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HIMACHAL PRADESH NATIONAL LAW

UNIVERSITY, SHIMLA

2019-2020

Subject- Political Science

Emergence of International Terrorism

Submitted by: Submitted to:


Naman Mishra Dr. Ved Prakash Sharma
ROLL No.-1020181936 (Asst. Professor of Political Science)
(B.A.LL.B-3rd SEMESTER)

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

It is not conceivable to set up an undertaking report without the help and consolation of other
individuals. This is positively no exemption. I am utilizing this chance to express my appreciation
to everybody who upheld me over the span of this assignment. I am grateful for their aspiring
guidance, importantly valuable feedbacks and friendly advice amid my assignment. I am truly
appreciative to them for sharing their honest and illuminating views on various issue identified
with the venture. I also want to express my exceptional appreciation to Dr. Ved Prakash, who
gave me the brilliant chance to do this incredible undertaking, which likewise helped me in
completing a great deal of exploration and I came to think about such a large number of new things
for which I am obligated to her from the core of my heart. I additionally recognize with a profound
feeling of respect, my appreciation towards my parents and member of my family, in view of
whom I have figured out how to finish this task on time and who have continuously upheld me
ethically. Finally, my appreciation goes to the majority of my companions who specifically or on
the other hand in a roundabout way helped me to finish this task. Any oversight in this brief
acknowledgement does not mean absence of appreciation.

-NAMAN MISHRA

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

SERIAL CONTENTS PAGE


NO. NO.
1. INTRODUCTION 4-6

2. EVOLUTION OF PLANS AND TACTICS IN TERRORISM 6-8

3. USE OF TECHNOLOGY IN SPREADING TERRORISM 8-9

4. FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 9-11

5. APPLICATION 11-12

6. EXAMPLES OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 12-13

7. CONCLUSION 14

8 REFRENCES 15

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EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Introduction
International terrorism refers to terrorism that goes beyond national boundaries in terms of the
methods used, the people that are targeted or the places from which the terrorists operate.

Since the emergence of Al Qaida in the 1990s, international terrorism has become largely
synonymous with Islamist terrorism. Terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq, including Al Qaida and
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), possess both the intention and the capability to
direct attacks against the West. The UK is a high-priority target for Islamist extremists and they
pose a significant threat to our country and to our interests and citizens abroad. Despite the current
main focus on terrorism originating from Syria and Iraq, the threat of terrorism also emanates from
other parts of the Middle East and regions such as North, East and West Africa, South and South
East Asia.

The majority of terrorist attack plots in this country have been planned by British residents. There
are several thousand individuals in the UK who support violent extremism or are engaged in
Islamist extremist activity. British nationals who have fought for extremist groups overseas
continue to return to the UK, increasing the risk of terrorist attacks. Using skills acquired overseas,
they may organize attacks under direction from outside the UK, or on their own initiative, or they
might radicalize others to do so. While the majority of returners will not mount attacks in the UK,
the large numbers involved mean it is likely that at least some of them will attempt to do so.

Groups like ISIL make full use of social media and modern communication methods to glamorize
their horrific acts and inspire others to commit them. Once inspired, an individual might decide to
conduct an attack in the name of Islam without any prior signs of radicalization. Simple, self-
organized attacks by UK-based Islamist extremists have increased and are inherently harder to
detect than more complex and ambitious plots.

Inspired by the success of the Cuban revolution but unable to replicate its success, Latin America's
guerrillas moved their struggle from the countryside into the cities. They replaced traditional

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guerrilla warfare with bombings, assassinations, and kidnappings, which guaranteed them national
and international attention. Spectacular action took the place of patient political mobilization. At
the same time, the Vietnam War sparked a new wave of revolutionary fervor that spread through
the universities of Europe, Japan, and the United States. Mass protest movements spawned small
groups on their extremist fringes that were determined to pursue a more violent struggle. These
extremist groups emulated the tactics of their ideological counterparts in Latin America and the
Middle East.

Changes in the technological environment during the 1970s also facilitated international terrorism.
Jet air travel offered terrorists worldwide mobility and, with it, opportunities to strike targets
anywhere. Television and the deployment of communications satellites offered terrorists almost
instantaneous access to a global audience. By choreographing dramatic incidents of violence and
hostage situations in which human life hung in the balance, terrorists could guarantee worldwide
press coverage for their acts and their causes. The diffusion of small arms around the world and of
increasingly powerful explosives and sophisticated detonating devices took terrorists far beyond
the capacity of the early bomb throwers. Modern technology-dependent societies offered
numerous vulnerabilities, from power grids to jumbo jets.

