Constitutional Law 2  aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed
Notes and Case Digest to continue their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance
by Florizza Alolor
TOPIC 1 : INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE; POLICE POWER;
DEFINITION, SCOPE, CHARACTERISTICS:
Definition:
Police Power has been defined as the power of promoting the public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property.
Police power easily outspaces the other two inherent powers as instruments of the
State in interfering with private rights. The power of Eminent Domain and Taxation
involve only property rights. By contrast, Police Power regulates not only the
property, but more importantly, the liberty of private persons and virtually all the
people. It is regarded as infinitely more important than eminent domain or taxation.
Characteristics:
Police power is considered the most pervasive, the least limitable, and the most
demanding of the three powers. It may be exercised as long as the activity or the
property sought to be regulated has some relevance to the public welfare.
Limits:
It is virtually limitless. Owing to the need to protect society from the inordinate
assertion of individual liberty, it has been held that the police power may not be
bargained away by virtue of a contract or even a treaty, so long as it is regulated in
order to promote the general welfare.
1. Ichong vs Hernandez
FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its
purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a
stranglehold upon the people’s economic life.
 a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade
with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical
persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of
term.
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.
 provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for
violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and
measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and
industry.
 provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged
in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business
Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the
ff: reasons:
1. it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives
them of their liberty and property without due process
2. the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
3. the Act violates international and treaty obligations
4. the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail
business thru hereditary succession
ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.
HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens
the equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and
fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the
legislative classification adopted.
RATIO:
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents.
It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are
treated alike.
The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for
reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.
Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of
the retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the legislature’s target in the
enactment of the Act.
The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and
the national as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and
enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien
owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely on him/her in
times of crisis or emergency.
While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of
the country, the alien may become the potential enemy of the State.
The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people
on whom he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs
and practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control on the nation’s economy
endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.
TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD [151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-
75697; 18 Jun 1987]
Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators
adversely affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987, “An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the
videogram industry.
A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the
National Internal Revenue Code provided that:
"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on each processed video-
tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five
pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be
subject to sales tax."
"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. — Notwithstanding
any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent
(30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale,
lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture
or audiovisual program.”
“Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the
province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where
the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be
shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.”
The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated
circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or
any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the
operations of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated circulation have
caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and
a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and
other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million
annually in government revenues.
Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum
from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not
been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180
Million in taxes each year.
The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the
viability of the movie industry.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power.
(2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.
Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy
of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need
for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy,
the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of
pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to
protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.
We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing
Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying
objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no
question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair
competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the
viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed
video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent
sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical
attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are
virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees
are required to engage in business."
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
Osmena v. Orbos
FACTS: October 10, 1984, President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating
a Special Account in the General Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization
Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was designed to reimburse oil companies for cost
increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange
rate adjustments and from increases in the world market prices of crude oil.
Subsequently, the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability account,". President
Corazon C. Aquino promulgated E. O. 137 expanding the grounds for
reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost under recovery incurred as a
result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products.
The petitioner argues inter alia that "the monies collected pursuant to . . P.D. 1956,
as amended, must be treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or a
'trust fund,' and that "if a special tax is collected for a specific purpose, the revenue
generated therefrom shall 'be treated as a special fund' to be used only for the
purpose indicated, and not channeled to another government objective." Petitioner
further points out that since "a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through
the taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use
thereof is limited to the special purpose/objective for which it was created."
ISSUE: Whether or not the funds collected under PD 1956 is an exercise of the
power of taxation
RULING: The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power of the State.
While the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the
exercise of the police power of the State.
What petitioner would wish is the fixing of some definite, quantitative restriction, or
"a specific limit on how much to tax." The Court is cited to this requirement by the
petitioner on the premise that what is involved here is the power of taxation; but as
already discussed, this is not the case. What is here involved is not so much the
power of taxation as police power. Although the provision authorizing the ERB to
impose additional amounts could be construed to refer to the power of taxation, it
cannot be overlooked that the overriding consideration is to enable the delegate to
act with expediency in carrying out the objectives of the law which are embraced
by the police power of the State.
It would seem that from the above-quoted ruling, the petition for prohibition should
fail.
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs. Honorable Secretary
of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989
Petitioner: Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines
Respondent: Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform
Facts: These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including
serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D.
No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A.
No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79777
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on
grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the
constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use
without just compensation. G.R. No. 79310
G.R. No. 79310
This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No.
229. They contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just
compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no
such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the constitutional
provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or just
compensation.
G.R. No. 78742
Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their
right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued
the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree.
Issue: Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent domain
Ruling: There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power
of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the
same time on the same subject. Property condemned under the police power is
noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of
collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials,
which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of
such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of
expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of
compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under
challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of
the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the
Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to
deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum
area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for
which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not
a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title
to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing
to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of
the police power but of the power of eminent domain
Ortigas and Co. v. CA
Petitioner Ortigas sold to the Hermosos a parcel of land in Greenhills Subdivision.
The contract of sale provided that the lot will be used for single-family residential
building only and this was annotated at the back of the title of the lot. In 1981, the
Metropolitan Commission enacted MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 reclassifying as a
commercial zone the stretch of Ortigas Avenue from Roosevelt Street to Madison
Street. Subsequently in 1984, private respondent Mathay III leased the lot from
Hermoso and constructed a commercial building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a
car sales company. Petitioner 􀀺led Civil Case No. 4 seeking to enjoin the building
by respondent ofstructure on the lot and sought the demolition of the commercial
structure for having violated the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale. The trial
court issued the injunctive order ruling that the ordinance should be given
prospective application. On certiorari, however, the CA granted the petition, ruling
that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in refusing to treat MMC Ordinance
No. 81-01 as applicable to Civil Case No. 64931.
CAheld that the ordinance effectively nulli􀀺ed the restrictions allowing only
residential use of
the property in question. In this petition, petitioner claims that even with the zoning
ordinance, the seller and buyer of the re-classi􀀺ed lot can voluntarily agree to an
exclusive residential use thereof; and that respondent Mathay III as a mere lessee
of the lot in question, is a total stranger to the deed of sale and is thus barred from
questioning the condition of said deed. The Supreme Court denied the petition,
ruling: that while as a rule, laws are to be construed as having only prospective
operation, one exception is a law which involves police power, which could be
given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts; that
the MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 has been held to be a legitimate police power
measure to which the non-impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will
have to yield; and that Mathay III in this case is clearly a real party in interest
because
he holds the lot pursuant to a valid lease and it is his building of a commercial
structure
which petitioner seeks to enjoin.
St. Luke’s Medical Center Employees Association-AFW v. National Labor
Relations Commission
Facts: Petitioner was hired as XRAY Technician in the Radiology Department of
St. Lukes on October 1984. On April 1992 Congress passed and enacted Republic
Act No. 7431 known as the "Radiologic Technology Act of 1992." Said law requires
that no person shall practice or offer to practice as a radiology and/or x-ray
technologist
in the Philippines without having obtained the proper certicate of registration from
the Board of Radiologic Technology. SLMC issued a notice to all practioners of
radio technology to comply with the requirement by Dec. 31, 1995. Maribel did not
comply with the requirement, thus on May 1997 SLMC gave notice to Maribel once
again to remind her of the requirement. On November 1998, theDirector of
radiology issued a notice to Maribel that slmc has approved her retirement in lieu
of separation pay.
