UKCEU-PTGWO versus KIMBERLY – CLARK PHILS DIGEST

UNITED KIMBERLY-CLARK EMPLOYEES UNION – PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT GENERAL

WORKERS’ ORGANIZATION (UKCEU-PTGWO), Petitioner, versus KIMBERLY – CLARK
PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent., G.R. No. 162957, 2006 Mar 6,

SUMMARY:
Petitioner is the certified collective bargaining agent of all rank-and-file employees of the San
Pedro milling plant of the respondent. In 1980, the parties executed a CBA, Art. XX, Sec. 1 of which
reads: “The company agrees to employ, regardless of sex, the immediate member of the family of an
employee provided qualified, upon the employee’s resignation, retirement, disability or death. x x
x”. On Nov. 7, 1995, KCPI issued Guidelines on the Hiring of Replacements of Retired/Resigned
Employees which require, among others, that: (a) such recommendees must at least be 18 but not
more than 30 at the time of hiring, and (b) have completed, after graduating from high school, at
least a two-year technical/vocational course or a third year level of college education. UKCEU
specifically requested the deferment of the implementation of the Guidelines after the next CBA
negotiations in 1997. KCPI agreed to postpone, but only with respect to the educational
qualification. In the new (1997) CBA, the educational qualifications contained in the Guidelines
were not incorporated. KCPI continued to hire employees pursuant to the CBA up to 1998.
However, in the second half of 1998, KCPI started to suspend the implementation of the CBA.
On April 23, 1999, the parties filed before the NCMB a Submission Agreement referring to
arbitration the issue of whether KCPI violated the CBA. Meantime, in August 1999, KCPI and
UKCEU executed a new CBA. Said provision was incorporated in the new CBA. UKCEU averred in
its pleadings that the “qualification in terms of education,” that is, admitting recommmendees who
were at least high school graduates, had been an established practice of KCPI since 1980. This being
the case, KCPI could not just unilaterally revoke such practice without UKCEU’s consent and
approval. In its pleadings, KCPI maintained that pursuant to its management prerogative, it had the
right to determine hiring standards without the consent or approval of UKCEU. It explained that
such recommendees are applying for regular positions, who are hired on a temporary basis.

FACTS:
United Kimberly-Clark Employees Union (UKCEU), a local chapter affiliate of the Philippine
Transport General Workers’ Organization (PTGWO), is the certified collective bargaining agent of
all rank-and-file employees of the San Pedro milling plant of Kimberly-Clark Philippines, Inc.
(KCPI), a multinational corporation engaged in the manufacture of bathroom and facial tissues,
paper napkins, feminine care products, disposable diapers and absorbent cotton.
In 1980, KCPI and the UKCEU executed a CBA which essentially states that the Company
agrees to employ, regardless of sex, the immediate member of the family of an employee provided
qualified, upon the employee’s resignation, retirement, disability or death. The phrase “immediate
member of the family of an employee” referred to the employee’s legitimate children and in default
thereof to the employee’s collateral relative within the third civil degree. The recommendee of the
retired/resigned employee shall, if qualified, be hired on probationary status. But the KCPI did not
set any other qualifying standards for the recommendees of retired, resigned, deceased or disabled
employees and agreed to hire such recommendees who were high school graduates as an act of
liberality and generosity. The provision remained unchanged.
November 7, 1995, KCPI issued Guidelines on the Hiring of Replacements of
Retired/Resigned Employees. The Guidelines require, among others, that: (a) such recommendees
must be at least 18 years of age but not more than 30 years old at the time of the hiring, and (b) have
completed, after graduating from high school, at least a two-year technical/vocational course or a
third year level of college education
During the negotiation for the new 1997 CBA, UKCEU proposed the amendment of Article
XX, Section 1 (concerning the recommendation of relatives as replacement of former employees) of
the CBA. After the negotiation, KCPI and UKCEU executed a CBA to cover the period from July 1,
1997 to June 30, 1999. The educational qualifications contained in the Guidelines were not
incorporated in the CBA. CBA was retained without any modification. KCPI continued to hire
employees pursuant to the CBA up to 1998.
In the second half of 1998, KCPI started to suspend the implementation of the CBA. This was
partly due to the depressed economic conditions then prevailing in the Philippines, and in
compliance with the freeze hiring policy of its Asia-Pacific headquarters. It refused to hire, as
regular employees, 80 recommendees of retiring employees. KCPI and UKCEU failed to settle the
matter through the existing grievance machinery.
April 23, 1999, the parties filed before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB), a Submission Agreement referring to arbitration the issue of whether KCPI violated the
CBA. Meantime, in August 1999, KCPI and UKCEU executed a new CBA. Article XX, Section 1
was incorporated in the new CBA, governing the relation of the parties up to June 30, 2002.
UKCEU averred in its pleadings that the “qualification in terms of education,” that is,
admitting recommendees who were at least high school graduates, had been an established practice
of KCPI since 1980 so that KCPI could not just unilaterally revoke such practice without its
(UKCEU) consent and approval, and that while KCPI had the discretion to raise the educational
qualification of its applicants for employment, this did not apply to recommendees due to the
manner by which Article XX, Section 1 was implemented in the past. Thus, in refusing to hire the
80 recommendees as regular employees, KCPI violated its CBA with the union, equivalent to breach
of contract and unfair labor practice.
KCPI maintained that pursuant to its management prerogative, it had the right to determine
hiring standards under Article XX, Section 1 of the CBA without the consent or approval of UKCEU.
It argued that like applicants for regular positions, recommendees of retiring employees must also
be college graduates, in accordance with its Guidelines.
March 19, 2001, the Voluntary Arbitrator (VA) issued a Resolution favoring UKCEU. And
held that the company cannot suspend implementation of Section 1, Article XX of the existing CBA
unilaterally by upgrading the educational qualifications of “applicants-replacements” than are
required previously; and that since the CBA is the law between the parties, KCPI could not just
unilaterally change or suspend the implementation of the existing employment requirements, even
in the light of the business situation then prevailing in the Philippines.
 KCPI questioned the decision of the VA via petition for review before the CA. CA partially
set aside the Resolution of the VA and ruled that KCPI may validly exercise its management
prerogative and impose the requirement on recommendees. Only UKCEU moved for a partial
reconsideration of CA Decision. CA denied the MR. hence this instant petition.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in ruling that the respondent is required to hire only those recommendees
of retired/resigned, deceased or disabled members of petitioner who had completed at least a two-
year technical/vocational course or a third-year level of college education.