The relationship of all these incidents to one another was not self-evident at the time. Beyond the
similarity in tactics, there was no obvious connection between a kidnapping in Uruguay, a bombing
in Germany, and a hijacking in Africa. Why should actions carried out by persons who called
themselves Tupamaros, Montone, the Red Brigades, or the Japanese Red Army be addressed
within the same analytical and policy framework? International terrorism was an artificial
construct useful for policy purposes. While recognizing the diversity of the terrorists and their
causes, it identified their actions in the international domain as a mutual problem for all nations.

International terrorism emerged from a confluence of political circumstances and technological


process. In the Middle East, Israel's defeat of the Arab armies in the Six-Day War of 1967 and the
inability of Palestinians to mount an effective resistance movement in the territories newly
occupied by Israel pushed them toward the use of terrorist tactics. Their mentors were the Algerian
revolutionaries who in the fight for independence had carried their own terrorist campaign to

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France itself. For the Palestinians, anyone anywhere in the world who supported Israel's continued
existence became a potential target, greatly broadening the theater of operations.

In February 1970 members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) sabotaged
a Swissair flight to Tel Aviv, killing all forty-seven persons on board. In September 1970 the same
group hijacked three airliners bound for Europe and diverted them to Jordan. In May 1972 three
members of the Japanese Red Army, a group allied with the PFLP, which was leaded by Fusako
Shigenobu, attacked passengers at Israel's Lod Airport, killing twenty-five and wounding seventy-
six. And in September of that year, members of Black September, another Middle Eastern group,
seized nine Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics. Five of the terrorists and all nine of the
hostages were killed in a disastrous rescue attempt by German police. The three surviving terrorists
were traded for hostages aboard a Lufthansa flight hijacked the next month.

Terrorists continued to use the tactics of their historical predecessors: setting off bombs in public
places, assassinating officials, kidnapping individuals to demand political concessions or ransom
payments. But a new phenomenon, international terrorism, began with a series of spectacular
attacks in the late 1960s. In 1968, Palestinians hijacked an El Al jetliner and flew it to Algeria,
where they demanded the release of Palestinian prisoners. This began a wave of hijackings to
obtain political concessions. In 1969 urban guerrillas in Brazil kidnapped the U.S. ambassador,
later releasing him in return for the release of fifteen comrades imprisoned in Brazil. The tactic
quickly spread throughout the world. In the following twelve months, diplomats were kidnapped
in Uruguay, Argentina, Bolivia, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and Jordan.

EVOLUTION OF PLANS AND TACTICS IN TERRORISM-

One of the main areas of change, especially in the new era of terrorism, is the composition of
military units and the tactics that are used. Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
in the United States, U.S. forces entered Afghanistan with the objective of eliminating Osama bin
Laden and Al-Qaeda and overthrowing his protectors, the Taliban. Instead of hitting with a large

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overwhelming force, most of the U.S. military on the ground was composed of small groups of
Special Forces personnel. These groups hit and run, taking out targets to weaken the enemy; they
do not perform like traditional large land forces used to subdue and to occupy a nation. The
problem with this type of warfare is that it rests in part on the premise that the striking force would
care for and remove its own sick and wounded but in all likelihood would leave the sick and
wounded of the opposing force on the field. Although this may be good military doctrine, some
may argue that this runs counter to the Geneva Conventions, for they would say that all parties to
the conflict have an affirmative duty to seek and to care for the wounded and sick (as indicated in
Article 15 of the 1949 Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field).

