LAGAZO V.

CA
287 SCRA 18
FACTS:

Catalina was the grantee of the Monserrat estate. She had to leave for Canada to
become a permanent resident therein and she appointed Espanol to be her attorney-in-
fact to fix the requirements needed. Failing to accomplish what he ought to do, Catalina
appointed Lagazo as her new attorney-in-fact. The grant was subsequently given and
later, the land was donated to Lagazo. Lagazo then sought to remove Cabanlit from the
property. The latter claims ownership over the land by virtue of a deed of sale executed
in favor of him by Espanol.

HELD:

The donation is simple and pure. There is no showing of any acceptance from Lagazo
and thus, there has been no perfected donation.

Bonsato vs CA Case Digest

Bonsato vs CA
95 PHIL 481
FACTS: The case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, by respondents Josefa
Utea and other heirs of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, both deceased. Their
complaint (for annulment and damages) charged that on the first day of December, 1949, Domingo
Bonsato, then already a widower, had been induced and deceived into signing two notarial deeds of
donations in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato, respectively,
transferring to them several parcels of land situated in the municipalities of Mabini and Burgos,
Province of Pangasinan, both donations having been duly accepted in the same act and documents.
Plaintiffs likewise charged that the donations were mortis causa and void for lack of the requisite
formalities. The defendants, Juan Bonsato and Felipe Bonsato, answered averring that the
donations made in their favor were voluntarily executed in consideration of past services rendered
by them to the late Domingo Bonsato; that the same were executed freely without the use of force
and violence, misrepresentation or intimidation; and prayed for the dismissal of the case.
After trial, the CFI rendered its decision finding that the deeds of donation were executed by the
donor while the latter was of sound mind, without pressure or intimidation; that the deeds were of
donation inter vivos without any condition making their validity or efficacy dependent upon the death
of the donor; but as the properties donated were presumptively conjugal, having been acquired
during the coverture of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, the donations were only valid
as to an undivided one-half share in the three parcels of land described therein.
ISSUE: W/N the donation was a donation mortis causa or a donation inter vivos?
HELD: Donation inter vivos. If it was a donation mortis causa, then the documents should reveal
any or all of the following characteristics:
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control
of the property while alive (Vidal vs. Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman vs. Ibea, 67 Phil., 633);
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of
the properties conveyed (Bautista vs. Sabiniano, G. R.
L-4326, November 18, 1952);
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of donation executed by the late Domingo
Bonsato. The donor only reserved for himself, during his lifetime, the owner’s share of the fruits or
produce (“de los productos mientras viva el donante tomara la parte que corresponde como dueño”),
a reservation that would be unnecessary if the ownership of the donated property remained with the
donor. Most significant is the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations; on
the contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to be “irrevocable”, a quality absolutely incompatible
with the idea of conveyances mortis causa where revocability is of the essence of the act, to the
extent that a testator can not lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation (Old Civil Code, Art.
737; New Civil Code, Art. 828).
It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the phrase “that after the death of the
donor the aforesaid donation shall become effective” (que despues de la muerte del donante entrara
en vigor dicha donacion”). However, said expression must be construed together with the rest of the
paragraph, and thus taken, its meaning clearly appears to be that after the donor’s death, the
donation will take effect so as to make the donees the absolute owners of the donated property, free
from all liens and encumbrances; for it must be remembered that the donor reserved for himself a
share of the fruits of the land donated. Such reservation constituted a charge or encumbrance that
would disappear upon the donor’s death, when full title would become vested in the donees.
GESTOPA VS. CA FACTS- Acceptance in Donation

Acceptance is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in
the form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the donee during the donor’s
lifetime.

FACTS:

Spouses Danlag own six parcels of land. To four parcels of land, they executed a
donation mortis causa in favor of respondent Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil, reserving
donor's rights to amend, cancel, or revoke the donation and to sell or encumber such
properties. Years later, they executed another donation, this time inter vivos, to six
parcels of land in favor of respondents, reserving their rights to the fruits of the land
during their lifetime and for prohibiting the donee to sell or dispose the properties
donated. Subsequently, the spouses sold 2 parcels to herein petitioners, spouses
Gestopa, and eventually revoking the donation. Respondent filed a petition to quiet title,
stating that she had already become the owner of the parcels of land. Trial Court ruled
in favor of petitioners, but CA reversed.

