Ho 9 - Civil Procedure PDF

2019 BAR REVIEW REMEDIAL LAW
Handout No. 9
CIVIL PROCEDURE
JURISDICTION
The exclusion of the term “damages of whatever kind” in determining the jurisdictional amount
under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies
to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of
action. However, if the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of
action, such as an action for Malicious Prosecution, the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
In the instant case, the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 5794-R is for the recovery of damages for
the alleged malicious acts of petitioners. The complaint principally sought an award of moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, for the alleged shame and
injury suffered by respondent by reason of petitioners’ utterance while they were at a police
station in Pangasinan. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged
in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting
the plaintiff’s causes of action. It is clear, based on the allegations of the complaint, that
respondent’s main action is for damages. Hence, the other forms of damages being claimed by
respondent, e.g., exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, are not merely
incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in
the complaint.
Considering therefore that the total amount of damages being claimed by respondent herein
(moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00
attorney’s fees; P20,000.00 litigation expenses; and costs of suit) for the alleged shame and injury
suffered by reason of petitioners’ utterance while they were at a police station in Pangasinan was
P420,000.00, the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan. Sante
vs. Hon. Claravall, G.R. No. 173915, February 22, 2010
The rule is settled that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the
time of the commencement of an action. Therefore, the RTC still had jurisdiction over an
agrarian dispute filed on June 30, 1986 since at that time, the Courts of Agrarian Relations were
integrated into the Regional Trial Courts and the jurisdiction of the Courts of Agrarian Relations
was vested in the Regional Trial Courts.
Although the CA has correctly categorized Jorge’s case as an agrarian dispute, it ruled that the
RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case based on Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657, which vested
in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) the “primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters” and the “exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform” except disputes falling under the exclusive ju-
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risdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources.
We hold that the CA gravely erred. The rule is settled that the jurisdiction of a court is determined
by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of an action. In 1980, upon the passage
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act), the Courts of Agrarian Relations were
integrated into the Regional Trial Courts and the jurisdiction of the Courts of Agrarian Relations
was vested in the Regional Trial Courts. It was only on August 29, 1987, when Executive Order
No. 229 took effect, that the general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts to try agrarian
reform matters was transferred to the DAR. Therefore, the RTC still had jurisdiction over the
dispute at the time the complaint was filed in the RTC on June 30, 1986. Jusayan vs. Sombilla,
G.R. No. 163928, January 21, 2015
In the filing of a permissive counterclaim, failure to pay the required docket fees, even on the
reliance that the same is a compulsory counterclaim as declared by the lower courts, should
not necessarily lead to the dismissal of the counterclaim provided that: (a) the fees are paid
within a reasonable period; and (b) there was no intention on the part of the claimant to
defraud the government.
In view of the finding that the counterclaim is permissive, and not compulsory as held by the
courts a quo, respondents are required to pay docket fees. However, it must be clarified that
respondents' failure to pay the required docket fees, per se, should not necessarily lead to the
dismissal of their counterclaim. It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction
over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time
of filing of the initiatory pleading does not automatically cause its dismissal provided that: (a) the
fees are paid within a reasonable period; and (b) there was no intention on the part of the
claimant to defraud the government.
Here, respondents cannot be faulted for non-payment of docket fees in connection with their
counterclaim, primarily because as early as November 16, 2006, the RTC had already found such
counterclaim to be compulsory in nature. Such finding was then upheld in the July 2, 2007 RTC
Decision and affirmed on appeal by the CA in its assailed Decision. As such, the lower courts did
not require respondents to pay docket fees and even proceeded to rule on their entitlement
thereto. Verily, respondents' reliance on the findings of the courts a quo, albeit erroneous,
exhibits their good faith in not paying the docket fees, much more their intention not to defraud
the government. Thus, the counterclaim should not be dismissed for non-payment of docket
fees. Sy-Vargas vs. Estate of Ogsos, G.R. No. 221062, October 05, 2016, J. Perlas-Bernabe

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The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are
ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a party’s right to due process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the
fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is
void for lack of jurisdiction.
An apparent lack of due process may be raised by a party at any time since due process is a
jurisdictional requisite that all tribunals, whether administrative or judicial, are duty bound to
observe. In Salva v. Valle, the Court pronounced that "[a] decision rendered without due process
is void ab initio and may be attacked at any time directly or collaterally by means of a separate
action, or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked." The Court
sees no defensible reason as to why this principle should not be herein applied. APO Cement
Corporation vs. Mingson Mining Corporation, G.R. No. 206728, November 12, 2014, J. Perlas-
Bernabe
In petitions for certiorari filed before the CA, the latter acquires jurisdiction over the person of
the respondent upon: (1) the service of the order or resolution indicating the CA's initial action
on the petition to the respondent; or (2) voluntary submission of the respondent to the CA's
jurisdiction.
In this case, records disclose that the CA served its Resolution dated September 17, 2008
indicating its initial action on the petition before it, directing petitioner to file certified copies of
the parties' position papers, among others. The said order was sent to Monzon through his
counsel of record. Case law instructs that when a client is represented by counsel, notice to
counsel is notice to client. However, the counsel of respondents denied its representation of
Monzon in a Motion and Manifestation dated October 28, 2008, or after the receipt of the
Resolution dated October 14, 2008 of the CA directing them to file their comment. It was only on
May 8, 2009 that the counsel of respondents formally filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw as
Counsel of Monzon. Hence, prior to such notice of withdrawal as counsel, the CA aptly held that
without notice of withdrawal of counsel filed by Monzon or his counsel, the CA rightly assumed
that counsel of record continues to represent Monzon. Considering that the CA had issued a
Resolution dated September 17, 2008 directing petitioner to file the necessary attachments, the
resolution indicating the initial action taken by the CA, it cannot be denied that respondents were
already aware of the certiorari proceedings before the CA and that jurisdiction had been acquired
over their person. Thus, the CA had already acquired jurisdiction over both parties. Francisco vs.
Loyola Plans Consolidated, G.R. No. 194134, February 01, 2016; Province of Leyte vs. Energy
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 203124, June 22, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe

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A complaint filed to enforce rights granted by CA 141 specifically to recover the lot subject of
free patent is actually an action for specific performance, or if not strictly such action, akin or
analogous to action for specific performance. Such being the case, the action for specific
performance is incapable of pecuniary estimation and cognizable by the RTC.
At first blush, it appears that the action filed by Bautista involves title to or possession of the lots
he sold to respondents. Since the total selling price is less than PhP 20,000, then the MTC, not
the RTC, has jurisdiction over the case. This proposition is incorrect for the re-acquisition of the
lots by Bautista or herein successors-in-interests, the present petitioners, is but incidental to and
an offshoot of the exercise of the right by the latter to redeem said lots pursuant to Sec. 119 of
CA 141. The reconveyance of the title to petitioners is solely dependent on the exercise of such
right to repurchase the lots in question and is not the principal or main relief or remedy sought.
Thus, the action of petitioners is, in reality, incapable of pecuniary estimation, and the
reconveyance of the lot is merely the outcome of the performance of the obligation to return the
property conformably to the express provision of CA 141. Heirs of Bautista vs. Lindo, G.R. No.
208232, March 10, 2014
Although not an authorized mode of payment under Section 6, Rule VIII of the 2009 IRCA, the
attachment of a personal check shows an exertion of earnest efforts to pay the required docket
fees. Thus, the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
Here, it appears that when Camaso filed his certiorari petition through his counsel and via mail,
a Metrobank check dated July 6, 2015 under the account name of Pedro L. Linsangan was
attached thereto to serve as payment of docket fees. Although this was not an authorized mode
of payment under Section 6, Rule VIII of the 2009 IRCA, the attachment of such personal check
shows that Camaso exerted earnest efforts to pay the required docket fees. Clearly, this exhibits
good faith and evinces his intention not to defraud the government. In this relation, the assertion
of the Officer-in-Charge of the CA Receiving Section that there was no check attached to
Camaso's certiorari petition is clearly belied by the fact that when it was examined at the Office
of the Division Clerk of Court, the check was found to be still stapled thereto.
In light of the foregoing circumstances, the Court deems it appropriate to relax the technical rules
of procedure in the interest of substantial justice and, hence, remands the instant case to the CA
for the resolution of its substantial merits. Upon remand, the CA is directed to order Camaso to
pay the required docket fees within a reasonable period of thirty (30) days from notice of such
order. Camaso vs. TSN Shipping, G.R. No. 223290, November 07, 2016, J. Perlas-Bernabe

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While petitioners' Amended Complaint was denominated as one mainly for specific
performance, they additionally prayed for reconveyance of the property, as well as the
cancellation of Paglinawan's TCT T-46,627. In other words, petitioners' aim in filing Civil Case
No. 4633-2K5 was to secure their claimed ownership and title to the subject property, which
qualifies their case as a real action. Thus, the assessed value of the subject land must be alleged
in order to determine the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
Since Civil Case No. 4633-2K5 is a real action made so by the Amended Complaint later filed,
petitioners should have observed the requirement under A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC relative to
declaring the fair market value of the property as stated in the current tax declaration or zonal
valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Since no such allegation was made in the
Amended Complaint, then the value of the subject property as stated in the handwritten
document sued upon and restated in the Amended Complaint should be the basis for
determining jurisdiction and the amount of docket fees to be paid. The CA is correct in its general
observation that in the absence of the required declaration of the fair market value as stated in
the current tax declaration or zonal valuation of the property, it cannot be determined whether
the RTC or first level court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners' action, since
the jurisdiction of these courts is determined on the basis of the value of the property. However,
the CA failed to consider that in determining jurisdiction, it could rely on the declaration made in
the Amended Complaint that the property is valued at P6,000.00. The handwritten document
sued upon and the pleadings indicate that the property was purchased by petitioners for the
price of P6,000.00. For purposes of filing the civil case against respondents, this amount should
be the stated value of the property in the absence of a current tax declaration or zonal valuation
of the BIR. Since the value of the subject property as stated in the Amended Complaint is just
P6,000.00, then the RTC did not have jurisdiction over petitioners' case in the first instance; it
should have dismissed Civil Case No. 4633-2K5. But it did not. In continuing to take cognizance of
the case, the trial court clearly committed grave abuse of discretion. Spouses Trayvilla vs.
Paglinawan, G.R. No. 204970, February 01, 2016
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has been held not to extend to an intra-corporate case
even if the same involves a sequestered company notwithstanding that the majority of the
members of the board of directors were PCGG nominees.
The Sandiganbayan correctly denied jurisdiction over the proposed complaint-in-intervention.

