of probate, letters testamentary and proceedings held in their court (Exhs. "H-6" and "I-
July 18, 1986, citing Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which provides that no 6")" (Rollo, pp. 13-16).
party may institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. She pointed out
that separate proceedings for the wills of the spouses which contain basically the same Petitioner adds that the wills had been admitted to probate in the Surrogate Court’s
provisions as they even named each other as a beneficiary in their respective wills, Decision of April 13, 1983 and that the proceedings were terminated on November
would go against "the grain of inexpensive, just and speedy determination of the 29, 1984.
proceedings" (Records, pp. 405-407).cralawnad
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be
On September 11, 1986, petitioner filed a supplement to the motion for effective in this country upon compliance with the following provisions of the Civil
reconsideration, citing Benigno v. De La Peña, 57 Phil. 305 (1932) (Records, p. 411), Code of the Philippines:jgc: les.com.ph
but respondent Judge found that this pleading had been filed out of time and that the
adverse party had not been furnished with a copy thereof. In her compliance, "Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made
petitioner stated that she had furnished a copy of the motion to the counsel of the with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according
Cunanan heirs and reiterated her motion for a "final ruling on her supplemental to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code
motion" (Records, p. 421). prescribes."cralaw virtua1aw library

On November 19, respondent Judge issued an order, denying the motion for Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws
reconsideration filed by petitioner on the grounds that "the probate of separate wills or by Philippine laws is imperative.
of two or more different persons even if they are husband and wife cannot be
undertaken in a single petition" (Records, pp. 376-378). The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been
probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in
Hence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that the evidence offered at accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign
the hearing of April 11, 1983 sufficiently proved the laws of the State of New York on country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such
the allowance of wills, and that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses need not country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a
be probated in separate proceedings. foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the
II Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer
v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]. Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner
submitted all the needed evidence. les virtual lawlibrary
Petitioner contends that the following pieces of evidence she had submitted before
respondent Judge are sufficient to warrant the allowance of the wills: 1es virtual 1aw The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in
library the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial
notice of them (Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266
(a) two certificates of authentication of the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose by the [1974]).
Consulate General of the Philippines (Exhs. "F" and "G");
Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved for more time to
(b) two certifications from the Secretary of State of New York and Custodian of the submit the pertinent procedural and substantive New York laws but which request
Great Seal on the facts that Judge Bernard L. Reagan is the Surrogate of the County of respondent Judge just glossed over. While the probate of a will is a special proceeding
Onondaga which is a court of record, that his signature and seal of office are genuine, wherein courts should relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best
and that the Surrogate is duly authorized to grant copy of the respective wills of Evelyn evidence of which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or
and Jose (Exhs. "F-1" and "G-1"); denied probate (Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]).

(c) two certificates of Judge Reagan and Chief Clerk Donald E. Moore stating that they There is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses
have in their records and files the said wills which were recorded on April 7, 1982 should be probated jointly. Respondent Judge’s view that the Rules on allowance of
(Exhs. "F-2" and "G-2"); wills is couched in singular terms and therefore should be interpreted to mean that
there should be separate probate proceedings for the wills of the Cunanan spouses is
(d) the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose (Exhs. "F-3", "F-6" and Exh. "G-3" — "G-6"); too literal and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the provisions of Section 2,
Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the rules shall be "liberally
(e) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk certifying to the genuineness and construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just,
authenticity of the exemplified copies of the two wills (Exhs. "F-7" and "F-7"); les.com speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." les
: virtual law library lawlibrary : rednad