Maribel filed a complaint in the NLRC against SLMC for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of salaries, allowance and other monetary benefits. the Labor Arbiter
came out with a Decision ordering private respondent SLMC to pay petitioner
Maribel S. Santos the amount of One
Hundred Fifteen Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P115,500.00) representing her
separation pay. All other claims of petitioner were dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Ultimately, the issue raised by the parties boils down to whether petitioner
Santos was illegally dismissed by private respondent SLMC on the basis of her
inability to secure a certificate of registration from the Board of Radiologic
Technology.The requirement for a certi􀀺cate of registration is set forth under R.A.
No. 7431
Held: petitioner Santos' failure to comply with the certi􀀺cation requirement did not
constitute just cause for termination as it violated her constitutional right to security
of tenure. This contention is untenable. While the right of workers to security of
tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise may be reasonably regulated
pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace,
education, order, safety, and the general welfare of the people. Consequently,
persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring
scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a
prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. 9 The most concrete example of
this would be in the Field of medicine, the practice of which in all its branches has
been closely regulated by the
State. It has long been recognized that the regulation of this 􀀺eld is a reasonable
method
of protecting the health and safety of the public to protect the public from the
potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would
practice medicine.
PRC vs. De Guzman, G. R. No. 144681, June 21, 2004
Constitutional Law: Police Power
Facts: The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine,
Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure
Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board).
Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their
names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination.
Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine
successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in
the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and
Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven
Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne,
another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-Gyne.
The Board also observed that many of those who passed from Fatima got
marks of 95% or better in both subjects, and no one got a mark lower than
90%. A comparison of the performances of the candidates from other schools was
made. The Board observed that strangely, the unusually high ratings were true
only for Fatima College examinees. It was a record-breaking phenomenon in the
history of the Physician Licensure Examination.
For its part, the NBI found that “the questionable passing rate of Fatima
examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the
Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions.”
The Board issued Resolution No. 26, dated July 21, 1993, charging
respondents with "immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit" in
connection with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne examinations. It recommended that
the test results of the Fatima examinees be nullified. Trial court’s judgment is
rendered ordering the respondents to allow the petitioners and intervenors to
take the physician’s oath and to register them as physicians without
prejudice to any administrative disciplinary action which may be taken against
any of the petitioners for such causes and in the manner provided by law and
consistent with the requirements of the Constitution as any other professionals.
Issue: Whether or not the act pursuant to R.A. 2382 (prescribes that a person
who aspires to practice medicine in the Philippines, must have
“satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board Examination) known as The
Medical Act of 1959 a valid exercise of police power.
Held:
Yes. It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every
citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable,
and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated
pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace,
education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who
desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical
knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging
in their chosen careers. This regulation takes particular pertinence in the field of
medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence
and ignorance among those who would practice medicine.
*satisfactorily- defined as “sufficient to meet a condition or obligation” or “capable
of dispelling doubt or ignorance”
It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the exercise of a
profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or
its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political body that
regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and
grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions may
not, however, require giving up ones constitutional rights as a condition to
acquiring the license.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner vs. HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO
G.R. No. 157036. June 9, 2004
Facts:
Petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of the
“Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside
of Residence” (Guidelines) issued by respondent Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr.,
Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP).
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has
been issued, requested the DILG to reconsider the implementation of the assailed
Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the present petition
impleading public respondents Ebdane, as Chief of PNP; Alberto G. Romulo, as
Executive Secretary; and Gerry L. Barias, as Chief of the PNP-Firearms and
Explosives Division.
Issues:
1. whether the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a valid exercise of
police power?;
1. Police Power
At any rate, assuming that petitioner’s PTCFOR constitutes a property right
protected by the Constitution, the same cannot be considered as absolute
as to be placed beyond the reach of the State’s police power. All
property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, necessary
to the common good and general welfare.
The Court laid down the test to determine the validity of a police measure,
thus:
(1) The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the exercise of the police power; and
(2) The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance
was the need for peace and order in the society. Owing to the proliferation
of crimes, particularly those committed by the New People’s Army (NPA),
which tends to disturb the peace of the community, President Arroyo deemed it
best to impose a nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the
issuance of the assailed Guidelines is the interest of the public in general.
The only question that can then arise is whether the means employed are
appropriate and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and are not unduly oppressive. In the instant case, the assailed
Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they
proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence.
However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences
may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This is a reasonable regulation. If the
carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed.
Criminals carry their weapon to hunt for their victims; they do not wait in the
comfort of their homes. With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be difficult
for criminals to roam around with their guns. On the other hand, it would be
easier for the PNP to apprehend them.
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLDMINING CORP. vs. BALITE
PORTALMINING COOP., et al.[G.R. No. 135190, April 3, 2002]
FACTS:
On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper) was granted
Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which
included the Diwalwal area. On June 27, 2991, Congress enacted Republic Act
No. 7076, or the People's Small-Scale Mining Act. The law established a People's
Small-Scale Mining Program to beimplemented by the Secretary of the DENR and
created the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) under the DENR
Secretary's direct supervision and control.
 Subsequently, a petition for the cancellation of EP No. 133 and the
admission of a Mineral Production Sharing Arrangement (MPSA) proposal
over Diwalwal was filed before the DENR Regional Executive Director,
docketed as RED Mines Case.
On February 16, 1994, while the RED Mines case was pending,
Marcopper assigned its EP No. 133 to petitioner Southeast Mindanao Gold
Mining Corporation (SEM), which in turn applied for an integrated MPSA over
the land covered by the permit. In due time, the Mines and Geosciences
Bureau Regional Office No. XI in Davao City (MGB-XI) accepted and
registered the integrated MPSA application of petitioner and thereafter, several
MAC cases were filed.
On March 3, 1995, Republic Act No. 7942, the Philippine Mining Act,
was enacted. Pursuant to this statute, the MAC cases were referred to a
Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA) tasked to resolve disputes involving
conflicting mining rights. The RPA subsequently took cognizance of the RED
Mines case, which was consolidated with the MAC cases.
On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order
No. 97-03 which provided that the DENR shall study thoroughly and
exhaustively the option of diret state utilization of the mineral resources in the
Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area.
On July 16, 1997, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus before the Court of Appeals against PMRB-Davao,
the DENR Secretary and Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative
(BCPMC). It prayed for the nullification of the above-quoted Memorandum
Order No. 97-03 on the ground that the "direct state utilization" espoused
therein would effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133; and that
the memorandum order arbitrarily imposed the unwarranted condition that
certain studies be conducted before mining and environmental laws are
enforced by the DENR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the "direct state utilization scheme" espoused in MO
97-03 divested petitioner of its vested right to the gold rush area under its EP
No. 133.
