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Dr. Manoj Kumar Mishra is currently is working as a Lecturer at

Authored by:
the Department of Political Science, S.V.M. Autonomous College,
Odisha, India. He has a PhD in International Relations from the
Dr. Manoj Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad, India.
Kumar Mishra
Previously, he served as the program coordinator at the School
of International Studies at Ravenshaw University in Odisha, India
and was also engaged in teaching Theories of International
Relations and India’s Foreign Policy to MA and M.Phil students.

He has many published articles and commentaries in journals

and magazines such as the Journal of Eurasian
Studies (Holland), Afro Eurasian Studies (Istanbul), Georgetown
Journal of International Affairs (Online Edition), World
Affairs (New Delhi), Journal of Peace Studies (New Delhi), The
Indian Journal of Political Science, Eurasia Review and
International Policy Digest.

i
Indo-US Strategic
Relations:
Strengths and Limits

ii
 The Indo-US strategic relations may
not be as promising as some leaders
and scholars from both sides
epitomize such as natural allies or
defining partners, but the history
suggests the relations will not decline
rather will witness a steady rise.

iii

Indo-US Strategic Relations: Strengths and Limits
Strategic relations between the US and
India evolved steadily and were steered
by multiple factors like size and
population of India, impact of Indian
soft power on US's leaders and people,
relative stability of Indian political and
economic system necessary for bilateral
trade and investment and alignment of
interests of both in containing a
militarily assertive and muscular China.
India’s relations with the US were
placed on a firm footing with robust
economic engagement and a defacto
nuclear power status for India with the
signing of the civil nuclear energy deal
in the post-Cold War era. Indo-US
relations began to change in a positive
direction in the final years of Clinton's
presidency which was further intensified
during the Jr. Bush regime. Even before
assuming power, Bush made some
favorable references to India during the
election campaign when Condoleezza
Opinion Paper [01]:
Rice, who became the national security
adviser during the Bush's first term,
noted in an article in Foreign Affairs in
early 2000 that the US should pay closer
attention to India's role in the regional
balance of South Asia for it “is not a
great power yet, but it has the potential
to emerge as one”.i
During his trip to the US in 2000, the
then Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari
Vajpayee seemed to return the
complement by depicting India and the
US as ‘natural allies’.ii He referred to the
shared values of democracy between the
largest and the oldest democracy in the
world. Henceforth, leaders from each
side have engaged themselves in
platitudes calling their relations as
natural or defining partnership.
However, more than the convergence of
their values, each of these countries
found the other relevant for own
interests. Deepening of ties between the
two countries have not been cultivated
Page | 1

Indo-US Strategic Relations: Strengths and Limits
within a short span of time rather they
have evolved gradually where hard and
soft power along with geopolitical
imperatives left their imprints steadily.
Notwithstanding steady evolution of
their relationship, differences in the
respective state’s power, ambitions and
role and concerns ordain many a times
differences in perspectives on
international issues. Based on these grey
areas, it can be argued that Indo-US
strategic relations are not poised to be as
promising as some leaders and scholars
from each side epitomize, with
references such as natural allies or
defining partners.
Goaded by their respective power and
interests, their stance on the ways to deal
with human rights issues, democracy and
use of force in international affairs also
varies. The US and/or NATO played a
proactive role in some instances like
Kosovo and Iraq by pointing to
Opinion Paper [01]:
disagreements and delay in decision
making within the UN framework and at
times, showed inefficacy of peaceful
measures against authoritarian regimes
thus bypassed the authorization of the
UN Security Council. In some other
instances like Libya and Syria, the US
and allies threw their weight behind UN
Security Council resolutions that
implicitly promoted the US or NATO’s
active role in strengthening anti-regime
forces, helped pushing the agenda of
democracy and assigned militaristic
roles without exhausting all the peaceful
options. New Delhi firmly argued that
any form of government be it
authoritarian, democratic or communist
is an internal affair and the consent of
the functioning state was required before
sending peace-keeping operations. iii It
further argued that it is the state with
which lies the prime responsibility of
human rights protection and supported
the argument that it is only when the
state fails or is unwilling to protect its
Page | 2

