FERDINAND A. CRUZ, 332 Edang St., Pasay City, G.R. No.

154464

Petitioner, Present:

- versus - TINGA, J.,*

JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, Presiding Judge, CHICO-NAZARIO,

Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Acting Chairperson,

Public Respondent. VELASCO, JR.,*

BENJAMIN MINA, JR., 332 Edang St., Pasay City, NACHURA, and

Private Respondent. REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

September 11, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was directly filed with this
Court assailing the Resolutions dated May 10, 20021 and July 31, 20022 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 108, Pasay City, which denied the appearance of the plaintiff Ferdinand A.
Cruz, herein petitioner, as party litigant, and the refusal of the public respondent, Judge Priscilla
Mijares, to voluntarily inhibit herself from trying the case. No writ of preliminary injunction was
issued by this Court.

The antecedents:

On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter his appearance for
and on his behalf, before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 01-
0410, for Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law student, anchors his claim on
Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court3 that a non-lawyer may appear before any court and
conduct his litigation personally.

During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure a written permission
from the Court Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself, a
party-litigant. Atty. Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss
instead of a pre-trial brief to which petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to
Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares then remarked, "Hay
naku, masama ‘yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?" and proceeded to hear the pending Motion to
Dismiss and calendared the next hearing on May 2, 2002.

On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit,4 praying for the
voluntary inhibition of Judge Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part of
the respondent judge in the conduct of the trial could be inferred from the contumacious remarks
of Judge Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark,
reflects a negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief that justice will not be served.5

In an Order6 dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion for inhibition stating that
throwing tenuous allegations of partiality based on the said remark is not enough to warrant her
voluntary inhibition, considering that it was said even prior to the start of pre-trial. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration7 of the said order.

On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality.8 In the same Order, the trial
court held that for the failure of petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and
jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the requirements or conditions under Rule 138-A of
the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied.

In a motion for reconsideration,9 petitioner reiterated that the basis of his appearance was not
Rule 138-A, but Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules were distinct and are
applicable to different circumstances, but the respondent judge denied the same, still invoking
Rule 138-A, in an Order10 dated July 31, 2002.

On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant petition and assigns
the following errors:

I.

THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE APPEARANCE OF THE PETITIONER, FOR AND
IN THE LATTER’S BEHALF, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-0401 [sic] CONTRARY TO RULE
138, SECTION 34 OF THE RULES OF COURT, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF
NON-LAWYERS AS A PARTY LITIGANT;

II.

THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN
IT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY INHIBIT DESPITE THE ADVENT OF JURISPRUDENCE
[sic] THAT SUCH AN INHIBITION IS PROPER TO PRESERVE THE PEOPLE’S FAITH
AND CONFIDENCE TO THE COURTS.

The core issues raised before the Court are: (1) whether the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court may issue; and (2) whether
the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it denied the appearance of the petitioner as party litigant and when the judge
refused to inhibit herself from trying the case.

This Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction is not
exclusive; it has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals. This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as an absolute, unrestrained freedom to
choose the court where the application therefor will be directed.11 A becoming regard of the
judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs
against the RTCs should be filed with the Court of Appeals.12 The hierarchy of courts is
determinative of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs; and only in
exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues
reviewed, may this Court take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.13

Considering, however, that this case involves the interpretation of Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule
138-A of the Rules of Court, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition. Nonetheless, the
petitioner is cautioned not to continue his practice of filing directly before this Court petitions
under Rule 65 when the issue raised can be resolved with dispatch by the Court of Appeals. We
will not tolerate litigants who make a mockery of the judicial hierarchy as it necessarily delays
more important concerns before us.

In resolving the second issue, a comparative reading of Rule 138, Section 34 and Rule 138-A is
necessary.

Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A

LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully completed his
3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without
compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board
or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under
the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly
accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers
to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

The respondent court held that the petitioner could not appear for himself and on his behalf
because of his failure to comply with Rule 138-A. In denying petitioner’s appearance, the court a
quo tersely finds refuge in the fact that, on December 18, 1986, this Court issued Circular No.
19, which eventually became Rule 138-A, and the failure of Cruz to prove on record that he is
enrolled in a recognized school’s clinical legal education program and is under supervision of an
attorney duly accredited by the law school.
However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance was Section 34 of Rule 138,
which provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.

and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.

From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will have to be conceded that the
contention of the petitioner has merit. It recognizes the right of an individual to represent himself
in any case to which he is a party. The Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation
personally or with the aid of an attorney, and that his appearance must either be personal or by a
duly authorized member of the Bar. The individual litigant may personally do everything in the
course of proceedings from commencement to the termination of the litigation.14 Considering
that a party personally conducting his litigation is restricted to the same rules of evidence and
procedure as those qualified to practice law,15 petitioner, not being a lawyer himself, runs the risk
of falling into the snares and hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his
own instance, can personally conduct the litigation of Civil Case No. 01-0410. He would then be
acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his right to represent himself.

The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law student and must,
therefore, be subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule
138-A, when the basis of the petitioner’s claim is Section 34 of Rule 138. The former rule
provides for conditions when a law student may appear in courts, while the latter rule allows the
appearance of a non-lawyer as a party representing himself.

The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by virtue of Circular No.
19 is misplaced. The Court never intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released the guidelines for
limited law student practice. In fact, it was intended as an addendum to the instances when a
non-lawyer may appear in courts and was incorporated to the Rules of Court through Rule 138-
A.

It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right of an accused to be heard by
himself and counsel,16 this Court has held that during the trial, the right to counsel cannot be
waived.17 The rationale for this ruling was articulated in People v. Holgado,18 where we declared
that "even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is
guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence."

The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff therein. The solicitous
concern that the Constitution accords the accused in a criminal prosecution obviously does not
obtain in a civil case. Thus, a party litigant in a civil case, who insists that he can, without a
lawyer’s assistance, effectively undertake the successful pursuit of his claim, may be given the
chance to do so. In this case, petitioner alleges that he is a law student and impliedly asserts that
he has the competence to litigate the case himself. Evidently, he is aware of the perils incident to
this decision.

In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue of Section 34, Rule
138, a law student may appear as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without need of the
supervision of a lawyer, before inferior courts. Here, we have a law student who, as party
litigant, wishes to represent himself in court. We should grant his wish.

Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent judge committed manifest bias
and partiality by ruling that there is no valid ground for her voluntary inhibition despite her
alleged negative demeanor during the pre-trial when she said: "Hay naku, masama ‘yung
marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?" Petitioner avers that by denying his motion, the respondent judge
already manifested conduct indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice, causing petitioner’s and his
co-plaintiff’s loss of faith and confidence in the respondent’s impartiality.

We do not agree.

It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner filed an administrative case19 against
the respondent for violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which we dismissed for lack of
merit on September 15, 2002. We now adopt the Court’s findings of fact in the administrative
case and rule that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Mijares when she
did not inhibit herself from the trial of the case.

In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and prejudice by clear and
convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial,20 as voluntary
inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and addressed to the sound discretion of the judge.
The decision on whether she should inhibit herself must be based on her rational and logical
assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case before her.21 Absent clear and convincing
proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule in favor of the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City are MODIFIED. Regional Trial Court, Branch
108, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Civil Case
No. 01-0410 as a party litigant.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

People v Leoncio Santocildes, Jr. Y Siga-an

Saturday, October 19, 2013

FACTS:

Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of rape of a girl less than nine years old. The
court rendered a decision finding appellant guilty as charged. However, during the proceeding,
accused-appellant was not represented by a member of the Bar. Hence, he filed a Notice of
Appeal and praying that the judgment against him be set aside on the ground that he was denied
of his right to be represented by a counsel which results to the denial of due process. The Office
of the Solicitor General maintains that notwithstanding the fact that appellant's counsel during
the trial was not a member of the Bar, he was afforded due process since he was given
opportunity to be heard and records reveal that said person handled the case in a professional and
skillful manner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a person not member of the Philippine Bar may represent an accused in a
criminal proceeding.

HELD:

NO.

The presence and participation of counsel in criminal proceedings should never be taken lightly.
Even the most intelligent or educated man may be convicted without a counsel, not because he is
guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence.

The right of the accused to counsel is guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial
system where the accused is pitted against the awesome prosecutory machinery of the State. A
person has the right to due process, he must be heard before being condemned - a part of
person's basic rights. The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in the Constitution (Art.
III,Secs. 12 & 14(2)], Rules of Criminal Procedure (Sec. 1 of Rule 115), Art. 8, Sec. 5 of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court (Sec. 1 of Rule 138)

The assailed judgment is Set Aside, and the case is hereby Remanded to the trial court for new
trial.

[G.R. No. 109149. December 21, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEONCIO SANTOCILDES, JR. y

SIGA-AN, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:
Where an accused was not duly represented by a member of the Philippine Bar during trial, the
judgment should be set aside and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial. A person
who misrepresents himself as a lawyer shall be held liable for indirect contempt of court.

Subject of the present appeal is the decision dated October 29, 1992, of the Regional Trial Court
of Iloilo City, Branch 33, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of rape, sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the offended party the amount
of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On February 17, 1992, appellant was charged with the crime of rape1 of a girl less than nine (9)
years old, committed on December 28, 1991, in the town of Barangay San Luis, San Joaquin,
Iloilo.

Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued and the prosecution
presented as its witnesses the victim, her mother, her six (6) year-old playmate, and the medico-
legal officer who examined the victim.

