Introduction

Model for Interpretation To assist readers to understand this chapter better and to appreciate its
significance it is necessary to introduce them briefly to the model for interpretation. Since this
model is developed later in this book a summary will suffice here.1 The model has three steps.
These are

Step 1: Options,

Step 2: Reasons and

Step 3: Decision.

Step 1: Options
This step identifies the options before the court. These consist of the various meanings of the
ambiguous provision and the effect that each meaning will cause if chosen as the legally correct
meaning. These meanings are designated Meanings 1–n and their effects as effects as Effects 1–
n. Meaning 1 causes Effect 1, Meaning 2 causes Effect 2 and so on.

Step 2: Reasons
This step formulates reasons for and against each meaning of the ambiguous provision. The aim
of the reasoning process is to identify the meaning whose effect is the best. In our analysis, this is
the effect with the highest net benefit. The meaning that causes this effect is the best meaning.

Step 3: Decision
Step 3 is a formality since it flows from Step 2. The reasoning process in Step 2 identified the
best meaning. In Step 3 the court formally makes the decision that decrees this meaning to be the
legally correct meaning of the ambiguous provision. Obviously a lawyer who is advising a client
does not decide the correct meaning as the court does. Instead they try to predict the meaning
that the court will choose.

Analysing Language

There are two reasons for analysing language when working with law. Both are connected to
interpreting law. Analysing language is necessary for interpretation in that a vital part of the
method for interpreting law is to identify precisely the ambiguity, including the meanings that
constitute the ambiguity, in the provision in statute or common law that makes interpretation
necessary. Analysing language is necessary for determining the limits of interpretation – in any
given case it is necessary to know what meanings are arguable and what meanings are not.

1. Ambiguity
Ambiguity creates the need for interpretation and yields the range of meanings that confront a
court. (These are represented as Meanings 1–n in our model). While there has been some
consideration of ambiguity by legal writers,2 given that ambiguity is so fundamental to
understanding interpretation there has been surprisingly little detailed analysis of it. While most
theories of interpretation address ambiguity in some way, the treatment is often cursory rather
than detailed. Conspicuously absent so far is a classification of ambiguity to assist in detecting,
understanding and resolving it.

This discussion seeks to rectify these problems at least in part. To start, it highlights the
relevance of ambiguity by explaining why it is so important to identify the various meanings of
an ambiguous provision when interpreting law.

Discussion then turns to techniques that lawyers can use to identify ambiguity. Ambiguity comes
in several forms so one technique involves using a classification system for ambiguity as a check
list and a guide. Since this classification is so important, this chapter pays it considerable
attention.

Then the discussion confronts two controversies. One concerns the scope of ambiguity, which
entails resolving a dispute as to whether ambiguity should be given a wide or a narrow meaning.
The text argues for a wide meaning on functional grounds. (Prior discussion of identifying
meanings and classifying ambiguity was premised on this wide view of the scope of ambiguity.)

The second controversy concerns the prevalence of ambiguity. Is language fraught with
ambiguity on a pandemic scale, or is it something that happens sometimes? Our argument is that
it happens sometimes rather than most of the time.

Identifying Meanings
Introduction
When interpreting law it is necessary to analyse the ambiguous provision to identify the
meanings that constitute the ambiguity. It is not enough just to sense that the provision is
ambiguous. Step 1 in the model for interpreting law directs those who interpret law to uncover
these various meanings and then to frame them in the clearest possible way. In short, Step 1
requires precise identification of the meanings that constitute and cause the ambiguity. Because
precise identification of the meanings is so crucial, lawyers need to develop a technique for
performing the task. Three techniques are explained here – using a dictionary, reusing the words
in another context and consulting a catalogue that contains a classification of ambiguity.

Dictionary
A simple and highly useful means of ascertaining possible meanings is to look up the word or
words in a dictionary. A standard English dictionary will at least give the broad sense of a word
by indicating a commonly accepted range of meanings. In this regard, dictionary definitions are a
useful, almost necessary starting point for interpretation. Be aware, though, of the limitations of a
dictionary – for example, no dictionary is perfect and words shimmy about. Moreover, some of
the forms of ambiguity would not ordinarily be captured or completely captured in the dictionary
definition of a term.

Obviously a dictionary merely indicates possible or permissible meanings of word and even than
not infallibly. A dictionary describes only ‘how a word can be used’ but emphatically does not
describe how it is ordinarily used or which meaning should prevail in a particular context.
Reuse Words
Another method is to take the words under scrutiny and use them in another context. This gives a
fresh look at the provision. It also enables you to make a contrast between two settings where the
provision is used and in this way may enlighten you as to the ambiguity and even as to its
possible resolution.

There is a good illustration in Corkery v Carpenter. There, Corkery had been charged with being
drunk while in charge of a ‘carriage’ because he was pedalling his bicycle while under the
influence of alcohol. The issue, therefore, was whether a bicycle was a ‘carriage’. To show
popular usage, counsel recited a popular music hall song. As far as relevant it went: ‘Daisy,
Daisy, give me your answer true, I’m half crazy, all for the love of you. It won’t be stylish
marriage, I can’t afford a carriage, but you’ll look sweet upon the seat of a bicycle built for two’.

Through the intensity of this marriage proposal readers can see how the song illustrates that in
popular usage the word ‘carriage’ is taken not to include a bicycle. Whether this was the legally
correct position was precisely the issue in this case. Unfortunately in the case, the rhetoric of
romance did not prevail and Corkery, the inebriated pedaller, was convicted. The court held that
the core meaning of ‘carriage’ was something that carries things or people – in other words a
form of conveyance. Since a bicycle carried people it was a carriage. Classification of Ambiguity
A catalogue of ambiguity is an aid to identifying ambiguity because it classifies ambiguity. It
does this by setting out various categories and subcategories of ambiguity. A lawyer who is
interpreting law can use these as a check list. These forms of ambiguity are discussed in detail in
another text and are summarised below.7 Some of these move beyond the entries in a dictionary
so that they include other ways in which words can have two or more meanings.8

Classification of Ambiguity
Introduction
As just discussed, one of the ways to identify ambiguity is to use a catalogue or classification of
ambiguity as a guide. Analysing ambiguity in this way demonstrates how ambiguity takes
different forms and thus provides lawyers with a catalogue of various types of ambiguity, which
can function as a checklist to assist in analysing ambiguity to identify all of the meanings of the
ambiguous provision. This assists readers in becoming more proficient at detecting ambiguity,
understanding its nature and framing arguments to resolve it. This is more so the case given that
some forms of ambiguity, for example ambiguity of implication, are not always obvious to an
untrained eye.

On the wide view of its scope ambiguity can be classified into five major types, most of which
contain sub types. The five types are lexical ambiguity, relational ambiguity, ambiguity of
implication, ambiguity from competing versions of a rule and ambiguity from a conflict between
rules. Knowing these categories may assist in detecting an ambiguity, understanding how it has
arisen and in formulating arguments to resolve it. These categories are fully explained in another
text, so what now follows is just an outline of these forms of ambiguity. This is followed by
discussion of some cases that are special because they can be contentious.

Lexical Ambiguity
Lexical or verbal ambiguity is ambiguity within words themselves. A word can have two or more
distinct meanings.11 In the phrase ‘offensive behaviour’ does the word ‘offensive’ mean
aggressive (as in taking the offensive) or disgusting? A word can also be wide or vague in its
terms and hence uncertain in its reach. How high does a person have to be to be ‘tall?’ How
much is enough? With open-ended expressions like these the best that a court can usually do is
rule, in each particular case as it arises, on which side of the line the item in question falls.

Relational Ambiguity
Ambiguity can lie in the structure of sentences. This can also be termed ‘syntactic or
grammatical ambiguity’. An example is the sentence: ‘The historic house was saved from
destruction by a developer’. It is not clear from this whether the developer saved the house or
was the person who threatened to destroy it. The concluding phrase ‘by a developer’ could as a
matter of syntax attach either to ‘saved’ or to ‘destruction’.

Implication
Ambiguity can arise from implication. There is an implication from the text that the words might
be read either more widely or more narrowly than their ordinary meaning. Something is
effectively to be added to the text or something is to be taken away from the text. Implication
raises the question of whether the text should or should not be read as subject to the implication.
Justification for making the implication can be found in the golden rule of interpretation (which
is discussed below).

An example of implication is the rule written on the walls of stations in the London underground
rail system. It says: ‘Dogs must be carried on the escalator’. To analyse this ambiguity it is
necessary to divide those who might travel on the escalator into two classes. Class 1 consists of
those who have a dog with them while Class 2 consists of those who do not have dog with them.
Taken literally, members of both Class 1 and Class 2 would have to carry a dog to ride the
escalator. This means that members of Class 2 would have to procure a dog by some means or
not ride the escalator.

Common sense, however, suggests that the sign has to be read subject to an implied
qualification. Its purpose is to protect dogs from harm. So the implied qualification is in all
likelihood that the sign is meant to apply to people in Class 1 only being those who have a dog
with them.

Competing Versions of a Rule

Ambiguity of competing versions of a rule occurs only with common law. It arises when, for
example, one judge frames a rule with one set of words while another judge frames the rule with
another set of words similar to but not identical with the first.

Conflict Between Rules

In ambiguity based on conflict between rules (in common law or statute), one rule regulates a
situation in one way while a second rule regulates the situation in another way.

Special Cases
In this context special cases refer to situations where facts do not precisely fall within the
language of a statute but do so if the provision is stretched. There are at least three cases. One
involves open terms (a form of lexical ambiguity), a second involves partial satisfaction (a form
of lexical ambiguity) while a third involves implied qualification and implied extension. These
raise a question as to the scope of ambiguity, which is why the text gives them special treatment.

