Biboso v.
Victoria’s Milling the clients applications for immigration to Canada to ensure that they are in
FACTS: Bibos et. al were employed by Victoria’s Milling as academic teachers
in its school (St. Mary Mazzarello). Biboso et. al were notified by the school
Directress that they were not going to be rehired for the school year 1973-
74. The necessary report for such was filed by the school with the
Department of Labor, informing that the teacher’s services were thus
terminated. Biboso et. al challenged such decision and were quite successful
with the Arbitrator, the former National Labor Relations Commission under
Presidential Decree No. 21, and the Secretary of Labor. Victoria’s Milling
then appealed to the Office of the President
OP: Presidential Executive Assistant Clave, dismissed the complaint of Biboso
et. al for reinstatement. The OP had examined and analyzed the various
contracts. The complainants were hired as teachers of the school on a year-
to-year basis and that they reapplied before the expiration of the contracts
and/or signed new ones, as the case may be, if the school decided to renew
the same. They all signed identical contracts which provided for a definite
period of employment. The complainants were hired as temporary and when
required or until the contract is supposed to terminate. The Labor Code
recognizes the policy of the Bureau of Private Schools settling the maximum
probationary period for teachers at three years. The Labor Code does not
set the maximum probationary period at six months. Under the Labor Code,
the probationary period is the period required to learn a skill, trade,
occupation or profession. It was likewise held that the allegation of unfair
labor practice is untenable. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S: W/N the provision of the assuring worker’s security of tenure is
applicable to those whose employment admittedly were on a basis.
RULING NO. The Office of the President exercised its discretion but it cannot
be said that an abuse could rightfully be imputed. What is decisive is that
petitioners were well aware that their tenure was for a limited duration.
Upon its termination, both parties to the employment relationship were free
to renew it or to let it lapse. It was the decision of the company that it should
cease. The Office of the President could find nothing objectionable when it
determined that the will of the parties as to the limited duration thereof
should be respected. However, this is not to assert that the security of
tenure protection of the constitution does not apply to probationary
employees. The Labor code provides that "The termination of employment
of probationary employees and those employed with a fixed period shall be
subject to such regulations as the Secretary of labor may prescribe to prevent
the circumvention of the right of the employees to be secured in their
employment as provided herein. Petitioners did not enjoy a permanent
status but during such period of employment, they could remain in their
positions and any circumvention of their rights is subject to inquiry and
correction by the Department of Labor. There was the safeguard as to the
duration of their employment being respected. To that extent, their tenure
was secure. The moment, however, the period expired in accordance with
contracts freely entered into, they could no longer invoke the constitutional
protection. It would be a different matter of course had the failure to renew
the contracts of petitioners been justly attributable to their joining petitioner
labor union, Vicmico Supervisoyr Employees Association. That would be a
clear case of an unfair labor practice.
DISPOSITION WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed.
CANADIAN OPPORTUNITIES UNLIMITED, INC., Petitioner, v. BART Q.
DALANGIN
FACTS: Dalangin was hired by the company in October 2001, as Immigration
and Legal Manager, with a monthly salary of P15,000.00. He was placed on
probation for six months. He was to report directly to the Chief Operations
Officer, Annie Llamanzares Abad. His tasks involved principally the review of
his position and duties. Additionally, very early in his employment, Dalangin
accordance with Canadian and Philippine laws.
Through a memorandum signed by Abad, the company terminated Dalangins
employment, declaring him "unfit" and "unqualified" to continue as
Immigration and Legal Manager. The following are the reasons for Dalangins
termination: Obstinacy and utter disregard of company policies, Lack of
concern for the company's interest despite having just been employed in the
company, lack of enthusiasm toward work, and lack of interest in fostering
relationship with his co-employees.
Labor Arbiter Eduardo G. Magno declared Dalangins dismissal illegal. On
appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA decision. Dalangin moved for
reconsideration, but the NLRC denied the motion, prompting him to go to
the CA on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In its decision, the CA reversed the NLRC ruling. As the labor arbiter did, the
CA found that the company failed to support, with substantial evidence, its
claim that Dalangin failed to meet the standards to qualify as a regular
employee.
The CA denied the company's subsequent motion for reconsideration in its.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dalangin was validly dismissed
HELD: Labor Law. In International Catholic Migration Commission v. NLRC,
the Court explained that a probationary employee, as understood under
Article 281 of the Labor Code, is one who is on trial by an employer, during
which, the latter determines whether or not he is qualified for permanent
employment. A probationary appointment gives the employer an
opportunity to observe the fitness of a probationer while at work, and to
ascertain whether he would be a proper and efficient employee. Dalangin
was barely a month on the job when the company terminated his
employment. He was found wanting in qualities that would make him a
"proper and efficient" employee or, as the company put it, he was unfit and
unqualified to continue as its Immigration and Legal Manager. The CA did not
believe that the company could fully assess Dalangins performance within a
month. It viewed Dalangins dismissal as arbitrary, considering that the
company had very little time to determine his fitness for the job. Contrary to
the CAs conclusions, we find substantial evidence indicating that the
company was justified in terminating Dalangins employment, however brief
it had been. Time and again, we have emphasized that substantial evidence
is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. Dalangin overlooks the fact, wittingly or unwittingly,
that he offered glimpses of his own behavior and actuations during his four-
week stay with the company; he betrayed his negative attitude and regard
for the company, his co-employees and his work. Dalangin admitted in
compulsory arbitration that the proximate cause for his dismissal was his
refusal to attend the company's "Values Formation Seminar" scheduled for
October 27, 2001, a Saturday. He refused to attend the seminar after he
learned that it had no relation to his duties, as he claimed, and that he had
to leave at 2:00 p.m. because he wanted to be with his family in the province.
When Abad insisted that he attend the seminar to encourage his co-
employees to attend, he stood pat on not attending, arguing that marked
differences exist between their positions and duties, and insinuating that he
did not want to join the other employees. He also questioned the scheduled
2:00 p.m. seminars on Saturdays as they were not supposed to be doing a
company activity beyond 2:00 p.m. The "Values Formation Seminar" incident
is an eye-opener on the kind of person and employee Dalangin was. The
incident also reveals Dalangins lack of interest in establishing good working
relationship with his co-employees, especially the rank and file; he did not
want to join them because of his view that the seminar was not relevant to
exhibited negative working habits, particularly with respect to the one hour
lunch break policy of the company and the observance of the companys
working hours. However, since the company failed to observe the required
due process in terminating probationary employees, Dalangin is entitled to
nominal damages.
Buiser v. Leogardo, Jr.
GR No. L-63316 | 131 SCRA 151 | July 31, 1984
FACTS: Buiser, Rilloacuna and Intengan were employed by General
Telephone Directory Co. as sales representative. Buiser et al. entered an
“Employment Contract (on Probationary Status)” with GT Directory.
The employment contact states that: The company hereby employs the
employee as telephone sales representative on a probationary status for a
period of eighteen (18) months. During the probationary period of
employment, the Employee may be terminated at the pleasure of the
company without the necessity of giving notice of termination or the
payment of termination pay. It takes about eighteen (18) months before his
worth as a telephone sales representative can be fully evaluated. GT
Directory prescribed sales quotas to be accomplished by Buiser. Failing to
meet their respective sales quotas, Buiser et al. were dismissed from the
service. Thus, Buiser filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Regional Director
Ministry of Labor dismissed the complaint. Buiser appealed to Deputy
Minister Vicente Leogardo, Jr which affirmed the decision of RD. Deputy
Minister Leogardo ruled that the petitioners have not attained permanent
status since private respondent was justified in requiring a longer period of
probation, and that the termination of petitioners’ services was valid since
the latter failed to meet their sales quotas.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S W/N the 18 months probationary status is allowed.
RULING YES.
General Rule: probationary period of employment is limited to six (6)
months.
Exception: parties to an employment contract agreed otherwise, established
by company policy, required by the nature of work to be performed by the
employee. There is an exercise of managerial prerogatives in requiring a
longer period of probationary employment, especially where the employee
must learn a particular kind of work such as selling, or when the job requires
certain qualifications, skills, experience or training. Under the Labor Code, six
(6) months is the general probationary period, but the probationary period
is the period needed to determine fitness for the job. This period, for lack of
a better measurement is deemed to be the period needed to learn the job.
Moreover, an eighteen-month probationary period is recognized by the
Labor Union GT Directory Co, which is Article V of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
MARIWASA MANUFACTURING v LEOGARDO (Narvasa, 1989)
QUICK FACTS: Dequila, a probationary utility worker of Mariwasa, agreed to
have his probationary period extended for another 3 months after the first 6
months, so that he may have another chance to improve his performance
and qualify as a regular worker. After the extension, he was terminated.
FACTS: Joaquin A. Dequila (or Dequilla) was hired on probation by Mariwasa
Manufacturing, Inc. as a general utility worker on January 10, 1979. After 6
months, he was informed that his work was unsatisfactory and had failed to
meet the required standards. To give him another chance, and with Dequila’s
written consent, Mariwasa extended Dequila’s probationary period for
another three months: from July 10 to October 9, 1979. Dequila’s
performance, however, did not improve and Mariwasa terminated his
employment at the end of the extended period. Dequila filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against Mariwasa and its VP for Administration, Angel T.
Dazo, and violation of Presidential Decrees Nos. 928 and 1389. DIRECTOR OF
MINISTRY OF LABOR: Complaint is dismissed. Termination is justified. Thus,
Dequila appeals to the Minister of Labor. MINISTER OF LABOR: Deputy
Minister Vicente Leogardo, Jr. held that Dequila was already a regular
employee at the time of his dismissal, thus, he was illegally dismissed. (Initial
order: Reinstatement with full backwages. Later amended to direct payment
of Dequila's backwages from the date of his dismissal to December 20, 1982
only.)
ISSUE: WON employer and employee may, by agreement, extend the
probationary period of employment beyond the six months prescribed in Art.
282 of the Labor Code?
RULING: YES, agreements stipulating longer probationary periods may
constitute lawful exceptions to the statutory prescription limiting such
periods to six months. The SC in its decision in Buiser vs. Leogardo, Jr. (1984)
said that “Generally, the probationary period of employment is limited to six
(6) months. The exception to this general rule is when the parties to an
employment contract may agree otherwise, such as when the same is
established by company policy or when the same is required by the nature
of work to be performed by the employee. In the latter case, there is
recognition of the exercise of managerial prerogatives in requiring a longer
period of probationary employment, such as in the present case where the
probationary period was set for eighteen (18) months, i.e. from May, 1980
to October, 1981 inclusive, especially where the employee must learn a
particular kind of work such as selling, or when the job requires certain
qualifications, skills experience or training.” In this case, the extension given
to Dequila could not have been pre-arranged to avoid the legal
consequences of a probationary period satisfactorily completed. In fact, it
was ex gratia, an act of liberality on the part of his employer affording him a
second chance to make good after having initially failed to prove his worth
as an employee. Such an act cannot now unjustly be turned against said
employer's account to compel it to keep on its payroll one who could not
perform according to its work standards. By voluntarily agreeing to an
extension of the probationary period, Dequila in effect waived any benefit
attaching to the completion of said period if he still failed to make the grade
during the period of extension. By reasonably extending the period of
probation, the questioned agreement actually improved the probationary
employee's prospects of demonstrating his fitness for regular employment.
Petition granted. Order of Deputy Minister Leogardo reversed. Case for
illegal dismissal is dismissed.
HOLIDAY INN MANILA V. NLRC GR No. 109114 September 14, 1993
Facts: On April 15, 1991, Elena Honasan was accepted for on-the-job training
as a telephone operator inHoliday Inn Manila for a period of three (3) weeks.
On May 13, 1991, after the completion of her training,she was employed on
a "probationary basis" for a period of six (6) months ending on November 12,
1991.Her employment contract stipulated that the Hotel could terminate her
probationary employment at anytime prior to the expiration of the six-
month period in the event of her failure (a) to learn or progress in her job;
(b) to faithfully observe and comply with the hotel rules and the instructions
and orders of hersuperiors; or (c) to perform her duties according to hotel
standards.On November 8, 1991, Holiday Inn Manila notified her of her
dismissal on the ground that herperformance had not come up to the
standards of the Hotel. Hence, Honasan filed a complaint for illegaldismissal
contending that she was already a regular employee at the time of her
separation. Therefore,she was entitled to full security of tenure. The
complaint was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter. On appeal,the decision was
reversed by the NLRC which held that Honasan had become regular
employee and socould not be dismissed as a probationer. NLRC ordered
Holiday Inn Manila to reinstate Honasan to herformer position without loss
of seniority rights and other privileges with backwages without deduction
andqualification.Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether Elena Honasan was illegally dismissed.
Held: Yes. Elena Honasan was illegally dismissed. She was placed by the
petitioner on probation twice,to wit, (1) during her on-the-job training for
three weeks and (2) during another period of six months. The Hotel’s system
of double probation was a transparent scheme to circumvent the plain
mandate of the law and make it easier for it to dismiss its employees even
after they shall have already passed probation.The petitioners had ample
time to terminate Honasan’s services during her period of probation if they
were deemed unsatisfactory.There is also no reason why the three-week
period of on-the-job training should not be includedin the stipulated six-
month period of probation. Since she was accepted on April 15, 1991, she
hadbecome a regular employee of Holiday Inn and acquired full security of
tenure as of October 15, 1991. Asa regular employee, she had acquired the
protection of Art. 279 of the Labor Code stating as follows:Art. 279. Security
of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate
theservices of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by
this Title. An employee who isunjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled
to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and otherprivileges and to
his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their
monetaryequivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actualreinstatement.The policy of
the Constitution is to give the utmost protection to the working class
whensubjected to such maneuvers as the one attempted by the petitioners.
The Supreme Court is fullycommitted to that policy and has always been
quick to rise in defense of the rights of labor.Wherefore, the petition is
DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner.
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY v. NLRC,
GR No. 132564 1999-10-20
Facts: In June 1993, respondent Priscila Endozo applied to petitioner Sameer
Overseas Employment Agency, a local recruitment placement agency, for
overseas employment in Taiwan as a domestic helper. As she was initially
found to have a "minimal spot" she was advised to rest for at... least two (2)
months. On April 6, 1994, petitioner told respondent Endozo that she would
be finally deployed to Taiwan and required her to pay the amount of
P30,000.00, which she did, but petitioner did not issue any receipt.
On April 8, 1994, respondent Endozo left for Taiwan. She was to be employed
as a housemaid of Sung Kui Mei with a monthly salary of NT$13,380.00 for a
period of one year. However, she stayed in Taiwan only for eleven (11) days
as her employer terminated her services, and sent her home on April 19,
1994 for alleged incompetence.Immediately upon her return, she
confronted petitioner agency and Rose Mahinay of said agency told her that
she was just unlucky and that she would be refunded the amount of
P50,000.00. On June 20, 1995, private respondent filed with the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration a complaint against petitioner for
illegal dismissal, payment of salary corresponding to the unexpired portion
of her contract, illegal exaction, violation of the Labor Code,... falsification of
contract of employment, attorney's fees and costs. Meantime, on June 7,
1995, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8042, vesting jurisdiction over
claims of overseas workers with the National Labor Relations Commission
(hereafter NLRC). Consequently, respondent's claim was transferred to the
National Labor Relations Commission,... Arbitration Branch, in San Pablo City.
Labor Arbiter Andres C. Zavalla rendered a decision finding that private
respondent was illegally dismissed and ordering petitioner to pay her salary
corresponding to the unexpired portion of her contract of employment of...
eleven (11) months and nineteen (19) days equivalent to NT$151,996.80,
plus ten percent (10%) of the award equivalent to NT$15,199.68 as
attorney's fees.
Issues: whether the employer in Taiwan could lawfully terminate private
respondent's employment as domestic helper for incompetence during the
probationary period of her employment.
Ruling: We consider private respondent to have waived the filing of her
comment and set aside the resolution of February 1, 1999.
In this case, the employment contract was for a definite period of one (1)
year, with six (6) months probationary period. After only eleven days of work,
the employer dismissed private respondent without just cause.
In termination cases, the burden of proving just or valid cause for dismissing
an employee rests on the employer.[13] In this case, petitioner was not able
to... present convincing proof establishing respondent Endozo's alleged
incompetence. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition and
AFFIRMS the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission adopted
on November 28, 1997, in NLRC NCR CA No. 013114-97.
Principles:
It is an elementary rule in the law on labor relations that even a probationary
employee is entitled to security of tenure.[9] A probationary employee can
not be terminated, except for cause.
