EN BANC

[G.R. No. 45081. July 15, 1936.]

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner, vs. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO
YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR, respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Solicitor-General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEPARATION OF POWERS. — The separation of
powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
2. ID.; ID.; SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES. — But it does not follow from the
fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended
them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of various departments of government. For example, the Chief Executive under
our Constitution is 80 far made a check on the legislative power that his assent is required in
the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a
law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-
fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to
convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the
National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through
its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain officers; and the
concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties.
Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be
established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National
Assembly exercises to a certain extent control over the judicial department. The Assembly
also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of
its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if
violative of the Constitution.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIARY THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONAL ARBITER TO ALLOCATE
CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES. — But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with
deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the
judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and
duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where
the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement,
the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which
can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MODERATING POWER OF THE JUDICIARY IS GRANTED, IF
NOT EXPRESSLY, BY CLEAR IMPLICATION. — As any human production,
our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within
the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is
the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government
intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and
balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument.
The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon
governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended, it
would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct
the course of government along constitutional channels, for, then, the distribution of powers
would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles
of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions
embodied in the Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United
States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of
this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there,
has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication
from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHAT IS MEANT BY "JUDICIAL SUPREMACY". —
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature,
scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality
of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under
the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
"judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW LIMITED TO ACTUAL LITIGATION; WISDOM,
JUSTICE OR EXPEDIENCY OF LEGISLATION. — Even then, this power of judicial review is
limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by
the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this
manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments not only because the Legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect
the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of the government.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; SYSTEM ITSELF NOT THE CHIEF PALLADIUM OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY; SUCCESS MUST BE TESTED IN THE CRUCIBLE OF
FILIPINO MINDS AND HEARTS. — But much as we might postulate on the internal checks
of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered that, in the
language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional
liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their
eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of
their constitution." In the last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our government
in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in
the consultation rooms and court chambers.
8. ID.; OUR CONSTITUTION HAS ADOPTED THE AMERICAN TYPE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT. — Discarding the English type and other European
types of constitutional government, the framers of our Constitution adopted the American type
where the written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In
some countries which have declined to follow the American example, provisions have been
inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to interpret the
fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the
absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume what is logically their function. For
instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no
power to examine the validity of statutes (article 81, chapter IV). The former
Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose constitutions are
silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece,
Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to
Constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts 121-
123, Title IX, Constitution of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are
established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws.
9. ID.; JURISDICTION OVER THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION. — The nature of the
present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the
conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. If the conflict were left
undecided and undetermined, a void would be created in our constitutional system which may
in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must
we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
10. ID.; THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION; CONSTITUTIONAL GRANT OF POWER
TO THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION TO BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS
RELATING TO THE ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. — The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule that the assembly shall be the
judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken from clause 1 of
section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the United States providing that "Each House shall be
the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ." The Act of
Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the insertion of the
word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be
the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members, . . ."
apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred upon
each House of the Legislature over the particular cases therein specified. This court has had
occasion to characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and House of
Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete". (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers
of Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)
11. ELECTORAL COMMISSION; HISTORICAL INSTANCES. — The transfer of the
power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Legislature
long lodged in the legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is
by no means a mere experiment in the science of government. As early as 1868, the House
of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the non-partisan settlement of the
controverted elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of the King's
Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance with rules of court made
for the purpose. Having proved successful, the practice has become imbedded in English
jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by
Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act, 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt
and Illegal Practices Prevention Act 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51], s. 70; Expiring Laws
Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p.
787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which were originally heard by the
Committee of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the
Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which were originally determined by each
house, are since 1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all
protests against the election of members of the Upper House of Diet are to be resolved by the
Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of
Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May 13,
1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly
in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative contests, the Constitution of the
German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of
February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art.
43) all provide for an Electoral Commission.
12. ID.; ELECTORAL COMMISSION IN THE UNITED STATES. — The creation of
an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from the legislature and the
judiciary is by no means unknown in the United States. In the presidential elections of 1876
there was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes received by each of the two opposing
candidates. As the Constitution made no adequate provision for such a contingency,
Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap.
37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral Commission composed of five members elected
by the Senate, five members elected by the House of Representatives, and five justices of the
Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the four designated in the Act. The decision
of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two houses voting separately.
Although there is not much moral lesson to be derived from the experience of America in this
regard, the experiment has at least abiding historical interest.