The original and exclusive jurisdiction given to the Sandiganbayan over PCGG cases pertains to
(a) cases filed by the PCGG, pursuant to the exercise of its powers under Executive Order Nos. 1,
2 and 14. as amended by the Office of the President, and Article XVIII, Section 26 of the
Constitution, i.e., where the principal cause of action is the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, as well

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as all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to such cases and (b) cases filed by those
who wish to question or challenge the commission’s acts or orders in such cases.
Evidently, petitioner’s proposed complaint-in-intervention is an ordinary civil case that does not
pertain to the Sandiganbayan. As the Solicitor General stated, the complaint is not directed
against PCGG as an entity, but against a private corporation, in which case it is not per se, a PCGG
case.
In the cases now before the Court, what are sought to be determined are the propriety of the
election of a party as a Director, and his authority to act in that capacity. Such issues should be
exclusively determined only by the RTC pursuant to the pertinent law on jurisdiction because
they did not concern the recovery of ill-gotten wealth. POTC vs. Africa, G.R. No. 184622, July 3,
2013
Although the caption of the complaint was denominated as one for "specific performance and
damages", if the relief sought is the conveyance or transfer of real property, or ultimately, the
execution of deeds of conveyance in their favor of the real properties enumerated in the
provisional memorandum of agreement, such action was actually a real action, affecting as it
does title to or possession of real property. Thus, jurisdiction depends on the assessed value of
the lot in dispute.
In the instant case, although the CA correctly pointed out that Civil Case No. 2031-08 involves a
complaint for specific performance and damages, a closer perusal of petitioner's complaint
reveals that it actually prays for, inter alia, the delivery of ownership of the subject land through
Bautista's execution of a deed of sale and the turnover of TCT No. T-800 in its favor. This shows
that the primary objective and nature of Civil Case No. 2031-08 is to recover the subject property
itself and thus, is deemed to be a real action.
In Gochan v. Gochan, the Court explained that complaints like this are in the nature of real
actions, or actions affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property, to wit:
“In this jurisdiction, the dictum adhered to is that the nature of an action is determined by the
allegations in the body of the pleading or complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading. The
caption of the complaint below was denominated as one for "specific performance and
damages." The relief sought, however, is the conveyance or transfer of real property, or
ultimately, the execution of deeds of conveyance in their favor of the real properties enumerated
in the provisional memorandum of agreement. Under these circumstances, the case below was
actually a real action, affecting as it does title to or possession of real property”.

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In the case of Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, this Court held that a real action is one where
the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property or, as indicated in Section 2(a) of Rule 4 (now
Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), a real action is an action affecting title to
or recovery of possession of real property.
It has also been held that where a complaint is entitled as one for specific performance but
nonetheless prays for the issuance of a deed of sale for a parcel of land, its primary objective and
nature is one to recover the parcel of land itself and, thus, is deemed a real action. x x x
In the case at bar, therefore, the complaint filed with the trial court was in the nature of a real
action, although ostensibly denominated as one for specific performance. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied). Pacific Rehouse Corporation vs. Joven L. Ngo, G.R. No. 214934, April 12,
2016, J. Perlas-Bernabe
The factual allegations in a complaint should be considered in tandem with the statements and
inscriptions on the documents attached to it as annexes or integral parts. In addition to the
complaint, other pleadings submitted by the parties in deciding whether or not the court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case should be well taken into consideration.
Here, Esperanza filed a complaint for recovery of possession of real property before the RTC but
failed to allege in her complaint the property’s assessed value. Attached, however, to the
Esperanza’s complaint was a copy of a Declaration of Real Property showing that the subject
property has a market value of P51,965.00 and assessed value of P20,790.00. The CA was fully
aware of this attachment but still proceeded to dismiss the Esperanza’s complaint.
Generally, the court should only look into the facts alleged in the complaint to determine whether
a suit is within its jurisdiction. There may be instances, however, when a rigid application of this
rule may result in defeating substantial justice or in prejudice to a party’s substantial right. In
Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Garcia, [the Court] allowed the RTC to consider, in addition to the
complaint, other pleadings submitted by the parties in deciding whether or not the complaint
should be dismissed for lack of cause of action. In Guaranteed Homes, Inc. vs. Heirs of Valdez, et
al., [the Court] held that the factual allegations in a complaint should be considered in tandem
with the statements and inscriptions on the documents attached to it as annexes or integral
parts. Tumpag vs. Tumpag, G.R. No. 199133, September 29, 2014

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Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of
authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil,
criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or
insolvency.
It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, "this authority
being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid
and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law." The Constitution
vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a
law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs. We said in J.M. Tuason and Co.,
Inc. v. CA that, "plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have
jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate
review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be
in issue. Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262
could have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection
order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to
the review of this Court. Garcia vs. Drillon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013, J. Perlas-Bernabe
An action for reconveyance or to remove a cloud on one’s title involves the title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein. Exclusive original jurisdiction over such action
pertained to the RTC, unless the assessed value of the property did not exceed ₱20,000.00 (in
which instance the MTC having territorial jurisdiction would have exclusive original
jurisdiction), in case the real property is located outside Metro Manila.
The respondents’ reliance on Section 12 and Section 18 of Act No. 1120 to sustain their position
that the Bureau of Public Lands (now LMB) instead had exclusive jurisdiction was without basis.
The provisions read:
Section 12. xxx the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall give the said settler and occupant a
certificate which shall set forth in detail that the Government has agreed to sell to such settler
and occupant the amount of land so held by him, at the price so fixed, payable as provided in this
Act at the office of the Chief of Bureau of Public Lands xxx and that upon the payment of the final
installment together with all accrued interest the Government will convey to such settler and
occupant the said land so held by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued
and become effective in the manner provided in section one hundred and twenty-two of the
Land Registration Act xxx.

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Section 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the provisions of
this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
As the provisions indicate, the authority of LMB under Act No. 1120, being limited to the
administration and disposition of friar lands, did not include the petitioners’ action for
reconveyance. LMB ceases to have jurisdiction once the friar land is disposed of in favor of a
private person and title duly issues in the latter’s name. By ignoring the petitioners’ showing of
its plain error in dismissing Civil Case No. TM-983, and by disregarding the allegations of the
complaint, the RTC acted whimsically and capriciously. Heirs of Reterta vs. Mores, G.R. No.
159941, August 17, 2011
CAUSE OF ACTION
An indicium of the presence of, or the test for determining whether a litigant violated the rule
against forum shopping is where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other case.
Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court, to increase his
chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. The test for
determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of
parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. If a situation of litis pendentia or res judicata
arises by virtue of a party's commencement of a judicial remedy identical to one which already
exists (either pending or already resolved), then a forum shopping infraction is committed.
Litis pendentia refers to a situation where two actions are pending between the same parties for
the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is based
on the policy against multiplicity of suits. The requirements of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity
of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the
identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res judicata in the other. Dy vs Uy, G.R. No. 202632, July 08, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.

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Filing a complaint for the Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage simultaneously with a complaint
for collection of sum of money constitutes splitting 2 actions arising from the same cause of
action, thus, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground
for the dismissal of the other.
In the present case, records show that petitioner, as creditor-mortgagee, instituted an action for
judicial foreclosure pursuant to the provisions of Rule 68 of the Rules of Court in order to recover
on Rafael's debt. In light of the foregoing discussion, the availment of such remedy thus bars
recourse to the subsequent filing of a personal action for collection of the same debt, in this case,
under the principle of litis pendentia, considering that the foreclosure case only remains pending
as it was not shown to have attained finality.
While the ensuing collection case was anchored on the promissory note executed by respondent
who was not the original debtor, the same does not constitute a separate and distinct contract
of loan which would have given rise to a separate cause of action upon breach. Notably, records
are bereft of any indication that respondent's agreement to pay Rafael's loan obligation and the
execution of the subject PN extinguished by novation the contract of loan between Rafael and
petitioner, in the absence of express agreement or any act of equal import. Well-settled is the
rule that novation is never presumed, but must be clearly and unequivocally shown. Thus, in
order for a new agreement to supersede the old one, the parties to a contract must expressly
agree that they are abrogating their old contract in favor of a new one, which was not shown
here. Marilag vs. Martinez, G.R. No. 201892, July 22, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
PARTIES
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any
stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the
motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead
an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for
the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed
to be indispensable.
In this case, while it is conceded that Santiago bought the interests of majority of the heirs of
Conrado, Sr. as evidenced by the subject document, as a vendee, he merely steps into the shoes
of the vendors-heirs. Since his interest over the subject land is merely derived from that of the
vendors-heirs, the latter should first be determined as co-owners thereof, thus necessitating the
joinder of all those who have vested interests in such land, i.e., the aforesaid heirs of Conrado,
Sr., in Santiago’s complaint.

