was standing at the left side of the rear of her car
pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix
G.R. No. 115024 February 7, 1996
VALENZUELA vs CA
FACTS:
 Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving home when she
ha a flat tire.
 She stopped at a lighted place and parked along the
sidewalk, put on her emergency lights, alighted from
the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She
the conduct which is required of an individual in
such cases is dictated not exclusively by the
the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987
Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and
registered in the name of defendant Alexander
Commercial, Inc.
 Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against
the windshield of the car of the defendant, and was
pulled out from under defendant’s car. She was
brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where
she was found to have a “traumatic amputation, leg,
left up to distal thigh (above knee).”
ISSUE #1:
WON Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence
in parking her car alongside Aurora Boulevard, which
entire area is a no parking zone.
HELD: NO
 Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the
injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the
harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard
to which he is required to conform for his own
protection.
 Courts have traditionally been compelled to
recognize that an actor who is confronted with an
emergency is not to be held up to the standard of
conduct normally applied to an individual who is in
no such situation. The law takes stock of impulses of
humanity when placed in threatening or dangerous
situations and does not require the same standard of
thoughtful and reflective care from persons
confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening
conditions.
 Under the “emergency rule” adopted by this Court in
Gan vs Court of Appeals, an individual who suddenly
finds himself in a situation of danger and is required
to act without much time to consider the best means
that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger,
is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a
better solution, unless the emergency was brought by
his own negligence.
 While the emergency rule applies to those cases in
which reflective thought, or the opportunity to
adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent,
suddenness of the event which absolutely negates
thoughtful care, but by the over-all nature of the
circumstances. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly
crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be
faulted for stopping at a point which is both
convenient for her to do so and which is not a
hazard to other motorists.
 Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did
exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the
emergency and could not be considered to have
contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which
eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower
extremities.
 Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence
ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of the
accident. “Negligence, as it is commonly understood
is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to
others.” It is the failure to observe that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury. We stressed, in Corliss vs. Manila Railroad
Company, that negligence is the want of care
required by the circumstances.
ISSUE #1:
WON Alexander Commercial, Inc. Is liable as Li’s
employer.
HELD:
 We agree with the respondent court that the
relationship in question is not based on the principle
of respondeat superior, which holds the master
liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater
familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon
the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence
of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of his employees. Utilizing the bonus
pater familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, we are of the opinion that Li’s
employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. is jointly and
solidarily liable for the damage caused by the
accident of June 24, 1990.
 The employer’s primary liability under the concept of
pater familias embodied by Art. 2180 (in relation to
Art. 2176) of the Civil Code is quasi-delictual or
1|C h e - a n
 tortious in character. His liability is relieved on a
showing that he exercised the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of
its employees. Once evidence is introduced showing
that the employer exercised the required amount of
care in selecting its employees, half of the employer’s
burden is overcome. The question of diligent
supervision, however, depends on the circumstances
of employment.
 Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to
our satisfaction, that it exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting
its company car to Li. No allegations were made as to
whether or not the company took the steps necessary
to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and
history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of
a company car. Not having been able to overcome the
burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of
liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said
company, based on the principle of bonus pater
familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with
the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela during the accident.
 After the meeting, petitioner went back to her official
station in Caloocan City, by boarding the LRT from
Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue to Monumento.
 On board the LRT, her handbag was slashed and its
contents stolen by an unidentified person. Among
the items taken from her were her wallet and the
government-issued cellular phone, which is the
subject of the instant case. That same day, she
reported the incident to police authorities who
immediately conducted an investigation, which
proved futile.
 Three days after, petitioner reported the theft to the
regional director of TESDA-NCR.
 resident auditor and COA denied the request of
petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the
diligence required in the custody of government
properties.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner was negligent in the care of the
government-issued cellular phone, hence, should be
held accountable for its loss.
with the nature of the situation in which he is placed,
and the importance of the act which he is to
perform.”