Open Terms
This is a form of lexical ambiguity. Some terms are so vague, wide and subjective that they
effectively confer a discretion on a court. Common examples of such words in statutes are
provisions that authorise some authority to take action that must be ‘reasonable,’ ‘fit and proper,’
or ‘just and equitable’. These terms often raise a question of degree, for example how just and
equitable must it be to satisfy the requirement? The scope of these terms is chronically wide.
Therefore to make these terms more manageable courts often develop criteria and guidelines to
implement them. As a result such terms, although contained in statute, give rise to a new
common law as courts endeavour to turn their open texture into more definite standards. This is
referred to as statutory common law. Clearly with this type of ambiguity there is no list of
specific meanings but an amorphous spectrum of possibilities.

Partial Satisfaction
Partial satisfaction is a form of lexical ambiguity. Sometimes a fact partially satisfies the
expressed or assumed requirements of a term. There is a literary example in Banjo Patterson’s
poem Clancy of the Overflow, which refers to a letter written by a shearer with a ‘thumbnail
dipped in tar’. Is this a ‘pen’? Or is an inverted wooden packing case a ‘table’? This ambiguity is
sometimes described by reference to words having an umbra of certainty and a penumbra of
uncertainty. Cases that definitely fall within the term are the umbra. Cases on the fringe such as
the thumbnail dipped in tar and the inverted wooden packing case fall within a penumbra of
uncertainty.

Implied Extension and Implied Qualification

Implication takes two forms, implied extension and implied qualification. This can be explained
as a statute’s having a central meaning, an umbra that is uncontentious, and a possible or
arguable wider meaning, a penumbra that is contentious:

(1) Implied Qualification. An implied qualification narrows the scope of a provision by lessening
the area that it covers. It narrows the umbra.

(2) Implied Extension. An implied extension does the reverse. It extends the scope of a provision
by extending the area that it covers. It creates or expands the penumbra.

Scope of Ambiguity
The cases of vague terms, partial satisfaction and implication are important because they open up
the question of the scope of ambiguity. According to a narrow view of ambiguity these are not
proper ambiguities. In the discussion here the text just marks them for identification. The text
discusses the question of the scope of ambiguity below and in doing so refers back to this
description of these three disputed types of ambiguity. Scope of Ambiguity Introduction While
ambiguity makes interpretation necessary,16 somewhat ironically the word ‘ambiguity’ is itself
ambiguous or at least has been rendered so by lawyers. In their wisdom, or more likely their lack
of it, they have bestowed on it both a wide and a narrow meaning. The question therefore is
which meaning of ambiguity should courts adopt. To appreciate fully discussion of this question
it may be either helpful or necessary for the reader to acquaint themselves with the five types of
ambiguity – lexical ambiguity, relational ambiguity, ambiguity of implication, ambiguity from
competing versions of a rule and ambiguity from a conflict between rules – by reading again the
outline of them that is located earlier in this chapter.

The wide meaning is that for legal purposes ambiguity includes all five types including their sub-
types. The narrower view of ambiguity is to a substantial extent determined by inference because
it is generally implied rather than expressed.18 It has two components, which have been
explained above. One component excludes meanings that do not fall fully within the text of the
law. This encompasses lexical ambiguity based on partial satisfaction and ambiguity of
implication. A second component excludes lexical ambiguity based on vagueness.

Wide Meaning
The wide meaning is the basis of the analysis of language presented in this chapter. The wide
view is that there is ambiguity when ‘the intention of the legislature is for whatever reason
doubtful’ (which is why it fully includes all of the five types of ambiguity). This is plain logic. A
provision is ambiguous for the purposes of legal interpretation if there is some uncertainty about
its meaning, leading to uncertainty as to whether or not the provision applies to the facts of a
case. On one view of the law it applies, on another view it does not. So, ambiguity exists where
by any stretch of the imagination a provision could reasonably be interpreted and applied one
way or another. In other words, whatever generates the need for interpretation constitutes
ambiguity. Glanville Williams also takes this view. As he put it, the proper test is to put the
question: Does the provision in the case apply or not apply to particular facts? If on a reasonable
view either a ‘yes’ and a ‘no’ is possible, there is ambiguity. On this line of reasoning, a court can
decide that there is no ambiguity on a point only if it decides in the context of the case before it
that ‘[any] alternative interpretation is impossible on

Proposed Exclusion 1: Meaning not Fully Within Text of Law

One strand of the narrow form of ambiguity is based on a proposed meaning of a provision not
falling totally within the text of the ambiguous provision.
There are two specific types:
(1) Ambiguity of Implication. This is by far the most common exclusion, and occurs in texts,
legislation and cases. Yet despite this neglect of ambiguity of implication in formal discussion,
there is wide resort to this ambiguity in cases.
(2) Partial Satisfaction. This applies where the meaning falls partly within the provision and
partly outside.

Both of these forms of ambiguity raise the question of how far courts should allow language to
go. Must an item fall squarely with a word or phrase, that is, within the umbra? Or is it enough
that they fall fairly but not squarely or precisely within the term, that is, within the penumbra?
An extreme literal approach would not countenance ambiguities of this kind. Either the facts fit
the words precisely or they do not fit them at all. This approach is referred to in the United States
as textualism, or in its latter day appearance, the new textualism. As an illustration the United
States Supreme Court decided a case where the relevant provision provided a higher penalty for
purchasing drugs in the case where the purchaser ‘used’ a gun in the course of the purchase. In
this case the purchaser sought to barter the gun for drugs. Defence counsel argued an implied
qualification so that one ‘used’ a gun for the purpose of the statute when one used it as a firearm.
The Supreme Court, however, refused to impose the implied qualification and so held that the
defendant ‘used’ the gun for the purchase.25 An alternative approach takes into account that
language is not an inherently precise means of communication and that attempts to make it more
precise will often cause a legislature to use more rather than fewer words. Further, where the
intention of the legislature is obvious, rational and just, the legalism entailed in a strict reading of
the scope of words defies common sense and creates unnecessary disruption and disorder.

Proposed Exclusion 2: Vagueness

The narrow view may exclude lexical ambiguity to the extent that it arises from words that are
vague or uncertain. For example, s15AB(1)(b)(i) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) draws
a distinction between a provision which is ‘ambiguous’ and one which is ‘obscure’. Dickerson
also argues for this distinction in the following way: ‘Whereas ‘ambiguity’ in its classical sense
refers to equivocation, “vagueness” refers to the degree to which, independently of equivocation,
language is uncertain in its respective application to a number of particulars. Whereas the
uncertainty of ambiguity is central, with an “either or” challenge, the uncertainty of vagueness
lies in a marginal question of degree’.

Resolution
This chapter adopts the wider view. The best reason for taking the wider view is that justice is
generally better served by allowing courts to take the wider view. While it may involve some
damage to the proper use of language it is avoids unnecessary complications with only minor
cost. There is some general judicial support for the wider view. The golden rule of interpretation
also provides some support for the wider view in relation to ambiguity of implication and
ambiguity based on partial satisfaction. It applies where the literal sense of a statute would ‘lead
to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency’ with the rest of the statute.30 These, it
should be noted are fairly extreme cases.31 When it operates, the golden rule allows a court to
depart from the ordinary meaning of the language of a statute by bending the meaning of a
provision by resorting to implication or by allowing a meaning that only partially fits within the
words of the statute.

Relevance of Ambiguity
Introduction
When a lawyer or court is confronted with a question of interpretation logically one of the first
things that they need to do is to identify the meanings of the ambiguous provision and the effects
that each will cause. As described above, this is Step 1 in the model for interpreting law. For
reasons given below, this is of major importance. Unless one can analyse language to identify the
various meanings of an ambiguous provision it is not possible to interpret law either as a lawyer
or a judge. Trying to interpret law without identifying ambiguity in biblical terms is akin to
building bricks without straw. While it might seem intuitively right to identify the meanings of
the ambiguous provision and their effects it will enhance the interpretive skills of readers if the
reasons for this are articulated. There are in fact three major reasons for identifying the options.
It defines the problem, it identifies the solution to the problem, and it enables reasons to target
the particular meaning to which they must be addressed.

Defining the Problem

Identifying all of the meanings of the ambiguous provision defines the problem. When
interpreting law the problem arises from a provision of a statute being ambiguous. Step 1 defines
the problem by identifying each of the various meanings of this ambiguous provision. The
existence of these meanings generates the ambiguity. By identifying these meanings the court
knows precisely what the problem is. By identifying the effects that each meaning will cause the
court knows the significance of the problem. When the court chooses one of these meanings as
legally correct it is implementing the effect that that meaning will cause. At the same time it is
rejecting the effects that the other meanings would cause if chosen as correct. Thus, identifying
the meanings and their effects makes clear what choice the ambiguity has imposed on the court.
It must decide which of several competing meanings of the ambiguous provision is legally
correct and by this means introduce into the world the effect that this particular meaning will
cause.

Identifying the Solution

If the lawyer or the court correctly identifies all possible meanings of the ambiguous provision it
also identifies the solution to the problem – it must be one or more of those meanings. This is
how the model seeks to ensure that the task is done comprehensively so that nothing of relevance
is overlooked. In consequence, one of the options must constitute the best available solution to
the problem.45 Conversely, if not all options have been identified there is always the possibility
that the best outcome consists of an option that has not been identified – in consequence it will
not be appraised by the court in Step 2 and therefore cannot be indorsed in Step 3 as the legally
correct meaning of the provision.