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In fine, the absence of the aforementioned indispensable parties in the instant complaint for
judicial partition renders all subsequent actions of the RTC null and void for want of authority to
act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to those present. Therefore, the CA correctly
set aside the November 29, 2002 Decision and the April 4, 2003 Order of the RTC.
However, the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint on account of Santiago’s failure
to implead all the indispensable parties in his complaint. The remedy is to implead the non-party
claimed to be indispensable. In view of the foregoing, the correct course of action in the instant
case is to order its remand to the RTC for the inclusion of those indispensable parties who were
not impleaded and for the disposition of the case on the merits. Divinagracia vs. Parilla, G.R. No.
196750, March 11, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Grandchildren are not considered real parties in interest to file nullification of sale of their
grandfather’s lot when they have no successional rights to Udiaan's estate. In this regard, the
CA ratiocinated that respondents could only succeed from said estate by right of representation
if their mother, who is one of their grandfather’s children, predeceased their grandfather.
However, such fact was not established.
In the instant case, respondents claim to be the successors-in-interest of the subject land just
because they are Udiaan's grandchildren. Under the law, however, respondents will only be
deemed to have a material interest over the subject land - and the rest of Udiaan' s estate for
that matter - if the right of representation provided under Article 970, in relation to Article 982,
of the Civil Code is available to them. In this situation, representatives will be called to the
succession by the law and not by the person represented; and the representative does not
succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented would have
succeeded.
For such right to be available to respondents, they would have to show first that their mother:
(a) predeceased Udiaan; (b) is incapacitated to inherit; or (c) was disinherited, if Udiaan died
testate. However, as correctly pointed out by the CA, nothing in the records would show that the
right of representation is available to respondents. Hence, the RTC and the CA correctly found
that respondents are not real parties in interest to the instant case. It is well-settled that factual
findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great weight and respect by the
Court and are deemed final and conclusive when supported by the evidence on record, as in this
case. Andy Ang vs. Teresita Torralba, G.R. No. 208928, July 8, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe

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Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards have the legal standing to file a special civil
action of Certiorari since they stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in this suit.
In Oposa, we allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn "based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned." Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology,
a right that does not even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been
eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to
enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real
parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The
Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible
violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore
declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition. Resident Marine Mammals vs. Reyes,
G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015
A person authorized to file an action is not a real party in interest who stands to be benefited
by the judgment in the case. He is merely a representative. Thus, his residence is immaterial to
the venue of the filing of the action.
Contrary to the petitioners’ claim, Atty. Aceron, despite being the attorney-in-fact of the
petitioners, is not a real party in interest in the case below. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
reads: Sec. 2. Parties in interest. – A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest. (Emphasis ours)
Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an interest in issue
to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about
the question involved. A real party in interest is the party who, by the substantive law, has the
right sought to be enforced.
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that Atty. Aceron is not a real party in interest in the case
below as he does not stand to be benefited or injured by any judgment therein. He was merely
appointed by the petitioners as their attorney-in-fact for the limited purpose of filing and
prosecuting the complaint against the respondents. Such appointment, however, does not mean

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that he is subrogated into the rights of petitioners and ought to be considered as a real party in
interest.
Being merely a representative of the petitioners, Atty. Aceron in his personal capacity does not
have the right to file the complaint below against the respondents. He may only do so, as what
he did, in behalf of the petitioners – the real parties in interest. To stress, the right sought to be
enforced in the case below belongs to the petitioners and not to Atty. Aceron. Clearly, an
attorney-in-fact is not a real party in interest. Spouses Ang vs. Spouses Ang, G.R. No. 186993,
August 22, 2012
A Vice-Governor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of

Cavite, although not a signatory to the compromise agreement being assailed, represents the
interests of the province itself which is, undoubtedly, a real party in interest since it stands to
be either benefited or injured by the execution of the compromise judgment.
Remulla filed his petition for annulment of judgment in two capacities: first, in his personal
capacity as a taxpayer; and, second, in his official capacity as then presiding officer of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Cavite. With respect to the first, jurisprudence
dictates that a taxpayer may be allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public
funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law or ordinance. In
this case, public funds of the Province of Cavite stand to be expended to enforce the compromise
judgment. As such, Remulla – being a resident-taxpayer of the Province of Cavite – has the legal
standing to file the petition for annulment of judgment and, therefore, the same should not have
been dismissed on said ground. Anent the second, Remulla equally lodged the petition for
annulment of judgment in his official capacity as then Vice-Governor and Presiding Officer of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Cavite. As such, he represents the interests of the
province itself which is, undoubtedly, a real party in interest since it stands to be either benefited
or injured by the execution of the compromise judgment. Juanito Remulla vs. Maliksi et. Al, G.R.
No. 171633, September 18, 2013, J. Perlas-Bernabe
VENUE
A complaint directly assailing the validity of the written instrument itself should not be bound
by the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein and should be filed in accordance with the
general rules on venue.

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In this relation, case law likewise provides that in cases where the complaint assails only the
terms, conditions, and/or coverage of a written instrument and not its validity, the exclusive
venue stipulation contained therein shall still be binding on the parties, and thus, the complaint
may be properly dismissed on the ground of improper venue. Conversely, therefore, a complaint
directly assailing the validity of the written instrument itself should not be bound by the exclusive
venue stipulation contained therein and should be filed in accordance with the general rules on
venue. To be sure, it would be inherently consistent for a complaint of this nature to recognize
the exclusive venue stipulation when it, in fact, precisely assails the validity of the instrument in
which such stipulation is contained.
In this case, the venue stipulation found in the subject contracts is indeed restrictive in nature,
considering that it effectively limits the venue of the actions arising therefrom to the courts of
Makati City. However, it must be emphasized that Briones's complaint directly assails the validity
of the subject contracts, claiming forgery in their execution. Given this circumstance, Briones
cannot be expected to comply with the aforesaid venue stipulation, as his compliance therewith
would mean an implicit recognition of their validity. Hence, pursuant to the general rules on
venue, Briones properly filed his complaint before a court in the City of Manila where the subject
property is located. Virgilio Briones vs. CA, G.R. No. 204444, January 14, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
An action for the nullification of the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase with no allegation
that the possession and title to the property have been transferred to respondent is a personal
action. Thus, venue lies in the residence of the plaintiff or defendant, at the option of the
plaintiff.
In the case at hand, the Complaint filed by the plaintiff states:
“5. Plaintiff Racpan purchased a property from his brother Lorezo L. Racpan formerly covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 189893 and located at Carmen, Davao del Norte and the said
property is now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-142-2011009374. Hereto attached
and marked as Annex "B" is a copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-142-2011009374
registered under the name of plaintiff Rudy L. Racpan. Also attached and marked as Annex "C"'
is the tax declaration of the subject property to prove that plaintiff is the owner of the same.
xxx When plaintiff navigated the Deed of Sale, he was surprised because his signature appearing
on the same is COMPLETELY FALSIFIED ....
8.a Moreover, plaintiff did not also execute any special power of attorney in favour of his
deceased wife authoring the latter to [sell] the subject property to the defendant.

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8.b On the other hand, the subject property is registered under the name of plaintiff Rudy Racpan
and NOT TO SPOUSES Racpan. The words "married to Ma. Lucila B. Racpan" only signified the
civil status of plaintiff to the latter.
9.d Evidently, from the foregoing the (alleged) subject deed of sale with right to repurchase is
NULL AND VOID as the same contains the falsified signature of the herein plaintiff.”
Evidently, as the Complaint was not concerned with the title to or recovery of the real property,
it was a personal action. Thus, Davao City, where both the petitioner and the respondent reside
is the proper venue for the complaint. The appellate court therefore committed a reversible error
in affirming the trial court's dismissal of the case for improper venue. Racpan vs. Sharon Barroga-
Haigh, G.R. No. 234499, June 6, 2018
The venue for an action to nullify the decree of confirmation of title over a parcel of land located
in Las Piñas should be Las Piñas even if the venue in the original action for application and
confirmation of title over said land was in Makati City.
This case was only filed before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134 because, during that time, i.e.,
December 1976, Las Piñas City had no RTC. Barring this situation, the aforesaid application should
not have been filed before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134 pursuant to the rules on venue
prevailing at that time. Under Section 2, Rule 4 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, which took
effect on January 1, 1964, the proper venue for real actions, such as an application for original
registration, lies with the CFI of the province where the property is situated, viz.:
Sec. 2. Venue in Courts of First Instance.—(a) Real actions.—Actions affecting title to, or for
recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real
property, shall be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof
lies.
As the land subject of this case is undeniably situated in Las Piñas City, the application for its
original registration should have been filed before the Las Piñas City-RTC were it not for the fact
that the said court had yet to be created at the time the application was filed. Be that as it may,
and considering further that the complication at hand is actually one of venue and not of
jurisdiction, the Court, cognizant of the peculiarity of the situation, holds that the Las Piñas City-
RTC has the authority over the petition for the review of Decree No. N-217036 filed in this case.
Indeed, the filing of the petition for review before the Las Piñas City-RTC was only but a
rectificatory implementation of the rules of procedure then-existing, which was temporarily set
back only because of past exigencies. In light of the circumstances now prevailing, the Court
perceives no compelling reason to deviate from applying the rightful procedure. After all, venue