Singer Sewing Machine Co. vs. Drilon, et.al GR. No. 91307
FACTS: On February 15, 1989, the respondent union, collectors of Singer
Sewing Machine Company-Singer Machine Collectors Union-Baguio
(SIMACUB), filed a petition for direct certification as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all collectors of Petitioner (“Company”). The Company
opposed the petition mainly on the ground that the union members are
actually not employees but are independent contractors as evidenced by the
collection agency agreement which they signed. Med-Arbiter, finding that
there exists an employer-employee relationship between the union
members and the Company, granted the petition for certification election.
On appeal, Secretary of Labor Franklin M. Drilon affirmed it. Petitioners
contend that respondent Labor Secretary disregarded the well-settled rule
that commission agents are not employees but are independent contractors;
the public respondents patently erred in finding that there exists an
employer-employee relationship. The respondents, on the other hand, insist
that the provisions of the Collection Agency Agreement contradict the
Company's position that the union members are independent contractors.
To prove that union members are employees, it is asserted that they
"perform the most desirable and necessary activities for the continuous and
effective operations of the business of the petitioner Company" (citing
Article 280 of the Labor Code). Petitioners quote paragraph 2 of the
Collective Agency Agreement which states that an agent shall utilize only
receipt forms authorized and issued by the Company. They also note
paragraph 3 which states that an agent has to submit and deliver at least
once a week or as often as required a report of all collections made using
report forms furnished by the Company. And that monthly collection quota
required by the Company is deemed by respondents as a control measure
over the means by which an agent is to perform his services.
ISSUE: WON private respondents are regular employees of the company on
the alleged ground that they are performing activities desirable or necessary
to the business.
HELD: No. The nature of the relationship between a company and its
collecting agents depends on the circumstances of each particular
relationship. Not all collecting agents are employees and neither are all
collecting agents independent contractors. The collectors could fall under
either category depending on the facts of each case. The Collecting Agency
Agreement confirms the status of the collecting agent in this case as an
independent contractor not only because he is explicitly described as such
but also because the provisions permit him to perform collection services for
the company without being subject to the control of the latter except only
as to the result of his work. After a careful analysis of the contents of the
agreement, The Court rules in favor of the petitioner. Further, respondent
Secretary Drilon did not consider existing facts in his decision:
1. The collection agents are not required to observe office hours or report to
Singer's office everyday except, naturally and necessarily, for the purpose of
remitting their collections. 2. The collection agents do not have to devote
their time exclusively for SINGER. There is no prohibition on the part of the
collection agents from working elsewhere. Nor are these agents required to
account for their time and submit a record of their activity. 3. The manner
and method of effecting collections are left solely to the discretion of the
collection agents without any interference on the part of Singer. 4. The
collection agents shoulder their transportation expenses incurred in the
collections of the accounts assigned to them. 5. The collection agents are
paid strictly on commission basis. The amounts paid to them are based solely
on the amounts of collection each of them make. They do not receive any
commission if they do not effect any collection even if they put a lot of effort
in collecting. They are paid commission on the basis of actual collections. 6.
The commissions earned by the collection agents are directly deducted by
them from the amount of collections they are able to effect. The net amount
is what is then remitted to Singer." (Rollo, pp. 7-8) The Court finds the
contention of the respondents that the union members are employees under
Article 280 of the Labor Code. The definition that regular employees are
those who perform activities which are desirable and necessary for the
business of the employer is not determinative in this case. Any agreement
may provide that one party shall render services for and in behalf of another
for a consideration even without being hired as an employee. This is precisely
true in the case of an independent contractorship as well in an agency
agreement. The Court agrees with the petitioner’s argument that Article 280
is not the yardstick for determining the existence of an employment
relationship because it merely distinguishes between two kinds of
employees, i.e. regular employees and casual employees, for purposes of
determining the right of an employee to certain benefits, to join or form a
union, or to security of tenure. Article 280 does not apply where the
existence of an employment relationship is in dispute.
Magsalin v. National Organization of Working Men Digest
Magsalin v. National Organization of Working Men
Facts: The private respondents worked as sales route helpers for the
petitioner (Coca Cola) for 5 months and thereafter they were hired on a daily
basis. According to the petitioner, the respondents were merely hired as
substitutes for regular helpers when the latter were unavailable or due to
shortage of manpower/high volume of work. These workers would then wait
every morning outside the gates and if hired, they would be paid their wages
at the end of the day. The respondents asked the petitioner to make them
regular but the latter refused. Hence, 23 of these temporary workers filed a
case for illegal dismissal.
Issue: W/N the respondents' work is deemed necessary and desirable in the
usual business or trade of the petitioner
RULING: Yes. The repeated hiring of the respondent workers and continuing
need of their daily services clearly attest to the necessity or desirability of
their services in the regular conduct of the business/trade of petitioner. In
determining whether employment is regular or not, the applicable test is the
reasonable connection between a particular activity performed in relation to
the usual business or trade of the employer. The nature of work must be
viewed from the perspective of the business in its entirety and not confined
scope.
BRENT SCHOOL, INC.DIMACHE vs. RONALDO ZAMORA and DOROTEO R.
ALEGRE
G.R. No. L-48494 February 5, 1990
FACTS: Private respondent Doroteo R. Alegre was engaged as athletic
director by petitioner Brent School, Inc. at a yearly compensation of
P20,000.00. The contract fixed a specific term for its existence, five (5) years,
i.e., from July 18, 1971, the date of execution of the agreement, to July 17,
1976. Subsequent subsidiary agreements dated March 15, 1973, August 28,
1973, and September 14, 1974 reiterated the same terms and conditions,
including the expiry date, as those contained in the original contract of July
18, 1971. On April 20,1976, Alegre was given a copy of the report filed by
Brent School with the Department of Labor advising of the termination of his
services effective on July 16, 1976. The stated ground for the termination
was "completion of contract, expiration of the definite period of
employment." Although protesting the announced termination stating that
his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his
employer, and his employment lasted for 5 years - therefore he had acquired
the status of regular employee - Alegre accepted the amount of P3,177.71,
and signed a receipt therefor containing the phrase, "in full payment of
services for the period May 16, to July 17, 1976 as full payment of contract."
The Regional Director considered Brent School's report as an application for
clearance to terminate employment (not a report of termination), and
accepting the recommendation of the Labor Conciliator, refused to give such
clearance and instead required the reinstatement of Alegre, as a "permanent
employee," to his former position without loss of seniority rights and with
full back wages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended, have
anathematized "fixed period employment" or employment for a term.
RULING: Respondent Alegre's contract of employment with Brent School
having lawfully terminated with and by reason of the expiration of the
agreed term of period thereof, he is declared not entitled to reinstatement.
The employment contract between Brent School and Alegre was executed
on July 18, 1971, at a time when the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. 442)
had not yet been promulgated. At that time, the validity of term employment
was impliedly recognized by the Termination Pay Law, R.A. 1052, as
amended by R.A. 1787. Prior, thereto, it was the Code of Commerce (Article
302) which governed employment without a fixed period, and also implicitly
acknowledged the propriety of employment with a fixed period. The Civil
Code of the Philippines, which was approved on June 18, 1949 and became
effective on August 30,1950, itself deals with obligations with a period. No
prohibition against term-or fixed-period employment is contained in any of
its articles or is otherwise deducible therefrom. It is plain then that when the
employment contract was signed between Brent School and Alegre, it was
perfectly legitimate for them to include in it a stipulation fixing the duration
thereof Stipulations for a term were explicitly recognized as valid by this
Court. The status of legitimacy continued to be enjoyed by fixed-period
employment contracts under the Labor Code (PD 442), which went into
effect on November 1, 1974. The Code contained explicit references to fixed
period employment, or employment with a fixed or definite period.
Nevertheless, obscuration of the principle of licitness of term employment
began to take place at about this time. Article 320 originally stated that the
"termination of employment of probationary employees and those
employed WITH A FIXED PERIOD shall be subject to such regulations as the
Secretary of Labor may prescribe." Article 321 prescribed the just causes for
which an employer could terminate "an employment without a definite
period." And Article 319 undertook to define "employment without a fixed
period" in the following manner: …where the employee has been engaged
to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been
fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of
which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee
or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season. Subsequently, the foregoing
articles regarding employment with "a definite period" and "regular"
employment were amended by Presidential Decree No. 850, effective
December 16, 1975. Article 320, dealing with "Probationary and fixed period
employment," was altered by eliminating the reference to persons
"employed with a fixed period," and was renumbered (becoming Article
271). As it is evident that Article 280 of the Labor Code, under a narrow and
literal interpretation, not only fails to exhaust the gamut of employment
contracts to which the lack of a fixed period would be an anomaly, but would
also appear to restrict, without reasonable distinctions, the right of an
employee to freely stipulate with his employer the duration of his
engagement, it logically follows that such a literal interpretation should be
eschewed or avoided. The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to
preclude absurdity in its application. Outlawing the whole concept of term
employment and subverting to boot the principle of freedom of contract to
remedy the evil of employer's using it as a means to prevent their employees
from obtaining security of tenure is like cutting off the nose to spite the face
or, more relevantly, curing a headache by lopping off the head. Such
interpretation puts the seal on Bibiso upon the effect of the expiry of an
agreed period of employment as still good rule—a rule reaffirmed in the
recent case of Escudero vs. Office of the President (G.R. No. 57822, April 26,
1989) where, in the fairly analogous case of a teacher being served by her
school a notice of termination following the expiration of the last of three
successive fixed-term employment contracts, the Court held:
Reyes (the teacher's) argument is not persuasive. It loses sight of the fact
that her employment was probationary, contractual in nature, and one with
a definitive period. At the expiration of the period stipulated in the contract,
her appointment was deemed terminated and the letter informing her of the
non-renewal of her contract is not a condition sine qua non before Reyes
may be deemed to have ceased in the employ of petitioner UST. The notice
is a mere reminder that Reyes' contract of employment was due to expire
and that the contract would no longer be renewed. It is not a letter of
termination. Paraphrasing Escudero, respondent Alegre's employment was
terminated upon the expiration of his last contract with Brent School on July
16, 1976 without the necessity of any notice. The advance written advice
given the Department of Labor with copy to said petitioner was a mere
reminder of the impending expiration of his contract, not a letter of
termination, nor an application for clearance to terminate which needed the
approval of the Department of Labor to make the termination of his services
effective. In any case, such clearance should properly have been given, not
denied.
Pakistan International Airlines v. Ople
G.R. No. 61594, 28 September 1990
FACTS: On 2 December 1978, petitioner Pakistan International Airlines
Corporation (PIA), a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the
Philippines, executed in Manila 2 separate contracts of employment, one
with private respondent Farrales and the other with private respondent
Mamasig. 1 The contracts, which became effective on 9 January 1979,
provided in pertinent portion as follows:
5. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY
This agreement is for a period of 3 years, but can be extended by the mutual
consent of the parties.
xxx xxx xxx
6. TERMINATION
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding anything to contrary as herein provided, PIA reserves the
right to terminate this agreement at any time by giving the EMPLOYEE notice
in writing in advance one month before the intended termination or in lieu
thereof, by paying the EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one month’s salary.
xxx xxx xxx
10. APPLICABLE LAW:
This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws of
Pakistan, and only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction
to consider any matter arising out of or under this agreement.
Farrales & Mamasig (employees) were hired as flight attendants after
undergoing training. Base station was in Manila and flying assignments to
different parts of the Middle East and Europe.
roughly 1 year and 4 months prior to the expiration of the contracts of
employment, PIA through Mr. Oscar Benares, counsel for and official of the
local branch of PIA, sent separate letters, informing them that they will be
terminated effective September 1, 1980.
Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint, for illegal dismissal and
non-payment of company benefits and bonuses, against PIA with the then
Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE).
PIA’s Contention: The PIA submitted its position paper, but no evidence, and
there claimed that both private respondents were habitual absentees; that
both were in the habit of bringing in from abroad sizeable quantities of
“personal effects”; and that PIA personnel at the Manila International Airport
had been discreetly warned by customs officials to advise private
respondents to discontinue that practice. PIA further claimed that the
services of both private respondents were terminated pursuant to the
provisions of the employment contract. Favorable decision for the
respondents. The Order stated that private respondents had attained the
status of regular employees after they had rendered more than a year of
continued service; that the stipulation limiting the period of the employment
contract to 3 years was null and void as violative of the provisions of the
Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations on regular and casual
employment; and that the dismissal, having been carried out without the
requisite clearance from the MOLE, was illegal and entitled private
respondents to reinstatement with full backwages.
Decision sustained on appeal. Hence, this petition for certiorari
ISSUE: (Relative to the subject) Which law should govern over the case?
Which court has jurisdiction?
HELD: Philippine Law and Philippine courts
Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment
agreement which specifies, firstly, the law of Pakistan as the applicable law
of the agreement and, secondly, lays the venue for settlement of any dispute
arising out of or in connection with the agreement “only [in] courts of Karachi
Pakistan”.
We have already pointed out that the relationship is much affected with
public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and
regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some
other law to govern their relationship.
the contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also performed
here, at least partially; private respondents are Philippine citizens and
respondents, while petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is licensed to
do business (and actually doing business) and hence resident in the
Philippines; lastly, private respondents were based in the Philippines in
between their assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe. All the above
contacts point to the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as a
proper forum for the resolution of contractual disputes between the parties.
Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement
cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the
jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event, the
petitioner PIA did not undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan
law on the matter; it must therefore be presumed that the applicable
provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as the applicable provisions of
Philippine law.
[DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION, eh?]
Petition denied.
_______
NOTES:
Another Issue: petitioner PIA invokes paragraphs 5 and 6 of its contract of
employment with private respondents Farrales and Mamasig, arguing that
its relationship with them was governed by the provisions of its contract
rather than by the general provisions of the Labor Code.
A contract freely entered into should, of course, be respected, as PIA argues,
since a contract is the law between the parties. The principle of party
autonomy in contracts is not, however, an absolute principle. The rule in
Article 1306, of our Civil Code is that the contracting parties may establish
such stipulations as they may deem convenient, “provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.” Thus,
counter-balancing the principle of autonomy of contracting parties is the
equally general rule that provisions of applicable law, especially provisions
relating to matters affected with public policy, are deemed written into the
contract. Put a little differently, the governing principle is that parties may
not contract away applicable provisions of law especially peremptory
provisions dealing with matters heavily impressed with public interest. The
law relating to labor and employment is clearly such an area and parties are
not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact
of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other. It is thus
necessary to appraise the contractual provisions invoked by petitioner PIA in
terms of their consistency with applicable Philippine law and regulations.
Chua vs. CA, 443 SCRA 142 (2004)
Facts: On February 28, 1996, private respondent Lydia Hao, treasurer of
Siena Realty Corporation, filed a complaint-affidavit with the City Prosecutor
of Manila charging Francis Chua and his wife, Elsa Chua, of four counts of
falsification of public documents pursuant to Article 172[3] in relation to
Article 171[4] of the RPC. Petitioner avers that a derivative suit is by nature
peculiar only to intra-corporate proceedings and cannot be made part of a
criminal action. He cites the case of Western Institute of Technology, Inc. v.
Salas, where the court said that an appeal on the civil aspect of a criminal
case cannot be treated as a derivative suit. Petitioner asserts that in this
case, the civil aspect of a criminal case cannot be treated as a derivative suit,
considering that Siena Realty Corporation was not the private complainant.
Issue: WON Court of Appeals committed reversible errors IN RULING THAT
LYDIA HAO’S FILING OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 285721 WAS IN THE NATURE OF
A DERIVATIVE SUIT
Held: No.Petitioner misapprehends our ruling in Western Institute. Under
Section 36[13] of the Corporation Code, read in relation to Section 23,[14]
where a corporation is an injured party, its power to sue is lodged with its
board of directors or trustees.[15] An individual stockholder is permitted to
institute a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation wherein he holds
stocks in order to protect or vindicate corporate rights, whenever the
officials of the corporation refuse to sue, or are the ones to be sued, or hold
the control of the corporation. In such actions, the suing stockholder is
regarded as a nominal party, with the corporation as the real party in
interest. A derivative action is a suit by a shareholder to enforce a corporate
cause of action. The corporation is a necessary party to the suit. And the
relief which is granted is a judgment against a third person in favor of the
corporation. Similarly, if a corporation has a defense to an action against it
and is not asserting it, a stockholder may intervene and defend on behalf of
the corporation.