Assisting the Reasoning Process

Identifying all of the meanings of the ambiguous provision is necessary for the reasoning
process, which takes place in Step 2 of the model. This reasoning consists of arguments
addressed for or against options. Any reason or argument addressed to the court makes sense
only if it is directed to a meaning of the ambiguous provision. It seeks to persuade the court to
accept or reject that meaning as the legally correct meaning of the ambiguous provision.
Obviously, it is not possible to formulate an argument for or against a meaning until the
meanings have been precisely identified.

2. Limits to Interpretation
Ambiguity provides an interpreting court with a choice. This choice, however, is not unlimited.
Conveniently the limits can be stated in two phases. There are general limits, which are imposed
by the fact that any interpretation made by a court must fit broadly or reasonably within the
limits of the language used in the ambiguous rule. Within this broad limit there are specific limits
imposed by the various types of ambiguity. Each ambiguity confers a choice, while at the same
time imposing limits on that choice. This analysis of language is directly relevant to interpreting
law. It is also relevant to any consideration of the contentious question of judicial activism.
Obviously the limits of interpretation set outer limits to the creative role of the courts when
interpreting law (but not when making common law). The question then is whether there are any
ascertainable inner limits that define the proper creative role of a court.

General Limits: Language

[U]nless the statute plainly hands courts the power to create and revise a form of common law,
the domain of the statute should be restricted to cases anticipated by its framers and expressly
resolved in the legislative process.

Introduction
The proposition that language sets limits on interpretation flows from two other propositions.
Here are all three of these propositions:
(1) Ambiguity as the Problem. Ambiguity is the source of a problem because it gives rise to the
need for interpretation. An ambiguous word or phrase has two or more meanings and a court
must decide which is legally correct.
(2) Ambiguity as the Answer. Ambiguity, however, is also the source of the answer. The answer
to the question of interpretation lies within these meanings.
(3) Limits of Language. Logically, a court can choose its answer to the question of interpretation
only from the meanings that the ambiguous word or phrase properly yields up. This is how
language sets limits on the function of interpretation. If the language of the ambiguous law does
not encompass a meaning of a provision then it is not available as the legally correct
interpretation

Exceptions
In prior discussion in this chapter we considered two special types of ambiguity – ambiguity
based on partial satisfaction and ambiguity based on implication. In both of these cases courts
accept as proper meanings the meaning derived from partial satisfaction and implication where
the meaning fitted fairly but not squarely within the words of the provision. These operate as
exceptions or qualifications to the literal rule. Comment Relevant to our analysis is that many
lawyers are not fully conscious of implied qualification and implied extension to a statute.
Consequently, they fail to know and appreciate the only meaning of the literal rule that makes
sense. This failure to recognise qualification or extension of a statute explicitly occurs in texts,
cases and legislation, despite widespread resort implication in cases. Confusion ensues, and this
confusion generates a substantial amount of muddled comment about the nature of statutory
interpretation.

Specific Limits: Ambiguity

As has just been discussed, the words of the common law or statutory rule that is ambiguous set
outer limits to the scope of the statute. These limits are stated in the fundamental notion that the
language is the law and the law is the language, which leads to the proposition that a court may
give a meaning to words only if these words are ‘reasonably open to such a construction’. Within
this broad limit there are further limits imposed by the various types of ambiguity. According to
the classification deployed in this book, there are five types of ambiguity:
# lexical ambiguity
# relational ambiguity
# ambiguity of implication
# ambiguity from competing versions of a rule
# ambiguity from a conflict between rules. Each form of ambiguity confers a choice on a court.
At the same time they define and impose limits on that choice. These forms of ambiguity are
outlined above. They are discussed in detail in another text, which also explains both the leeway
that they furnish for interpretation and the limits that they impose.
 Lagman vs. Medialdea

Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216
declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.

Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a written
Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.

The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and
worsened with the passing of time.

Mindanao has been the hotbed of violent extremism and a brewing rebellion for decades. In more recent years, we have
witnessed the perpetration of numerous acts of violence challenging the authority of the duly constituted authorities, i.e.,
the Zamboanga siege, the Davao bombing, the Mamasapano carnage, and the bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat,
Sulu, and Basilan, among others. Two armed groups have figured prominently in all these, namely, the Abu Sayaff Group
(ASG) and the ISIS-backed Maute Group.

The President went on to explain that on May 23, 2017, a governmeµt operation to capture the high-ranking officers of the Abu
Sayyaf (ASG) and the Maute Group was conducted. These groups, which have been unleashing havoc in Mindanao, however,
confronted the government operation by intensifying their efforts at sowing violence aimed not only against the government
authorities and its facilities but likewise against civilians and their properties.

On 23 May 2017, a government operation to capture Isnilon Hapilon, a senior leader of the ASG, and Maute Group operational
leaders, Abdullah and Omarkhayam Maute, was confronted with armed resistance which escalated into open hostility against the
government. Through these groups' armed siege and acts of violence directed towards civilians and government authorities,
institutions and establishments, they were able to take control of major social, economic, and political foundations of Marawi City
which led to its paralysis. This sudden taking of control was intended to lay the groundwork for the eventual establishment of a
DAESH wilayat or province in Mindanao.

The unfolding of these events, as well as the classified reports he received, led the President to conclude that:

These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to establish the groups' seat of power in
Marawi City for their planned establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province covering the entire Mindanao.

The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the recruitment of young Muslims to further expand their ranks and
strengthen their force; the armed consolidation of their members throughout Marawi City; the decimation of a segment of
the city population who resist; and the brazen display of DAESH flags constitute a clear, pronounced, and unmistakable intent to
remove Marawi City, and eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its allegiance to the Government.

There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to deprive the President of his power, authority, and
prerogatives within Marawi City as a precedent to spreading their control over the entire Mindanao, in an attempt to
undermine his control over executive departments, bureaus, and offices in said area; defeat his mandate to ensure that all
laws are faithfully executed; and remove his supervisory powers over local govemments.

The groups' occupation of Marawi City fulfills a strategic objective because of its terrain and the easy access it provides to
other parts of Mindanao. Lawless armed groups have historically used provinces adjoining Marawi City as escape routes,
supply lines, and backdoor passages.

Considering the network and alliance-building activities among terrorist groups, local criminals, and lawless armed men,
the siege of Marawi City is a vital cog in attaining their long-standing goal: absolute control over the entirety of Mindanao.
These circumstances demand swift and decisive action to ensure the safety and security of the Filipino people and
preserve our national integrity

After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S. Resolution No. 3888 expressing full support to the
martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 "to be satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law" . In the
same Resolution, the Senate declared that it found "no compelling reason to revoke the same". The Senate's counterpart in the
lower house shared the same sentiments.

Lagman's petition:

There is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any part of Mindanao. It argues that acts of terrorism in Mindanao do not
constitute rebellion since there is no proof that its purpose is to remove Mindanao or any part thereof from allegiance to the
Philippines, its laws, or its territory. It labels the flying of ISIS flag by the Maute Group in Marawi City and other outlying areas as
mere propaganda and not an open attempt to remove such areas from the allegiance to the Philippine Government and deprive the
Chief Executive of the assertion an exercise of his powers and prerogatives therein.

The Lagman Petition also avers that Gen. Salvador Mison, Jr. himself admitted that the current armed conflict in Marawi City was
precipitated or initiated by the government in its bid to capture Hapilon. That all the acts of terrorism found in the report of Duterte
are fake.
The Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis considering that the President acted
alone and did not consult the military establishment or any ranking official before making the proclamation.

Based on the review by the Senate, there was absence of any hostile plan by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front; and the number of
foreign fighters allied with ISIS was "undetermined" which indicates that there are only a meager number of foreign fighters who can
lend support to the Maute Group.

Cullamat’s petitions:

In particular, it avers that the supposed rebellion described in Proclamation No. 216 relates to events happening in Marawi City only
and not in the entire region of Mindanao. It concludes that Proclamation No 216 "failed to show any factual basis for the imposition
of martial law in the entire Mindanao," "failed to allege any act of rebellion outside Marawi City, much less x x x allege that public
safety requires the imposition of martial law in the whole of Mindanao".

The Cullamat Petition claims that the alleged "capability of the Maute Group and other rebel groups to sow terror and cause death
and damage to property" does not rise to the level of rebellion sufficient to declare martial law in the whole of Mindanao. It also
posits that there is no lawless violence in other parts of Mindanao similar to that in Marawi City.

In addition, the Cullamat Petition cites alleged inaccuracies, exaggerations, and falsities in the Report of the President to Congress.

Mohamad’s petitions:

It contends that the extraordinary powers of the President should be dispensed sequentially, i.e., first, the power to call out the
armed forces; second, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and finally, the power to declare martial law.
It maintains that the President has no discretion to choose which extraordinary power to use; moreover, his choice must be dictated
only by, and commensurate to, the exigencies of the situation.

It asserts that the Marawi incidents "do not equate to the existence of a public necessity brought about by an actual rebellion, which
would compel the imposition of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus".

The Report by the President regarding martial law is bereft of substantiation.

Finally, in invoking this Court's power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the Mohamad Petition insists that the Court may "look into the wisdom of
the [President's] actions, [and] not just the presence of arbitrariness".

The Government’s petition:

The OSG acknowledges that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution vests the Court with the authority or power to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law. The OSG, however, posits that although Section 18, Article VII lays
the basis for the exercise of such authority or power, the same constitutional provision failed to specify the vehicle, mode or remedy
through which the "appropriate proceeding" mentioned therein may be resorted to.