 The Rules provide that property for official use and
purpose shall be utilized with the diligence of a good
father of a family. Extra-ordinary measures are not
called for in taking care of a cellular phone while in
transit. Placing it in a bag away from covetous eyes
and holding on to that bag, as done by petitioner, is
ordinarily sufficient care of a cellular phone while
travelling on board the LRT. The records do not show
any specific act of negligence on her part. It is a
settled rule that negligence cannot be presumed; it
has to be proven. In the absence of any shred of
evidence thereof, respondents gravely abused their
discretion in finding petitioner negligent.

HELD: NO
 Riding the LRT cannot per se be denounced as a
negligent act; more so under the circumstances in this
case, in which petitioner’s mode of transit was
influenced by time and money considerations.
 Possession of a cellular phone would not and should
not hinder one from boarding an LRT coach as
petitioner did. After all, whether she took a bus or a
jeepney, the risk of theft would have also been
present. Because of her relatively low position and
pay, she was not expected to have her own vehicle or
to ride a taxicab. Neither had the government
granted her the use of any vehicle.
 “Negligence is the omission to do something which a G.R. No. L-6870 May 24, 1954
G.R. No. 143403. January 22, 2003 reasonable man, guided upon those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human AMEDO vs. RIO Y OLABARRIETA, INC.
CRUZ vs. GANGAN affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a
CONCEPCION, J.:
PANGANIBAN, J.: prudent man and reasonable man would not do.
FACTS:
FACTS: “Negligence is want of care required by the
circumstances.  On May 27, 1949 at about 11:30 o'clock in the
 Filonila Cruz went to the Regional Office of the TESDA morning, while the deceased Filomeno Managuit was
for consultation with the regional director.  “The diligence with which the law requires the
on board M/S "Pilar II" as such seaman, he jumped
individual at all times to govern his conduct varies
2|C h e - a n
 into the water to retrieve a 2-peso bill belonging to
him, and as a consequence of which, he was drowned.
ISSUE:
WON Filomeno Managuit was grossly negligent when he
jumped into the water to retrieve his 2-peso bill
HELD: YES
 His death was the consequence of his decision to
jump into the water to retrieve said bill. The
hazardous nature of this act was not due specially to
the nature of his employment. It was a risk to which
any person on board the M/S Pilar II, such as a
passenger thereof or an ordinary visitor, would have
been exposed had he, likewise, jumped into the sea,
as Filomeno had.
 The phrase "notorious negligence" has been held to
be tantamount to "gross negligence", which, in turn,
has been defined as follows:
Gross negligence is defined to be the want of
even slight care and diligence.
By gross negligence is meant "such entire
want of care as to raise a presumption that the
person in fault is conscious of the probable
consequences of carelessness, and is
indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury to
person or property of others." ... The
negligence must amount to a reckless
disregard of the safety of person or property."
 It cannot be denied that in jumping into the sea, one
mile and a half from the seashore of Arceli,
Dumarang, Palawan, Filomeno failed to exercise
"even slight care and diligence," that he displayed a
"reckless disregard of the safety" of his person, that
he could not have been but conscious of the probable
consequences" of his carelessness and that he was
"indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury.
G.R. No. L-8110 June 30, 1956
MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS, INC. vs. THE
WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION
BENGZON, J.:
FACTS:
 Mamador together with other laborers of the
Respondent-corporation, boarded a truck belonging
to the latter, which was then driven by one Procopio
Macunat, also employed by the corporation, and on
its way to their place of work at the mine camp at
Talantunan, while trying to overtake another truck on
the company road, it turned over and hit a coconut
tree, resulting in the death of said Mamador and
injury to the others.”
 Procopio Macunat was prosecuted, convicted and
sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased.
ISSUE:
WON the deceased’s violation the employer’s
prohibition against laborers riding the haulage trucks is
tantamount to “notorious negligence” which, under the
law, precludes recovery.
HELD: NO
 There is no doubt that mere riding on haulage truck
or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence,
ordinarily. It couldn’t be, because transportation by
truck is not dangerous per se.
 The prohibition had nothing to do with personal
safety of the riders.
 Nevertheless, even granting there was negligence, it
surely was not “notorious” negligence, which we
have interpreted to mean the same thing as “gross
negligence” — implying “conscious indifference to
consequences” “pursuing a course of conduct which
would naturally and probably result in injury” “utter
disregard of consequences.” Getting or accepting a
free ride on the company’s haulage truck couldn’t be
gross negligence, because as the referee found, “no
danger or risk was apparent.”