HELD:
No. MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt "direct state utilization" as
a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum
clearly indicate that what was directed hereunder was merely a study of this
option and nothing else. Contrary to petitioner's contention, it did not grant any
management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners or to
any party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned
to undertake studies to determine its feasibility. As to the alleged "vested
rights" claimed by petitioner, it is well to note that the same is invariably based
on EP No. 133, whose validity is still being disputed in the Consolidated Mines
cases. A reading of the appealed MAB decision reveals that the continued
efficacy of EP No. 133 is one of the issues raised in said cases, with
respondents therein asserting that Marcopper cannot legally assign the permit
which purportedly had expired. In other words, whether or not petitioner
actually has a vested right over Diwalwal under EP No. 133 is still an indefinite
and unsettled matter. And until a positive pronouncement is made by the
appellate court in the Consolidated Mines cases, EP No. 133 cannot be
deemed as a source of any conclusive rights that can be impaired by the
issuance of MO 97-03. It must likewise be pointed out that under no
circumstances may petitioner's rights under EP No. 133 be regarded as total
and absolute. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals EP No.133 merely
evidences a privilege granted by the State, which may be amended, modified
or rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is necessarily so
since the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural
mineral resources are matters impressed with great public interest. Like timber
permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in the grantee any permanent
or irrevocable right within the purview of the non-impairment of contract and
due process clauses of the Constitution, since the State, under its all-
encompassing police power, may alter, modify or amend the same, in
accordance with the demands of the general welfare. Additionally, there can
be no valid opposition raised against a mere study of an alternative which the
State, through the DENR, is authorized to undertake in the first place. Worth
noting is Article XII, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution and Section 4, Chapter
II of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. Thus, the State may pursue the
constitutional policy of full control and supervision of the exploration,
development and utilization of the country's natural mineral resources, by
either directly undertaking the same or by entering into agreements with
qualified entities. The DENR Secretary acted within his authority when he
ordered a study of the first option, which may be undertaken consistently in
accordance with the constitutional policy enunciated above. Obviously, the
State may not be precluded from considering a direct takeover of the mines, if
it is the only plausible remedy in sight to the gnawing complexities generated
by the gold rush
MMDA vs. Garin, GR No. 130239, April 15, 2005
FACTS:
The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a
lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) by MMDA and his
driver's license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo,
Manila, on August 1995. Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the
respondent addressed a letter to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta
requesting the return of his driver's license, and expressing his preference for
his case to be filed in court. Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the
original complaint with application for preliminary injunction, contending that, in
the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act
No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of
their licenses, preempting a judicial determination of the validity of the
deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution. The
respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional
prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does
the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified — and therefore unlimited — fines
and other penalties on erring motorists. The trial court rendered the assailed
decision in favor of herein respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not MMDA, through
Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 could validly exercise police power. HELD: NO.
Unlike the legislative bodies of local government units, there is no provision in
R.A. 7924 that empowers the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) or
its Council to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for
the general welfare” of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. Thus, MMDA may not
order the opening of Neptune St. in the Bel-Air Subdivision to public traffic, as
it does not possess delegated police power . While Sec. 5(f), R.A. 7924, does
not grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’
licenses without need of any other legislative enactment, the same law vests
the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulations. Thus,
where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or
those agencies to whom legislative power has been delegated (the City of
Manila, in this case), the MMDA is not precluded — and in fact is duty-bound
— to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses in the exercise of its
mandate of transport and traffic management, as well as the administration
and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering
services and traffic education programs.
Carlos Superdrug Corporation vs. DSWD, et al., GR No. 166494, (June 29,
2007)
FACTS: Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating
drugstores in the Philippines. Meanwhile, AO 171 or the Policies and
Guidelines to Implement Relevant Provisions of Republic Act 9257, otherwise
known as the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003” was issued by the DOH,
providing the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount in the purchase of
unbranded generic medicines from all establishments dispensing medicines for
the exclusive use of the senior citizens. DOH issued Administrative Order No
177 amending A.O. No. 171. Under A.O. No. 177, the twenty percent discount
shall not be limited to the purchase of unbranded generic medicines only, but
shall extend to both prescription and non-prescription medicines whether
branded or generic. Thus, it stated that “[t]he grant of twenty percent (20%)
discount shall be provided in the purchase of medicines from all
establishments dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of the senior
citizens.” Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional
because it constitutes deprivation of private property. Compelling drugstore
owners and establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss of profit
and capital because 1) drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on
branded medicines; and 2) the law failed to provide a scheme whereby
drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount. ISSUE: Whether or not
RA 9257 is unconstitutional? HELD: NO. The law is a legitimate exercise of
police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general
welfare for its object. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which,
similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object.
Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely
veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all
exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits.
Accordingly, it has been described as “the most essential, insistent and the
least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs.” It
 is “[t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution,
as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and
of the subjects of the same.” For this reason, when the conditions so demand
as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of
police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must
yield to general welfare.
SURIGAO DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (SURNECO),
Petitioner,v. ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
FACTS:
The Association of Mindanao Rural Electric Cooperatives, as representative of
SURNECO and of the other 33 rural electric cooperatives in Mindanao, filed a
petition before the then Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) for the approval of the
formula for automatic cost adjustment and adoption of the National Power
Corporation (NPC) restructured rate adjustment to comply with Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7832.
The ERB granted SURNECO and other rural electric cooperatives provisional
authority to use and implement the Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA). In the
meantime, the passage of R.A. No. 9136led to the creation of the Energy
Regulatory Commission (ERC), replacing and succeeding the ERB. All pending
cases before the ERB were transferred to the ERC. Thereafter, the ERC continued
its review, verification, and confirmation of the electric cooperatives implementation
of the PPA formula based on the available data and information submitted by the
latter.
The ERC issued its assailed Order, mandating that the discounts earned by
SURNECO from its power supplier should be deducted from the computation
of the power cost. SURNECO filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied. Aggrieved, SURNECO filed a petition for review to the CA but the
same was denied. Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration, SURNECO
files the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the ERC Decision
HELD: No. CA Decision Affirmed
POLITICAL LAW- The State, in its exercise of police power, can regulate
the rates imposed by a public utility such as SURNECO
The ERC was merely implementing the system loss caps in R.A. No. 7832
when it reviewed and confirmed SURNECOS PPA charges, and ordered the
refund of the amount collected in excess of the allowable system loss caps
through its continued use of the multiplier scheme. The Commission deemed it
appropriate to clarify its PPA confirmation process particularly on the treatment
of the Prompt Payment Discount (PPD) granted to distribution utilities (DUs) by
their power suppliers. The foregoing clarification was intended to ensure that
only the actual costs of purchased power are recovered by the DUs.
In directing SURNECO to refund its over-recoveries based on PPA policies,
which only ensured that the PPA mechanism remains a purely cost-recovery
mechanism and not a revenue-generating scheme for the electric
cooperatives, the ERC merely exercised its authority to regulate and approve
the rates imposed by the electric cooperatives on their consumers. The ERC
simply performed its mandate to protect the public interest imbued in those
rates.
As held in the case of Republic v. Manila Electric Company, the regulation of
rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the
State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulation of public
utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is used for a public
purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only
and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the common
good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by
discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is continued, the same is
subject to public regulation.
Likewise, SURNECO cannot validly assert that the caps set by R.A. No. 7832
are arbitrary, or that they violate the non-impairment clause of the Constitution
for allegedly traversing the loan agreement between NEA and ADB. Striking
down a legislative enactment, or any of its provisions, can be done only by way
of a direct action, not through a collateral attack, and more so, not for the first
time on appeal in order to avoid compliance. The challenge to the laws
constitutionality should also be raised at the earliest opportunity.

Even assuming, merely for arguments sake, that the ERC issuances violated
the NEA and ADB covenant, the contract had to yield to the greater authority
of the States exercise of police power. It has long been settled that police
power legislation, adopted by the State to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people prevail not
only over future contracts but even over those already in existence, for all
private contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by
the State to promote public welfare.
CAMARINES NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. vs. HON. RUBEN D.
TORRES
Neither can police power be invoked to clothe with validity the assailed
Memorandum Order No. 409. Police power is the power inherent in a government
to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health,
morals, and general welfare of society. It is lodged primarily in the legislature. By
virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the
President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all
municipal levels, including the barangay. Delegation of legislative powers to the
President is permitted in Sections 23(2) and 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution.
The pertinent laws on cooperatives, namely, R.A. No. 6938, R.A. No. 6939, and
P.D. No. 269 as amended by P.D. No. 1645 do not provide for the President or any
other administrative body to take over the internal management of a cooperative.