Sufficiency of facts in the proclamation should be reviewed under the lens of grave abuse of discretion.

Likewise, the OSG posits that the sufficiency of the factual basis must be assessed from the trajectory or point of view of the
President and based on the facts available to him at the time the decision was made. It argues that the sufficiency of the factual
basis should be examined not based on the facts discovered after the President had made his decision to declare martial law
because to do so would subject the exercise of the President's discretion to an impossible standard. It reiterates that the President's
decision should be guided only by the information and data available to him at the time he made the determination. The OSG thus
asserts that facts that were established after the declaration of martial law should not be considered in the review of the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law.

The OSG fears that the Court considers after-proclamation-facts in its review of the sufficiency of the factual basis for the
proclamation, it would in effect usurp the powers of the Congress to determine whether martial law should be revoked or extended.

Since the power to declare martial law is vested solely on the President as Commander-in-Chief, the lack of recommendation from
the Defense Secretary, or any official for that matter, will not nullify the said declaration, or affect its validity, or compromise the
sufficiency of the factual basis.

Moreover, the OSG opines that the petitioners miserably failed to validly refute the facts cited by the President in Proclamation No.
216 and in his Report to the Congress by merely citing news reports that supposedly contradict the facts asserted therein or by
criticizing in piecemeal the happenings in Marawi. For the OSG, the said news articles are "hearsay evidence, twice removed," and
thus inadmissible and without probative value, and could not overcome the "legal presumption bestowed on governmental acts".

Finally, the OSG points out that it has no duty or burden to prove that Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual basis. It maintains
that the burden rests with the petitioners. (He who alleges must prove)

ISSUES
W/N petitioners has locus standi

W/N the petition to review the validity of declaring martial law is appropriate

W/N the power to review by the court is independent on the power to review by the legislature

W/N the power to review by the court calibrates the power of the president

W/N the facts which the proclamation was based depends on the approval of the Defense Secretary

W/N the proclamation fits the void for vagueness doctrine

W/N there is an actual rebellion

RULING

W/N petitioners has locus standi – Yes.

One of the requisites for judicial review is locus standi, i.e., "the constitutional question is brought before [the Court] by a party
having the requisite 'standing' to challenge it." As a general rule, the challenger must have "a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." Over the years, there has been a trend
towards relaxation of the rule on legal standing, a prime example of which is found in Section 18 of Article VII which provides that
any citizen may file the appropriate proceeding to assail the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. "[T]he only requisite for standing to challenge the validity of the suspension
is that the challenger be a citizen. He need not even be a taxpayer."

Petitioners in the Cullamat Petition claim to be "suing in their capacities as citizens of the Republic;" similarly, petitioners in the
Mohamad Petition all claim to be "Filipino citizens, all women, all of legal [age], and residents of Marawi City".

In the Lagman petition, petitioners therein did not categorically mention that they are suing as citizens but merely referred to
themselves as duly elected Representatives. Considering, however, the trend towards relaxation of the rules on legal standing, as
well as in the transcendental issues involved in the present Petitions, the Court will exercise judicial self-restraint and will not venture
into this matter.

In any case, the Court can take judicial cognizance of the fact that petitioners in the Lagman Petition are all citizens of the
Philippines since Philippine citizenship is a requirement fof them to be elected as representatives. We will therefore consider them
as suing in their own behalf as citizens of this country. Besides, respondent did not question petitioners' legal standing.

W/N the petition to review the validity of declaring martial law is appropriate – Yes. It is sui generis.

During the oral argument, the petitioners theorized that the jurisdiction of this Court under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article
VII is sui generis. It is a special and specific jurisdiction of the Supreme Court different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of
Article VIII.

It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or by the law. Unless jurisdiction has been
specifically conferred by the Constitution or by some legislative act, no body or tribunal has the power to act or pass upon a matter
brought before it for resolution. It is likewise settled that in the absence of a clear legislative intent, jurisdiction cannot be implied
from the language of the Constitution or a statute. It must appear clearly from the law or it will not be held to exist.

A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority to the Court to determine the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension. Put differently, if this Court applies the standard of review used in a petition for
certiorari, the same would emasculate its constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII.

Section 18, Article VII is meant to provide additional safeguard against possible abuse by the President in the exercise of his power
to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Reeling from the aftermath of the Marcos martial law,
the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise to insert the now third paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII.

To give more teeth to this additional safeguard, the framers of the 1987 Constitution not only placed the President's proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus within the ambit of judicial review, it also relaxed the rule on
standing by allowing any citizen to question before this Court the sufficiency of the factual basis of such proclamation or suspension.
Moreover, the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII veritably conferred upon any citizen a demandable right to challenge the
sufficiency of the factual basis of said proclamation or suspension. It further designated this Court as the reviewing tribunal to
examine, in an appropriate proceeding, the sufficiency of the factual basis, and to render its decision thereon within a limited period
of 30 days from date of filing.
The most important objective, however, of Section 18, Article VII is the curtailment of the extent of the powers of the Commander-in-
Chief. This is the primary reason why the provision was not placed in Article VIII or the Judicial Department but remained under
Article VII or the Executive Department.

While traditional powers inherent in the office of the President are granted, nonetheless for the first time, there are specific
provisions which curtail the extent of such powers. Most significant is the power of the Chief Executive to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or proclaim martial law.

To conclude that the "appropriate proceeding" refers to a Petition for Certiorari filed under the expanded jurisdiction of this Court
would, therefore, contradict the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution to place additional safeguards against possible
martial law abuse for, invariably, the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII would be subsumed under Section 1 of Article VIII. In
other words, the framers of the Constitution added the safeguard under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII on top of the
expanded jurisdiction of this Court.

The jurisdiction of this Court is not restricted to those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. For instance, its jurisdiction to
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President can be found in
the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII. The power of the Court to review on certiorari the decision, order, or ruling of the
Commission on Elections and Commission on Audit can be found in Section 7, Article IX(A).

The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate that it should be treated as sui generis separate
and different from those enumerated in Article VIII. Under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed pursuant
therewith will follow a different rule on standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the Constitution also limits the issue to
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive of his emergency powers. The usual period for filing
pleadings in Petition for Certiorari is likewise not applicable under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII considering the
limited period within which this Court has to promulgate its decision.

In fine, the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action
initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive's
emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.

W/N the power to review by the court is independent on the power to review by the legislature – Yes.

The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the scope of the/ extraordinary powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief
and the review of the said presidential action. In particular, the President' extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and imposing martial law are subject to the veto powers of the Court and Congress.

The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in any appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack
sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only the information and data
available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration; it is not allowed to "undertake an independent investigation
beyond the pleadings." On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise events
supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court which does not look into the absolute correctness of the factual basis as will be
discussed below, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.

In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an appropriate proceeding" by a
citizen. On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it, may be activated by Congress itself at any
time after the proclamation or suspension was made. Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress
are not only totally different but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is,
the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to review can be exercised independently
from the power of revocation of Congress.

If only to show that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution was to vest the Court and Congress with veto powers
independently from each other

A petition for a writ of habeas corpus, if the Members are detained, can immediately be applied for, and the Supreme
Court shall also review the factual basis

By the above pronouncement, the Court willingly but unwittingly clipped its own power and surrendered the same to Congress as
well as: abdicated from its bounden duty to review. Worse, the Court considered itself just on stand-by, waiting and willing to act as
a substitute in case Congress "defaults." It is an aberration, a stray declaration, which must be rectified and set aside in this
proceeding.

We, therefore, hold that the Court can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and independently from, the power to
revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or default on the part of Congress does not deprive or deny the Court of its
power to review.

W/N the power to review by the court calibrates the power of the president – No.
Among the three extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the most benign and involves ordinary police action. The President
may resort to this extraordinary power whenever it becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or
rebellion. "[T]he power to call is fully discretionary to the President;" the only limitations being that he acts within permissible
constitutional boundaries or in a manner not constituting grave abuse of discretion.In fact, "the actual use to which the President
puts the armed forces is xx x not subject to judicial review.

The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or declaring martial law may be exercised
only when there is actual invasion or rebellion, and public safety requires it. Limitations of martial law and or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus:

(1) time limit of 60 days,

(2) review and possible revocation of congress,
(3) review and possible nullification of SC

The powers to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus involve curtailment and suppression of
civil rights and individual freedom. Thus, the declaration of martial law serves as a warning to citizens that the Executive Department
has called upon the military to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and while the emergency remains, the citizens must,
under pain of arrest and punishment, not act in a manner that will render it more difficult to restore order and enforce the law. As
such, their exercise requires more stringent safeguards by the Congress, and review by the Court.

What really happens during the imposition of martial law?

Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice on March 13, 2006, stated that under a valid declaration of martial law, the
President as Commander-in-Chief may order the "(a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies;
(c) [takeover] of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees.

Worthy to note, however, that the above-cited acts that the Presidenf may perform do not give him unbridled discretion to infringe on
the rights of civilians during martial law. This is because martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, neither does
it supplant the operation of civil courts or legislative assemblies. Moreover, the guarantees under th Bill of Rights remain in place
during its pendency. And in such instances where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is also suspended, such suspension
applies only to those judicially charged with rebellion or offense connected with it.

GRADUATION OF POWERS

Indeed, the 1987 Constitution gives the "President, as Commander-in-Chief, a 'sequence' of 'graduated power[s]'.