For the defense, appellant presented one German Toriales and himself. Appellant denied
committing the rape and claimed that he merely tried to stop the two girls, the victim and her
playmate, from quarreling.

On October 29, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision2 finding appellant guilty as charged. The
dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together its accessory penalty. The
accused is ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 to the complainant and another amount for
costs, without subsidiary penalty in case of failure to pay the civil liability and the cost.

If qualified under Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 6127, as amended, and
he has agreed in writing to abide by the same rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall be
credited with the full duration of his preventive imprisonment; otherwise, he shall only be
credited with 4/5 of the same.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, appellant duly filed a Notice of Appeal.3 In his brief,4 appellant made the following
assignment of errors:

I. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF RAPE INSPITE OF CONFLICTING
TESTIMONIES OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AND HER WITNESSES ON
MATERIAL POINTS.
II. THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED THOUGH NO FAULT OF
HIS OWN TO BE DEFENDED BY A PERSON AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW
AMOUNTING TO DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.

Considering the importance of the constitutional right to counsel, we shall now first resolve
the issue of proper representation by a member of the bar raised by appellant.

Appellant contends that he was represented during trial by a person named Gualberto C.
Ompong, who for all intents and purposes acted as his counsel and even conducted the
direct examination and cross-examinations of the witnesses. On appeal, however, appellant
secured the services of a new lawyer, Atty. Igmedio S. Prado, Jr., who discovered that
Gualberto C. Ompong is actually not a member of the bar. Further verification with the
Office of the Bar Confidant confirmed this fact.5 Appellant therefore argues that his
deprivation of the right to counsel should necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime
charged.

The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, maintains that notwithstanding the
fact that appellants counsel during trial was not a member of the bar, appellant was
afforded due process since he has been given an opportunity to be heard and the records
reveal that said person presented the evidence for the defense with the ability of a seasoned
lawyer and in general handled the case of appellant in a professional and skillful manner.
However, the right of the accused to be heard by himself and his counsel, in our view, goes
much deeper than the question of ability or skill. It lies at the heart of our adversarial
system of justice. Where the interplay of basic rights of the individual may collide with the
awesome forces of the state, we need a professional learned in the law as well as ethically
committed to defend the accused by all means fair and reasonable.

On the matter of proper representation by a member of the bar, we had occasion to resolve
a similar issue in the case of Delgado v. Court of Appeals.6 In Delgado, petitioner and two
others were convicted by the trial court of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public
and/or official documents. One accused did not appeal. Petitioner Delgado and her
remaining co-accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed petitioners
conviction but acquitted her co-accused. After entry of judgment, petitioner discovered
that her lawyer was not a member of the bar and moved to set aside the entry of judgment.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion, hence, she filed a petition for certiorari
with this Court. The Court set aside the assailed judgment and remanded the case to the
trial court for a new trial, explaining that -

This is so because an accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the bar in

a criminal case filed against her before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented
by a lawyer, there is great danger that any defense presented in her behalf will be
inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings.
This would certainly be a denial of due process.7

Indeed, the right to counsel is of such primordial importance that even if an accused was
represented by three successive counsels from the Public Attorneys Office, the Court has
ordered the remand of a rape case when it found that accused was given mere perfunctory
representation by aforesaid counsels such that appellant was not properly and effectively
accorded the right to counsel. In the recent en banc case of People v. Bermas, G.R. No.
120420, April 21, 1999, the Court, speaking through Justice Vitug, admonished three (3)
PAO lawyers for failing to genuinely protect the interests of the accused and for having
fallen much too short of their responsibility as officers of the court and as members of the
Bar. Verily, we can do no less where the accused was not even duly represented by a
certified member of the Philippine Bar, no matter how zealous his representation might
have been.

The presence and participation of counsel in criminal proceedings should never be taken
lightly.8 Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the
law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not
because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence.9 The right
of an accused to counsel is guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system
where the accused is pitted against the awesome prosecutory machinery of the State.10 Such
a right proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that
a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of
a persons basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed
perfunctorily.11

The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in no less than Article III, Sections 12 and
14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution. This constitutional mandate is reflected in Section 1 of Rule
115 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which declares the right of the accused at the
trial to be present in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings from the
arraignment to the promulgation of judgment. In turn, Section 5 of Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution vests the power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice
of law to the Supreme Court. Section 1 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court explicitly states
who are entitled to practice law in the Philippines, and Section 2 thereof clearly provides
for the requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Jurisprudence has also
held that the right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature
of a privilege or franchise. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The right does not only presuppose in its
possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special
privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust.12 Indeed, so strict is
the regulation of the practice of law that in Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,13 a Bar candidate who has
already successfully hurdled the Bar examinations but has not yet taken his oath and
signed the roll of attorneys, and who was caught in the unauthorized practice of law was
held in contempt of court. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person
who undertakes the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court for
assuming to be an attorney and acting as such without authority.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is SET ASIDE, and the case is hereby REMANDED
to the trial court for new trial.
With respect to the unauthorized practice of law by the person named Gualberto C.
Ompong in connection with this case, the local Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines of Iloilo City is DIRECTED to conduct a prompt and thorough investigation
regarding this matter and to report its recommendations to the Court within ninety (90)
days from notice of this order. Let all concerned parties, including the Office of the Bar
Confidant, be each furnished a copy of this Decision for their appropriate action.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO Legal Ethics

EH307
Cases 21
-
40 Digest
Garcy Kate D. Go LLB
-
1
University of San Carlos
–
School of Law and Governance
PAFLU, Entila and Tenazas v. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., Court of Industrial
Relations and Quentin Muning
Facts: Petitioners PAFLU, Entila and Tenazas were complainants in Case No. 72
-
ULP
-
Iloilo in the Court of Industrial Relations. The complainants
were represented by
Cipriano Cid & Associates thru Atty. ANastacio Pacis and Quentin Muning, a non
-
lawyer.
After trial, the court rendered a decision in favour of the complainants; a portion of
that order granted respondent Quentin Muning, a non
-
laywer attorney’s fees for professional service. Thus a petition was filed seeking review of
the order made by the Court of Industrial Relations in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo.

Issue: May a non-lawyer recover attorney’s fees for legal services rendered?

Holding: Order under review is set aside.

Ratio: Lawyer
-
client relationship is only possible if one is a lawyer. Since respondent
Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique
Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU and he cannot therefore, recover
attorney’s fees.Public policy demands that legal work in representation of party litigants
should be
entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications for the protection of the
courts, clients and the public.
The permission of
a non
-
lawyer to represent a party litigant in court does not by itself
entitle the representation to compensation. For Section 24 Rule 138, of the Rules of
Court provides:
Sec. 24. Compensation of Attorney’s Agreement as to Fees
–
An
attorney shall be ent
itled to have and recover from his client no more than a
reasonable compensation for his services
,
imports the existence of an attorney
-
client
relationship as a condition for recovery of attorney’s fees

ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO TENAZAS petitioners,
vs.
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, & QUINTIN MUNING respondents.

Cipriano Cid & Associates for petitioners.

Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for respondent Quintin Muning.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? This is the issue presented in this petition for review of an order, dated
12 May 1964, and the en banc resolution, dated 8 December 1964, of the Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, granting
respondent Quintin Muning a non-lawyer, attorney's fees for professional services in the said case.

The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo entitled, "PAFLU et al. vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al."
After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision, on 29 March 1961, ordering the reinstatement with backwages of
complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final. On 18 October 1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of
record for the winning complainants, filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On 22 November 1963, Atty.
Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas on 3 December 1963, filed a
manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on the same day, Quentin
Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages. Munings petition was opposed by Cipriano
Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.

The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid & Associates through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the
hearings were held in Bacolod City and appearances made in behalf of the complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and subsequently by
respondent Quintin Muning.

On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation for professional services rendered in the
case, apportioned as follows:

Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates ............................................. 10%

Quintin Muning ......................................................................... 10%

Atty. Atanacio Pacis ................................................................. 5%

The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be voided in the present petition.

Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on the ground of late filing but his motion was overruled on 20
January 1965.1 He asked for reconsideration, but, considering that the motion contained averments that go into the merits of the case, this
Court admitted and considered the motion for reconsideration for all purposes as respondent's answer to the petitioner for review.2 The case
was considered submitted for decision without respondent's brief.3

Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et
al., L-23467, 27 March 1968,4 that an agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is
allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a
court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present case.

The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that —

In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall not be required to be represented by
legal counsel ...

is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is
entitled to attorney's fees: for the same section adds that —

it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses on behalf of
the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence.

thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar.

The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court on behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself
entitle the representative to compensation for such representation. For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing —

Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from
his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, ...

imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorney's fees. Such a relationship cannot exist
unless the client's representative in court be a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client
relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees. Certainly public
policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications and who
are sworn, to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the protection of
courts, clients and the public.
On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it is stated:

But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been enacted prohibiting persons not licensed or admitted to the
bar from practising law, and under statutes of this kind, the great weight of authority is to the effect that compensation
for legal services cannot be recovered by one who has not been admitted to practice before the court or in the
jurisdiction the services were rendered. 5

No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an attorney at law unless he has been duly admitted to
practice ... and is an attorney in good standing at the time.6

The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated;7 that acting as an attorney with authority constitutes contempt
of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both,8 and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an
act done in violation of law;9 and that if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to
consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to
disciplinary measures. 10

And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of attorney's fees by non-lawyers) cannot be circumvented
when the services were purely legal, by seeking to recover as an "agent" and not as an attorney. 11

The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney's fees should suffice to refute the possible
argument that appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of Industrial Relations should be excepted on the ground that said court is a
court of special jurisdiction; such special jurisdiction does not weigh the aforesaid reasons and cannot justify an exception.