Cartagenas et al vs Romago Electric
Facts: Romago is a general contractor engaged in contracting and sub-
contracting of specificbuilding construction projects or undertaking such as
electrical, mechanical and civil engineeringaspects in the repair of buildings
and from other kindred services. Complainants are employed bythe
respondent in connection with particular construction projects. Some
employees weretemporarily laid off. Two days after the meeting they filed
an instant case for illegal dismissal butbefore the respondent could receive
a copy of the complaint and the notification and summonsissued by the NLRC
National Capital Region individual complainants re-applied with the
Romagoand were assigned to work with its project at Robinson-EDSA. Int
their agreement it was specificallyindicated that they were: Hired for above
project only and that employment will terminate uponcompletion/stoppage
of the project or terminated earlier for cause.
Issue: WON Cartagenas are project employees( as per NLRC) of Romago
Electric Company, Inc. orregular employees (as per Labor Arbiter).
Held: They are project employees. The SC upheld the findings of fact of labor
officials which are generallyconclusive and binding upon this Court when
supported by substantial evidence.The petitionfor certiorariis dismissed for
lack of merit. No costs.Ratio: The NLRC held that the complainants were
project employees because their appointmentswere "co-terminus with the
phase or item of work assigned to them in said project," It held further:The
fact that the complainants worked for the respondent under different
project employmentcontracts for so many years could not be made a basis
to consider them as regular employees forthey remain project employees
regardless of the number of projects in which they have worked. (p.22,
Rollo.)Citing Article 280 of the Labor Code emphasizing the exception to wit:
except where theemployment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination ofwhich has been determined at
the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work orservices
to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration
of the season.As an electrical contractor, the private respondent depends for
its business on the contracts it is ableto obtain from real estate developers
and builders of buildings. Since its work depends on theavailability of such
contracts or "projects," necessarily the duration of the employment of its
workforce is not permanent but co-terminus with the projects to which they
are assigned and from whosepayrolls they are paid. It would be extremely
burdensome for their employer who, like them, dependson the availability
of projects, if it would have to carry them as permanent employees and pay
themwages even if there are no projects for them to work on. We hold,
therefore, that the NLRC did notabuse its discretion in finding, based on
substantial evidence in the records, that the petitioners areonly project
workers of the private respondent.
LEIDEN FERNANDEZ, et. al., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, et. al., respondents.
G.R. No. 105892 January 28, 1998
FACTS: Petitioners, who are employees of private respondent Agencia
Cebuana-H. Lhuillier and/or Margueritte Lhuillier, filed a complaint before
Dept. of Labor for illegal dismissal and payment of backwages when the
latter denied them their demand to increase their salaries and subsequently
terminated their employment. Labor Arbiter favored petitioners but NLRC
vacated the labor arbiter’s order. MR denied. Hence, this petition. In her
opinion, SG recommended that the labor arbiter’s decision be reinstated
substantially, that the award of service incentive leave be limited to three
years. This is based on Article 291 of the Labor Code which provides:
“ART. 291. Money Claims. — All money claims arising from employer-
employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed
within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise
they shall be forever barred. SC ruled that the petitioners, except Lim and
Canonigo,were illegally dismissed so it had to rule now on the money claims.
ISSUE: WON the claim for service incentive leaves may be limited to a certain
number of
years.
HELD: No. Section 2, Rule V, Book III of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations provides that “every employee who has rendered at least one
year of service shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive leave of five days
with pay.” To limit the award to three years is to unduly restrict such right.
The law does not prohibit its commutation. SG’s recommendation is contrary
to the ruling of the Court in Bustamante et al. vs. NLRC et al. lifting the three-
year restriction on the amount of backwages and other allowances that may
be awarded an illegally dismissed employee, thus: “Therefore, in accordance
with R.A. No. 6715, petitioners are entitled to their full backwages, inclusive
of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, from the time
their actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their
actual reinstatement.”
Notes:
*** Implementing Rules clearly state that entitlement to “benefit provided
under this Rule shall start December 16, 1975, the date the amendatory
provision of the [Labor] Code took effect.”Hence, petitioners, except Lim and
Canonigo, should be entitled to service incentive leave pay from December
16, 1975 up to their actual reinstatement.
***Full backwages, including the accrued thirteenth month pay, are also
awarded to the nine petitioners from the date of their illegal dismissal to the
time of their actual reinstatement.
ALU-TUCP vs. NLRC and NSC [G.R. No. 109902. August 02, 1994]
15
AUG
Ponente: FELICIANO, J.
FACTS: [P]etitioners, as employees of private respondent National Steel
Corporation (NSC), filed separate complaints for unfair labor practice,
regularization and monetary benefits with the NLRC, Sub-Regional
Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. The complaints were consolidated and
after hearing, the Labor Arbiter declared petitioners “regular project
employees who shall continue their employment as such for as long as such
[project] activity exists,” but entitled to the salary of a regular employee
pursuant to the provisions in the collective bargaining agreement. It also
ordered payment of salary differentials. The NLRC in its questioned
resolutions modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision. It affirmed the Labor
Arbiter’s holding that petitioners were project employees since they were
hired to perform work in a specific undertaking — the Five Years Expansion
Program, the completion of which had been determined at the time of their
engagement and which operation was not directly related to the business of
steel manufacturing. The NLRC, however, set aside the award to petitioners
of the same benefits enjoyed by regular employees for lack of legal and
factual basis. The law on the matter is Article 280 of the Labor Code, where
the petitioners argue that they are “regular” employees of NSC because: (i)
their jobs are “necessary, desirable and work-related to private respondent’s
main business, steel-making”; and (ii) they have rendered service for six (6)
or more years to private respondent NSC.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are considered “permanent employees”
as opposed to being only “project employees” of NSC.
HELD: NO. Petition for Certiorari dismissed for lack of merit. NLRC
Resolutions affirmed. Function of the proviso. Petitioners are not considered
“permanent employees”. However, contrary to petitioners’ apprehensions,
the designation of named employees as “project employees” and their
assignment to a specific project are effected and implemented in good faith,
and not merely as a means of evading otherwise applicable requirements of
labor laws. On the claim that petitioners’ service to NSC of more than six (6)
years should qualify them as “regular employees”, the Supreme Court
believed this claim is without legal basis. The simple fact that the
employment of petitioners as project employees had gone beyond one (1)
year, does not detract from, or legally dissolve, their status as “project
employees”. The second paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted
above, providing that an employee who has served for at least one (1) year,
shall be considered a regular employee, relates to casual employees, not to
project employees.
Mercado v. NLRC
Facts: Petitioners were agricultural workers of the private respondent's
sugar land who were dismissed. They had worked in all agriculture phases
for several years in the said sugar land. The respondent denied that
petitioners were regular employees alleging that their services were engaged
through 'mandarols' or supply workers to do a particular phase of the
agricultural work. As a result, the petitioners filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal. The Labor Arbiter held that the petitioners were not regular
employees and the NLRC affirmed this ruling.
Issue: W/N the petitioners are regular and permanent farm workers
RULING: No, they are project/seasonal employees. A project employee is
one whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking,
the completion has been determined at the time of engagement, or where
work or service is seasonal in nature and employment is for the duration of
the season. As such, the termination of employment cannot be considered
as illegal dismissal. The petitioners are free to contract their services to work
for other farm owners.
Hacienda Fatima v. National Federation
Facts: The petitioner disfavored the fact that the private respondent
employees have formed a union. When the union became the collective
bargaining representative in the certification election, the petitioner refused
to sit down to negotiate a CBA. Moreover, the respondents were not given
work for a month amounting to unjustified dismissal. As a result, the
complainants staged a strike to protest but was settled through a
memorandum of agreement which contained a list of those considered as
regular employees for the payroll. The NLRC held that there was illegal
dismissal and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: W/N the employees are regular workers
RULING: Yes, they are regular and not seasonal employees. For them to be
excluded as regulars, it is not enough that they perform work that is seasonal
in nature but they also are employed for the duration of one season. The
evidence only proved the first but not the second requirement. The ruling in
Mercado v. NLRC is not applicable since in that case, the workers were
merely required to perform phases of agricultural work for a definite period
of time, after which, their services are available to other employers. The
management's sudden change of assignment reeks of bad faith, it is likewise
guilty of ULP.
 71. VASSAR INDUSTRIES EMPLOYEES UNION (VIEU) vs. HON. FRANCISCO
L. ESTRELLA
FACTS: There was in existence a collective bargaining agreement between
private respondents Associated Labor Unions and Vassar Industries, Inc..
Prior to its expiration, 111 of a total number of 150 employees of such firm
disaffiliated from the former labor organization and formed their own union.
Thereafter, they filed an application for registration of their union with the
Bureau of Labor Relations, complying with an the requirements of both the
Labor Code and its implementing regulations. While such application was
pending, petitioner Union filed a petition for certification as bargaining agent
for the rank-and-file employees of the company. The Med-Arbiter denied
their plea on the ground that the union was not duly registered with the
Department of Labor. The Acting Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations,
denied, the application for registration on the ground that there is a
registered collective bargaining agent in the company.
ISSUE: Whether or not an application for registration should be denied just
because there is already a registered collective bargaining agent in the
company.
RULING: No. As long as an applicant union complies with all of the legal
requirements for registration, it becomes the BLR’s ministerial duty to so
register the union. It suffices then to order that petitioner Union be
registered, there being no legal obstacle to such a step and the duty of the
Bureau of Labor Relations being clear. Then there is this ruling in Philippine
Labor Alliance Council v. Bureau of Labor Relations that calls for application
that “once the fact of disaffiliation has been demonstrated beyond doubt, as
in this case, a certification election is the most expeditious way of
determining which labor organization is to be the exclusive bargaining
representative.” In the meanwhile, if as contended by private respondent
labor union the interim collective bargaining agreement which was entered
during the pendency of the petition of the petitioner, has much more
favorable terms for the workers of private respondent Vassar Industries,
then it should continue in full force and effect until the appropriate
bargaining representative is chosen and negotiations for a new collective
bargaining agreement thereafter concluded. This is one way of assuring that
both the social justice, and the protection to labor provisions would be
effectively implemented without sanctioning an attempt to frustrate the
exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction in a pending case.
72. VICTORIANO V. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS’ UNION
FACTS: Victoriano was an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. As such
employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union which had
a closed shop agreement with the Company that membership in the Union
shall be required as a condition of employment for all its permanent
employees. Prior to its amendment, Section 4(a)(4) of Republic Act No. 875
allows the employer to require as a condition of employment membership
in a labor organization, if such organization is the representative of the
employees. However, the provision was later amended by the enactment of
Republic Act No. 3350, which reads: … “but such agreement shall not cover
members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in
any such labor organization”. Being a member of a religious sect that
prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor organization,
Victoriano presented his resignation to the Union. In turn, the Union asked
the Company to dismiss Victoriano from the service in view of the fact that
he was resigning from the Union as a member. This prompted Victoriano to
file an action to enjoin the Company and the Union from dismissing him. The
Union assails the constitutionality of RA No. 3350, contending that it
infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful associations guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA No. 3550 is unconstitutional for infringing on the
fundamental freedom to form associations.
RULING: No. As ruled by the Supreme Court:
“RA No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage
of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects
which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization. What
the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects
cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions
have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed
shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused
employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are
not members of the collective bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that
the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom
of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members
of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said
members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor
unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said
religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in
deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can
do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit
them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel
them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the
constitutional provision on freedom of association.”
73. KAPATIRAN VS. CALLEJA
FACTS: 1984-1987: TUPAS (Kapatiran) was the sole and exclusive collective
bargaining representative of the workers in the Meat and Canning Division
of the Universal Robina Corp, with a 3-yr collective bargaining agreement
which was to expire on November 15, 1987. Within the freedom period of
60 days prior to the expiration of its CBA, TUPAS filed an amended notice of
strike as a means of pressuring the company to extend, renew, or negotiate
a new CBA with it. The NEW ULO (composed mostly of workers belonging to
the INC sect) registered as a labor union. TUPAS staged a strike ROBINA
obtained an injunction against the strike, resulting in an agreement to return
to work and for the parties to negotiate a new CBA. The NEW ULO filed a
petition for a certification election at the BLR
TUPAS moved to dismiss the petition
- for being defective in form and
- the members of the NEW ULO were mostly members of INC sect which 3
yrs previous refused to affiliate with any labor union
- accused company of using the NEW ULO to defeat TUPAS’ bargaining rights
Med-Arbiter ordered the holding of a certification election with 20 days,
TUPAS appealed to BLR; In the meantime, it was able to negotiate a new 3-
yr CBA with ROBINA, which was signed on December 3, 1987 and to expire
on November 15, 1990. BLR Director Calleja dismissed the appeal. TUPAS’
MR was denied. Hence, this petition alleging that BLR acted in excess of her
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in affirming the Med-Arbiter’s
order for a certification election
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the formation of NEW ULO as a labor union was proper
2. Whether or not the petition filed by TUPAS was proper
RULING:
1. YES, because This Court's decision in Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope
Workers' Union, upholding the right of members of the IGLESIA NI KRISTO
sect not to join a labor union for being contrary to their religious beliefs, does
not bar the members of that sect from forming their own union. The public
respondent correctly observed that the "recognition of the tenets of the sect
... should not infringe on the basic right of self-organization granted by the
constitution to workers, regardless of religious affiliation."
2. YES, because the fact that TUPAS was able to negotiate a new CBA with
ROBINA within the 60-day freedom period of the existing CBA, does not
foreclose the right of the rival union, NEW ULO, to challenge TUPAS' claim to
majority status, by filing a timely petition for certification election on
October 13, 1987 before TUPAS' old CBA expired on November 15, 1987 and
before it signed a new CBA with the company on December 3, 1987. As
pointed out by Med-Arbiter Abdullah, a "certification election is the best
forum in ascertaining the majority status of the contending unions wherein
the workers themselves can freely choose their bargaining representative
thru secret ballot." Since it has not been shown that this order is tainted with
unfairness, this Court will not thwart the holding of a certification election
DISPOSITIVE: TUPAS won.
DOCTRINE: Upholding the right of members of the IGLESIA NI KRISTO sect
not to join a labor union for being contrary to their religious beliefs, does not
bar the members of that sect from forming their own union. The "recognition
of the tenets of the sect ... should not infringe on the basic right of self-
organization granted by the constitution to workers, regardless of religious
affiliation." A "certification election is the best forum in ascertaining the
majority status of the contending unions wherein the workers themselves
can freely choose their bargaining representative thru secret ballot."
74. UST FACULTY UNION VS. BITONIO
G.R. No. 131235
FACTS: Private Responednts are duly elected officers of the UST Faculty
Union (USTFU). The union has a subsisting five-year CBA with UST. The
petitioners on the other hand, questioned before the Med-Arbiter, that the
COMELEC was not constituted in accordance with USTFU’s constitution and
by-laws (CBL) and that no rules had been issued to govern the conduct of the
05 October 1996 election. Med-Arbiter issued a TRO enjoining the conduct
of elections. However, a general faculty assembly was held as scheduled. The
general assembly was attended by members of the USTFU and, as admitted
by the appellants, also by “non-USTFU members [who] are members in good
standing of the UST Academic Community Collective Bargaining Unit”. On
this occasion, appellants were elected as USTFU’s new set of officers by
acclamation and clapping of hands. On 03 December 1996, appellants and
UST allegedly entered into another CBA covering the period from 01 June
1996 to 31 May 2001. Said CBA was ratified by a majority of the UST faculty
community.
ISSUE: WON the election of the officers in this case was valid
HELD: NO. The importance of a union’s constitution and bylaws cannot be
overemphasized. They embody a covenant between a union and its
members and constitute the fundamental law governing the members’ rights
and obligations. As such, the union’s constitution and bylaws should be
upheld, as long as they are not contrary to law, good morals or public policy.
A union election is held pursuant to the union’s constitution and bylaws, and
the right to vote in it is enjoyed only by union members. A union election
should be distinguished from a certification election, which is the process of
determining, through secret ballot, the sole and exclusive bargaining agent
of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, for purposes of
collective bargaining. Specifically, the purpose of a certification election is to
ascertain whether or not a majority of the employees wish to be represented
by a labor organization and, in the affirmative case, by which particular labor
organization. In a certification election, all employees belonging to the
appropriate bargaining unit can vote. Therefore, a union member who
likewise belongs to the appropriate bargaining unit is entitled to vote in said
election. However, the reverse is not always true; an employee belonging to
the appropriate bargaining unit but who is not a member of the union cannot
vote in the union election, unless otherwise authorized by the constitution
and bylaws of the union. Verily, union affairs and elections cannot be decided
in a non-union activity.
In both elections, there are procedures to be followed. Thus, the October 4,
1996 election cannot properly be called a union election, because the
procedure laid down in the USTFU’s CBL for the election of officers was not
followed. It could not have been a certification election either, because
representation was not the issue, and the proper procedure for such election
was not followed. The participation of non-union members in the election
aggravated its irregularity.