Indo-US Strategic Relations: Strengths and Limits
population, the international community
needs to come to its assistance. New
Delhi consistently pleaded at the UN that
military measures can be used as a last
resort only after all the peaceful
measures are exhausted, and strictly with
the authorization of the UN Security
Council.
India not only restrained from
recognizing the independence of
Kosovoiv, but also the US-led war on
Iraq were criticized in both houses of the
Indian Parliament and India decided not
to send troops to Iraq in support of US-
led war. v India abstained from some
specific UN Security Council resolutions
that assigned the US or NATO forces
with far-reaching mandate allegedly
threatening sovereignty of Libya vi and
Syria.vii India also made categorical
statements in the UN and other forums
about its concerns on the alleged
violation of sovereignty, starting from
Kosovo to Syria.
Opinion Paper [01]:
There are still many issues pending and
pacts to be signed in the areas of defense
in order to take off India’s strategic
relations (with the US) to the level
enjoyed by some traditional allies such
as Japan and NATO member-states. It is
worth remembering that the US, under
Obama Administration, recognized India
as a “major defense partner” in a joint
statement issued during Indian Prime
Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the
US. However, the US Senate rejected a
key amendment recognizing India as
“global strategic and defense partner”.viii
When signing the Logistics Exchange
Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA)
– one of the foundational agreements for
strategic defense partnership – the Indian
Defense Minister, Manohar Parrikar,
made it clear that the agreement would
not compromise India’s ‘strategic
autonomy’ because it neither makes
logistical support automatic or
obligatory nor does it involve allowing
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Indo-US Strategic Relations: Strengths and Limits

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Indo-US Strategic Relations: Strengths and Limits
military bases.ix India’s concerns for
sovereignty, idea of strategic autonomy
and the policy of multi-alignment come
in the way of close Indo-US strategic
partnership.
India has expressed concerns over the
second foundational agreement known
as Communications Compatibility and
Security Agreement (COMCASA),
which would enable high-end secured
communication equipment to be
installed on military platforms that India
would buy from the US instead of
current reliance on less secured
commercially available communication
systems on high-end US platforms.
Experts on strategic affairs and officials
and leaders relating to Indian Defense
Ministry have expressed their
reservations that the agreement in its
current form would facilitate US
intrusion into the Indian defense
communication systems and violate its
sovereignty by allowing visits by US
Opinion Paper [01]:
officials to Indian bases to inspect
equipments safeguarded under
x
COMCASA.
There are also arguments that India’s
indigenous military platforms and
already existing Russian military
platforms may not be compatible with
COMCASA. xi For materializing the
agreement, it has to allay Indian
concerns, and the discussions are
underway for a modified version. India
has to sign yet another agreement in
order to become a key strategic partner
of the US – namely the Basic Exchange
and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-
spatial Cooperation (BECA) – which the
US has proposed but no discussions have
taken place till date.
India’s policy of multi-alignment aims at
preventing India’s strategic over-
dependence on any major powers,
including the US. India’s wish to
continue close engagement with Russia
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 Opinion Paper [01]:
Indo-US Strategic Relations: Strengths and Limits

in the area of defense, as not only most
of the defense equipments and
technology still remain Russian, but also
Indian interest in signing new defense
deals with Russia – for instance, a $500
billion deal to purchase the S400 air
defense system from Russia – suggests
India’s inclination for a multi-alignment
foreign policy rather than putting all its
eggs in the US's basket.xii
However, despite differences in
perspectives, the history of bilateral
relations suggests that the graph will
witness a steady rise given the
diversified nature of their relationship.

Russian S400 missile system [Xinhua]