(f) two certificates of authentication from the Consulate General of the Philippines in A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result in the
New York (Exh. "H" and "F"); delay in the administration of justice (Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA
100 [1987]; Roberts v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33 [1984]).
(g) certifications from the Secretary of State that Judge Reagan is duly authorized to
grant exemplified copies of the decree of probate, letters testamentary and all What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testators’
proceedings had and proofs duly taken (Exhs. "H-1" and "I-1"); reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines,
Article 818). In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since
(h) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk that letters testamentary were the two wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in
issued to Rafael G. Cunanan (Exhs. "H-2" and "I-2"); all probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint
probate. As this Court has held a number of times, it will always strive to settle the
(i) certification to the effect that it was during the term of Judge Reagan that a decree entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds
admitting the wills to probate had been issued and appointing Rafael G. Cunanan as of future litigation (Motoomull v. Dela Paz, 187 SCRA 743 [1990]).
alternate executor (Exhs. "H-3" and
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact —
"I-10"); petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and
because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably
j) the decrees on probate of the two wills specifying that proceedings were held and failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant
proofs duly taken (Exhs. "H-4" and "I-5"); petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is
being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215
(k) decrees on probate of the two wills stating that they properly executed, genuine SCRA 876 [1992]).
and valid and that the said instruments were admitted to probate and established as
wills valid to pass real and personal property (Exhs. "H-5" and "I-5"); and The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause
notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance"
24
(Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will
probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is
presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and
4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known
heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the
executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.cralawnad
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner’s claim are
entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule
76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the
time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other
known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . ." .
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow
petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint
probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters
of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the
probate proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-21993. June 21, 1966.]
ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN DE
BORJA, as Judge of the Court of FIRST Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, ANATOLIA
PANGILINAN and ADELAIDA JACALAN, Respondents.
Lorenzo Sumulong, for Petitioners.
Torres & Torres for Respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Petitioners Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio, surnamed Rodriguez, petition this
Court for a writ of certiorari and prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
for its refusal to grant their motion to dismiss its Special Proceeding No. 1331, which
said Court is alleged to have taken cognizance of without jurisdiction.
The facts and issues are succinctly narrated in the order of the respondent court dated
June 12, 1963 (Petition, Annex O), in this wise:jgc: les.com.ph
"It is alleged in the motion to dismiss filed by Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio
Rodriguez, through counsel, that this Court "has no jurisdiction to try the above-
entitled case in view of the pendency of another action for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
namely, Sp. Proceedings No. 3907 entitled ‘In the matter of the Intestate Estate of the
deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez’ which was filed ahead of the instant case"
The records show that Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963 in the City of
Manila; that on March 4, 1963, Anatolia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to
the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez; that
on March 8, 1963, Maria rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through counsel, filed a
petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will; that on Mach 11,
1963, before the Court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn; that on
March 12, 1963, aforementioned petitioners filed before the Court of First Instance of
Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging,
among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Parañaque, Rizal, and died
without leaving a will and praying That Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special
Administratrix of the estate; and that on March 12, 1963 Apolonia Pangilinan and
Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this Court for the probate of the will delivered by
them on March 4, 1963. It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in
Parañaque, Rizal; that he was parish priest of the Catholic Church in Hagonoy, Bulacan,
from the year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963; that he was buried in
Parañaque, and that he left real properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan.
The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for
probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same
date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate citing as
authority in support thereof the case of Ongsingco Vda. de Borja v. Tan and De Borja,
G. R. No. L-7792, July 27, 1955.
The petitioners Pañgilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the stand that the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by
them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and that the case in this Court
therefore has precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The Court of First Instance, as previously stated, denied the motion to dismiss on the
ground that a difference of a few hours did not entitle one proceeding to preference
over the other; that, as early as March 7, movants were aware of the existence of the
purported will of the Father Rodriguez, deposited in the Court of Bulacan, since they
filed a petition to examine the same, and that movants clearly filed the intestate
proceedings in Rizal "for no other purpose than to prevent this Court (of Bulacan) from
exercising jurisdiction over the probate proceedings." Reconsideration having been
denied, movants, now petitioners, came to this Court, relying principally on Rule 73,
section 1, of the Rules of Court, and invoking our ruling in Ongsingco v. Tan and De
Borja, L-7792, July 27, 1955.
"SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is inhabitant
of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall
be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of
First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which
he had estate. The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the state of the
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, as far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record."cralaw virtua1aw library
We find this recourse to be untenable. the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father
Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later,
because upon the will being deposited the Court could, motu proprio, have taken
steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding
notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules
of Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of the old Rules):jgc: les.com.ph
"SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published. — When
a will is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the Court having
jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and place for proving the will when all
concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and shall cause notice of
such time and place to be published three (3) weeks successively, previous to the time
appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate has been
filed by the testator himself."cralaw virtua1aw library
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to or a petition for the
allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere
deposit therein of a decedent’s statement, even if no petition for its allowance is as
yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made after the deposits of the will, the
petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the
testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on
March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal on March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusively jurisdiction of
the Bulacan court is incontestable.
But, Petitioners, object, section 3 of revised Rule 76 (old Rule 77) speaks of a will being
delivered to the "Court having jurisdiction", and in the case at bar the Bulacan court
did not have it because the decedent was domiciled in Rizal province. We can not
disregard Fr. Rodriguez’s 33 years of residence as parish priest in Hagonoy, Bulacan
(1930-1963); but even if we do so, and consider that he retained throughout some
animus revertendi to the place of his birth in Parañaque, Rizal, that detail would not
imply that the Bulacan court lacked jurisdiction. As ruled in previous decisions, the
power to settle decedent’s estates is conferred by law upon all courts of first instance,
and the domicile of the testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the
Court (In re Kaw Singco, 74 Phil. 239; reyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484; Bernabe v. Vergara,
73 Phil. 676). Neither party denies that the late Fr. Rodriguez is deceased, or that he
left personal property in Hagonoy, province of Bulacan (t.s.n., p. 46, hearing of June
11, 1963, Annex "H", Petition, rec., p. 48). That is sufficient in the case before us.
In the Kaw Singco case (ante) this court ruled that:jgc: les.com.ph
". . . If we consider such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the
trial court over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole proceedings
including all decisions on the different incidents which have arisen in court will have
to be annulled and the same case will have to be commenced anew before another
court of the same rank in another province. That this is of mischievous effect in the
25
prompt administration of justice is too obvious to require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan
v. Dy Buncio & Co., G. R. No. 48206, December 31, 1942). Furthermore section 600 of
Act No. 190, providing that the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in the
province where he had last resided, could not have been intended as defining the
jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject- matter, because such legal provision
is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as we
have said time and again, procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject-
matter is another. (Attorney-General v. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The
law of jurisdiction — Act No. 136, Section 56, No. 5 confers upon Courts of First
Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of
the deceased. 1 Since, however, there are many courts of First Instance in the
Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act no. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the
place where each case shall be brought. thus, the place of residence of the deceased
is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject-matter but merely of venue. And it
is upon this ground that in the new Rules of Court the province where the estate of a
deceased person shall be settled is properly called "venue" (Rule 75, section 1.)
Motion for reconsideration is denied."cralaw virtua1aw library
The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance
ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue, by express provisions of Rule 73
(old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court, since the same enjoins that:jgc: les.com.ph
"The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." (Sec. 1)
This disposition presupposes that two or more courts have been asked to take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate. Of them only one could be of proper
venue, yet the rule grants precedence to that Court whose jurisdiction is first invoked,
without taking venue into account.
There are two reasons that militate against the success of petitioners. One is that their
commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they had learned of the delivery of
the decedent’s will to the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently done with a view
to divesting the latter court of the precedence awarded it by the Rules. Certainly the
order of priority established in Rule 73 (old Rule 75) was not designed to convert the
settlement of decedent’s estates into a race between applicants, with the
administration of the properties as the price for the fleetest.
The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate succession is only
subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the
absence of a valid operative will. Says Article 960 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines:jgc: les.com.ph
"ART. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place: 1es virtual 1aw library
(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently
lost its validity;
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property belonging
to the testator. In such case, legal succession shall take place only with respect to the
property of which the testator has not disposed;
(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does not happen or
is not fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or repudiates the inheritance,
there being no substitution, and no right of accretion takes place;
(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases provided in this
Code."cralaw virtua1aw library
Therefore, as ruled in Castro, Et. Al. v. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only after final decision
as to the nullity of testate succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the
form of pre- established action." The institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may
not thus proceed while the probate of the purported will of Father Rodriguez is
pending.
We rule that the Bulacan Court of First Instance was entitled to priority in the
settlement of the estate in question, and that in refusing to dismiss the probate
proceedings, said Court did not commit any abuse of discretion. It is the proceedings
in the Rizal Court that should be discontinued.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari applied for is denied. Costs against petitioners
Rodriguez.
G.R. No. 129505. January 31, 2000
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II,, Petitioner, v. PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS, Respondent.
[G.R. No. 133359. January 31, 2000
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II,, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO V.
GOROSPE, JR., in his Official Capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Makati, Branch 61,
and PACITA PHILLIPS as the alleged executrix of the alleged will of the late Dr. Arturo
de Santos, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
These are petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of the Thirteenth and the
Special Eighth Divisions of the Court of Appeals which ruled that petitioner has no right
to intervene in the settlement of the estate of Dr. Arturo de Santos. The cases were
consolidated considering that they involve the same parties and some of the issues
raised are the same.
The facts which gave rise to these two petitions are as follows:
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a
petition for probate of his will1 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati,
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr. De Santos alleged that he had no
compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo
de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his properties with an
approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in
the custody of the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. A
copy of the will2 was annexed to the petition for probate.
On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati, Branch 61 issued
an order granting the petition and allowing the will. The order reads:
On 03 August 1995, the Court issued an Order setting the hearing of the petition on
12 September 1995, at 8:30 oclock in the morning, copies of which were served to
Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc. and Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips (Officers Return,
dated 04 September 1995 attached to the records). When the case was called for
hearing on the date set, no oppositor appeared nor any written opposition was ever
filed and on motion of petitioner, he was allowed to adduce his evidence in support
of the petition.
Petitioner personally appeared before this Court and was placed on the witness stand
and was directly examined by the Court through "free wheeling" questions and
answers to give this Court a basis to determine the state of mind of the petitioner
when he executed the subject will. After the examination, the Court is convinced that
petitioner is of sound and disposing mind and not acting on duress, menace and undue
influence or fraud, and that petitioner signed his Last Will and Testament on his own
free and voluntary will and that he was neither forced nor influenced by any other
person in signing it.
Furthermore, it appears from the petition and the evidence adduced that petitioner
in his lifetime, executed his Last Will and Testament (Exhs. "A", "A-1", "A-2", "A-4", "A-
5") at his residence situated at 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati
City; said Last Will and Testament was signed in the presence of his three (3) witnesses,
namely, to wit: Dr. Elpidio Valencia (Exhs. "A-6", "A-7", "A-8", "A-16", "A-16-A"), Atty.
Edward J. Berenguer (Exhs. "A-3", "A-3-A", "A-9", "A-10", & "A-11"), and Atty. Victoria
C. delos Reyes (Exhs. "A-12", "A-13", "A-14", "A-17", & "A-18"), who in turn, in the
presence of the testator and in the presence of each and all of the witnesses signed
the said Last Will and Testament and duly notarized before Notary Public Anna Melissa
L. Rosario (Exh. "A-15"); on the actual execution of the Last Will and Testament,
pictures were taken (Exhs. "B" to "B-3").
Petitioner has no compulsory heirs and Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc., with
address at No. 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City has been
named as sole legatee and devisee of petitioners properties, real and personal,
approximately valued at not less than P2 million, Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips was
designated as executor and to serve as such without a bond.
From the foregoing facts, the Court finds that the petitioner has substantially
established the material allegations contained in his petition. The Last Will and
Testament having been executed and attested as required by law; that testator at the
time of the execution of the will was of sane mind and/or not mentally incapable to
make a Will; nor was it executed under duress or under the influence of fear or threats;
that it was in writing and executed in the language known and understood by the
testator duly subscribed thereof and attested and subscribed by three (3) credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of another; that the testator and all the
attesting witnesses signed the Last Will and Testament freely and voluntarily and that
the testator has intended that the instrument should be his Will at the time of affixing
his signature thereto.
WHEREFORE, as prayed for by the petitioner (testator himself) the petition for the