It must be stressed, however, that the graduation refers only to hierarchy based on scope and effect. It does not in any manner refer
to a sequence, arrangement, or order which the Commander-in-Chief must follow. This so-called "graduation of powers" does not
dictate or restrict the manner by which the President decides which power to choose.

These extraordinary powers are conferred by the Constitution with the President as Commander-in-Chief; it therefore necessarily
follows that the power and prerogative to determine whether the situation warrants a mere exercise of the calling out power; or
whether the situation demands suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; or whether it calls for the declaration of
martial law, also lies, at least initially, with the President. The power to choose, initially, which among these extraordinary powers to
wield in a given set of conditions is a judgment call on the part of the President. As Commander-in-Chief, his powers are broad
enough to include his prerogative to address exigencies or threats that endanger the government, and the very integrity of the State.

It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President's decision pertaining to which
extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive
domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the President.

The elimination by the framers of the 1987 Constitution of the requirement of prior concurrence of the Congress in the initial
imposition of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus further supports the conclusion that judicial
review does not include the calibration of the President's decision of which of his graduated powers be availed of in a given
situation.

It cannot be overemphasized that time is paramount in situations in necessitating the proclamation of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It was precisely this time element that prompted the Constitutional Commission to
eliminate the requirement of concurrence of the Congress in the initial imposition by the President of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Considering that the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is now anchored on actual invasion or rebellion and when public safety requires it, and is no longer under threat or
in imminent danger thereof, there is a necessity and urgency for the President to act quickly to protect the country. The Court, as
Congress does, must thus accord the President the same leeway by not wading into the realm that is reserved exclusively by the
Constitution to the Executive Department.

W/N the facts which the proclamation was based depends on the approval of the Defense Secretary – No.

Even the recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of National Defense, or other high-ranking military officials, is not a
condition for the President to declare martial law. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the
President's power to declare martial law is not subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual invasion or rebellion
and that public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if the decision of the President is made dependent
on the recommendation of his mere alter ego. Rightly so, it is only on the President and no other that the exercise of the powers of
the Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is bestowed.

In any event, the President initially employed the most benign action - the calling out power before he declared martial law and
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Proclamation No. 55 on September 4, 2016, declaring a state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao.
This, in fact, is extant in the first Whereas Clause of Proclamation No. 216. Based on the foregoing presidential actions, it can be
gleaned that although there is no obligation or requirement on his part to use his extraordinary powers on a graduated or sequential
basis still the President made the conscious and deliberate effort to first employ the most benign from among his extraordinary
powers. As the initial and preliminary step towards suppressing and preventing the armed hostilities in Mindanao, the President
decided to use his calling out power first. Unfortunately, the situation did not improve; on the contrary, it only worsened. Thus,
exercising his sole and exclusive prerogative, the President decided to impose martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus on the belief that the armed hostilities in Mindanao already amount to actual rebellion and publif safety requires it.

W/N the proclamation fits the void for vagueness doctrine – No.

Proclamation No. 216 is being facially challenged on the ground of "vagueness" by the insertion of the phrase "other rebel groups"
in its Whereas Clause and for lack of available guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao
region, making the proclamation susceptible to broad interpretation, misinterpretation, confusion.

The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application." "[A] statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. [In such instance, the statute] is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted
by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

The vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are
called in American law, First Amendment cases. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and also to one which is
overbroad because of possible "'chilling effect' on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who
does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking
in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence."

Clearly, facial review of Proclamation No. 216 on the grounds void for vagueness is unwarranted. Proclamation No. 216 does not
regulate speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights that may be facial challenged. What it seeks to penalize is
conduct, not speech.

The contention that the phrase "other rebel groups" leaves Proclamation No. 216 open to broad interpretation, misinterpretation, and
confusion, cannot be sustained. The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in the
context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to "other rebel groups" found in Proclamation
No. 55, which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas clauses. Neither could Proclamation No. 216 be described as vague, and
thus void, on the ground that it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region.
Besides, operational guidelines will serve only as mere tools for the implementation of the proclamation.

Clearly, therefore, there is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the implementing and/or operational guidelines,
general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the proclamation for being, irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act
committed under the said orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws, such as criminal acts or human rights violations,
should be resolved in a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades into these areas, it would be deemed as
trespassing into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its power to revoke.

Nullifying the Proclamation will have no adverse effect on previous actions commenced by the President pursuant to the
situation

The Court's ruling in these cases will not, in any way, affect the President's declaration of a state of national emergency on account
of lawless violence in Mindanao through Proclamation No. 55 dated September 4, 2016, where he called upon the Armed Forces
and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to undertake such measures to suppress any and all forms of lawless violence in the
Mindanao region, and to prevent such lawless violence from spreading and escalating elsewhere in the Philippines.

In Kulayan v. Tan, the Court ruled that the President's calling out power is in a different category from the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to declare martial law:

Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis
thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President's action to
call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare
martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution
would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and review without any
qualification.
In other words, the President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently of the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, although, of course, it may also be a prelude to a possible future
exercise of the latter powers, as in this case.

Even so, the Court's review of the President's declaration of martial law and his calling out the Armed Forces necessarily entails
separate proceedings instituted for that particular purpose.

As explained in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, the President's exercise of his power to call out the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion may only be examined by the Court as to whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.

This locus standi requirement, however, need not be complied with in so far as the Court's jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the President's declaration of martial law.

But, even assuming arguendo that the Court finds no sufficient basis for the declaration of martial law in this case, such ruling could
not affect the President's exercise of his calling out power through Proclamation No. 55. Neither would the nullification of
Proclamation No. 216 result in the nullification of the acts of the President done pursuant thereto. Under the "operative fact
doctrine," the unconstitutional statute is recognized as an "operative fact" before it is declared unconstitutional.

'The actual existence of a statute prior to such a determination [of constitutionality], is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.

Scope of the power to review – on to factual basis existing prior to proclamation

The 1987 Constitution, by providing only for judicial review based on th determination of the sufficiency of the factual bases, has in
fact done away with the test of arbitrariness as provided in Lansang.

Similarly, under the doctrine of contemporaneous construction, the framers of the 1987 Constitution are presumed to know the
prevailing jurisprudence at the time they were drafting the Constitution. Thus, the phrase "sufficiency of factual basis" in Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution should be understood as the only test for judicial review of the. President's power to declare martial
law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. The Court does not need
to satisfy itself that the President's decision is correct, rather it only needs to determine whether the President's decision had
sufficient factual bases.

As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and the review of this Court. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment
call of the President, the determination of this Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such, must be
based only on facts or information known by o available to the President at the time he made the declaration or suspension which
facts or information are found in the proclamation as well as that written Report submitted by him to Congress. These may be based
on that situation existing at the time the declaration was made or past events. As to how far the past events should be from the
present depends on the President.

As to what facts must be stated in the proclamation and the written Report is up to the President. As Commander-in-Chief, he has
sole discretion to determine what to include and what not to include in the proclamation and the written Report taking into account
the urgency of the situation as well as national security. He cannot be forced to divulge intelligence reports and confidential
information that may prejudice the operations and the safety of the military.

Similarly, events that happened after the issuance of the proclamation, which are included in the written report, cannot be
considered in determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus since these happened after the President had already issued the proclamation. If at all, they may be
used only as tools, guides or reference in the Court's determination of the sufficiency of factual basis, but not as part or component
of the portfolio of the factual basis itself.

In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the suspension, the Court should look into the full
complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness
of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and
veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To require precision in the President's appreciation of facts
would unduly burden him and therefore impede the process of his decision-making. Such a requirement will practically necessitate
the President to be on the ground to confirm the correctness of the reports submitted to him within a period that only the
circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate. Such a scenario, of course, would not only place the President in peril but would
also defeat the very purpose of the grant of emergency powers upon him.

Corollary, as the President is expected to decide quickly on whether there is a need to proclaim martial law even only on the basis of
intelligence reports, it is irrelevant, for purposes of the Court's review, if subsequent events prove that the situation had not been
accurately reported to him.

In sum, the Court's power to review is limited to the determination of whether the President in declaring martial law and suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had sufficient factual basis. Thus, our review would be limited to an examination on
whether the President acted within the bounds set by the Constitution, i.e., whether the facts in his possession prior to and at the
time of the declaration or suspension are sufficient for him to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.

W/N there is an actual rebellion – Yes.

Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law
and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, "namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety
requires the exercise of such power." Without the concurrence of the two conditions, the President's declaration of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must be struck down.

Thus, rebellion as mentioned in the Constitution could only refer to rebellion as defined under Article 134 of the RPC. To give it a
different definition would not only create confusion but would also give the President wide latitude of discretion, which may be
abused - a situation that the constitution seeks to prevent.

Thus, for rebellion to exist, the following elements must be present, to wit: "(l) there is a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms
against the Government; and (2) the purpose of the uprising or movement is either (a) to remove from the allegiance to the
Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or
(b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives."

Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, concluded that the President needs only to satisfy probable cause as the standard of proof
in determining the existence of either invasion or rebellion for purposes of declaring martial law, and that probable cause is the most
reasonable, most practical and most expedient standard by which the President can fully ascertain the existence or non-existence
of rebellion necessary for a declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ. This is because unlike other standards of proof,
which, in order to be met, would require much from the President and therefore unduly restrain his exercise of emergency powers,
the requirement of probable cause is much simpler.

At this juncture, it bears to emphasize that the purpose of judicial review is not the determination of accuracy or veracity of the facts
upon which the President anchored his declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; rather,
only the sufficiency of the factual basis as to convince the President that there is probable cause that rebellion exists. It must also be
reiterated that martial law is a matter of urgency and much leeway and flexibility should be accorded the President. As such, he is
not expected to completely validate all the information he received before declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.