G.R. NO. 172406 October 11, 2007
ILAO-ORETA vs. SPS. RONQUILLO
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
 Sps Eva Marie Ronquillo and Noel Benedicto
Ronquillo, had not been blessed with a child despite
several years of marriage. They thus consulted
petitioner, Dr. Concepcion Ilao-Oreta, an Ob-Gyn.
 Upon Dr. Ilao-Oreta's advice, Eva Marie agreed to
undergo a laparoscopic procedure to get a direct view
of her internal reproductive organ in order to
determine the real cause of her infertility.
 Dr. Ilao-Oreta did not arrive at the scheduled time for
the procedure, however, and no prior notice of its
cancellation was received. It turned out that the
doctor was on a return flight from Hawaii to, and
arrived at 10:00 p.m. of April 5, 1999 in, Manila fron
her honeymoon, failing to consider the time
difference between Hawaii and the Philippines.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner acted with gross negligence
HELD: NO
 "Gross negligence" implies a want or absence of or
failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the
entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless
disregard of consequences without exerting any
effort to avoid them. It is characterized by want of
even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a
conscious indifference to consequences in so far as
other persons may be affected.
 Although petitioner failed to take into consideration
the time difference between the Philippines and
Hawaii, the situation then did not present any clear
and apparent harm or injury that even a careless
person may perceive. Unlike in situations where the
Supreme Court had found gross negligence to exist,
petitioner could not have been conscious of any
foreseeable danger that may occur since she actually
believed that she would make it to the operation that
was elective in nature, the only purpose of which was
to determine the real cause of infertility and not to
treat and cure a life threatening disease. Thus, in
merely fixing the date of her appointment with
respondent Eva Marie Ronquillo, petitioner was not
in the pursuit or performance of conduct which any
ordinary person may deem to probably and naturally
result in injury.
 It bears noting that when she was scheduling the date
of her performance of the procedure, Dr. Ilao-Oreta
3|C h e - a n
had just gotten married and was preparing for her
honeymoon, and it is of common human knowledge
that excitement attends its preparations. Her
negligence could then be partly attributed to human
frailty which rules out its characterization as gross.

4|C h e - a n
  The City Engineer's office investigated the case and
learned that the five victims entered the septic tank
without clearance from it nor with the knowledge
and consent of the market master. In fact, the septic
tank was found to be almost empty and the victims
were presumed to be the ones who did the re-
emptying.
ISSUE:
WON respondent Davao City is guilty of negligence
which is the immediate and proximate cause of deaths
of the victims hereof
septic tank. Considering the nature of the task of
emptying a septic tank especially one which has not
been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person
should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks.
The victims are no exception; more so with Mr.
Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is
presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure,
therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary
measures for their safety was the proximate cause of
the accident.

G.R. No. 92087 May 8, 1992
FERNANDO vs. CA
MEDIALDEA, J.:
FACTS:
 Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public
Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of
Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-
emptying of the septic tank in Agdao.
 An invitation to bid was issued, where Antonio
Suñer, Jr. Bascon won the bid. Before Bascon was
notified and can sign the purchase order, bidder
Bertulano with four other companions were found
dead inside the septic tank.
HELD: NO
 Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe
for the protection of the interests of another person
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury. Under the law, a person who by
his omission causes damage to another, there being
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done
(Article 2176, New Civil Code). As to what would
constitute a negligent act in a given situation, the case
of Picart v. Smith (37 Phil. 809, 813) provides Us the
answer, to wit:
 To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from
the negligence of another, a claimant must establish
the relation between the omission and the damage.
He must prove under Article 2179 of the New Civil
Code that the defendant's negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury. G.R. No. 176675 September 15, 2010
Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, SPS. BONTILAO vs. GERONA
which, in natural and continuous sequence unbroken
FACTS:
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have  On December 28, 1991, respondent Dr. Carlos
occurred. Proof of such relation of cause and effect is Gerona, an orthopedic surgeon at the Vicente Gullas
not an arduous one if the claimant did not in any way Memorial Hospital, treated petitioners' son, eight (8)-
contribute to the negligence of the defendant. year-old Allen Key Bontilao (Allen), for a fractured
However, where the resulting injury was the product right wrist. Respondent administered a "U-splint" and
of the negligence of both parties, there exists a immobilized Allen's wrist with a cast, then sent Allen
difficulty to discern which acts shall be considered home.
the proximate cause of the accident.