allowance of the Last Will and Testament of Arturo de Santos is hereby APPROVED and
ALLOWED.
Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26, 1996.
On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention
claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testators sister) and Octavio L.
Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos.
He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for
the reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the issuance of letters of
administration in his name.
26
On the other hand, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, the designated
executrix of the will, filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary with
Branch 61. Later, however, private respondent moved to withdraw her motion. This
was granted, while petitioner was required to file a memorandum of authorities in
support of his claim that said court (Branch 61) still had jurisdiction to allow his
intervention.3cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner filed his memorandum of authorities on May 13, 1996. On the other hand,
private respondent, who earlier withdrew her motion for the issuance of letters
testamentary in Branch 61, refiled a petition for the same purpose with the Regional
Trial Court, Makati, which was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and assigned to
Branch 65.
Upon private respondents motion, Judge Salvador Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued an
order, dated June 28, 1996, appointing her as special administrator of Dr. De Santoss
estate.
On July 29, 1996, petitioner sought to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and to set
aside the appointment of private respondent as special administrator. He reiterated
that he was the sole and full blooded nephew and nearest of kin of the testator; that
he came to know of the existence of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 only by accident; that the
probate proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223 before Branch 61 of the same court was
still pending; that private respondent misdeclared the true worth of the testators
estate; that private respondent was not fit to be the special administrator of the
estate; and that petitioner should be given letters of administration for the estate of
Dr. De Santos.
On August 28, 1996, Judge Abad Santos ordered the transfer of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343
to Branch 61, on the ground that "[it] is related to the case before Judge Gorospe of
RTC Branch 61 . . ."
It appears, however, that in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223, Judge Gorospe had denied on
August 26, 1996 petitioners motion for intervention. Petitioner brought this matter to
the Court of Appeals which, in a decision4 promulgated on February 13, 1998, upheld
the denial of petitioners motion for intervention.
Meanwhile, Judge Gorospe issued an order, dated September 4, 1996, returning the
records of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 65 on the ground that there was a pending
case involving the Estate of Decedent Arturo de Santos pending before said court. The
order reads:
Acting on the ORDER dated 28 August 1996 of Branch 65, this Court, transferring this
case to this Branch 61 on the ground that this case is related with a case before this
Court, let this case be returned to Branch 65 with the information that there is no
related case involving the ESTATE OF DECEDENT ARTURO DE SANTOS pending before
this Branch.
There is, however, a case filed by ARTURO DE SANTOS, as petitioner under Rule 76 of
the Rules of Court for the Allowance of his will during his lifetime docketed as SP.
PROC. NO. M-4223 which was already decided on 16 February 1996 and has become
final.
It is noted on records of Case No. M-4223 that after it became final, herein Petitioner
Pacita de los Reyes Phillips filed a MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS
TESTAMENTARY, which was subsequently withdrawn after this Court, during the
hearing, already ruled that the motion could not be admitted as the subject matter
involves a separate case under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and movant withdrew
her motion and filed this case (No. 4343).
Octavio de Santos Maloles [II] filed a MOTION FOR INTERVENTION before Case No. M-
4223 and this motion was already DENIED in the order (Branch 61) of 26 August 1996
likewise for the same grounds that the matter is for a separate case to be filed under
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court and cannot be included in this case filed under Rule 76
of the Rules of Court.
It is further noted that it is a matter of policy that consolidation of cases must be
approved by the Presiding Judges of the affected Branches.
Initially, in his decision dated September 23, 1996,5 Judge Abad Santos appeared firm
in his position that " . . . it would be improper for (Branch 65) to hear and resolve the
petition (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343)," considering that the probate proceedings were
commenced with Branch 61. He thus ordered the transfer of the records back to the
latter branch. However, he later recalled his decision and took cognizance of the case
"to expedite the proceedings." Thus, in his Order, dated October 21, 1996, he stated:
Considering the refusal of the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of Branch 61 to continue
hearing this case notwithstanding the fact that said branch began the probate
proceedings of the estate of the deceased and must therefore continue to exercise its
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others, until the entire estate of the testator had
been partitioned and distributed as per Order dated 23 September 1996, this branch
(Regional Trial Court Branch 65) shall take cognizance of the petition if only to expedite
the proceedings, and under the concept that the Regional Trial Court of Makati City is
but one court.
Furnish a copy of this order to the Office of the Chief justice and the Office of the Court
Administrator, of the Supreme Court; the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr.; Pacita De Los
Reyes Phillips, Petitioner; and Octavio de Santos Maloles, Intervenor.
On November 4, 1996, Judge Abad Santos granted petitioners motion for intervention.
Private respondent moved for a reconsideration but her motion was denied by the
trial court. She then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which, on
February 26, 1997, rendered a decision6 setting aside the trial courts order on the
ground that petitioner had not shown any right or interest to intervene in Sp. Proc.
No. M-4343.
Hence, these petitions which raise the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 61 has lost
jurisdiction to proceed with the probate proceedings upon its issuance of an order
allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos
2. Whether or not the Honorable (Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 65) acquired
jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by (private)
respondent.
3. Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has
a right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed
by the respondent.
4. Whether or not (private) respondent is guilty of forum shopping in filing her petition
for issuance of letters testamentary with the Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 65
knowing fully well that the probate proceedings involving the same testate estate of
the decedent is still pending with the Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 61.
First. Petitioner contends that the probate proceedings in Branch 61 of RTC-Makati did
not terminate upon the issuance of the order allowing the will of Dr. De Santos. Citing
the cases of Santiesteban v. Santiesteban7 and Tagle v. Manalo,8 he argues that the
proceedings must continue until the estate is fully distributed to the lawful heirs,
devisees, and legatees of the testator, pursuant to Rule 73, 1 of the Rules of Court.
Consequently, petitioner contends that Branch 65 could not lawfully act upon private
respondents petition for issuance of letters testamentary.
The contention has no merit.
In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is
limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being
of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed
by law.9cräläwvirtualibräry
Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the testator, so
much so that, after approving and allowing the will, the court proceeds to issue letters
testamentary and settle the estate of the testator. The cases cited by petitioner are of
such nature. In fact, in most jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain a petition for
probate of the will of a living testator under the principle of ambulatory nature of
wills.10cräläwvirtualibräry
However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for probate of
the will filed by the testator himself. It provides:
Civil Code, Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for
the allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court
for the allowance of wills after the testators death shall govern.
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be necessary
for the allowance of wills on petition of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of
the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
Rule 76, 1 likewise provides:
Sec. 1 Who may petition for the allowance of will. - Any executor, devisee, or legatee
named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after
the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will
allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in the court for the allowance of
his will.
The rationale for allowing the probate of wills during the lifetime of testator has been
explained by the Code Commission thus:
Most of the cases that reach the courts involve either the testamentary capacity of
the testator or the formalities adopted in the execution of wills. There are relatively
few cases concerning the intrinsic validity of testamentary dispositions. It is far easier
for the courts to determine the mental condition of a testator during his lifetime than
after his death. Fraud, intimidation and undue influence are minimized. Furthermore,
if a will does not comply with the requirements prescribed by law, the same may be
corrected at once. The probate during the testators life, therefore, will lessen the
number of contest upon wills. Once a will is probated during the lifetime of the
testator, the only questions that may remain for the courts to decide after the
testators death will refer to the intrinsic validity of the testamentary dispositions. It is
possible, of course, that even when the testator himself asks for the allowance of the
will, he may be acting under duress or undue influence, but these are rare cases.
After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does not
necessarily mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death. Should he
make a new will, it would also be allowable on his petition, and if he should die before
he has had a chance to present such petition, the ordinary probate proceeding after
the testators death would be in order.11cräläwvirtualibräry
Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there was
nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will
pursuant to Rule 73, 12 of the Rules of Court. There is, therefore, no basis for the ruling
of Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 of RTC-Makati that -Nex old
27
Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati having begun the probate proceedings
of the estate of the deceased, it continues and shall continue to exercise said
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others. It should be noted that probate proceedings
do not cease upon the allowance or disallowance of a will but continues up to such
time that the entire estate of the testator had been partitioned and distributed.
The fact that the will was allowed during the lifetime of the testator meant merely
that the partition and distribution of the estate was to be suspended until the latters
death. In other words, the petitioner, instead of filing a new petition for the issuance
of letters testamentary, should have simply filed a manifestation for the same purpose
in the probate court.12cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene, cites Rule
73, 1 which states:
Where estate of deceased persons settled. - If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he
had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record.
The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for the settlement
of the estate of deceased persons. In Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, it was
held:13cräläwvirtualibräry
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause
"so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of
the state," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates:
"Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes." It could not have
been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal
provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters.
Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or
authority of the court over the subject matter "existed was fixed before procedure in
a given cause began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure,
which simply directs the manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and
justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably
with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it
loses the power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose
jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective
for lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the
procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of
method, of convenience to the parties.
Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates with
approximate value of over P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or P200,000.00 (in
Metro Manila) belongs to the regional trial courts under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended.
The different branches comprising each court in one judicial region do not possess
jurisdictions independent of and incompatible with each other.14cräläwvirtualibräry
It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, 1 applies insofar as the venue of the petition
for probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar other branches of
the same court from taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the testator
after his death. As held in the leading case of Bacalso v.
Ramolote:15cräläwvirtualibräry
The various branches of the Court of First Instance of Cebu under the Fourteenth
Judicial District, are a coordinate and co-equal courts, and the totality of which is only
one Court of First Instance. The jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges.
And when a case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to
the branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the other branches. Trial may be held or
proceedings continue by and before another branch or judge. It is for this reason that
Section 57 of the Judiciary Act expressly grants to the Secretary of Justice, the
administrative right or power to apportion the cases among the different branches,
both for the convenience of the parties and for the coordination of the work by the
different branches of the same court. The apportionment and distribution of cases
does not involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction, the jurisdiction attaches and
continues to be vested in the Court of First Instance of the province, and the trials may
be held by any branch or judge of the court.
Necessarily, therefore, Branch 65 of the RTC of Makati City has jurisdiction over Sp.
Proc. No. M-4343.
Second. Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose the petition for issuance
of letters testamentary filed by private respondent. He argues that, as the nearest next
of kin and creditor of the testator, his interest in the matter is material and direct. In
ruling that petitioner has no right to intervene in the proceedings before Branch 65 of
RTC-Makati City, the Court of Appeals held:
The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent
Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and nearest
collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case of
intestacy. Since the decedent has left a will which has already been probated and
disposes of all his properties the private respondent can inherit only if the said will is
annulled. His interest in the decedents estate is, therefore, not direct or immediate.
His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having been raised for the
first time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as
the records show, not supported by evidence.
. . . . [T]he opposition must come from one with a direct interest in the estate or the
will, and the private respondent has none. Moreover, the ground cited in the private
respondents opposition, that the petitioner has deliberately misdeclared the truth
worth and value of the estate, is not relevant to the question of her competency to
act as executor. Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court requires only an allegation of
the probable value and character of the property of the estate. The true value can be
determined later on in the course of the settlement of the
estate.16cräläwvirtualibräry
Rule 79, 1 provides:
Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition for
administration. - Any person interested in a will may state in writing the grounds why
letters testamentary should not issue to the persons named therein as executors, or
any of them, and the court, after hearing upon notice, shall pass upon the sufficiency
of such grounds. A petition may, at the same time, be filed for letters of administration
with the will annexed.
Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one who would
be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate,
such as a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not merely incidental or
contingent.17cräläwvirtualibräry
Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered
an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one
who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Thus,
Art. 842 of the Civil Code provides:
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it
in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not
contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.
Compulsory heirs are limited to the testators -
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil
Code.18cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been
preterited in the testators will.
Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on his
allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator instituted or named
an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of the
testator. As we stated in Ozaeta v. Pecson:19cräläwvirtualibräry
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary
concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It is
natural that the testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one who can
be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of his estate. The curtailment of this
right may be considered a curtailment of the right to dispose.
Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond
may the court appoint other persons to administer the estate.20 None of these
circumstances is present in this case.
Third. Petitioner contends that private respondent is guilty of forum shopping when
she filed the petition for issuance of letters testamentary (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343) while
the probate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. M-4223) were still pending. According to
petitioner, there is identity of parties, rights asserted, and reliefs prayed for in the two
actions which are founded on the same facts, and a judgment in either will result in res
judicata in the other.
This contention has no merit. As stated earlier, the petition for probate was filed by
Dr. De Santos, the testator, solely for the purpose of authenticating his will. Upon the
allowance of his will, the proceedings were terminated.
On the other hand, the petition for issuance of letters testamentary was filed by
private respondent, as executor of the estate of Dr. De Santos, for the purpose of
securing authority from the Court to administer the estate and put into effect the will
of the testator. The estate settlement proceedings commenced by the filing of the
petition terminates upon the distribution and delivery of the legacies and devises to
