THE FAMILY CODE
209 is hereby amended to read as follows:
The Family Code of the
Philippines (Executive Order no. 209) was
signed into law by then President Corazon
Aquino on July 6, 1987. The basic law covering
persons and family relations governs
marriages, legal separations, property relations
between spouses, and parental authority,
among others.
Under Executive Order No. 209 also known
as the Family Code of the Philippines, Article
37 and 38, incestuous marriages are void ab
initio for being contrary to public policy. ... This
bill criminalizes such sexual relations because
they are contrary to public morals and public
policy.
Accordingly, "The Family Code of the
Philippines" should have taken effect as of
August 3, 1988 (People vs. Ramos, No. L-
25265, May 9, 1978), instead of on August 5,
1988, as was inadvertently declared in a
Certification dated October 7, 1988
Executive order 227
AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE “FAMILY
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES”
I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the
Philippines, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. Article 26 of Executive Order No.
209 is hereby amended to read as follows:
“Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized,
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”
SECTION 2. Article 36 of Executive Order No.
“Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.”
SECTION 3. Article 39 of the Executive Order
No. 209 is hereby amended to read as follows:
“Art. 39. The action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage
shall not prescribe. However, in the case of
marriages celebrated before the effectivity of
this Code and falling under Article 36, such
action or defense shall prescribe in ten years
after this Code shall have taken effect.”
SECTION 4. This Executive Order shall take
effect upon the effectivity of the Family Code of
the Philippines.
Done in the City of Manila, this 17th day of
July, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and eighty-seven
REPUBLIC ACT 6809] AN ACT LOWERING
THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-
ONE TO EIGHTEEN YEARS, AMENDING
FOR THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE ORDER
NUMBERED TWO HUNDRED NINE, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
SECTION 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No.
209, the Family Code of the Philippines, is
hereby amended to read as follows: “ART. 234.
Emancipation takes place by the attainment of
majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority
commences at the age of eighteen years.”
SEC. 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code
are hereby repealed.
SEC. 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also
hereby amended to read as follows: “ART. 236.
Emancipation shall terminate parental authority
over the person and property of the child who
shall then be qualified and responsible for all
1
acts of civil life, save the exceptions
established by existing laws in special cases.
“Contracting marriage shall require parental
consent until the age of twenty-one. “Nothing in
this Code shall be construed to derogate from
the duty or responsibility of parents and
guardians for children and wards below twenty-
one years of age mentioned in the second and
third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code.”
Republic Act 7160 –Local Government Code
REPEAL AND AMMENDMENT
Chapter 4. Other Matters Subject to Summary
Proceedings
Art. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and
3 hereof shall likewise govern summary
proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73,
96, 124 and 127, insofar as they are
applicable.
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY
*Hermosisisima, Wassmer, Tanjanco, Baksh
R. No. L-8166 February 8, 1916
JORGE DOMALAGAN, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CARLOS BOLIFER, defendant-appellant.
-November, 1909, he and the defendant
entered into a contract by virtue of the terms of
which he was to pay to the defendant the sum
of P500 upon the marriage of his son
CiprianoDomalagan with the daughter of the
defendant, BonifaciaBolifer, together with the
further sum of P16 "as hansel or token of future
marriage," that, notwithstanding said
agreement,
- the said Bonifaciabolifer, in the month of
August, 1910, was joined in lawful wedlock to
LaureanoSisi;
-paragraph 5 of said section (335). A contract
may be a perfectly valid contract even though it
is not clothed with the necessary form. If it is
not made in confirmity with said section of
course it cannot be proved, if proper objection
is made.
-endered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant in said sum of P516
together with the interest at the rate of 6 per
cent from the 17th of December, 1910, and
costs (350).
FELIPE CABAGUE and GERONIMO
CABAGUE, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MATIAS AUXILIO and SOCORRO AUXILIO,
defendants-appellees.