RULING:
No, the CA did not err.
If the terms of a CBA are clear and have no doubt upon the intention of the contracting
parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall prevail. However, if, in a CBA, the parties stipulate
that the hires must be presumed of employment qualification standards but fail to state such
qualification standards in said CBA, the VA may resort to evidence extrinsic of the CBA to
determine the full agreement intended by the parties.
In this case, the subject provision does not include employment qualification standards for
recommendees. However, the respondent issued Guidelines in light of the ruling in Kimberly Clark
Philippines vs. Lorredo. Respondent saw it imperative to do away with its practice of
accommodating recommendees who were mere high school graduates, and to require higher
employment standards for them.
G.R. No. 80737 September 29, 1988

PHILIPPINE GRAPHIC ARTS INC., IGMIDIO R. SILVERIO AND CARLOS CABAL, petitioners,
vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ROSALINA M. PULPULAAN AND
EMELITA SALONGA, respondents
GUTIERREZ, JR., J

Facts:

Petitioner corporation was forced by economic circumstances to require its workers to go on

mandatory vacation leave. The workers were paid while on leave but the pay was charged against
their respective earned leaves. As a result, the private respondents filed complaints for unfair labor
practice and discrimination. Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for ULP.
Ordering the Petitioner to restore and grant to all its employees the company policy regarding
groceries previously enjoyed by them. The private respondents filed a "partial appeal" with (NLRC)
questioning the Labor Arbiter's dismissal of their complaint for ULP and the resultant forced
vacation leaves which were actually without pay. NLRC affirmed the arbiter's decision with
modification ordering the employers to refund the amount equivalent to the earned leave of the
employees.

Issue:

Whether or not the forced vacation leave without pay is unfair labor practice and if not an
unfair labor practice, whether or not it was tainted with arbitrariness.

Held:

No, there was no ULP and it was not tainted with arbitrariness.

In Art. 261 of the Labor Code, both employers and bargaining representative of the employees are
required to go through the grievance machinery in case a grievance arises. And though the law does
not provide who, as between labor and capital, should initiate that said grievance be brought first
to the grievance machinery, it is only logical, just and equitable that whoever is aggrieved should
initiate settlement of the grievance through the grievance machinery. To impose the compulsory
procedure on employers alone would be oppressive of capital, notwithstanding the fact that in most
cases the grievance is of the employees.

In this case, when petitioners sent notice to complainants, no grievance between petitioners and
private respondents that need be threshed out before the grievance machinery has yet materialized.
But then, private respondents, who received such notice and being aggrieved thereof, instituted a
case before the Labor Arbiter for ULP and discrimination, prior to any referral to the grievance
machinery, which they are equally mandated to go through and under the circumstances they were
better situated to initiate; likewise, petitioners even prayed before the Labor Arbiter that the
complaint be dismissed and/or referred to the grievance machinery. Thus, petitioner should not be
faulted if the grievance machinery was in any way bypassed.
CENTRAL PANGASINAN ELECTRIC COOP INC V MACARAEG
395 SCRA 720
PUNO; January 22, 2003

NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari

SUMMARY
De Vera was employed as a teller whose primary duty was to accept payments from
petitioner’s consumers and remit her collections to the cashier, co-respondent Macaraeg whose duty
was to deposit the collections to petitioner’s account at the Rural Bank of Central Pangasinan.
Respondent sister, Evelyn Joy Estrada, issued 211 crossed checks payable to petitioner despite lack
of any outstanding obligation with the latter. In turn, respondent de Vera, with the knowledge and
consent of Macaraeg, paid the full value of these checks from the cash collections of petitioner.
Respondents credited the checks as part of their collection and deposited the same together with
their cash collection to the petitioner’s bank account. Petitioner noticed that several checks payable
to petitioner were returned due to insufficiency of funds. Respondents were confronted with said
discovery, to which de Vera admitted her act.
Respondents were terminated for “serious misconduct, and breach of trust and confidence
reposed on them by management.” Respondents questioned their dismissal before the NCMB,
claiming that it was without just cause and in violation of the CBA, which requires that the case
should first be brought before a grievance committee. Eventually, the parties agreed to submit the
case to a voluntary arbitrator for arbitration. The VA rendered a decision in favor of respondents
and ordered their reinstatement. CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the VA.

FACTS
- De Vera was employed as teller and Geronima Macaraeg as cashier by Central Pangasinan Electric
cooperative inc. They accommodated and encashed two hundred eleven crossed checks of Evelyn
Joy Estrada (de Vera’s sister) amounting to P6,945,128.95 payable to the cooperative despite the
absence of any transaction or any outstanding obligation with it. They credited the checks as part
of their collection and deposited the same together with their cash collection to the coop’s account
at the Rural Bank of Central Pangasinan.
- The finance department noticed these checks which bounced (insufficient funds).De Vera and
Macaraeg were confronted with the discovery. De Vera admitted that the checks were issued by
her sister and that she encashed them from the money collected from petitioner’s customers.
- De Vera testified and admitted that she encashed the checks of Evelyn Joy Estrada because the
latter is her older sister. Macaraeg admitted that she knew of the accommodations given by
respondent de Vera to her sister; that she allowed her subordinate to do it because respondent de
Vera is her kumare, and that she knew that Mrs. Estrada’s checks were sufficiently funded.
- On March 19, 1999, on the basis of the findings and recommendation of Atty. Fernandez (presided
over the hearing), the General Manager issued to respondents separate notices of termination for
“serious misconduct, and breach of trust and confidence reposed on them by management.”
- Respondents questioned their dismissal before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB),claiming that their dismissal was without just cause and in violation of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA), which requires that the case should first be brought before a
grievance committee. Eventually, the parties agreed to submit the case to a voluntary arbitrator for
arbitration.
- LA-ruled in favor of defendants and ordered their reinstatement
CA-affirmed

ISSUES
1. WON the procedure leading to the termination of respondents Maribeth de Vera and Geronima
Macaraeg was in violation of the provisions of the CBA
2. WON the respondents were validly dismissed