the persons named in the will. Clearly, there is no identity between the two petitions,
nor was the latter filed during the pendency of the former. There was, consequently,
no forum shopping.
28
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 160530 : November 20, 2007]
CYNTHIA V. NITTSCHER, Petitioner, v. DR. WERNER KARL JOHANN NITTSCHER
(Deceased), ATTY. ROGELIO P. NOGALES and THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MAKATI (Branch 59), Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated July 31, 2003 and Resolution2 dated
October 21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55330, which affirmed the
Order3 dated September 29, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 59, Makati
City, in SP Proc. No. M-2330 for the probate of a will.
The facts are as follows.
On January 31, 1990, Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with the RTC of Makati
City a petition for the probate of his holographic will and for the issuance of letters
testamentary to herein respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales.
On September 19, 1991, after hearing and with due notice to the compulsory heirs,
the probate court issued an order allowing the said holographic will, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Holographic Will of the petitioner-testator Dr.
Werner J. Nittscher executed pursuant to the provision of the second paragraph of
Article 838 of the Civil Code of the Philippines on January 25, 1990 in Manila,
Philippines, and proved in accordance with the provision of Rule 76 of the Revised
Rules of Court is hereby allowed.
SO ORDERED.4
On September 26, 1994, Dr. Nittscher died. Hence, Atty. Nogales filed a petition for
letters testamentary for the administration of the estate of the deceased. Dr.
Nittscher's surviving spouse, herein petitioner Cynthia V. Nittscher, moved for the
dismissal of the said petition. However, the court in its September 29, 1995 Order
denied petitioner's motion to dismiss, and granted respondent's petition for the
issuance of letters testamentary, to wit:
In view of all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is DENIED. The petition for the
issuance of Letters Testamentary, being in order, is GRANTED.
Section 4, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides "when a will has been proved
and allowed, the court shall issue letters testamentary thereon to the person named
as executor therein, if he is competent, accepts the trust and gives a bond as required
by these rules." In the case at bar, petitioner Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales of the R.P.
Nogales Law Offices has been named executor under the Holographic Will of Dr.
Werner J. Nittscher. As prayed for, let Letters Testamentary be issued to Atty. Rogelio
P. Nogales, the executor named in the Will, without a bond.
SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied for lack of merit. On
May 9, 1996, Atty. Nogales was issued letters testamentary and was sworn in as
executor.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that respondent's petition for the
issuance of letters testamentary should have been dismissed outright as the RTC had
no jurisdiction over the subject matter and that she was denied due process.
The appellate court dismissed the appeal, thus:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the
assailed Order is AFFIRMED in toto. The court a quo is ordered to proceed with
dispatch in the proceedings below.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision was denied for
lack of merit. Hence, the present petition anchored on the following grounds:
I.
BOTH THE CA AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING OUTRIGHT THE
PETITION FOR LETTERS - TESTAMENTARY FILED BY ATTY. NOGALES WHEN,
OBVIOUSLY, IT WAS FILED IN VIOLATION OF REVISED CIRCULAR NO. 28-91 AND
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94 OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II.
THE CA ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE LOWER COURT [HAS] NO JURISDICTION
OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PRESENT SUIT.
III.
THE CA ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT SUMMONS WERE PROPERLY ISSUED TO THE
PARTIES AND ALL PERSONS INTERESTED IN THE PROBATE OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL
OF DR. NITTSCHER.
IV.
THE CA ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF DUE
PROCESS OF LAW BY THE LOWER COURT.7
Petitioner contends that respondent's petition for the issuance of letters testamentary
lacked a certification against forum-shopping. She adds that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case because Dr. Nittscher was allegedly
not a resident of the Philippines; neither did he leave real properties in the country.
Petitioner claims that the properties listed for disposition in her husband's will actually
belong to her. She insists she was denied due process of law because she did not
receive by personal service the notices of the proceedings.
Respondent Atty. Nogales, however, counters that Dr. Nittscher did reside and own
real properties in Las Piñas, Metro Manila. He stresses that petitioner was duly notified
of the probate proceedings. Respondent points out that petitioner even appeared in
court to oppose the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary and that she also
filed a motion to dismiss the said petition. Respondent maintains that the petition for
the issuance of letters testamentary need not contain a certification against forum-
shopping as it is merely a continuation of the original proceeding for the probate of
the will.
We resolve to deny the petition.
As to the first issue, Revised Circular No. 28-918 and Administrative Circular No. 04-
949 of the Court require a certification against forum-shopping for all initiatory
pleadings filed in court. However, in this case, the petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary is not an initiatory pleading, but a mere continuation of the original
petition for the probate of Dr. Nittscher's will. Hence, respondent's failure to include
a certification against forum-shopping in his petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary is not a ground for outright dismissal of the said petition.
Anent the second issue, Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. - If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in
the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of any province in which he had
estate. - (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the RTC and the Court of Appeals are one in their finding that Dr. Nittscher
was a resident of Las Piñas, Metro Manila at the time of his death. Such factual finding,
which we find supported by evidence on record, should no longer be disturbed. Time
and again we have said that reviews on certiorari are limited to errors of law. Unless
there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or
are glaringly erroneous, this Court will not analyze or weigh evidence all over again.10
Hence, applying the aforequoted rule, Dr. Nittscher correctly filed in the RTC of Makati
City, which then covered Las Piñas, Metro Manila, the petition for the probate of his
will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent.
Regarding the third and fourth issues, we note that Dr. Nittscher asked for the
allowance of his own will. In this connection, Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court
states:
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. -'
If the testator asks for the allowance of his own will, notice shall be sent only to his
compulsory heirs.
In this case, records show that petitioner, with whom Dr. Nittscher had no child, and
Dr. Nittscher's children from his previous marriage were all duly notified, by registered
mail, of the probate proceedings. Petitioner even appeared in court to oppose
respondent's petition for the issuance of letters testamentary and she also filed a
motion to dismiss the said petition. She likewise filed a motion for reconsideration of
the issuance of the letters testamentary and of the denial of her motion to dismiss.
We are convinced petitioner was accorded every opportunity to defend her cause.
Therefore, petitioner's allegation that she was denied due process in the probate
proceedings is without basis.
As a final word, petitioner should realize that the allowance of her husband's will is
conclusive only as to its due execution.11 The authority of the probate court is limited
to ascertaining whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.12 Thus, petitioner's claim of title to
the properties forming part of her husband's estate should be settled in an ordinary
action before the regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated July
31, 2003 and Resolution dated October 21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 55330, which affirmed the Order dated September 29, 1995 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 59, Makati City, in SP Proc. No. M-2330 are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176831 : January 15, 2010
UY KIAO ENG, Petitioner, v. NIXON LEE, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the August 23, 2006 Amended Decision1cralaw of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91725 and the February 23, 2007 Resolution,2cralaw denying
the motion for reconsideration thereof.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Alleging that his father passed away on June 22, 1992 in Manila and left a holographic
will, which is now in the custody of petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his mother, respondent
Nixon Lee filed, on May 28, 2001, a petition for mandamus with damages, docketed
as Civil Case No. 01100939, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, to compel
petitioner to produce the will so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof
could be instituted. Allegedly, respondent had already requested his mother to settle
and liquidate the patriarchs estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective
29
inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable
reason.3cräläwvirtualibräry
In her answer with counterclaim, petitioner traversed the allegations in the complaint
and posited that the same be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, for lack
of cause of action, and for non-compliance with a condition precedent for the filing
thereof. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and
that she knew of its whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted that photocopies of the
will were given to respondent and to his siblings. As a matter of fact, respondent was
able to introduce, as an exhibit, a copy of the will in Civil Case No. 224-V-00 before the
RTC of Valenzuela City. Petitioner further contended that respondent should have first
exerted earnest efforts to amicably settle the controversy with her before he filed the
suit.4cräläwvirtualibräry
The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondents
evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had
in her custody the original holographic will. Importantly, she asserted that the pieces
of documentary evidence presented, aside from being hearsay, were all immaterial
and irrelevant to the issue involved in the petitionthey did not prove or disprove that
she unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoined
as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, for the court to issue the writ of
mandamus.5cräläwvirtualibräry
The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence.6cralaw In its February 4, 2005
Order,7cralaw however, it granted the same on petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Respondents motion for reconsideration of this latter order was
denied on September 20, 2005.8cralaw Hence, the petition was dismissed.
Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court. On April 26, 2006, the
CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. It ruled that the writ of mandamus
would issue only in instances when no other remedy would be available and sufficient
to afford redress. Under Rule 76, in an action for the settlement of the estate of his
deceased father, respondent could ask for the presentation or production and for the
approval or probate of the holographic will. The CA further ruled that respondent, in
the proceedings before the trial court, failed to present sufficient evidence to prove
that his mother had in her custody the original copy of the will.9cräläwvirtualibräry
Respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate court, in the assailed August 23,
2006 Amended Decision,10cralaw granted the motion, set aside its earlier ruling,
issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will and the payment of attorneys
fees. It ruled this time that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that
his mother had in her possession the holographic will.
Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The
appellate court denied this motion in the further assailed February 23, 2007
Resolution.11cräläwvirtualibräry
Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court,
contending in the main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and
that the testimonial evidence used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is
inadmissible.12
The Court cannot sustain the CAs issuance of the writ.
The first paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides
that
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled,
and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding
the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do
the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent.13cräläwvirtualibräry
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the
name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board,
or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty
therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the
writ is directed or from operation of law.14cralaw This definition recognizes the public
character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for
the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no
interest.15cralaw The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public
right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public
right involved is mandated by the Constitution.16cralaw As the quoted provision
instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust or station.17cräläwvirtualibräry
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything
which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant
anything to which he is not entitled by law.18cralaw Nor will mandamus issue to
enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists,
although objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is
clear and the case is meritorious.19cralaw As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the
absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person
against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or
[b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded
petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is
entitled.20cralaw On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of
mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must
be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act
required.21cräläwvirtualibräry
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used
to enforce contractual obligations.22cralaw Generally, mandamus will not lie to
enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some
obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed.23cralaw The writ is
not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual.24cralaw The writ of
mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be
obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the
government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ.25To preserve its prerogative
character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters
relating to the public.26cräläwvirtualibräry
Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there
should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other
than the remedy of mandamus being invoked.27cralaw In other words, mandamus can
be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are
powerless to afford relief.28cralaw Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is
equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable
principles.29cralaw Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound
discretion of the court.
In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the
obligation involved herethe production of the original holographic willis in the nature
of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of
by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will
and that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of
Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the
allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not. Rule 76, Section 1
relevantly provides:
Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will.Any executor, devisee, or legatee
named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time, after
the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will
allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
An adequate remedy is further provided by Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5, for the production
of the original holographic will. Thus
SEC. 2. Custodian of will to deliver.The person who has custody of a will shall, within
twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will to the
court having jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.
SEC. 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust.A person named as executor
in a will shall within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, or
within twenty (20) days after he knows that he is named executor if he obtained such
knowledge after the death of the testator, present such will to the court having
jurisdiction, unless the will has reached the court in any other manner, and shall,
within such period, signify to the court in writing his acceptance of the trust or his
refusal to accept it.
SEC. 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for neglect.A person who neglects any
of the duties required in the two last preceding sections without excuse satisfactory
to the court shall be fined not exceeding two thousand pesos.
SEC. 5. Person retaining will may be committed.A person having custody of a will after
the death of the testator who neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same,
when ordered so to do, to the court having jurisdiction, may be committed to prison
and there kept until he delivers the will.30cralaw
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the
production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice
it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court
grants the demurrer.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.
The August 23, 2006 Amended Decision and the February 23, 2007 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91725 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No.
01100939 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 53546. June 25, 1992.]
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE JESUS FRAN and CARMEN MEJIA RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner, v.
HON. BERNARDO LL. SALAS, CONCEPCION MEJIA ESPINA and MARIA MEJIA
GANDIONGCO, Respondents.
30
 The reception of evidence by the Clerk of Court immediately followed. Petition Fran’s
DAVIDE, JR., J.: first witness was Atty. Nazario R. Pacquiao, one of the subscribing witnesses to the
will. The original of the will, marked as Exhibit "F", and its English translation, marked
as Exhibit "F-Translation", were submitted to the Clerk of Court. 7 Petition Fran was
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of the second and also the last witness. He enumerated the names of the surviving heirs
Court, with payer for a writ of preliminary injunction, to annul and set aside, for having of the deceased.
been issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction, the following Orders of the respondent Judge in Special Proceedings On 13 November 1972, the probate court rendered a decision admitting to probate
No. 3309-R of Branch VIII of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) the will of the testatrix, Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo, and appointing petitioner
of Cebu entitled "In The Matter of the Petition for Probate of the Last Will and Fran as executor thereof. 8 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:jgc:
Testament of Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo:" les.com.ph