75. TROPICAL HUT EMPLOYEES’ UNION-CGW et al vs.TROPICAL HUT
FACTS: The rank and file workers of the Tropical Hut Food Market
Incorporated (respondent company) organized a local union called the
Tropical Hut Employees Union (THEU) and immediately sought affiliation
with the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU). The NATU accepted
the THEU application for affiliation. The CBA between respondent company
and THEU-NATU contains a union security clause:
xx
Union Membership and Union Check-off
Sec. 1 —. . . Employees who are already members of the UNION at the time
of the signing of this Agreement or who become so thereafter shall be
required to maintain their membership therein as a condition of continued
employment.
Xx
Attached to the Agreement is a check-off Authorization Form, the terms of
which are as follows:
We, the undersigned, hereby designate the NATU, of which the THEU is an
affiliate as sole collective bargaining agent in all matters relating to salary
rates, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment in the
Tropical Hut Food Market, Inc…xx
Later on, NATU received a letter jointly signed by the incumbent officers of
the local union informing the NATU that THEU was disaffiliating from the
NATU federation. The employees were dismissed because, as respondent
company contended, they violated the union security clause.
ISSUE: Was the disaffiliation of the local union from the national federation
valid?
HELD: YES. The right of a local union to disaffiliate from its mother federation
is well-settled. A local union, being a separate and voluntary association, is
free to serve the interest of all its members including the freedom to
disaffiliate when circumstances warrant. This right is consistent with the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of association. The inclusion of the word
NATU after the name of the local union THEU in the registration with the
Department of Labor is merely to stress that the THEU is NATU’s affiliate at
the time of the registration. It does not mean that the said local union cannot
stand on its own. Neither can it be interpreted to mean that it cannot pursue
its own interests independently of the federation. A local union owes its
creation and continued existence to the will of its members and not to the
federation to which it belongs. Further, there is no merit in the contention
of the respondents that the act of disaffiliation violated the union security
clause of the CBA and that their dismissal as a consequence thereof is valid.
A perusal of the CBAs shows that the THEU-NATU, and not the NATU
federation, was recognized as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining
agent for all its workers and employees in all matters concerning wages,
hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment. Although
NATU was designated as the sole bargaining agent in the check-off
authorization form attached to the CBA, this simply means it was acting only
for and in behalf of its affiliate. The NATU possessed the status of an agent
while the local union remained the basic principal union which entered into
contract with the respondent company. When the THEU disaffiliated from its
mother federation, the former did not lose its legal personality as the
bargaining union under the CBA. Moreover, the union security clause
embodied in the agreements cannot be used to justify the dismissals meted
to petitioners since it is not applicable to the circumstances obtaining in this
case. The CBA imposes dismissal only in case an employee is expelled from
the union for joining another federation or for forming another union or who
fails or refuses to maintain membership therein. The case at bar does not
involve the withdrawal of merely some employees from the union but of the
whole THEU itself from its federation. Clearly, since there is no violation of
the union security provision in the CBA, there was no sufficient ground to
terminate the employment of petitioners.
76. Philippine Skylanders vs NLRC
GR 127374
Facts: In November 1993 the Philippine Skylanders Employees Association
(PSEA), a local labor union affiliated with the Philippine Association of Free
Labor Unions (PAFLU), won in the certification election conducted among the
rank and file employees of Philippine Skylanders, Inc. (PSI). Its rival union,
Philippine Skylanders Employees Association-WATU (PSEA-WATU)
immediately protested the result of the election before the Secretary of
Labor. Several months later, PSEA sent PAFLU a notice of disaffiliation. PSEA
subsequently affiliated itself with the National Congress of Workers (NCW),
changed its name to Philippine Skylanders Employees Association – National
Congress of Workers (PSEA-NCW), and to maintain continuity within the
organization, allowed the former officers of PSEA-PAFLU to continue
occupying their positions as elected officers in the newly-formed PSEA-NCW.
On 17 March 1994 PSEA-NCW entered into a collective bargaining
agreement with PSI which was immediately registered with the Department
of Labor and Employment. Meanwhile, apparently oblivious to PSEA’s shift
of allegiance, PAFLU Secretary General Serafin Ayroso wrote Mariles C.
Romulo requesting a copy of PSI’s audited financial statement. On 30 July
1994 PSI through its personnel manager Francisco Dakila denied the request
citing as reason PSEA’s disaffiliation from PAFLU and its subsequent
affiliation with NCW.
Issue: WON PSEA’s disaffiliation is legitimate.
Held: At the outset, let it be noted that the issue of disaffiliation is an inter-
union conflict the jurisdiction of which properly lies with the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR) and not with the Labor Arbiter. We upheld the right of local
unions to separate from their mother federation on the ground that as
separate and voluntary associations, local unions do not owe their creation
and existence to the national federation to which they are affiliated but,
instead, to the will of their members. Yet the local unions remain the basic
units of association, free to serve their own interests subject to the restraints
imposed by the constitution and by-laws of the national federation, and free
also to renounce the affiliation upon the terms laid down in the agreement
which brought such affiliation into existence. There is nothing shown in the
records nor is it claimed by PAFLU that the local union was expressly
forbidden to disaffiliate from the federation nor were there any conditions
imposed for a valid breakaway. As such, the pendency of an election protest
involving both the mother federation and the local union did not constitute
a bar to a valid disaffiliation. It was entirely reasonable then for PSI to enter
into a collective bargaining agreement with PSEA-NCW. As PSEA had validly
severed itself from PAFLU, there would be no restrictions which could validly
hinder it from subsequently affiliating with NCW and entering into a
collective bargaining agreement in behalf of its members. Policy
considerations dictate that in weighing the claims of a local union as against
those of a national federation, those of the former must be preferred.
Parenthetically though, the desires of the mother federation to protect its
locals are not altogether to be shunned. It will however be to err greatly
against the Constitution if the desires of the federation would be favored
over those of its members. That, at any rate, is the policy of the law. For if it
were otherwise, instead of protection, there would be disregard and neglect
of the lowly workingmen.
78. UNITED PEPSI-COLA VS. LAGUESMA
G.R. No. 122226
FACTS: Petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It appears that on
March 20, 1995 the union filed a petition for certification election on behalf
of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. However, its
petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment, on the ground that the route managers are
managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible for union membership
under the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, which provides:
Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of
supervisory employees. — Managerial employees are not eligible to join,
assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be
eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file
employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their
own.
Petitioner brought this suit challenging the validity of the order, dismissed.
Hence, this petition. Pressing for resolution its contention that the first
sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, so far as it declares managerial
employees to be ineligible to form, assist or join unions, contravenes Art. III,
§8 of the Constitution which provides: The right of the people, including
those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.
ISSUES:
(1) whether the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. are
managerial employees and
(2) whether Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial employees from
forming, joining or assisting labor unions, violates Art. III, §8 of the
Constitution.
HELD: YES and NO. As a class, managers constitute three levels of a pyramid:
(1) Top management; (2) Middle Management; and (3) First-line
Management [also called supervisors].
FIRST-LINE MANAGERS — The lowest level in an organization at which
individuals are responsible for the work of others is called first-line or first-
level management. First-line managers direct operating employees only;
they do not supervise other managers. Examples of first-line managers are
the “foreman” or production supervisor in a manufacturing plant, the
technical supervisor in a research department, and the clerical supervisor in
a large office. First-level managers are often called supervisors.
MIDDLE MANAGERS — The term middle management can refer to more than
one level in an organization. Middle managers direct the activities of other
managers and sometimes also those of operating employees. Middle
managers’ principal responsibilities are to direct the activities that
implement their organizations’ policies and to balance the demands of their
superiors with the capacities of their subordinates. A plant manager in an
electronics firm is an example of a middle manager.
TOP MANAGERS — Composed of a comparatively small group of executives,
top management is responsible for the overall management of the
organization. It establishes operating policies and guides the organization’s
interactions with its environment. Typical titles of top managers are “chief
executive officer,” “president,” and “senior vice-president.” Actual titles vary
from one organization to another and are not always a reliable guide to
membership in the highest management classification.
A distinction exists between those who have the authority to devise,
implement and control strategic and operational policies (top and middle
managers) and those whose task is simply to ensure that such policies are
carried out by the rank-and-file employees of an organization (first-level
managers/supervisors). What distinguishes them from the rank-and-file
employees is that they act in the interest of the employer in supervising such
rank-and-file employees.
“Managerial employees” may therefore be said to fall into two distinct
categories: the “managers” per se, who compose the former group
described above, and the “supervisors” who form the latter group.
#1: It appears that this question was the subject of two previous
determinations by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, in accordance
with which this case was decided by the med-arbiter.
To qualify as managerial employee, there must be a clear showing of the
exercise of managerial attributes under paragraph (m), Article 212 of the
Labor Code as amended. Designations or titles of positions are not
controlling. As to the route managers and accounting manager, we are
convinced that they are managerial employees. Their job descriptions clearly
reveal so (Worker’s Alliance Trade Union (WATU) v. Pepsi-Cola Products
Philippines, Inc., Nov. 13, 1991)
This finding was reiterated in Case No. OS-A-3-71-92. entitled In Re: Petition
for Direct Certification and/or Certification Election-Route
Managers/Supervisory Employees of Pepsi-Cola Products Phils.Inc.
* doctrine of res judicata certainly applies to adversary administrative
proceedings
Thus, we have in this case an expert’s view that the employees concerned
are managerial employees within the purview of Art. 212.
At the very least, the principle of finality of administrative determination
compels respect for the finding of the Secretary of Labor that route
managers are managerial employees as defined by law in the absence of
anything to show that such determination is without substantial evidence to
support it.
The Court now finds that the job evaluation made by the Secretary of Labor
is indeed supported by substantial evidence. The nature of the job of route
managers is given in a four-page pamphlet, prepared by the company, called
“Route Manager Position Description,” the pertinent parts of which read:
A. BASIC PURPOSE
A Manager achieves objectives through others.
As a Route Manager, your purpose is to meet the sales plan; and you achieve
this objective through the skillful MANAGEMENT OF YOUR JOB AND THE
MANAGEMENT OF YOUR PEOPLE.
These then are your functions as Pepsi-Cola Route Manager. Within these
functions — managing your job and managing your people — you are
accountable to your District Manager for the execution and completion of
various tasks and activities which will make it possible for you to achieve your
sales objectives.
Xxxx
Distinction is evident in the work of the route managers which sets them
apart from supervisors in general. Unlike supervisors who basically merely
direct operating employees in line with set tasks assigned to them, route
managers are responsible for the success of the company’s main line of
business through management of their respective sales teams. Such
management necessarily involves the planning, direction, operation and
evaluation of their individual teams and areas which the work of supervisors
does not entail.
The route managers cannot thus possibly be classified as mere supervisors
because their work does not only involve, but goes far beyond, the simple
direction or supervision of operating employees to accomplish objectives set
by those above them.
While route managers do not appear to have the power to hire and fire
people (the evidence shows that they only “recommended” or “endorsed”
the taking of disciplinary action against certain employees), this is because
thisis a function of the Human Resources or Personnel Department of the
company.
# 2: Constitutionality of Art. 245
Art.245 is the result of the amendment of the Labor Code in 1989 by R.A. No.
6715, otherwise known as the Herrera-Veloso Law. Unlike the Industrial
Peace Act or the provisions of the Labor Code which it superseded, R.A. No.
6715 provides separate definitions of the terms “managerial” and
“supervisory employees,” as follows:
Art. 212. Definitions. . . .
(m) “managerial employee” is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives
to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees.
Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer,
effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such
authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of
independent judgment. All employees not falling within any of the above
definitions are considered rank-and-file employees for purposes of this Book.
The distinction between top and middle managers, who set management
policy, and front-line supervisors, who are merely responsible for ensuring
that such policies are carried out by the rank and file, is articulated in the
present definition. 30 When read in relation to this definition in Art. 212(m),
it will be seen that Art. 245 faithfully carries out the intent of the
Constitutional Commission in framing Art. III, §8 of the fundamental law.
*Framer’s Intent: MR. LERUM. My amendment is on Section 7, page 2, line
19, which is to insert between the words “people” and “to” the following:
WHETHER EMPLOYED BY THE STATE OR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS. In other
words, the section will now read as follows: “The right of the people
WHETHER EMPLOYED BY THE STATE OR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS to form
associations, unions, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not
be abridged.”
Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, §8 infringed by a ban
against managerial employees forming a union. The right guaranteed in Art.
III, §8 is subject to the condition that its exercise should be for purposes “not
contrary to law.” In the case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for
prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining labor
organizations.
PETITION is DISMISSED.
79. NATU v Republic
G. R. No. 93468
Facts: Petitioner NATU filed a petition for certification election to determine
the exclusive bargaining agent of its supervisory employees. The bank
(Private respondent) moved to dismiss the petition alleging that the
supervisory employees are actually managerial employees hence prohibited
from joining unions. The Med Arbiter granted the petition but the decision
was modified by the Sec. of Labor on the ground that the ff employees are
deemed as managerial and/or confidential employees and are therefore
ineligible to join or form labor unions (Dept. Managers, Asst. Managers,
branch Cashiers and Controllers).
ISSUE: W/N the Department Managers, Assistant Managers, Branch
Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers of respondent Bank are managerial
and/or confidential employees hence ineligible to join or assist the union of
petitioner.
RULING: The subject employees are supervisory and not managerial. As
provided under 212 of the Philippine Labor Code, a Managerial employee is;
a) One vested with power to lay down and execute management policies,
or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or
discipline employees, and
b) One vested with both the power or prerogative.
Like Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers, Department Managers do
not possess the power to lay down policies nor to hire, transfer, suspend, lay
off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. They occupy
supervisory positions, charged with the duty among others to "recommend
proposals to improve and streamline operations. On one hand, a confidential
employee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or with the
custody, handling, or care and protection of the employer's property.
Therefore only the Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers of
respondent bank who are deemed as confidential employees are ineligible
to join or assist petitioner NATU-Republic Planters Bank Supervisors Chapter,
or join, assist or form any other labor organization
Doctrine of Necessary Implication
The disqualification of managerial employees from joining a union is due to
the evident conflict of interest as they are supposed to be on the side of the
management. As to confidential employees, their disqualification is due to
the undue advantage they possess. Branch managers/Cashiers/Controllers
are all considered confidential employees and hence disqualified from
joining a labor organization. Do note that this is not applicable to all banks
in general.
80. SAN MIGUEL UNION VS. LAGUESMA
G.R. No. 110399
FACTS: Petitioner union filed before DOLE a Petition for Direct Certification
or Certification Election among the supervisors and exempt employees of the
SMC Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.
Med-Arbiter Danilo L. Reynante issued an Order ordering the conduct of
certification election among the abovementioned employees of the different
plants as one bargaining unit. San Miguel Corporation filed a Notice of
Appeal with Memorandum on Appeal, pointing out, among others, the Med-
Arbiter’s error in grouping together all three (3) separate plants, into one
bargaining unit, and in including supervisory levels 3 and above whose
positions are confidential in nature. The public respondent, Undersecretary
Laguesma, granted respondent company’s Appeal and ordered the remand
of the case to the Med-Arbiter of origin for determination of the true
classification of each of the employees sought to be included in the
appropriate bargaining unit. Upon petitioner-union’s motion,
Undersecretary Laguesma granted the reconsideration prayed for and
directed the conduct of separate certification elections among the
supervisors ranked as supervisory levels 1 to 4 (S1 to S4) and the exempt
employees in each of the three plants at Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees of the
company are considered confidential employees, hence ineligible from
joining a union.
2. If they are not confidential employees, do the employees of the three
plants constitute an appropriate single bargaining unit.
RULING:
(1) On the first issue, this Court rules that said employees do not fall within
the term “confidential employees” who may be prohibited from joining a
union. They are not qualified to be classified as managerial employees who,
under Article 245 of the Labor Code, are not eligible to join, assist or form
any labor organization. In the very same provision, they are not allowed
membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may
join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own. Confidential
employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, (2) to
persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in
the field of labor relations. The two criteria are cumulative, and both must
be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee — that is,
the confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his
supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the prescribed responsibilities
relating to labor relations. The exclusion from bargaining units of employees
who, in the normal course of their duties, become aware of management
policies relating to labor relations is a principal objective sought to be
accomplished by the ”confidential employee rule.” The broad rationale
behind this rule is that employees should not be placed in a position involving
a potential conflict of interests. “Management should not be required to
handle labor relations matters through employees who are represented by
the union with which the company is required to deal and who in the normal
performance of their duties may obtain advance information of the
company’s position with regard to contract negotiations, the disposition of
grievances, or other labor relations matters.” The Court held that “if these
managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the
latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident
conflict of interest. The Union can also become company-dominated with
the presence of managerial employees in Union membership.” An important
element of the “confidential employee rule” is the employee’s need to use
labor relations information. Thus, in determining the confidentiality of
certain employees, a key question frequently considered is the employee’s
necessary access to confidential labor relations information.