Although it can be said that the U.S. Afghanistan campaign was different from most combat
scenarios, it has become clear that, at least in the near term, the United States will have a greater
reliance on “commando”-type activities. The proof can be found primarily in two events. The first
was in April 2003, when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld cancelled work on a new artillery
system because it was designed for large Cold War-era battles. The second was when Secretary
Rumsfeld passed over sitting three- and four-star generals for the position of Chief of Staff of the
Army and recalled to active duty a retired four-star general, GEN Pete Schoomaker, in 2003. Why
GEN Schoomaker? Perhaps it was his almost 20 years of experience in Special Operations. 3 The
Law of Armed Conflict establishes the obligations between combatants who are signatories to the
Geneva Conventions (see as an example Article 2 of the 1949 Convention for the Amelioration of
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, and see also Additional Protocol 1, Article
1, and Additional Protocol 2, Article 1). It also provides coverage to insurgents (or rebels) when
these groups conform to certain requirements, such as being dressed in a manner that identifies
them as members of an armed force and carrying their weapons openly (see Article 13 of the 1949
Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; note that,
if one party fails to follow the Geneva Conventions, then the other party may fail to follow them
as well). The problem, in this age of international terrorism (whether dealing with situations in Sri
Lanka, Sudan, Iraq, Israel, or Chechnya), is how to treat people who have no regard for the rules
of war, who are threatening not only military assets but also civil assets, and who have no regard
for their lives or the lives of the civilian population as a whole. Additional Protocol 2, Article 2,

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denies Law of Armed Conflict application in cases involving acts of sporadic international
violence. Is it appropriate to use harsh methods, short of torture (defined by the 1984 Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment as any act by
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person),
to extract information for the purpose of protecting innocent women and children who otherwise
would be the victims of a suicide bomber?

USE OF TECHNOLOGY IN SPREADING TERRORISM

Military combatants have used animals in support of combat operations for centuries. Before and
during World War II, true cavalry units still existed, and mules carried supplies through the jungles
of Asia and elsewhere. To keep the cavalry charging and the mules carrying supplies, armies
typically had veterinarians to keep care for wounded animals and to ensure the animals' general
health. One could say that the role of the veterinarian was no different from that of a tank or truck
mechanic today, i.e., to keep the units moving. As a result of this, members of the veterinary
services are considered combatants under the Geneva Conventions and arguably are not entitled
to the same protections as other members of medical units.1 Article 19 of the 1949 Geneva
Convention dealing with the sick and wounded in the field states that fixed and mobile medical
units should be respected and under no circumstances attacked. Article 22, paragraph 4, states that,
if a medical unit includes members of the veterinary service, that does not deprive the medical unit
of the protections it has under Article 19. The natural inference is that members of the veterinary
service are not considered to be medical personnel for purposes of the Geneva Conventions.

From a practical standpoint, the role of veterinarians in the U.S. military today deals more with
preventive and public health for people, both military and civilian. Members of the veterinary
service check on sanitation conditions (including food and water), and they monitor and ensure
that proper sanitation conditions exist in prisoner of war/detention facilities to limit and to
eliminate disease. Because of this, despite indications to the contrary in the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, veterinarians within the U.S. Armed Forces are generally considered by the United

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States to be medical personnel within the meaning of Article 24 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
and therefore are entitled to the same protections as medical personnel.

This does not mean that warfare has evolved completely away from the use of animals for combat
operations. In Afghanistan, U.S. Special Forces members equipped with global positioning
satellite units and advanced communications systems traveled on horseback to locate Taliban and
Al-Qaeda forces and then provided regular forces with their locations to enable the bombing and
destruction of those forces. This was truly a merging of ages, with a man on horseback directing
advanced precision ordinance on target. For the protection of both military personnel and civilians,
the U.S. military uses dogs for numerous tasks, including the detection of explosives. In addition
to the use of dogs on land, the U.S. Navy is using sea mammals, such as dolphins equipped with
cameras to locate sea mines, whereas sea lions have been trained to detect and to locate swimmers
and divers who may be hostile, thus providing force protection to naval vessels that are anchored
offshore.2 Is it improper for veterinarians assigned to medical units, who normally provide
preventive health services, to also provide care and treatment to military animals? Do they lose
their right to be considered medical personnel for purposes of Article 24 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions? If so, why? If the basis is that they are supporting the war effort by caring for military
working animals, then why are physicians and other medical personnel afforded different treatment
when they provide care to military personnel for the express purpose of returning them to combat?
If veterinarians are denied protection because they are “horse mechanics,” then should physicians
be denied special protections because they are simply “people mechanics”?

FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES

Extraordinary circumstances often led men to do things that they otherwise would not. A classic
example in time of war is the case of SGT Alvin York, USA. York grew up in a very poor family
that scratched out a living in the hills of eastern Tennessee. To survive, the family farmed very
rocky terrain and hunted wild game. York, using an old muzzle-loading rifle, became an expert
marksman at a young age. Although he was a bit wild in his youth, he became a devote Christian
who was active in teaching within his church and firmly believed in the Ten Commandants,

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especially “Thou shalt not kill.” When the United States entered World War I in 1917, a nationwide
draft began, and York was drafted into the Army. Because of his strong religious beliefs, York
applied for an exception to the military on the basis of his beliefs, which is typically referred to as
“conscientious objector” status. Although even then the U.S. military granted these requests when
deemed appropriate, York's request was denied, for various reasons, and York entered the Army.
His superiors were informed of his request for exemption from service and watched him carefully.
Despite their fears that he might cause trouble, they were so impressed with his marksmanship
skills that they put him in charge of training his fellow recruits how to shoot.

When the time came for the unit to join the war in France, there was concern regarding what York
would do. York made it clear to his commander that, although he was willing to die for his country,
he would not kill for it; it was against his religious beliefs to do so. York and his fellow soldiers
were shipped to France. Shortly after arriving, York and a group of 17 of his fellow soldiers found
themselves accidentally behind enemy lines in the trenches, and a fire fight broke out. After seeing
several of his buddies killed, York sprang into action. Using his expert marksman skills, York,
with the aid of the eight remaining members of his unit, systematically shot and killed 25 Germans
and captured 132.

When word of what York and his fellow soldiers had done reached his commander (the same one
whom York had told he would not fight), curiosity got the better of the commander, who wanted
a full accounting of what had transpired. He met with York at the site of the action, and York
explained in detail what he did and why. The commander expected to hear that York had changed
his opinion on killing or that he had simply reacted to the situation around him, including the death
of his friends. Instead, what he heard was that York still believed it was wrong to kill but, as he
watched the death and destruction around him, he came to the conclusion that the only way to stop
the fighting and killing, and to save lives, was to kill. He then went on to explain that he engaged
only the targets that were necessary to stop the fighting; he did not kill simply for the sake of
killing or because they were the enemy.

For his actions, York was promoted to sergeant and given the nation's highest military award, the
Medal of Honor. He returned from Europe a national hero, who could have exploited the situation
and become a very wealthy man. Instead, he made it clear that he was not proud of what he had

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done and he did it only out of necessity. He went home to the hills of Tennessee, where he returned
to farming and teaching in church and tried to use his status to encourage children to stay in school
and to seek education.

The question that must naturally follow is, “What is the point of the story of Alvin York?” It is
simple, that what may normally be beyond the rationality of a man may become the lesser evil
when he is confronted with a situation and the situation may morally justify the action, although it
would normally be considered wrong. York did not act with malice, he did not act with a depraved
heart, he acted for the greater good of all, including, in his eyes, saving the lives of the Germans
he had captured by ending the war for them.

APPLICATION

This brings us to the larger philosophical question of when, if ever, it is permissible to use torture
and/or humiliation to extract information from prisoners. If it is permissible, for what purpose?
Should there be a distinction between the treatment of those who are military members and those
who are deemed terrorists? Is there a distinction that can be made when the target of terrorist
activities is the civilian population, as opposed to the government or the military?

As a general rule, the laws of most nations recognize the right of individuals to protect themselves
and others. Even the Geneva Conventions allow protected medical units to carry small arms for
the protection of themselves and those in their care (see Article 22 of the 1949 Convention for the
Amelioration of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, as well as Additional
Protocol 1, Article 13). If an individual is threatened with imminent death or grievous bodily harm,
then most governments sanction the right of the individual to use deadly force against the aggressor
or aggressors. Additionally, governments frequently “transfer” this authority to defend oneself to
another who is present. In other words, they recognize the basic right of self-defense and defense
of another. But where does this right to defense start and stop, especially in the age of international
terrorism?

It is easy to see an armed man pointing a gun at a child and to determine, at that moment, that the
child is in imminent danger. At that moment, the child or a third person has a right to respond to
the situation with deadly force. Terrorists do not typically work that way, however. They act with