1. The Order of 26 February 1980 setting for hearing private respondents’ Omnibus "WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
Motion for Reconsideration 1 which was filed six (6) years, ten (10) months and last will and testament of the deceased Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo marked as
eighteen (18) days after the probate judgment was rendered and six (6) years and Exhibit F as admitted to probate. Dr. Jesus Fran is hereby appointed as executor of the
twenty-one (21) days after the testate proceedings was declared closed and will. Let letters testamentary be issued in favor of Dr. Jesus Fran. The special
terminated; and administrator’s bond put up by Dr. Jesus Fran as special administrator duly approved
by this Court shall serve and be considered as the executor’s bond considering that
2. The Order of 2 June 1980 finding the signature of the testatrix in the last will and the special administrator and executor are one and the same person."cralaw
testament to be a forgery and (a) declaring the testatrix as having died intestate; (b) virtua1aw library
declaring the testamentary dispositions in said last will and testament as null and void;
(c) setting aside the order dated 10 September 1973 declaring the testate proceedings The requisite notice to creditors was issued, but despite the expiration of the period
closed and terminated; (d) revoking the appointment of Jesus Fran as executor while therein fixed, no claim was presented against the estate.
appointing respondent Concepcion M. Espina as administratrix; and (e) ordering the
conversion of the proceedings to one of intestacy. 2 This Order effectively annulled On 4 January 1973, petitioner Fran filed an Inventory of the Estate; 9 copies thereof
and set aside the probate judgment of 13 November 1972. were furnished each of the private respondents.