ISSUE:

Whether the (second) donation was inter vivos or mortis causa

RULING:

It was donation inter vivos. The spouses were aware of the difference between the two
donations, and that they needed to execute another deed of donation inter vivos, since
it has a different application to a donation mortis causa. Also, the court stated four
reasons to the matter: (1) that the spouses donated the parcels of land out of love and
affection, a clear indication of a donation inter vivos; (2) the reservation of a lifetime
usufruct; (3) reservation of sufficient properties for maintenance that shows the intention
to part with their six lot; and (4) respondent's acceptance, contained in the deed of
donation. Once a deed of donation has been accepted, it cannot be revoked, except for
officiousness or ingratitude, which the spouses failed to invoke.
AUSTRIA-MAGAT VS. CA-
DONATION INTER VIVOS
When the deed of donation provides that the donor will not dispose or take away the
property donated, he is in effect making a donation inter vivos.

Here, the 2nd characteristic of a donation mortis causa (revocable at will) is absent.

FACTS:

Cavite, 1953:
Basilisa Comerciant, mom to five children, executed a Deed of Donation to her five
children covered by Transfer Certificate 3268, with an area of 150 square meters. The
said document reads as follows:
“xxx Kusang loob na ibinibigay ko at ipinagkakaloob ng ganap at hindi na mababawi sa
naulit ng apat na anak ko at sa kanilang mga tagamagmana (sic),xxx”

Thereafter, the parties executed another notarized document that stated”

“xxx Na ang titulo numero TCT-T-2260 (RT-4036) ng Lungsod ng Kabite, bahay sa
loteng tirahan ng Bagong Pook na nababanggit sa nasabing kasulatan, ay mananatili sa
poder o possession ng Ina, na si Basilisa Comerciante habang siya ay nabubuhay at
Gayon din ang nasabing Titulo ay hindi mapapasangla o maipagbibili ang lupa habang
maybuhay ang nasabing Basilisa Comerciante. Xxx “
On Feb 1979, Basilia executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Apolinaria Austria Magat for
P5000. Basilia’s children contested the act, saying that the donation was intervivos and
thereby irrevocable. The trial court disagreed, stating it was mortis causa and therefore
revocable. The case went to the CA and the case was reversed. CA found the
document to be intervivos because of the phrase “ganap at hindi na mababawi sa
naulit”

Basilia, to their mind, definitely had no plans of revoking the donation. The document
executed thereafter upheld such irrevocability.
The parties proceeded to the Supreme Court

ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation was intervivos.

HELD: YES.

The court found that whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends on
whether the donor intended to transfer ownership over the properties upon the
execution of the deed.

In Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, the court recalls the characteristics of a donation mortis
causa,:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor;
or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full
or naked) and control of the property while alive;

2)That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in
the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
For the case at bar, the phrase “hindi na mababawi” definitely exudes the character of
an intervivos agreement. The other provisions therein which seemingly make the
donation mortis causa do not go against the irrevocable character of the subject
donation. According to the petitioner, the provisions which state that the same will only
take effect upon the death of the donor and that there is a prohibition to alienate,
encumber is mortis causa. The court disagrees. The said provisions should be
harmonized with its express irrevocability. In Bonsato where the donation per the deed
of donation would also take effect upon the death of the donor with reservation for the
donor to enjoy the fruits of the land, the Court held that the said statements only mean
that “after the donor’s death, the donation will take effect so as to make the donees the
absolute owners of the donated property, free from all liens and encumbrances. In
Gestopa v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the prohibition to alienate does not
necessarily defeat the inter vivos character of the donation. It even highlights the fact
that what remains with the donor is the right of usufruct and not anymore the naked title
of ownership over the property donated. In the case at bar, the provision in the deed of
donation that the donated property will remain in the possession of the donor just goes
to show that the donor has given up his naked title of ownership thereto and has
maintained only the right to use (jus utendi) and possess (jus possidendi) the subject
donated property.