Page | 6

Indo-US Strategic Relations: Strengths and Limits
INDO-US RELATIONS DURING
THE COLD WAR ERA
India’s relations with the US are
perceived by and large frozen except a
few instances of US sanctions during the
Cold War given (i) India’s policy of
non-alignment, (ii) its first Prime
Minister Nehru’s leanings towards
socialist ideology and (iii) later on
India’s proclivity towards forging close
ties with the Soviet Union. xiii
The size and population of India
persuaded the US to try and bring India
into its Cold War military camp, prior to
the idea of Pakistan’s inclusion. India’s
expressed policy of non-alignment led
the US – desperate to contain Soviet
influence – to seek alliance in Pakistan.
Pakistan, at the time, was in a lookout
for an opportunity which could enable it
to match India’s power and overpower it
if possible.
Opinion Paper [01]:
Pakistan became a member of SEATO in
1954 even though it is not a Southeast
Asian country and was recipient of huge
amount of US aid. However, when
requested for military aid to avert border
war with China in 1962, India was
obliged by the US – something for
which Pakistan felt betrayed. It was
largely due to the then Kennedy
Administration’s belief that a country of
India’s size and population provided the
bulwark of stability in South Asia
against Chinese ambitions.xiv
Furthermore, in 1965, when Pakistan
and India fought a war, the then Johnson
Administration, moved by the belief that
most of the US military aid provided to
contain communism has been diverted to
military build-up and war against India,
suspended military assistance to
Pakistan. xv
The Cold War was a period of
occasional – yet valuable – US support.
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Indo-US Strategic Relations: Strengths and Limits
India became recipient of continuous
food supply under US PL-480 aid
program and, therefore, could avoid poor
harvest, famine and divert scarce
resources towards industrial
development in the heydays of the Cold
War. Many scholars, however, expressed
their concerns regarding an agrarian
country’s [India's] dependence on the
US for food stuff, something that
primarily represented corporate interests.
Support of the US government, the role
of the US Agency for International
Development (USAID) and the role of
the US scientists – all of these elements
cannot be underestimated in bringing
green-revolution in India, with the
possibility of making India more self-
reliant in agricultural output.xvi India’s
soft power had its impact on the US
Presidents like Dwight Eisenhower and
John F. Kennedy who were aware of the
fact that the non-aligned countries like
India, Egypt and Indonesia could play a
Opinion Paper [01]:
decisive role during the Cold War with
their power of attraction and, therefore,
sought to engage these countries through
constructive diplomacy. xvii
In the very beginning of the 1970s,
Pakistan facilitated lines of
communication between the US and
China, becoming quite favorite of the
then Nixon Administration. In support of
Pakistan, the US moved its Seventh
Fleet to the Bay of Bengal during 1971
Indo-Pak War [also known as the
Liberation War of Bangladesh] that was
waged on the question to determine
the future of East Pakistan [now
Bangladesh].
Despite then US Administration’s
continued support for the Pakistani army
General’s attempt to subdue the
independence struggle of East Pakistan
[now Bangladesh], the American Gallup
poll in 1971 voted the then Indian Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi as the most
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Indo-US Strategic Relations: Strengths and Limits
admired person in the world for her role
in the creation of the independent
Bangladesh. xviii The US Administration
eventually withdrew its military support
during the last stage of the war.
Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
(1917-1984) at the National Press Club,
Washington, D.C. 1n 1966 [Wikimedia
Commons]
Opinion Paper [01]:
GROWTH IN INDO-US
RELATIONS DESPITE
US’S DEPENDENCE ON PAKISTAN
FOR ‘WAR ON TERROR’
India opened up its economy in 1991
and shed its professed obsession with
socialistic ideology, moving closer
towards the West ideologically and in
terms of public policy. Many sectors of
the Indian economy – hitherto closed for
the US – had opened for economic
engagements. The US software
industries were flush with Indian
professionals in the US and many
worked for them offshore.
As a semblance of US's recognition of
India’s growing economic clout, the
Clinton Administration forcefully
intervened to pressure Pakistan to
withdraw its forces sent across the Line
of Control in Kashmir near the town of
Kargil in mid-1999. In the same year,
Pakistan was subject to US sanctions
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 Opinion Paper [01]:
Indo-US Strategic Relations: Strengths and Limits

following the removal of a

democratically elected government by
an army chief Pervez Musharraf
through military coup.xix

The Bush Administration, being

aware of India’s economic and
military clout, de-hyphenated the
relationship between India and
Pakistan by making it clear that while
it was keen on having good
relationship with Pakistan, India
would be treated on its own right and
not in reference to US's ties with
Pakistan. xx

India's response to the changing US

gestures was very positive. India was
one of the countries to have
responded immediately, positively
and enthusiastically to Bush's
allegedly controversial National
Missile Defense (NMD) program.