13. ID.; ID.; FAMILIARITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION WITH THE HISTORY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF OTHER
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD; ELECTORAL COMMISSION IS THE EXPRESSION OF THE
WISDOM AND ULTIMATE JUSTICE OF THE PEOPLE. — The members of the Constitutional
Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority men mature in years and
experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political development
of other countries of the world. When, therefore, they deemed it wise to create
an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function
of passing upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own experience
but also having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation
of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of
our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members
of the Convention to its creation, the plan was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against
58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the Constitution, the creation of
the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the people".
(Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE WAS TO TRANSFER IN ITS TOTALITY POWER
EXERCISED PREVIOUSLY BY THE LEGISLATURE OVER THE CONTESTED ELECTIONS
OF THE MEMBERS TO AN INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL. — From the
deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in
its totality all the powers previously exercised by the Legislature in matters pertaining to
contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so
much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however,
as the long-felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations
which prompted the people acting through their delegates to the Convention to provide for this
body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which
both the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in
its deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its
membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
15. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION IS AN INDEPENDENT
CONSTITUTIONAL CREATION ALTHOUGH FOR PURPOSES OF CLASSIFICATION IT IS
CLOSER TO THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT THAN TO ANY OTHER. —
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority
in the performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by
the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all
intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It
is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to any other. The location of the
provision (sec. 4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative
Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its composition is also significant in that it
is constituted by a majority of members of the Legislature. But it is a body separate from and
independent of the Legislature.
16. ID.; ID; ID.; GRANT OF POWER TO
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION INTENDED TO BE AS COMPLETE AND UNIMPAIRED
AS IF IT HAD REMAINED ORIGINALLY IN THE LEGISLATURE. — The grant of power to
the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the Legislature. The express lodging of that
power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the
National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an
express prohibition in the constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs.
Whisman, 33 S. D., 260; L. R. A., 1917B, 1). If the power claimed for the National Assembly
to regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of
the Electoral Commission to lay down a period within which protest should be filed were
conceded, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective.
The Electoral Commission in such a case would be invested with the power to determine
contested cases involving the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly.
Not only would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this
authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the
resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be
presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of
cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority effective
whenever and wherever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that
intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part
of the National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by
the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to
the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be
permitted.
17. ID.; ID.; ID; ID.; THE POWER TO PROMULGATE INCIDENTAL RULES AND
REGULATIONS LODGED ALSO IN THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION BY NECESSARY
IMPLICATION. — The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate
rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests intrusted to its
cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is
conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or
the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed.,
vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the
procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the
incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive
powers to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also
in the Electoral Commission.
18. ID; ID.; ID.; POSSIBILITY OF ABUSE NO ARGUMENT AGAINST GRANT OF
POWER. — The possibility of abuse is not an argument against the concession of the power
as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse. If any mistake has been committed in
the creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all
cases relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
the remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary processes of
democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to be corrected by the
judiciary. The people in creating the Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in
this body in the exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned to it, as it has given
to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies of the
government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each
constitutional organ working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action must be
deemed to be animated with same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which
they were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional agencies
might leave much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the imperfections of human
institutions. From the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in the
exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or
unconstitutional, may not be challenged in appropriate cases over which the courts may
exercise jurisdiction.
19. ID.; ID.; ID.; FACTS OF THE CASE; EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS. — The
Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date
the Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went
into effect. The new National Assembly convened on November 25, of that year, and the
resolution confirming the election of the petitioner was approved by that body on December
3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent against the election of the petitioner was filed
on December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show when
the Electoral Commission was formally organized but it does appear that on December 9,
1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said
date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly
passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the
National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said
body had actually been organized. As a matter of fact, according to certified copies of official
records on file in the archives division of the National Assembly attached to the record of this
case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court and the six
members of the National Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission were respectively
designated only on December 4 and 6, 1936. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly
confirming non-protested elections of members of the National Assembly had the effect of
limiting or tolling the time for the presentation of protests, the result would be that the National
Assembly — on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power of regulation in such
cases — had already barred the presentation of protests before
the Electoral Commission had had time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and
method to be followed in a matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution.
This result was not and could not have been contemplated, and should be avoided.
20. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CAN NOT
DEPRIVE THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF ITS AUTHORITY TO FIX THE TIME
WITHIN WHICH PROTESTS AGAINST THE ELECTION, RETURNS AND
QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD BE FILED. —
Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members against whom
no protests has been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1936, can not be
construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might
have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of members of the
Legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the Legislature,
confirmation alone by the Legislature cannot be construed as depriving
the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the
National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose election no protests have
been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. Confirmation of the election of any member
is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member. As a
matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle
a member-elect to a seat in the National Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in
said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).