We do not then hesitate to rule that Memorandum Order No. 409 has no
constitutional and statutory basis. It violates the basic underlying principle
enshrined in Article 4(2) of R.A. No. 6938 that cooperatives are democratic
organizations and that their affairs shall be administered by persons elected or
appointed in a manner agreed upon by the members.
FACTS: Petitioner CANORECO is an electric cooperative organized under the
provisions of P.D. No. 269, otherwise known as the National Electrification
Administration Decree, as amended by P.D. No. 1645. On 3 December 1996, the
President of the Philippines issued Memorandum Order No. 409 constituting an Ad
Hoc Committee to temporarily take over and manage the affairs of CANORECO. It
reads as follows: To efficiently and effectively address the worsening problem of
the Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CANORECO) and in order not to
prejudice and endanger the interest of the people who rely on the said cooperative
for their supply of electricity, an AD HOC Committee is hereby constituted to take
over and manage the affairs of CANORECO until such time as a general
membership meeting can be called to decide the serious issues affecting the said
cooperative and normalcy in operations is restored. Further, if and when
warranted, the present Board of Directors may be called upon by the Committee
for advisory services without prejudice to the receipt of their per diems as may be
authorized by existing rules and regulations. On 11 December 1996, the
petitioners filed this petition wherein they claim that the president has no power to
take over and manage or to order the take-over or management of CANORECO.
ISSUE: Whether Memorandum Order No. 409 is constitutional. (NO)
RULING: Neither can police power be invoked to clothe with validity the assailed
Memorandum Order No. 409. Police power is the power inherent in a government
to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health,
morals, and general welfare of society. It is lodged primarily in the legislature. By
virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the
President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all
municipal levels, including the barangay. Delegation of legislative powers to the
President is permitted in Sections 23(2) and 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution.
The pertinent laws on cooperatives, namely, R.A. No. 6938, R.A. No. 6939, and
P.D. No. 269 as amended by P.D. No. 1645 do not provide for the President or any
other administrative body to take over the internal management of a cooperative.
Article 98 of R.A. 6938 instead provides: Art. 98.Regulation of Public Service
Cooperatives. — (1) The internal affairs of public service cooperatives such as the
rights and privileges of members, the rules and procedures for meetings of the
general assembly, board of directors and committees; for the election and
qualification of officers, directors, and committee members; allocation and
distribution of surpluses, and all other matters relating to their internal affairs shall
be governed by this Code. We do not then hesitate to rule that Memorandum
Order No. 409 has no constitutional and statutory basis. It violates the basic
underlying principle enshrined in Article 4(2) of R.A. No. 6938 that cooperatives
are democratic organizations and that their affairs shall be administered by
persons elected or appointed in a manner agreed upon by the members. Likewise,
it runs counter to the policy set forth in Section 1 of R.A. No. 6939 that the State
shall, except as provided in said Act, maintain a policy of non-interference in the
management and operation of cooperatives
Gancayco v. City Government of Quezon City

Facts:
In the early 1950s, retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel of land
located at 746 Epifanio delos Santos Avenue (EDSA), the Quezon City Council
issued Ordinance No. 2904, entitled "An Ordinance Requiring the Construction of
Arcades, for Commercial Buildings to be Constructed in Zones Designated as
Business Zones in the Zoning Plan of Quezon City, and Providing Penalties in
Violation Thereof”. An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the first
floor projecting over the sidewalk beyond the first storey wall used as protection for
pedestrians against rain or sun. Ordinance No. 2904 required the relevant
property owner to construct an arcade with a width of 4.50 meters and height of
5.00 meters along EDSA. At the time Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city
council, there was yet no building code passed by the national legislature. Thus,
the regulation of the construction of buildings was left to the discretion of local
government units. The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco.
Subsequently, sometime in 1965, Justice Gancayco sought the exemption of a
two-storey building being constructed on his property from the application of
Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his
property.The City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancayco's request and
issued Resolution No. 7161, S-66, "subject to the condition that upon notice by the
City Engineer. Decades after, in March 2003, the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) conducted operations to clear obstructions along
the sidewalk of EDSA. The MMDA sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco
alleging that a portion of his building violated the National Building Code of the
Philippines (Building Code) in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. The MMDA gave
Justice Gancayco fifteen (15) days to clear the portion of the building that was
supposed to be an arcade along EDSA.
Justice Gancayco did not comply with the notice. Soon after the lapse of the 15
days, the MMDA proceeded to demolish the party wall, or what was referred to as
the "wing walls," of the ground floor structure. Justice Gancayco filed a Petition for
a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, seeking to prohibit the MMDA and the
City Government of Quezon City from demolishing his property. In his Petition, he
alleged that the ordinance authorized the taking of private property without due
process of law and just compensation. The RTC ruled in favor of Justice
Gancayco, it held that the questioned ordinance was unconstitutional, ruling that it
allowed the
taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Upon appeal,
the CA ruled in favor of the MMDA,it held that the ordinance was a valid exercise
of the right of the local government unit to promote the general welfare of its
constituents pursuant to its police powers.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ORDINANCE NO. 2904 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
WHETHER MMDA ILLEGALLY DEMOLISHED THE PROPERTY OF JUSTICE
GANCAYCO.
Ruling: 1. To resolve the issue on the constitutionality of the ordinance, we must
first
determine whether there was a valid delegation of police power. In the case at bar,
it is clear that the primary objectives of the city council of Quezon City when it
issued the questioned ordinance ordering the construction of arcades were the
health and safety of the city and its inhabitants; the promotion of their prosperity;
and the improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort, and the
convenience. These arcades provide safe and convenient passage along the
sidewalk for commuters and
pedestrians, not just the residents of Quezon City. More especially so because the
contested portion of the building is located on a busy segment of the city, in a
business zone along EDSA. Corollarily, the policy of the Building Code, which was
passed after the Quezon City Ordinance, supports the purpose for the enactment
of Ordinance No. 2904. Thus, the zoning ordinance is not unconstitutional.
2. MMDA alleges that by virtue of MMDA Resolution No. 02-28, Series of
2002, it is
empowered to demolish Justice Gancayco's property. It insists that the Metro
Manila
Council authorized the MMDA and the local government units to clear the
sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro
Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions. It further alleges that it demolished
the property pursuant to the Building Code in relation to Ordinance No. 2904 as
amended. However, it is the Building official who was tasked to demolish
properties according to the provisions of the Building Code, not the MMDA. There
is also no evidence that MMDA had been delegated to implement the Building
Code. Therefore, the MMDA acted on its own and should be held solely
liable for the destruction of the portion of Justice Gancayco's building.
United BF Homeowners Association v. The City Mayor of Paranaque
Facts: BF Homes Parañaque Subdivision (BF Homes Parañaque), with a land
area straddling the cities of Parañaque, Las Piñas, and Muntinlupa, is the largest
subdivision in
the country. The Municipal Council of Parañaque enacted Municipal Ordinance No.