Furthermore, the act of selling the property to petitioner herein cannot be construed as a
valid act of revocation of donation. A formal case ought to be filed pursuant to Art 764
which speaks of an action bearing a prescriptive period of 4 years from non compliance
with the deed of donation. In this case, the 4 year prescriptive period does not even
apply because none of the terms (if any) were even violated.

In Gestopa v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the prohibition to alienate does not
necessarily defeat the inter vivos character of the donation. It even highlights the fact
that what remains with the donor is the right of usufruct and not anymore the naked title
of ownership over the property donated. In the case at bar, the provision in the deed of
donation that the donated property will remain in the possession of the donor just goes
to show that the donor has given up his naked title of ownership thereto and has
maintained only the right to use (jus utendi) and possess (jus possidendi) the subject
donated property.

Furthermore, the act of selling the property to petitioner herein cannot be construed as a
valid act of revocation of donation. A formal case ought to be filed pursuant to Art 764
which speaks of an action bearing a prescriptive period of 4 years from non compliance
with the deed of donation. In this case, the 4 year prescriptive period does not even
apply because none of the terms (if any) were even violated.

Vitug v. CA

G.R. No. 82027, March 29, 1990

Spouses Dolores and Romarico Vitug entered into a survivorship agreement with the
Bank of American National Trust and Savings Association. The said agreement contained
the following stipulations:

(1) All money deposited and to be deposited with the Bank in their joint savings current
account shall be both their property and shall be payable to and collectible or
withdrawable by either or any of them during their lifetime; and
(2) After the death of one of them, the same shall belong to and be the sole property of the
surviving spouse and payable to and collectible or withdrawable by such survivor

Dolores died naming Rowena Corona in her wills as executrix. Romarico later filed a
motion asking authority to sell certain shares of stock and real property belonging to
the estate to cover his advances to the estate which he claimed were personal funds
withdrawn from their savings account. Rowena opposed on the ground that the same
funds withdrawn from the savings account were conjugal partnership properties and part
of the estate. Hence, there should be no reimbursement. On the other hand, Romarico
insists that the same are his exclusive property acquired through the survivorship
agreement.

ISSUE: Whether or not the funds of the savings account subject of the survivorship
agreement were conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate

No. The Court ruled that a Survivorship Agreement is neither a donation mortis causa nor
a donation inter vivos. It is in the nature of an aleatory contract whereby one or both of
the parties reciprocally bind themselves to give or to do something in consideration of
what the other shall give or do upon the happening of an event which is to occur at an
indeterminate time or is uncertain, such as death. The Court further ruled that a
survivorship agreement is per se not contrary to law and thus is valid unless its operation
or effect may be violative of a law such as in the following instances: (1) it is used as a
mere cloak to hide an inofficious donation; (2) it is used to transfer property
in fraud of creditors; or (3) it is used to defeat the legitime of a compulsory heir. In the
instant case, none of the foregoing instances were present. Consequently, the Court
upheld the validity of the survivorship agreement entered into by the spouses Vitug. As
such, Romarico, being the surviving spouse, acquired a vested right over the amounts
under the savings account, which became his exclusive property upon the death of his
wife pursuant to the survivorship agreement. Thus, the funds of the savings account are
not conjugal partnership properties and not part of the estate of the deceased Dolores.

VITUG vs. CA

183 SCRA 755

FACTS:

Dolores Vitug, deceased, during her lifetime together with her husband Romarico
Vitug, executed a survivorship agreement with the bank. It provides that after the death of
either of them, the fund shall belong exclusively to the survivor.

ISSUES:

WON the survivorship agreement is a will.

WON it is valid.

RULING:

Because the account was a joint account and they made a will while they were
married, so naturally the cash would be their absolute community or conjugal property. The
cash is owned in-common by them. When the spouses opened savings account, they merely
put what rightly belonged to them in a money-making venture. They did not dispose of it in
favor of the other. Since the wife predeceased her husband, the latter acquired
upon her death a vested right over the amount under the savings account.