Pervez Musharraf in the Pentagon in 2002 [US Department of

Defense photo by Helene C. Stikkel]

Page | 10
 Opinion Paper [01]:
Indo-US Strategic Relations: Strengths and Limits

When the US declared the ‘War on

Terror’, India expected a greater role
in the reconstruction of the economy
and polity of the post-9/11 Afghanistan
and, therefore, declared its immediate
support and within a short time the
government had offered all logistic
help to Washington. The US lifted
nuclear sanctions against India in the
wake of 9/11 and eased export controls
on so-called dual-technologies, which
could serve both civilian and military
purposes.xxi

However, once Pakistan joined the

War on Terror, its geostrategic location
allowed it a bigger role in Afghanistan
in the provision of supply routes for
the US and NATO convoys, and the
US had to rely heavily on intelligence
inputs from Pakistan to curb militancy
in Afghanistan.xxii

Notwithstanding the US's increased

Twin Towers on September 11, 2001, New York City [Pinterest] dependence on Pakistan, the relations

Page | 11

Indo-US Strategic Relations: Strengths and Limits
between the US and India – during the
Bush Administration – cemented with
the signing of the Indo-US Civil Nuclear
Deal in 2005, with the intention to
facilitate the supply of the US's nuclear
energy technology, uranium and reactors
to India for civilian purposes. The deal
poised to provide India with all benefits
that the signatories to the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT) receive,
although India had been refuting to sign
the treaty even under the US's pressure.
This is a milestone in bilateral relations
between India and the US from Indian
perspective despite legitimate concerns
regarding liability issues and commercial
non-viability of the deal. The deal came
with the recognition of India as a nuclear
weapons power.
During the time when the deal was in the
process, Indian nuclear-power-plants had
been facing the problem of uranium
shortage and some were on the verge of
shutdown. Russia insisted that it would
Opinion Paper [01]:
be able to authorize the supply of
uranium only after India got approval of
the Nuclear Suppliers Group.xxiii In this
context, the pertinence of this deal rose
in significance. The deal is also
significant from another perspective as it
could never have been possible without
the US's recognition of India as a
sensible nuclear-weapon-power with
declared policies of ‘no first use’ and
‘minimum credible deterrence’.xxiv
It can be seen in contrast to the US's
perception of Pakistan, which allegedly
passed on sensitive nuclear information
to Iran and Libya and its continued
instability raised the specter of nuclear
weapons falling into the hands of
militants. The deal opened up further
possibilities of Indo-US engagement on
strategic issues.
As the war in Afghanistan deepened, the
Obama Administration’s dependence on
Pakistan increased. The administration’s
Page | 12

Indo-US Strategic Relations: Strengths and Limits
Af-Pak strategy indicated that the US
seemed more interested in taking on
those terrorist groups who were against
the western interests by concentrating on
the Af-Pak area whereas the center for
cross-border terrorism across the Line of
Control between India and Pakistan was
[allegedly] located in some of the eastern
provinces of Pakistan. xxv
However, the Indian concern that the
‘War on Terror’ should be an all-out
fight against militant groups that are
organically linked with each other found
little resonance in the US foreign policy
concerns.
Pakistan became the recipient of
enormous US aid to fight terrorism, and
the territorial integrity and
socioeconomic development also
deserved the US's attention and aid with
the primary concern that Pakistan did not
collapse and its nuclear arsenal did not
fall into the hands of militants.xxvi
Opinion Paper [01]:
Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008 had led
the US leadership to condemn such acts
and express solidarity with India to fight
terrorism. Furthermore, when the US
forces killed Osama bin Laden – who
was [allegedly] sheltered by the
xxvii
Pakistani authorities – in Abbottabad
in 2011, the US relationship with
Pakistan touched a new low.
What's more, two US Congress
legislators had taken the efforts to
introduce a bill designating Pakistan as a
state sponsor of terrorism, showing signs
of promising strategic partnership
between India and the US following the
terrorist attack on Uri military camp in
India during the concluding phase of
Obama Administration.
However, the Obama Administration’s
plan to withdraw the US forces from
Afghanistan (by fixing timeline for it)
prevented the US from taking harsh
measures against Pakistan. Instead, the
Page | 13