The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of some
of its members. This issue arose because it was the union PAFLU, alone, that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for
review; union members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were included as petitioners in the present petition that was
subsequently filed, it being contended that, as to them (Entila and Tenazas), their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was belated.

We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of its
members because such union or labor organization is permitted to institute an action in the industrial court, 12 on behalf of its members; and
the union was organized "for the promotion of the emloyees' moral, social and economic well-being"; 13 hence, if an award is
disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party, under Section 6, Republic Act 875, which
provides:

Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases — Appeals. — Any person aggrieved by any order of the Court may appeal to the
Supreme Court of the Philippines ...,

since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden of litigations.

Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law before the Court of Industrial Relations, and many of
them like him who are not licensed to practice, registering their appearances as "representatives" and appearing daily before the said court.
If true, this is a serious situation demanding corrective action that respondent court should actively pursue and enforce by positive action to
that purpose. But since this matter was not brought in issue before the court a quo, it may not be taken up in the present case. Petitioners,
however, may file proper action against the persons alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of the backwages as attorney's fees for
respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed in all other respects. Costs against respondent Muning.

G.R. No. 111474

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this special civil action for certiorari to
annul the decision[1] of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering
petitioners to pay private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their
accumulated deposits and car wash payments, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the date
of promulgation of judgment to the date of actual payment, and 10% of the total amount as and
for attorney's fees.

We have given due course to this petition for, while to the cynical the de minimis amounts
involved should not impose upon the valuable time of this Court, we find therein a need to
clarify some issues the resolution of which are important to small wage earners such as taxicab
drivers. As we have heretofore repeatedly demonstrated, this Court does not exist only for the
rich or the powerful, with their reputed monumental cases of national impact. It is also the Court
of the poor or the underprivileged, with the actual quotidian problems that beset their individual
lives.

Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as
taxi drivers[2] and, as such, they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside
from the daily "boundary" of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-airconditioned
taxi, they were also required to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit
to answer for any deficiency in their "boundary," for every actual working day.

In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the petitioners, he already
failed to report for work for unknown reasons. Later, petitioners learned that he was working for
"Mine of Gold" Taxi Company. With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of petitioners
on September 6, 1983, he was held up by his armed passenger who took all his money and
thereafter stabbed him. He was hospitalized and after his discharge, he went to his home
province to recuperate.

In January 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver under the same terms
and conditions as when he was first employed, but his working schedule was made on an
"alternative basis," that is, he drove only every other day. However, on several occasions, he
failed to report for work during his schedule.

On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary" of P700.00 for the previous day.
Also, he abandoned his taxicab in Makati without fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated
requests of petitioners for him to report for work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards it was
revealed that he was driving a taxi for "Bulaklak Company."

Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily cash
deposits for 2 years, but herein petitioners told him that not a single centavo was left of his
deposits as these were not even enough to cover the amount spent for the repairs of the taxi he
was driving. This was allegedly the practice adopted by petitioners to recoup the expenses
incurred in the repair of their taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit,
petitioners terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination from
employment was effected when he refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers.

On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the Manila Arbitration Office
of the National Labor Relations Commission charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and
illegal deductions. That complaint was dismissed, the labor arbiter holding that it took private
respondents two years to file the same and such unreasonable delay was not consistent with the
natural reaction of a person who claimed to be unjustly treated, hence the filing of the case could
be interpreted as a mere afterthought.

Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the observation that private respondents
failed to controvert the evidence showing that Maldigan was employed by "Mine of Gold" Taxi
Company from February 10, 1987 to December 10, 1990; that Sabsalon abandoned his taxicab
on September 1, 1990; and that they voluntarily left their jobs for similar employment with other
taxi operators. It, accordingly, affirmed the ruling of the labor arbiter that private respondents'
services were not illegally terminated. It, however, modified the decision of the labor arbiter by
ordering petitioners to pay private respondents the awards stated at the beginning of this
resolution.

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC, this petition is now
before us imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of said public respondent.

This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the
NLRC, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters,
are generally accorded not only respect but, at times, finality if such findings are supported by
substantial evidence.[3] Where, however, such conclusions are not supported by the evidence,
they must be struck down for being whimsical and capricious and, therefore, arrived at with
grave abuse of discretion.[4]

Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by respondents to defray any
shortage in their "boundary" is covered by the general prohibition in Article 114 of the Labor
Code against requiring employees to make deposits, and that there is no showing that the
Secretary of Labor has recognized the same as a "practice" in the taxi industry. Consequently, the
deposits made were illegal and the respondents must be refunded therefor.

Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:

"Article 114. Deposits for loss or damage. - No employer shall require his worker to make
deposits from which deductions shall be made for the reimbursement of loss of or damage to
tools, materials; or equipment supplied by the employer, except when the employer is engaged in
such trades, occupations or business where the practice of making deposits is a recognized one,
or is necessary or desirable as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules and
regulations."

It can be deduced therefrom that the said article provides the rule on deposits for loss or damage
to tools, materials or equipments supplied by the employer. Clearly, the same does not apply to
or permit deposits to defray any deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in the remittance of
his "boundary." Also, when private respondents stopped working for petitioners, the alleged
purpose for which petitioners required such unauthorized deposits no longer existed. In other
case, any balance due to private respondents after proper accounting must be returned to them
with legal interest.
However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the claim of Sabsalon is as follows:

YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES

1987 P1,403.00 P 567.00 P1,000.00
1988 720.00 760.00 200.00
1989 686.00 130.00 1,500.00
1990 605.00 570.00 --
1991 165.00 2,300.00 --
P3,579.00 P4,327.00 P2,700.00

The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991, Sabsalon was able to withdraw his
deposits through vales or he incurred shortages, such that he is even indebted to petitioners in the
amount of P3,448.00. With respect to Maldigan's deposits, nothing was mentioned questioning
the same even in the present petition. We accordingly agree with the recommendation of the
Solicitor General that since the evidence shows that he had not withdrawn the same, he should be
reimbursed the amount of his accumulated cash deposits.[5]

On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to say in his decision: "Anent
the issue of illegal deductions, there is no dispute that as a matter of practice in the taxi industry,
after a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has driven to the same
clean condition when he took it out, and as claimed by the respondents (petitioners in the present
case), complainant(s) (private respondents herein) were made to shoulder the expenses for
washing, the amount doled out was paid directly to the person who washed the unit, thus we find
nothing illegal in this practice, much more (sic) to consider the amount paid by the driver as
illegal deduction in the context of the law."[6] (Words in parentheses added.)

Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash payments
they made. It will be noted that there was nothing to prevent private respondents from cleaning
the taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor General
correctly noted, car washing after a tour of duty is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact,
dictated by fair play.

On the last issue of attorney's fees or service fees for private respondents' authorized
representative, Article 222 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree
No. 1691, states that non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter only (1) if
they represent themselves, or (2) if they represent their organization or the members thereof.
While it may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized representative of private
respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the foregoing categories. Hence,
by clear mandate of the law, he is not entitled to attorney's fees.

Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his
client a reasonable compensation for his services[7] necessarily imports the existence of an
attorney-client relationship as a condition for the recovery of attorney's fees, and such
relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative is a lawyer.[8]
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent National Labor Relations Commission
is hereby MODIFIED by deleting the awards for reimbursement of car wash expenses and
attorney's fees and directing said public respondent to order and effect the computation and
payment by petitioners of the refund for private respondent Domingo Maldigan's deposits, plus
legal interest thereon from the date of finality of this resolution up to the date of actual payment
thereof.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 126625 September 18, 1997

KANLAON CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, 5TH DIVISION, and BENJAMIN RELUYA, JR., EDGARDO GENAYAS, ERNESTO
CANETE, PROTACIO ROSALES, NESTOR BENOYA, RODOLFO GONGOB, DARIO BINOYA, BENJAMIN BASMAYOR, ABELARDO
SACURA, FLORENCIO SACURA, ISABELO MIRA, NEMESIO LACAR, JOSEPH CABIGKIS, RODRIGO CILLON, VIRGILIO QUIZON,
GUARINO EVANGELISTA, ALEJANDRO GATA, BENEDICTO CALAGO, NILO GATA, DIONISIO PERMACIO, JUANITO SALUD, ADOR
RIMPO, FELIPE ORAEZ, JULIETO TEJADA, TEOTIMO LACIO, ONOFRE QUIZON, RUDY ALVAREZ, CRESENCIO FLORES, ALFREDO
PERMACIO, CRESENCIO ALVIAR, HERNANI SURILLA, DIOSDADO SOLON, CENON ALBURO, ZACARIAS ORTIZ, EUSEBIO
BUSTILLO, GREGORIO BAGO, JERRY VARGAS, EDUARDO BUENO, PASCUAL HUDAYA, ROGELIO NIETES, and REYNALDO
NIETES, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Kanlaon Construction Enterprises Co., Inc. seeks to annul the decision of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission, Fifth Division and remand the cases to the Arbitration Branch for a retrial on the merits.