November 26, 1952
Basud, Camarines Norte, Felipe Cabague and
his son Geronimo sued the defendant Matias
Auxilio and his daughter Socorro to recover
damages resulting from defendants' refusal to
carry out the previously agreed marriage
between Socorro and Geronimo.
improve the defendants' house in Basud and
spend for the wedding feast and the needs of
the bride; (b) that relying upon such promises
plaintiffs made the improvement and spent
P700; and (c) that without cause defendants
refused to honor their pledged word.
arguing that the contract was oral,
unenforceable under the rule of evidence
hereinbefore mentioned. And the court
dismissed the case.
There is no question here that the transaction
was not in writing. The only issue is whether it
may be proved in court.
Consequently, we declare that Geronimo may
continue his action against Socorro for such
damages as may have resulted from her failure
to carry out their mutual matrimonial promises.
Wherefore this expediente will be returned to
the lower court for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion. So ordered.
REQUISITES
NOT SUBJECT TO STIPULATION
*Panganiban, Santiago, Selanova
G.R. No. 80965 June 6, 1990
SYLVIA LICHAUCO DE LEON, petitioner,
vs.
2
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MACARIA
DE LEON AND JOSE VICENTE DE LEON,
respondents.
On October 18, 1969, private respondent Jose
Vicente De Leon and petitioner Sylvia Lichauco
De Leon were united in wedlock
October, 1972, a de facto separation between
the spouses occured due to irreconcilable
marital differences, with Sylvia leaving the
conjugal home. Sometime in March, 1973,
Sylvia went to the United States where she
obtained American citizenship.
On November 23, 1973, Sylvia filed with the
Superior Court of California, County of San
Francisco, a petition for dissolution of marriage
against Jose Vicente.
that since Jose Vicente was then a Philippine
resident and did not have any assets in the
United States, Sylvia chose to hold in
abeyance the divorce proceedings, and in the
meantime, concentrated her efforts to obtain
some sort of property settlements with Jose
Vicente in the
March 16, 1977, Sylvia succeeded in entering
into a Letter-Agreement with her mother-in-law,
private respondent Macaria De Leon.
Since the Letter-Agreement was repudiated
before the purpose has been accomplished
and to adhere to the pari delicto rule in this
case is to put a premium to the circumvention
of the laws, positive relief should be granted to
Macaria. Justice would be served by allowing
her to be placed in the position in which she
was before the transaction was entered into.
With the conclusions thus reached, We find it
unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby
DENIED. The decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals dated June 30, 1987 and its
resolution dated November 24, 1987 are
AFFIRMED.
REQUISITES
G.R. No. L-16925 March 31, 1962
FABIAN PUGEDA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAPAEL TRIAS, MIGUEL TRIAS, SOLEDAD
TRIAS, assisted by her husband Angel
Sanchez,
CLARA TRIAS, assisted by her husband
Victoriano Salvanera,
GABRIEL TRIAS, minors ROMULO
VINIEGRA, GLORIA VINIEGRA
and FERNANDO VINIEGRA, JR., assisted by
guardian-ad-litem, Rafael Trias,
TEOFILO PUGEDA, and VIRGINIA PUGEDA,
assisted by her husband Ramon
Portugal, defendants-appellants.
-The subject of this action, which was appealed
from the Court of First Instance of Cavite, is
certain lands acquired from the Friar Lands
Estate Administration
- The plaintiff claims participation in the said
properties on the ground that the same were
acquired by him and the deceased Maria C.
Ferrer, with whom plaintiff contracted marriage
in January, 1916 and who died on February 11,
1934.
The defendants Rafael, Miguel, Soledad,
Clara, Constancia and Gabriel, all surnamed
Trias are the children of the deceased Maria C.
Ferrer with her first husband Mariano Trias,
while the defendants Teofilo Pugeda and
Virginia Pugeda are children of the plaintiff with
said deceased Maria C. Ferrer.
- Defendants Trias also denied for lack of
knowledge and belief the claim of plaintiff in his
complaint that he was married to Maria C.