Indo-US Strategic Relations: Strengths and Limits
US's dependence on Pakistan increased,
as the US was seeking a political
solution to the Afghan conundrum.
It's worth noting that the US, under the
Obama Administration, and India signed
the bilateral Logistics Exchange
Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA)
giving each of the two military access to
the other's facilities for supplies and
repairs in a major attempt to take
defense relations between these two
countries a notch ahead.
The succeeding US administration under
Trump, from the beginning, was
categorical about the alleged role of
Pakistan in sponsoring terrorism and,
therefore, came out with unambiguous
expression of deep concerns and
criticisms following the alleged
mastermind of Mumbai terrorist attack
Hafiz Saeed's release from house arrest
in Pakistan. The Trump administration
not only withheld military assistance to
Opinion Paper [01]:
Pakistan condemning its role in
harboring ‘the agents of chaos’, it clearly
expressed its desire to cast India in a
more prominent role in its policy
concerning the South Asian and the
Indo-Pacificxxviiiregions.
Indo-US strategic relations deepened
gradually during almost all the US
administrations and different factors
contributed to the strengthening of the
relations. While the US support for
Pakistan waxed and waned quickly, the
US relations with India grew
independent of the US's relations with
Pakistan. India’s interests and concerns
were not completely ignored by the US
even during the Cold War years
notwithstanding Pakistan’s
dissatisfaction as an ally. The breadth of
US and India relations has widened
considerably after the end of the Cold
War with opening up of the Indian
economy and deepening of defense ties.
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 Opinion Paper [01]:
Indo-US Strategic Relations: Strengths and Limits

Page | 15

Indo-US Strategic Relations: Strengths and Limits
DIVERGENCES OF ROLES AND
INTERESTS
India has expressed its willingness to
continue close defense ties with Russia
not only for repairing and updating of its
existing Russian made defense
equipments, but also for new defense
deals in order to diversify its military
supplies as part of its policy of multi-
alignment – something that is not a
welcome development in the eyes of
Washington.
The US has expressed its displeasure at
the Indian move to buy air-defense-
system from Russia – the state with
which any major defense deals are to
face sanctions under the US law. India’s
invitation to Russia to become a part of
Russia's Indo-Pacific vision will not be
seen favorably in Washington.
This invitation to become a part of its
Indo-Pacific vision while simultaneously
engaging the US, Japan, Australia – is
Opinion Paper [01]:
clearly reflective of India’s policy of
multi-alignment and its attempt at
normalization of relations with China
during Indian Prime Minister Modi’s
visit to China is indicative of India’s
reluctance to throw its weight behind the
US’s strategy of containing Chinese
influence.xxix
India has shown willingness to cooperate
with other developing countries like
Brazil, South Africa and China in
providing leadership on climate issues
within the framework of BASIC and
address the environmental grievances of
less developing and underdeveloped
countries. These countries, along with
Russia, formed BRICS and expressed
their intentions of working closely on
issues of development and financing.
India has also been a part of IBSA
Dialogue forum consisting of India,
Brazil and South Africa to discuss and
cooperate on the issues of agriculture,
Page | 16

Indo-US Strategic Relations: Strengths and Limits
trade, culture and defense. All these
indicate India’s willingness to diversify
its relations on the basis of commonality
of interests and purpose within the rubric
of South-South cooperation.xxx
Further to these aforesaid factors, India’s
willingness to forge close ties with Iran
for energy supplies and gain
accessibility to Afghanistan – bypassing
Pakistan – is at odds with the Trump
Administration’s withdrawal from the
2015 Iran nuclear deal and with the
attempt of bringing-in new sanctions
against Iran.xxxi
What’s more, the US would find it
difficult to abandon Pakistan despite its
displeasure and rhetoric castigating
Pakistan for not doing enough to contain
militancy against US presence in
Afghanistan. The alternatives to the
Pakistani intelligence inputs to curb
militancy and the alternatives to the
supply routes for the US and NATO
Opinion Paper [01]:
convoys are not currently available to
the US. Furthermore, the US-Iran
tensions and Russian caution against any
heightened US presence in Russian
backyard would drive the impetus of the
US's dependence on Pakistan for supply
routes. These aforesaid factors will
remain as irritants in the Indo-US
relations.
India and the US have expressed their
differences over trade related issues and
sued each other in WTO on a spate of
issues. Each of them has attracted the
attention of the other towards the
protectionist measures each pursued.
India’s environmental concerns and the
need for assistance have been sidelined
by the US when Trump decided to walk
away from the Paris Climate
Agreement. xxxii
Global aspirations and role of the US
and its willingness to invest its resources
in different parts of the globe have rarely
Page | 17