97-08 5 entitled, "An Ordinance Prescribing the Comprehensive Land Use Plan &
Zoning of the Municipality of Parañaque Pursuant to the Local Government Code
of 1991” Sections 11.5 and 11.6 of Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08, reclassifying El
Grande and Aguirre Avenues in BF Homes Parañaque from residential to
commercial areas. Petitioners questioned the
constitutionality of some Sections Municipal Ordinance No.97-08. Petitioners
alleged that the reclassification of certain portions of BF Homes
Parañaque from residential to commercial zone is unconstitutional because it
amounts to impairment of the contracts between the developer of BF Homes
Parañaque and the lot buyers. Petitioners cited the annotation on the lot buyers'
titles which provides that "the property shall be used for residential purposes only
and for no other purpose. Meanwhile, El Grande Aguirre Commerce and Trade
Organization (EL ACTO), a nonstock, non-pro􀀺t corporation, intervened as
respondent. EL ACTO claimed that its members are lot owners, residents, and
operators of commercial establishments along El Grande and Aguirre Avenues in
BF Homes Parañaque, who will be affected if Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is
declared unconstitutional. EL ACTO asserted that Municipal
Ordinance No. 97-08 is a valid exercise of police power. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals held that the enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 which, among
others, reclassi􀀺ed El Grande and Aguirre Avenues in BF Homes Parañaque as
commercial zones, was a valid exercise of police power by the Municipality of
Parañaque.
ISSUE: Whether Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is a legitimate exercise of police
power.
Ruling: The Municipal Council of Parañaque enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 97-
08 pursuant to the provisions of RA 7160 and Executive Order No. 72. 14 Under
Section 447 of RA 7160, the Sangguniang Bayan or the Municipal Council, as the
legislative body of the municipality, has the power to enact ordinances for the
general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants. Among the functions of the
Sangguniang Bayan enumerated under Section 447 of RA 7160 are:
(2) Generate and maximize the use of resources and revenues for the
development plans, program objectives and priorities of the municipality as
provided for under Section 18 of this Code with particular attention to agro-
industrial development and countryside growth and progress, and relative thereto,
shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(vii) Adopt a comprehensive land use plan for the municipality:
(viii) Reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the municipality
(ix) Enact integrated zoning ordinances in consonance with the approved
comprehensive land use plan
Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is reasonable and not discriminating or oppressive
with respect to BF Homes Parañaque. As held by the Court of Appeals, the
increasing number of homeowners in BF Homes
Parañaque necessitated the addition of commercial areas in the subdivision to
service the needs of the homeowners. In fact, several homeowners along El
Grande and Aguirre
Avenues already converted their residences into business establishments.
Furthermore, as
found by the Court of Appeals, El Grande and Aguirre Avenues are main
thoroughfares in
BF Homes Parañaque which have long been commercialized.
MMDA v. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., G.R. No. 135962
FACTS:
Bel-Air received from the MMDA a notice requesting respondent to open Neptune
Street to public vehicular traffic. On January 2, 1996, respondent instituted against
petitioner before the RTC for injunction, which issued a temporary restraining order
the following day. After due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a preliminary
injunction. The appellate court conducted an ocular inspection of Neptune Street
and issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the
MMDA's proposed action. On January 28, 1997, the appellate court rendered a
Decision on the merits of the case finding that the MMDA has no authority to order
the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition
of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of
Makati by ordinance.
Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public
traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery
of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is traffic
management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure
the safety, convenience and welfare of the general public. It is alleged that the
police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of
Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court. From the premise that it has police
power, it is now urged that there is no need for the City of Makati to enact an
ordinance opening Neptune street to the public.
ISSUE:
WON the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant
to its regulatory and police powers.
RULING:
Petition is denied. Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been
defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain,
and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as
they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the
subjects of the same. Police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature.
It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing
legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to
the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of
municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can
exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national
lawmaking body.
The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring,
setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable
in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.
Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power.
Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in
R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances,
approve resolutions appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of
Metro Manila.
The MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with
legislative power. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the
people, but appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet
member. In fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be
assigned to him by the President, whereas in local government units, the President
merely exercises supervisory authority. This emphasizes the administrative
character of the MMDA.
The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It
is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils,
that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution
ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner
MMDA is illegal.
FRANCISCO vs FERNANDO, G.R. No. 166501, November 16, 2006
FACTS
Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr, as a taxpayer and as a member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines filed a petition to enjoin MMDA Chairman Bayani Fernando
from further implementing its wet flag scheme. Petitioner contends that the Flag
Scheme: (1) has no legal basis because the MMDA's governing body, the Metro
Manila Council, did not authorize it; (2) violates the Due Process Clause because it
is a summary punishment for jaywalking; (3) disregards the Constitutional
protection against cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment; and (4) violates
'pedestrian rights' as it exposes pedestrians to various potential hazards. .
Petitioner also contended that he filed this petition directly with the Court because
the issues raised in the petition deserve the direct intervention of the Court.
Respondents moved for the dismissal of the case. Petitioner files his reply
that the present case raises issues of transcendental importance.
ISSUE
Whether or not the MMDA Chairman be enjoined from further implementing the
present anti-jay walking campaign
RULING
NO.
All the cities and municipalities within the MMDA's jurisdiction, except Valenzuela
City, have each enacted anti-jaywalking ordinances or traffic management codes
with provisions for pedestrian regulation. Such fact serves as sufficient basis for
respondents' implementation of schemes, or ways and means, to enforce the anti-
jaywalking ordinances and similar regulations. After all, the MMDA is an
administrative agency tasked with the implementation of rules and regulations
enacted by proper authorities
In addition, petitioner failed to show that there is a clear constitutional and statutory
violation. Therefore, he cannot raise the issue on transcendental importance.
Further, the petition ultimately calls for a factual determination of whether the Flag
Scheme is a reasonable enforcement of anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar
enactments. This Court is not a trier of facts. This Court cannot determine the
reasonableness of the Flag Scheme based on mere surmises and speculations.
Lastly, petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when he filed this
petition directly with us
MMDA, ET AL. v. VIRON TRANS. CO., INC., G.R. No. 170656-57, August 15,
2007
FACTS:
The president Arroyo issued E.O. No. 179 providing for the establishment of
Greater Manila Mass Transport System. Pursuant to such authority the MMDA
which was designated to implement such project, recommended a plan to
decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro
Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the mass
transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport
terminal facilities.
Viron Transport Co., Inc. (Viron), a domestic corporation engaged in the business
of public transportation with a provincial bus operation, filed a petition for
declaratory relief before the RTC of Manila, alleging that the MMDA was “poised to
issue a Circular, Memorandum or Order closing, or tantamount to closing, all
provincial bus terminals along EDSA and in the whole of the Metropolis under the
pretext of traffic regulation.” This impending move, it stressed, would mean the
closure of its bus terminal in Sampaloc, Manila and two others in Quezon City.
Alleging that the MMDA’s authority does not include the power to direct provincial
bus operators to abandon their existing bus terminals to thus deprive them of the
use of their property, Viron asked the court to construe the scope, extent and
limitation of the power of the MMDA to regulate traffic under R.A. No. 7924, “AN
ACT CREATING THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
DEFINING ITS POWERS AND FUNCTIONS, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR
AND OTHER PURPOSES.”
Mencorp Transportation System, Inc. (Mencorp), another provincial bus operator,
later filed a similar petition for declaratory relief against Executive Secretary
Alberto G. Romulo and MMDA Chairman Fernando.
Mencorp asked the court to declare the E.O. unconstitutional and illegal for
transgressing the possessory rights of owners and operators of public land
transportation units over their respective terminals.
The RTC sustained the constitutionality of EO No. 179 pursuant to RA 7924 which
empowered the MMDA to administer Metro Manila’s basic services including those
of transport and traffic management, based on the police power of the State. On
Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself and ruled that EO No. 179 is
an unreasonable exercise of police power and its powers under the law does not
include the power to order the closure of the petitioners’ existing bus terminals. It
further ruled that it is inconsistent with the Public Service Act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the MMDA’s power to regulate traffic in Metro Manila included the
power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon and close their duly
established and existing bus terminals in order to conduct business in a common
terminal as a valid exercise of police power.