Ferrer and that the marriage continued up to
the death of the latter in 1934. They further
presented a counterclaim against the plaintiff
for the sum of P40,000, this amount being what
was contributed by them in support of the
candidacies of plaintiff when running for the
office of provincial governor of Cavite.
- There are two questions or issues raised in
the present case. The first is the alleged
existence of a marriage of Fabian Pugeda and
Maria C. Ferrer. The second is the claim of the
3
plaintiff to various lands acquired from the Friar
Lands Estate
- On the first issue, the existence of marriage,
plaintiff and his witness Ricardo Ricafrente
testified that in the afternoon of January 5,
1916, on the eve of Epiphany or Three Kings,
that after the usual ceremony Ricafrente asked
the parties to sign two copies of a marriage
contract, and after the witnesses had signed
the same. Plaintiff and his witnesses explained
that no celebration of the marriage was held
inspite of the prominence of the contracting
parties because plaintiff was then busy
campaigning for the office of Member of the
Provincial Board and Maria C. Ferrer was
already on the family way.
- The baptismal certificate submitted states that
the baptized child was the issue of the spouses
Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer. The
registry of said birth was also submitted and it
states that the father is Fabian Pugeda and the
mother is Maria C. Ferrer. It is also not denied
that after the marriage, plaintiff cohabited with
the deceased wife, as husband and wife, until
the death of the latter, publicly and openly as
husband and wife.
- The judge who heard the evidence, after a
review of he testimonial and documental
evidence, arrived at the conclusion that plaintiff
Fabian Pugeda was in fact married to Maria C.
Ferrer on January 5, 1916, as well as by the
fact that plaintiff and deceased Maria C. Ferrer
lived together as husband and wife for eighteen
years (1916-1934) and there is a strong
presumption that they were actually married.
- Testimony by one of the parties to the
marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the
marriage and the person who officiated the
marriage.
- The pendency of the above intestate
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
Mariano Trias must have been known to
plaintiff Fabian Pugeda, who is a lawyer. It
does not appear, and neither does he claim or
allege, that he ever appeared in said
proceedings to claim participation in the
properties subject of the proceedings. His
failure to intervene in the proceedings to claim
that the friar lands or some of them belonged to
himself and his wife Maria C. Ferrer, shows a
conviction on his part that the said friar lands
actually belonged to the spouses Mariano Trias
and Maria C. Ferrer, and that he had no
interest therein
- FOR ALL THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the plaintiff's complaint is
hereby dismissed, and the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Cavite, Hon. Antonio
C. Lucero, presiding, decreeing the division of
the properties of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer
among her eight children and plaintiff, is hereby
modified in the sense that all of her properties
be divided among her eight children at the rate
of one-eight per child. As thus modified, the
judgment of Judge Lucero is hereby affirmed
SOLEMNIZING OFFICER
*Villar v Paraiso and Aranes v Occiano
MARRIAGE CEREMONY
G.R. No. L-4904 February 5, 1909
ROSALIA MARTINEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ANGEL TAN, defendant-appellee.
- the only question in this case is whether or
not the plaintiff and the defendant were married
on the 25th day of September, 1907, before the
justice of the peace, Jose Ballori, in the town of
Palompon in the Province of Leyte.
- The court below decided the case in favor of
the defendant, holding that the parties were
legally married on the day named. The
evidence in support of that decision is: First.
The document itself, which the plaintiff admits
that she signed. Second. The evidence of the
defendant, who testifies that he and said
plaintiff appeared before the justice of the
peace at the time named, together with the
witness Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori,
and that they all signed the document above
mentioned. Third. The evidence of Zacarias
4
Esmero, one of the above-named witnesses,
who testifies that the plaintiff, the defendant,
and Pacita Ballori appeared before the justice
at the time named and did sign the document
referred to. Fourth. The evidence of Pacita
Ballori, who testified to the same effect. Fifth.