HELD
1. Issue is moot and academic
- The parties’ active participation in the voluntary arbitration proceedings, and their failure to insist
that the case be remanded to the grievance machinery, shows a clear intention on their part to have
the issue of respondents’ illegal dismissal directly resolved by the voluntary arbitrator.
2. YES
- The respondents were validly dismissed.
Article 282(c) of the Labor Code allows an employer to dismiss employees for willful breach of trust
or loss of confidence. The basic premise for dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence is that the
employees concerned hold positions of trust. The betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offense
for which an employee is penalized.
In this case, Respondents held positions of utmost trust and confidence as a teller and a
cashier, respectively. Respondents also admitted accommodating Evelyn Joy Estrada by encashing
her checks from its funds, which they did without petitioner’s knowledge, much less its permission.
Said acts were clearly inimical to the financial interests of the petitioner.
REFORMIST UNION OF R. B. LINER, INC., HEVER DETROS, ET AL., vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. No. 120482. January 27, 1997

DAVIDE, JR., J

FACTS:
Petitioner union was organized "by affiliating itself with Lakas Manggagawa sa Pilipinas
(hereinafter Lakas)." Lakas filed a notice of strike on 13 November 1989 because of alleged acts of
unfair labor practice committed by private respondents. Despite conciliation hearings, the parties
failed to reach an agreement. Later, another act of unfair labor practice allegedly committed by the
private respondents impelled Reformist, with the authorization of Lakas, to go on strike on 13
December 1989 even as conciliation proceedings continued.
On Dec. 21, 1989, R.B. Liner, Inc. petitioned DOLE Secretary Franklin Drilon to assume
jurisdiction or certify it to the NLRC. Secretary Drilon certified the dispute to the NLRC for
compulsory arbitration and issued a return-to-work order. The certified case was dismissed after
the union and the company reached an agreement. A certification election was held where Lakas
won as the collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees. Lakas presented a proposal
to private respondents, but they refused to bargain. Thus, Petitioners filed a case charging private
respondents with ULP, i.e., illegal lockout. The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment dismissing the
complaint for lack of merit, and declared that the Dec. 13, 1989 strike as illegal for failure to observe
legal requirements. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter but allowed
reinstatement of the dismissed employees as a measure of social justice. MR was denied. Thus, the
present special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.

FACTS:

Petitioner union was organized "by affiliating itself with Lakas Manggagawa sa Pilipinas
(hereinafter Lakas)." Lakas filed a notice of strike on 13 November 1989 because of alleged
acts of unfair labor practice committed by private respondents. Despite conciliation
hearings, the parties failed to reach an agreement. Later, another act of unfair labor practice
allegedly committed by the private respondents impelled Reformist, with the authorization
of Lakas, to go on strike on 13 December 1989 even as conciliation proceedings continued.

On 21 December 1989, R.B. Liner, Inc. petitioned then DOLE Secretary Fanklin Drilon
to assume jurisdiction over the ongoing dispute or certify it to the NLRC. Secretary Drilon
certified the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration and issued a return-to-work
order.
 The certified case (NLRC Certified case No. 0542, entitled In Re: Labor Dispute at RB
Liner, Inc.) was dismissed on 13 February 1990 after the union and the company reached
all agreement on 19 January 1990 providing, among other matters, for the holding of a
certification election.

On 31 January 1990, a certification election was held where Lakas won as the collective
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees. On 13 February 1990, Lakas presented a
proposal for a collective bargaining agreement to Bernita and Rodelia Dejero, but they
refused to bargain. Meanwhile, as admitted by private respondents' witness Arcile
Tanjuatco, Jr., eight R.B. Liner buses were "converted" to Sultran Lines, one "became MCL,"
and another "became SST Liner."

The petitioners filed with NLRC a case charging the private respondents with unfair labor practice,
i.e., illegal lock out. The private respondents countered with NLRC Case, which sought to declare
as illegal the union's 13 December 1989 strike, as well as other "work stoppages/boycotts" staged by
the petitioners. The two cases were consolidated and simultaneously tried.

In his decision, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the evidence indicated against an illegal lockout while
finding that Reformist staged an illegal strike. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s
finding. Reformist and its members moved to reconsider the NLRC decision, which was however,
denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
WON the legality of the strike could be reviewed by the Labor Arbiter.
HELD:
No, the legality of the strike could no longer be reviewed by the Labor Arbiter.
The very nature of compulsory arbitration makes settlement binding upon the private
respondents, for compulsory arbitration has been defined as “the process of settlement of labor
disputes by a government agency which has the authority to investigate and to make an award
which is binding on all the parties,” and as a mode of arbitration where the parties are “compelled
to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a third party.”
In this case, the dispute or strike was settled when the company and the union entered into an
agreement on January 19,1990 where the private respondents agreed to accept all employees who,
by then, had not yet returned to work. By acceding to the peaceful settlement brokered by the
NLRC, the private respondents waived the issue of the illegality of the strike.
 ADDTL:
Art. 263(i) of the Labor Code provides that the decision in compulsory arbitration proceedings
“shall be final and executory 10 calendar days after receipt thereof by the parties.” The parties were
informed of the dismissal of the case in a letter dated February 14, 1990, and while nothing in the
record indicates when said letter was received by the parties, it is reasonable to infer that more than
ten days elapsed.
Moreover, the compromise agreement also complied with Art. 227 as it was forged under
authority of the Labor Secretary, with representatives from both the union and the company signing
the handwritten agreement to signify their consent thereto.
Ludo & Luym Corp. vs Saornido, G.R. No. 140960, January 20, 2003

Facts:
Petitioner (LUDO) operates a manufacturing plant and a wharf where raw materials and
finished products are shipped out. They engaged the arrastre services of Cresencio Lu Arrastre
Services (CLAS) for the loading and unloading of its finished products at the wharf. These arrastre
workers were subsequently hired, on different dates, as regular rank-and-file employees of LUDO
every time the latter needed additional manpower services. Said employees thereafter joined
Respondent union, the LUDO Employees Union (LEU), which acted as the exclusive bargaining
agent of the rank-and-file employees. LEU entered into a collective bargaining agreement with
LUDO which provides certain benefits to the employees, the amount of which vary according to
the length of service rendered by the availing employee. Thereafter, the union requested LUDO to
include in its members’ period of service the time during which they rendered arrastre services to
LUDO through the CLAS so that they could get higher benefits. The matter was submitted for
voluntary arbitration when LUDO failed to act on said request. The VA ruled in favor of the 214
complainants. LUDO filed an MR, which was denied. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the
decision of the VA. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

WON a VA can award benefits not claimed in the submission agreement, considering the
contention of the petitioner that the arbitrator must confine its adjudication to those issues
submitted by the parties for arbitration, which in this case is the sole issue of the date of
regularization of the workers.