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is only a matter of procedure and, hence, should succumb to the greater interests of the orderly
administration of justice. Lozada vs. Bracewell, G.R. No. 179155, April 2, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
The phrase “waiving any other venue” denotes exclusivity. The phrase plainly shows that the
choice of Makati City as the venue for actions arising out of or in connection with the
Restructuring Agreement and the Collateral, with the Real Estate Mortgages being explicitly
defined as such, is exclusive.
In this particular case, the parties stipulated in their Real Estate Mortgage Contract and
Restructuring Agreement the following clause:
“20. Venue – Venue of any action or proceeding arising out of or connected with this
Restructuring Agreement, the Note, the Collateral and any and all related documents shall be in
Makati City, [HealthTech] and [Union Bank] hereby waiving any other venue. (Emphasis
supplied.) “
These quoted provisions of the Real Estate Mortgages and the later Restructuring Agreement
clearly reveal the intention of the parties to implement a restrictive venue stipulation, which
applies not only to the principal obligation, but also to the mortgages. The phrase "waiving any
other venue" plainly shows that the choice of Makati City as the venue for actions arising out
of or in connection with the Restructuring Agreement and the Collateral, with the Real Estate
Mortgages being explicitly defined as such, is exclusive.
Even if this Court were to consider the venue stipulations under the Real Estate Mortgages, it
must be underscored that those provisions did not contain words showing exclusivity or
restrictiveness. In fact, in the Real Estate Mortgages dated 11 February 1994, the phrase "parties
hereto waiving" – from the entire phrase "the parties hereto waiving any other venue" – was
stricken from the final executed contract. Following the ruling in Sps. Lantin as earlier quoted, in
the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the venue stipulation should only be deemed as
an agreement on an additional forum, and not as a restriction on a specified place.
Considering that Makati City was agreed upon by the parties to be the venue for all actions arising
out of or in connection with the loan obligation incurred by HealthTech, as well as the Real Estate
Mortgages executed by PAGLAUM, the CA committed reversible error in affirming the dismissal
of Civil Case No. 01-1567 by RTC Br. 134 on the ground of improper venue. Paglaum
Management Development Corporation vs. Union Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 179018,
June 18, 2012

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The proper venue in actions for the revival of judgments depends on the determination of
whether the present action for revival of judgment is a real action or a personal action.
Under the present Rules of Court, Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 4 provide:
Section 1. Venue of real actions. - Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or
interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over
the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. x x x
Section 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff.
Thus, the proper venue depends on the determination of whether the present action for revival
of judgment is a real action or a personal action. Applying the afore-quoted rules on venue, if the
action for revival of judgment affects title to or possession of real property, or interest therein,
then it is a real action that must be filed with the court of the place where the real property is
located. If such action does not fall under the category of real actions, it is then a personal action
that may be filed with the court of the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides. Infante vs.
Aran Builders, G.R. No. 156596, August 24, 2007
PLEADINGS AND MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS
The claim that the sale was effected through "voidable and void documents" which were not
even identified partakes merely of a conclusion of law that is not supported by any averment
of circumstances that will show why or how such conclusion was arrived at.
In Abad v. Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, the Court pronounced that: A pleading should
state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of action or defense asserted, as distinguished from
mere conclusions of fact, or conclusions of law. General allegations that a contract is valid or
legal, or is just, fair, and reasonable, are mere conclusions of law. Likewise, allegations that a
contract is void, voidable, invalid, illegal, ultra vires, or against public policy, without stating facts
showing its invalidity, are mere conclusions of law. Hence, by merely stating a legal conclusion,
the Amended Complaint presented no sufficient allegation upon which the Court could grant the
relief Santos prayed for. Thus, said pleading should be dismissed on the ground of failure to state
cause of action, as correctly held by the RTC. Santos vs. Register of Deeds, G.R. No. 197380,
October 8, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe

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Where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a common interest in the property
subject of the action, the fact that only one of the petitioners executed the verification or
certification of forum shopping will not deter the court from proceeding with the action.
To reiterate, both Lourdes and Cecilia are co-plaintiffs in the ejectment suit. Thus, they share a
commonality of interest and cause of action as against respondents. Hence, the lone signature
of Lourdes on the verification attached to the CA petition constituted substantial compliance with
the rules.
Where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a common interest in the property
subject of the action, the fact that only one of the petitioners executed the verification or
certification of forum shopping will not deter the court from proceeding with the action.
It has been held that under reasonable or justifiable circumstances - as in this case where the
plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense
- the rule requiring all such plaintiffs or petitioners to sign the certification against forum
shopping may be relaxed. Lourdes Fernandez vs. Villegas, G.R. No. 200191, August 20, 2014, J.
Perlas-Bernabe
If the notarial certificate of the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to a

Petition for Certiorari before the CA did not state whether the Petitioner presented competent
evidence of their identities, or that he was personally known to the notary public, the Petition
has to be dismissed.
Evidently, not being documents of identification issued by an official agency, the photocopies of
the IDs of private respondents Singson, Pasaqui, and Lominiqui from La Vista Association, Inc.,
R.O. Barra Builders & Electrical Services, and St. Charbel Executive Village, respectively, do not
constitute competent evidence of their identities under Section 12 (a), Rule II of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice. In the same vein, their Joint-Affidavit identifying Andales and assuring the
CA that he was a party-litigant is not competent evidence of Andales' identity under Section 12
(b), Rule II of the same rules, considering that they (i.e., Singson, Pasaqui, and Lominiqui)
themselves are privy to the instrument, i.e., the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping, in which Andales' participation is sought to be proven. To note, it cannot be presumed
that an affiant is personally known to the notary public; the jurat must contain a statement to
that effect. Tellingly, the notarial certificate of the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping attached to private respondents' petition before the CA did not state whether they
presented competent evidence of their identities, or that they were personally known to the
notary public, and, thus, runs afoul of the requirements of verification and certification against
forum shopping under Section 1, Rule 65, in relation to Section 3, Rule 46, of the Rules of Court.

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Case law states that verification is required to secure an assurance that the allegations in the
petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative." On
the other hand, "[t]he certification against forum shopping is required based on the principle that
a party-litigant should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora." The
important purposes behind these requirements cannot be simply brushed aside absent any
sustainable explanation justifying their relaxation. In this case, proper justification is especially
called for in light of the serious allegations of forgery as to the signatures of the remaining private
respondents, i.e., Lominiqui and Andales. Thus, by simply treating the insufficient submissions
before it as compliance with its Resolution dated August 13, 2009 requiring anew the submission
of a proper verification/certification against forum shopping, the CA patently and grossly ignored
settled procedural rules and, hence, gravely abused its discretion. All things considered, the
proper course of action was for it to dismiss the petition. Go Que Construction vs. CA, G.R. No.
191699, April 19, 2016, J. Perlas-Bernabe
In a case involving co-owners of property where said property is the subject matter of the suit,
the failure of the other co-owners to sign the verification and certification against forum
shopping is not fatal, as the signing by only one or some of them constitutes substantial
compliance with the rule.
The issue in the present case is not the lack of verification but the sufficiency of one executed by
only one of [the] plaintiffs. This Court held in Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo, that the
verification requirement is deemed substantially complied with when, as in the present case,
only one of the heirs-plaintiffs, who has sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of
the allegations in the petition (complaint), signed the verification attached to it. Such verification
is deemed sufficient assurance that the matters alleged in the petition have been made in good
faith or are true and correct, not merely speculative.
The same liberality should likewise be applied to the certification against forum shopping. The
general rule is that the certification must be signed by all plaintiffs in a case and the signature of
only one of them is insufficient. However, the Court has also stressed in a number of cases that
the rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration
of justice and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own
ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with
respect to the contents of the certification. This is because the requirement of strict compliance
with the provisions merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be
altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded.

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As such co-owners, each of the heirs may properly bring an action for ejectment, forcible entry
and detainer, or any kind of action for the recovery of possession of the subject properties. Thus,
a co-owner may bring such an action, even without joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs,
because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Conchita Gloria vs. Builders
Savings and Loan Association, G.R. No. 202324, June 04, 2018
An answer fails to tender an issue if it does not comply with the requirements of a specific denial
as set out in Sections 8 and 10, Rule 8 of the Rules, resulting in the admission of the material
allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings. As such, it is a form of judgment that is exclusively
based on the submitted pleadings without the introduction of evidence as the factual issues
remain uncontroverted.
In this case, records disclose that in its Answer, GSIS admitted the material allegations of PGAI’s
complaint warranting the grant of the relief prayed for. In particular, GSIS admitted that: (a) it
made a request for reinsurance cover which PGAI accepted in a reinsurance binder effective for
one year; (b) it remitted only the first three reinsurance premium payments to PGAI; (c) it failed
to pay PGAI the fourth and final reinsurance premium installment; and (d) it received demand
letters from PGAI. It also did not refute the allegation of PGAI that it settled reinsurance claims
during the reinsured period. On the basis of these admissions, the Court finds that the CA did not
err in affirming the propriety of a judgment on the pleadings. GSIS vs. PGAI, G.R. No. 165585,
November 20, 2013, J. Perlas Bernabe
FAILURE TO PLEAD
The issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter was raised by respondents in their
Appellant's Brief. The fact that it was raised for the first time on appeal is of no moment.
Under Sec. 1, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court, defenses not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except for lack of jurisdiction, litis pendentia, res
judicata, and prescription, which must be apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on record.
In other words, the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal.
In fact, the court may motu proprio dismiss a complaint at any time when it appears from the
pleadings or the evidence on record that lack of jurisdiction exists. Heirs of Julao vs. Sps. De Jesus,
G.R. No. 176020, September 29, 2014

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AMENDMENT
The curing effect under Section 5 of Rule 10 is applicable only if a cause of action in fact exists
at the time the complaint is filed, but the complaint is defective for failure to allege the essential
facts. Thus, a complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured or remedied
by an amended or supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action
while the case is pending.
It is a rule of law to which there is, perhaps, no exception, either at law or in equity, that to
recover at all there must be some cause of action at the commencement of the suit. As observed
by counsel for appellees, there are reasons of public policy why there should be no needless
haste in bringing up litigation, and why people who are in no default and against whom there is
yet no cause of action should not be summoned before the public tribunals to answer complaints
which are groundless. We say groundless because if the action is immature, it should not be
entertained, and an action prematurely brought is a groundless suit.
It is true that an amended complaint and the answer thereto take the place of the originals which
are thereby regarded as abandoned and that "the complaint and answer having been superseded
by the amended complaint and answer thereto, and the answer to the original complaint not
having been presented in evidence as an exhibit, the trial court was not authorized to take it into
account." But in none of these cases or in any other case have we held that if a right of action did
not exist when the original complaint was filed, one could be created by filing an amended
complaint. In some jurisdictions in the United States what was termed an "imperfect cause of
action" could be perfected by suitable amendment xxx. That, however, which is no cause of
action whatsoever cannot by amendment or supplemental pleading be converted into a cause of
action: Nihil de re accrescit ei qui nihil in re quando jus accresceret habet.
We are therefore of the opinion, and so hold, that unless the plaintiff has a valid and subsisting
cause of action at the time his action is commenced, the defect cannot be cured or remedied by
the acquisition or accrual of one while the action is pending, and a supplemental complaint or an
amendment setting up such after-accrued cause of action is not permissible. Swagman Hotels
vs. CA, G.R. No. 161135, April 8, 2005
A complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured by an amended or
supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action during the
pendency of the action. For, only when there is an invasion of primary rights, not before, does
the adjective or remedial law become operative.