Petitioners would also have this Court nullify all other actions of respondent Judge in Subsequently, a Project of Partition based on the dispositions made in the will and
said Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R; restore the status quo therein prior to the issuance of the signed by all the devisees and legatees, with the exception of Luis Fran, Remedios C.
foregoing orders; and permanently enjoin respondent Judge from reopening said Mejia and respondent Concepcion M. Espina, was submitted by the executor for the
proceedings. court’s approval. 10 Said legatees and devisees submitted certificates wherein they
admit receipt of a copy of the Project of Partition together with the notice of hearing,
The following facts are not controverted: 1es virtual 1aw library and state that they had no objection to its approval. 11

Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo, a widow, died on 10 July 1972 in Cebu City with neither The notice of hearing referred to in these certifications is the 6 August 1973 notice
descendants nor ascendants; she left real and personal properties located in Cebu issued by the Clerk of Court setting the hearing on the Project of Partition for 29
City, Ormoc City and Puerto Bello, Merida, Leyte. Earlier, on 23 April 1972, she August 1973. 12
executed a last will and testament 3 wherein she bequeathed to her collateral relatives
(brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces) all her properties, and designated Rosario Tan After the hearing on the Project of Partition, the court issued its Order of 10
or, upon the latter’s death, Jesus Fran, as executor to serve without bond. September 1973 13 approving the same, declaring the parties therein as the only heirs
Instrumental witnesses to the will were Nazario Pacquiao, Alcio Demerre and Primo entitled to the estate of Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo, directing the administrator
Miro. les law library : red to deliver to the said parties their respective shares and decreeing the proceedings
closed. The dispositive portion thereof reads:jgc: les.com.ph
On 15 July 1972, Jesus Fran filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Cebu for
the probate of Remedios’ last will and testament. 4 The case was raffled to the original "WHEREFORE, the signers (sic) to the project of partition are declared the only heirs
Branch VIII thereof which was then presided over by Judge Antonio D. Cinco. The entitled to the estate; the project of partition submitted is ordered approved and the
petition alleged that Rosario Tan is not physically well and, therefore, will not be administrator is ordered to deliver to each one of them their respective aliquot parts
assuming the position of administratix. Tan signed a waiver in favor of Jesus Fran on as distributed in the said project of partition. It is understood that if there are expenses
the third page of the said petition. The probate court issued an order setting the incurred or to be incurred as expenses of partition, Section 3 of Rule 90 shall be
petition for hearing on 18 September 1972. Meanwhile, on 31 July 1972, the court followed.
appointed petitioner Jesus Fran as special administrator.
Let this proceedings be now declared closed.
On 10 August 1972, the private respondents, who are sisters to the deceased, filed a
manifestation 5 alleging that they needed time to study the petition because some SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
heirs who are entitled to receive their respective shares have been intentionally
omitted therein, and praying that they be given ample time to file their opposition, Thereafter, the aforesaid Branch VIII of the Court of First Instance of Cebu was
after which the hearing be reset to another date. converted to a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. On November 1978, by virtue
of Presidential Decree No. 1439, Branch XVII (Danao City) of the Court of First Instance
Private respondents did not file any opposition. Instead, they filed on 18 September of Cebu, presided over by herein respondent Judge, was officially transferred to Cebu
1972 a "Withdrawal of Opposition to the Allowance of Probate (sic) of the Will" City and renumbered as Branch VIII.
wherein they expressly manifested, with their "full knowledge and consent that . . .
they have no objection of (sic) the allowance of the . . . will of the late Remedios Mejia On 1 October 1979, private respondents filed with the new Branch VIII an Omnibus
Vda. de Tiosejo," and that they have "no objection to the issuance of letters Motion for Reconsideration of the probate judgment of 13 November 1972 and on the
testamentary in favor of petitioner, Dr. Jesus Fran." 6 Order of partition of 10 September 1973; in said motion, they ask the court to declare
the proceedings still open and admit their opposition to the allowance of the will, 14
No other party filed an opposition. The petition thus became uncontested. which they filed on 1 October 1979. They allege that: (a) they were not furnished with
a copy of the will; (b) the will is a forgery; (c) they were not notified of any resolution
During the initial hearing, petitioner Fran introduced the requisite evidence to or order on their manifestation requesting time within which to file their opposition,
establish the jurisdictional facts. or of the order authorizing the clerk of court to receive the evidence for the petitioner,
or of the order closing the proceedings; (d) the reception of evidence by the clerk of
Upon a determination that the court had duly acquired jurisdiction over the court was void per the ruling in Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete; 15 (e) the project of partition
uncontested petition for probate, Judge Cinco issued in open court an order directing contains no notice of hearing and they were not notified thereof; (f) the petitioner
counsel for petitioner to present evidence proving the authenticity and due execution signed the project of partition as administrator and not as executor, thereby proving
of the will before the Clerk of Court who was, accordingly, so authorized to receive the that the decedent died intestate; (g) the petitioner did not submit any accounting as
same. required by law; and (h) the petitioner never distributed the estate to the devisees
31
and legatees.
In a detailed opposition 16 to the above Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioner Fran refuted all the protestations of private respondents. Among other
reasons, he stresses therein that: (a) private respondents are in estoppel to question
the will because they filed their Withdrawal Of Opposition To The Allowance of Will
which states that after thoroughly studying the petition, to which was attached a copy
of the English translation of the will, they have no objection to its allowance; the order
directing the clerk of court to receive the evidence was dictated in open court in the
presence of private respondents; private respondent Maria M. Gandiongco signed the
Project of Partition and private respondent Concepcion M. Espina submitted a
certification stating therein that she received the notice of hearing therefore and has
no objection to its approval; (b) except for some properties, either covered by a
usufruct under the will or agreed upon by the parties to be held in common by reason
of its special circumstance, there was an actual distribution of the estate in accordance
with the Project of Partition; insofar as private respondents are concerned, they not
only received their respective shares, they even purchased the shares of the other
devisees. To top it all, private respondents’ children, namely Rodrigo M. Gandiongco,
Jr. and Victor Espina, mortgaged their respective shares in favor of a bank.
Notwithstanding petitioners’ objections, respondent Judge issued on 26 February
1980 an Order setting for hearing the said Omnibut Motion for Reconsideration on 8
April 1980 so that "the witnesses and the exhibits (may be) properly ventilated." 17
On 25 March 1980, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Omnibus Motion and to
Reconsider the 26 February 1980 Order setting it for hearing on 17 April 1980, 18 but
the respondent Judge prematurely denied it for lack of merit in his Order of 31 March
1980. 19
Consequently, on 8 April 1980, the instant petition was filed challenging the
jurisdiction of the lower court in taking cognizance of the Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration considering that the probate judgment and the order approving the
Project of Partition and terminating the proceedings had long become final and had in
fact been executed. Private respondents had long lost their right to appeal therefrom.
The Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration cannot likewise be treated as a petition for
relief from judgment for under Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court, the same must
be filed within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice of the judgment/order and within
six (6) months from the date of said judgment. Therefore, this remedy can no longer
be availed of.cralawnad
On 8 April 1980, the date the instant petition was filed, respondent Judge proceeded
with the hearing of the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration. He received the
testimonies of private respondents and one Romeo O. Varena, an alleged handwriting
expert from the Philippine Constabulary, who averred that the signature of the
testatrix on the will is a forgery. The respondent Judge likewise issued an Order on the
same date stating that unless he received a restraining order from this Court within
twenty (20) days therefrom, he will reopen Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R.
On 14 April 1980, petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition asking this Court to restrain
respondent Judge from reopening the case. 20
In their voluminous Comments and Opposition to the petition and Supplemental
Petition, 21 private respondents not only amplify in great detail the grounds raised in
their Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, they also squarely raise for the first time
the following issues: 1es virtual 1aw library
(a) The probate court never acquired jurisdiction over the case since petitioner Jesus
Fran failed to submit to the court the original of the will.
(b) They were deprived of the opportunity to examine the will as petitioner Jesus Fran
did not attach it to the petition; what was attached was only the English translation of
the will.
(c) Even assuming that the probate judge could validly delegate the reception of
evidence to the Clerk of Court, the proceeding before the latter would sill be void as
he failed to take an oath of office before entering upon his duties as commissioner
and failed to render a report on the matters submitted to him.
(d) Respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco was defrauded into (sic) signing the
Project of Partition and respondent Concepcion M. Espina, her certification, when
they were misled by petitioner Fran into believing that the Agreement of Partition to
be submitted to the court is the Extra Judicial Patrician they signed on 7 May 1973.
(e) Petitioner Fran is guilty of fraud in undervaluing the estate of the late Remedios
Media Vda. de Tiosejo by reporting properties worth only P400,000.00 when in truth
and in fact the estate has an aggregate value of P2,094,333.00.
In the Resolution dated 2 June 1980, We issued a restraining order enjoining
respondent Judge from reopening Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R. 22
However, on the same date, before the restraining order was served on him,
respondent Judge issued the impugned order declaring the testamentary dispositions
of the will void, finding the signature of the late Remedios Media Vda. de Tiosejo to
be a forgery, decreeing the reopening of Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R and converting the same
into an intestate proceeding. 23
Hence, on 6 June 1980, petitioners filed their Second Supplemental Petition 24 asking
this Court to declare as null and void the Order of 2 June 1980 and, pending such
declaration, to restrain respondent Judge from enforcing the same. Private
respondents filed their Comment and Opposition to the Second Supplemental Petition
on 9 July 1980.
Thereafter, as mandated in the resolution of 30 June 1980, 25 this Court gave due
course to this case and required the parties to file their respective Memoranda, which
private respondents complied with on 16 August 1980; 26 petitioners filed theirs on
27 August 1980. 27 Consequently, the parties continued to file several pleadings
reiterating substantially the same allegations and arguments earlier submitted to this
Court.
On 22 March 1984, counsel for petitioners filed a manifestation informing this Court
of the death of petitioner Fran on 29 February 1984 and enumerating therein his
surviving heirs. On 2 April 1984, this Court resolved to have said heirs substitute him
in this case.
Over a year later, respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco filed an affidavit, 28 sworn
to before the acting Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City, disclosing
the following material facts: (a) she signed the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration
dated 1 October 1979 without knowing or reading the contents thereof; (b) she saw
the will of the late Remedios Media Vda. de Tiosejo written in the Cebuano dialect
after the same was executed by the latter; the said will bearing the authentic signature
of Remedios was the very one presented to the probate court by petitioner’s counsel;
(c) she received the notice of hearing of the petition for probate and because she was
convinced that the signature of the testatrix was genuine, she, together with
Concepcion M. Espina, withdrew her opposition; (d) she received her share of the
estate if the late Remedios Media Vda. de Tiosejo which was distributed in accordance
with the provisions of the latter’s will; and (e) she did not authorize Atty. Numeriano
Estenzo or other lawyers to present a motion to this Court after 25 February 1981
when Estenzo withdrew as counsel for Private Respondents. She then asks this Court
to consider as withdrawn her Opposition to the Allowance of the Will, her
participation in the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and her Opposition to this
petition.
Due to the development, We required private respondent Concepcion M. Espina to
comment on the affidavit of private respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco.
On 17 August 1985, private respondents filed a joint manifestation 29 wherein they
claim that Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco does not remember executing the affidavit.
A few weeks before the affidavit was filed, particularly on 17 June 1985, Maria M. Vda.
de Gandiongco was confined in the hospital; she could not recall having signed, during
this period, any affidavit or recognized her sisters and other relatives.
On 19 September 1985, respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco, through special
counsel, filed a Manifestation/Motion with a second Affidavit attached thereto 30
confessing that she signed the Joint Manifestation dated 16 August 1985 "without
knowing or being informed of its contents, and only upon Mrs. Concepcion Espina’s
request." She reiterated her desire to withdraw from the Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration filed in Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R as well as from the instant petition.
Despite the valiant attempt of private respondent Concepcion M. Espina to influence
and control the action of Maria Gandiongco, there is nothing in the records that would
cast any doubt on the irrevocability of the latter’s decision to withdraw her
participation in the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and Opposition to this case.
That decision, however, is not a ground for dropping her as a private respondent as
the respondent Judge had already issued the abovementioned Order of 2 June 1980.
The petition and the supplemental petitions are impressed with merit.
We do not hesitate to rule that the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he granted the Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and thereafter set aside the probate judgment of 13 November 1972
in Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R, declared the subject will of the testatrix a forgery, nullified the
testamentary dispositions therein and ordered the conversion of the testate
32
proceedings into one of intestacy.
It is not disputed that private respondents filed on the date of the initial hearing of the
petition their "Withdrawal of Opposition To Allowance of Probate (sic) Will" wherein
they unequivocally state that they have no objection to the allowance of the will. For
all legal intents and purposes, they became proponents of the same.
After the probate court rendered its decision on 13 November 1972, and there having
been no claim presented despite publication of notice to creditors, petitioner Fran
submitted a Project of Partition which private respondent Maria M. Vda. de
Gandiongco voluntarily signed and to which private respondent Espina expressed her
conformity through a certification filed with the probate court. Assuming for the sake
of argument that private respondents did not receive a formal notice of the decision
as they claim in their Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, these acts nevertheless
constitute indubitable proof of their prior actual knowledge of the same. A formal
notice would have been an idle ceremony. In testate proceedings, a decision logically
precedes the project of partition, which is normally an implementation of the will and
is among the last operative acts to terminate the proceedings. If private respondents
did not have actual knowledge of the decision, they should have desisted from
performing the above acts and instead demanded from petitioner Fran the fulfillment
of his alleged promise to show them the will. The same conclusion refutes and defeats
the plea that they were not notified of the order authorizing the Clerk of Court to
receive the evidence and that the Clerk of Court did not notify them of the date of the
reception of evidence. Besides, such plea must fail because private respondents were
present when the court dictated the said order.
Neither do We give any weight to the contention that the reception of evidence by
the Clerk of Court is null and void per the doctrine laid down in Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete.
31 In the first place, Lim Tanhu was decided on 29 August 1975, nearly four (4) years
after the probate court authorized the Clerk of Court to receive the evidence for the
petitioner in this case. A month prior to Lim Tanhu, or on 30 July 1975, this Court, in
Laluan v. Malpaya, 32 recognized and upheld the practice of delegating the reception
of evidence to Clerks of Court. Thus:jgc: les.com.ph
"No provision of law or principle of public policy prohibits a court from authorizing its
clerk of court to receive the evidence of a party litigant. After all, the reception of
evidence by the clerk of court constitutes but a ministerial task — the taking down of
the testimony of the witnesses and the marking of the pieces of documentary
evidence, if any, adduced by the party present. This task of receiving evidence
precludes, on the part of the clerk of court, the exercise of judicial discretion usually
called for when the other party who is present objects to questions propounded and
to the admission of the documentary evidence proffered. 33 More importantly, the
duty to render judgment on the merits of the case still rests with the judge who is
obliged to personally and directly prepare the decision based upon the evidence
reported. 34
But where the proceedings before the clerk of court and the concomitant result
thereof, i.e., the judgment rendered by the court based on the evidence presented in
such limited proceedings, prejudice the substantial rights of the aggrieved party, then
there exists sufficient justification to grant the latter complete opportunity to thresh
out his case in court." 35
Monserrate v. Court of Appeals, 36 decided on 29 September 1989, reiterated this
rule. Lim Tanhu then cannot be used as authority to nullify the order of the probate
court authorizing the Clerk of Court to receive the evidence for the rule is settled that
"when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had
relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof." 37 It may also be
emphasized in this connection that Lim Tanhu did not live long; it was subsequently
overruled in Gochangco v. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, 38 wherein
this Court, en banc, through Justice, now Chief Justice, Andres R. Narvasa, in reference
to what the trial court termed as "the doctrinal rule laid down in the recent case in
Lim Tan Hu (sic) v. Ramolete," ruled:jgc: les.com.ph
"Now, that declaration does not reflect long observed and established judicial practice
with respect to default cases. It is not quite consistent, too, with the several explicitly
authorized instances under the Rules where the function of receiving evidence and
even of making recommendatory findings of facts on the basis thereof may be
delegated to commissioners, inclusive of the Clerk of Court. These instances are set
out in Rule 33, . . .; Rules 67 and 69, . . .; Rule 86, . . .; Rule 136, . . . In all these instances,
the competence of the clerk of court is assumed. Indeed, there would seem, to be
sure, nothing intrinsically wrong in allowing presentation of evidence ex parte before
a Clerk of Court. Such a procedure certainly does not foreclose relief to the party
adversely affected who, for valid cause and upon appropriate and seasonable
application, may bring about the undoing thereof or the elimination of prejudice
thereby caused to him; and it is, after all, the Court itself which is duty bound and has
the ultimate responsibility to pass upon the evidence received in this manner,
discarding in the process such proofs as are incompetent and then declare what facts
have thereby been established. In considering and analyzing the evidence preparatory
to rendition of judgment on the merits, it may not unreasonably be assumed that any
serious error in the ex-parte presentation of evidence, prejudicial to any absent party,
will be detected and duly remedied by the Court, and/or may always, in any event, be
drawn to its attention by any interested party.
x x x
It was therefore error for the Court a quo to have declared the judgment by default to
be fatally flawed by the fact that the plaintiff’s evidence had been received not by the
Judge himself but by the clerk of court."cralaw virtua1aw library
The alternative claim that the proceedings before the Clerk of Court were likewise void
because said official did not take an oath is likewise untenable. The Clerk of Court
acted as such when he performed the delegated task of receiving evidence. It was not
necessary for him to take an oath for that purpose; he was bound by his oath of office
as a Clerk of Court. Private respondents are obviously of the impression that by the
delegation of the reception of evidence to the Clerk of Court, the latter became a
commissioner as defined under Rule 33 of the Rules of Court entitled Trial by
Commissioner. This is not correct; as this Court said in Laluan:jgc: les.com.ph
"The provisions of Rule 33 of the Rules of Court invoked by both parties properly relate
to the reference by a court of any or all of the issues in a case to a person so
commissioned to act or report thereon. These provisions explicitly spell out the rules
governing the conduct of the court, the commissioner, and the parties before, during,
and after the reference proceedings. Compliance with these rules of conduct becomes
imperative only when the court formally orders a reference of the case to a
commissioner. Strictly speaking then, the provisions of Rule 33 find no application to
the case at bar where the court a quo merely directed the clerk of court to take down
the testimony of the witnesses presented and the mark the documentary evidence
proffered on a date previously set for hearing."cralaw virtua1aw library
Belatedly realizing the absence of substance of the above grounds, private
respondents now claim in their Comments to the Petition and the Supplemental
Petition that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the petition because only
the English translation of the will — and not a copy of the same — was attached to the
petition; the will was not even submitted to the court for their examination within
twenty (20) days after the death of the testatrix; and that there was fraud in the
procurement of the probate judgment principally because they were not given any
chance to examine the signature of the testatrix and were misled into signing the
withdrawal of their opposition on the assurance of petitioner Fran and their sister,
Rosario M. Tan, that the will would be shown to them during the trial. These two
grounds easily serve as the bases for the postulation that the decision is null and void
and so, therefore, their omnibus motion became all the more timely and proper.
The contentions do not impress this Court.
In Santos v. Castillo 39 and Salazar v. Court of First Instance of Laguna, 40 decided six
(6) months apart in 1937, this Court already ruled that it is not necessary that the
original of the will be attached to the petition. In the first, it ruled: "The original of said
document [the will] must be presented or sufficient reasons given to justify the
nonpresentation of said original and the acceptance of the copy or duplicate thereof
." 41 In the second case, this Court was more emphatic in holding that:jgc: les.com.ph
"The law is silent as to the specific manner of bringing the jurisdictional allegations
before the court, but practice the jurisprudence have established that they should be
made in the form of an application and filed with the original of the will attached
thereto. It has been the practice in some courts to permit attachment of a mere copy
of the will to the application, without prejudice to producing the original thereof at
the hearing or when the court so requires. This precaution has been adopted by some
attorneys to forestall its disappearance, which has taken place in certain cases." 42
That the annexing of the original will to the petition is not a jurisdictional requirement
is clearly evident in Section 1, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which allows the filing of a
petition for probate by the person named therein regardless of whether or not he is
in possession of the will, or the same is lost or destroyed. The section reads in full as
follows:jgc: les.com.ph
"SECTION 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. — Any executor, devisee, or
legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time
after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will
allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed."cralaw
virtua1aw library
33
In the instant case, a copy of the original will and its English translation were attached
to the petition as Annex "A" and Annex "A-1", respectively, and made integral part of
the same. It is to be presumed that upon the filing of the petition the Clerk of Court,
or his duly authorized subordinate, examined the petition and found that the annexes
mentioned were in fact attached thereto. If they were not, the petition cannot be said
to have been properly presented and the Clerk of Court would not have accepted it
for docketing. Under Section 6, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, the Clerk of Court shall
receive and file all pleadings and other papers properly presented, endorsing on each
such paper the time when it was filed. The presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty militates against private respondents’ claim that Annex
"A" of the petition was not in fact attached thereto.
The certification of the Assistant Clerk of Court issued on 8 April 1980, 43 or SIX (6)
months after the filing of the motion for reconsideration, to the effect that as per
examination of the records of Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R, "the copy of the Will mentioned
in the petition as Annex "A" is not found to be attached as of this date in the said
petition; only the English Translation of said Will is attached thereof (sic) as Annex "A-
1" does not even save the day for Private Respondents. It is not conclusive because it
fails to state the fact that as hereafter shown, the pages of the records which
correspond to the four (4) pages of Annex "A" were missing or were detached
therefrom. As emphatically asserted by the petitioners in their Reply to the Comments
of private respondents, 44 duly supported by a certification of the former Clerk of
Court of the original Branch VIII of the court below, 45 and which private respondents
merely generally denied in their motion for reconsideration with comments and
opposition to consolidated reply, 46 the four-page xerox copy of the will, marked as
Annex "A" of the petition, became, as properly marked by the personnel of the original
Branch VIII of the court below upon the filing of the petition, pages 5, 6, 7 and 8 while
the translation thereof, marked as Annex "A-1", became pages 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the
records. The markings were done in long hand. The records of the case were thereafter
sent to the Clerk of Court, 14th Judicial District, Cebu City on 9 February 1978. These
records, now in the possession of the respondent Judge, show that said pages 5, 6, 7
and 8 in long hand are missing. As a consequence thereof, petitioners filed with the
Executive Judge of the court below an administrative complaint.
It is not likewise disputed that the original of the will was submitted in evidence and
marked as Exhibit "F." It forms part of the records of the special proceedings — a fact
which private respondents admit in their Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration,
thus:jgc: les.com.ph
"9. That an examination of the alleged will of our deceased sister has revealed that the
signatures at the left hand margin of Exhibit "F", are written by (sic) different person
than the signature appearing at the bottom of said alleged will . . ." 47
The availability of the will since 18 September 1972 for their examination renders
completely baseless the private respondents’ claim of fraud on petitioner Fran’s part
in securing the withdrawal of their opposition to the probate of the will. If indeed such
withdrawal was conditioned upon Fran’s promise that the private respondents would
be shown the will during the trial, why weren’t the appropriate steps taken by the
latter to confront Fran about this promise before certifications of conformity to the
project of partition were filed?
Granting for the sake of argument that the non-fulfillment of said promise constitutes
fraud, such fraud is not of the kind which provides sufficient justification for a motion
for reconsideration or a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 37 and Rule 38,
respectively, of the Rules of Court, or even a separate action for annulment of
judgment. It is settled that for fraud to be invested with such sufficiency, it must be
extrinsic or collateral to the matters involved in the issues raised during the trial which
resulted in such judgment. 48
In Our jurisdiction, the following courses of action are open to an aggrieved party to
set aside or attack the validity of a final judgment: 1es virtual 1aw library
the court issued the order approving the Project of Partition, to which they voluntarily
expressed their conformity through their respective certifications, and closing the
testate proceedings.
Private respondents did not avail of the other two (2) modes of attack.
The probate judgment of 13 November 1972, long final and undistributed by any
attempt to unsettle it, had inevitably passed beyond the reach of the court below to
annul or set the same aside, by mere motion, on the ground that the will is a forgery.
Settled in the rule that the decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due
execution of the will and it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by
law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent action or proceeding. 50 We
wish also to advert to the related doctrine which holds that final judgments are
entitled to respect and should not be disturbed; otherwise, there would be a wavering
of trust in the courts. 51 In Lee Bun Ting v. Aligaen, 52 this Court had the occasion to
state the rationale of this doctrine, thus:jgc: les.com.ph
"Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness, economy and judicial time and the
interests of litigants, as well as the peace and order of society, all require that stability
be accorded the solemn and final judgments of the courts or tribunals of competent
jurisdiction."cralaw virtua1aw library
This is so even if the decision is incorrect 53 or, in criminal case, the penalty imposed
is erroneous. 54
Equally baseless and unmeritorious is private respondents’ contention that the order
approving the Project of Partition and closing the proceedings is null and void because
the Project of Partition did not contain a notice of hearing and that they were not
notified of the hearing thereon. In truth, in her own certification 55 dated 5 September
1973, private respondent Concepcion M. Espina admitted that she "received a copy of
the Project of Partition and the Notice of Hearing in the above-entitled proceeding,
and that she has no objection to the approval of the said Project of Partition." The
notice of hearing she referred to is the Notice of Hearing For Approval of Project of
Partition issued on 6 August 1973 by the Clerk of Court. 56 Private respondent Espina
was lying through her teeth when she claimed otherwise.
The non-distribution of the estate, which is vigorously denied by the petitioners, is not
a ground for the re-opening of the testate proceedings. A seasonable motion for
execution should have been filed. In De Jesus v. Daza, 57 this Court ruled that if the
executor or administrator has possession of the share to be delivered, the probate
court would have jurisdiction within the same estate proceeding to order him to
transfer that possession to the person entitled thereto. This is authorized under
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. However, under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules
of Court. However, if no motion for execution is filed within the reglementary period,
a separate action for the recovery of the shares would be in order. As We see it, the
attack of 10 September 1973 on the Order was just a clever ploy to give a semblance
of strength and substance to the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration by depicting
therein a probate court committing a series of fatal, substantive and procedural
blunders, which We find to be imaginary, if not deliberately fabricated.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition and supplemental petitions are GRANTED. The
Order of respondent Judge of 2 June 1980 and all other orders issued by him in Sp.
Proc. No. 3309-R, as well as all other proceedings had therein in connection with or in
relation to the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE.
The restraining order issued on 2 June 1980 is hereby made PERMANENT.
Costs against private respondent Concepcion M. Espina.
SO ORDERED.