 Allen refractured the same wrist and was brought
 In view of this factual milieu, it would appear that an back to the hospital, where respondent performed a
accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic closed reduction procedure, with Dr. Vicente Jabagat
tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes its as the anesthesiologist. Then he placed Allen's arm in
covers. The accident in the case at bar occurred a plaster cast to immobilize it.
because the victims on their own and without
authority from the public respondent opened the
5|C h e - a n
 The cast had not been retightened, a rotational
deformity had developed in Allen's arm, requiring an
open reduction surgery will be conducted on June 24,
1992 by respondent, again with Dr. Jabagat as the
anesthesiologist.
 Dr. Jabagat failed to intubate the patient after five (5)
attempts so anesthesia was administered through a
gas mask. Respondent asked Dr. Jabagat if the
operation should be postponed given the failure to
intubate, but Dr. Jabagat said that it was alright to
proceed.
 Respondent verified that Allen was breathing
properly before proceeding with the surgery. As
respondent was about to finish the suturing, Sherlina
decided to go out of the operating room to make a
telephone call and wait for her son. Later, she was
informed that her son had died on the operating
table. The cause of death was "asphyxia due to
congestion and edema of the epiglottis.
ISSUE:
WON respondent is liable for damages for Allen's death.
HELD: NO
 The trial court erred in applying the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur to pin liability on respondent for Allen's
death. Res ipsa loquitur is a rebuttable presumption
or inference that the defendant was negligent. The
presumption only arises upon proof that the
instrumentality causing injury was in the defendant's
exclusive control, and that the accident was one (1)
which ordinarily does not happen in the absence of
negligence. It is a rule of evidence whereby
negligence of the alleged wrongdoer may be inferred
from the mere fact that the accident happened,
provided that the character of the accident and
circumstances attending it lead reasonably to the
belief that in the absence of negligence it would not
have occurred and that the thing which caused injury
is shown to have been under the management and
control of the alleged wrongdoer.
 Under this doctrine, the happening of an injury
permits an inference of negligence where the plaintiff
produces substantial evidence that the injury was
caused by an agency or instrumentality under the
exclusive control and management of the defendant,
and that the injury was such that in the ordinary
course of things would not happen if reasonable care way not deemed appropriate by Dr. Jabagat.
had been used. Respondent's specialization not being in the field of
anesthesiology, it would be dangerous for him to
 In malpractice cases, the doctrine is generally
substitute his judgment for Dr. Jabagat's decisions in
restricted to situations where a layman is able to say,
matters that fall appropriately within the scope of Dr.
as a matter of common knowledge and observation,
Jabagat's expertise.
that the consequences of professional care were not
as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care
had been exercised. In other words, as held in Ramos
v. Court of Appeals, the real question is whether or not
in the process of the operation, any extraordinary
incident or unusual event outside of the routine
performance occurred which is beyond the regular
scope of professional activity in such operations, and
which, if unexplained, would themselves reasonably
speak to the average man as the negligent cause or
causes of the untoward consequence.
 Petitioners failed to present substantial proof that
intubation was an indispensable prerequisite for the
operation and that it would be grave error for any
surgeon to continue with the operation under such
circumstances. In fact, the testimony of the expert
witness presented by the prosecution in the criminal
proceedings and admitted into evidence at the RTC,
was even to the effect that the anesthesia could be
administered by alternative means such as a mask
and that the operation could proceed even without
intubation.
 The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere
existence of an injury to justify a presumption of
negligence on the part of the person who controls the
instrument causing the injury, provided that the G.R. No. 180440 December 5, 2012
following requisites concur:
HUANG vs. PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS, INC
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does
PEREZ, J.:
not occur in the absence of someone's
negligence: FACTS:
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the  Delia Goldberg (Delia), a registered guest of Dusit
exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; Hotel, invited her friend, petitioner Dr. Genevieve L.
and Huang, for a swim at the hotel’s swimming pool
facility.