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That the respondent had indisputably no unrestricted retained earnings in its books at the time
the petitioners commenced Civil Case No. 01-086 on January 22, 2001 proved that the
respondent’s legal obligation to pay the value of the petitioners’ shares did not yet arise. Thus,
the CA did not err in holding that the petitioners had no cause of action, and in ruling that the
RTC did not validly render the partial summary judgment.
Neither did the subsequent existence of unrestricted retained earnings after the filing of the
complaint cure the lack of cause of action in Civil Case No. 01-086. The petitioners’ right of action
could only spring from an existing cause of action. Thus, a complaint whose cause of action has
not yet accrued cannot be cured by an amended or supplemental pleading alleging the existence
or accrual of a cause of action during the pendency of the action. For, only when there is an
invasion of primary rights, not before, does the adjective or remedial law become operative.
Verily, a premature invocation of the court’s intervention renders the complaint without a cause
of action and dismissible on such ground. In short, Civil Case No. 01-086, being a groundless suit,
should be dismissed.
Even the fact that the respondent already had unrestricted retained earnings more than
sufficient to cover the petitioners’ claims on June 26, 2002 (when they filed their motion for
partial summary judgment) did not rectify the absence of the cause of action at the time of the
commencement of Civil Case No. 01-086. The motion for partial summary judgment, being a
mere application for relief other than by a pleading, was not the same as the complaint in Civil
Case No. 01-086. Thereby, the petitioners did not meet the requirement of the Rules of Court
that a cause of action must exist at the commencement of an action, which is "commenced by
the filing of the original complaint in court." Philip Turner vs. Lorenzo Shipping, G.R. No. 157479,
November 24, 2010
FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS
When a party's counsel serves a notice of change in address upon a court, and the court
acknowledges this change, service of papers, processes, and pleadings upon the counsel's
former address is ineffectual.
Service is deemed completed only when made at the updated address. Proof, however, of
ineffectual service at a counsel's former address is not necessarily proof of a party's claim of when
service was made at the updated address. The burden of proving the affirmative allegation of
when service was made is distinct from the burden of proving the allegation of where service was
or was not made. A party who fails to discharge his or her burden of proof is not entitled to the
relief prayed for. Gatmaytan vs. Dolor, GR No. 198120, February 20, 2017

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To prove service by a private courier or ordinary mail, a party must attach an affidavit of the
person who mailed the motion or pleading. Further, such affidavit must show compliance with
Rule 13, Section 7 of the Rules of Court
Section 7 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides: “Service by registered mail shall be made by
depositing the copy in the post office in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or his
counsel at his office, if known, otherwise at his residence, if known, with postage fully prepaid,
and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if
undelivered. If no registry service is available in the locality of either the senders or the
addressee, service may be done by ordinary mail.”
In this case, PSB admits that it served the copy of the motion for reconsideration to Papa's
counsel via private courier. However, said motion was not accompanied by an affidavit of the
person who sent it through the said private messengerial service. Moreover, PSB's explanation
why it resorted to private courier failed to show its compliance with Rule 13, Section 7. PSB's
explanation merely states:
“Greetings: Kindly set the instant motion on 20 November 2009 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning or
soon thereafter as matter and counsel may be heard. Copy of this pleading was served upon
defendant's counsel by private registered mail for lack of material time and personnel to effect
personal delivery.”
Very clearly, PSB failed to comply with the requirements under Rule 13, Section 7 for an effective
service by ordinary mail. While PSB explained that personal service was not effected due to lack
of time and personnel constraints, it did not offer an acceptable reason why it resorted to
"private registered mail" instead of by registered mail. In particular, PSB failed to indicate that no
registry service was available in San Mateo, Rizal, where the office of Papa's counsel is situated,
or in Makati City, where the office of PSB's counsel is located. Consequently, PSB failed to comply
with the required proof of service by ordinary mail. Thus, the RTC is correct when it denied PSB's
motion for reconsideration, which, for all intents and purposes, can be effectively considered as
not filed. Philippine Savings Bank vs. Papa, G.R. No. 200469 January 15, 2018
SUMMONS
Substituted service of summons requires that the process server should first make several
attempts on personal service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on
at least two different dates.

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The date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the
defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all
other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the
Return to justify substituted service. These matters must be clearly and specifically described in
the Return of Summons. Thus, where the server’s return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the
attempts undertaken by the process server to personally serve the summons on Ong, a defendant
in a case for nullity of marriage; that the return did not describe in detail the person who received
the summons, on behalf of Ong, and that her husband, the respondent, failed to indicate any
portion of the records which would describe the specific attempts to personally serve the
summons, then the substituted service was invalid and the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the person of Ong. Co cannot rely on the presumption of regularity on the part of the process
server when, like in the instant case, it is patent that the sheriff's or server's return is defective
Yuk Ling Ong vs. Co, G.R. No. 206653, February, 25, 2015
Extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under any of three modes: (1) by personal
service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of the
summons and order of the court by registered mail to the defendant's last known address, also
with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider sufficient.
In the present case, it is undisputed that when Philip filed the Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage, an action which affects his personal status, Viveca was already residing in the United
States of America. Thus, extraterritorial service of summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court is the proper mode by which summons may be served on Viveca, a non-resident
defendant who is not found in the Philippines. Yu vs. Yu, GR No. 200072, June 20, 2016
Regardless of the type of action - whether it is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem - the
preferred mode of service of summons is personal service. To avail themselves of substituted
service, courts must rely on a detailed enumeration of the sheriff's actions and a showing that
the defendant cannot be served despite diligent and reasonable efforts. The sheriff's return,
which contains these details, is entitled to a presumption of regularity, and on this basis, the
court may allow substituted service. Should the sheriff's return be wanting of these details,
substituted service will be irregular if no other evidence of the efforts to serve summons was
presented. Failure to serve summons will mean that the court failed to acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant. However, the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration is
tantamount to voluntary appearance.

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This return shows no detail of the sheriff’s efforts to serve the summons personally upon
petitioner. The summons was unserved only because the post office messenger stated that there
was no "Aurora N. De Pedro" in the service address. The return did not show that the sheriff
attempted to locate petitioner’s whereabouts. Moreover, it cannot be concluded based on the
return that personal service was rendered impossible under the circumstances or that service
could no longer be made within reasonable time.
The lack of any demonstration of effort on the part of the sheriff to serve the summons personally
upon petitioner is a deviation from this court’s previous rulings that personal service is the
preferred mode of service, and that the sheriff must narrate in his or her return the efforts made
to effect personal service. Thus, the sheriff’s return in this case was defective. No substituted
service or service by publication will be allowed based on such defective return.
The issuance of a judgment without proper service of summons is a violation of due process
rights. The judgment, therefore, suffers a jurisdictional defect. The case would have been
dismissible had petitioner learned about the case while trial was pending. At that time, a motion
to dismiss would have been proper. After the trial, the case would have been the proper subject
of an action for annulment of judgment. De Pedro vs. Romasan Development Corporation, G.R.
No. 194751, November 26, 2014
If the substituted service will be done at defendant's office or regular place of business, then it
should be served on a competent person in charge of the place.
Thus, the person on whom the substituted service will be made must be the one managing the
office or business of defendant, such as the president or manager; and such individual must have
sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its
importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons. Again, these
details must be contained in the Return. Carson Realty & Management Corp. vs. Red Robin
Security Agency, G.R. No. 225035, February 08, 2017
MOTION TO DISMISS
The preliminary hearing authorized on the affirmative defenses raised in the answer, applies
only if no motion to dismiss has been filed.