(1) Petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court which must be filed within CYNTHIA C. ALABAN, G.R. No. 156021
sixty (60) days after learning of the decision, but not more than six (6) months after FRANCIS COLLADO, JOSE
such decision is entered; P. COLLADO, JUDITH Present:
PROVIDO, CLARITA PROVIDO,
(2) By direct action, via a special civil action for certiorari, or by collateral attack, ALFREDO PROVIDO, MANUEL PUNO, J.,
assuming that the decision is void for want of jurisdiction; PROVIDO, JR., LORNA DINA Chairman,
E. PROVIDO, SEVERO ARENGA, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
(3) By an independent civil action under Article 1114 of the Civil Code, assuming that JR., SERGIO ARENGA, EDUARDO CALLEJO, SR.,
the decision was obtained through fraud and Rule 38 can not be applied. 49 ARENGA, CAROL ARENGA, RUTH TINGA, and
BABASA, NORMA HIJASTRO, ' CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
It is not difficult to see that private respondents had lost their right to file a petition DOLORES M. FLORES, ANTONIO
for relief from judgment, it appearing that their omnibus motion for reconsideration MARIN, JR., JOSE MARIN, SR., and
was filed exactly six (6) years, ten (10) months and twenty-two (22) days after the MATHILDE MARIN, Promulgated:
rendition of the decision, and six (6) years, one (1) month and thirteen (13) days after Petitioners,
34
September 23, 2005
- versus' -
COURT OF APPEALS and
FRANCISCO H. PROVIDO,
Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Resolutions [1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69221, [2] dismissing petitioners' petition for
annulment of judgment.
On 8 November 2000, respondent Francisco Provido (respondent) filed a petition,
docketed as SP Proc. No. 00-135, for the probate of the Last Will and Testament [3] of
the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado (decedent'), who died on 26 October 2000 in
Janiuay, Iloilo. [4] Respondent alleged that he was the heir of the decedent and the
executor of her will. On 30 May 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, in P.D.
Monfort North, Dumangas, Iloilo, rendered its Decision, [5] allowing the probate of
the will of the decedent and directing the issuance of letters testamentary to
respondent. [6]
More than four (4) months later, or on 4 October 2001, herein petitioners filed a
motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings. [7] Likewise, they filed an
opposition to the allowance of the will of the decedent, as well as the issuance of
letters testamentary to respondent, [8] claiming that they are the intestate heirs of
the decedent. Petitioners claimed that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
petition due to non-payment of the correct docket fees, defective publication, and
lack of notice to the other heirs. Moreover, they alleged that the will could not have
been probated because: (1) the signature of the decedent was forged; (2) the will was
not executed in accordance with law, that is, the witnesses failed to sign below the
attestation clause; (3) the decedent lacked testamentary capacity to execute and
publish a will; (4) the will was executed by force and under duress and improper
pressure; (5) the decedent had no intention to make a will at the time of affixing of
her signature; and (6) she did not know the properties to be disposed of, having
included in the will properties which no longer belonged to her. Petitioners prayed
that the letters testamentary issued to respondent be withdrawn and the estate of
the decedent disposed of under intestate succession. [9]
On 11 January 2002, the RTC issued an Order [10] denying petitioners' motion for
being unmeritorious. Resolving the issue of jurisdiction, the RTC held that petitioners
were deemed notified of the hearing by publication and that the deficiency in the
payment of docket fees is not a ground for the outright dismissal of the petition. It
merely required respondent to pay the deficiency. [11] Moreover, the
RTC's Decision was already final and executory even before petitioners' filing of the
motion to reopen. [12]
Petitioners thereafter filed a petition [13] with an application for preliminary
injunction with the CA, seeking the annulment of the RTC's Decision dated 30 May
2001 and Order dated 11 January 2002. They claimed that after the death of the
decedent, petitioners, together with respondent, held several conferences to discuss
the matter of dividing the estate of the decedent, with respondent agreeing to a one-
sixth (1/6) portion as his share. Petitioners allegedly drafted a compromise agreement
to implement the division of the estate. Despite receipt of the agreement, respondent
refused to sign and return the same. Petitioners opined that respondent feigned
interest in participating in the compromise agreement so that they would not suspect
his intention to secure the probate of the will. [14] They claimed that they learnt of
the probate proceedings only in July of 2001, as a result of which they filed their
motion to reopen the proceedings and admit their opposition to the probate of the
will only on 4 October 2001. They argued that the RTC Decision should be annulled
and set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the RTC. [15]
In its Resolution [16] promulgated on 28 February 2002, the CA dismissed the petition.
It found that there was no showing that petitioners failed to avail of or resort to the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other
appropriate remedies through no fault of their own. [17] Moreover, the CA declared
as baseless petitioners' claim that the proceedings in the RTC was attended by
extrinsic fraud. Neither was there any showing that they availed of this ground in a
motion for new trial or petition for relief from judgment in the RTC, the CA
added. [18] Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Resolution, but the same was
denied by the CA for lack of merit. [19]
Petitioners now come to this Court, asserting that the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed their petition for the
alleged failure to show that they have not availed of or resorted to the remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment or other remedies through no fault
of their own, and held that petitioners were not denied their day in court during the
proceedings before the RTC. [20] In addition, they assert that this Court has yet to
decide a case involving Rule 47 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, the instant
petition should be given due course for the guidance of the bench and bar. [21]
For his part, respondent claims that petitioners were in a position to avail of the
remedies provided in Rules 37 and 38, as they in fact did when they filed a motion for
new trial. [22] Moreover, they could have resorted to a petition for relief from
judgment since they learned of the RTC's judgment only three and a half months after
its promulgation. [23] Respondent likewise maintains that no extrinsic fraud exists to
warrant the annulment of the RTC's Decision, since there was no showing that they
were denied their day in court. Petitioners were not made parties to the probate
proceedings because the decedent did not institute them as her heirs. [24] Besides,
assuming arguendo that petitioners are heirs of the decedent, lack of notice to them
is not a fatal defect since personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural
convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite. [25] Finally, respondent charges
petitioners of forumshopping, since the latter have a pending suit involving the same
issues as those in SP No. 00-135, that is' SP No. 1181 [26] filed before Branch 23, RTC
of General Santos City and subsequently pending on appeal before the CA in CA-G.R.
No.74924. [27]
It appears that one of the petitioners herein, Dolores M. Flores (Flores'), who is a niece
of the decedent, filed a petition for letters of administration with the RTC of General
Santos City, claiming that the decedent died intestate without any issue, survived by
five groups of collateral heirs. Flores, armed with a Special Power of Attorney from
most of the other petitioners, prayed for her appointment as administratrix of the
estate of the decedent. The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, stating that the probate court in Janiuay, Iloilo has jurisdiction since the
venue for a petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is the place where
the decedent died. This is also in accordance with the rule that the first court acquiring
jurisdiction shall continue hearing the case to the exclusion of other courts, the RTC
added. [28] On 9 January 2002, Flores filed a Notice of Appeal [29] and on 28 January
2002, the case was ordered forwarded to the CA. [30]
Petitioners maintain that they were not made parties to the case in which the decision
sought to be annulled was rendered and, thus, they could not have availed of the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment and other
appropriate remedies, contrary to the ruling of the CA. They aver that respondent's
offer of a false compromise and his failure to notify them of the probate of the will
constitute extrinsic fraud that necessitates the annulment of the RTC's judgment. [31]
The petition is devoid of merit.
Section 37 of the Rules of Court allows an aggrieved party to file a motion for new trial
on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The same
Rule permits the filing of a motion for reconsideration on the grounds' of excessive
award of damages, insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision or final order, or
that the decision or final order is contrary to law. [32] Both motions should be filed
within the period for taking an appeal, or fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment
or final order.
Meanwhile, a petition for relief from judgment under Section 3 of Rule 38 is resorted
to when a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter
taken, against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence. Said party may file a petition in the same court and in the same case to set
aside the judgment, order or proceeding. It must be filed within sixty (60) days after
the petitioner learns of the judgment and within six (6) months after entry
thereof. [33]
A motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for relief from judgment are
remedies available only to parties' in the proceedings' where the assailed judgment is
rendered. [34] In fact, it has been held that a person who was never a party to the
case, or even summoned to appear therein, cannot avail of a petition for relief from
judgment. [35]
However, petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have
not become parties to the probate proceedings.
Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any
other person interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator,
petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed. [36] Notice of the time
and place for proving the will must be published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province, [37] as well as furnished to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. [38] Thus, it
has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with
the corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all
persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent. [39]
Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar
indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right
sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole
world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide
it. [40] Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate,
they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the
notice of hearing.
As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the
remedies of motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from
judgment. In fact, petitioners filed a motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion
for new trial, with petitioners praying for the reopening of the case and the setting of
35
further proceedings. However, the motion was denied for having been filed out of
time, long after the Decision became final and executory.
Conceding that petitioners became aware of the Decision after it had become final,
they could have still filed a petition for relief from judgment after the denial of their
motion to reopen. Petitioners claim that they learned of the Decision only on 4
October 2001, or almost four (4) months from the time the Decision had attained
finality. But they failed to avail of the remedy.
For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said remedies available
to them, petitioners could no longer resort to a petition for annulment of judgment;
otherwise, they would benefit from their own inaction or negligence. [41]
Even casting aside the procedural requisite, the petition for annulment of judgment
must still fail for failure to comply with the substantive requisites, as the appellate
court ruled.
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case
where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. [42] The purpose of such
action is to have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a
renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner, [43] and is based on only two
grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. [44] A person
need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that
he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and
collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby. [45]
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is
extrinsic or collateral in character. [46] Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents
a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it
operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in
which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is
that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his
day in court. [47]
To sustain their allegation of extrinsic fraud, petitioners assert that as a result of
respondent's deliberate omission or concealment of their names, ages and residences
as the other heirs of the decedent in his petition for allowance of the will, they were
not notified of the proceedings, and thus they were denied their day in court. In
addition, they claim that respondent's offer of a false compromise even before the
filing of the petition prevented them from appearing and opposing the petition for
probate.
The Court is not convinced.
According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator. [48] A perusal of the will shows that respondent
was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of
the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs [49] who are entitled to be
notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal
obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify
them of the same.
Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the
purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice. After all, personal notice
upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional
requisite. [50]
The non-inclusion of petitioners' names in the petition and the alleged failure to
personally notify them of the proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners
were not denied their day in court, as they were not prevented from participating in
the proceedings and presenting their case before the probate court.
One other vital point is the issue of forum-shopping against petitioners. Forum-
shopping consists of filing multiple suits in different courts, either simultaneously or
successively, involving the same parties, to ask the courts to rule on the same or
related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially same reliefs, [51] on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition. [52] Obviously, the parties in the instant case, as well as in the appealed
case before the CA, are the same. Both cases deal with the existence and validity of
the alleged will of the decedent, with petitioners anchoring their cause on the state of
intestacy. In the probate proceedings, petitioners' position has always been that the
decedent left no will and if she did, the will does not comply with the requisites of a
valid will. Indeed, that position is the bedrock of their present petition. Of course,
respondent maintains the contrary stance. On the other hand, in the petition for
letters of administration, petitioner Flores prayed for her appointment as'
administratrix of the estate on the theory that the decedent died intestate. The
petition was dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and it is this order of
dismissal which is the subject of review in CA-G.R. No. 74924. Clearly, therefore, there
is forum-shopping.
Moreover, petitioners failed to inform the Court of the said pending case in their
certification against forum- shopping. Neither have they done so at any time
thereafter. The Court notes that even in the petition for annulment of judgment,
petitioners failed to inform the CA of the pendency of their appeal in CA-G.R. No.
74924, even though the notice of appeal was filed way before the petition for
annulment of judgment was instituted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 77047. May 28, 1988.]
JOAQUINA R-INFANTE DE ARANZ, ANTONIO R-INFANTE, CARLOS R-INFANTE,
MERCEDES R-INFANTE DE LEDNICKY, ALFREDO R-INFANTE, TERESITA R-INFANTE,
RAMON R-INFANTE, FLORENCIA R-INFANTE DE DIAS, MARTIN R-INFANTE, JOSE R-
INFANTE LINK and JOAQUIN R-INFANTE CAMPBELL, Petitioners, v. THE HON.
NICOLAS GALING, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL
JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH NO. 166, PASIG, METRO MANILA AND JOAQUIN R-
INFANTE, Respondents.
Belo, Abiera and Associates, for Petitioners.
Miguel J. Lagman for Respondents.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals,
dated 13 January 1987, in CA-G.R. SP-No. 09622, entitled "Joaquina R-Infante de
Aranz, Et Al., petitioners v. Hon. Nicolas Galing, etc., Et Al., Respondents," dismissing
petitioners’ petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the orders 2 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, dated 12 May 1986 and 30 May 1986, respectively, in
Sp. Proc. No. 9995, entitled, In the Matter of Petition for Approval of the Last Will and
Testament of Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola, Joaquin R-Infante, Petitioner."cralaw
virtua1aw library
On 3 March 1986, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Branch 166, a petition for the probate and allowance of the last will and testament of
the late Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola. The petition specified the names and
addresses of herein petitioners as legatees and devisees, as follows:jgc: les.com.ph
"Joaquina R-Infante Roxas de Aranz residing at No. 86 10th St., New Manila, Quezon
City, Metro Manila;
Antonio R-Infante Roxas residing at #91 Cambridge, North Forbes, Makati, Metro
Manila;
Carlos R-Infante Roxas residing at #46 Washington St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro
Manila;
Mercedes R-Infante Roxas de Lednicky residing at #386 P. Guevarra St., San Juan,
Metro Manila;
Alfredo R-Infante Roxas residing at #27 A. Scout Tobias St., Quezon City, Metro Manila;
Teresita R-Infante Roxas residing at #121 9th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, Metro
Manila;
Ramon R-Infante Roxas residing at #27 B. Scout Tobias St., Quezon City, Metro Manila;
Florencia R-Infante Roxas de Diaz residing at Calle Sancho Davila, 13-19-D, Madrid,
23028 Spain;
Martin R-Infante Roxas residing at #2 Bongavilla St., Cubao, Quezon City, Metro
Manila;
Jose R-Infante Link residing at 174R-Pascual St., San Juan, Metro Manila;
Joaquin R-Infante Campbell C/O Pilar Campbell, 15 Briones, Makati, Metro Manila." 3
On 12 March 1986, the probate court issued an order setting the petition for hearing
on 5 May 1986 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning. Said order was published in the "Nueva
Era" a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks. On the date of the hearing, no oppositor appeared. The hearing
was then reset to 12 May 1986, on which date, the probate court issued the following
order:jgc: les.com.ph
"There being no opposition to this instant case, as prayed for, the Branch Clerk of Court
is hereby designated Commissioner to receive evidence ex-parte of the petitioner.
36