HEMEDES vs CA Case Digest

HEMEDES vs CA
316 SCRA 347
FACTS: Jose Hemedes executed a document entitled “Donation Inter Vivos With Resolutory
Conditions” conveying ownership a parcel of land, together with all its improvements, in favor of his
third wife, Justa Kauapin, subject to the resolutory condition that upon the latter’s death or
remarriage, the title to the property donated shall revert to any of the children, or heirs, of the
DONOR expressly designated by the DONEE.
Pursuant to said condition, Justa Kausapin executed a “Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real
Property by Reversion” conveying to Maxima Hemedes the subject property.

Maxima Hemedes and her husband Raul Rodriguez constituted a real estate mortgage over the
subject property in favor of R & B Insurance to serve as security for a loan which they obtained.

R & B Insurance extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage since Maxima Hemedes failed to pay the
loan even. The land was sold at a public auction with R & B Insurance as the highest bidder. A new
title was subsequently issued in favor the R&B. The annotation of usufruct in favor of Justa Kausapin
was maintained in the new title.

Despite the earlier conveyance of the subject land in favor of Maxima Hemedes, Justa Kausapin
executed a “Kasunduan” whereby she transferred the same land to her stepson Enrique D.
Hemedes, pursuant to the resolutory condition in the deed of donation executed in her favor by her
late husband Jose Hemedes. Enrique D. Hemedes obtained two declarations of real property, when
the assessed value of the property was raised. Also, he has been paying the realty taxes on the
property from the time Justa Kausapin conveyed the property to him. In the cadastral survey, the
property was assigned in the name of Enrique Hemedes. Enrique Hemedes is also the named
owner of the property in the records of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform office at Calamba, Laguna.

Enriques D. Hemedes sold the property to Dominium Realty and Construction Corporation
(Dominium).

Dominium leased the property to its sister corporation Asia Brewery, Inc. (Asia Brewery) who made
constructions therein. Upon learning of Asia Brewery’s constructions, R & B Insurance sent it a
letter informing the former of its ownership of the property. A conference was held between R & B
Insurance and Asia Brewery but they failed to arrive at an amicable settlement.

Maxima Hemedes also wrote a letter addressed to Asia Brewery asserting that she is the rightful
owner of the subject property and denying the execution of any real estate mortgage in favor of
R&B.

Dominium and Enrique D. Hemedes filed a complaint with the CFI for the annulment of TCT issued
in favor of R & B Insurance and/or the reconveyance to Dominium of the subject property alleging
that Dominion was the absolute owner of the land.

The trial court ruled in favor of Dominium and Enrique Hemedes.

ISSUE: W/N the donation in favor of Enrique Hemedes was valid?

HELD: NO. Enrique D. Hemedes and his transferee, Dominium, did not acquire any rights over the
subject property. Justa Kausapin sought to transfer to her stepson exactly what she had earlier
transferred to Maxima Hemedes – the ownership of the subject property pursuant to the first
condition stipulated in the deed of donation executed by her husband. Thus, the donation in favor of
Enrique D. Hemedes is null and void for the purported object thereof did not exist at the time of the
transfer, having already been transferred to his sister. Similarly, the sale of the subject property by
Enrique D. Hemedes to Dominium is also a nullity for the latter cannot acquire more rights than its
predecessor-in-interest and is definitely not an innocent purchaser for value since Enrique D.
Hemedes did not present any certificate of title upon which it relied.
The declarations of real property by Enrique D. Hemedes, his payment of realty taxes, and his being
designated as owner of the subject property in the cadastral survey of Cabuyao, Laguna and in the
records of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform office in Calamba, Laguna cannot defeat a certificate of
title, which is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein. Particularly, with regard to tax declarations and tax receipts,
this Court has held on several occasions that the same do not by themselves conclusively prove title
to land.

SUMIPAT vs BANGA
G.R. No. 155810. August 13, 2004
FACTS: The spouses Placida Tabo-tabo and Lauro Sumipat acquired three parcels of land.
The couple was childless.

Lauro Sumipat, however, sired five illegitimate children out of an extra-marital affair, namely: herein
defendants-appellees.

Lauro Sumipat executed a document denominated “DEED OF ABSOLUTE TRANSFER AND/OR

QUIT-CLAIM OVER REAL PROPERTIES” (the assailed document) in favor of defendants-appellees
covering the three parcels of land (the properties). On the document appears the signature of his
wife Placida indicating her marital consent thereto.