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which
would make the plaintiff responsible is  At around 7:00 p.m., the hotel’s swimming pool
eliminated. attendant informed them that the swimming pool
area was about to be closed. The two subsequently
 Here, the respondent could only supervise Dr. Jabagat
proceeded to the shower room adjacent to the
to make sure that he was performing his duties. But
swimming pool to take a shower and dress up.
respondent could not dictate upon Dr. Jabagat the
However, when they came out of the bathroom, the
particular anesthesia to administer, the dosage
entire swimming pool area was already pitch black
thereof, or that it be administered in any particular
6|C h e - a n
 and there was no longer any person around and the
door was locked.
 After some time, petitioner saw a phone behind the
lifeguard’s counter. While slowly walking towards the
phone, a hard and heavy object, which later turned
out to be the folding wooden counter top, fell on
petitioner’s head that knocked her down almost
unconscious.
 Delia immediately got hold of the house phone and
notified the hotel telephone operator of the incident.
Not long after, the hotel staff arrived at the main
entrance door of the swimming pool area, assisted
petitioner by placing an ice pack and applying some
ointment on her head. Petitioner demanded the
services of the hotel physician.
 Dr. Violeta Dalumpines arrived. She approached
petitioner and introduced herself as the hotel
physician. However, instead of immediately providing
the needed medical assistance, Dr. Dalumpines
presented a "Waiver" and demanded that it be signed
by petitioner, which the latter refused to do.
 Petitioner claimed that her MRI result clearly showed
that her head was bruised. Based also on the same
MRI result, Dr. Noble told her that she has a very
serious brain injury.
ISSUE:
WON it is respondents PHI and DTPCI and its
employees who are liable to the petitioner for
negligence, applying the well-established doctrines of
res ipsa loquitur and respondeat superior.
HELD: NO
 This Court finds it significant to take note of the
following differences between quasi-delict (culpa
aquilina) and breach of contract (culpa contractual).
In quasi-delict, negligence is direct, substantive and
independent, while in breach of contract, negligence
is merely incidental to the performance of the
contractual obligation; there is a pre-existing contract
or obligation. In quasi-delict, the defense of "good
father of a family" is a complete and proper defense
insofar as parents, guardians and employers are
concerned, while in breach of contract, such is not a
complete and proper defense in the selection and
supervision of employees. In quasi- delict, there is no
presumption of negligence and it is incumbent upon when direct evidence is lacking. Simply stated, this
the injured party to prove the negligence of the doctrine finds no application if there is direct proof of
defendant, otherwise, the former’s complaint will be absence or presence of negligence. If there is
dismissed, while in breach of contract, negligence is sufficient proof showing the conditions and
presumed so long as it can be proved that there was circumstances under which the injury occurred, then
breach of the contract and the burden is on the the creative reason for the said doctrine disappears.
defendant to prove that there was no negligence in
the carrying out of the terms of the contract; the rule  Further, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies
where, (1) the accident was of such character as to
of respondeat superior is followed.
warrant an inference that it would not have
 As petitioner’s cause of action is based on quasi-delict, happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2)
it is incumbent upon her to prove the presence of the the accident must have been caused by an agency or
following requisites before respondents PHI and instrumentality within the exclusive management or
DTPCI can be held liable, to wit: (a) damages suffered control of the person charged with the negligence
by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the complained of; and (3) the accident must not have
defendant, or some other person for whose acts he been due to any voluntary action or contribution on
must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and the part of the person injured.
effect between the fault or negligence of the
 In her open court testimony, particularly during
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
cross-examination, petitioner confirmed that she
Further, since petitioner’s case is for quasi-delict , the
made such statement that "she lifted the hinge
negligence or fault should be clearly established as it
massive wooden section of the counter near the
is the basis of her action. The burden of proof is upon
petitioner. Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court swimming pool." In view thereof, this Court cannot
acquiesce petitioner’s theory that her case is one of
provides that "burden of proof is the duty of a party
res ipsa loquitur as it was sufficiently established
to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
how petitioner obtained that "bukol" or "hematoma."