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the construction business nationwide with principal office at No. 11 Yakan St., La Vista
Subdivision, Quezon City. In 1988, petitioner was contracted by the National Steel Corporation to construct residential houses for its plant
employees in Steeltown, Sta. Elena, Iligan City. Private respondents were hired by petitioner as laborers in the project and worked under the
supervision of Engineers Paulino Estacio and Mario Dulatre. In 1989, the project neared its completion and petitioner started terminating the
services of private respondents and its other employees.

In 1990, private respondents filed separate complaints against petitioner before Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. Numbering
forty-one (41) in all, they claimed that petitioner paid them wages below the minimum and sought payment of their salary differentials and
thirteenth-month pay. Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were named co-respondents.

Some of the cases were assigned to Labor Arbiter Guardson A. Siao while the others were assigned to Labor Arbiter Nicodemus G.
Palangan. Summonses and notices of preliminary conference were issued and served on the two engineers and petitioner through Engineer
Estacio. The preliminary conferences before the labor arbiters were attended by Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and private respondents. At
the conference of June 11, 1990 before Arbiter Siao, Engineer Estacio admitted petitioner's liability to private respondents and agreed to pay
their wage differentials and thirteenth-month pay on June 19, 1990. As a result of this agreement, Engineer Estacio allegedly waived
petitioner's right to file its position paper.1 Private respondents declared that they, too, were dispensing with their position papers and were
adopting their complaints as their position paper.2

On June 19, 1990, Engineer Estacio appeared but requested for another week to settle the claims. Labor Arbiter Siao denied this request.
On June 21, 1990, Arbiter Siao issued an order granting the complaint and directing petitioner to pay private respondents' claims. Arbiter
Siao held:

xxx xxx xxx

Considering the length of time that has elapsed since these cases were filed, and what the complainants might think as to how
this branch operates and/or conducts its proceedings as they are now restless, this Arbiter has no other alternative or recourse but
to order the respondent to pay the claims of the complainants, subject of course to the computation of the Fiscal Examiner II of
this Branch pursuant to the oral manifestation of respondent. The Supreme Court ruled: "Contracts though orally made are binding
on the parties." (Lao Sok v. Sabaysabay, 138 SCRA 134).

Similarly, this Branch would present in passing that "a court cannot decide a case without facts either admitted or agreed upon by
the parties or proved by evidence." (Yu Chin Piao v. Lim Tuaco, 33 Phil. 92; Benedicto v. Yulo, 26 Phil. 160)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent is hereby ordered to pay the individual claims of the above-named
complainants representing their wage differentials within ten (10) days from receipt of this order.

The Fiscal Examiner II of this Branch is likewise hereby ordered to compute the individual claims of the herein complainants.

SO ORDERED.3

On June 29, 1990, Arbiter Palangan issued a similar order, thus:

When the above-entitled cases were called for hearing on June 19, 1990 at 10:00 a.m. respondent thru their representative
manifested that they were willing to pay the claims of the complainants and promised to pay the same on June 28, 1990 at 10:30
a.m.

However, when these cases were called purposely to materialize the promise of the respondent, the latter failed to appear without
any valid reason.
 Considering therefore that the respondent has already admitted the claims of the complainants, we believe that the issues raised
herein have become moot and academic.

WHEREFORE premises considered, the above-entitled cases are hereby ordered Closed and Terminated, however, the
respondent is hereby ordered to pay the complainants their differential pay and 13th-month pay within a period of ten (10) days
from receipt hereof based on the employment record on file with the respondent.

SO ORDERED.4

Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission. It alleged that it was denied due process and that Engineers
Estacio and Dulatre had no authority to represent and bind petitioner. Petitioner's appeal was filed by one Atty. Arthur Abundiente.

In a decision dated April 27, 1992, respondent Commission affirmed the orders of the Arbiters.

Petitioner interposed this petition alleging that the decision of respondent Commission was rendered without jurisdiction and in grave abuse
of discretion. Petitioner claims that:

THE QUESTIONED DECISION RENDERED BY THE HONORABLE COMMISSION IS A NULLITY, IT HAVING BEEN ISSUED
WITHOUT JURISDICTION;

II

PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
ARBITRARILY, CAPRICIOUSLY AND WHIMSICALLY MAKING THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS BASED NOT ON FACTS
AND BUT ON SPECULATION, SURMISE AND EVIDENCE CONJECTURE:

A. Petitioner was deprived of the constitutional right to due process of law when it was adjudged by the
NLRC liable without trial on the merits and without its knowledge;

B. The NLRC erroneously, patently and unreasonably interpreted the principle that the NLRC and its
Arbitration Branch are not strictly bound by the rules of evidence;

C. There is no legal nor actual basis in the NLRC's ruling that petitioner is already in estoppel to disclaim the
authority of its alleged representatives.

D. The NLRC committed manifest error in relying merely on private, respondents' unsubstantiated
complaints to hold petitioner liable for damages.5

In brief, petitioner alleges that the decisions of the labor arbiters and respondent Commission are void for the following reasons: (1) there
was no valid service of summons; (2) Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and Atty. Abundiente had no authority to appear and represent
petitioner at the hearings before the arbiters and on appeal to respondent Commission; (3) the decisions of the arbiters and respondent
Commission are based on unsubstantiated and self-serving evidence and were rendered in violation of petitioner's right to due process.

Service of summons in cases filed before the labor arbiters is governed by Sections 4 and 5 of Rule IV of the New Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC. They provide:

Sec. 4. Service of Notices and Resolutions. — (a) Notices or summons and copies of orders, resolutions or decisions shall be
served on the parties to the case personally by the bailiff or duly authorized public officer within three (3) days from receipt thereof
or by registered mail; Provided that where a party is represented by counsel or authorized representative, service shall be made
on such counsel or authorized representative; provided further that in cases of decision and final awards, copies thereof shall be
served on both the parties and their counsel; provided finally, that in case where the parties are so numerous, service shall be
made on counsel and upon such number of complainants as may be practicable, which shall be considered substantial
compliance with Article 224 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5. Proof and completeness of service. — The return is prima facie proof of the facts indicated therein. Service by registered
mail is complete upon receipt by the addressee or his agent. . . .

Under the NLRC Rules of Procedure, summons on the respondent shall be served personally or by registered mail on the party himself. If
the party is represented by counsel or any other authorized representative or agent, summons shall be served on such person.
It has been established that petitioner is a private domestic corporation with principal address in Quezon City. The complaints against
petitioner were filed in Iligan City and summonses therefor served on Engineer Estacio in Iligan City. The question now is whether Engineer
Estacio was an agent and authorized representative of petitioner.

To determine the scope or meaning of the term "authorized representative" or "agent" of parties on whom summons may be served, the
provisions of the Revised Rules of Court may be resorted to.6

Under the Revised Rules of Court,7 service upon a private domestic corporation or partnership must be made upon its officers, such as the
president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. These persons are deemed so integrated with the corporation that they
know their responsibilities and immediately discern what to do with any legal papers served on them.8

In the case at bar, Engineer Estacio, assisted by Engineer Dulatre, managed and supervised the construction project.9 According to the
Solicitor General and private respondents, Engineer Estacio attended to the project in Iligan City and supervised the work of the employees
thereat. As manager, he had sufficient responsibility and discretion to realize the importance of the legal papers served on him and to relay
the same to the president or other responsible officer of petitioner. Summons for petitioner was therefore validly served on him.

Engineer Estacio's appearance before the labor arbiters and his promise to settle the claims of private respondents is another matter.

The general rule is that only lawyers are allowed to appear before the labor arbiter and respondent Commission in cases before them. The
Labor Code and the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, nonetheless, lists three (3) exceptions to the rule, viz:

Sec. 6. Appearances. — . . . .

A non-lawyer may appear before the Commission or any Labor Arbiter only if:

(a) he represents himself as party to the case;

(b) he represents the organization or its members, provided that he shall be made to present written proof that he is properly
authorized; or

(c) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized by the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines in cases referred thereto by the latter. . . .10

A non-lawyer may appear before the labor arbiters and the NLRC only if: (a) he represents himself as a party to the case; (b) he represents
an organization or its members, with written authorization from them: or (c) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly
recognized by the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred to by the latter.11

Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were not lawyers. Neither were they duly-accredited members of a legal aid office. Their appearance before
the labor arbiters in their capacity as parties to the cases was authorized under the first exception to the rule. However, their appearance on
behalf of petitioner required written proof of authorization. It was incumbent upon the arbiters to ascertain this authority especially since both
engineers were named co-respondents in the cases before the arbiters. Absent this authority, whatever statements and declarations
Engineer Estacio made before the arbiters could not bind petitioner.

The appearance of Atty. Arthur Abundiente in the cases appealed to respondent Commission did not cure Engineer Estacio's representation.
Atty. Abundiente, in the first place, had no authority to appear before the respondent Commission. The appellants' brief he filed was verified
by him, not by petitioner.12 Moreover, respondent Commission did not delve into the merits of Atty. Abundiente's appeal and determine
whether Engineer Estacio was duly authorized to make such promise. It dismissed the appeal on the ground that notices were served on
petitioner and that the latter was estopped from denying its promise to pay.

Nevertheless, even assuming that Engineer Estacio and Atty. Abundiente were authorized to appear as representatives of petitioner, they
could bind the latter only in procedural matters before the arbiters and respondent Commission. Petitioner's liability arose from Engineer
Estacio's alleged promise to pay. A promise to pay amounts to an offer to compromise and requires a special power of attorney or the
express consent of petitioner. The authority to compromise cannot be lightly presumed and should be duly established by evidence.13 This
is explicit from Section 7 of Rule III of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, viz:

Sec. 7. Authority to bind party. — Attorneys and other representatives of parties shall have authority to bind their clients in all
matters of procedure; but they cannot, without a special power of attorney or express consent, enter into a compromise
agreement with the opposing party in full or partial discharge of a client's claim.