Ruling:

Yes, the VA can award benefits not claimed in the submission agreement.

Generally, the arbitrator is expected to decide only those questions expressly delineated by the
submission agreement. Nevertheless, the arbitrator can assume that he has the necessary power to
make a final settlement since arbitration is the final resort for the adjudication of disputes.
Centro Escolar University Faculty and Allied Workers Union-Independent, petitioner, vs. CA, Apron
Mangabat as Voluntary Arbitrator, and Centro Escolar University, respondents.
G.R. No. 165486
May 31, 2006

FACTS:
R.A. 6728, otherwise known as the “Government Assistance to Students and Teachers in
Private Education Act,” allows private schools to increase their tuition fees on the condition that
70% of the tuition fee increases shall go to the payment of salaries, wages, allowances other benefits
of teaching and non-teaching personnel. Aside from R.A. 6728, the CBAs of the petitioner union
and the respondent granted both the teaching and the non-teaching staff increases in their
compensation.
Petitioner filed with the NCMB a preventive mediation for the recovery of IP losses due to
the university’s alleged deduction of the cost of CBA-won economic benefits from the 70% share of
the teachers and employees in the IP. Petitioner asserts that the integrated Incremental Proceeds
(IP) granted in the CBAs should not be deducted from the personnel’s 70% share in the IP by virtue
of R.A. 6728. The VA upheld the position of respondent university and dismissed the case.
Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The CA
dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner used a wrong mode of appeal, for it should have
filed an appeal under Rule 43. The CA also denied the MR filed by the petitioner. Hence, the instant
petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES:
 WON the decision of the VA is appealable to the CA under Rule 43, considering the
petitioner’s contention that Sec. 2, Rule 43 explicitly provides that Rule 43 does not apply in
decisions under the Labor Code.
 WON the university may deduct from the 70% share of the personnel in the IP and integrated
IP granted in the CBAs of the teaching and the non-teaching staff.

RULING:
 Yes, the decision of the VA is appealable to the CA.
In Luzon Development Bank vs. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees, the
Court held that decisions of the VA under the Labor Code are appealable to the CA. In that case,
the Court observed that the Labor Code was silent as regards the appeals from the decisions of the
voluntary arbitrator, unlike those of the Labor Arbiter which may be appealed to the NLRC. The
Court noted, however, that the VA is a government instrumentality within the contemplation of
Sec. 9 of BP 129 which provides for the appellate jurisdiction of the CA. The decisions of the VA
are akin to those of the RTC, and, therefore, should first be appealed to the CA before being elevated
to the Supreme Court.
 In this case, there was no question of jurisdiction involved in the decision of the VA. What
was being questioned was merely his findings.

 Yes, the university may deduct from the 70% share of the personnel in the IP and integrated
IP granted in the CBAs of the teaching and the non-teaching staff. In other words, the
charging of the integrated IP against the 70% is not violative of the CBA.
The allocation of 70% of the IP for payment of salaries, wages, allowances and other benefits of
teaching and non-teaching personnel is clearly mandated by law. Yet, nowhere is it provided in
R.A. 6728 that the IP should be integrated with the salary and wages.
Hence, the determination of IP to be integrated into employees’ basic salary entails the exercise of
the right of an employer to regulate all aspects of employment. Precisely, the employer has the right
to change the basis of the payment of wages of the employees, subject to provisions of law.
G.R. No. 163942; November 11, 2008;NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL
RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (NUWHRAIN-APL-IUF) DUSIT HOTEL NIKKO
CHAPTER, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Eighth Division), THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS INC., owner
and operator of DUSIT HOTEL NIKKO and/or CHIYUKI FUJIMOTO, and ESPERANZA V.
ALVEZ, respondents.

G.R. No. 166295; November 11, 2008NUWHRAIN-DUSIT HOTEL NIKKO

CHAPTER, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and PHILIPPINE
HOTELIERS, INC., respondents.; VELASCO, JR., J.:

SUMMARY:

National Union of Workers in the Hotel and Restaurant and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN-
APL-IUF) of the Dusit Hotel Nikko Chapter (Union) is the certified bargaining agent of the RF
employees of Dusit Nikko Hotel. Union submitted its CBA negotiation proposals to the Hotel.
Parties however failed to arrive at mutually accepted terms and conditions hence a deadlock. Union
filed a Notice of strike with the NCMB. Conciliation hearings were conducted but were
unsuccessful. A strike vote was conducted and the Union decided to wage a strike. Hotel suspended
the Union members, preventively suspending them and charging them with offenses. The Union
filed a second Notice of Strike with NCMB (ULP and violation of A248(a) on Illegal Lockout). Hotel
terminated 29 Union officers and 61 members and suspended 81 employees for 30 days, 48 for 15
days, 4 for 10 days and 3 for 5 days. The Union again went on strike. On the 3rd Notice of Strike
(ULDP and union-busting). Secretary of labor assumed jurisdiction over the dispute giving the Hotel
an option to merely reinstate the dismissed or suspended workers. Hotel issued an Inter-Office
Memo directing some of the employees to return to work. NLRC ruled that the strike was illegal
since it violated the “No Strike, No Lockout” provision of the CBA (failed to comply with the
mandatory 30-day cooling-off periodand the seven-day strike ban,). CA affirmed NLRC decision.