Indo-US Strategic Relations: Strengths and Limits
been supported by India which is
normally expected from strategic
partners. India’s limited power and role
and its willingness to preserve its hard-
won independence and sovereignty and
political compulsion of preventing
internationalization of Kashmir issue led
India to express strong disagreement
with the US as regards viewpoints and
role in Kosovo, Iraq, Libya, Ukraine and
Syria to name a few.
Indo-US strategic relations will also
depend on how both fare on the
proposed two foundational agreements
on major defense partnership – namely
COMCASA and BECA. Therefore, there
are areas for both sides to work on.
Keeping their respective role and
aspirations in perspective, the Indo-US
strategic relations may not be as
promising as some leaders and scholars
from each side epitomize such as natural
allies or defining partners, but the
Opinion Paper [01]:
history suggests they will not decline
rather will witness a steady rise.
i
C. Rice, “Campaign 2000: Promoting the
National Interest”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79,
January/February 2000, Available at
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2000-
01-01/campaign-2000-promoting-national-
interest
ii
M. Parthasarathy, “India, U.S. natural allies:
Vajpayee”, The Hindu, September 9, 2000,
Available at
https://www.thehindu.com/2000/09/09/stories
/01090005.htm
iii
For details see, K. Pethiyagoda, “India’s
Approach to Humanitarian intervention and the
Responsibility to Protect”, Working Paper,
Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed
Conflict, pp. 1-29.
iv
S. Parasar, “India to support Serbia’s stand on
Kosovo in UN” The Times of India, September
21, 2008, Available at
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-
Page | 18

Indo-US Strategic Relations: Strengths and Limits
to-support-Serbias-stand-on-Kosovo-in-
UN/articleshow/3510467.cms
v
H. Khare, “India not to send troops to Iraq”,
The Hindu, July 13, 2003 Available at
https://www.thehindu.com/2003/07/13/stories
/2003071305290100.htm
vi
“India Abstains from UN vote on Libya”, The
Hindu, March 19, 2011, Available at
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Indi
a-abstains-from-U.N.-vote-on-
Libya/article14952398.ece
vii
“India Abstains from voting on UNGA
Resolution on Syria”, The Times of India,
December 10, 2016, Available at
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-
abstains-from-voting-on-UNGA-resolution-on-
Syria/articleshow/55908257.cms
viii
“India downplays US Senate rejecting bill on
global strategic and defence partner status” The
Indian Express, June 16, 2016, Available at
https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-
news-india/india-downplays-us-senate-
rejecting-bill-on-global-strategic-and-defence-
partner-status-2856078/
ix
“India, US sign key defence pact to use each
other’s bases for repair, supplies”, The India
Opinion Paper [01]:
Express, August 31, 2016, Available at
https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-
news-india/manohar-parrikar-signs-key-
logistics-defence-pact-with-us-3004581/
x
P.D. Samanta, “India, US to open talks on
Comcasa”, The Economic Times, March 27,
2018, Available at
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/de
fence/india-us-to-reopen-talks-on-
comcasa/articleshow/63474835.cms
xi
P. Stobdan, “Whither the Indo-US Defence
Partnership”, Indian Defence Review, June 30,
2018.
xii
M. Pubby, “India’s Purchase of Russian S-400
to curb military cooperation: US”, The Economic
Times, May 29, 2018, Available at
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/de
fence/purchase-of-russian-s-400-to-curb-
military-coop-us/articleshow/64363168.cms
xiii
A. Kapur, “India’s Path was Paved by Soviet
Fall”, The New York Times, November 19, 2009,
Available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/20/world/a
sia/20iht-letter.html
Page | 19