The promise to pay allegedly made by Engineer Estacio was made at the preliminary conference and constituted an offer to settle the case
amicably. The promise to pay could not be presumed to be a single unilateral act, contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General.14 A
defendant's promise to pay and settle the plaintiff's claims ordinarily requires a reciprocal obligation from the plaintiff to withdraw the
complaint and discharge the defendant from liability.15 In effect, the offer to pay was an offer to compromise the cases.
In civil cases, an offer to compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror.16 If this rule
were otherwise, no attempt to settle litigation could safely be made.17 Settlement of disputes by way of compromise is an accepted and
desirable practice in courts of law and administrative tribunals.18 In fact, the Labor Code mandates the labor arbiter to exert all efforts to
enable the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement of the dispute within his jurisdiction on or before the first hearing.19

Clearly, respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion in affirming the decisions of the labor arbiters which were not only based on
unauthorized representations, but were also made in violation of petitioner's right to due process.

Section 3 of Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure provides:

Sec. 3. Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum. — Should the parties fail to agree upon an amicable settlement, in whole or
in part, during the conferences, the Labor Arbiter shall issue an order stating therein the matters taken up and agreed upon during
the conferences and directing the parties to simultaneously file their respective verified position papers

xxx xxx xxx

After petitioner's alleged representative failed to pay the workers' claims as promised, Labor Arbiters Siao and Palangan did not order the
parties to file their respective position papers. The arbiters forthwith rendered a decision on the merits without at least requiring private
respondents to substantiate their complaints. The parties may have earlier waived their right to file position papers but petitioner's waiver was
made by Engineer Estacio on the premise that petitioner shall have paid and settled the claims of private respondents at the scheduled
conference. Since petitioner reneged on its "promise," there was a failure to settle the case amicably. This should have prompted the arbiters
to order the parties to file their position papers.

Article 221 of the Labor Code mandates that in cases before labor arbiters and respondent Commission, they "shall use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in
the interest of due process." The rule that respondent Commission and the Labor Arbiters are not bound by technical rules of evidence and
procedure should not be interpreted so as to dispense with the fundamental and essential right of due process.20 And this right is satisfied,
at the very least, 'when the parties are given the opportunity to submit position papers.21 Labor Arbiters Siao and Palangan erred in
dispensing with this requirement.

Indeed, the labor arbiters and the NLRC must not, at the expense of due process, be the first to arbitrarily disregard specific provisions of the
Rules which are precisely intended to assist the parties in obtaining the just, expeditious and inexpensive settlement of labor disputes.22

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth Division, is
annulled and set aside and the case is remanded to the Regional Arbitration Branch, Iligan City for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado and To

A.C. No. 8096 July 5, 2010

REY J. VARGAS AND EDUARDO A. PANES, JR., Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. MICHAEL A. IGNES, ATTY. LEONARD BUENTIPO MANN, ATTY.
RODOLFO U. VIAJAR, JR., AND ATTY. JOHN RANGAL D. NADUA, Respondents.

RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-3351 passed on July 17,
2008 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in CBD Case No.
07-1953. The IBP Board of Governors dismissed the disbarment case filed by the complainants
against the respondents.

The facts and proceedings antecedent to this case are as follows:

Koronadal Water District (KWD), a government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC),

hired respondent Atty. Michael A. Ignes as private legal counsel for one (1) year effective April
17, 2006.2 The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and the Commission on
Audit (COA) gave their consent to the employment of Atty. Ignes.3 However, controversy later
erupted when two (2) different groups, herein referred to as the Dela Peña board and Yaphockun
board, laid claim as the legitimate Board of Directors of KWD.

On December 28, 2006, the members of the Dela Peña board filed Civil Case No. 17934 for
Injunction and Damages, seeking to annul the appointment of two (2) directors, Joselito T. Reyes
and Carlito Y. Uy, who will allegedly connive with Director Allan D. Yaphockun whose
hostility to the "present" Board of Directors, the Dela Peña board, is supposedly of public
knowledge.

On January 18, 2007, the Dela Peña board also adopted Resolution No. 0095 appointing
respondents Atty. Rodolfo U. Viajar, Jr. and Atty. Leonard Buentipo Mann as private
collaborating counsels for all cases of KWD and its Board of Directors, under the direct
supervision and control of Atty. Ignes.

Subsequently, on February 9, 2007, Attys. Ignes, Viajar, Jr. and Mann filed SCA Case No. 50-24
for Indirect Contempt of Court6 entitled Koronadal Water District (KWD), represented herein by
its General Manager, Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba v. Efren V. Cabucay, et al. On February 19,
2007, they also filed Civil Case No. 1799 for Injunction and Damages7 entitled Koronadal Water
District (KWD), represented herein by its General Manager, & Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba v. Rey
J. Vargas. On March 9, 2007, KWD and Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba filed a supplemental
complaint8 in Civil Case No. 1799.

Meanwhile, in Contract Review No. 0799 dated February 16, 2007, the OGCC had approved the
retainership contract of Atty. Benjamin B. Cuanan as new legal counsel of KWD and stated that
the retainership contract of Atty. Ignes had expired on January 14, 2007.

In its letter10 dated March 2, 2007, the OGCC also addressed Eleanor P. Gomba’s insistence that
the retainership contract of Atty. Ignes will expire on April 17, 2007. The OGCC stated that as
stipulated, the KWD or OGCC may terminate the contract anytime without need of judicial
action; that OGCC’s grant of authority to private counsels is a privilege withdrawable under
justifiable circumstances; and that the termination of Atty. Ignes’s contract was justified by the
fact that the Local Water Utilities Administration had confirmed the Yaphockun board as the
new Board of Directors of KWD and that said board had terminated Atty. Ignes’s services and
requested to hire another counsel.

Alleging that respondents acted as counsel for KWD without legal authority, complainants filed
a disbarment complaint11 against the respondents before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 07-1953. Complainants alleged that respondents filed SCA
Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1799 as counsels of KWD without legal authority. They
likewise stated in their position paper12 that Atty. Ignes continued representing KWD even after
the OGCC had confirmed the expiration of Atty. Ignes’s contract in its April 4, 2007
manifestation/motion13 in Civil Case No. 1796-25 entitled Koronadal Water District (KWD),
represented herein by its General Manager, Eleanor Pimentel Gomba v. Supreme Investigative
and Security Agency, represented by its Manager Efren Y. Cabucay.

In his defense,14 Atty. Mann stated that he and his fellow respondents can validly represent
KWD until April 17, 2007 since Atty. Ignes was not notified of his contract’s pre-termination.
Atty. Mann also stated that he stopped representing KWD after April 17, 2007 in deference to
the OGCC’s stand. Attys. Ignes, Viajar, Jr. and Nadua echoed Atty. Mann’s defense.15

On March 10, 2008, complainants filed a manifestation16 before the IBP with the following
attachments: (1) the transcript of stenographic notes taken on January 28, 2008 in Civil Case No.
1799, and (2) the notice of appeal dated February 28, 2008 of the January 7, 2008 Order
dismissing Civil Case No. 1799. Aforesaid transcript showed that Atty. Ignes appeared as
counsel of KWD and Ms. Gomba. He also signed the notice of appeal.

In his report and recommendation,17 the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the
charge against Atty. Ignes be dismissed for lack of merit. The Investigating Commissioner held
that Atty. Ignes had valid authority as counsel of KWD for one (1) year, from April 2006 to
April 2007, and he was unaware of the pre-termination of his contract when he filed pleadings in
SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1799 in February and March 2007.

As to Attys. Viajar, Jr., Mann and Nadua, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that
they be fined ₱5,000 each for appearing as attorneys for a party without authority to do so, per
Santayana v. Alampay.18 The Investigating Commissioner found that they failed to secure the
conformity of the OGCC and COA to their engagement as collaborating counsels for KWD.

As aforesaid, the IBP Board of Governors reversed the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and dismissed the case for lack of merit.

Hence, the present petition.

Complainants contend that the IBP Board of Governors erred in dismissing the case because
respondents had no authority from the OGCC to file the complaints and appear as counsels of
KWD in Civil Case No. 1799, SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1796-25. Complainants
point out that the retainership contract of Atty. Ignes had expired on January 14, 2007; that the
"Notice of Appeal filed by Atty. Ignes, et al." in Civil Case No. 1799 was denied per Order dated
April 8, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) "for being filed by one not duly authorized by
law;" and that the authority of Attys. Viajar, Jr. and Mann as collaborating counsels is infirm
since Resolution No. 009 of the Dela Peña board lacks the conformity of the OGCC. As a
consequence, according to complainants, respondents are liable for willfully appearing as
attorneys for a party to a case without authority to do so.

In his comment, Atty. Ignes admits that their authority to represent KWD had expired on April
17, 2007, but he and his fellow respondents stopped representing KWD after that date. He
submits that they are not guilty of appearing as counsels without authority. In their comment,
Attys. Viajar, Jr. and Nadua propound similar arguments. They also say that their fees were paid
from private funds of the members of the Dela Peña board and KWD personnel who might need
legal representation, not from the public coffers of KWD. In his own comment, Atty. Mann
submits similar arguments.

After a careful study of the case and the parties’ submissions, we find respondents
administratively liable.