(2) The fact that the three plants are located in three different places,
namely, in Cabuyao, Laguna, in Otis, Pandacan, Metro Manila, and in San
Fernando, Pampanga is immaterial. Geographical location can be completely
disregarded if the communal or mutual interests of the employees are not
sacrificed. An appropriate bargaining unit may be defined as “a group of
employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire
body of employees, which the collective interest of all the employees,
consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve
the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law.” A unit to be appropriate must effect a grouping of
employees who have substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours, working
conditions and other subjects of collective bargaining.
81. COOPERATIVE RURAL BANK OF DAVAO CITY, INC. vs. FERRER-CALLEJA
165 SCRA 725 September 26, 1988
FACTS: Petitioner Cooperative Rural bank of Davao City, Inc. is a cooperative
banking corporation operating in Davao City, partly-owned by the
Government and its employees are members and co-owners of the same.
The petitioner has around 16 rank-and-file employees. On the other hand,
private respondent Federation of Free Workers is a labor organization
registered with the DOLE which expressed its interest in representing the
said employees for purposes of collective bargaining. Private respondent
filed with the Davao City Regional Office a verified petition for certification
election among the rank-and-file employees of the cooperative which was
subsequently granted. However, petitioner filed an appeal and insisted that
its employees are disqualified from forming labor organizations for purposes
of collective bargaining. Bureau of Labor Relations Director Pura Ferrer-
Calleja dismissed petitioner’s appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the employees of a cooperative who are non-member
thereof can organize themselves for purposes of collective bargaining
HELD: YES An employee therefore of such a cooperative who is a member
and co-owner thereof cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining for
certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners. In the
opinion of August 14, 1981 of the Solicitor General he correctly opined that
employees of cooperatives who are themselves members of the cooperative
have no right to form or join labor organizations for purposes of collective
bargaining for being themselves co-owners of the cooperative. However, in
so far as it involves cooperatives with employees who are not members or
co-owners thereof, certainly such employees are entitled to exercise the
rights of all workers to organization, collective bargaining, negotiations and
others as are enshrined in the Constitution and existing laws of the country.
NOTES: COOPERATIVE- organizations composed primarily of small producers
and of consumers who voluntarily join together to form business enterprises
which they themselves own, control and patronize.(Section 2, PD !75)
PRINCIPLES GOVERNING COOPERATIVES 1.Open Membership- voluntary and
without restriction or discrimination 2.Democratic Control- one member,
one vote 3.Limited interests to capital- maximum rate is fixed by DOLE and
Community Development 4.Patronage refund- net income is distributed in
proportion to their patronage
82. Arizala v. CA
Facts: Government Service Insurance System became bound by a CBA
executed between it and the labor organization representing the majority of
its employees, the GSIS Employees Association. The agreement contained a
"maintenance-of-membership" clause, i.e., that all employees who, at the
time of the execution of said agreement, were members of the union or
became members thereafter, were obliged to maintain their union
membership in good standing for the duration of the agreement as a
condition for their continued employment in the GSIS. The Petitioners
occupied supervisory positions in the GSIS. Pablo Arizala and Sergio Maribao
were, respectively, the Chief of the Accounting Division, and the Chief of the
Billing Section of said Division, in the Central Visayas Regional Office of the
GSIS. Leonardo Joven and Felino Bulandus were, respectively, the Assistant
Chief of the Accounting Division (sometimes Acting Chief in the absence of
the Chief) and the Assistant Chief of the Field Service and Non-Life Insurance
Division (and Acting Division Chief in the absence of the Chief), of the same
Central Visayas Regional Office of the GSIS. Demands were made on all four
of them to resign from the GSIS Employees Association, in view of their
supervisory positions. They refused to do so. 2 criminal cases for violation of
the Industrial Peace Act were lodged against them in the City Court of Cebu:
one involving Arizala and Maribao and the other, Joven and Bulandus. Both
criminal actions resulted in the conviction of the accused in separate
decisions. They were each sentenced "to pay a fine of P 500.00 or to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency." They appealed to the CA. The
appeals were consolidated on motion of the appellants, and eventuated in a
judgment affirming the convictions of all four appellants. The appellants
moved for reconsideration which the Appellate Court denied.
Issue: Can the petitioners' criminal liability for a violation of the Industrial
Peace Act may be deemed to have been obliterated in virtue of subsequent
legislation and the provisions of the 1973 and 1987 Constitution.
Held: Supervisors who were already members of a rank-and-file labor
organization at the time of the effectivity of R.A. No. 6715, are authorized to
"remain therein." The maintenance by supervisors of membership in a rank-
and-file labor organization even after the enactment of a statute imposing a
prohibition on such membership, is not only not a crime, but is explicitly
allowed, under present law.
83. SSS Employee Asso. v CA
175 SCRA 686 (July 28, 1989)
Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the
union’s demands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed
before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a
temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for
preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the
court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that
the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter
since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations
Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one
hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and
regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or
DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.
Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike
Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social
Justice provides guarantee among workers with the right to organize and
conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section
14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and rules governing
concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,
subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress” referring to
Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which
states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws
concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from
staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of
mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public
service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing govt.
employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so. In Sec. 1 of E.O. No.
180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as “government
employees” and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation
with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its
employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service
Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes. Neither the DOLE nor the
NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public
Sector Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority to
issue writ of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort
of SSS before the general court for the issuance of a writ of injunction to
enjoin the strike is appropriate.
 85. Philippine Phospate Fertilizer Co. v Torres
231 SCRA 335 (1994)
Facts: Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with the
Department of Labor and Employment a petition for certification election
among the supervisory employees of petitioner, alleging that as a
supervisory union duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment it was seeking to represent the supervisory employees of
Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation. Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S.
Milado issued an order directing the holding of a certification election among
the supervisory employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom the
superintendents and the professional and technical employees. However,
the PMPI filed an amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it
sought to represent not only the supervisory employees of petitioner but
also its professional/technical and confidential employees. The parties
therein agreed to submit their respective position papers and to consider the
amended petition submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related
documents. Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order granting the petition
and directing the holding of a certification election among the "supervisory,
professional (engineers, analysts, mechanics, accountants, nurses, midwives,
etc.), technical, and confidential employees. PHILPHOS appealed the order
to the Secretary of Labor and Employment who rendered a decision through
Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma dismissing the appeal. PHILPHOS
moved for reconsideration but the same was denied; hence, the instant
petition alleging denial of due process on the part of the DOLE to which the
mediator-arbiter was under.
Issue: Whether or Not there was denial of due process.
Held: There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of petitioner PHILPHOS
agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider
the case submitted for decision on the basis of the position papers filed by
the parties, there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due
process, as petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to present its
side. Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing
to confront and examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did not;
instead it opted to submit its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter.
Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its
appeal to the Secretary of Labor.
86. DOLORES VILLAR vs.THE HON. AMADO G. INCIONG
G.R. No. L-50283-84, 20 April 1983
FACTS: The petitioners, who are the disaffiliating union members insist that
their disaffiliation from PAFLU and filing a petition for certification election
are not acts of disloyalty but an exercise of their right to self-organization.
The contention was that these acts were done within the 60-day freedom
period when questions of representation may freely be raised.
ISSUE: Whether or not the disaffiliation from its mother union is justified
considering it was done during the freedom period.
RULING: No, it must be supported by the majority of the union members. In
the first place, had petitioners merely disaffiliated from the. Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU, there could be no legal objections thereto for it
was their right to do so. But what petitioners did by the very clear terms of
their “Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan” was to disaffiliate the Amigo Employees
Union-PAFLU from PAFLU, an act which they could not have done with any
effective consequence because they constituted the minority in the Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU. Extant from the records is the fact that petitioners
numbering ten (10), were among the ninety-six (96) who signed the “Sama-
Samang Kapasiyahan” whereas there are two hundred thirty four (234) union
members in the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU. Hence, petitioners
constituted a small minority for which reason they could not have
successfully disaffiliated the local union from PAFLU. Since only 96 wanted
disaffiliation, it can be inferred that the majority wanted the union to remain
an affiliate of PAFLU and this is not denied or disputed by petitioners. The
action of the majority must, therefore, prevail over that of the minority
members.
87. PAFLU VS. SECRETARY OF LABOR
G.R. No. L-22228
FACTS: The Registration of Labor Organization (Registrar) rendered a
decision cancelling the SSSEA’s Registration Certificate No. 1-IP169 for failure
to submit the following:
1. Failure to furnish the Bureau of Labor Relations with copies of the reports
on the finances of that union duly verified by affidavits which its treasurer or
treasurers rendered to said union and its members covering the periods from
September 24, 1960 to September 23, 1961 and September 24, 1961 to
September 23, 1962, inclusive, within sixty days of the 2 respective latter
dates, which are the end of its fiscal year; and
2. Failure to submit to this office the names, postal addresses and non-
subversive affidavits of the officers of that union within sixty days of their
election in October (1st Sunday), 1961 and 1963, in conformity with Article
IV (1) of its constitution and by-laws.
On the following day, Manuel Villagracia, Assistant Secretary of the SSSEA
filed with the Office of the Registrar, a letter enclosing documents that
supposed to comply with the abovementioned requirements, but the
Registrar found out that the following are still not complied with:
1. Non-subversive affidavits of Messrs. Teodoro Sison, Alfonso Atienza,
Rodolfo Zalameda, Raymundo Sabino and Napoleon Pefianco who were
elected along with others on January 30, 1962.
2. Names, postal addresses and non-subversive affidavits of all the officers
who were supposedly elected on October (1st Sunday), of its constitution
and by-laws.
Alfredo Fajardo, president of the SSSEA moved for a reconsideration of said
decision and prayed for time, up to November 15, within which to submit the
requisite papers and data. An opposition thereto having been filed by one
Paulino Escueta, a member of the SSSEA, upon the ground that the latter had
never submitted any financial statement to its members, said motion was
heard on November 27, 1963. Subsequently, or on December 4, 1963, the
Registrar issued an order declaring that the SSSEA had “failed to submit the
abovementioned requirements and granting the SSSEA 15 days from notice
to comply with said requirements, as well as meanwhile holding in abeyance
the resolution of its motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the effect of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 (“Any
labor organization, association or union of workers duly organized for the
material, intellectual and moral well being of its members shall acquire legal
personality and be entitled to all the rights and privileges granted by law to
legitimate labor organizations within thirty days of filing with the office of
the Secretary of Labor notice of its due organization and existence and the
following documents, together with the amount of five pesos as registration
fee, except as provided in paragraph “d” of this section:”) unduly curtails the
freedom of assembly and association guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.
RULING: There is no incompatibility between Republic Act No. 875 and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Upon the other hand, the
cancellation of the SSSEA’s registration certificate would not entail a
dissolution of said association or its suspension. The existence of the SSSEA
would not be affected by said cancellation, although its juridical personality
and its statutory rights and privileges — as distinguished from those
conferred by the Constitution — would be suspended thereby.
To be registered, pursuant to Section 23(b) of Republic Act No. 875, a labor
organization, association or union of workers must file with the Department
of Labor the following documents:
(1) A copy of the constitution and by-laws of the organization together with
a list of all officers of the association, their addresses and the address of the
principal office of the organization;
(2) A sworn statement of all the officers of the said organization, association
or union to the effect that they are not members of the Communist Party
and that they are not members of any organization which teaches the
overthrow of the Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional
method; and
(3) If the applicant organization has been in existence for one or more years,
a copy of its last annual financial report.
Moreover, paragraph (d) of said-Section ordains that:
The registration and permit of a legitimate labor organization shall be
cancelled by the Department of Labor, if the Department has reason to
believe that the labor organization no longer meets one or more of the
requirements of paragraph (b) above; or fails to file with the Department
Labor either its financial report within the sixty days of the end of its fiscal
year or the names of its new officers along with their non-subversive
affidavits as outlined in paragraph (b) above within sixty days of their
election; however, the Department of Labor shall not order the cancellation
of the registration and permit without due notice and hearing, as provided
under paragraph (c) above and the affected labor organization shall have the
same right of appeal to the courts as previously provided.
89. UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN FACULTY UNION vs. UNIVERSITY OF
PANGASINAN And NLRC DIGEST
GRN L-63122 February 20, 1984
FACTS: Petitioner is a labor union composed of faculty members of the
respondent University of Pangasinan, an educational institution duly
organized and existing by virtue of the laws of the Philippines. The petitioner
filed a complaint against the private respondent with the Arbitration Branch
of the NLRC- Dagupan City seeking: (a) the payment of Emergency Cost of
Living Allowances (ECOLA) for November 7 to December 5, 1981, a semestral
break; (b) salary increases from the 60% of the incremental proceeds of
increased tuition fees; and (c) payment of salaries for suspended extra loads.
The petitioner’s members are full-time professors, instructors, and teachers
of respondent University. The teachers in the college level teach for a normal
duration of 10 months a school year, divided into 2 semesters of 5 months
each, excluding the 2 months summer vacation. These teachers are paid their
salaries on a regular monthly basis. During the semestral break (Nov. 7- Dec.
5, 1981), they were not paid their ECOLA. The private respondent claims that
the teachers are not entitled thereto because the semestral break is not an
integral part of the school year and there being no actual services rendered
by the teachers during said period, the principle of “No work, no pay”
applies. During the same school year (1981-1982), the private respondent
was authorized by the Ministry of Education and Culture to collect, from its
students a 15% increase of tuition fees. Petitioner’s members demanded a
salary increase effective the first semester of said schoolyear to be taken
from the 60% percent incremental proceeds of the said increased tuition fees
as mandated by the PD 451. Private respondent refused.
ISSUES:
WON PETITIONER’S MEMBERS ARE ENTITLED TO ECOLA DURING THE
SEMESTRAL BREAK FROM NOV. 7 – DEC. 5, 1981 OF THE 1981-82 SCHOOL
YEAR.
WON 60% OF THE INCREMENTAL PROCEEDS OF INCREASED TUITION FEES
SHALL BE DEVOTED EXCLUSIVELY TO SALARY INCREASE
RULING: Yes. According to various Presidential Decrees on ECOLAs
“Allowances of Fulltime Employees . . .” that “Employees shall be paid in full
the required monthly allowance regardless of the number of their regular
working days if they incur no absences during the month. If they incur
absences without pay, the amounts corresponding to the absences may be
deducted from the monthly allowance . . .”; and on “Leave of Absence
Without Pay”, that “All covered employees shall be entitled to the allowance
provided herein when they are on leave of absence with pay.”
The petitioner’s members are full-time employees receiving their monthly
salaries irrespective of the number of working days or teaching hours in a
month. However, they find themselves in a situation where they are forced
to go on leave during semestral breaks. These semestral breaks are in the
nature of work interruptions beyond the employees’ control. As such, these
breaks cannot be considered as absences within the meaning of the law for
which deductions may be made from monthly allowances. The “No work, no
pay” principle does not apply in the instant case. The petitioner’s members
received their regular salaries during this period. It is clear from the provision
of law that it contemplates a “no work” situation where the employees
voluntarily absent themselves. Petitioners, in the case at bar, do not
voluntarily absent themselves during semestral breaks. Rather, they are
constrained to take mandatory leave from work. For this they cannot be
faulted nor can they be begrudged that which is due them under the law.
The intention of the law is to grant ECOLA upon the payment of basic wages.
Hence, we have the principle of “No pay, no ECOLA” the converse of which
finds application in the case at bar. Petitioners cannot be considered to be
on leave without pay so as not to be entitled to ECOLA, for, as earlier stated,
the petitioners were paid their wages in full for the months of November and
December of 1981, notwithstanding the intervening semestral break.
Although said to be on forced leave, professors and teachers are,
nevertheless, burdened with the task of working during a period of time
supposedly available for rest and private matters. There are papers to
correct, students to evaluate, deadlines to meet, and periods within which
to submit grading reports. Although they may be considered by the
respondent to be on leave, the semestal break could not be used effectively
for the teacher’s own purposes for the nature of a teacher’s job imposes
upon him further duties which must be done during the said period of time.
Arduous preparation is necessary for the delicate task of educating our
children. Teaching involves not only an application of skill and an imparting
of knowledge, but a responsibility which entails self dedication and sacrifice.