RULING:
No. Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain,
and establish wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, not
repugnant to the Constitution, for the good and welfare of the people. This power
to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order or
safety, and general welfare of the people flows from the recognition that salus
populi est suprema lex ─ the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
While police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may be
delegated, as it is in fact increasingly being delegated. By virtue of a valid
delegation, the power may be exercised by the President and administrative
boards37 as well as by the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
governments under an express delegation by the Local Government Code of
1991.38
The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project
notwithstanding, the designation of the MMDA as the implementing agency for the
Project may not be sustained. It is ultra vires, there being no legal basis therefor.
Under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the
MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one
subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish
or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the
instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and
administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of
transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project
such as the Project in question.
ID; ID; TESTS FOR VALID EXERCISE; LAWFUL SUBJECT:
Lawful Subject simply means that the subject of the measure is within the scope
of the police power, that is, that the activity or property sought to be regulated
affects the public welfare. If it does, the enjoyment of private rights may be
subordinated to the interests of the greater number, on the time-honored principle
that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila vs. BOT, 119 SCRA 597 (1982)
FACTS:
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic
corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates
ofPublic Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any
other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads:
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis.
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case
No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow
the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model
1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at
the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.
The law is set to be immediately implemented in Metro Manila first before it would
be implemented elsewhere. Pursuant to this, the Director of the Bureau of Land
Transportation issued Circ 52 which is the IRR of the law in the
NCR. TOMMI assailed the constitutionality of the law. It avers, among other
things, that the Circular in question violates their right to equal protection of the law
because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely
towards the taxi industry. At the outset it should be pointed out that implementation
outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in Memorandum Circular
No. 77-42.
ISSUES:
Whether or not granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the
procedural requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the
implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate
the petitioners’ constitutional rights to: (1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and (3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable
classification and standard.
HELD:
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the
overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the
dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its
police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good
order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to
comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property
rights.
The SC held that Circ 77-42 is valid. BOT’s reason for enforcing the Circular
initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other
places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. Thus is of
common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every
city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection
clause can hardly be successfully claimed.
In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation
services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause
does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to
things or persons identically or similarly situated. What is required under the equal
protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under
identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in
privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. The challenged Circulars satisfy the
foregoing criteria.
Velasco vs. Villegas, 120 SCRA 568 (1983)
FACTS:
In their own behalf and in representation of the other owners of barbershops in the
City of Manila, petitioners challenge the constitutionality based on Ordinance No.
4964 of the City of Manila, which prohibited the business of massaging customers
of a barber shop. They contend that it amounts to a deprivation of property of their
means of livelihood without due process of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not said ordinance was unconstitutional, and therefore an improper
exercise of police power.
HELD:
NO. The attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in the brief of
respondents-appellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives behind its
enactment are: “(1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee for engaging
in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as
amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance
regulating the business of barbershops and,
(2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction
of separate rooms for massage of customers.”
The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general
welfare clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a 1918 decision, this Court
through Justice Malcolm made clear the significance and scope of such a clause,
which “delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality. As above
stated, this clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities and
has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been
liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is the progressive view of
Philippine jurisprudence.”
BAUTISTA VS. JUNIO
FACTS: The constitutionality of Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 869, a response to
protracted oil crisis, banning the use of private motor vehicles with H (heavy) and
EH (extra heavy) plates on week-ends and holidays, was assailed for being
allegedly violative of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the
Constitution.
Petitioners also contends that Memorandum Circular No. 39 issued by herein
respondents imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation
of license of owners of the above specified vehicles found violating such LOI, is
likewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of “undue delegation of
legislative power.”
Respondents denied the above allegations.
ISSUE: Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum
Circular No. 39 is violative of certain constitutional rights.
HELD: NO.
The disputed regulatory measure is an appropriate response to a problem that
presses urgently for solution, wherein its reasonableness is immediately apparent.
Thus due process is not ignored, much less infringed. The exercise of police power
may cut into the rights to liberty and property for the promotion of the general
welfare. Those adversely affected may invoke the equal protection clause only if
they can show a factual foundation for its invalidity.
Moreover, since LOI No. 869 and MC No. 39 were adopted pursuant to the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code which contains a specific provision as to penalties,
the imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions
therein set forth is valid with the exception of the impounding of a vehicle.
SANGALANG vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 148 SCRA 659
DIGEST
FACTS:
GRs 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281 are efforts to enforce the “deed restrictions”
against specific residents of Jupiter Street and, with respect to GR 78182,
Reponso Street. The residents have allegedly converted their residences into
commercial establishments in violation of the said restrictions. The mother case,
GR 71169 is a petition to hold the vendor itself, AYALA CORP, liable for tearing
down the perimeter wall along Jupiter Street that had theretofore closed its
commercial section from the residences of Bel-Air Village and ushering in, as a
consequence, the full “commercialization” of Jupiter Street, in violation of the very
restrictions it had authored. The CA dismissed all 5 appeals in the basis of stare
decisis on a prior ruling in which the appellate court explicity rejected claims under
the same “deed restrictions” as a result of Ordinance 81 enacted by the
Municipality of Makati, as well as the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance 8101
promulgated by the Metropolitan Manila Commission, which two ordinances
allegedly allowed the use of Jupiter Street for both residential and commercial
purposes. It was likewise held that these twin measures were valid as a legitimate
exercise of police power.
ISSUE:
WON the constitutional guarantee on non-impairment of contracts be raised as a
deterrent to the exercise of police power.
RULING:
All contracts are subject to the overriding demands, needs, and interests of the
greater number as the State may determine in the legitimate exercise of police
power. The Court guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to be the “law
between the contracting parties,” but while it is so, it cannot contravene “law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.” Above all, it cannot be raised
as a deterrent to police power, designed precisely to promote health, safety,
peace, and enhance the common good, at the expense of contractual rights,
whenever necessary. Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general
welfare of the people. Invariably described as “the most essential, insistent, and
illimitable of powers” and “in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of
government,” the exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into and
corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having
been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional
guarantee. Police power is elastic and must be responsive to various social
conditions; it is not confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents
resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic
way of life. Public welfare, when clashing with the individual right to
property, should be made to prevail through the state’s exercise of its police
power. Herein, the MMC Ordinance represents a legitimate exercise of police
power, as the ordinance is neither capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable; but that
it is based on compelling interests of general welfare. The restrictive easements
are similar to any other contract, and should not deter the valid exercise of police
power. The MMC has reclassified Jupiter Street into a “high density commercial
zone, pursuant to Ordinance 81-01. Sangalang, BAVA, et. al., thus have no cause
of action on the strength alone of said “deed restrictions.”
LIM vs. PACQUING, 240 SCRA 649
DIGEST
FACTS:
The petition was dismissed by the First Division of the SC based on a finding that
there was no abuse of discretion, much less lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the
part of respondent judge in issuing the questioned orders:
(a) Ordering Lim to issue the permit to operate the jai-alai in favor of ADC
(b) Ordering Lim to explain why he should not be cited for contempt for non
compliance with such order
(c) Reiterating the previous order directing Lim to immediately issue the
permit/license to ADC
The order was in turn issued upon motion by ADC for execution of a final judgment
rendered on September 1988 which ordered the Manila Mayor to immediately
issue a permit from the ADC to operate the jai-alai under Manila Ordinance No.
7065.
Subsequently, the RP, through the GAB, filed a motion for intervention. The
national government contends that Manila Ordinance 7065 which purported to
grant to ADC a franchise to conduct jai-alai operation is void and ultra vires since
RA954 was enacted very much earlier than the ordinance requires a
LEGISLATIVE FRANCHISE, not a municipal franchise, for the operation of jai-alai.