establish his claim or defense by the amount of
evidence required by law." It is then up for the  The doctrine of respondeat superior finds no
plaintiff to establish his cause of action or the application in the absence of any showing that the
defendant to establish his defense. Therefore, if the employees of respondents PHI and DTPCI were
plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was damaged negligent. Since in this case, the trial court and the
because of the negligent acts of the defendant, he has appellate court found no negligence on the part of the
the burden of proving such negligence. It is even employees of respondents PHI and DTPCI, thus, the
presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his latter cannot also be held liable for negligence and be
concerns. The quantum of proof required is made to pay the millions of pesos damages prayed for
preponderance of evidence. by petitioner.
 In this case, as found by the trial court and affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, petitioner utterly failed to
prove the alleged negligence of respondents PHI and
DTPCI. Moreover, petitioner’s aforesaid allegations
were successfully rebutted by respondents PHI and
DTPCI.
 Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally
means "the thing or the transaction speaks for itself."
It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an
inference to the cause thereof or establishes the
plaintiff’s prima facie case. The doctrine rests on
inference and not on presumption. The facts of the
occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and
they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence
7|C h e - a n

 The abdominal pains and fever kept on recurring and
 When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas
 Considering that we have assessed Dr. Kho to be a
 As such, the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore.
G.R. No. 118231 July 5, 1996
BATIQUIN vs. CA
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS:
 Dr. Batiquin was a Resident Physician at the Negros
Oriental Provincial Hospital, with the assistance of Dr.
Doris Teresita Sy, performed a simple cesarean
section on Mrs. Villegas at the same hospital and after
45 minutes Mrs. Villegas delivered her first child,
Rachel Acogido, at about 11:45 that morning.
 Soon after leaving the Hospital Mrs. Villegas began to
suffer abdominal pains and complained of being
feverish. She also gradually lost her appetite, so she
consulted Dr. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who
prescribed for her certain medicines . . . which she
had been taking up to December, 1988.
bothered Mrs. Villegas no end and despite the
medications administered by Dr. Batiquin. When the
pains become unbearable and she was rapidly losing
weight she consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho at the Holy
Child's Hospital. The result of all those examinations
impelled Dr. Kho to suggest that Mrs. Villegas submit
to another surgery to which the latter agreed.
she found whitish-yellow discharge inside, an ovarian
cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave
out pus, dirt and pus behind the uterus, and a piece of
rubber materials on the right side of the uterus
embedded on [sic] the ovarian cyst, 2 inches by 3/4
inch in size. This piece of rubber material which Dr.
Kho described as a "foreign body" looked like a piece
of a "rubber glove" . . . and which is [sic] also "rubber-
drain like” . . . . It could have been a torn section of a
surgeon's gloves or could have come from other
sources. And this foreign body was the cause of the
infection of the ovaries and consequently of all the
discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas after her
delivery.
credible witness, her positive testimony [that a piece
of rubber was indeed found in private respondent
Villegas' abdomen] prevails over the negative
testimony in favor of the petitioners.
This Court has had occasion to delve into the nature
and operation of this doctrine:
This doctrine res ipsa loquitur is stated thus:
"Where the thing which causes injury is shown
to be under the management of the defendant,
and the accident is such as in the ordinary course
of things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an
explanation by the defendant, that the accident
arose from want of care." Or as Black's Law
Dictionary puts it:
Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself.
Rebuttable presumption or inference that
defendant was negligent, which arises upon
proof that [the] instrumentality causing injury
was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the
accident was one which ordinary does not
happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa
loquitur is [a] rule of evidence whereby
negligence of [the] alleged wrongdoer may be
inferred from [the] mere fact that [the] accident
happened provided [the] character of [the]
accident and circumstances attending it lead
reasonably to belief that in [the] absence of
negligence it would not have occurred and that
thing which caused injury is shown to have been
under [the] management and control of [the]
alleged wrongdoer . . . . Under [this] doctrine . . .
the happening of an injury permits an inference
of negligence where plaintiff produces
substantial evidence that [the] injury was caused
by an agency or instrumentality under [the]
exclusive control and management of defendant,
and that the occurrence [sic] was such that in the
ordinary course of things would not happen if
reasonable care had been used.
xxx xxx xxx
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of
evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence
which recognizes that prima facie negligence
may be established without direct proof and
furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of
substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a
mere procedural convenience. The rule, when
applicable to the facts and circumstances of a
particular case, is not intended to and does not
dispense with the requirement of proof of
culpable negligence on the party charged. It
merely determines and regulates what shall be
prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the
burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the
duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked
when and only when, under the circumstances
involved, direct evidence is absent and not
readily available.