It appears that when the assailed document was executed, Lauro Sumipat was already very sick and
bedridden; that upon defendant-appellee Lydia’s request, their neighbor Benjamin Rivera lifted the
body of Lauro Sumipat whereupon Lydia guided his (Lauro Sumipat’s) hand in affixing his signature
on the assailed document which she had brought; that Lydia thereafter left but later returned on the
same day and requested Lauro’s unlettered wife Placida to sign on the assailed document, as she
did in haste, even without the latter getting a responsive answer to her query on what it was all
about.

After Lauro Sumipat’s death, his wife Placida, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff-appellant, and
defendants-appellees jointly administered the properties 50% of the produce of which went to
plaintiff-appellant.

As plaintiff-appellant’s share in the produce of the properties dwindled until she no longer received
any and learning that the titles to the properties in question were already transferred/made in favor of
the defendants-appellees, she filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of titles, contracts, partition,
recovery of ownership now the subject of the present appeal.

Defendant-appellee Lydia disclaims participation in the execution of the assailed document, she
claiming to have acquired knowledge of its existence only five days after its execution when Lauro
Sumipat gave the same to her.

RTC decided the case in favor of defendants-appellees holding that by virtue of the assailed
document the due execution of which was not contested by plaintiff-appellant, the properties were
absolutely transferred to defendants-appellees.

ISSUE: Whether the questioned deed by its terms or under the surrounding circumstances has
validly transferred title to the disputed properties to the petitioners?
HELD: NO. A perusal of the deed reveals that it is actually a gratuitous disposition of property — a
donation — although Lauro Sumipat imposed upon the petitioners the condition that he and his wife,
Placida, shall be entitled to one-half (1/2) of all the fruits or produce of the parcels of land for their
subsistence and support.
Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed of
donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified
thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance
does not appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Where the deed of donation
fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate
instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the deed of donation and in the
separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.

In this case, the donees’ acceptance of the donation is not manifested either in the deed itself or in a
separate document. Hence, the deed as an instrument of donation is patently void.

Neither can we give effect to the deed as a sale, barter or any other onerous conveyance, in the
absence of valid cause or consideration and consent competently and validly given.

In Sumipat, et al. v. Banga, et al., G.R. No. 155810

In Sumipat, et al. v. Banga, et al., G.R. No. 155810, August 13, 2004, it was ruled that
title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a
deed of donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the
donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very same instrument
of donation. If the acceptance does not appear in the same document, it must be made
in another. Where the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the
formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either not given to
the donor or else not noted in the deed of donation and in the separate acceptance, the
donation is null and void.
C-J YULO & SONS, INC vs. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF SAN PABLO, INC.
[G.R. No. 133705. March 31, 2005]
FACTS: On September 24, 1977, petitioner donated unto respondent a parcel of land at Canlubang,
Calamba, Laguna on the condition that it shall be used for the construction of a home for the aged
and infirm and for other charitable purposes and cannot be used for any other purposes without the
consent of the former said land with all real improvements thereon shall revert in otherwise trust to
the Donor for prompt disposition in favor of some other charitable organization that Donor may deem
best suited to the care of the aged.
Thereafter, or sometime in 1980, the donee, for purposes of generating funds to build the perimeter
fence on the donated property and the construction of a nucleus building for the aged and the infirm,
leased a portion of the donated property to one Martin Gomez who planted said portion with sugar
cane. There is no dispute that the lease agreement was entered into by the donee without the prior
written consent of the donor, as required in the deed of donation. The lease to Gomez ended in
1985.

The following year, 1986, a portion of the donated property was again leased by the donee, this time
to one Jose Bostre who used the leased area as a ranch. As explained by the donee, it entered into
a lease agreement with Bostre to protect the premises from vandals and for the electrification of the
nucleus building of the home for the aged and in the infirm, which was named as “Casa dela
Merced.” As before, however, the donee executed the lease contract without the prior written
consent of the donor.