Petitioners concede that there is an armed public uprising in Marawi City. However, they insist that the armed hostilities do not
constitute rebellion in the absence of the element of culpable political purpose, i.e., the removal from the allegiance to the Philippine
Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or
(b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.

After the assessment by the President of the aforementioned facts, he arrived at the following conclusions, as mentioned in
Proclamation No. 216 and the Report:

1) The Maute Group is "openly attempting to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government this part of
Mindanao and deprive the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain
public order and safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of rebellion."

2) "[L]awless armed groups have taken up arms and committed public uprising against the duly constituted government
and against the people of Mindanao, for the purpose of removing Mindanao -starting with the City of Marawi, Lanao del
Sur -from its allegiance to the Government and its laws and depriving the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives
to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, to the great damage, prejudice, and
detriment of the people therein and the nation as a whole."

3) The May 23, 2017 events "put on public display the groups' clear intention to establish an Islamic State and their
capability to deprive the duly constituted authorities -the President, foremost -of their powers and prerogatives. "

4) "These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to establish the groups' seat of power in
Marawi City for their planned establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province covering the entire Mindanao. "

5) "The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the recruitment of young Muslims to further expand their ranks
and strengthen their force; the armed consolidation of their members throughout Marawi City; the decimation of a
segment of the city population who resist; and the brazen display of DAESH flags constitute a clear, pronounced, and
unmistakable intent to remove Marawi City, and eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its allegiance to the Government

6) "There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to deprive the President of his power, authority, and
prerogatives within Marawi City as a precedent to spreading their control over the entire Mindanao, in an attempt to
undermine his control over executive departments, bureaus, and offices in said area; defeat his mandate to ensure that all
laws are faithfully executed; and remove his supervisory power over local governments."

7) "Law enforcement and other government agencies now face pronounced difficulty sending their reports to the Chief
Executive due to tlle city-wide power outages. Personnel from the BJMP have been prevented from performing their
 functions. Through the attack and occupation of several hospitals, medical services in Marawi City have been adversely
affected. The bridge and road blockades set up by the groups effectively deprive the government of its ability to deliver
basic services to its citizen .... Troop reinforcements have been hampered, preventing the government from restoring
peace and order in the area. Movement by both civilians and government personnel to and from the city is likewise
hindered. "

8) "The taking up of arms by lawless armed groups in the area, with support being provided by foreign-based terrorists
and illegal drug money, and their blatant acts of defiance which embolden other armed groups in Mindanao, have resulted
in the deterioration of public order and safety in Marawi City; they have likewise compromised the security of the entire
Island of Mindanao."

9) "Considering the network and alliance-building activities among terrorist groups, local criminals, and lawless armed
men, the siege of Marawi City is a vital cog in attaining their long-standing goal: absolute control over the entirety of
Mindanao. These circumstances demand swift and decisive action to ensure the safety and security of the Filipino people
and preserve our national integrity."

Thus, the President deduced from the facts available to him that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which
was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of
his powers and prerogative, leading the President to believe that there was probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and is
being committed and that public safety requires the imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.

A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had
sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President's conclusion, that there was an armed public
uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the removal from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its territory
and the deprivation of the President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after a tactical consideration of the
facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof.

The allegation in the Lagman Petition that the facts stated in Proclamation No. 216 and the Report are false, inaccurate, simulated,
and hyperbolic, does not persuade. As mentioned, the Court is not concerned about absolute correctness, accuracy, or precision of
the facts because to do so would unduly tie the hands of the President in responding to an urgent situation.

Moreover, the alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the Report; along with these alleged false
data is arsenal of other independent facts showing that more likely than not, actual rebellion exists, and public safety requires the
declaration of martial law r suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Invasion or rebellion alone may justify resort to the calling out power but definitely not the declaration of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. For a declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
to be valid, there must be a concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion and the public safety requirement. In his Report, the
President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group were directed not only against government
forces or establishments but likewise against civilians and their properties. In addition and in relation to the armed hostilities, bomb
threats were issued; road blockades and checkpoints were set up; schools and churches were burned; civilian hostages were taken
and killed; non-Muslims or Christians were targeted; young male Muslims were forced to join their group; medical services and
delivery of basic services were hampered; reinforcements of government troops and civilian movement were hindered; and the
security of the entire Mindanao Island was compromised.

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the parameters for the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus have been properly and fully complied with. Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual basis there being probable
cause to believe that rebellion exists and that public safety requires the martial law declaration and the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.

To be sure, the facts mentioned in the Proclamation and the Report are far from being exhaustive or all-encompassing. At this
juncture, it may not be amiss to state that as Commander-in-Chief, the President has possession of documents and information
classified as "confidential", the contents of which cannot be included in the Proclamation or Report for reasons of national security.
These documents may contain information detailing the position of government troops and rebels, stock of firearms or ammunitions,
ground commands and operations, names of suspects and sympathizers, etc. In fact, during the closed door session held by the
Court, some information came to light, although not mentioned in the Proclamation or Report. But then again, the discretion whether
to include the same in the Proclamation or Report is the judgment call of the President. In fact, petitioners concede to this. During
the oral argument, petitioner Lagman admitted that "the assertion of facts [in the Proclamation and Report] is the call of the
President.

In fine, not only does the President have a wide array of information before him, he also has the right, prerogative, and the means to
access vital, relevant, and confidential data, concomitant with his positions Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states that "[i]n case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, [the
President] may x x x suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law."
Clearly, the Constitution grants to the President the discretion to determine the territorial coverage of martial law and the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. He may put the entire Philippines or only a part thereof under martial law.
The significance of martial law should not be undermined by unjustified fears and past experience. After all, martial law is critical and
crucial to the promotion of public safety, the preservation of the nation's sovereignty and ultimately, the survival of our country. It is
vital for the protection of the country not only against internal enemies but also against those enemies lurking from beyond our
shores.

Conscious of those fears and apprehensions, the Constitution placed several safeguards which effectively watered down the power
to declare martial law. The 1987 Constitution "[clipped] the powers of [the] Commander-in-Chief because of [the] experience with the
previous regime." Not only were the grounds limited to actual invasion or rebellion, but its duration was likewise fixed at 60 days,
unless sooner revoked, nullified, or extended; at the same time, it is subject to the veto powers of the Court and Congress.

Public safety, which is another component element for the declaration of martial law, "involves the prevention of and protection from
events that could endanger the safety of the general public from significant danger, injury/harm, or damage, such as crimes or
disasters." Public safety is an abstract term; it does not take any physical form. Plainly, its range, extent or scope could not be
physically measured by metes and bounds.

Perhaps another reason why the territorial scope of martial law should not necessarily be limited to the particular vicinity where the
armed public uprising actually transpired, is because of the unique characteristic of rebellion as a crime. "The crime of rebellion
consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of
rebellion[,] though crimes in themselves.

Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is not limited only to the place where there is actual rebellion; it
extends to other areas where the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. It is not intended merely to prevent the escape of
lawless elements from Marawi City, but also to avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut their supply lines.

The Court can only act within the confines of its power. For the Court to overreach is to infringe upon another's territory. Clearly, the
power to determine the scope of territorial application belongs to the President. "The Court cannot indulge in judicial legislation
without violating the principle of separation of powers, and, hence, undermining the foundation of our republican system.

To reiterate, the Court is not equipped with the competence and logistical machinery to determine the strategical value of other
places in the military's efforts to quell the rebellion and restore peace. It would be engaging in an act of adventurism if it dares to
embark on a mission of deciphering the territorial metes and bounds of martial law.

Thus, there is reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is only the staging point of the rebellion, both for symbolic and strategic
reasons. Marawi may not be the target but the whole of Mindanao. As mentioned in the Report, "[l]awless armed groups have
historically used provinces adjoining Marawi City as escape routes, supply lines, and backdoor passages;" there is also the plan to
establish a wilayat in Mindanao by staging the siege of Marawi. The report that prior to May 23, 2017, Abdullah Maute had already
dispatched some of his men to various places in Mindanao, such as Marawi, Iligan, and Cagayan de Oro for bombing operations,
carnapping, and the murder of military and police personnel, must also be considered. Indeed, there is some semblance of truth to
the contention that Marawi is only the start, and Mindanao the end.

Moreover, considering the widespread atrocities in Mindanao and the linkages established among rebel groups, the armed uprising
that was initially staged in Marawi cannot be justified as confined only to Marawi. The Court therefore will not simply disregard the
events that happened during the Davao City bombing, the Mamasapano massacre, the Zamboanga City siege, and the countless
bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulµ, and Basilan, among others. The Court cannot simply take the battle of Marawi in
isolation. As a crime without predetermined bounds, the President has reasonable basis to believe that the declaration of martial
law, as well as the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao, is most necessary, effective,
and called for by the circumstances.

In determining what crime was committed, we have to look into the main objective of the malefactors. If it is political, such as for the
purpose of severing the allegiance of Mindanao to the Philippine Government to establish a wilayat therein, the crime is rebellion. If,
on the other hand, the primary objective is to sow and create a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand, the crime is terrorism. Here, we have already
explained and ruled that the President did not err in believing that what is going on in Marawi City is one contemplated under the
crime of rebellion.