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As a rule, a preliminary hearing is not authorized when a motion to dismiss has been filed. An
exception previously carved out is if the trial court had not categorically resolved the motion to
dismiss. Spouses Rasdas vs. Estenor, G.R. No. 157605, December, 13, 2005
Res judicata has two concepts. The first is bar by prior judgment under Rule 39, Section 47(b),
and the second is conclusiveness of judgment under Rule 39, Section 47(c).
Jurisprudence taught us well that res judicata under the first concept or as a bar against the
prosecution of a second action exists when there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause
of action in the first and second actions. The judgment in the first action is final as to the claim or
demand in controversy, including the parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every
matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any
other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all matters that
could have been adjudged in that case. The case at hand satisfies the essential requisites of res
judicata under the first concept. The RTC is therefore correct in dismissing the case on the ground
of res judicata. Samson vs. Sps. Gabor, G.R. No. 182970, July 23, 2014
The language of the rule, particularly on the relation of the words “abandoned” and “otherwise
extinguished” to the phrase “claim or demand deemed set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading” is
broad enough to include within its ambit the defense of bar by laches.
In reversing the RTC's order of dismissal, the Court of Appeals held that "laches could not be a
ground to dismiss the complaint as it is not enumerated under Rule 16, Section 1." This is not
entirely correct. Under paragraph (h) thereof, where a claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's
pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished, the same may be raised
in a motion to dismiss. The language of the rule, particularly on the relation of the words
"abandoned" and "otherwise extinguished" to the phrase "claim or demand deemed set forth in
the plaintiff's pleading" is broad enough to include within its ambit the defense of bar by laches.
However, when a party moves for the dismissal of the complaint based on laches, the trial court
must set a hearing on the motion where the parties shall submit not only their arguments on the
questions of law but also their evidence on the questions of fact involved. Thus, being factual in
nature, the elements of laches must be proved or disproved through the presentation of
evidence by the parties. As discussed above, an apparent delay in the filing of a complaint as
shown in a pleading does not automatically warrant the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
of laches. Pineda vs. Heirs of Guevara, G.R. No. 143188, February 14, 2007

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DISMISSAL BY PLAINTIFF
Section 3 of Rule 17 does not apply when counsel for the plaintiff/petitioner acted negligently
in failing to attend the scheduled hearing dates and even notify the plaintiff/petitioner of the
same so as to enable them to travel all the way from Aurora, Isabela to Manila and attend said
hearings.
Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provides that “[i]f plaintiff fails to appear at the time of
the trial, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these
rules or any order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or
upon the court’s own motion. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the
merits, unless otherwise provided by the court.” However, the application of the foregoing rule
is not, to the Court’s mind, warranted in this case since, as correctly found by the CA,
respondents’ counsel acted negligently in failing to attend the scheduled hearing dates and even
notify respondents of the same so as to enable them to travel all the way from Aurora, Isabela to
Manila and attend said hearings. Verily, relief is accorded to the client who suffered by reason of
the lawyer’s palpable mistake or negligence and where the interest of justice so requires.
The Court finds that respondents would be deprived of the opportunity to prove the legitimacy
of their claims if the RTC’s dismissal of the case – on a procedural technicality at that, which was
clearly caused by the palpable negligence of their counsel – is sustained.
Considering that respondents appear to have legal and factual bases for their grievance, it would
better serve the higher interest of substantial justice to allow the parties’ conflicting claims to be
resolved on the merits. Yap-Co vs. Spouses Uy, G.R. No. 209295, February 11, 2015, J. Perlas-
Bernabe
If a motion to dismiss was filed by the plaintiff or petitioner after the defendant or respondent
has filed an answer with a counterclaim, the latter must first make a manifestation as to his
preference to have his counterclaim resolved in the same action. Failing to do so will trigger
the finality of the court's dismissal of the complaint and hence, bars the conduct of further
proceedings, i.e., the prosecution of respondent's counterclaim, in the same action. If the 15
day period has lapsed, the only recourse of the counter-claimant is to institute the same in a
separate action.
In this case, the CA confined the application of Section 2, Rule 17 to that portion of its second
sentence which states that the "dismissal shall be limited to the complaint." Evidently, the CA
ignored the same provision's third sentence, which provides for the alternatives available to the
defendant who interposes a counterclaim prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion

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for dismissal. As may be clearly inferred therefrom, should the defendant desire to prosecute his
counterclaim, he is required to manifest his preference therefor within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss. Failing in which, the counterclaim may be prosecuted
only in a separate action.
The rationale behind this rule is not difficult to discern: the passing of the fifteen (15)-day period
triggers the finality of the court's dismissal of the complaint and hence, bars the conduct of
further proceedings, i.e., the prosecution of respondent's counterclaim, in the same action. Thus,
in order to obviate this finality, the defendant is required to file the required manifestation within
the aforesaid period; otherwise, the counterclaim may be prosecuted only in a separate action.
Blay vs. Bana, G.R. No. 232189, March 7, 2018, J. Perlas-Bernabe
The "two-dismissal rule" under Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure will not apply
if the prior dismissal was done at the instance of the defendant.
In all instances, Rule 17 governs dismissals at the instance of the plaintiff, not of the defendant.
Dismissals upon the instance of the defendant are generally governed by Rule 16, which covers
motions to dismiss. As a general rule, dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17 are without prejudice
except when it is the second time that the plaintiff caused its dismissal (“two-dismissal rule”).
Accordingly, for a dismissal to operate as an adjudication upon the merits, i.e, with prejudice to
the re-filing of the same claim, the following requisites must be present: 1) There was a previous
case that was dismissed by a competent court; 2) Both cases were based on or include the same
claim; 3) Both notices for dismissal were filed by the plaintiff; and 4) When the motion to dismiss
filed by the plaintiff was consented to by the defendant on the ground that the latter paid and
satisfied all the claims of the former. Accordingly, the purpose of the "two-dismissal rule" is to
avoid vexatious litigation. Clearly, when a complaint is dismissed a second time, the plaintiff is
now barred from seeking relief on the same claim. Powing Properties, Inc. vs. Cheng and Santos,
G.R. No. 175507, October 8, 2014
Dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Section 3 cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to ask
for partition of the property at any time, as provided by Article 494 of the Civil Code, given that
there is no actual adjudication of ownership of shares yet.
Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Section 3, and the right granted to co-owners
under Article 494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish
the substantive right of a co-owner through the promulgation of procedural rules. In other
words, Article 494 is an exception to Rule 17, Section 3. However, there can still be res judicata

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in partition cases concerning the same parties and the same subject matter once the respective
shares of the co-owners have been determined with finality by a competent court with
jurisdiction or if the court determines that partition is improper for co-ownership does not or no
longer exists. Here, the RTC has not made any such determination. Quintos, et al. vs. Nicolas, et
al, G.R. No. 210252, June 16, 2014
PRE-TRIAL
If the party is counseled, the notice of pre-trial must be served on the counsel and there is no
separate requirement for the service of such notice on the party. If the party is uncounseled,
notice of pre-trial must be served on him. This is now the new and established rule on service
of Notice of Pre-trial.
Prior to Section 3, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule was that a notice of pre-
trial had to be served on the party affected separately from his counsel, and the same could be
served directly on him or through his counsel. Otherwise, the proceedings were null and void.
Under the present Section 3, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the notice of pre-trial
should be served on counsel. The counsel served with notice is charged with the duty of notifying
the party he represents. It is only when a party has no counsel that the notice of pre-trial is
required to be served personally on him.
Thus, the present rule simplifies the procedure in the sense that notice of pre-trial is served on
counsel, and service is made on a party only if he has no counsel. Agulto vs. Tecson, G.R. No.
145276, November 29, 2005
Lack of notice of pre-trial voids a subsequently issued decision.
Section 3, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure unequivocally requires that "[t]he notice
of pre-trial shall be served on counsel, or on the party who has no counsel." It is elementary in
statutory construction that the word "shall" denotes the mandatory character of the rule. Thus,
it is without question that the language of the rule undoubtedly requires the trial court to send
a notice of pre-trial to the parties.
More importantly, the notice of pre-trial seeks to notify the parties of the date, time and place
of the pre-trial and to require them to file their respective pre-trial briefs within the time

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prescribed by the rules. Its absence, therefore, renders the pre-trial and all subsequent
proceedings null and void.
In Pineda v. Court of Appeals, the Court therein discussed the importance of the notice of pre-
trial. It pointed out that the absence of the notice of pre-trial constitutes a violation of a person’s
constitutional right to due process. Further, the Court ruled that all subsequent orders, including
the default judgment, are null and void and without effect, viz:
Reason and justice ordain that the court a quo should have notified the parties in the case at bar.
Otherwise, said parties without such notice would not know when to proceed or resume
proceedings. With due notice of the proceedings, the fate of a party adversely affected would
not be adjudged ex parte and without due process, and he would have the opportunity of
confronting the opposing party, and the paramount public interest which calls for a proper
examination of the issues in any justiciable case would be subserved. The absence, therefore, of
the requisite notice of pre-trial to private respondents through no fault or negligence on their
part, nullifies the order of default issued by the petitioner Judge for denying them their day in
court — a constitutional right. In such, the order suffers from an inherent procedural defect and
is null and void. Under such circumstance, the granting of relief to private respondents becomes
a matter of right; and the court proceedings starting from the order of default to the default
judgment itself should be considered null and void and of no effect. PNB vs. Spouses Perez, G.R.
No. 187640, June 15, 2011.
INTERVENTION
Intervention is improper when the intervenor assails the decision in the main action which was
dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over an intervention is governed by jurisdiction
over the main action. Accordingly, an intervention presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court
of competent jurisdiction.
In this case, Pulgar does not contest the RTC's dismissal of Civil Case No. 0587-M for lack of
jurisdiction, but oddly maintains his intervention by asking in this appeal a review of the
correctness of the subject realty tax assessment. This recourse, the Court, however, finds to be
improper since the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the main case necessarily resulted in the
dismissal of his intervention. In other words, the cessation of the principal litigation - on
jurisdictional grounds at that - means that Pulgar had, as a matter of course, lost his right to
intervene. Verily, it must be borne in mind that: Intervention is never an independent action, but
is ancillary and supplemental to the existing litigation. Its purpose is not to obstruct nor x x x
unnecessarily delay the placid operation of the machinery of trial, but merely to afford one not
an original party, yet having a certain right or interest in the pending case, the opportunity to