FACTS:
 National Union of Workers in the Hotel and Restaurant and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN-
APL-IUF) of the Dusit Hotel Nikko Chapter (Union): certified bargaining agent of the RF
employees of Dusit Nikko Hotel.
 Dusit Nikko Hotel: owned and operated by Philippine Hoteliers Inc.
 Chiyuki Fujimoto and Esperanza Alvez:Hotel’s General Manager and Dir. Of Human
Resources

 Oct. 24, 2000 – Union submitted its CBA negotiation proposals to the Hotel. Parties however
failed to arrive at mutually accepted terms and conditions hence a deadlock
 Dec. 20, 2001 – Union filed a Notice of strike with the NCMB. Conciliation hearings were
conducted but were unsuccessful . A strike vote was conducted and the Union decided to
wage a strike.
 Jan. 17, 2002 – Union held a general assembly at the Hotel Basement (members sported
cropped/cleanly shaven heads). More male Union members came to work the next day with
the same hair style. The Hotel prevented them from entering (violation of Hotel’s Grooming
Standards)
o Union staged a picket outside the Hotel. The Hotel also experienced severe lack of
manpower which forced them to temporarily cease 3 restaurant operations
  Jan. 20, 2002 – Hotel suspended the Union members, preventively suspending them and
charging them with offenses. The Union filed a second Notice of Strike with NCMB ( ULP
and violation of A248(a) on Illegal Lockout)
 Jan 26, 2002 – Hotel terminated 29 Union officers and 61 members and suspended 81
employees for 30 days, 48 for 15 days, 4 for 10 days and 3 for 5 days. The Union again went
on strike
 Jan 31, 2002 – 3rd Notice of Strike (ULDP and union-busting). Secretary of labor assumed
jurisdiction over the dispute giving the Hotel an option to merely reinstate the dismissed or
suspended workers
 Feb. 1, 2002 – Hotel issued an Inter-Office Memo directing some of the employees to return
to work
 NLRC – Illegal strike which violated the “No Strike, No Lockout” provision of the CBA (failed
to comply with the mandatory 30-day cooling-off periodand the seven-day strike ban,)
 CA – affirmed NLRC

ISSUE: WON the Union conducted an illegal strike

HELD:

YES
Jurisprudence provides the 6 categories of an illegal strike according to Ludwig Teller and
how the acts of the Union met the requisites:
1. [when it] is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees performing
governmental functions; or
2. [when it] violates a specific requirement of law[, such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on the
requisites of a valid strike]; or
3. [when it] is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to commit an
unfair labor practice against non-union employees; or
4. [when it] employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as a widespread
terrorism of non-strikers [for example, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code];
or
5. [when it] is declared in violation of an existing injunction[, such as injunction, prohibition,
or order issued by the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of the Labor Code]; or
6. [when it] is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or conclusive
arbitration clause
PASVIL/Pascual Liner, Inc., Workers Union-NAFLU vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 124823
July 28, 1999

FACTS:
Petitioner union staged a strike. Further efforts to effect settlement achieved nothing and the
strike continued. Upon petition of private respondent Pasvil, then DOLE Secretary Confesor
assumed jurisdiction over the case and certified it to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.
Notwithstanding receipt of the return-to-work order, Secretary Confesor found that petitioner
union continued to picket and barricade Pasvil’s premises thereby preventing the workers wanting
to report back to work from entering the premises. Thus, she reiterated the return-to-work order
and deputized the Station Commander of the Novaliches Police Station to assist. The conciliation
conferences were scheduled, but only representatives of Pasvil appeared. On this account, the
parties were ordered to submit their Position Papers which they complied. NLRC declared the still-
ongoing strike illegal (as there was no legitimate reason to strike and that the strikers did not comply
with the DOLE Secretary’s return-to-work order) and consequently deemed the union officers who
acted as leaders thereof, herein petitioners, to have lost their employment status. However, the
charge of ULP was dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUES:
 WON the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the illegality of the strike
thus violating the doctrine laid down in PAL vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment that the
Labor Secretary’s authority to resolve a labor dispute over which he has assumed jurisdiction
encompasses only the issues involved therein, not the legality or illegality of the strike.
 WON the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring the strike illegal and
considering petitioners to have lost their employment status.

RULING:
 No, there was no grave abuse of discretion.
Art. 217 provides the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters to hear and decide cases involving the
legality of strikes and lock-outs, “except as otherwise provided under this Code.” Art. 263(g) of the
same Code provides for this exception.
In this case, what was certified to the NLRC was the entire labor dispute including the strike which
was then ongoing. It was thus necessary for the NLRC to rule on the matter.
Interphil Employees v. Interphil
Topic: Jurisdiction of DOLE, Illegal Strike (Work Slowdown), Evidence in labor cases
Relevant Provisions: (just the title of the provision)
 Art 236(g), Labor Code – Joint jurisdiction between LAs and Sec. of Labor

G. R. No. 142824
Dec. 19, 2001
Kapunan J.

Petitioners: Interphil Employees Union (Union)

Respondents: Interphl Laboratories, Inc.

Summary: (Note: this is what I think the main doctrine is. Read the digest for the other issues). The
Interphil Union wanted the company to renegotiate, or at least guarantee an extension of the CBA
before it expired. When the company wanted to defer negotiation to the proper period, the
employees conducted “overtime boycott” and “work slowdown.” The company filed with the Labor
Arbiter to declare the strike illegal. Eventually, another case was born in front of the Sec. Of Labor.
The Sec of Labor directed the LA to hear the case and report to the Secretary. Both the LA and the
Sec. ruled against the union. The union said that the Sec had no jurisdiction to rule on the case,
since it was in front of the LA. The SC held that because of art. 236(g), the Sec has jurisdiction over
these acts which were intertwined with the labor dispute in front of him.