The evidence of Jose Santiago, the bailiff of
the court of the justice of the peace, who
testified that the plaintiff, the defendant, the two
witnesses above-named, and the justice of the
peace were all present in the office of the
justice of the peace at the time mentioned
- only direct evidence in favor of the plaintiff is
her own testimony that she never appeared
before the justice of the peace and never was
married to the defendant. She admits that she
signed the document in question, but says that
she signed it in her own home, without reading
it
- She says that at the request of the defendant
on the day named, about 5 o'clock in the
afternoon, she went to the store of a Chinese
named Veles; that there she met the plaintiff
and her mother; that she asked the mother of
the plaintiff to allow the plaintiff to accompany
her, the witness, to her own house for the
purpose of examining some dress patterns;
that the mother gave her consent and the two
rights left the store, but instead of going to the
house of the witness they went directly to the
office of the justice of the peace where the
ceremony took place
- The plaintiff admits that she wrote letters
numbered 2 and 9. The authenticity of the
others was proven. No. 9 is as follows:
ANGEL: Up to this time I did not see my
father; but I know that he is very angry
and if he be informed that we have been
married civilly, I am sure that he will turn
me out of the house.
- Letter No. 6, which bears no date, but which
undoubtedly was written on the morning of the
25th of September, is as follows:
Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.
ANGEL: It is impossible for me to go to
the house of Veles this morning
because my sister in law will not let me
go there; if it suits you, I believe that this
afternoon, about 5 or 6 o'clock, is the
best hour.
Arrange everything, as I shall go there
only for the purpose of signing, and
have Pacita wait for me at the Chinese
store, because I don't like to go without
Pacita
- Don't tell her that we have been civilly
married, but tell her at first that you are
willing to celebrate the marriage at this
time,
- General orders, No. 68, section 6, is as
follows:
No particular form from the ceremony of
marriage is required, but the parties
must declare in the presence of the
person solemnizing the marriage, that
they take each other as husband and
wife.
- plaintiff and the defendant were able to read
and write the Spanish language, and that they
knew the contents of the document which they
signed; and under the circumstances in this
particular case were satisfied, and so hold, that
what took place before the justice of the peace
on this occasion amounted to a legal marriage.
PLACE AND MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE
G.R. No. L-32473 October 6, 1930
MELECIO MADRIDEJO, assisted by his
guardian ad litem, Pedro Madridejo, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
GONZALO DE LEON, ET AL., defendants-
appellants.
- In support of their appeal the defendants
assign the following alleged errors as
committed by the trial court, to wit:
5
1. The lower court erred in holding that the
marriage between Pedro Madridejo and
Flaviana Perez is valid.
- the mere fact that the parish priest of Siniloan,
Laguna, who married Pedro Madridejo and
Flaviana Perez, failed to send a copy of the
marriage certificate to the municipal secretary
does not invalidate the marriage in articulo
mortis
2. The lower court also erred in declaring that
solely because of the subsequent marriage of
his parents, the appellee Melecio Madridejo, a
natural child, was legitimated.
- there has been no attempt to deny that
Melecio Madridejo, the plaintiff-appellee, is the
natural son of the Pedro Madridejo and
Flaviana Perez, The only question to be
decided is whether the subsequent marriage of
his parents legitimated him.
Article 121 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 121. Children shall be considered as
legitimated by a subsequent marriage
only when they have been
acknowledged by the parents before or
after the celebration thereof.
Melecio Madridejo, then, was not voluntarily
acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo or Flaviana
Perez, either before or after their
marriage. 1awph!l.net
- Did Pedro Madridejo acknowledge Melecio
Madridejo as his son, by compulsion?
The compulsory acknowledgment by the father
established in article 135 of the Civil Code, and
by the mother according to article 136, requires
that the natural child take judicial action against
the father or mother, or against the persons
setting themselves up as the heirs of both, for
the purpose of compelling them to
acknowledge him as a natural son through a
judgment of the court.