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appear and be joined so he could assert or protect such right or interests. Otherwise stated, the
right of an intervenor should only be in aid of the right of the original party. Where the right of
the latter has ceased to exist, there is nothing to aid or fight for; hence, the right of intervention
ceases. Pulgar vs. RTC, G.R. No. 157583, September 10, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Senators De Lima and Trillanes' averments that they have legal interest as Intervenors in the
Quo Warranto Case against Chief Justice Sereno contending their would-be participation in the
impeachment trial as Senators-judges if the articles of impeachment will be filed before the
Senate as the impeachment court does not hold water.
Clearly, herein movant-intervenors' sentiments, no matter how noble, do not, in any way, come
within the purview of the concept of "legal interest" contemplated under the Rules to justify the
allowance of intervention. Movant-intervenors failed to show any legal interest of such nature
that they will "either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment". Even the IBP's
assertion of their "fundamental duty to uphold the Constitution, advocate for the rule of law, and
safeguard the administration of justice", being the official organization of all Philippine lawyers,
will not suffice. Admittedly, their interest is merely out of "sentimental desire" to uphold the rule
of law. Meanwhile, Senators De Lima and Trillanes' claimed legal interest is mainly grounded
upon their would-be participation in the impeachment trial as Senators-judges if the articles of
impeachment will be filed before the Senate as the impeachment court. Nevertheless, the fact
remains that as of the moment, such interest is still contingent on the filing of the articles of
impeachment before the Senate. It bears stressing that the interest contemplated by law must
be actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or expectant.
Indeed, if every person, not parties to the action but assert their desire to uphold the rule of law
and the Constitution, were allowed to intervene, proceedings would become unnecessarily
complicated, expensive, and interminable. Republic vs. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
The Ombudsman may not be allowed to intervene and seek reconsideration of the adverse
decision rendered by CA in absolving the accused from the liability.
In order to file an intervention, two requisites must concur: (1) movant has legal interest in the
matter in litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the rights of the parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly
decided in a separate proceeding. The interest referred to must be direct and immediate in
character that the intervenor will be affected by the decision or judgment to be rendered.
Moreover, when judges actively participate in the appeal of the decision which they have ren-

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dered, they become adversarial and cease to be judicial which supposed to be principal function.
The Court ruled that the Ombudsman must be mindful of its role as an adjudicator which must
remain partial and detached from the cases it ruled upon. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Sison,
G.R. No. 185954, February 6, 2010
After trial and decision in a case, intervention can no longer be permitted
Lastly, on the matter of allowing the intervention after trial, suffice it to state that the rules now
allow intervention "before rendition of judgment by the trial court." After trial and decision in a
case, intervention can no longer be permitted. The permissive tenor of the provision on
intervention shows the intention of the Rules to give to the court the full measure of discretion
in permitting or disallowing the same. The rule on intervention was evidently intended to
expedite and economize in litigation by permitting parties interested in the subject matter, or
anything related therein, to adjust the matter in one instead of several suits. Yau vs. Manila
Banking corporation, G.R. No. 126731, July 11, 2002
MODES OF DISCOVERY
The consequences enumerated in Section 3(c) of Rule 29 would only apply where the party upon
whom the written interrogatories is served, refuses to answer a particular question in the set
of written interrogatories and despite an order compelling him to answer the particular
question, still refuses to obey the order.
In the instant case, petitioners refused to answer the whole set of written interrogatories, not
just a particular question. Clearly then, respondent bank should have filed a motion based on
Section 5 and not Section 3(c) of Rule 29. Section 5 of Rule 29 reads:
SEC. 5. Failure of party to attend or serve answers. – If a party or an officer or managing agent of
a party willfully fails to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served
with a proper notice, or fails to serve answers to interrogatories submitted under Rule 25 after
proper service of such interrogatories, the court on motion and notice, may strike out all or any
part of any pleading of that party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or
enter a judgment by default against that party, and in its discretion, order him to pay reasonable
expenses incurred by the other, including attorney’s fees.

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Due to respondent bank’s filing of an erroneous motion, the trial court cannot be faulted for
ruling that the motion to expunge was premature for lack of a prior application to compel
compliance based on Section 3.
This Court has long encouraged the availment of the various modes or instruments of discovery
as embodied in Rules 24 to 29 of the Rules of Court. In the case of Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing
Corporation v. Ley Construction and Development Corporation, we declared:
“Indeed, the importance of discovery procedures is well recognized by the Court. It approved
A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC on July 13, 2004 which provided for the guidelines to be observed by trial
court judges and clerks of court in the conduct of pre-trial and use of deposition-discovery
measures. Under A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, trial courts are directed to issue orders requiring parties
to avail of interrogatories to parties under Rule 45 and request for admission of adverse party
under Rule 26 or at their discretion make use of depositions under Rule 23 or other measures
under Rule 27 and 28 within 5 days from the filing of the answer. The parties are likewise required
to submit, at least 3 days before the pre-trial, pre-trial briefs, containing among others a
manifestation of the parties of their having availed or their intention to avail themselves of
discovery procedures or referral to commissioners. Zeoeda vs. China Banking Corporation, G.R.
No. 172175, October 9, 2006
The Court ruled that the availment of a motion for production, as one of the modes of discovery,
is not limited to the pre-trial stage. Rule 27 does not provide for any time frame within which
the discovery mode of production or inspection of documents can be utilized. The rule only
requires leave of court "upon due application and a showing of due cause".
The availment of a motion for production, as one of the modes of discovery, is not limited to the
pre-trial stage. Rule 27 does not provide for any time frame within which the discovery mode of
production or inspection of documents can be utilized. The rule only requires leave of court
"upon due application and a showing of due cause." Rule 27, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
states:
SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection order — Upon motion of any party showing good
cause therefor the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and
permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things,
not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action
and which are in his possession, custody or control[.] (Emphasis supplied)

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In Producers Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, this court held that since the rules are
silent as to the period within which modes of discovery (in that case, written interrogatories) may
still be requested, it is necessary to determine: (1) the purpose of discovery; (2) whether, based
on the stage of the proceedings and evidence presented thus far, allowing it is proper and would
facilitate the disposition of the case; and (3) whether substantial rights of parties would be unduly
prejudiced.41 This court further held that "[t]he use of discovery is encouraged, for it operates
with desirable flexibility under the discretionary control of the trial court."
In Dasmariñas Garments, Inc. v. Reyes, this court declared that depositions, as a mode of
discovery, "may be taken at any time after the institution of any action [as there is] no prohibition
against the taking of depositions after pre-trial." Thus:
Dasmariñas also contends that the "taking of deposition is a mode of pretrial discovery to be
availed of before the action comes to trial." Not so. Depositions may be taken at any time after
the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits
deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against the taking of
depositions after pre-trial. Indeed, the law authorizes the taking of depositions of witnesses
before or after an appeal is taken from the judgment of a Regional Trial Court "to perpetuate
their testimony for use in the event of further proceedings in the said court" (Rule 134, Rules of
Court), and even during the process of execution of a final and executory judgment.
"The modes of discovery are accorded a broad and liberal treatment." The evident purpose of
discovery procedures is "to enable the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain
the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials" and, thus, facilitating an
amicable settlement or expediting the trial of the case. Eagle Ridge Development Corporation
vs. Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc., G.R. No. 204700, November 24, 2014
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct grounds to dismiss a
particular action. The former refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading, while
the latter to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action The former is a ground for a
motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court while the latter is ground to dismiss under
Rule 33 as demurrer to evidence.
Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of the
proceedings through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, while dismissal for
lack of cause of action may be raised any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on
the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff.

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The Amended and Second Amended Complaints are dismissible on the ground of failure to state
a cause of action, as correctly held by the RTC. "A complaint states a cause of action if it
sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely:
(a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; (b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and (c) an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the right of the
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter
may maintain an action for recovery of damages. If the allegations of the complaint do not state
the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on
the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Westmont Bank vs. Funai Philippines
Corporation, G.R. Nos. 175733 & 180162, July 8, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Judgment on the pleadings is proper where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading.
An answer would “fail to tender an issue” if it does not deny the material allegations in the
complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by confessing the
truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all. Now, if an answer does in fact
specifically deny the material averments of the complaint and/or asserts affirmative defenses
(allegations of new matter which, while admitting the material allegations of the complaint
expressly or impliedly, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff), a judgment
on the pleadings would naturally be improper. Adolfo vs. Adolfo, GR No. 201427, March 18, 2015
What distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a summary judgment is the presence of
issues in the Answer to the Complaint.
When the Answer fails to tender any issue, that is, if it does not deny the material allegations in
the complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by admitting
the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all, a judgment on the pleadings is
appropriate. On the other hand, when the Answer specifically denies the material averments of
the complaint or asserts affirmative defenses, or in other words raises an issue, a summary
judgment is proper provided that the issue raised is not genuine. A genuine issue means an issue
of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is
fictitious or contrived or which does not constitute a genuine issue for trial. Basbas vs. Sayson,
G.R. No. No. 172660, August 21, 2011

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JUDGMENTS
It is just as basic that a judgment can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified as soon as it
becomes final and executory; "nothing is more settled in law." Once a case is decided with
finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest.
Accordingly, [a final judgment] may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification
is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless
of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest
court of the land. Once a judgment becomes final, the court or tribunal loses jurisdiction, and any
modified judgment that it issues, as well as all proceedings taken for this purpose are null and
void.
This elementary rule finds basis in "public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional
error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some
definite date fixed by law." Basic rationality dictates that there must be an end to litigation. Any
contrary posturing renders justice inutile, reducing to futility the winning party's capacity to
benefit from the resolution of a case. In accordance with Rule 36, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, unless a Motion for Reconsideration is timely filed, the judgment or final order
from which it arose shall become final. Gatmaytan vs. Dolor, G.R. No. 198120, February 20, 2017
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS
The factual findings that NSSC is under a state of rehabilitation and had ceased business
operations, taken together with the information that NSSC President and General Manager
Orimaco had permanently left the country with his family, constitute “Good reasons” which
warrant execution pending appeal.
The execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule that only a final
judgment may be executed; hence, under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (Rules), the
existence of "good reasons" for the immediate execution of a judgment is an indispensable
requirement as this is what confers discretionary power on a court to issue a writ of execution
pending appeal. Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances justifying immediate
execution, lest judgment becomes illusory, that is, the prevailing party’s chances for recovery on
execution from the judgment debtor are altogether nullified.
Notably, as early as April 22, 2008, the rehabilitation receiver had manifested before the
rehabilitation court the futility of rehabilitating NSSC because of the latter’s insincerity in the
implementation of the rehabilitation process. Clearly, respondents’ diminishing chances of