After the termination of the Bostre lease agreement, the donee, for the third time, leased a portion of
the donated property to one Rudy Caballes who used the leased area for fattening cattles. The
donee explained that the lease agreement with Bostre was also for the purposes of generating funds
for the completion of “Casa dela Merced.” Again, however, the donee did not secure the prior
written consent of the donor.

Hence, on September 20, 1990, pursuant to a board resolution, the donor, through its president
Miguel A. Yulo, addressed a letter to the donee informing the latter that it was revoking the donation
in accordance with Section 5 of the deed due to the donee’s non-compliance with and material
breach of the conditions thereunder stipulated.

ISSUE: W/N revocation is proper?

HELD: NO. In Republic vs. Silim, where the donor sought to revoke the donation on the ground that
the donee breached the condition to exclusively and forever use the land for school purpose only,
the Court ruled in favor of the donee:
Without the slightest doubt, the condition for the donation was not in any way violated when the lot
donated was exchanged with another one. The purpose for the donation remains the same, which is
for the establishment of a school. The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or affected. In fact,
the exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance and enhancement of the purpose
of the donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved way for the release of funds for the
construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be accommodated by the limited
area of the donated lot.

As in Silim, the three (3) lease contracts herein entered into by the donee were for the sole purpose
of pursuing the objective for which the donation was intended. In fact, such lease was authorized by
the donor by express provision in the deed of donation, albeit the prior written consent therefor of the
donor is needed. Hence, considering that the donee’s acts did not detract from the very purpose for
which the donation was made but precisely to achieve such purpose, a lack of prior written consent
of the donor would only constitute casual breach of the deed, which will not warrant the revocation of
the donation.

Besides, this Court cannot consider the requirement of a prior written consent by the donor for all
contracts of lease to be entered into by the donee as an absolute ground for revocation of the
donation because such a condition, if not correlated with the purpose of the donation, would
constitute undue restriction of the donee’s right of ownership over the donated property.

EDUARTE V. CA-
REVOCATION OF DONATION
All crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for revocation of donation.
FACTS:

Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land. He executed a deed of donation
inter vivos of ½ of the land to his niece, Helen Doria. Subsequently, he executed another deed of
donation inter vivos ceding the other ½ of the property to Helen Doria. Helen Doria donated a
protion of the lot (157 sqm) to the Calauan Christian Reformed Church. Helen Doria sold and
conveyed the remaining portion save some 700 meters for his residence. Pedro Calapine sought
to annul the sale and donation to eduarte and CCRC on the ground that the deed of donation was
a forgery and that Doria was unworthy of his liberality claiming ingratitude (commission of
offense against the person, honor or property of donor [par. 1])

ISSUE:

W/N the falsification of public document committed by Doria is an act of ingratitude against
Calapine (considering that falsification is a crime against public interest)?

RULING: YES

In commentaries of Tolentino, it is said that “all crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude
and are causes of revocation.” Petitioner attempted to categorize the offenses according to their
classification under the RPC by deleting the first sentence. However, this is unwarranted
considering that illegal detention, threats and coercion are considered crimes against the person
of the donor despite the fact that they are classified as crimes against personal liberty and
security under the RPC.

Note: Eduarte and the Church still won although the donation was deemed by the Court to be
revocable. The Court applied the CHAIN OF TITLE THEORY because the lands were
registered lands and it has already passed from the forger (Doria) to innocent purchasers for
value (Eduarte, et al.).
NOCEDA VS. DIRECTO-
REVOCATION OF A
DONATION BASED ON
INGRATITUDE
The Act of Usurpation by the donee of the donor’s land is an act of ingratitude. The law
does not require conviction in order to revoke the donation; only preponderance of
evidence is needed in an action to revoke instituted by the donor.

Note: An action for revocation of a donation based on ingratitude must file the action to
revoke his donation within 1 year from the time he had knowledge of the ingratitude of
the donee (not from the occurrence of the act of ingratitude).

FACTS:

Directo, Noceda, and Arbizo (the daughter, grandson, and widow, respectively of the
late Celestino Arbizo) extra-judicially settled a parcel of land. Directo’s share was
11,426 square meters, Noceda got 13,294 square meters, and the remaining 41,810
square meters went to Maria Arbizo. On the same day, Directo donated 625 sq.m. of
her share to her nephew.