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kidnapping, killing, and suicide bombers (which are prohibited under the Geneva Conventions;
see Additional Protocol 1, Article 85). They work in networks, with multiple people being involved
in their operations. As we have seen in Iraq, people are kidnapped and later executed by the groups.
If a member of such a group, or an associate who may have information, comes to the attention of
military or civil authorities, what (if anything) should they do? Should they question the person?
If they do and the person denies any knowledge of the kidnapping or the whereabouts of the victim
or the kidnappers, should they just allow the person to go, or should they hold the person? If they
hold the person, should they allow contact with outsiders or make it public that the person is in
custody? If they were prisoners of war, then there would be an obligation to provide information
to an organization such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (see Additional Protocol
1, Article 81, as well as Article 81 of the 1949 Convention for the Treatment of Prisoners of War),
but terrorists are not prisoners of war, they are criminals. Furthermore, if the detention of this
person becomes public, will it warn the terrorists that the authorities may be closing in on them,
thus possibly ensuring that the captive is killed? Finally, it should be noted that, even under the
Geneva Conventions, the protections afforded uniformed soldiers do not apply to spies who may
be members of the military (see Additional Protocol 1, Article 46). Should a terrorist be afforded
greater protection than a spy?

If detaining the suspected terrorist does not provide the information requested, what (if any)
measures can be taken to obtain the information? Can suspects be threatened, in a manner in which
they think they are in danger, to obtain information that may save innocent lives? Under Additional
Protocol 1, Article 75, this appears to be prohibited, but was this truly the intent in these types of
situations, or were these situations not foreseen?

EXAMPLE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

In August 2003, near Tikrit, Iraq, LTC Allen West, USA, learned that a group of insurgents
planned to attack him and his men. He also learned that a local Iraqi police officer was involved
and had knowledge of the plot. The police officer was taken into custody and interrogated. When
he claimed to know nothing, LTC West had some of his men physically assault the police officer.
When this did not work, LTC West fired his service pistol near the head of the police officer. The
police officer then provided detailed information on the planned attack, as well as other activities.

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When his superiors learned what LTC West had done, he was criminally charged with aggravated
assault and communicating a threat and faced the possibility of a court martial for his role in
interrogating the Iraqi policeman, as well as up to 8 to 11 years in prison. In the end, LTC West
was relieved of command, fined $5,000, and essentially forced to retire.4 Although obviously the
U.S. Army thought that LTC West's actions were wrong, there was a small but vocal group of
Americans, including many retired military officers, who thought that LTC West was justified in
his actions, because they viewed him as simply protecting his men. As one online commentary put
it, “It's not like West actually harmed the prisoner … he just scared the truth out of him and, as a
result saved some American troopers' lives and effectively slowed down the terrorism around
Tikrit.”5

It is important to note that the intended targets in this instance were LTC West and his men;
therefore, one could argue that LTC West, unlike Alvin York, acted out of malice and thus his
conduct could not be justified. In his report regarding the incident, LTC West stated, “In my anger,
I couldn't remember how many shots were fired”; this suggests that he was motivated by anger.6
Would the same conduct be considered justifiable if the acts were intended to break up an
assassination plot when the intended target was the head of state?

Let us change the facts and location and assume that we are in Afghanistan and the targets are
women who have dared to register to vote, targeted with the intent to terrorize women into not
voting and to attempt to destabilize the government.7 Are the actions justified? Under the Taliban,
it was illegal for girls to receive an education. Assume the target is a new school for girls and the
plan is to kill and to maim as many as possible in an effort to frighten all girls and their families
from attending school and learning to read.8 Does this justify the use of humiliation, scare tactics,
psychological methods to “break” the person, or the use of physical abuse, short of death and
permanent disability, to protect innocent people against terrorism? Does the protection of civilian
lives justify actions that normally would not be condoned?

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CONCLUSION

Baer and Baillat of the French Navy outlined a justification that, in certain circumstances, the
Law of Armed Conflict should be put aside for purposes of “military necessity.” Part of their
theory appears to be based on numerous references within the Geneva Conventions that prohibit
specific acts except when military necessity requires otherwise. Using the logic put forth by
those authors, it may be time to reexamine the application of international humanitarian law
when dealing with organizations, groups, and people who, although international, have no regard
for human life or the rule of law.

I started from the premise that the law is reactive, not proactive, and this holds true for all laws,
including the Law of Armed Conflict. With this in mind, it is time, in my opinion, to deal with
the issues of technology and terrorists. There must be rules to deal with groups of international
outlaws and terrorists, or at least a clear understanding of when the Law of Armed Conflict does
and does not apply.

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REFFRENCES

Books-

1. Johari, J.C., International Relations and Politics


2. Ghai, U.R., International Politics- Theory and Practice

Websites-

1. www.academic.oup.com
2. www.mi5.gov.uk
3. www.americanforeignrelations.com

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