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recovery from the favorable Decision is a good reason to justify immediate execution; hence, it
would be improper to set aside the order granting execution pending appeal. Centenial
Guarantee Assurance Corporation vs. UMC, G.R. No. 189358, October 8, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Revival of judgment is premised on the assumption that the decision to be revived, either by
motion or by independent action, is already final and executory.
An action to revive a judgment is an action whose exclusive purpose is to enforce a judgment

which could no longer be enforced by mere motion. Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides: Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. - A final and executory
judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry.
After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may
be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years
from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.
Section 6 is clear. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it
executed as a matter of right by mere motion within five years from the date of entry of
judgment. If the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a motion after the lapse
of five years, the said judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be enforced by the
institution of a complaint in a regular court within 10 years from the time the judgment becomes
final.
Further, a revival suit is a new action, having for its cause of action the judgment sought to be
revived. It is different and distinct from the original judgment sought to be revived or enforced.
It is a new and independent action, wherein the cause of action is the decision itself and not the
merits of the action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is rendered. Revival of
judgment is premised on the assumption that the decision to be revived, either by motion or by
independent action, is already final and executory. Anama vs. Citibank, G.R. No. 192048,
December 13, 2017
Before the divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove it
as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Proving the foreign law under which the divorce was secured is mandatory considering that
Philippine courts cannot and could not be expected to take judicial notice of foreign laws. For the
purpose of establishing divorce as a fact, a copy of the divorce decree itself must be presented
and admitted in evidence. This is in consonance with the rule that a foreign judgment may be
given presumptive evidentiary value only after it is presented and admitted in evidence.

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In particular, to prove the divorce and the foreign law allowing it, the party invoking them must
present copies thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Pursuant to these rules, the divorce decree and foreign law may be proven through (1) an
official publication or (2) or copies thereof attested to by the officer having legal custody of said
documents. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country, the copies of said documents
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept; and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. Misalucha vs. People, G.R. No. 206284, February 28, 2018
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
Jurisprudence dictates that there is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference arises as
to what the law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances; on the other hand, there is a
"question of fact" when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. The test for determining whether the supposed error was one of "law" or "fact" is not the
appellation given by the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can
resolve the issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law;
otherwise, it is one of fact. In other words, where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question
of whether or not the conclusions drawn from these facts are correct is a question of law.
However, if the question posed requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the
existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relationship to each other, the
issue is factual.
Thus, given that the issues to be resolved on appeal only involve questions of law, no reversible
error was committed by the CA in dismissing petitioner’s appeal. The proper recourse should
have been to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Bases
Convention Development Authority vs. Carlos Reyes, G.R. No. 194247, June 19, 2013, J. Perlas-
Bernabe
Petition for relief from judgment can only be filed with Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional
Trial Courts although Rule 38 uses the phrase "any court".
As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule as it now allows the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Court which decided the case or issued the order to hear the petition for relief.
Under the old rule, a petition for relief from the judgment or final order of Municipal Trial Courts
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, viz.:

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Section 1. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment of inferior court. – When a
judgment is rendered by an inferior court on a case, and a party thereto by fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence, has been unjustly deprived of a hearing therein, or has been
prevented from taking an appeal, he may file a petition in the Court of First Instance of the
province in which the original judgment was rendered, praying that such judgment be set aside
and the case tried upon its merits.
Section 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from the judgment or other proceeding
thereof. – When a judgment order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken against a party in
a Court of First Instance through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a
petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be
set aside.
The procedural change in Rule 38 is in line with Rule 5, prescribing uniform procedure for
Municipal and Regional Trial Courts and designation of Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Courts as
courts of record.
The procedure in the CA and the Supreme Court are governed by separate provisions of the Rules
of Court. It may, from time to time, be supplemented by additional rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court through resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the
Revised Internal Rules of the CA allows the remedy of petition for relief in the CA.
There is no provision in the Rules of Court making the petition for relief applicable in the CA or
this Court. The procedure in the CA from Rules 44 to 55, with the exception of Rule 45 which
pertains to the Supreme Court, identifies the remedies available before said Court such as
annulment of judgments or final orders or resolutions (Rule 47), motion for reconsideration (Rule
52), and new trial (Rule 53). Nowhere is a petition for relief under Rule 38 mentioned.
If a petition for relief from judgment is not among the remedies available in the CA, with more
reason that this remedy cannot be availed of in the Supreme Court. This Court entertains only
questions of law. A petition for relief raises questions of facts on fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence, which are beyond the concerns of this Court. Purcon vs. MRM Philippines,
G.R. No. 182718, September 26, 2008
The "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals and not to administrative
appeals
The "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals and not to administrative
appeals. In this case, the subject appeal, i.e., appeal from a decision of the HLURB Board of Com-

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missioners to the OP, is not judicial but administrative in nature; thus, the "fresh period rule" in
Neypes does not apply. An administrative appeal is governed by Section 1 of Administrative Order
No. 87, Series of 1990 which provides that if the motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant
shall perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period of appeal, reckoned from receipt of
the resolution of denial; whereas if the decision is reversed, the adverse party has a fresh 15-day
period to perfect his appeal. San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders vs. Bayang, G.R. No. 194702, April 20,
2015
It is well-settled that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or successive. The simultaneous filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and
an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be allowed
since one remedy would necessarily cancel out the other. The existence and availability of the
right of appeal proscribes resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for availment of
the latter is precisely that there should be no appeal.
The general rule is that certiorari will not lie as a substitute for an appeal, for relief through a
special action like certiorari may only be established when no remedy by appeal lies. The
exception to this rule is conceded only "where public welfare and the advancement of public
policy so dictate, and the broader interests of justice so require, or where the orders complained
of were found to be completely null and void, or that appeal was not considered the appropriate
remedy, such as in appeals from orders of preliminary attachment or appointments of receiver."
(Fernando v. Vasquez, L- 26417, 30 January 1970; 31 SCRA 288). For example, certiorari maybe
available where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual (Romero Sr. v. Court of Appeals, L-29659,
30 July 1971; 40 SCRA 172).
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, it is clear that Cailipan, et al.’s January 11,
2011 petition for certiorari was rendered superfluous by their January 22, 2011 appeal. Although
Cailipan, et al. did not err in filing the certiorari petition with the CA on January 11, 2011 – as they
only received the RTC’s Decision three days after the said date and therefore could not have
availed of the remedy of an appeal at that time – the Court observes that Cailipan, et al. should
have (a) withdrawn their certiorari petition and instead raised the jurisdictional errors stated
therein in their appeal or (b) at the very least, informed the CA’s Twenty-First Division of the
Decision rendered on the main case and the filing of their Notice of Appeal on January 22, 2011.
Prudence should have guided them to pursue either course of action considering the well-
entrenched conflict between the remedies of an appeal and a petition for certiorari, of which
they should have been well aware of. Villamar-Sandoval vs. Cailipan, G.R. 200727, March 4,
2013, J. Perlas-Bernabe

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The procedural requirement under Section 4 of Rule 41 is not merely directory, as the payment
of the docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and
jurisdictional. It bears stressing that an appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege.
An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC to the CA must be made within 15
days from notice. And within this period, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other
lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from.
The requirement of paving the full amount of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed
period is not a mere technicality of law or procedure. The payment of docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the
appeal is not perfected. The appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action and the Decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.
Further, under Section 1 (c), Rule 50, an appeal may be dismissed by the CA, on its own motion
or on that of the appellee, on the ground of the non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees
within the reglementary period as provided under Section 4 of Rule 41. The payment of the full
amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In both original
and appellate cases, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees. Huang vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 218867, February 17,
2016, Perlas-Bernabe, J.
The OP‟s cancellation and/or revocation of a mining firm’s FTAA is purely administrative in
nature and not an exercise of its quasi-judicial authority. It merely exercised a contractual right
by cancelling/revoking said agreement, a purely administrative action which should not be
considered quasi-judicial in nature.
In this case, the OP cancelled/revoked the subject FTAA based on its finding that petitioners
misrepresented, inter alia, that they were Filipino corporations qualified to engage in mining
activities. Again, this is obviously an administrative exercise of a contractual right under
paragraph a (iii), Section 17.2 of the FTAA, which finds legal basis in Section 99 of RA 7942 that
states: "[a]ll statements made in the exploration permit, mining agreement and financial or
technical assistance shall be considered as conditions and essential parts thereof x x x."
The Court holds that the OP has no quasi-judicial power to adjudicate the propriety of its
cancellation/revocation. At the risk of belaboring the point, the FTAA is a contract to which the
OP itself represents a party, i.e., the Republic. It merely exercised a contractual right by
cancelling/revoking said agreement, a purely administrative action which should not be

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CIVIL PROCEDURE
considered quasi-judicial in nature. Thus, absent the OP's proper exercise of a quasi-judicial
function, the CA had no appellate jurisdiction over the case, and its Decision is, perforce, null and
void. With this, it is unnecessary to delve into the other ancillary issues raised in the course of
these proceedings. Narra Nickel Mining & Dev‟t Corp. vs. Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp.,
December 9, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.

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2019 BAR REVIEW REMEDIAL LAW

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The Sandiganbayan correctly denied jurisdiction over the proposed complaint-in-intervention.

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A Vice-Governor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of

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In the case at hand, the Complaint filed by the plaintiff states:

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Under the present Rules of Court, Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 4 provide:

PLEADINGS AND MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS

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If the notarial certificate of the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to a

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FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS

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Lack of notice of pre-trial voids a subsequently issued decision.

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After trial and decision in a case, intervention can no longer be permitted

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JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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An action to revive a judgment is an action whose exclusive purpose is to enforce a judgment

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POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES

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