ISSUE:
WON the Associated Development Corporation has a valid and subsisting
franchise to maintain and operate the jai-alai.
HELD:
No. ADC does not possess the required congressional franchise to operate and
conduct the jai-alai under RA954 and PD771. Congress did not delegate to the
City of Manila the power to franchise wagers or betting, including the jai-alai. What
Congress delegated to the City of Manila in RA409 was the power to “license,
permit, or regulate” which therefore means that a license or permit issued by the
City of Manila would not amount to something meaningful unless the holder of the
permit was also FRANCHISED by the national gov’t to so operate.

Since ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so
operate even if it has a license or permit from the City Mayor.
POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD vs. CA, 195 SCRA 112
DIGEST
Petitioner PAB ass to review the Decision and Resolution by the CA entitled “Solar
Textile Finishing Corporation vs. PAB.” In that Decision and Resolution, the CA
reversed an order of the RTC dismissing respondent Solar’s petition for certiorari
and remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings.
FACTS:
Petitioner PAB issued an ex parte Order directing SOLAR to immediately cease
and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations which were
discharging untreated wastewater directly into a canal leading to the adjacent
Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The said order was based on findings of 2 inpections of
SOLAR’s plant.
The findings of these inspections were that SOLAR’s wastewater treatment plant
was non-operational and that its plant generated about 30 gallons per minute of
wastewater, 80% of which was being directly discharged into a drainage canal
leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The remaining 20% was being channeled
through SOLAR’s non-operational wastewater plant. Chemical analysis of samples
of SOLAR’s effluents showed the presence of pollutants on a higher level of what
was permissible under PD984.
SOLAR filed a motion for reconsideration allowing SOLAR to operate temporarily,
to enable the PAB to conduct another inspection. Subsequently, however, SOLAR
filed in the RTC on petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against PAB.
RTC dismissed SOLAR’s petition on the grounds of, among others, mootness in
that the PAB’s subsequent order to allow SOLAR to operate temporarily. In the
CA, the decision was reversed and was remanded to the RTC for further
proceedings; hence, the present petition.
Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority
to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there
is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or
wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible
standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner Board contends that the
reports before it concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the Tullahan-
Tinejeros River provided prima facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of
the 1982 Effluent Code.
Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and
regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an
"immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant
life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the inspection reports before the
Board made no finding that Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat.
ISSUE:
WON the ex parte order of PAB were issued in accordance with law
RULING:
We note that under Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984, an ex parte cease and desist
order may be issued by the PAB (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an
establishment pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or
to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever such discharges or wastes exceed "the
allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." On the one hand, it is not essential that
the Board prove that an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or
to animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte cease and desist order may be
issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed "the
allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." In respect of discharges of wastes as to
which allowable standards have been set by the Commission, the Board may issue
an ex parte cease and desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an
establishment exceeding such allowable standards.
In the instant case, the ex parte cease and desist Order was issued not by a local
government official but by the Pollution Adjudication Board, the very agency of the
Government charged with the task of determining whether the effluents of a
particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution
statutory and regulatory provisions.
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations
like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of
pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the
Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate
correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple
and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may
take several years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing
regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive,
sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of
the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated
as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital
public interests like those here involved, through the
ID; ID; ID; LAWFUL MEANS:
Even if the purpose be within the scope of the police power, the law will still be
annulled if the subject is sought to be regulated in violation of the second
requirement. In Constitutional Law, the end does not justify the means. The lawful
objective, in other words, must be pursued through a lawful method; that is, both
the end and the means must be legitimate. Lacking such concurrence, the police
measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion of private rights
RESTITUTO YNOT v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R. No. 74457,
March 20, 1987
DIGEST
FACTS:
Ynot had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on
January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. Ynot sued for recovery,
and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of
a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the
court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be
produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on
the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of
authority and also for its presumed validity.
Ynot appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which upheld the
trial court and he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 626-A is unconstitutional.
RULING:
Executive Order No. 626-A is unconstitutional. Executive Order No. 626-A is penal
in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only
but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the
prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused. The
executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately
imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Ynot was not given a
chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair
play.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power
which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply
defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the
promotion of the general welfare. By reason of its function, it extends to all the
great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and
the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing
taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed
in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him
still after he is dead — from the womb to beyond the tomb — in practically
everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and
often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has
some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not
only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin
maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,
which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater
number. It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive
Order No. 626-A, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain
conditions.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as
the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies
with the second requirement, that there be a lawful method. We do not see how
the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less
difficulty in one province than in another. Even if a reasonable relation between the
means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the
sanction for violation of the prohibition which is outright confiscation of the carabao
being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police
only.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the
police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied
the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt
of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an
invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are
granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
JMM PROMOTION vs. CA, 260 SCRA 319
FACTS:
The death of Maricris Sioson resulted to the order a total ban against the
deployment of performing artists to Japan and other foreign destinations by
President Cory Aquino. The ban was, however, rescinded after leaders of the
overseas employment industry promised to extend full support for a program
aimed at removing kinks in the system of deployment. In its place, the
government, through the Secretary of Labor and Employment, subsequently
issued Department Order No. 28, creating the Entertainment Industry Advisory
Council (EIAC), which was tasked with issuing guidelines on the training, testing
certification and deployment of performing artists abroad.
Pursuant to the EIAC's recommendations, the Secretary of Labor, on January 6,
1994, issued Department Order No. 3 establishing various procedures and
requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of training,
testing, certification and deployment of the former. Performing artists successfully
hurdling the test, training and certification requirement were to be issued an Artist's
Record Book (ARB), a necessary prerequisite to processing of any contract of
employment by the POEA.
In Civil Case No. 95-72750, the Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of
the Philippines (FETMOP), on January 27, 1995 filed a class suit assailing these
department orders, principally contending that said orders 1) violated the
constitutional right to travel; 2) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3)
deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of law. FETMOP,
likewise, averred that the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was
discriminatory and illegal and "in gross violation of the constitutional right... to life
liberty and property." Said Federation consequently prayed for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction against the aforestated orders. JMM Promotion and
Management were petitioners in intervention.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the abovementioned Department Order is valid.
RULING:
The latin maxim salus populi est suprema lex embodies the character of the entire
spectrum of public laws aimed at promoting the general welfare of the people
under the State's police power. As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which
virtually "extends to all public needs," this "least limitable" of governmental powers
grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the state, as parens patriae
gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers.
It was during the same period that this Court took judicial notice not only of the
trend, but also of the fact that most of our women, a large number employed as
domestic helpers and entertainers, worked under exploitative conditions "marked
by physical and personal abuse." Even then, we noted that "the sordid tales of
maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of
torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers" compelled "urgent
government action."
Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was
paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and
absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to "high risk"
destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further underground,
the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing
artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits
deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable
demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme
at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and
agencies.
In any event, apart from the State's police power, the Constitution itself mandates
government to extend the fullest protection to our overseas workers. The basic
constitutional statement on labor, embodied in Section 18 of Article II of the
Constitution provides:

Sec. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall
protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
More emphatically, the social justice provision on labor of the 1987 Constitution in
its first paragraph states:
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.
Obviously, protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone.
Under the welfare and social justice provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of
full employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the government's
constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local
or overseas.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision sought to be reviewed,
petition is hereby DENIED.