In the instant action brought by Melecio
Madridejo not only has he not demanded to be
acknowledged as a natural child, which is the
condition precedent to establishing his
legitimation by the subsequent marriage and
his right to the estate of his uterine brother,
Domingo de Leon, but he has not even
impleaded either his father Pedro Madridejo, or
the heirs of his mother, Flaviana Perez, in
order that the court might have authority to
make a valid and effective pronouncement of
his being a natural child, and to compel them to
acknowledge him as such.
3. The lower court lastly erred in not rendering
judgment in favor of the defendants and
appellants.
- in view of the foregoing, it is evident that
Melecio Madridejo has not been acknowledged
by Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, either
voluntarily or by compulsion, before or after
their marriage, and therefore said marriage did
not legitimate him
MARRIAGE LICENSE
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, Petitioner,
vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC,
Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
- may 21,1966 Complainant avers that she was
the lawful wife of the late David Manzano,
On 22 March 1993, however, her husband
contracted another marriage with one
Luzviminda Payao before respondent
Judge.Hhe knew or ought to know that the
same was void and bigamous, as the marriage
contract clearly stated that both contracting
parties were "separated."
-May 21,For this act, complainant Herminia
Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with
gross ignorance of the law in a sworn
Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the
Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
- Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims
in his Comment that when he officiated the
marriage between Manzano and Payao he did
not know that Manzano was legally married.
6
- the Court Administrator recommended that
respondent Judge be found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a
fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition
of the same or similar act would be dealt with
more severely
- On 25 October 2000, this Court required the
parties to manifest whether they were willing to
submit the case for resolution o
- David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
expressly stated that they were married to
Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos,
respectively
- Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage
of a man and a woman who have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and
without any legal impediment to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths.
The solemnizing officer shall also state under
oath that he ascertained the qualifications of
the contracting parties and found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
- ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the
Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with
the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to
be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque
Sanchez is increased to P20,000.
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as
Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE
NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL &
PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
- May the heirs of a deceased person file a
petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage after his death?
- Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa
Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners.
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her
death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8
months thereafter or on December 11, 1986,
Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license
- On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their father's death, petitioners
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the
said marriage was void for lack of a marriage
license.
- Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional
Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissed the petition after finding that the
Family Code is "rather silent, obscure,
insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a
cause of action against defendant in
asking for the declaration of the nullity of
marriage of their deceased father,
Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so
when at the time of the filing of this
instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal
is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage
of plaintiffs' deceased father with
defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are
estopped from assailing the validity of
the second marriage after it was
dissolved due to their father's death.
- valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab
initio
-exemption: 5 years cohabitation. But Pepito
had a subsisting marriage at the time when he
started cohabiting with respondent.
- A marriage that is annulable is valid until
otherwise declared by the court; whereas a
7
marriage that is void ab initio is considered as
having never to have taken place. oid
marriages can be questioned even after the
death of either party but voidable marriages
can be assailed only during the lifetime of the
parties and not after death of either.
- WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil
Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The said case is ordered
REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt.
PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE
G.R. No. L-28248 March 12, 1975
LEONORA PERIDO, joined by husband
MANUEL PIROTE, INOCENCIA PERIDO,
ALBENIO PERIDO, PAULINO PERIDO,
LETIA PERIDO, joined by husband
BIENVENIDO BALYAO, LETICIA PERIDO,
joined by husband FELIX VILLARUZ,
EUFEMIA PERIDO, CONSOLACION
PERIDO, ALFREDO PERIDO, GEORGE
PERIDO, AMPARO PERIDO, WILFREDO
PERIDO, MARGARITA PERIDO, ROLANDO
SALDE and EDUARDO SALDE, petitioners,
vs.
MARIA PERIDO, SOFRONIO PERIDO, JUAN
A. PERIDO, GONZALO PERIDO, PACITA
PERIDO, MAGDALENA PERIDO, ALICIA
PERIDO, JOSEFINA PERIDO, FE PERIDO,
TERESA PERIDO and LUZ
PERIDO, respondents.
Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros
Occidental, married twice during his lifetime.
His first wife was Benita Talorong, with whom
he begot three (3) children: Felix, Ismael, and
Margarita. After Benita died Lucio married
MarcelinaBaliguat, with whom he had five (5)
children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and
Gonzalo. Lucio himself died in 1942, while his
second wife died in 1943.
On August 15, 1960 the children and
grandchildren of the first and second marriages
of Lucio Perido executed a document
denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and
Extra-judicial Partition," whereby they
partitioned among themselves Lots Nos. 458,
471, 506, 511, 509, 513-B, 807, and 808, all of
the Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan,
Occidental Negros.
1st marriage: They alleged, among other
things, that they had been induced by the
defendants to execute the document in
question through misrepresentation, false
promises and fraudulent means; that the lots
which were partitioned in said document
belonged to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong,
and that the five children of Lucio Perido with
MarcelinaBaliguat were all illegitimate and
therefore had no successional rights to the
estate of Lucio Perido, who died in 1942. The
defendants denied the foregoing allegations.
After trial the lower court rendered its decision
dated July 31, 1965, annulling the "Declaration
of Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition."
However, it did not order the partition of the lots
involved among the plaintiffs exclusively in
view of its findings that the five children of
Lucio Perido with his second wife,
MarcelinaBaliguat, were legitimate; that all the
lots, except Lot No. 458, were the exclusive
properties of Lucio Perido; and that 11/12 of
Lot No. 458 belonged to the conjugal
partnership of Lucio Perido and his second
wife, MarcelinaBaliguat.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals,
alleging that the trial court erred: (1) in
declaring that EusebioPerido, Juan Perido,
Maria Perido, SofroniaPerido and Gonzalo
Perido, were the legitimate children of Lucio
Perido and his second wife, MarcelinaBaliguat;
(2) in declaring that Lucio Perido was the
exclusive owner of Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511,
509, 513-Part, 807, and 808 of Cadastral
Survey of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental,
and in not declaring that said lots were the
conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido
and his first wife, Benita Talorong; and (3) in
holding that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal
partnership property of Lucio Perido and
MarcelinaBaliguat.
8
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the petitioners.
DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE
BENJAMIN P. ABELLA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ADELINA Y. LARRAZABAL, respondents.
G.R. No. 100739 September 3, 1991
ADELINA Y. LARRAZABAL, petitioner,
vs.
COMMSSION ON ELECTIONS and
SILVESTRE DE LA CRUZ, respondents.
who is the rightful governor of the province of
Leyte 1) petitioner AdelinaLarrazabal (PDP-
Laban) (G.R. No. 100739) who obtained the
highest number of votes in the local elections
of February 1, 1988 and was proclaimed as the
duly elected governor but who was later
declared by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) "... to lack both residence and
registration qualifications for the position of
Governor of Leyte as provided by Art. X,
Section 12,
petitioner Benjamin Abella (Liberal Party), who
obtained the second highest number of votes
for the position of governor but was not allowed
by the COMELEC to be proclaimed as
governor after the disqualification of
Larrazabal; or 3) Leopoldo E. Petilla, the vice-
governor of the province of. Leyte.
On January 31, 1988, the day before the
election, she filed her own certificate of
candidacy in substitution of her husband. (Ibid.,
p. 48) The following day, at about 9:30 o'clock
in the morning, Silvestre de la Cruz, a
registered voter of Tacloban City, filed a
petition with the provincial election supervisor
of Leyte to disqualify her for alleged false
statements in her certificate of candidacy
regarding her residence. (
On February 14, 1991, the second division in a
2-1 vote rendered a decision disqualifying
Larrazabal as governor.
Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte
on the ground that she misrepresented her
residence in her certificate of candidacy as
Kananga, Leyte. It was alleged that she was in
fact a resident of Ormoc City like her husband
who was earlier disqualified from running for
the same office
two (2) legal issues raised by Silvestre T. de la
Cruz namely, Larrazabal's lack of legal
residence in the province of Leyte and her not
being a registered voter in the province
COMELEC found that petitioner Larrazabal
was neither a resident of Kananga, Leyte nor a
registered voter there
Appeals: NIMUS REVERTENDI evidenced by
her continuous and regular acts of returning
there in the course of the years, although she
had physically resided at Ormoc City."
But Her attempt to purportedly change her
residence one year before the election by
registering at Kananga, Leyte to qualify her to
ran for the position of governor of the province
of Leyte clearly shows that she considers
herself already a resident of Ormoc
testimony of Adolfo Larrazabalreenforces this
conclusion. It admits, as of the second or third
week of November, that the residence of
EmeterioLarrazabal was Ormoc City and that
IndayLarrazabal was going to transfer her
registration so she may be able to vote for him.
Civil Code is clear that '[F]or the exercise of
civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations,
the domicile of natural persons is the place of
their habitual residence.
There is no evidence to prove that the
petitioner temporarily left her residence in
Kananga, Leyte in 1975 to pursue any calling,
profession or business.
There is no evidence to prove that the
petitioner temporarily left her residence in
Kananga, Leyte in 1975 to pursue any calling,
profession or business.
most telling evidence is the list of voters (Form
2-A), Exh. "G", that the Chairman and the poll
clerk had written in Part II of the same, closed
by the signatures of both officials showing that
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there were only nine (9) additional registered
voters in Precinct 17, Mahawan, Kananga,
Leyte,
was only on February 15, 1988, or two weeks
after the election day that the same Registrar
certified for the first time that there were two
voters lists, the first without the names of the
Larrazabals and the second, which appeared
only after February 1, submitted by the
Chairman of the Board for Precinct 17 which
contained the spouses Larrazabals' names.
Section 12, Article X of the Constitution
provides:
Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined
by law, and component cities whose charters
prohibit their voters from voting for provincial
elective officials, shall be independent of the
province
Section 89 of Republic Act No. 179 creating the
City of Ormoc provides:
Election of provincial governor and members of
the Provincial Board of the members of the
Provincial Board of the Province of Leyte —
The qualified voters of Ormoc City shall not be
qualified and entitled to vote in the election of
the provincial governor and the members of the
provincial board of the Province of Leyte.
9 to section 12, Article X of the Constitution
one comes up with the following conclusion:
that Ormoc City when organized was not yet a
highly-urbanned city
We agree with the COMELEC en banc that
"the phrase 'shall not be qualified and entitled
to vote in the election of the provincial governor
and the members of the provincial board of the
Province of Leyte' connotes two prohibitions —
one, from running for and the second, from
voting for any provincial elective official."
Finally, the petitioner contends that the
February 14, 1991 decision of the COMELEC's
second division is null and void on the ground
that on that date, the term of Commissioner
Andres Flores, one of the signatories of the
majority opinion (vote was 2-1) had already
expired on February 2, 1991.
Andres Flores, his term expired on February 2,
1991 to enable a faithful compliance with the
constitutional provision that the terms of office
in the COMELEC are on a staggered basis
commencing and ending at fixed intervals, his
continuance in office until February 15, 1991
has a color of validity.
Abella claim: Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes case for
him shall not be counted.
the votes cast in favor of Larrazabal who
obtained the highest number of votes are not
considered counted making her a non-
candidate, he, who obtained the second
highest number of votes should be installed as
regular Governor of Leyte in accordance with
the Court's ruling
Decision:notpursuasive
The simple reason is that as he obtained only
the second highest number of votes in the
election, he was obviously not the choice of the
people of Baguio City.
hose who have received the highest number of
votes cast in the election for that office, and it is
a fundamental idea in all republican forms of
government
In sum, the Court does not find any reason to
reverse and set aside the questioned decision
and resolution of the COMELEC. The
COMELEC has not acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion
10