FACTS:
 The union and Interphil have a CBA in place. It’s to be effeective from Aug 1, 1990, to July
31, 1993.
 Sometime in Feb. 1993, Nestor Ocampo (union president) and Hernando Clemente (union
director) approached Salazar (VP for HR), asking him about the CBA.
o They wanted to know what the company’s stand was regarding the duration of the CBA
o Salazar said it would better be discussed during the formal negotiations.
o They approached him again in March, and they got the same reply.
 They approached him again in April, asking for a meeting to discuss the CBA – Salazar
acceded, and he was asked if he would be amenable to making the new CBA effective for 2
years, starting Aug 1, 1993.
o Salazar said, again, that it was premature to discuss this, and the company couldn’t make
a decision right then and there.
 The very next day (April 16, 1993), all the rank and file employees suddenly refused to follow
the normal two-shift work schedule (6am-6pm, and 6pm-6am).
 At 2pm (first shift) and at 2am (2nd shift), the employees simply left the workplace without
sealing the containers or securing the materials they were working with.
 Salazar, alarmed, asked the employees “What’s going on???” (not his exact words, siguro
nagmura pa yun)
o They merely said “ask the union officers.”
  Salazar immediately called for a meeting with the officers, and they said that the employees
would only return to the normal work schedule if the company would agree to their demands
regarding the effectivity and duration of the CBA.
o Salazar, again, said that this would be better discussed during the formal negotiations.
 The union was not satisfied – they continued the “overtime boycott” (notice, they would
leave after exactly 8 hours of work)
o They also conducted a work slowdown campaign when they were working –
production was thus substiantially delayed.
 The union submitted their CBA proposal, and the company submitted their counterproposal.
 On September 3, 1993, the company filed with the NLRC a petition to declare the boycot and
slowdown illegal – they said that it amounted to illegal strike.
o This was assigned to Labor Arbiter Caday.
 On Oct. 22, 1993, the company filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) a request for preventive mediation – however, the parties were unable to arrive at
an agreement
o Thus, the company filed, on Nov. 15, with the Secretary of Labor and Employment, a
petition for assumption of jurisdiction.
 On Jan. 24, 1994, the union filed with the NCMB a Notice of Strike, citing unfair labor
practice. They staged a strike on Feb. 12. (kapal).
 On Feb 14, the Secretary of Labor, Nieves Confesor, issued an assumption order over the labor
dispute.
o On March 2, Confesor ordered the company to accept all the striking workers, and the
union to stop striking and return to work.
o This order said that “all pending cases which were direct offshoots of the labor dispute
are subsumed herewith.”
 Meanwhile, the case before LA Caday continued.
o The union filed for consolidation of the case with the labor dispute pending before the
Secretary.
o Caday held the proceedings in abeyance
o However, on June 6, Acting Secretary Brillanted directed Caday and another arbiter to
proceed with the case.
 On Sept 5, Caday submitted the recommendation to Sec. of Labor, Quisumbing, who
approved and adopted the report into his order dated August 13, 1997 (I wonder what’s been
going on the past 4 years. Strike parin ba sila?)
o The overtime boycott and work slowdown were declared an illegal strike
o Several union officers were fired
o The union was charged with unfair labor practice for violating the CBA, which
prohibited the union or any employee from striking or engaging in slowdown or
interruption of work. They were ordered to cease and desist.
 Union moved for reconsideration – denied. They moved up to the CA – dismissed.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
 1. Did the CA err in disregarding the “parol evidence rule?”
2. Did the CA err in not declaring the company’s act of extending substantial separation package
to the involved officers as tantamount to condonation if there was any misdeed committed?
3. WON the Labor Secretary has jurisdiction to rule over an illegal strike.
HELD:
 Petition DENIED.
 Decision of lower court AFFIRMED.

YES, the Labor Secretary has jurisdiction to rule over an illegal strike.

In International Pharmaceutical, Inc. vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor and Associated Labor Union
(ALU) it was held that the Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code the
authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in
an industry indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same accordingly. Necessarily,
this authority to assume jurisdiction over the said labor dispute must include and extend to all
questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases over which the labor arbiter has
exclusive jurisdiction.

In this case, the issuance of the assailed orders is within the province of the Secretary as
authorized by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code and Article 217(a) and (5) of the same Code,
taken conjointly and rationally construed to subserve the objective of the jurisdiction vested in the
Secretary.

RATIO:
 On the matter of jurisdiction
o It is undisputed that the petition to declare the strike illegal was filed before LA Caday
long before the Sec. of Labor and Employment (SOLE – katamad itype) issued the
assumption order.
o However, issues of “overtime boycott” and “work slowdown” amounting to illegal
strike before Caday are intertwined with the labor dispute before the SOLE.
 In fact, on March 16, 1994, the Union even asked Caday to suspend proceedings
and consolidate the same with the SOLE.
 When Brillantes ordered Caday to continue the case, both parties acceded,
knowing that there was a directive for him to submit his recommendation to the
SOLE.
o The subsequent participation of the union in the hearing was an affirmation of the
jurisdiction of the SOLE.
o The SC also cited a case – International Pharmaceutical v. Sec. Of Labor and Associated
Labor Union
 Art. 263 (g) of the Labor Code: SOLE has authority to assume jurisdiction over a
labor dispute causing/likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to national interest
  Necessarily, this extends to all questions arising therefrom, including cases over
which the LA has jurisdiction.
 Art. 217 of the Labor Code has exceptions (“except as otherwise provided under
this code…) – Art. 263(g) is such an exception.
 The SOLE and the Las share jurisdiction, sometimes.
o Thus, the assailed orders are within the province of the SOLE.
 On the matter of evidence
o The union says that the lower courts disregarded the parol evidence rule, when they
upheld the allegation of the company that the schedule was the two-shift sked
mentioned above.
o The CBA provides that the normal working hours were from 730am – 4pm (normal 8
hour shift)

o Reliance on this rule is misplaced – labor cases before the NLRC od LA aren’t strictly
bound by the rules of evidence. They’re not applied in a very rigid or technical sense.

o So the LA could in fact accept and consider other evidence than the CBA.

o In any case, the CBA said that the work hours could change at the company’s discretion.

o Also, the employees were aware, and in fact complied with the 12-hour shifts. Their
own witnesses show this.