DECISION

LAUREL, J p:

This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for
the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of
the respondents, from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another
respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for
the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents
are as follows:
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and
the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for
the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of
Tayabas;
(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the
petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received
the most number of votes;
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;
(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed
the following resolution:
"[No. 8]
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS
DIPUTADOS CONTRAQUIENES NO SE HA PRESENTADO PROTESTA.

"Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes
no se hubiere presentado debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de la
presente resolucion sean, como por la presente, son aprobadas y confirmadas.
"Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935."
(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua, filed before
the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner,
Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolution No. 8 aforequoted,
and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the
National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be
nullified;
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution,
paragraph 6 of which provides:
"6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya
presentado en o antes de este dia."
(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the
respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to
Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted
in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which
protests against the election of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid
resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and
(c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period;
(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer
to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the
presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the National Assembly, after
confirmation;
(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply"
to the aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal";
(10) That the case being submitted for decision,
the Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein
petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the
writ prayed for:
(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon
the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National
Assembly;
(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the
proceedings of said election contests, which power has been reserved to the Legislative
Department of the Government or the National Assembly;
(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of
the Constitution, whose exclusive jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of
controversies submitted to hem for decision and to matters involving their internal
organization, the Electoral Commission can regulate its proceedings only if the National
Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so regulate such proceedings;
(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be
respected and obeyed;
(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution and paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd
Congress of the United States) as well as under sections 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and
2) of article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the
fundamental question herein raised because it involves an interpretation of the Constitution of
the Philippines.
On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf
of the respondent Electoral Commission interposing the following special defenses:
(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an
instrumentality of the Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, fixing this date as the last day
for the presentation of protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly,
it acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted it by
the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry out the powers and
functions conferred upon the same by the fundamental law; that in adopting its resolution of
January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in
question, and declaring itself with jurisdiction to take cognizance of said protest, it acted in the
legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions as an instrumentality of the Legislative
Department of the Commonwealth Government, and hence said act is beyond the judicial
cognizance or control of the Supreme Court;
 (b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the
election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been
filed, could not and did not deprive the Electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to take
cognizance of election protests filed within the time that might be set by its own rules;
(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi- judicial functions,
created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not an
"inferior tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person" within the purview of sections 226 and
516 of the Code of Civil Procedure, against which prohibition would lie.
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own
behalf on March 2, 1936, setting forth following as his special defense:
(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on
December 9, 1935, there was no existing Law fixing the period within which protests against
the election of members of the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission was exercising
a power impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial
attributes;
(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before
the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules
of the said Electoral Commission;
(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed
by said respondent and over the parties thereto, and the resolution of
the Electoral Commission of January 23, 1936, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss said
protest was an act within the jurisdiction of the said commission, and is not reviewable by
means of a writ of prohibition;
(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National
Assembly of the election of its members, and that such confirmation does not operate to limit
the period within which protests should be filed as to deprive the Electoral Commission of
jurisdiction over protests filed subsequent thereto;
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by
the Constitution, endowed with quasi-judicial functions, whose decisions are final and
unappeallable;
(f) That the Electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior
tribunal, corporation, board or person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code
of Civil Procedure; and that neither under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of Article II (should
be article VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance appended
thereto could it be subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions to a writ of prohibition
from the Supreme Court;
(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd
Congress of the United States) has no application to the case at bar.
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for
decision, the petitioner prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against the
respondent Electoral Commission which petition was denied "without passing upon the merits
of the case" by resolution of this court of March 21, 1936.
There was no appearance for the other respondents. The issues to be decided in the
case at bar may be reduced to the following two principal propositions:
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly?
We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the
controversy. However, the question of jurisdiction having been presented, we do not feel
justified in evading the issue. Being a case primæ impressionis, it would hardly be consistent
with our sense of duty to overlook the broader aspect of the question and leave it undecided.
Neither would we be doing justice to the industry and vehemence of counsel were we not to
pass upon the question of jurisdiction squarely presented to our consideration.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and
is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are
to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is
so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of
laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law
notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-
fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to
convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the
National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through
its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain officers; and the
concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties.
Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be
established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National
Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises
the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court
as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to
determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of
the Constitution.
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines,
allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several
departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the
other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of
the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of
conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the
integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and
perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their
delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however
limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a
harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations
and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain
language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these
restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had
not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional
channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere
expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms.
Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should
be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is
found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak
of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence
for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is
granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the
nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it
does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn
and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the
rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved
in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under
the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited
further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption
of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to
abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases
and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through
their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in
our Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered that, in the language of James
Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the people
who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready
to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of their constitution." In the
last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our government in the unfolding years to
come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and
court chambers.