At the outset, we note that the parties do not dispute the need for OGCC and COA conformity if
a GOCC hires private lawyers. Nonetheless, we shall briefly recall the legal basis of this rule.
Under Section 10, Chapter 3, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, it is the
OGCC which shall act as the principal law office of all GOCCs. And Section 3 of Memorandum
Circular No. 9,19 issued by President Estrada on August 27, 1998, enjoins GOCCs to refrain from
hiring private lawyers or law firms to handle their cases and legal matters. But the same Section
3 provides that in exceptional cases, the written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor
General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be, and the written concurrence
of the COA shall first be secured before the hiring or employment of a private lawyer or law
firm. In Phividec Industrial Authority v. Capitol Steel Corporation,20 we listed three (3)
indispensable conditions before a GOCC can hire a private lawyer: (1) private counsel can only
be hired in exceptional cases; (2) the GOCC must first secure the written conformity and
acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be;
and (3) the written concurrence of the COA must also be secured.

In the case of respondents, do they have valid authority to appear as counsels of KWD?

We find that Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann had no valid authority to appear as collaborating
counsels of KWD in SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1799. Nothing in the records
shows that Atty. Nadua was engaged by KWD as collaborating counsel. While the 4th Whereas
Clause of Resolution No. 009 partly states that he and Atty. Ignes "presently stand as KWD legal
counsels," there is no proof that the OGCC and COA approved Atty. Nadua’s engagement as
legal counsel or collaborating counsel. Insofar as Attys. Viajar, Jr. and Mann are concerned, their
appointment as collaborating counsels of KWD under Resolution No. 009 has no approval from
the OGCC and COA.

Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann are in the same situation as the private counsel of Phividec
Industrial Authority in Phividec. In that case, we also ruled that said private counsel of Phividec
Industrial Authority, a GOCC, had no authority to file the expropriation case in Phividec’s behalf
considering that the requirements set by Memorandum Circular No. 9 were not complied with.21
Thus, Resolution No. 009 did not grant authority to Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann to act as
collaborating counsels of KWD. That Atty. Ignes was not notified of the pre-termination of his
own retainership contract cannot validate an inexistent authority of Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and
Mann as collaborating counsels.

In the case of Atty. Ignes, he also appeared as counsel of KWD without authority, after his
authority as its counsel had expired. True, the OGCC and COA approved his retainership
contract for one (1) year effective April 17, 2006. But even if we assume as true that he was not
notified of the pre-termination of his contract, the records still disprove his claim that he stopped
representing KWD after April 17, 2007.

Atty. Ignes offered no rebuttal to the verified manifestation of complainants filed with the IBP on
March 10, 2008. Attached therein was the transcript of stenographic notes22 in Civil Case No.
1799 taken on January 28, 2008 when Atty. Ignes argued the extremely urgent motion for the
immediate return of the facilities of the KWD to the KWD Arellano Office. The RTC was
compelled to ask him why he seeks the return of KWD properties if he filed the motion as
counsel of Ms. Gomba. When the RTC noted that KWD does not appear to be a party to the
motion, Atty. Ignes said that KWD is represented by Ms. Gomba per the caption of the case.
Atty. Ignes also manifested that they will file a motion for reconsideration of the orders
dismissing Civil Case No. 1799 and Civil Case No. 1793. The RTC ruled that it will not accept
any motion for reconsideration in behalf of KWD unless he is authorized by the OGCC, but Atty.
Ignes later filed a notice of appeal23 dated February 28, 2008, in Civil Case No. 1799. As the
notice of appeal signed by Atty. Ignes was filed by one (1) not duly authorized by law, the RTC,
in its Order24 dated April 8, 2008, denied due course to said notice of appeal.

As we see it, Atty. Ignes portrayed that his appearance on January 28, 2008 was merely as
counsel of Ms. Gomba. He indicted himself, however, when he said that Ms. Gomba represents
KWD per the case title. In fact, the extremely urgent motion sought the return of the facilities of
KWD to its Arellano Office. Clearly, Atty. Ignes filed and argued a motion with the interest of
KWD in mind. The notice of appeal in Civil Case No. 1799 further validates that Atty. Ignes still
appeared as counsel of KWD after his authority as counsel had expired. This fact was not lost on
the RTC in denying due course to the notice of appeal.

Now did respondents willfully appear as counsels of KWD without authority?

The following circumstances convince us that, indeed, respondents willfully and deliberately
appeared as counsels of KWD without authority. One, respondents have admitted the existence
of Memorandum Circular No. 9 and professed that they are aware of our ruling in Phividec.25
Thus, we entertain no doubt that they have full grasp of our ruling therein that there are
indispensable conditions before a GOCC can hire private counsel and that for non-compliance
with the requirements set by Memorandum Circular No. 9, the private counsel would have no
authority to file a case in behalf of a GOCC. Still, respondents acted as counsels of KWD
without complying with what the rule requires. They signed pleadings as counsels of KWD.
They presented themselves voluntarily, on their own volition, as counsels of KWD even if they
had no valid authority to do so.
Two, despite the question on respondents’ authority as counsels of KWD which question was
actually raised earlier in Civil Case No. 1799 by virtue of an urgent motion to disqualify KWD’s
counsels26 dated February 21, 2007 and during the hearing on February 23, 200727 respondents
still filed the supplemental complaint in the case on March 9, 2007. And despite the pendency of
this case before the IBP, Atty. Ignes had to be reminded by the RTC that he needs OGCC
authority to file an intended motion for reconsideration in behalf of KWD.

With the grain of evidence before us, we do not believe that respondents are innocent of the
charge even if they insist that the professional fees of Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann, as
collaborating counsels, were paid not from the public coffers of KWD. To be sure, the facts were
clear that they appeared as counsels of KWD without authority, and not merely as counsels of
the members of the Dela Peña board and KWD personnel in their private suits.

Consequently, for respondents’ willful appearance as counsels of KWD without authority to do

so, there is a valid ground to impose disciplinary action against them. Under Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.

Disbarment, however, is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to
disbar must always be exercised with great caution, and should be imposed only for the most
imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of
the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not
be decreed where any punishment less severe such as a reprimand, suspension or fine, would
accomplish the end desired.28 In Santayana,29 we imposed a fine of ₱5,000 on the respondent for
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The respondent
therein also appeared as private counsel of the National Electrification Administration, a GOCC,
without any approval from the OGCC and COA.

Conformably with Santayana, we impose a fine of ₱5,000 on each respondent.

On another matter, we note that respondents stopped short of fully narrating what had happened
after the RTC issued four (4) orders on March 24, 2007 and on April 13, 2007 in Civil Case No.
1799.30 As willingly revealed by complainants, all four (4) orders were nullified by the Court of
Appeals.31 We are compelled to issue a reminder that our Code of Professional Responsibility
requires lawyers, like respondents, to always show candor and good faith to the courts.321awphi1

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-335 passed
on July 17, 2008 by the IBP Board of Governors in CBD Case No. 07-1953 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.

Respondents Attys. Michael A. Ignes, Leonard Buentipo Mann, Rodolfo U. Viajar, Jr., and John
Rangal D. Nadua are found GUILTY of willfully appearing as attorneys for a party to a case
without authority to do so and FINED ₱5,000 each, payable to this Court within ten (10) days
from notice of this Resolution. They are STERNLY WARNED that a similar offense in the
future will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondents’ personal records in the Office of the
Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 176530 : June 16, 2009]

SPOUSES CONSTANTE AGBULOS AND ZENAIDA PADILLA AGBULOS, Petitioners,

v. NICASIO GUTIERREZ, JOSEFA GUTIERREZ and ELENA G. GARCIA,
Respondents.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated February 6, 2007 in CA G.R. CV No. 83994 which set aside the dismissal of a
complaint for declaration of nullity of contract, cancellation of title, reconveyance and damages.

The case stems from the following antecedents:

On October 16, 1997, respondents, Dr. Nicasio G. Gutierrez, Josefa Gutierrez de Mendoza and
Elena G. Garcia, through their counsel, Atty. Adriano B. Magbitang, filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, a complaint against petitioners, spouses Constante
Agbulos and Zenaida Padilla Agbulos, for declaration of nullity of contract, cancellation of title,
reconveyance and damages. The complaint alleged that respondents inherited from their father,
Maximo Gutierrez, an eight-hectare parcel of land located in Callos, Penaranda, Nueva Ecija,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT-123790 in the name of Maximo
Gutierrez. Through fraud and deceit, petitioners succeeded in making it appear that Maximo
Gutierrez executed a Deed of Sale on July 21, 1978 when, in truth, he died on April 25, 1977. As
a result, TCT No. NT-123790 was cancelled and a new one, TCT No. NT-188664, was issued in
the name of petitioners. Based on the notation at the back of the certificate of title, portions of the
property were brought under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and
awarded to Lorna Padilla, Elenita Nuega and Suzette Nuega who were issued Certificates of
Land Ownership Award (CLOAs).

In their defense, petitioners averred that respondents were not the real parties in interest, that the
Deed of Sale was regularly executed before a notary public, that they were possessors in good
faith, and that the action had prescribed.
On the day set for the presentation of the respondents' (plaintiffs') evidence, petitioners filed a
Motion to Dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the case.
Petitioners contended that the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),
not the RTC, had jurisdiction since the subject land was covered by the CARP, and CLOAs had
been awarded to tenants. Respondents opposed the motion, arguing that the motion had been
filed beyond the period for filing an Answer, that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case based
on the allegations in the complaint, and that the DARAB had no jurisdiction since the parties had
no tenancy relationship.