 On the illegal strike

o It’s clear that the actions taken by the union amounted to illegal strike.
o (The SC here just reiterated the facts as stated above).
o They also cited a testimony of a union member
 Essentially, he said that the union officers called for a stop to the overtime
activities. When he disregarded it and actually went to work, he was branded a
traitor by the union officers and was shouted at.
o The union also claimed that they had no hand in the work slowdown – there was no
change in performance/efficiency for the year 1993
 This was rebuffed by their own witness (she could not answer how she prepared
the productivity reports, because she was on union leave. She had no knowledge
of some of the reports)
 Even then, the comparison is of no moment – undeniably, the boycott and work
slowdown resulted in financial loss and damage to its reputation.
o The SC classified the acts by the union as a “strike on installment basis.”
 “Slowdown” is an inherently illegal activity wherein the workers purposefully
remain at their positions and accept wages, but at the same time, select what parts
of their allotted task they want to perform, and refuse to do other work.
 On the substantial separation package
o This is not a form of condonation.
o When the separation payments were given, the officers were still employees
o The company was just doing its legal obligation
o In fact, they could have withheld these – union should in fact be grateful to the
company.
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA SULPICIO LINES VS. SULPICIO LINES, G.R. NO. 140992,
MARCH 25, 2004
Facts:
Due to a CBA deadlock, petitioner union filed with the NCMB a Notice of Strike. Respondent
company, on its part filed with the DOLE a petition praying that the SOLE assume jurisdiction over
the controversy. The SOLE then issued an order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute,
enjoined any strike or lockout and directed the parties to cease and desist from committing any and
all acts that might exacerbate the situation. Meanwhile, Petitioner filed with the NCMB a second
notice of strike alleging that respondent company committed acts constituting unfair labor practice
amounting to union busting. Provoked by respondent’s alleged unfair labor practice/s, petitioner
union immediately conducted a strike vote. Thus, on May 20, 1994, 167 rank-and-file employees,
officers and members of petitioner, did not report for work and instead gathered in front of Pier 12,
North Harbor at Manila.
The SOLE again issued an order directing the striking employees to return to work; and
certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. Meanwhile, respondent
company filed with the NLRC a complaint for “illegal strike/clearance for termination.” NLRC
declared the strike of petitioner’s officers and members illegal, with notice to respondent of the
option to terminate their (petitioner’s officers) employment. NLRC also dismissed petitioner’s
complaint against respondent.

Issue:
Whether or not the one-day work stoppage or petitioner’s officers and members was an illegal
strike.

Ruling:

Yes, the strike is illegal.

Under Arts. 263 and 264 of the Labor Code, the requisites of a valid strike are: (1) A strike shall be
filed with the DOLE at least 15 days if the issues raised are ULP or at least 30 days if the issue
involved bargaining deadlock. However, in case of dismissal from employment of union officers
duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union
busting where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall not apply
and the union may take action immediately; (2) the strike shall be supported by a majority vote of
the members of the union obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for the purpose; and (3) a
strike vote shall be reported to the DOLE at least seven (7) days before the intended strike.
In this case, there is no showing that the petitioner union observed the 7-day strike ban; and that
the results of the strike vote were submitted by petitioners to the DOLE at least seven (7) days
before the strike.
Thus, the strike mounted by petitioner union on May 20, 1994 is illegal.
National Federation of Sugar Workers vs. Ovejera
GR No. L-59743, May 31, 1982 ; 114 SCRA 354

PLANA, J:

FACTS:
National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) has concluded with Central Azucarera de la Carlota
(CAC) a CBA effective February 16, 1981 to February 15, 1984 which provided that the parties agree
to maintain the present practice on the grant of Christmas bonus, milling bonus, and amelioration
bonus to the extent as the latter is required by law. The Christmas and milling bonuses amount to
1 ½ months' salary. On November 28, 1981, NFSW struck allegedly, to compel the payment of the
13th month pay under PD 851, in addition to the Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses being
enjoyed by CAC workers. On January 22, 1982, NFSW filed with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment (MOLE) a notice of strike based on non-payment of the 13th month pay. Six days
after, NFSW struck. One day after the commencement of the strike, a report of the strike-vote was
filed by NFSW with MOLE. CAC filed a petition with the Regional Arbitration Branch of MOLE to
declare the strike illegal, principally for being violative of BP 130, that is, the strike was declared
before the expiration of the 15-day cooling-off period for ULP strikes, and the strike was staged
before the lapse of seven days from the submission to MOLE of the result of the strike-vote After
the submission of position papers and hearing, Labor Arbiter Ovejara declared the strike illegal. On
February 26, 1982, the NFSW, by passing the NLRC filed the instant Petition for prohibition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the strike declared by NFSW is illegal, the resolution of which mainly
depends on the mandatory or directory character of the cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban
after report to MOLE of the result of a strike-vote, as prescribed in the Labor Code.

HELD:
YES
When the law says "the labor union may strike" should the dispute "remain unsettled until the lapse
of the requisite number of days (cooling-off period) from the filing of the notice," the unmistakable
implication is that the union may not strike before the lapse of the cooling-off period. Similarly, the
mandatory character of the 7-day strike ban after the report on the strike-vote is manifest in the
provision that "in every case," the union shall furnish the MOLE with the results of the voting "at
least seven (7) days before the intended strike, subject to the (prescribed) cooling-off period." It
must be stressed that the requirements of cooling-off period and 7-day strike ban must both be
complied with, although the labor union may take a strike vote and report the same within the
statutory cooling-off period.
 In the instant case the strike-vote report is filed with MOLE after the strike had actually
commenced. Such interpretation of the law ought not and cannot be countenanced. It would indeed
be self-defeating for the law to imperatively require the filing on a strike notice and strike-vote
report without at the same time making the prescribed waiting periods mandatory.
COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN V ASSN OF EMPLOYEES AND FACULTY OF LETRAN
340 SCRA 587
KAPUNAN; September 18, 2000

NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari

FACTS
Private respondent Ambas, the newly elected president of the Association of Employees and
Faculty of Letran (Union) wanted to continue the renegotiation of its CBA with petitioner for the
last 2 years of the CBA’s 5 year lifetime. However, petitioner claimed the CBA was already prepared
for signing by the parties. The CBA was submitted to a referendum by the union members, who
rejected it. Petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before the NLRC which
decided in favor of petitioner but was later reversed on appeal with the NLRC. The Union notified
the NCMB of its intention to strike on the grounds of petitioner’s refusal to bargain. Later, the
parties agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and start negotiating a new 5 year CBA for which the
Union submitted its proposals. Ambas protested a recent changing of her schedule and petitioner
sent the Union a letter dismissing Ambas for alleged insubordination after which the Union
amended its notice of strike to include the said dismissal.
The Union finally went on strike and the Sec. of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction,
ordering those on strike to return to work and for petitioner to accept them under the same terms
before the strike. All were readmitted except Ambas. The Sec. issued an order declaring petitioner
guilty of unfair labor practice and directing the reinstatement of Ambas with backwages. Letran’s
MFR was denied and the CA affirmed the Sec.’s decision, hence this petition.