In any case, even assuming that the insurgency in Marawi City can also be characterized as terrorism, the same will not in any
manner affect Proclamation No. 216. Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007
expressly provides that "[n]othing in this Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or diminution of constitutionally
recognized powers of the executive branch of the government." Thus, as long as the President complies with all the requirements of
Section 18, Article VII, the existence of terrorism cannot prevent him from exercising his extraordinary power of proclaiming martial
law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Besides, there is nothing in Art. 134 of the RPC and RA 9372 which states that rebellion and terrorism are mutuallty exclusive of
each other or that they cannot co-exist together. RA 9372 does not expressly or impliedly repeal Art. 134 of the RPC. And while
rebellion is one of the predicate crimes of terrorism, one cannot absorb the other as they have different elements.

Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the entire Mindanao region.
 Abello v. CIR
G.R. No. 120721
February 23, 2005

Topics: gift not defined in the Tax Code – Civil Code definition on donation applies; election
contributions are subject to gift tax – they are not exempt even if such transfers are with intentions,
motives or purpose
Facts: During the 1987 national elections, petitioners, who are partners in the Angara, Abello,
Concepcion, Regala and Cruz (ACCRA) law firm, contributed P882,661.31 each to the campaign funds of
Senator Edgardo Angara, then running for the Senate. BIR assessed each of the petitioners P263,032.66
for their contributions. Petitioners questioned the assessment to the BIR, claiming that political or
electoral contributions are not considered gifts under the NIRC so they are not liable for donor’s tax. The
claim for exemption was denied by the Commissioner. The CTA ruled in favor of the petitioners, but such
ruling was overturned by the CA, thus this petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not electoral contributions are subject to donor’s tax.

Held: Yes, they are. The NIRC does not define transfer of property by gift. However, Article 18 of the
Civil Code, states: “In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their
deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code.” Thus, reference may be made to the
definition of a donation in the Civil Code. Article 725 of said Code defines donation as: “. . . an act of
liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it.”

Donation has the following elements: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b) the increase in
the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi.

The present case falls squarely within the definition of a donation. Petitioners each gave P882,661.31 to
the campaign funds of Senator Edgardo Angara, without any material consideration. All three elements of
a donation are present. The patrimony of the four petitioners were reduced by P882,661.31 each.
Senator Angara’s patrimony correspondingly increased by P3,530,645.24. There was intent to do an act
of liberality or animus donandi was present since each of the petitioners gave their contributions without
any consideration. Taken together with the Civil Code definition of donation, Section 91 of the NIRC is
clear and unambiguous, thereby leaving no room for construction.

Since animus donandi or the intention to do an act of liberality is an essential element of a donation,
petitioners argue that it is important to look into the intention of the giver to determine if a political
contribution is a gift. Petitioners’ argument is not tenable. First of all, donative intent is a creature of the
mind. It cannot be perceived except by the material and tangible acts which manifest its presence. This
being the case, donative intent is presumed present when one gives a part of ones patrimony to another
without consideration. Second, donative intent is not negated when the person donating has other
intentions, motives or purposes which do not contradict donative intent. This Court is not convinced that
since the purpose of the contribution was to help elect a candidate, there was no donative intent.
Petitioners’ contribution of money without any material consideration evinces animus donandi.

Petitioner’s claim that since the purpose of electoral contributions is to influence the results of the
elections, donative intent is not present. They claim that the purpose of electoral contributions is brought
on by the desire of the giver to influence the result of an election by supporting candidates who would
influence the shaping of government policies that would promote the general welfare and economic well-
being of the electorate, including the giver himself. Petitioners attempt to place the barrier of mutual
exclusivity between donative intent and the purpose of political contributions. This Court reiterates that
donative intent is not negated by the presence of other intentions, motives or purposes which do not
contradict donative intent. Petitioners’ attempt is strained. The fact that petitioners will somehow in the
future benefit from the election of the candidate to whom they contribute, in no way amounts to a
valuable material consideration so as to remove political contributions from the purview of a donation.
Senator Angara was under no obligation to benefit the petitioners. The proper performance of his duties
as a legislator is his obligation as an elected public servant of the Filipino people and not a consideration
for the political contributions he received. In fact, as a public servant, he may even be called to enact
laws that are contrary to the interests of his benefactors, for the benefit of the greater good.

*** It bears stressing that the first and fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law. When the
law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation.
As has been our consistent ruling, where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is
no occasion for interpretation; there is only room for application (Cebu Portland Cement Co. v.
Municipality of Naga, 24 SCRA 708 [1968])

Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the
court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed (Chartered Bank Employees
Association v. Ople, 138 SCRA 273 [1985]; Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De Garcia, 30 SCRA 111
[1969]; Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines, 35 SCRA 270 [1970]).

Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court interpret or construe its true
intent. Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in more
l^vvphi1.net

than one way, or of referring to two or more things at the same time. A statute is ambiguous if it is
admissible of two or more possible meanings, in which case, the Court is called upon to exercise
one of its judicial functions, which is to interpret the law according to its true intent.

**** 8. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR WHEN IT DID NOT
CONSTRUE THE GIFT TAX LAW LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE TAXPAYER AND
STRICLTY AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE
PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION?

Petitioners next contend that tax laws are construed liberally in favor of the taxpayer and strictly
against the government. This rule of construction, however, does not benefit petitioners because, as
stated, there is here no room for construction since the law is clear and unambiguous.

Finally, this Court takes note of the fact that subsequent to the donations involved in this case,
Congress approved Republic Act No. 7166 on November 25, 1991, providing in Section 13 thereof
that political/electoral contributions, duly reported to the Commission on Elections, are not subject to
the payment of any gift tax. This all the more shows that the political contributions herein made are
subject to the payment of gift taxes, since the same were made prior to the exempting legislation,
and Republic Act No. 7166 provides no retroactive effect on this point.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED.
TITLE: Fetalino v COMELEC

Nature: Petition for Certiorari

Facts:

On February 10, 1998, President Fidel V. Ramos extended an interim

appointment to the petitioners as Comelec Commissioners, each for a term
of seven (7) years, pursuant to Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution.6 Eleven days later (or on February 21, 1998), Pres. Ramos
renewed the petitioners’ ad interim appointments for the same position.
Congress, however, adjourned in May 1998 before the CA could act on their
appointments. The constitutional ban on presidential appointments later took
effect and the petitioners were no longer re-appointed as Comelec
Commissioners.7 Thus, the petitioners merely served as Comelec
Commissioners for more than four months, or from February 16, 1998 to June
30, 1998.8
Subsequently, on March 15, 2005, the petitioners applied for their retirement
benefits and monthly pension with the Comelec, pursuant to R.A. No. 1568.9
The Comelec initially approved the petitioners’ claims pursuant to its
Resolution No. 06-136910 dated December 11, 2006 whose dispositive
portion reads:
The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve the
recommendation of Director Alioden D. Dalaig, Law Department, to grant the
request of former Comelec Commissioners Evalyn Fetalino and Amado
Calderon for the payment of their retirement benefits, subject to release of
funds for the purpose by the Department of Budget and Management.11
On February 6, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 07-0202 granting
the petitioners a pro-rated gratuity and pension. Subsequently, on October 5,
2007, the petitioners asked for a re-computation of their retirement pay on
the principal ground that R.A. No. 1568, does not cover a pro-rated
computation of retirement pay. In response, the Comelec issued a resolution
referring the matter to its Finance Services Department for comment and
recommendation. On July 14, 2009, the Comelec issued another resolution
referring the same matter to its Law Department for study and
recommendation.
In the presently assailed Resolution No. 880816 dated March 30, 2010, the
Comelec, on the basis of the Law Department’s study, completely
disapproved the petitioners’ claim for a lump sum benefit under R.A. No.
1568. The Comelec reasoned out that:
Of these four (4) modes by which the Chairman or a Commissioner shall be
entitled to lump sum benefit, only the first instance (completion of term) is
pertinent to the issue we have formulated above. It is clear that the non-
confirmation and non-renewal of appointment is not a case of resignation or
incapacity or death. The question rather is: Can it be considered as
retirement from service for having completed one’s term of office?

Application of statutory construction:

Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568. Tenure and term of office have well-defined
meanings in law and jurisprudence. As early as 1946, the Court, in Topacio
Nueno v. Angeles, provided clear distinctions between these concepts in this
wise:
The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the
office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents
shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the
incumbent actually holds the office.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners be granted the retirement benefits.

Ruling:
It should be stressed that the retirement benefits granted to COMELEC
Chairpersons and Commissioners under R.A. No. 1568, as amended, are
purely gratuitous in nature. The petitioners cannot claim any vested right
over the same as these are not similar to a pension plan where employee
contribution or participation is mandatory, thus vesting in the employee a
right over said pension. The rule is that where the pension is part of the
tenns of employment and employee participation is mandatory, employees
have contractual or vested rights in the pension.
WHEREFORE, I vote that the petition filed by Evelyn I. Fetalino and Amado M.
Calderon should be GRANTED while the petition tiled by Manuel A. Barcelona
should be DENIED inasmuch as he admitted that he already received his pro-
rated gratuity.
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

Title: Gachon v De vera

Nature: Special civil action for certiorari and injunction

Facts:
The factual antecedents of this case as found by the Regional Trial Court are
undisputed and admitted as correct by the parties. A complaint for forcible
entry 3 was filed by Private Respondent Susana Guevara against Patricio
Guevara and Petitioners Victoria Gachon and Alex Guevara before the
Municipal Trial Court for Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City. Summons was served on
and received by petitioners on August 25, 1993, directing them to file an
answer within the reglementary period of ten (10) days. Patricio Guevara was
abroad at that time; hence, the MTCC did not acquire jurisdiction over him.
On September 4, 1993, petitioners filed with the MTCC an urgent motion for
extension of time to file an answer. 4 On September 7, 1993, the MTCC
denied the motion on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading under the
Rule on Summary Procedure. 5 On September 8, 1993, or more than ten
days from their receipt of the summons, petitioner submitted an urgent
motion praying for the admission of their answer, 6 which was attached
thereto. Two days later, petitioners filed another motion pleading for the
admission of an amended answer. On September 23, 1993, the MTCC denied
the motions and considered the case submitted for resolution. 7 On October
27, 1993, the MTCC also denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 8
Thereafter, on November 26, 1993, the MTCC 9 issued a decision 10
resolving the complaint for forcible entry in favor of herein private
respondents.
Instead of filing an appeal, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and
injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, 11 Branch 24,
praying mainly that the MTCC be ordered to admit the amended answer and
to conduct further proceedings in the civil case for forcible entry. As prayed
for, a temporary restraining order was issued by the RTC.