It would be unfair for the private respondent to consider these teachers as
employees on leave without pay to suit its purposes and, yet, in the
meantime, continue availing of their services as they prepare for the next
semester or complete all of the last semester’s requirements.
Thus, the semestral break may also be considered as “hours worked.” For
this, the teachers are paid regular salaries and, for this, they should be
entitled to ECOLA. The purpose of the law is to augment the income of
employees to enable them to cope with the harsh living conditions brought
about by inflation; and to protect employees and their wages against the
ravages brought by these conditions
With regard to the second issue, under Section 3 of Presidential Decree 451,
“no increase in tuition or other school fees or charges shall be approved 60%
of the proceeds is allocated for increase in salaries or wages of the members
of the faculty and all other employees of the school concerned, and the
balance for institutional development, student assistance and extension
services, and return to investments: Provided, That in no case shall the return
to investments exceed twelve (12%) per centum of the incremental
proceeds; . . .”
Such allowances must be taken in resources of the school not derived from
tuition fees.
If the school happen to have no other resources to grant allowances and
benefits, either mandated by law or secured by collective bargaining, such
allowances and benefits should be charged against the return to investments
referred.
The law is clear. The 60% incremental proceeds from the tuition increase are
to be devoted entirely to wage or salary increases which means increases in
basic salary. The law cannot be construed to include allowances which are
benefits over and above the basic salaries of the employees. To charge such
benefits to the 60% incremental proceeds would be to reduce the increase
in basic salary provided by law.
Law provides that 60% of tuition fee increase should go to wage increases
and 40% to institutional developments, student assistance, extension
services, and return on investments. Framers of the law intended this portion
(return on investments) of the increases in tuition fees to be a general fund
to cover up for the university’s miscellaneous expenses.
Petition for certiorari is GRANTED.
90. MACTAN WORKERS UNION vs.DON RAMON ABOITIZ
[ G.R. No. L-30241 June 30, 1972]
FACTS: Defendant Cebu Shipyard & Engineering Works, Inc. in Lapulapu City
is employing laborers and employees belonging to two rival labor unions.
Seventy-two of these employees or laborers whose names appear in the
complaint are affiliated with the Mactan Workers Union while the rest are
members of the intervenor Associated Labor Union. On November 28, 1964,
the defendant Cebu Shipyard & Engineering Works, Inc. and the Associated
Labor Union entered into a ‘Collective Bargaining Agreement’ … the
pertinent part of which, Article XIII thereof, [reads thus]: ‘… The [Company]
agrees to give a profit-sharing bonus to its employees and laborers, to be
payable in two (2) installments, the first installment being payable in March
and the second installment in June, each year out of the profits in agreement.
Said profit-sharing bonus shall be paid by the [Company] to [Associated
Labor Union] to be delivered by the latter to the employees and laborers
concerned and it shall be the duty of the Associated Labor Union to furnish
and deliver to the [Company] the corresponding receipts duly signed by the
laborers and employees entitled to receive the profit-sharing bonus within a
period of sixty (60) days from the date of receipt by [it] from the [Company]
of the profit-sharing bonus. If a laborer or employee of the [Company] does
not want to accept the profit-sharing bonus which the said employee or
laborer is entitled under this Agreement, it shall be the duty of the
[Associated Labor Union] to return the money received by [it] as profit-
sharing bonus to the [Company] within a period of sixty (60) days from the
receipt by the [Union] from the [Company] of the said profit-sharing
bonus.'”Defendant Cebu Shipyard & Engineering Works, Inc. delivered to the
ALU for distribution to the laborers or employees working with the
defendant corporation to the profit-sharing bonus corresponding to the first
installment for the year 1965. Again in June 1965 the defendant corporation
delivered to the Associated Labor Union the profit-sharing bonus
corresponding to the second installment for 1965. The members of the
Mactan Workers Union failed to receive their shares in the second
installment of bonus because they did not like to go to the office of the ALU
to collect their shares. In accordance with the terms of the collective
bargaining after 60 days, the uncollected shares of the plaintiff union
members was returned by the ALU to the defendant corporation. Hence the
collection suit before the RTC.
HELD: Nevertheless, it is not to be forgotten that what is entitled to
constitutional protection is labor, or more specifically the working men and
women, not labor organizations. The latter are merely the instrumentalities
through which their welfare may be promoted and fostered. That is the
raison d’etre of labor unions. The utmost care should be taken then, lest in
displaying an unyielding, intransigent attitude on behalf of their members,
injustice be committed against opposing labor organizations. In the final
analysis, they alone are not the sole victims, but the labor movement itself,
which may well be the recipient of a crippling blow. Moreover, while it is
equally understandable that their counsel would take advantage of every
legal doctrine deemed applicable or conjure up any defense that could serve
their cause, still, as officers of the court, there should be an awareness that
resort to such a technique does result in clogged dockets, without the least
justification especially so if there be insistence on flimsy and insubstantial
contentions just to give some semblance of plausibility to their pleadings.
Certainly, technical virtuosity, or what passes for it, is no substitute for an
earnest and sincere desire to assure that there be justice according to law.
That is a creed to which all members of the legal profession, labor lawyers
not excluded, should do their best to live by.
91. University of the Philippines vs. Ferrer-Calleja
(G.R. No. 96189, 14 July 1992)
FACTS: The Organization of Non-Academic Personnel of UP (ONAPUP) filed a
petition for certification election with Bureau of Legal Relations (BLR). It
claimed to represent 33% of all the non-academic personnel of UP-Diliman,
Los Baños, Manila, and Visayas. The University made no objections thererto,
but the All UP Workers’ Union opposed the same and asked that the
appropriate organizational unistructure be first defined. It alleged that its
membership composed of both academic and non-academic rank-and-file
(RnF) employees (EEs) of UP. The University then made a comment on such
that there should indeed be 2 distinct unions, one for academic EEs and the
other for the non-academic EEs, considering their dichotomy of interests.
Director Calleja however declared that the appropriate bargaining unit
should comprise of both groups, stating that the intent of EO 180 was to not
fragmentalize the employer (ER) unit. The University also sought to exclude
from the bargaining unit EEs holding supervisory positions, alleging that
there still existed that held supervisory powers over her other EEs. Director
Calleja upheld her earlier ruling, interposing that the policy-making powers
contemplated in the case merely pertained to academic matters and not as
under the Labor Code. UP’s Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied,
hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON academic and non-academic EEs of UP should comprise a single
collective bargaining unit.
HELD: NO, although the country’s labor laws fail to provide a criterion for
determining the proper bargaining unit, even EO No. 180 only stated that the
appropriate organizational unit. A “bargaining unit” has been defined as a
group of employees, consistent with equity to the ER, cases have shown the
4 criterion to consider; (1) will of the employees; (2) affinity and unit of
employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or
similarity of compensation and working conditions; (3) prior collective
bargaining history; and (4) employment status, such as temporary, seasonal
probationary employees. Out of the four, it is the “community/mutuality of
interests” test that stands out the most. Applying the same, it's clear that the
acad and non-academic personnel’s respective interests contradict with
each other, and in effect, failed to satisfy the “community/mutuality of
interest test.” Contrarily, the 2 obviously share a dichotomy of interest or
dissimilarity in the work. Thus, the 2 separate and distinct bargaining units,
one unit is for academics and the other for non-academic unit personnel, is
essential to assure it to all the EEs the exercise of their collective bargaining
rights.
93. Golden Farms Inc vs Secretary of Labor
FACTS: Progressive Federation of Labor filed a petition before the Med-
Arbiter praying for holding of a certification election among the monthly paid
office and technical rank-and-file employees of Golden Farms. Golden Farms
moved to dismiss such petition on different grounds as opposed to by PFL,
saying that the monthly paid office and technical employees should be
allowed to form a separate bargaining unit because they were expressly
excluded from coverage in the CBA between Golden Farms and the National
Federation of Labor which represents the rank-and-file employees. Golden
Farms contended that the monthly paid office and technical employees
should have joined the existing Collective Bargaining Unit of the rank-and-
file employees if they are not managerial employees. Med-arbiter granted
PFL ‘s petition and ordered that a certification election be conducted to
which Golden Farms appealed to the Secretary of Labor
ISSUE: Whether or not there can be a separate bargaining unit for the
monthly-paid rank-and-file employees of Golden Farms
HELD: YES. The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s acceptability is
whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to
all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights. In this case,
the evidence established that the monthly paid rank-and-file employees of
Golden Farms primarily perform administrative or clerical work. In
contradistinction, the petitioner Golden Farms’ daily paid rank-and –file
employees mainly work in the cultivation of bananas in the field. It is crystal
clear that the monthly-paid and daily-paid employees of Golden Farms have
very little in common in terms of duties and obligation, working conditions,
salary rates, and skills. To be sure, said monthly paid rank-and-file employees
have even been excluded from the bargaining unit of daily paid rank-and-file
employees. This dissimilarity of interests warrants the formation of a
separate and distinct bargaining unit for the monthly-paid rank-and-file
employees of Golden Farms. To rule otherwise would deny this distinct class
of employees the right to self-organization for purposes of collective
bargaining.
94. Philtranco Service Enterprises vs. Bureau of Labor Relations
G.R. No. 85343, June 28, 1989
FACTS: The Kapisanan ng mga Kawani, Assistant, Manggagawa at
Konpidensyal sa Philtranco (KASAMA KO), a registered labor organization
filed a petition for certification election with the Department of Labor and
Employment, desiring to represent all professional, technical, administrative,
and confidential employees/personnel of Philtranco at its establishments in
Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao for purposes of collective bargaining for the
reason that the aforementioned employees were always expressly excluded
from participating in the certification election conducted among the rank
and file employees (drivers, conductors, coach drivers, coach stewards, and
mechanics) of respondent and are excluded from the bargaining unit covered
by the CBA between respondent and its rank and file employees. In addition,
there exist substantial differences in the terms and conditions of
employment between the aforementioned employees, hence, the former
are covered by another appropriate bargaining unit which is separate and
distinct from that of the rank and file employees of respondent. National
Mines and Allied Workers Union (NAMAWU-MIF) filed a motion for
intervention alleging that it is the bargaining agent of the workers at
Philtranco and as such it has a substantial interest in the outcome of the
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not professional, technical, administrative, and
confidential employees/personnel of a company may join a labor
organization.
HELD: No, the aforementioned employees may not join a labor organization.
Section 11 of Rule II, Book V of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor
Code did away with existing supervisors’ unions classifying the members
either as managerial or rank and file employees depending on the work they
perform. If they discharge managerial functions, supervisors are prohibited
from forming or joining any labor organization. If they do not perform
managerial work, they may join the rank and file union and if none exists,
they may form one such rank and file organization. It, therefore, follows that
the members of the KASAMA KO who are professional, technical,
administrative and confidential personnel of PHILTRANCO performing
managerial functions are not qualified to join, much less form a union. This
rationalizes the exclusion of managers and confidential employees exercising
managerial functions from the ambit of the collective bargaining unit.
Furthermore, the Court see no need for the formation of another union in
PHILTRANCO. The qualified members of the KASAMA KO may join the
NAMAWU-MIF if they want to be union members, and to be consistent with
the one-union, one-company policy of the Department of Labor and
Employment, and the laws it enforces. The private respondent has not even
shown that a separate bargaining unit would be beneficial to the employees
concerned.
95. SAN MIGUEL CORP V. LAGUESMA
GR NO. 110399
FACTS: On October 5, 1990, petitioner union filed before the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) a Petition for District Certification or
Certification Election among the supervisors and exempt employees of the
SMC Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.
Med-Arbiter Danilo L. Reynante issued an Order ordering the conduct of
certification among the supervisors and exempt employees of the SMC
Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis as one
bargaining unit. San Miguel Corporation filed a Notice of Appeal with
Memorandum on Appeal, pointing out, among others, the Med-Arbiters
error in grouping together all three (3) separate plants, Otis, Cabuyao and
San Fernando, into one bargaining unit, and in including supervisory levels 3
and above whose positions are confidential in nature. Respondent,
Undersecretary Laguesma, granted respondent companys Appeal and
ordered the remand of the case to the Med-Arbiter of origin for
determination of the true classification of each of the employees sought to
be included in the appropriate bargaining unit and directed the conduct of
separate certification elections among the supervisors ranked as supervisory
levels 1 to 4 (S1 to S4) and the exempt employees in each of the three plants
at Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.
ISSUE/S:
1.WON Supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees of the
company are considered confidential employees, hence ineligible from
joining a union.
2. If they are not confidential employees, do the employees of the three
plants constitute an appropriate single bargaining unit?
RULING:
1. NO, the said employees do not fall within the term confidential employees
who may be prohibited from joining a union. There is no question that the
said employees, supervisors and the exempt employees, are not vested with
the powers and prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies
and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, discharge or dismiss
employees. They are, therefore, not qualified to be classified as managerial
employees who, under Article 245 of the Labor Code, are not eligible to join,
assist or form any labor organization. In the very same provision, they are
not allowed membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file
employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their
own. The only question that need be addressed is whether these employees
are properly classified as confidential employees or not. Confidential
employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, (2) to
persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in
the field of labor relations. The two criteria are cumulative, and both must
be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee that is,
the confidential relationship must exist between the employees and his
supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the prescribed responsibilities
relating to labor relations.
Access to information which is regarded by the employer to be confidential
from the business standpoint, such as financial informationor technical trade
secrets, will not render an employee a confidential employee.
Herein listed are the functions of supervisors 3 and higher:
1. To undertake decisions to discontinue/temporarily stop shift operations
when situations require.
2. To effectively oversee the quality control function at the processing lines
in the storage of chicken and other products.
3. To administer efficient system of evaluation of products in the outlets.
4. To be directly responsible for the recall, holding and rejection of direct
manufacturing materials.
5. To recommend and initiate actions in the maintenance of sanitation and
hygiene throughout the plant.
It is evident that whatever confidential data the questioned employees may
handle will have to relate to their functions. From the foregoing functions, it
can be gleaned that the confidential information said employees have access
to concern the employers internal business operations.
The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal course
of their duties, become aware of management policies relating to labor
relations is a principal objective sought to be accomplished by the
confidential employee rule. The broad rationale behind this rule is that
employees should not be placed in a position involving a potential conflict of
interests. Management should not be required to handle labor relations
matters through employees who are represented by the union with the
company is required to deal and who in the normal performance of their
duties may obtain advance information of the company’s position with
regard to contract negotiations, the disposition of grievances, or other labor
relations matters
2. YES, it can be a single bargaining unit. An appropriate bargaining unit may
be defined as a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or
less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interest of
all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be best
suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the
collective bargaining provisions of the law. A unit to be appropriate must
effect a grouping of employees who have substantial, mutual interests in
wages, hours, working conditions and other subjects of collective bargaining.
It is readily seen that the employees in the instant case have community or
mutuality of interest, which is the standard in determining the proper
constituency of a collective bargaining unit. It is undisputed that they all
belong to the Magnolia Poultry Division of San Miguel Corporation. This
means that, although they belong to three different plants, they perform
work of the same nature, receive the same wages and compensation, and
most importantly, share a common stake in concerted activities.
 96. Belyca Corporation v. Calleja
FACTS: In the instant case, private respondent Associated Labor Union (ALU)-
TUCP, seeks direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of
all the rank-and-file workers of the livestock and agro division of petitioner
BELYCA Corporation engaged in piggery, poultry raising and the planting of
agricultural crops such as corn, coffee and various vegetables. Private
respondents in their petition allege the following:
(1) that there is no existing collective bargaining agreement between the
respondent employer, petitioner herein, and any other existing legitimate
labor unions;
(2) that there had neither been a certification election conducted in the
proposed bargaining unit within the last twelve (12) months prior to the filing
of the petition nor a contending union requesting for certification as the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative in the proposed bargaining unit;
(3) that more than a majority of respondent employer's rank-and-file
employees/workers in the proposed bargaining unit or one hundred
thirtyeight (138) as of the date of the filing of the petition, have
signedmembership with the ALU-TUCP and have expressed their written
consent and authorization to the filing of the petition; and
(4) that in response to petitioner union's two letters to the
proprietor/General Manager of respondent employer, dated April 21, 1986
and May 8, 1986, requesting for direct recognition as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file workers, respondent employer has
locked out 119 of its rank-and-file employees in the said bargaining unit and
had dismissed earlier the local union president, vice-president and three
other active members of the local unions for which an unfair labor practice
case was filed by petitioner union against respondent employer.