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS COMELEC
FACTS:
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No 2772 directing newspapers to provide free
print space of not less than ½ page for use as “Comelec Space” from
06March1995 to 06May1995. COMELEC Commisssioner sent letters to publishers
informing them of the same. PPI seek to declare the resolution unconstitutional
and void on the ground of taking private property w/o just compensation. TRO was
enforced. SocGen argues that even if the questioned Resolution and its
implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would
nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. COMELEC
Chair stated that they will clarify the resolution that the letter was intended to solicit
and not to compel. Resolution No. 2772-A was promulgated.
Issue: Whether or not Resolution 2772 is void on the ground of deprivation of use
w/o compensation of newspaper?
Conclusion:
1. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by
Comelec in its 22 March 1995 letter directives, purports to require print media
enterprises to "donate" free print space to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers
from a fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified.
2. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition must be dismissed for lack of an actual, justiciable case
or controversy.
Ruling:
To compel print media companies to donate “Comelec-space” amounts to “taking”
of private personal property for public use. The extent of the taking or deprivation
is not insubstantial measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by
newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas.
The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be appraised under
the rubric of expropriation of private personal property for public use. The threshold
requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use need to be examined
here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is the legal authority to effect the
taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent
Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell
print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. It has not been
suggested that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either by
the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between
that power and the enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec
must be shown.
The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the
Constitution, but not without payment of “just compensation.”
The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the
Constitution, but not without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9).
And apparently the necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec space" is
precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission, whether
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion
of authority to require newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space for
Comelec purposes, or as an exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to
donate free print space, as Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A attempts to
suggest. There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper and magazine publishers
from voluntarily giving free print space to Comelec for the purposes contemplated
in Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not, however,
provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the
kind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for Comelec
purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain.
CITY GOV’T OF QUEZON CITY vs. ERICTA
FACTS
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL
TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF
QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF"
provides:
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall
be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have
been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be
determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall
immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six
months from the date of approval of the application.
This section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but seven years
after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council through a resolution
ordered owners of memorial park lots in Quezon City who have failed to donate the
required 6% space intended for the burial of paupers to stop the selling and/or
transaction of memorial park lots.
Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang
Pilipino, Inc.
Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal Branch XVIII at Quezon City and prayed for the annulment of Section 9 of the
Ordinance in question. The respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the
Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised
Administrative Code.
The respondent court, therefore, rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of
Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police
power
RULING
No.
Petition is dismissed. Sec9 of Ordinance No 6118 is null and void.
It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of
Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives
a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without
compensation. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the
exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property
in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of
promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally
possessed article, such as opium and firearms.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not
covered by the Section in question.
Moreover, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied
powers of the municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law as
statutory basis of their exercise of power. The clause has always received broad
and liberal interpretation but the Court cannot stretch it to cover this particular
taking.
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., vs. JAC LINER, INC., G.R. No.
148339. February 23, 2005
FACTS:
Respondent, JAC Liner, Inc., a common carrier operating buses which ply various
routes to and from Lucena City, assailed, via a petition for prohibition and
injunction against the City of Lucena, its Mayor, and the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Lucena before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City, City Ordinance
Nos. 1631 and 1778 which grants an exclusive franchise for twenty five years,
renewable for another twenty five years, to one entity for the construction and
operation of one common bus and jeepney terminal facility in Lucena City, to be
located outside the city proper, were professedly aimed towards alleviating the
traffic congestion alleged to have been caused by the existence of various bus and
jeepney terminals within the city,as unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia,
the same constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of
private property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against
monopolies.
ISSUE:
Whether the City of Lucena properly exercised its police power when it enacted the
subject ordinances.
RULING:
Petition denied.
As with the State, the local government may be considered as having properly
exercised its police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests
of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary
for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a
lawful subject and lawful method.
From the memorandum filed before this Court by petitioner, it is gathered that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the cause of traffic congestion to be the
indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses on the streets of the
city proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed to the proliferation
of buses obstructing traffic on the city streets.
Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic;
how the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that
franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the
traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened. If terminals lack adequate
space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the
streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size
of terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the same denied those
which are unable to meet the specifications.
Absent any showing, nay allegation, that the terminals are encroaching upon
public roads, they are not obstacles. The buses which indiscriminately load and
unload passengers on the city streets are. The power then of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod to prohibit encroachments and obstacles does not extend to terminals.
Additional Limitations: When Exercise by Delegate
a. Express granted by Law
b. Within Territorial Limits
c. Must Not Be Contrary to Law
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Asociation vs. City Mayor (1967)
FACTS:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members
Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14,
1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila. They claimed that the ordinance was
beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to regulate due to the fact that hotels
were not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of the
challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being
unreasonable and violative of due process insofar because it would impose
P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second
class motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form
specifying their personal information. There was also a provision that the premises
and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for
inspection from city authorities.
They claimed this to be violative of due process for being vague. The law also
classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain
minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining
room or, restaurant and laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due
process on this for being arbitrary. It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any
room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours. There was also a
prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of
the hotels that violated the ordinance. The lower court declared the ordinance
unconstitutional. Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process
clause.
HELD:
NO. Judgment reversed. Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals. There is no violation o constitutional due
process for being reasonable and the ordinance is enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face. .As such a limitation cannot be
viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the
immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the
explanatory note, are being devoted. Taxation may be made to implement a police
power and the amount, object, and instance of taxation is dependent upon the
local legislative body. Judgment of lower court reversed and injunction
lifted.
Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties, 234 SCRA 255 (1994)
FACTS:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a
portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc.,renovated &
equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino during the Christmas
season.
Civil organizations angrily denounced the project. Petitioners opposed the casino’s
opening and enacted Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of
business permit and canceling existing business permit to the establishment for
the operation of the casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the
operation of the casino and providing a penalty for its violation. Respondents
assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that they both violated
Presidential Decree No. 1869. Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the Local
Government Code, they have the police power authority to prohibit the operation of
casino for the general welfare.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are valid.
HELD:
NO. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered
toenact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is
expressly v es t ed wi th the pol i ce power under
wha t i s known as the Genera l Wel f ar e Clause nowembodied in Section 16 as
follows: Sec. 16.
General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support,
among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health
and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and and social
justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order,
and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. The rationale of the
requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a
statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Local councils
exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the
national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the
local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have
derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate
of the statute. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings
for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation
of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to
P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore void.
City of Manila v. Judge Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005
FACTS:
On March 30, 1993 City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted
which prohibited certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services
and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and
disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be
moral welfare of the community. The Ordinance also provided that in case of forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance
violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and is therefore ultra vires null and void.
and padlocked permanently.
MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar as it
included motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared
invalid and unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid
exercise of police power and it constitutes a denial of equal protection under the
law.
Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme
Court.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the City of Manila validly exercised police power and whether or
not there was a denial of equal protection under the law.

HELD:
YES. The Ordinance infringes the due process clause since the requisites for a
valid exercise of police power are not met. The prohibition of the enumerated
establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of
the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution,
adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual diseases in Manila. It is
baseless and insupportable to bring within that classification sauna parlors,
massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques,
cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. These are lawful pursuits which are not per
se offensive to the moral welfare of the community. Sexual immorality, being a
human frailty, may take place in the most innocent places. Every house, building,
park, curb, street, or even vehicles for that matter will not be exempt from the
prohibition. Simply because there are no "pure" places where there are impure
men. The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues
of morality. Try as the Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster the
illusion that it can make a moral man out of it because immorality is not a thing, a
building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men. The Ordinance violates equal
protection clause and is repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires. The Local
Government Code merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not
prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof. All considered, the
Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal
privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is