PRIORITY IN EXPROPRIATION

36) JIL vs. Mun. of Pasig (G.R. 152230, August 9, 2005)

SUMMARY:
Respondent Municipality of Pasig wanted to expropriate the property of the Ching
Cuancos in order to build a road that will connect E.R. Santos Street and Barangay Santo
Tomas Bukid in Pasig. The Ching Cuancos then sold the land to petitioner JILCSF. The Supreme
Court ruled that the expropriation is not valid because (1) there was no definite offer to acquire
the property prior to the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court however clarified that (2)
even if the property is already intended to be used for public purposes (i.e., building of a church
and school), it may still be expropriated and (3) the condemnor need not comply with the
requirements for the establishment of an easement of right-of-way before it can expropriate a
property.

FACTS:
The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road. The road had to be at least three
meters in width so that fire trucks could pass through in case of conflagration. Likewise, the
residents in the area needed the road for water and electrical outlets. The municipality then
decided to acquire the property of Ching Cuanco.

The Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance authorizing the municipal

mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and appropriate the
fund. The ordinance stated that the property owners were notified of the municipality’s intent to
purchase the property for public use as an access road but they rejected the offer.

RTC Pasig:
The municipality filed a complaint against the Ching Cuancos for the expropriation of the
property under the Local Government Code. The defendants answered that they had sold the
said property to Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. (JILCSFI). JILCSFI filed a
motion for leave to intervene as defendant-in-intervention, which was granted. In its decision,
the RTC held that there was substantial compliance with the definite and valid offer
requirement and that the expropriated portion is the most convenient access to the interior of
Sto. Tomas Bukid. Dissatisfied, JILCSFI elevated the case to the CA.

Court of Appeals:
The CA affirmed the order of the RTC.

ISSUES:
1. WON the respondent complied with the requirement, under the Local Government Code,
of a valid and definite offer to acquire the property prior to the filing of the complaint.
NO.
2. WON the property which is already intended to be used for public purposes (i.e.,
building of a church and school) may still be expropriated by the respondent. YES.
3. WON the requisites for an easement for right-of-way under Articles 649 to 657 of the
New Civil Code may be dispensed with. YES.
4. WON respondent was able to show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in
the petitioner’s property and not elsewhere. NO.
RULING:
1.
The respondent did not comply with the requirement, under the Local Government
Code, of a valid and definite offer to acquire the property prior to the filing of the complaint.

The respondent failed to prove that before it filed its complaint, it made a written
definite and valid offer to acquire the property for public use as an access road. The only
evidence adduced by the respondent to prove its compliance with the Local Government Code is
the photocopy of the letter purportedly bearing the signature of Engr. Jose Reyes, to only one
of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco.

The RTC rejected the document because the respondent failed to adduce in evidence
the original copy thereof. The respondent, likewise, failed to adduce evidence that copies of the
letter were sent to and received by all the co-owners of the property, namely, Lorenzo Ching
Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Kho. Even if the letter was, indeed, received by the
co-owners, the letter is not a valid and definite offer to purchase a specific portion of the
property for a price certain. It is merely an invitation for only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo
Ching Cuanco, to a conference to discuss the project and the price that may be mutually
acceptable to both parties.

2.
The property which is already intended to be used for public purposes (i.e., building of a
church and school) may still be expropriated by the respondent.

We reject the contention of the petitioner that its property can no longer be
expropriated by the respondent because it is intended for the construction of a place for
religious worship and a school for its members. The requirement is that the expropriation must
be for a public purpose.

It has been explained as early as Seña v. Manila Railroad Co., that: A historical research
discloses the meaning of the term “public use” to be one of constant growth. As society
advances, its demands upon the individual increases and each demand is a new use to which
the resources of the individual may be devoted for “whatever is beneficially employed for the
community is a public use”.

3.
The Municipality is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an
easement of right-of-way.

We reject the petitioner’s assertion that the respondent must comply with the
requirements for the establishment of an easement of right-of-way, more specifically, the road
must be constructed at the point least prejudicial to the servient state, and that there must be
no adequate outlet to a public highway. The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of
constructing a road. The respondent is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for
an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code.
 Case law has it that in the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of
eminent domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such
determination is capricious and wantonly injurious.

4.
The respondent was not able to show the necessity for constructing the road particularly
in the petitioner’s property and not elsewhere.

The respondent’s complaint alleged that the said portion of the petitioner’s lot has been
surveyed as the best possible ingress and egress.

However, the respondent failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence to prove its

claims. There is no showing in the record that an ocular inspection was conducted during the
trial. The petitioner was, there- fore, deprived of its right to due process. It bears stressing that
an ocular inspection is part of the trial as evidence is thereby received and the parties are
entitled to be present at any stage of the trial. The findings of the trial court based on the
conduct of the ocular inspection must, therefore, be rejected.