In an Order2 dated October 24, 2002, the RTC granted the petitioners' motion and dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC held that the DARAB had jurisdiction, since the
subject property was under the CARP, some portions of it were covered by registered CLOAs,
and there was prima facie showing of tenancy.3

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. On November 13, 2003, the RTC denied the
motion.4

Atty. Magbitang filed a Notice of Appeal5 with the RTC, which gave due course to the same.6
The records reveal that on December 15, 2003, respondent Elena G. Garcia wrote a letter to
Judge Arturo M. Bernardo, Acting Judge of RTC Gapan, Branch 87, stating that they were
surprised to receive a communication from the court informing them that their notice of appeal
was ready for disposition. She also stated in the letter that there was no formal agreement with
Atty. Magbitang as to whether they would pursue an appeal with the CA, because one of the
plaintiffs was still in America.7

On February 6, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. The dispositive

portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Order
dated October 24, 2002 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija,
Branch 87, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the subject complaint is reinstated and
the records of the case is (sic) hereby remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. ςη αñrοblεš νιr†υα l lα ω lιbrαrÿ

SO ORDERED.8

The CA concluded that the dispute between the parties was purely civil, not agrarian, in nature.
According to the CA, the allegations in the complaint revealed that the principal relief sought
was the nullification of the purported deed of sale and reconveyance of the subject property. It
also noted that there was no tenurial, leasehold, or any other agrarian relations between the
parties.

Thus, this petition, raising the following issues for the resolution of this Court:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing the appeal despite the undisputed fact that Atty.
Magbitang filed the notice of appeal without respondents' knowledge and consent;
2. Whether or not the CA erred in giving due course to the appeal despite the fact that Atty.
Magbitang's appellants' brief failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 13,
Rule 44 of the Rules of Court regarding the contents of an appellants' brief; and cralawlibrary

3. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the RTC (Regional Trial Court), not the DARAB
(Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board) or the PARAD/RARAD
(Provincial/Regional Agrarian Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator), has jurisdiction over
respondents' complaint.9

The CA did not err in giving due course to the appeal, on both procedural and substantive
grounds.

A lawyer who represents a client before the trial court is presumed to represent such client before
the appellate court. Section 22 of Rule 138 creates this presumption, thus:

SEC. 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal. - An
attorney who appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue
representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in
the appellate court.

A reading of respondent Elena Garcia's letter to the RTC would show that she did not actually
withdraw Atty. Magbitang's authority to represent respondents in the case. The letter merely
stated that there was, as yet, no agreement that they would pursue an appeal.

In any case, an unauthorized appearance of an attorney may be ratified by the client either
expressly or impliedly. Ratification retroacts to the date of the lawyer's first appearance and
validates the action taken by him.10 Implied ratification may take various forms, such as by
silence or acquiescence, or by acceptance and retention of benefits flowing therefrom.11
Respondents' silence or lack of remonstration when the case was finally elevated to the CA
means that they have acquiesced to the filing of the appeal.

Moreover, a lawyer is mandated to "serve his client with competence and diligence."12
Consequently, a lawyer is entreated not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him; otherwise, his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.13 In light of such mandate, Atty.
Magbitang's act of filing the notice of appeal without waiting for her clients to direct him to do
so was understandable, if not commendable.

The CA was likewise correct in holding that the case is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, not
the DARAB.

For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must be a tenancy relationship between
the parties. It is, therefore, essential to establish all the indispensable elements of a tenancy
relationship, to wit: (1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2)
that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between
the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee.14

Basic is the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint.15
Respondents' complaint did not contain any allegation that would, even in the slightest, imply
that there was a tenancy relation between them and the petitioners. We are in full agreement with
the following findings of the CA on this point:

x x x A reading of the material averments of the complaint reveals that the principal relief sought
by plaintiffs-appellants is for the nullification of the supposedly forged deed of sale which
resulted in the issuance of TCT No. NT-188664 covering their 8-hectare property as well as its
reconveyance, and not for the cancellation of CLOAs as claimed by defendants-appellees.
Moreover, the parties herein have no tenurial, leasehold, or any other agrarian relations
whatsoever that could have brought this controversy under the ambit of the agrarian reform laws.
Neither were the CLOA awardees impleaded as parties in this case nor the latter's entitlement
thereto questioned. Hence, contrary to the findings of the RTC, the herein dispute is purely civil
and not agrarian in nature falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the trial courts.

On the alleged deficiency of the appellants' brief filed before the CA by the respondents, suffice
it to state that the requirements in Section 13, Rule 44 are intended to aid the appellate court in
arriving at a just and proper resolution of the case. Obviously, the CA found the appellants' brief
sufficient in form and substance as the appellate court was able to arrive at a just decision. We
have repeatedly held that technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, not to
suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from a rigid enforcement of the rules may, thus, be
allowed in order to attain this prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the core
reason for the existence of courts.16

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' Decision
dated February 6, 2007 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 82760 August 30, 1990

FELIMON MANANGAN, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA VIZCAYA, BRANCH 28, respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
For abuse of Court processes, hopping from one forum to another, filing a labyrinth of cases and pleadings, thwarting the smooth
prosecution of Criminal Case No. 639 against him for no less than twelve (12) years, and for masquerading as Filemon Manangan when his
real name is Andres Culanag, petitioner has brought upon himself the severest censure and a punishment for contempt. The Petition for
Certiorari he has filed likewise calls for dismissal.

The Petition, Amended Petition, and Second Amended Petition seek the annulment of the entire proceedings in Criminal Case No. 639 of
respondent Court, including the Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by it, dated 19 July 1979, "for being stale/functus officio." It is claimed, inter
alia, that respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in making it appear that petitioner was duly tried and convicted when the
contrary was true, and that the Alias Warrant of Arrest was irregularly issued because respondent Court had already accepted a property
bond.

In the Amended Petition, petitioner further alleges that respondent Court had irregularly assumed jurisdiction as it is the Sandiganbayan that
has exclusive original jurisdiction over the case considering that he was Legal Officer I of the Bureau of Lands, Region II, and that he had
supposedly committed the offense in relation to that office.

Piecing together the facts from the hodgepodge of quotations from the Decisions in the different cases filed by petitioner, we recite the
relevant ones below.

On 7 November 1977, petitioner, representing himself as a lawyer, was appointed Legal Officer I of the Bureau of Lands in Region II (p. 98,
Rollo).

On 30 June 1978, Criminal Case No. 639 entitled "People v. Filemon Manangan alias Andres Culanag" (Annex D, Petition, Rollo, UDK 3906,
p. 20) was filed before the then Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya, First Judicial District, Bayombong, charging petitioner with
"Execution of Deeds by Intimidation" under Article 298 of the Revised Penal Code (the Criminal Case, for short). Apparently, the Director of
Lands had given his imprimatur to the charge.

On the same date, an Order of Arrest was issued by then Judge Gabriel Dunuan of respondent Court (Rollo, UDK 3906, p. 21).

On 18 April 1979, petitioner filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Writ of Preliminary Injunction
entitled "Filemon de Asis Manangan v. Court of First Instance, et al.," in UDK No. 3906, assailing the jurisdiction of respondent Court to try
the criminal case and seeking to stay the Order of Arrest of 30 June 1978. The petition was dismissed on 7 May 1979 for non-payment of
legal fees (p. 99, Rollo).

On 10 and 18 July 1978, the dates set for preliminary investigation, petitioner did not show up and, in fact, disappeared for about a year.

On 31 July 1978, a Second Amended Information was filed (Comment, Solicitor General, p. 61, Rollo), this time Identifying the accused as
"Andres Culanag (alias Andres M. Culanag, Filemon Manangan Atty. Filemon A. Manangan and Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan)."

On 8 July 1979, petitioner surfaced and, through counsel, posted a bailbond with the Municipal Circuit Court of San Miguel, Zamboanga del
Sur (Resolution of the RTC, Nueva Vizcaya, 25 March 1983, Annex B, Petition, p. 2).

On 19 July 1979, an Alias Warrant of Arrest was by Judge Gabriel Dunuan. It is this Alias Warrant that is challenged herein.

On 12 September 1979, petitioner filed an ex-parte Motion to Dismiss the Criminal Case, which was denied by respondent Court (see CA-
G.R. No. 11588-SP, p. 2).

Petitioner then resorted to a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 11588-SP entitled "Filemon
Manangan v. Director of Lands and CFI of Nueva Vizcaya." The Petition sought to (1) nullify the decision of the Director of Lands, dated 27
March 1980, finding petitioner guilty of extortion, impersonation and abandonment of office and ordering his dismissal from the service; and
(2) "require respondent CFI of Nueva Ecija to dismiss Criminal Case No. 639 pending in its Court." In a Decision, promulgated on 27
February 1981, the Appellate Court dismissed the Petition for "absolute lack of legal and factual basis" and holding, among others, that "the
non-withdrawal of the Information for execution of deeds by intimidation . . . is not covered by mandamus" (hereinafter, the German
Decision). 1

On 30 October 1981, before respondent Court, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner, ostensibly through counsel, Atty.
Benjamin Facun, asking that the Criminal Case be dismissed on the ground that the accused had already died on 29 September 1971 such
that respondent Court had not acquired jurisdiction over his person. The Motion was denied.

On 22 February 1982, erroneously construing the German Decision as a final judgment of conviction, respondent Court reset the
promulgation to 19 April 1982 and ordered the bondsmen to produce the body of the accused on said date (Annex A, Petition). Realizing the
mistake, on 9 July 1982, respondent Court vacated said order and ruled that "the warrant of arrest issued by this Court through Judge
Gabriel Dunuan on 19 July 1979, shall remain in full force and effect" (Annex F, Petition).