However, a few months later, another extra-judicial settlement-partition of the same lot
was executed. 3/5 of the lot was awarded to Arbizo (widow) while Directo and Noceda
(daughter and grandson) got only 1/5 each.

Sometime on the same year when the partitions happened, the nephew (donee)
constructed his house on the land donated to him by Directo. On the other hand, Directo
fenced the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement, excluding the donated
portion, and constructed thereon three huts.
Around 3 years later, the nephew removed the fence earlier constructed by Directo,
occupied the 3 huts, and fenced the entire land of Directo without her consent. The
latter demanded Noceda to vacate her land, but Noceda refused.

Hence, Directo filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership and
rescission/annulment of donation, against Noceda before the lower court. A survey was
conducted and it was found that the area stated in the settlement was smaller than the
actual area of the lot. The TC declared the second extra-judicial settlement-partition and
the deed of donation revoked (because of ingratitude). The court ordered the nephew
(done) to vacate and reconvey the property to Directo. CA affirmed.

The nephew contends that there was no real partition and thus, there is no basis for the
charge of usurpation and ingratitude. He also contends that granting revocation is
proper, the 1 year period for such revocation has already lapsed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in revoking the deed of donation

RULING: NO

The court held that:

“We find unmeritorious petitioner’s argument that since there was no effective and real
partition of the subject lot there exists no basis for the charge of usurpation and hence
there is also no basis for finding ingratitude against him.

It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the portion donated to him
by Directo but he also fenced the whole area of Lot C which belongs to Directo; thus,
petitioner’s act of occupying the portion pertaining to Directo without the latter’s
knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation which is an offense against the property
of the donor and considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor. The
law does not require conviction of the donee; it is enough that the offense be proved in
the action for revocation.

Sometime on the same year when the partitions happened, the nephew (donee)
constructed his house on the land donated to him by Directo. On the other hand, Directo
fenced the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement, excluding the donated
portion, and constructed thereon three huts.
Around 3 years later, the nephew removed the fence earlier constructed by Directo,
occupied the 3 huts, and fenced the entire land of Directo without her consent. The
latter demanded Noceda to vacate her land, but Noceda refused.

Hence, Directo filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership and
rescission/annulment of donation, against Noceda before the lower court. A survey was
conducted and it was found that the area stated in the settlement was smaller than the
actual area of the lot. The TC declared the second extra-judicial settlement-partition and
the deed of donation revoked (because of ingratitude). The court ordered the nephew
(done) to vacate and reconvey the property to Directo. CA affirmed.

The nephew contends that there was no real partition and thus, there is no basis for the
charge of usurpation and ingratitude. He also contends that granting revocation is
proper, the 1 year period for such revocation has already lapsed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in revoking the deed of donation

RULING: NO

The court held that:

“We find unmeritorious petitioner’s argument that since there was no effective and real
partition of the subject lot there exists no basis for the charge of usurpation and hence
there is also no basis for finding ingratitude against him.

It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the portion donated to him
by Directo but he also fenced the whole area of Lot C which belongs to Directo; thus,
petitioner’s act of occupying the portion pertaining to Directo without the latter’s
knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation which is an offense against the property
of the donor and considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor. The
law does not require conviction of the donee; it is enough that the offense be proved in
the action for revocation.

Donee alleged that he usurped donor’s property in the 1st week of September 1985
while the complaint for revocation was filed on September 16, 1986; thus, more than
one (1) year had passed from the alleged usurpation by petitioner of private
respondent’s share in Lot 1121.
Article 769 expressly states that:

a. the donor must file the action to revoke his donation within one year from the time he
had knowledge of the ingratitude of the done; and that;

b. it must be shown that it was possible for the donor to institute the said action within
the same period.
The concurrence of these two requisites must be shown by the donee in order to bar the
present action, which he failed to do so. He reckoned the one year prescriptive period
from the occurrence of the usurpation and not from the time the latter had the
knowledge of the usurpation. He also failed to prove that at the time Directo acquired
knowledge of his usurpation, it was possible for him to institute an action for revocation
of her donation.