Belyca, on the other hand, alleged in its position paper the following:
(1) that due to the nature of its business, very few of its employees are
permanent, the overwhelming majority of which are seasonal and casual and
regular employees;
(2) that of the total 138 rank-and-file employees who authorized, signed and
supported the filing of the petition: (a) 14 were no longer working as of June
3, 1986; (b) 4 resigned after June, 1986; (c) 6 withdrew their membership
from petitioner union; (d) 5 were retrenched on June 23, 1986; (e) 12 were
dismissed due to malicious insubordination and destruction of property and;
(f) 100 simply abandoned their work or stopped working;
(3) that the 128 incumbent employees or workers of the livestock section
were merely transferred from the agricultural section as replacement for
those who have either been dismissed, retrenched or resigned; and
(4) that the statutory requirement for holding a certification election has not
been complied with by the union. The petitioner contends that the
bargaining unit must include all the workers in its integrated business
concerns ranging from piggery, poultry, to supermarts and cinemas so as not
to split an otherwise single bargaining unit into fragmented bargaining units.
ISSUE: WON the proposed bargaining unit by Belyca is an appropriate
bargaining unit.
HELD: No.
According to Rothenberg, a proper bargaining unit maybe said to be a group
of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the
entire body of employees, which the collective interests of all the employees,
consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve
reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law. This Court has already taken cognizance of the crucial
issue of determining the proper constituency of a collective bargaining unit.
Among the factors considered in Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu
Stevedoring Co. Inc. (103 Phil 1103[1958]) are: "(1) will of employees (Glove
Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of employee's interest, such as substantial
similarity of work and duties or similarity of compensation and working
conditions; (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) employment
status, such as temporary, seasonal and probationary employees".
Under the circumstances of that case, the Court stressed the importance of
the fourth factor and sustained the trial court's conclusion that two separate
bargaining units should be formed in dealing with respondent company, one
consisting of regular and permanent employees and another consisting of
casual laborers or stevedores. Otherwise stated, temporary employees
should be treated separately from permanent employees. But more
importantly, this Court laid down the test of proper grouping, which is
community and mutuality of interest. It is beyond question that the
employees of the livestock and agro division of petitioner corporation
perform work entirely different from those performed by employees in the
supermarts and cinema. Among others, the noted difference are: their
working conditions, hours of work, rates of pay, including the categories of
their positions and employment status. To lump all the employees of
petitioner in its integrated business concerns cannot result in an efficacious
bargaining unit comprised of constituents enjoying a community or
mutuality of interest
DISPOSITIVE: Calleja won. Petition Dismissed.
DOCTRINE:
Factors to consider to determine an appropriate bargaining unit:
(1) will of employees (Glove Doctrine);
(2) affinity and unity of employee's interest, such as substantial similarity of
work and duties or similarity of compensation and working conditions;
(3) prior collective bargaining history; and
(4) employment status, such as temporary, seasonal and probationary
employees".
97. Philippine Scout Veterans Security vs Torres
Facts: On April 6, 1989, private respondent labor union, PGA Brotherhood
Association – Union of Filipino Workers (UFW), hereinafter referred to as
“the Union ” filed a petition for Direct Certification/Certification Election
among the rank and file employees of Philippine Scout Veterans Security and
Investigation Agency (PSVSIA), GVM Security and Investigations Agency, Inc.
(GVM). and Abaquin Security and Detective Agency, Inc. (ASDA). These three
agencies were collectively referred to by private respondent Union as the
“PGA Security Agency,” which is actually the first letters of the corporate
names of the agencies.
On April 11, 1989, summons was issued to the management of PSVSIA, GVM,
ASDA (PGA Security Agency) at 82 E. Rodriquez Avenue, Quezon City.
On April 11, 26, 1986, petitioners filed a single comment alleging therein that
the said three security agencies have separate and distinct corporate
personalities while PGA Security Agency is not a business or corporate entity
and does not possess any personality whatsoever; the petition was unclear
as to whether the rank-and-file employees mentioned therein refer to those
of the three security agencies collectively and if so, the labor union cannot
seek a certification election in three separate bargaining units in one
petition.
Issue: WON petitioners can interfere with the certification election
proceeding.
Held: Except where the employer has to file a petition for certification
election pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code because of a request to
bargain collectively, it has nothing to do with a certification election which is
the sole concern of the workers. Its role in a certification election has aptly
been described in Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS)
v. Trajano, as that of a mere by-stander. It has no legal standing in a
certification election as it cannot oppose the petition or appeal the Med-
Arbiter’s orders related thereto. An employer that involves itself in a
certification election lends suspicion to the fact that it wants to create a
company union.
This Court’s disapprobation of management interference in certification
elections is even more forceful in Consolidated Farms, Inc. v. Noriel, where
we held:
On a matter that should be the exclusive concern of labor, the choice of a
collective bargaining representative, the employer is definitely an intruder.
His participation, to say the least, deserves no encouragement. This Court
should be the last agency to lend support to such an attempt at interference
with a purely internal affair of labor.
98. PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. SECRETARY OF LABOR
G.R. No. 96425 / 205 SCRA 802
FACTS:
1. Respondent Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa (KILUSAN) -TUCP filed with
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a petition for certification
election among the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner alleging that it
is a legitimate labor federation and its local chapter, Progressive
Development Employees Union, was issued charter certificate No. 90-6-1-
153.
2. Respondent Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa (KILUSAN) -TUCP claimed
that there was no existing collective bargaining agreement and that no other
legitimate labor organization existed in the bargaining unit.
3. Petitioner PDC filed its motion to dismiss contending that the local union
failed to comply with Rule II Section 3, Book V of the Rules Implementing the
Labor Code, as amended, which requires the submission of: (a) the
constitution and by-laws; (b) names, addresses and list of officers and/or
members; and (c) books of accounts.
4. Respondent KILUSAN-TUCP submitted a rejoinder to PDC's motion to
dismiss claiming that it had submitted the necessary documentary
requirements for registration, such as the constitution and by-laws of the
local union, and the list of officers/members with their addresses. Kilusan
further averred that no books of accounts could be submitted as the local
union was only recently organized.
5. Petitioner PDC insisted that upon verification with the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR), it found that the alleged minutes of the organizational
meeting was unauthenticated, the list of members did not bear the
corresponding signatures of the purported members, and the constitution
and by-laws did not bear the signature of the members and was not duly
subscribed. It argued that the private respondent KILUSAN-TUCP therefore
failed to substantially comply with the registration requirements provided by
the rules.
6. MED-ARBITER Dela Cruz: held that there was substantial compliance
with the requirements for the formation of the chapter. He further stated
that mere issuance of the charter certificate by the federation was sufficient
compliance with the rules. Considering that the establishment was
unorganized, he maintained that a certification election should be conducted
to resolve the question of representation.
7. Petitioner filed an MR to the Office of the Secretary.
8. SECRETARY Laguesma: denied the MR.
9. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was correct that a labor organization
such as the respondent (KILUSAN)-TUCP may not validly invest the status of
legitimacy upon a local or chapter through the mere expedient of issuing a
charter certificate and submitting such certificate to the BLR and as such local
or chapter must at the same time comply with the requirement of
submission of duly subscribed constitution and by-laws, list of officers and
books of accounts
RULING:
1. YES, because, the failure of the secretary of PDEU-Kilusan to certify the
required documents under oath is fatal to its acquisition of a legitimate
status.
In the case of union registration, the rationale for requiring that the
submitted documents and papers be certified under oath by the secretary or
treasurer, as the case may be, and attested to by president is apparent.
The submission of the required documents (and payment of P50.00
registration fee) becomes the Bureau's basis for approval of the application
for registration. Upon approval, the labor union acquires legal personality
and is entitled to all the rights and privileges granted by law to a legitimate
labor organization. The employer naturally needs assurance that the union it
is dealing with is a bona fide organization, one which has not submitted false
statements or misrepresentations to the Bureau. The inclusion of the
certification and attestation requirements will in a marked degree allay these
apprehensions of management. Not only is the issuance of any false
statement and misrepresentation a ground for cancellation of registration
(see Article 239 (a), (c) and (d)); it is also a ground for a criminal charge of
perjury.
In the case of the union affiliation with a federation, the documentary
requirements are found in Rule II, Section 3(e), Book V of the Implementing
Rules, which we again quote as follows:
(c) The local chapter of a labor federation or national union shall have and
maintain a constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books of accounts.
For reporting purposes, the procedure governing the reporting of
independently registered unions, federations or national unions shall be
observed. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the "procedure governing the reporting of independently registered
unions" refers to the certification and attestation requirements contained in
Article 235, paragraph 2, it follows that the constitution and by-laws, set of
officers and books of accounts submitted by the local and chapter must
likewise comply with these requirements. The same rationale for requiring
the submission of duly subscribed documents upon union registration exists
in the case of union affiliation. Moreover, there is greater reason to exact
compliance with the certification and attestation requirements because, as
previously mentioned, several requirements applicable to independent
union registration are no longer required in the case of formation of a local
or chapter. The policy of the law in conferring greater bargaining power upon
labor unions must be balanced with the policy of providing preventive
measures against the commission of fraud.
DISPOSITIVE: Petitioner Progressive Development Corporation won.
DOCTRINE: Article 212(h) defines a legitimate labor organization as "any
labor organization duly registered with the DOLE and includes any branch or
local thereof."
Rule I, Section 1 (j), Book V of the Implementing Rules likewise defines a
legitimate labor organization as "any labor organization duly registered with
the DOLE and includes any branch, local or affiliate thereof.
Ordinarily, a labor organization acquires legitimacy only upon registration
with the BLR. A local or chapter therefore becomes a legitimate labor
organization only upon submission of the following to the BLR:
1) A charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the labor
federation or national union, and
2) The constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers, and the
books of accounts all of which are certified under oath by the secretary or
treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or chapter, and attested to by its
president.
Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter
does not become a legitimate labor organization.
The certification and attestation requirements are preventive measures
against the commission of fraud. They likewise afford a measure of
protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured into joining
unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union
funds or to use the union for dubious ends.
99. PAGPALAIN HAULERS v. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO
GR No. 133215, 1999-07-15
Facts: respondent Integrated Labor Organization-Pagpalain Haulers
Worker's Union (hereafter referred to as ILO-PHILS), in a bid to represent the
rank-and-file drivers and helpers of petitioner Pagpalain Haulers, Inc.
(hereafter referred to as Pagpalain), filed a petition for certification election
with the Department of Labor and Employment. ILO-PHILS attached to the
petition copies of its charter certificate, its constitution and by-laws, its
books of account, and a list of its officers and their addresses. Pagpalain filed
a motion to dismiss the petition, alleging that ILO-PHILS was not a legitimate
labor organization due to its failure to comply with the requirements for
registration under the Labor Code. Specifically, it claimed that the books of
account... submitted by ILO-PHILS were not verified under oath by its
treasurer and attested to by its president, a required by Rule II, Book V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. ILO-PHILS dismissed
Pagpalain's claims, saying that Department Order No. 9, Series of 1997 had
dispensed with the requirement that a local or chapter of a national union
submit books of account in order to be registered with the Department of
Labor and Employment. Finding in favor of ILO-PHILS, the Med-Arbiter, on
August 27, 1997, ordered the holding of certification elections among the
rank-and-file of Pagpalain Haulers. Pagpalain promptly appealed the decision
to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. It claimed that the Med-Arbiter
had... gravely abused his discretion in allowing Department Order No. 9 to
take precedence over a ruling of the Supreme Court. Pagpalain cited
Protection Technology v. Secretary, Department of Labor and
Employment[1] and Progressive Development
Issues:
DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 9, SERIES OF 1997, ISSUED BY PUBLIC
RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF LABOR IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING
CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY; DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. 9, SERIES OF 1997,
OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF LABOR CANNOT ALTER THE
REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLES 241(H) AND (J) OF THE LABOR CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, NOR CAN IT PREVAIL OVER THE RULINGS OF THE SUPREME
COURT, WHICH FORM PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND.
Ruling: Pagpalain's contentions are without merit. Neither can Pagpalain
contend that Department Order No. 9 is an invalid exercise of rule-making
power by the Secretary of Labor. For an administrative order to be valid, it
must (i) be issued on the authority of law and (ii) it must not be contrary to
the law and
Constitution.[7]... epartment Order No. 9 has been issued on authority of
law. Under the law, the Secretary is authorized to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement the Labor Code. Specifically, Article 5 of the Labor
Code provides that "[t]he Department of Labor and other government...
agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or
any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and
regulations." Consonant with this article, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment promulgated the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code. By virtue of this self-same authority, the Secretary amended the
above-mentioned omnibus rules by issuing Department Order No. 9, Series
of 1997.
Moreover, Pagpalain has failed to show that Department Order No. 9 is
contrary to the law or the Constitution. At the risk of being repetitious, the
Labor Code does not require a local or chapter to submit books of account in
order for it to be registered as a legitimate labor... organization. There is,
thus, no inconsistency between the Labor Code and Department Order No.
9. Neither has Pagpalain shown that said order contravenes any provision of
the Constitution.
Pagpalain cannot also allege that Department Order No. 9 is violative of
public policy. As adverted to earlier, the sole function of our courts is to apply
or interpret the laws.[8] It does not formulate public policy, which is the
province of the... legislative and executive branches of government. It
cannot, thus, be said that the principles laid down by the court in Progressive
and Protection Technology constitute public policy on the matter. They do,
however, constitute the Court's interpretation of public... policy, as
formulated by the executive department through its promulgation of rules
implementing the Labor Code. However, this public policy has itself been
changed by the executive department, through the amendments introduced
in Book V of the Omnibus Rules by Department Order No. 9. It is not for us
to question this change in policy, it being a well-established principle beyond
question that it is not within the province of the courts to pass judgment
upon the policy of legislative or executive action.[9] Notwithstanding the...
expanded judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, an
inquiry on the above-stated policy would delve into matters of wisdom not
within the powers of this Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit and the resolution of the Secretary of Labor dated February
27, 1998 AFFIRMED
Principles:
Labor Law - Rule making power of Secretary of Labor
Department Order No. 9 has been issued on authority of law. Under the law,
the Secretary is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement the Labor Code. Specifically, Article 5 of the Labor Code provides
that "[t]he Department of Labor and other government... agencies charged
with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall
promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations." Consonant
with this article, the Secretary of Labor and Employment promulgated the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. By virtue of this self-same
authority, the Secretary amended the above-mentioned omnibus rules by
issuing Department Order No. 9, Series of 1997.
100. TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS INTERNATIONAL GOLF CLUB INC VS
TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS EMPLOYEES UNION-PGTWO
395 SCRA 699[January 22, 2003]
FACTS: October 16, 1997 > Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union (THEU),
Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (PTGWO), Local
Chapter No. 776, a legitimate labor organization said to represent majority
of the rank-and-file employees of THIGCI, filed a petition for certification
election before the DOLE Mediation-Arbitration Unit, Regional Branch No.
IV. November 27, 1997 > opposed petition for certification election because
the list of union members submitted by it was defective and fatally flawed as
it included the names and signatures of supervisors, resigned, terminated
and absent without leave (AWOL) employees, as well as employees of The
Country Club, Inc., a corporation distinct and separate from THIGCI; and that
out of the 192 signatories to the petition, only 71 were actual rank-and-file
employees of THIGCI. Also, some of the signatures in the list of union
members were secured through fraudulent and deceitful means, and
submitted copies of the handwritten denial and withdrawal of some of its
employees from participating in the petition. THEU asserted that it complied
with all the requirements for valid affiliation and inclusion in the roster of
legitimate labor organizations pursuant to DOLE Department Order No. 9,
series of 1997, on account of which it was duly granted a Certification of
Affiliation by DOLE on October 10, 1997; and that Section 5, Rule V of said
Department Order provides that the legitimacy of its registration cannot be
subject to collateral attack, and for as long as there is no final order of
cancellation, it continues to enjoy the rights accorded to a legitimate
organization. Therefore, the Med-Arbiter should, pursuant to Article 257 of
the Labor Code and Section 11, Rule XI of DOLE Department Order No. 09,
automatically order the conduct of a certification election. January 28, 1998
> DOLE Med-Arbiter Anastacio Bactin ordered the holding of a certification
election
DOLE Resolution of November 12, 19981 > setting aside the June 4, 1998
Resolution dismissing the petition for certification election. MFR denied
CA -denied THIGCI’s Petition for Certiorari and affirmed the DOLE Resolution
dated November 12, 1998. It held that while a petition for certification
election is an exception to the innocent bystander rule, hence, the employer
may pray for the dismissal of such petition on the basis of lack of mutuality
of interests of the members of the union as well as lack of employer-
employee relationship and petitioner failed to adduce substantial evidence
to support its allegations.