Indo-US Strategic Relations: Strengths and Limits
xiv
For details see, R.N. Das, “The US Factor in
Sino-Indian Relations: India’s Fine Balancing”,
IDSA Monograph Series, No. 46, October 2015.
xv
H. Haqqani, “A Non-Ally Relationship with
Pakistan”, The American Interest, January 12,
2018, Available at https://www.the-american-
interest.com/2018/01/12/non-ally-relationship-
pakistan/
xvi
For details on American aid policy on
Agricultural Development see “USAID’s Legacy
in Agricultural Development: 50 years of
Progress”, US Agency for International
Development Bureau for Food Security Report,
2013, pp. 1-182.
xvii
M.K. Mishra, “The Impacts and Limits of
India’s Soft Power”, Georgetown Journal of
International Affairs, online edition, March 28,
2016, Available at
https://www.georgetownjournalofinternational
affairs.org/online-edition/the-impacts-and-
limits-of-indias-soft-power
xviii
A. Ray, “1971: When Indira Gandhi outwitted
Nixon”, National Herald, November 19, 2017,
Available at
https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/opinion/
1971-when-indira-gandhi-outwitted-nixon
Opinion Paper [01]:
xix
“US-Pakistan Relations take nosedive: A look
back at the tempestuous ties between the two
nations”, FIRSTPOST, January 11, 2018, Available
at https://www.firstpost.com/world/us-
pakistan-ties-on-the-fritz-a-look-back-at-the-
tempestuous-diplomacy-between-two-nations-
4297987.html
xx
For details on Dehyphenation policy of Jr.
Bush see, A. J. Tellis, “The Merits of
Dehyphenation: Explaining U.S. Success in
Engaging India and Pakistan”, The Washington
Quarterly, Autumn 2008, pp. 21-42.
xxi
S. Krishnaswami, “U.S. lifts sanctions against
India, Pak”, The Hindu, September 24, 2001,
Available at
https://www.thehindu.com/2001/09/24/stories
/01240001.htm
xxii
L. T. Hadar, Pakistan in America’s War Against
Terrorism: Strategic Ally or Unreliable Client”,
Cato Policy Analysis, No. 436, May 8, 2002,
Available at
https://object.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa436.pdf
xxiii
S. Baru, “An Agreement that was called a
deal”, The Hindu, July 21, 2015, Available at
https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/indiau
sa-stand-in-nuclear-deal/article7444348.ece
Page | 20

Indo-US Strategic Relations: Strengths and Limits
xxiv
M. K. Mishra, “Doctrine of India’s Strategic
Restraint: India’s Nuclear Agreement with
Japan”, International Policy Digest, December
17, 2015, Available at
https://intpolicydigest.org/2015/12/17/doctrine
-of-strategic-restraint-and-india-s-nuclear-
agreement-with-japan/
xxv
For detailed analysis on Obama’s AfPak
strategy see, M. W. Aslam, Understanding the
‘Pak’ in ‘AfPak’: the Obama Administration’s
security policy for Pakistan at the mid-term”,
Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter
Terrorism, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2012, pp. 2-21.
xxvi
Ibid.
xxvii
David Headley’s interrogation revealed
Pakistani intelligence agency ISI’s alleged
connections with al-Qaeda and LeT.
xxviii
The Indo-Pacific is a biogeographic region of
Earth’s seas, comprising the tropical waters of
the Indian Ocean, the western and central
Pacific Ocean, and the seas connecting the two
in the general area of Indonesia. The term’s
profile was raised when it found mention in the
joint statement issued by the Indian Prime
Minister Narendra Modi and United States
President Donald Trump after the former’s state
visit to the White House on 26 June 2017.
Opinion Paper [01]:
xxix
S. Haidar, “US-Japan-India-Australia Quad:
New Delhi charts new line on Indo-Pacific
policy”, The Hindu, June 8, 2018, Available at
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/us-
japan-india-australia-quad-new-delhi-charts-
new-line-on-indo-pacific-
policy/article24113900.ece
xxx
S. Bilal, “The Rise of South-South Relations:
Development Partnerships Reconsidered”,
European Centre for Development Policy
Management, May 30, 2012, Available at
https://www.vvob.be/files/publicaties/2012053
0_ontwikkelingsdebat_bilal_05-12_south-
south_partnership.pdf
xxxi
“Trump move to re-impose sanctions on Iran
to hit Indian Economy”, The Times of India, May
9, 2018, Available at
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/in
dia-business/trump-move-to-re-impose-
sanctions-on-iran-to-hit-indian-economy-
assocham/articleshow/64098129.cms
xxxii
C. Roberts, Trump Walked Away from the
Paris Deal, But others are Leaning in”,
Huffington post, January 6, 2018, Available at
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/opinion
-roberts-paris-
climate_us_5b114b14e4b02143b7cbc7fb
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