ISSUES
1. WON petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the union
2. WON the termination of the Ambas amounts to an interference of the employee’s right to self-
organization

HELD
1. YES, Petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by its stern refusal to bargain in good faith with
respondent union.
Article 252 defines collective bargaining as the performance of a mutual obligation to meet
and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement.
In this case, the Union, in sending its proposals during the 2nd CBA negotiations, kept up its
end of the bargain while Letran devised ways and means to prevent the negotiation.
- Letran also failed to make a timely reply to the Union’s proposals (no counter-proposal a month
later), violating Article 250 which requires such a reply within 10 days upon receipt of a written
notice of said proposals. Letran’s refusal to reply is an indication of bad faith, showing a lack of
sincere desire to negotiate.
- In a last ditch effort, Letran suspended the bargaining process on the ground that it allegedly
received information that ACEC had filed a petition for certification election. The mere filing of a
petition for certification election does not ipso facto justify the suspension of negotiations when
there is no legitimate representation issue raised; also, such an action for intervention had already
prescribed.
2. YES
- While we recognize the right of the employer to terminate the services of an employee for just
cause, the dismissal of employees must be made within the parameters of law and pursuant to the
tenets of equity and fair play and must be exercised in good faith. It must not amount to interfering
with, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization as it would
amount to unlawful labor practice under Article 248.
-It would appear that Letran terminated Ambas in order to strip the union of a leader who would
fight for her co-workers’ rights at the bargaining table and frustrate their desire to form a new CBA.
The charge of insubordination was a mere ploy to give a color of legality to the action to dismiss
her. Management may have the prerogative to discipline its employees for insubordination but
when it interferes with employees’ right to self-organization, it amounts to union-busting which is
a prohibited act.
Disposition petition is DENIED for lack of merit
MSF Tire & Rubber, Inc., vs CA, G.R. No. 128632, August 5, 1999
Facts:
Respondent Union filed a notice of strike in the NCMB charging (Phildtread) with unfair
labor practice. Thereafter, they picketed and assembled outside the gate of Philtread’s plant.
Philtread, on the other hand, filed a notice of lockout. Subsequently, the Secretary of Labor assumed
jurisdiction over the labor dispute and certified it for compulsory arbitration.

During the pendency of the labor dispute, Philtread entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
with Siam Tyre whereby its plant and equipment would be sold to a new company, herein
petitioner, 80% of which would be owned by Siam Tyre and 20% by Philtread, while the land on
which the plant was located would be sold to another company, 60% of which would be owned by
Philtread and 40% by Siam Tyre. Petitioner then asked respondent Union to desist from picketing
outside its plant. As the respondent Union refused petitioner’s request, petitioner filed a complaint
for injunction with damages before the RTC. Respondent Union moved to dismiss the complaint
alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

Petitioner asserts that its status as an “innocent bystander” with respect to the labor dispute between
Philtread and the Union entitles it to a writ of injunction from the civil courts.

Issue: WON petitioner has shown a clear legal right to the issuance of a writ of injunction under
the “innocent bystander” rule.

Held:
NO.

In Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Cloribel, this Court, through Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, stated the “innocent bystander” rule as follows:

The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute is a phase of the freedom
of speech guaranteed by the constitution. If peacefully carried out, it cannot be curtailed even in
the absence of employer-employee relationship. However, the right may be regulated at the
instance of third parties or “innocent bystanders” if it appears that the inevitable result of its exercise
is to create an impression that a labor dispute with which they have no connection or interest exists
between them and the picketing union or constitute an invasion of their rights.

In the case at bar, petitioner cannot be said not to have such connection to the dispute. The
“negotiation, contract of sale, and the post transaction” between Philtread, as vendor, and Siam
Tyre, as vendee, reveals a legal relation between them which, in the interest of petitioner, cannot
be ignored. This, together with the fact that private respondent uses the same plant or factory;
similar or substantially the same working conditions; same machinery, tools, and equipment; and
manufacture the same products as Philtread, can safely conclude that private respondent’s
personality is so closely linked to Philtread as to bar its entitlement to an injunctive writ.
SUKHOTHAI CUISINE AND RESTAURANT V CA
Vote

FACTS:
The majority of the employees of the petitioner organized themselves into a union which
affiliated with the Philippine Labor Alliance Council (PLAC), and was designated as PLAC Local
460 Sukhothai Restaurant Chapter (Union). Petitioner and the Union entered into a Submission
Agreement, thereby agreeing to submit the issue of unfair labor practice – the subject matter of an
existing Notice of Strike and the Strike Vote – for voluntary arbitration with a view to prevent the
strike.
During the pendency of the voluntary arbitration proceedings, Petitioner, dismissed a union
member, due to an alleged petty quarrel with a co-employee. Union filed with the NLRC a
complaint for illegal dismissal and staged a "wildcat strike." Notice of Strike was re-filed by the
private respondents and the protest and was converted into a "sit-down strike." On the next day,
the same was transformed into an "actual strike."
Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal strike. Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner.
However, NLRC overruled Labor Arbiter and held that the petitioner is guilty of union busting;
that the petitioner violated the Submission Agreement.

ISSUE: Whether the strike staged by the private respondents is illegal; and whether private
respondents are deemed to have lost their employment status by participating in the commission of
illegal acts during the strike

HELD: Yes

RATIO:
Jurisprudence provides that strikes staged in violation of agreements providing for arbitration are
illegal, since these agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends are to be
achieved. The rationale of the prohibition under Article 264 is that once jurisdiction over the labor
dispute has been properly acquired by competent authority, that jurisdiction should not be
interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike. Indeed it is among the chief
policies of the State to promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and
negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation, and conciliation, as modes of settling
labor, or industrial disputes
In this case, for failing to exhaust all steps in the arbitration proceedings by virtue of the
Submission Agreement, in view of the proscription under Article 264 of the Labor Code, and the
prevailing state policy as well as its underlying rationale, this Court declares that the strike staged by
the private respondents is illegal.

The alleged dismissals of Lucente and respondent Lanorias, both union members, which
allegedly triggered the wildcat strike, are not sufficient grounds to justify the radical recourse on
the part of the private respondents.