On 25 June 1982, petitioner again resorted to the Court of Appeals in another Petition for Certiorari (CA-G.R. No. SP-14428) filed by one
Atty. Benjamin Facun as counsel for petitioner, this time praying for the annulment of the proceedings in the Criminal Case "on the ground
that the accused was already dead when the decision finding him guilty of the crime . . . was rendered." The pleading alleged "that petitioner
is of age, Filipino, deceased, but has come to this Honorable Court through counsel. . . ." In a Decision promulgated on 29 November 1982,
Certiorari was denied for being devoid of merit inasmuch as "there is nothing on record to show that such dismissal had been sought before
the decision was rendered" (briefly, the Kapunan Decision). 2 (Actually, no judgment has been rendered by respondent Court).

Unfazed by the adverse Kapunan Decision, the supposed heirs of the accused, on 10 February 1983, filed a Manifestation before
respondent Court asking for the dismissal and termination of the Criminal Case on the same ground that the accused had allegedly died.
On 25 March 1983, Judge Quirino A. Catral of respondent Court refused to declare the case closed and terminated inasmuch as the accused
was alive on 8 July 1979 when he posted his bailbond (citing the Kapunan Decision) and reiterated that the "alias warrant issued by the
Court on July 19, 1979 which up to the present has not yet been served upon the accused as in full force and effect."

For the third time, the case was elevated to the then Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. SP-00707, entitled "Heirs of the Deceased
Filemon Manangan v. Hon. Quirino A. Catral, etc." The Petition sought to annul the Order of Judge Catral of 25 March 1983 denying the
closure and termination of the Criminal Case.

On 28 May 1983, the then IAC, after quoting at length from the Kapunan Decision and the Catral Order, dismissed the Petition (hereinafter,
the Aquino Decision) 3 holding, inter alia, that "whether or not its denial of the motion to dismiss that case constitutes a grave abuse of
discretion, was already passed upon by this Court in CA-G.R. No. SP-14428 (Kapunan Decision), hence, it is res adjudicata. It may not be
litigated anew, no matter what form the action for that purpose may take."

On 28 June 1984, before the respondent Court, petitioner-accused filed an Omnibus Motion with Motion for New Trial, which was denied for
lack of merit in the Order of 19 November 1984. In the same Order, respondent Court ordered the case archived until such time that the
accused is brought to the Court.

On 19 June 1986, counsel for petitioner-accused filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds that: "(1) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction
over the offense charged or the person of the accused; and (2) the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted
of the offense charged."

It was at that stage of the case below, without awaiting disposition on the Motion to Quash, that the present Petition was instituted.

The obvious conclusion from the recital of facts given is that the Petition is without merit. Petitioner-accused had a pending Motion to Quash
before respondent Court and should have awaited resolution thereon. He had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law and resort to this Petition is decidedly premature.

Contrary to petitioner's pretensions, the Alias Warrant of Arrest is valid. Petitioner had evaded arrest by disappearing from the jurisdiction of
respondent Court. Neither is there any indication in the records that the property bond, filed by petitioner-accused in the Municipal Circuit
Court of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, had been accepted by respondent Court and petitioner discharged on the basis thereof. The Alias
Warrant is not "stale or functus officio," as alleged. Unlike a warrant, which is valid for only ten (10) days from date (Rule 126, Sec. 9), a
Warrant of Arrest remains valid until arrest is effected or the Warrant lifted. Respondent Court, therefore, cannot be faulted with grave abuse
of discretion for holding that said Warrant is in full force and effect.

Although there may have been some initial confusion on the part of respondent Court arising from the Kapunan Decision, that was timely
rectified. In the final analysis, respondent Court has not made it appear that petitioner-accused has already been arraigned and tried, let
alone convicted. No jeopardy has attached, as alleged. Again, therefore, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to respondent Court.

Petitioner's argument in his Amended Petition and Second Amended Petition that it is the Sandiganbayan that has exclusive jurisdiction over
the Criminal Case neither holds water considering that not only is he ineligible for the position of Legal Officer I in the Bureau of Lands,
Region II, for not being a lawyer, but also because he was dismissed from the service on 27 March 1980 by the Director of Lands, who found
him, with the approval of the Minister of Natural Resources, guilty of extortion, impersonation and abandonment of office CA-G.R. No. 11588-
SP, p. 2).

The foregoing conclusions could dispose of the case.

However, on 8 June 1989, the Solicitor General filed a "Manifestation/Motion to Strike Out" the present petition for being fictitious and that by
reason thereof petitioner should be cited for contempt of Court. The Solicitor General has also prayed that he be excused from filing a
Comment on petitioner's Second Amended Petition, which we resolve to grant.

The Solicitor General maintains that a re-examination of the records in the Criminal shows that:

a. Filemon A. Manangan is only an alias of Andres M. Culanag, the person charged in Criminal Case No. 639;

b. Filemon A. Manangan was a lawyer from San Marcelino, Zambales, who died on September 29, 1971 in the vicinity
of his residence where he and his driver died on the spot; and

c. [Andres M. Culanag] knew the real Filemon Manangan and knowing about the latter's death, assumed the name,
qualifications and other personal circumstances of Filemon Manangan. By means thereof, he was able to pass himself
off as a lawyer and to actually practice law, using even the Certificate of Admission to the Philippine Bar of Filemon
Manangan which states that he was admitted to the Bar on March 6, 1964. By this guise, [Andres M. Culanag]
succeeded in obtaining a position as legal Officer I in the Bureau of Lands.

In opposition, petitioner maintains that he is not a fictitious person, having been born out of the lawful wedlock of Segundino Manangan and
Felipa Asis; and that assuming that there is sufficient basis to charge him for contempt, it will no longer prosper on the ground of prescription.
Petitioner's posturings are completely bereft of basis. As the Solicitor General had also disclosed in the German Decision, petitioner [Andres
Culanag] had, on 23 February 1977, filed Sp. Procs. No. 23 with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, San Jose City Branch, for the
change of his name from Andres Culanag to Filemon Manangan. In that petition, he claimed that his real name is Andres Culanag; that his
entire school records carry his name as Filemon Manangan: and that he is the same person as Andres Culanag, the latter being his real
name. The imprisonment was carried to the extreme when, in petitioner's Manifestation, dated 10 February 1983, before respondent Court,
his supposed heirs alleged that accused had died before the filing of the Information on 29 September 1971, the exact date of death of the
real Filemon Manangan. More, petitioner also masquerades under the name of Atty. Benjamin M. Facun in the several pleadings filed in
connection with the Criminal Case.

In the German Decision, it was additionally pointed out that petitioner had also committed imprisonation when, representing himself as Atty.
Ross V. Pangilinan, he filed a petition with this Court praying that his right to practice law be affirmed (Misc. Bar-I and Misc. Bar-2). In those
cases, we ruled that petitioner Filemon Manangan is "really Andres Culanag, an impostor;" dismissed the petitions; and directed Andres
Culanag to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for filing the two false petitions (In re: Andres Culanag, September 30,
1971, 41 SCRA 26). He explained that "he thought this Court would not discover that he is a poseur, for which reason he apologizes to the
Court promising that he would not commit the same act if he is excused and given another chance." On 12 November 1971, after finding his
explanation unsatisfactory, we adjudged him guilty of indirect contempt of Court under Rule 71, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court 4 and
sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for six (6) months.

Parenthetically, we also take judicial notice of Bar Matter No. 190, entitled "In Re Andres Culanag alias Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan" and Bar
Matter No. 206, entitled "Eriberto H. Decena vs. Andres Culanag" wherein, on 9 October 1984, this Court Resolved "to direct that petitioner
be subjected to mental examination by a doctor from the National Mental Hospital" after noting that petitioner was suffering from some kind of
mental alienation. This mitigates somewhat petitioner's present liability for contempt.

It is the height of chicanery, indeed, that despite the foregoing antecedents, petitioner still has the gall to claim that he is, in truth and in fact,
Filemon Manangan. The evidence on hand, without need for more, and with petitioner having been sufficiently heard, amply establishes that
petitioner Filemon Manangan, is an impostor. He is guilty of continued fraudulent misrepresentation and highly improper conduct tending
directly to impede, obstruct, degrade, and make a mockery of the administration of justice (Rule 71, Sec. 3 [d]).

While it may be that some pronouncements in the pertinent decisions allude to Filemon Manangan and that Andres Culanag is just an alias
of Filemon Manangan, those statements actually refer to the person of Andres Culanag and not to the real Filemon Manangan, long since
dead.

The action for contempt has not prescribed since it is apparent that the contumacious acts continue to this day.

WHEREFORE, (1) the Petition, Amended Petition, and the Second Amended Petition are hereby dismissed for utter lack of merit; (2)
petitioner is adjudged in contempt of Court, severely censured, and sentenced to suffer three (3) months imprisonment, the same to be
served at the Provincial Jail of Nueva Vizcaya to ensure his appearance during the trial of the subject criminal case; (3) respondent Court is
hereby directed to retrieve Criminal Case No. 639 from its archives and to proceed to its determination with deliberate dispatch; (4) all Courts
are directed not to recognize any person representing himself as Filemon Manangan, Atty. Filemon Manangan, or Atty. Benjamin M. Facun;
and (5) petitioner's real name is declared to be Andres Culanag.

Treble costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.