ISSUE: WON the withdrawal of some union members from the certification
election will affect the result
HELD: NO. As for petitioner’ s allegation that some of the signatures in the
petition for certification election were obtained through fraud, false
statement and misrepresentation, the proper procedure is, as reflected
above, for it to file a petition for cancellation of the certificate of registration,
and not to intervene in a petition for certification election. Regarding the
alleged withdrawal of union members from participating in the certification
election, this Court’s following ruling is instructive:
“T]he best forum for determining whether there were indeed retractions
from some of the laborers is in the certification election itself wherein the
workers can freely express their choice in a secret ballot. Suffice it to say that
the will of the rank-and-file employees should in every possible instance be
determined by secret ballot rather than by administrative or quasi-judicial
inquiry. Such representation and certification election cases are not to be
taken as contentious litigations for suits but as mere investigations of a non-
adversary, fact-finding character as to which of the competing unions
represents the genuine choice of the workers to be their sole and exclusive
collective bargaining representative with their employer.”
Disposition: Petition is DENIED. Let the records of the case be remanded to
the office of origin, the Mediation-Arbitration Unit, Regional Branch No. IV,
for the immediate conduct of a certification election subject to the usual pre-
election conference.
102. Ferrer, et al. vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 100898, July 5, 1993
FACTS: Petitioners Ferrer and others were regular and permanent
employees of the Occidental Foundry Corporation (OFC). They had been in
the employe of OFC for about ten years at the time of their dismissal in 1989.
On May 6, 1989, petitioner Ferrer and companions filed with the Department
of Labor and Employment a complaint seeking the expulsion from SAMAHAN
of its officers headed by president Capitle. The complaint was founded on
the said officers' alleged lack of attention to the economic demands of the
workers. However, on September 4, 1989, petitioners Diaz and Ferrer
withdrew the petition. On September 10, 1989, petitioners conducted a
special election of officers of the SAMAHAN. FFW, to which SAMAHAN was
affiliated, questioned the election. Nonetheless, the elected set of officers
tried to dissuade the OFC from remitting union dues to the officers led by
Capitle. The intra-union squabble came to a head when, on September 11,
1989, the union officials headed by Capitle expelled Ferrer, et al. from the
union. Ferrer and his four companions turned to the Federation of
Democratic Labor Unions (FEDLU). They volunteered to be admitted as
members of the FEDLU and requested that they be represented
("katawanin") by said federation before the DOLE in the complaint which
they intended to file against the union (SAMAHAN), the FFW and the
company for illegal dismissal, reinstatement, and other benefits in
accordance with law. Thereafter, on various dates, petitioners sent individual
letters to the Company professing innocence of the charges levelled against
them by the SAMAHAN and the FFW and pleading that they be reinstated.
Their letters elicited no response. Thus, contending that their dismissal was
without cause and in utter disregard of their right to due process of law,
petitioners through the FEDLU, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
unfair labor practice before the NLRC against Hui Kam Chang, OFC, M.S.
Velasco (as representative of the FFW), the FFW, and the SAMAHAN officers
headed by Capitle.
RULING: In the first place, the union has a specific provision for the
permanent or temporary "expulsion" of its erring members in its constitution
and by-laws ("saligang batas at alituntunin"). Under the heading
Membership and Removal ("pag-aanib at pagtitiwalag"), it states:
SEC. 4. Ang sinumang kasapi ay maaring itwalag (sic) ng Samahan
pangsamantala o tuluyan sa pamamgitan (sic) ng tatlo't ikaapat (3/4) na
bahagi ng dami ng bilang ng Pamunuang Tagapapaganap. Pagkaraan lamang
sa pandinig sa kanyang kaso. Batay sa sumusunod:
(a) Sinumang gumawa ng mga bagay bagay na labag at lihis sa patakaran ng
Samahan.
(b) Sinumang gumawa ng mga bagay na maaring ikabuwag ng Samahan.
(c) Hindi paghuhulog ng butaw sa loob ng tatlong buwan na walang sakit o
Doctor's Certificate.
(d) Hindi pagbibigay ng abuloy na itinadhana ng Samahan.
(e) Sinumang kasapi na natanggal sa kapisanan at gustong sumapi uli ay
magpapanibago ng bilang, mula sa taon ng kanyang pagsapi uli sa Samahan.
No hearing ("pandinig") was ever conducted by the SAMAHAN to look into
petitioners' explanation of their moves to oust the union leadership under
Capitle, or their subsequent affiliation with FEDLU. While it is true that
petititioners' actions might have precipitated divisiveness and, later, showed
disloyalty to the union, still, the SAMAHAN should have observed its own
constitution and by-laws by giving petitioners an opportunity to air their side
and explain their moves. If, after an investigation the petitioners were found
to have violated union rules, then and only then should they be subjected to
proper disciplinary measures.
What aggravated the situation in this case is the fact that OFC itself took for
granted that the SAMAHAN had actually conducted an inquiry and
considered the CBA provision for the closed shop as self-operating that, upon
receipt of a notice that some members of the SAMAHAN had failed to
maintain their membership in good standing in accordance with the CBA, it
summarily dismissed petitioners. To make matters worse, the labor arbiter
and the NLRC shared the same view in holding that "(t)he matter or question,
therefore, of determining why and how did complainants fail to retain
membership in good standing is not for the company to inquire via formal
investigation."
Petitioners' alleged act of sowing disunity among the members of the
SAMAHAN could have been ventilated and threshed out through a grievance
procedure within the union itself. But resort to such procedure was not
pursued. What actually happened in this case was that some members,
including petitioners, tried to unseat the SAMAHAN leadership headed by
Capitle due to the latter's alleged inattention to petitioners' demands for the
implementation of the P25-wage increase which took effect on July 1, 1989.
The intra-union controversy was such that petitioners even requested the
FFW to intervene to facilitate the enforcement of the said wage increase.
Petitioners sought the help of the FEDLU only after they had learned of the
termination of their employment upon the recommendation of Capitle. Their
alleged application with federations other than the FFW can hardly be
considered as disloyalty to the SAMAHAN, nor may the filing of such
applications denote that petitioners failed to maintain in good standing their
membership in the SAMAHAN. The SAMAHAN is a different entity from FFW,
the federation to which it belonged. Neither may it be inferred that
petitioners sought disaffiliation from the FFW for petitioners had not formed
a union distinct from that of the SAMAHAN. Parenthetically, the right of a
local union to disaffiliate from a federation in the absence of any provision
in the federation's constitution preventing disaffiliation of a local union is
legal. (People's Industrial and Commercial Employees and Workers Org.
[FFW] vs. People's Industrial and Commercial Corp., 112 SCRA 440 [1982])
Such right is consistent with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
association. (Tropical Hut Employees' Union-CGW vs. Tropical Hut Food
Market, Inc., 181 SCRA 173 [1990])
Hence, while petitioner's act of holding a special election to oust Capitles, et
al. may be considered as an act of sowing disunity among the SAMAHAN
members, and, perhaps, disloyalty to the union officials, which could have
been dealt with by the union as a disciplinary matter, it certainly cannot be
considered as constituting disloyalty to the union. Faced with a SAMAHAN
leadership which they had tried to remove as officials, it was but a natural
act of self-preservation that petitioners fled to the arms of the FEDLU after
the union and the OFC had tried to terminate their employment. Petitioners
should not be made accountable for such an act.
104. PALACOL vs. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA
FACTS: October 12, 1987, the respondent Manila CCBPI Sales Force Union
(hereinafter referred to as the Union), as the collective bargaining agent of
all regular salesmen, regular helpers, and relief helpers of the Manila Plant
and Metro Manila Sales Office of the respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers
(Philippines), Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the Company) concluded a new
collective bargaining agreement with the latter. Salary increase given in lump
sum. President of the Union submitted to the Company the ratification by
the union members of the new CBA and authorization for the Company to
deduct union dues equivalent to P10.00 every payday or P20.00 every month
and, in addition, 10% by way of special assessment, from the CBA lump-sum
pay granted to the union members. Board Resolution of the Union dated
September 29, 1987, the purpose of the special assessment sought to be
levied is “to put up a cooperative and credit union; purchase vehicles and
other items needed for the benefit of the officers and the general
membership; and for the payment for services rendered by union officers,
consultants and others.” There was also an additional proviso stating that
the “matter of allocation … shall be at the discretion of our incumbent Union
President. Authorization and CBA Ratification”was obtained by the Union
through a secret referendum held in separate local membership meetings on
various dates 800 members. 672 members originally authorized the 10%
special assessment, while 173 opposed the same. 170) members of the
Union submitted documents to the Company stating that although they have
ratified the new CBA, they are withdrawing or disauthorizing the deduction
of any amount from their CBA lump sum. Later, 185 other union members
submitted similar documents expressing the same intent. These members,
numbering 355 in all (170 + 185), added to the original oppositors of 173,
turned the tide in favor of disauthorization for the special assessment, with
a total of 528 objectors and a remainder of 272 supporters. The company
filed an action for interpleader with the Bureau of Labor Relations in order
to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties concerned. Petitioners, who
are regular rank-and-file employees of the Company and bona fide members
of the Union, filed a motion/complaint for intervention therein in two groups
of 161 and 94, respectively. They claimed to be among those union members
who either did not sign any individual written authorization, or having signed
one, subsequently withdrew or retracted their signatures therefrom. Union
countered that the deductions not only have the popular indorsement and
approval of the general membership, but likewise complied with the legal
requirements of Article 241 (n) and (o) of the Labor Code in that the board
resolution of the Union imposing the questioned special assessment had
been duly approved in a general membership meeting and that the collection
of a special fund for labor education and research is mandated. Med-Arbiter
Manases T. Cruz ruled in favor of petitioners in an order dated February 15,
1988 whereby he directed the Company to remit the amount it had kept in
trust directly to the rank-and-file personnel without delay. Appealed to BLR,
reversed.
RULING: convinced that the deduction of the 10% special assessmentby the
Union was not made in accordance with the requirements provided by law.
The principle “that employees are protected by law from unwarranted
practices that diminish their compensation without their known edge
andconsent” is in accord with the constitutional principle of the State
affording full protection to labor. The failure of the Union to comply strictly
with the requirements set out by the law invalidates the questioned special
assessment. Substantialcompliance is not enough in view of the fact that the
special assessment will diminish the compensation of the union members.
Their express consent is required, and this consent must be obtained in
accordance with the steps outlined by law, which must be followed to the
letter. No shortcuts are allowed. Held local membership meetings on
separate occasions, on different dates and at various venues, contrary to the
express requirement that there must be a general membership meeting. The
contention of the Union that “the local membership meetings are precisely
the very general meetings required by law” is untenable because the law
would not have specified a general membership meeting had the legislative
intent been to allow local meetings in lieu of the latter. Submitted only
minutes of the local membership meetings when what is required is a written
resolution adopted at the general meeting. The minutes submitted to the
Company contained no list of the members present and no record of the
votes cast. Handwritten authorization which complied with the law is valid.
However, its withdrawal means no authorization was given.
105. VOLKSCHEL LABOR UNION vs. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS
G.R. No. L-45824 June 19, 1985
FACTS: Petitioner Volkschel Labor Union was once affiliated with the
Associated Labor Union for Metal Workers (ALUMETAL). Both unions jointly
entered into a CBA. They have agreed that the company would make payroll
deductions twice a month as union membership dues, provided that the
same is covered by the individual check-off authorization of the union
members. A majority of petitioner’s members decided to disaffiliate from
ALUMETAL in order to operate on its own as an independent labor group
pursuant to Art. 241 of the Labor Code, which reads: “Incumbent affiliates of
existing federations or national unions may disaffiliate only for the purpose
of joining a federation or national union or region in which it properly
belongs or for the purpose of operating as an independent labor group.”
Petitioner’s members revoked their check-off authorization in favor of
ALUMETAL. However, ALUMETAL advised respondent companies to
continue deducting from employees’ wages and remitting union dues to the
former. Thus, the respondent companies sought the legal opinion of the
Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR). Med-Arbiter Eduvallafound the disaffiliation
legal but opined that petitioner’s members should continue paying their
dues to ALUMETAL as to agency fees. Upon appeal to the director of BLR,
petitioner contended that MedArbiter’s opinion that petitioner’s members
remained obligated to pay dues was inconsistent with the finding that
petitioner’s disaffiliation was valid. ALUMETAL, on the other hand,
contended that the disaffiliation should have been declared contrary to law.
BLR reversed the Med-Arbiter’s Resolution and held that it recognized the
continued affiliation of petitioner with ALUMETAL.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner union’s disaffiliation from ALUMETAL is
valid
HELD: Yes. The right of a local union to disaffiliate from its mother union is
well-settled. In previous cases, it has been repeatedly held that a local union,
being a separate and voluntary association, is free to serve the interest of all
its members including the freedom to disaffiliate when circumstances
warrant. The right is consistent with the constitutional guarantee of freedom
of association (Art. IV, Sec. 7).
106. ABS-CBN SUPERVISORS EMPLOYEES UNION MEMBERS v. ABS-CBN
BROADCASTING CORP
G.R. No. 106518
FACTS: On December 7, 1989, the ABS-CBN Supervisors Employees Union
and ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation ("the Company") signed and
concluded a CBA with the following check-off provision, to wit: "ARTICLE XII
The Company agrees to advance to the Union a sum equivalent to 10% of the
sum total of all the salary increases and signing bonuses granted to the
Supervisors under this collective Bargaining Agreement and upon signing
hereof to cover the Union’s incidental expenses, including attorney’s fees
and representation expenses for its organization and and such advance shall
be deducted from the benefits granted herein as they accrue."cralaw
virtua1aw library. On September 19, 1990, Petitioners filed with the BLR
DOLE-NCR, Quezon City, a Complaint against the Union Officers and
MANAGEMENT, praying that:
1. the special assessment of ten percent (10%) of the sum total of all salary
increases and signing bonuses granted by respondent Company to the
members of the Union be declared illegal for failure to comply with the Labor
Code, as amended, particularly Article 241, paragraphs (g), (n), and (o); and
in utter violation of the Constitution and By-Laws of the ABS-CBN Supervisors
Employees Union;
2. respondent Company be ordered to suspend further deductions from
petitioners’ salaries for their shares thereof.
In their Answers, respondent prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint for
lack of merit. They argued that the check-off provision is in accordance with
law as majority of the Union members individually executed a written
authorization giving the Union officers and the Company a blanket authority
to deduct subject amount.
On January 21, 1991, Med-Arbiter Rasidali C. Abdullah issued the following
Order declared the check off illegal. On appeal, the DOLE thru Usec.
Laguesma, on July 1, 1991 affirmed in toto the decision of the Med Arbiter.
However, upon MR by respondent union , Usec Laguesma on July 31, 1992
reversed the previous decision on July 1, 1991 and entered a new decision
DISMISSING the Complaint/Petition for lack of merit
ISSUE: Whether or not the check off was valid
HELD: The assailed Order, dated July 31, 1992, of DOLE Undersecretary B. E.
Laguesma is AFFIRMED except that no deductions shall be taken from the
workers who did not give their individual written check-off authorization. No
pronouncement as to costs
RATIO: A check-off is a process or device whereby the employer, on
agreement with the Union, recognized as the proper bargaining
representative, or on prior authorization from its employees, deducts union
dues or agency fees from the latter’s wages and remits them directly to the
union.” Its desirability in a labor organization is quite evident. It is assured
thereby of continuous funding. As this Court has acknowledged, the system
of check-off is primarily for the benefit of the Union and only indirectly, for
the individual employees. The legal basis of check-off is found in statutes or
in contracts. The statutory limitations on check-offs are found in Article 241,
Chapter II, Title IV, Book Five of the Labor Code.
Article 222 (b) of the Labor Code prohibits the payment of attorney’s fees
only when it is effected through forced contributions from the workers from
their own funds as distinguished from the union funds .
Noticeably, Article 241 speaks of three (3) requisites that must be complied
with in order that the special assessment for Union’s incidental expenses,
attorney’s fees and representation expenses, as stipulated in Article XII of
the CBA, be valid and upheld namely: (1) authorization by a written
resolution of the majority of all the members at the general membership
meeting duly called for the purpose; (2) secretary’s record of the minutes of
the meeting; and (3) individual written authorization for check-off duly
signed by the employee concerned.
Premises studiedly considered, we are of the irresistible conclusion and, so
find, that the ruling in BPIEU-ALU vs. NLRC that (1) the prohibition against
attorney’s fees in Article 222, paragraph (b) of the Labor Code applies only
when the payment of attorney’s fees is effected through forced
contributions from the workers; and (2) that no deductions must be taken
from the workers who did not sign the check-off authorization, applies to the
case under consideration. [ABS-CBN Supervisors Employees Union Members
vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, 304 SCRA 489(1999)]