 In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to
the doctrine are present. First, the entire proceedings
of the cesarean section were under the exclusive
control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the private
respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the
actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object
finding its way into private respondent Villegas' body,
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 which, needless to say, does not occur unless through
the intervention of negligence. Second, since aside
from the cesarean section, private respondent
Villegas underwent no other operation which could
have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear
in her uterus, it stands to reason that such could only
have been a by-product of the cesarean section
performed by Dr. Batiquin. The petitioners, in this
regard, failed to overcome the presumption of
negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for
negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in private
respondent Villegas' abdomen and for all the adverse
effects thereof.
G.R. No. 156037 May 25, 2007
MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION vs BAKING
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS:
 Sebastian M. Baking, respondent, went to the clinic of
Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up. Dr. Sy found that
respondent’s blood sugar and triglyceride were above
normal levels. Dr. Sy then gave respondent two
medical prescriptions – Diamicron for his blood sugar
and Benalize tablets for his triglyceride.
 Respondent then proceeded to petitioner Mercury
Drug Corporation to buy the prescribed medicines.
However, the saleslady misread the prescription for
Diamicron as a prescription for Dormicum. Thus, have verified whether the medicine she gave
what was sold to respondent was Dormicum, a potent respondent was indeed the one prescribed by his
sleeping tablet. physician. The care required must be commensurate
with the danger involved, and the skill employed
 Unaware that what was given to him was the wrong
must correspond with the superior knowledge of the
medicine, respondent took one pill of Dormicum on
business which the law demands.
three consecutive days.
 Proximate cause is defined as any cause that
 On the third day he took the medicine, respondent produces injury in a natural and continuous
figured in a vehicular accident. The car he was
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
driving collided with the car of one Josie Peralta.
cause, such that the result would not have occurred
Respondent fell asleep while driving.
otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the
 Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a bearing facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of
on his physical and mental state at the time of the logic, common sense, policy, and precedent.
collision, respondent returned to Dr. Sy’s clinic.
 Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred
Upon being shown the medicine, Dr. Sy was shocked
had petitioner’s employee been careful in reading Dr.
to find that what was sold to respondent was
Sy’s prescription. Without the potent effects of
Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron.
Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that
respondent would fall asleep while driving his car,
ISSUE: resulting in a collision.
Whether petitioner was negligent, and if such  It is thus clear that the employer of a negligent
negligence was the proximate cause of respondent’s employee is liable for the damages caused by the
accident latter. When an injury is caused by the negligence of
an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of
HELD: YES the law that there has been negligence on the part of
 To sustain a claim based on Art 2176 of the Civil the employer, either in the selection of his employee
Code, the following requisites must concur: or in the supervision over him, after such selection.
The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a
a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; clear showing on the part of the employer that he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and,
family in the selection and supervision of his
c) connection of cause and effect between the fault employee. Here, petitioner's failure to prove that it
or negligence of the defendant and the damage exercised the due diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of its
incurred by the plaintiff.
employee will make it solidarily liable for damages
 It is generally recognized that the drugstore business caused by the latter.
is imbued with public interest. The health and safety
of the people will be put into jeopardy if drugstore
employees will not exercise the highest degree of care
and diligence in selling medicines. Inasmuch as the
matter of negligence is a question of fact, we defer to
the findings of the trial court affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
 Obviously, petitioner’s employee was grossly
negligent in selling to respondent Dormicum, instead
of the prescribed Diamicron. Considering that a fatal
mistake could be a matter of life and death for a
buying patient, the said employee should have been
very cautious in dispensing medicines. She should
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