Issue:

I. Are the provisions of the Rules on Summary Procedure on the period of

pleadings to be applied strictly or liberally.
II. What is the legal effect of a belated answer under the Rules on Summary
Procedure.

Application of statutory construction:

The word "shall" ordinarily connotes an imperative and indicates the

mandatory character of a statute. This, however, is not an absolute rule in
statutory construction. The import of the word ultimately depends upon a
consideration of the entire provision, its nature, object and the consequences
that would follow from construing it one way or the other.
As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts
must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and
speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are
regarded as mandatory.

Ruling:
The pertinent provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure are as follows:
Sec. 5. Answer. — Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the
defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on
the plaintiff . . .
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. — Should the defendant fail to answer the
complaint within the period above provided, the Court, motu proprio, or on
motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the
facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein: . . .
Private respondent assails petitioners for engaging in forum-shopping by
pursuing the present ejectment suit, notwithstanding the pendency of an
action for quieting of title involving the same property and parties. We are
unable to find basis for this charge.
For forum-shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same
transactions, essential facts and circumstances; and the actions must raise
identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues. 35 Suffice it to say that
an action for quieting of title and partition has a different cause of action
than that in an ejectment suit. As private respondent herself contended,
ownership of a certain portion of the property which is determined in a case
of partition does not necessarily mean that the successful litigant has the
right to possess the property adjudged in his favor. In ejectment cases, the
only issue for resolution is physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party
litigants. Anyone of them who can prove prior possession de facto may
recover such possession even from the owner himself. This rule holds true
regardless of the character of a party's possession, provided that he has in
his favor priority of time which entitles him to stay on the property until he is
lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either accion publiciana
or accion reivindicatoria. 36 It has even been ruled that the institution of a
separate action for quieting of title is not a valid reason for defeating the
execution of the summary remedy of ejectment.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the
assailed Decision is AFFIRMED in toto. Double costs against petitioners.

Finally, in the absence of any basis for liberal interpretation, the Court would be
engaged in judicial legislation if we grant the petitioners’ plea. We cannot
overemphasize that the policy of liberal construction cannot and should not be to the
point of engaging in judicial legislation — an act that the Constitution absolutely forbids
this Court to do. In the oft-cited case of Tanada v. Yulo,49 Justice George A. Malcolm
cautioned against judicial legislation and warned against liberal construction being used
as a license to legislate and not to simply interpret, 50 thus:

Counsel in effect urges us to adopt a liberal construction of the statute. That in this
instance, as in the past, we aim to do. But counsel in his memorandum concedes "that
the language of the proviso in question is somewhat defective and does not clearly
convey the legislative intent", and at the hearing in response to questions was finally
forced to admit that what the Government desired was for the court to insert words and
phrases in the law in order to supply an intention for the legislature. That we cannot do.
By liberal construction of statutes, courts from the language used, the subject matter,
and the purposes of those framing them are able to find out their true meaning. There is
a sharp distinction, however, between construction of this nature and the act of a court
in engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted which someone believes
ought to have been embraced. The former is liberal construction and is a legitimate
exercise of judicial power. The latter is judicial legislation forbidden by the tripartite
division of powers among the three departments of government, the executive, the
legislative, and the judicial.
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007

Facts:

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, born and registered as a male, underwent sex reassignment in Bangkok,
Thailand, the fact of which was certified here in the Philippines by virtue of a medical certificate issued by one
Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz. He then lived his life as a woman. On November 26, 2002, Rommel filed a petition
for the change of his first name and sex before the RTC of Manila. The court having underwent the
jurisdictional requirements, and there having no opposition, the court proceeded with the hearing where
Rommel presented his American Fiance as witness.

RTC gave due course to his petition, ruling based on equity, that “petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a
man’s body is not his own doing and should not be taken against him” and that “no harm, injury or prejudice will
be caused to anybody” if the petition were to be granted. His name was thus changed to Mely, and sex to
“female.” Republic filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. The appellate court reversed the decision of the RTC.

Petitioner’s claim / Issue:

Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles
407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.

Held: Petitioner, your contention is not meritorious.

Ratio decidendi:

1.) Change of Name, primarily Administrative in nature: Section 1 of RA 9048 provides in essence that
no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors, which can be changed by concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general. The jurisdiction therefore is primarily lodged with these officers. The intent and effect of the
law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an
administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. In sum, the remedy
and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
Hence, the venue to which petitioner filed is improper.

2.) Grounds for change of name: RA 9048 provides the grounds for which change of first name may be
allowed: 1) petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; 2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in
the community; or 3) The change will avoid confusion.

From these grounds, it can be gleaned that RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the
ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s name for his
declared purpose may only create grave complications. Before a person can legally change his given
name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.
In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this
case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true
and official name.

3.) No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment: By virtue of RA 9048, Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register, excluding the clerical or typographical error. Section 2 of RA
9048 provides expressly that no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status
or sex of the petitioner.
 The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code (*please see the codal provisions).
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those
that occur after birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion
that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.

4.) Purposes:

A. Correction - To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from"
while to change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with
something that serves as a substitute." The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All
entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No
correction is necessary.

B. Entry of Certain Acts under Article 407 - Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the
civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and
naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial
decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages,
adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of
filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal
consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects
are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or
events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law,
expressly or impliedly.

5.) Status of a Person is permanent. The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his
being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status… include
such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family
relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage,
divorce, and sometimes even succession. (emphasis supplied)

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth
certificate.

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at
the time of birth.29Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is
no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of
his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in
the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil
Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be
understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In
this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a
male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33Female is "the sex that
produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for
fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include
persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute
which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless
the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was
enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used
then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-
female transsexual to be included in the category "female."

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the
civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change
of the entries in his birth certificate.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license
for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to
make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative
guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
Republic vs. Orbecido
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United 
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City.  They had a son and a daughter named 
Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively.  In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son 
Kristoffer.  A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an 
American citizen and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce
decree and married a certain Stanley.  He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for 
authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

HELD:
The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of 
reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time 
of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes 
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.  The Filipino spouse should 
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the 
solemnization of the marriage.

Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a 
Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and 
remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold
that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at
the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute
may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they
come within its spirit or intent.12 If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be
deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26. In view of the
foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The
reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.

Provisional Remedies
Case Digest
Reyes v Lim

Facts:
Reyes as seller and Lim as buyer entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land. Harrison Lumber
occupied the Property as lessee. The Contract to Sell provided that in the event, the tenants or
occupants of the premises subject of this sale shall not vacate the premises on, the VENDEE
shall withhold the payment of the balance of and the VENDOR agrees to pay a penalty to the
VENDEE until the complete vacation of the premises by the tenants therein. Petitioner David
Reyes (Reyes) filed before the trial court a complaint for annulment of contract and damages
against respondents claiming that Reyes had informed Harrison Lumber to vacate the Property
and further alleged that Lim connived with Harrison Lumber not to vacate the property. Keng
and Harrison Lumber filed their answer denying that they connived with Lim to defraud Reyes
and alleged that Reyes approved their request for an extension of time to vacate the propert.
Lim filed his Answer stating that he was ready and willing to pay the balance of the purchase
price. Reyes offered to return the down payment to Lim because Reyes was having problems in
removing the lessee from the property which was offer was rejected by Lim. Lim learned that
Reyes had already sold the Property to Line One Foods Corporation. Lim filed a complaint for
estafa against Reyes as well as an action for specific performance and nullification of sale and
title plus damages before another trial court which prompted petitioner to file a motion for
leave to file amended complaint which the trial court granted. In his Amended Answer, Lim
prayed for the cancellation of the Contract to Sell and for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against Reyes. The trial court denied the prayer for a writ of preliminary
attachment. Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to deposit the down payment
with the cashier of the Regional Trial Court which was granted. Reyes filed a Motion to Set Aside
the Order which was denied.

Issue: WON the court erred in granting the order of deposit during the pendency of the case
when it is not one of the Provisional Remedies enumerated in the Rules of Court

Held: No. The provisional remedies enumerated in the Rules of Court are not exclusive. The
instant case is precisely one where there is a hiatus in the law and in the Rules of Court. If left
alone, the hiatus will result in unjust enrichment to Reyes at the expense of Lim. The hiatus may
also imperil restitution, which is a precondition to the rescission of the Contract to Sell that
Reyes himself seeks. This is not a case of equity overruling a positive provision of law or judicial
rule for there is none that governs this particular case. This is a case of silence or insufficiency of
the law and the Rules of Court. In this case, Article 9 of the Civil Code expressly mandates the
courts to make a ruling despite the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.[21] This calls
for the application of equity,[22] which fills the open spaces in the law.