"SO ORDERED."
On the same day (12 May 1986), private respondent presented his evidence ex-parte
and placed Arturo Arceo, one of the testamentary witnesses, on the witness stand.
During the proceedings, private respondent was appointed executor.
On 14 May 1986, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of 12 May
1986 alleging that, as named legatees, no notices were sent to them as required by
Sec. 4, Rule?6 of the Rules of Court and they prayed that they be given a period of ten
(10) days within which to file their opposition to the probate of the will.
. . . It is a proceedings in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice
4 or by publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The interested parties
in the case were known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows that no such
notice was received by the interested parties residing in the Philippines (pp. 474, 476,
481, 503-4, t.s.n., hearing of 24 February 1948). The proceedings had in the municipal
district court of Amoy, China, may be likened to a deposition or to a perpetuation of
testimony, and even if it were so it does not measure or come up to the standard of
such proceedings in the Philippines for lack of notice to all interested parties and the
proceedings were held at the back of such interested parties.
x x x

On 30 May 1986, the probate court, acting on the opposition of private respondent . . . In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have
and the reply thereto of petitioners, issued an order denying petitioners’ motion for been done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and
reconsideration. les.com:cralaw:red principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the
authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy,
Thereafter, petitioners filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or
which was, however, referred to the Court of Appeals. On 13 January 1987, the Court allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed
of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing the petition. 5 Hence, the instant and recorded by a competent court of this country." 11
petition.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 13 January 1987 is hereby
It is the view of petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that personal ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial
notice of probate proceedings to the known legatees and devisees is not a Court of Pasig for further proceedings in accordance with this decision. No costs.
jurisdictional requirement in the probate of a will. Contrary to the holding of the Court
of Appeals that the requirement of notice on individual heirs, legatees and devisees is SO ORDERED.
merely a matter of procedural convenience to better satisfy in some instances the
requirements of due process, petitioners allege that under Sec. 4 of Rule 76 of the
Rules of Court, said requirement of the law is mandatory and its omission constitutes
a reversible error for being constitutive of grave abuse of discretion. 6

We grant the petition.

Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court reads:jgc: les.com.ph

"SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally.

— The court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving
the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their places of residence, and
deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days
before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice must in
like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not the petitioner;
also, to any person named as co-executor not petitioning, if their places of residence
be known. Personal service of copies of the notice of least ten (10) days before the
day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing."cralaw virtua1aw library

It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing for
the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known heirs,
legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines at their places of residence, if such
places of residence be known. There is no question that the residences of herein
petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. The petition for
the allowance of the will itself indicated the names and addresses of the legatees and
devisees of the testator. 7 But despite such knowledge, the probate court did not
cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of the law for
the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing
for three (3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

The case of Joson v. Nable 8 cited by the Court of Appeals in its assailed decision to
support its theory is not applicable in the present case. In that case, petitioners
Purificacion Joson and Erotita Joson failed to contest the will of Tomas Joson because
they had not been notified of the hearing of the petition for probate. While the
petition included the residence of petitioners as Dagupan Street No. 83, Manila,
petitioners claimed that their residence was not Dagupan Street No. 83, Manila. There
the Court said: les virtual lawlibrary

"Petitioners maintain that no notice was received by them partly because their
residence was not Dagupan Street No. 83 as alleged in the petition for probate. If the
allegation of the petition was wrong and the true residence of petitioners was not
known, then notice upon them individually was not necessary. Under the provision
abovequoted, individual notice upon heirs, legatees and devisees is necessary only
when they are known or when their places of residence are known. In other instances,
such notice is not necessary and the court may acquire and exercise jurisdiction simply
upon the publication of the notice in a newspaper of general circulation . . . 9

In Re: Testate Estate of Suntay, 10 the Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla,
said: 1es virtual 1aw library

37