In the case at bar, the National Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3,
1935, confirmed the election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand,
the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as
the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the National
Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National
Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain
protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
submitted after December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of
December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if as contended by the
respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to
the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which
the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests against the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave
constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one hand, and
the Electoral Commission on the other. From the very nature of the republican government
established in our country in the light of American experience and of our own, upon the judicial
department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting
the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we
shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose,
namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered
with, when the while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond
the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to
constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the
government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law
between departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined
by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other
European types of constitutional government, the framers of our Constitution adopted the
American type where the written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial
department. In some countries which have declined to follow the American example,
provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the
power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would
be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume what is logically
their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts
shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former
Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose constitutions are
silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece,
Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to
Constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts.
121-123, Title IX, Constitution of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are
established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present
controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of
authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take
cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left
undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system
which may in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions
is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional
system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the
admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over
the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose
of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to
the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the
second proposition and determine whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to
take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding
the previous confirmation thereof by the National Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able
counsel for the petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4
of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the
Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National
Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes,
and three by the party having the second largest number of votes herein. The senior Justice
in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into the origin and history of this
constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its framers and the people who
adopted it so that we may properly appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902
(sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of
the Constitution of the United States providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of the
Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members, . . .." The Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as
follows: "That the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges
of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members, . . ." apparently in order
to emphasize the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred upon each House of the
Legislature over the particular cases therein specified. This court has had occasion to
characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives,
respectively, as "full, clear and complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and
Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.).
The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of
deciding contested elections to the legislature was taken by the sub-committee of five
appointed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention,
which sub- committee submitted a report on August 30, 1934, recommending the creation of
a Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to hear protests not only against the election
of members of the legislature but also against the election of executive officers for whose
election the vote of the whole nation is required, as well as to initiate impeachment
proceedings against specified executive and judicial officers. For the purpose of hearing
legislative protests, the tribunal was to be composed of three justices designated by the
Supreme Court and six members of the house of the legislature to which the contest
corresponds, three members to be designated by the majority party and three by the minority,
to be presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a member in which
case the latter shall preside. The foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee on
Constitutional Guarantees to the Convention on September 15, 1934, with slight modifications
consisting in the reduction of the legislative representation to four members, that is, two
senators to be designated one each from the two major parties in the Senate and two
representatives to be designated one each from the two major parties in the House of
Representatives, and in awarding representation to the executive department in the persons
of two representatives to be designated by the President.
Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As
submitted to the Convention on September 24, 1934, subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed
Article on the Legislative Department, reads as follows:
"The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either House
and all cases contesting the election of any of their members shall be judged by
an Electoral Commission, constituted, as to each House, by three members
elected by the members of the party having the largest number of votes therein,
three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of
votes, and as to its Chairman, one Justice of the Supreme Court designated by
the Chief Justice."
The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive
jurisdiction as proposed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees which was probably
inspired by the Spanish plan (art. 121, Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was
soon abandoned in favor of the proposition of the Committee on Legislative Power to create
a similar body with reduced powers and with specific and limited jurisdiction, to be designated
as an Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified the proposal of the
Committee on Legislative Power with respect to the composition of
the Electoral Commission and made further changes in phraseology to suit the project of
adopting a unicameral instead of a bicameral legislature. The draft as finally submitted to the
Convention on October 26, 1934, reads as follows:
"(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the
National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its Members
 shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members
elected by the party having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly,
three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of
votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice,
the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices."
During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo,
and others, proposing to strike out the whole subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting
in lieu thereof the following: "The National Assembly shall be the sole and exclusive judge of
the elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members", the following illuminating remarks
were made on the floor of the Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope
of the said draft:
The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to
restore the power to decide contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly to the National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of
ninety-eight (98) against fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the
draft by reducing the representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court in
the Electoral Commission to two members each, so as to accord more representation to the
majority party. The Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76) against
forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan character of the commission.
As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:
"(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the National Assembly shall be judged by an Electoral Commission,
composed of three members elected by the party having the largest number of
votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having
the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of
said justices."
The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three
Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six
Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated
by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having
the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in
the Commission shall be its chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the
sole judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the
National Assembly."
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935, the Style
Committee, through President Recto, to effectuate the original intention of the Convention,
agreed to insert the phrase "All contests relating to" between the phrase "judge of" and the
words "the election", which was accordingly accepted by the Convention.
The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an independent, impartial
and non-partisan tribunal, is by no means a mere experiment in the science of government.
Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI,
pages 57, 58), gives a vivid account of the "scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes by
political parties in the disposition of contests by the House of Commons in the following
passages which are partly quoted by the petitioner in his printed memorandum of March 14,
1936:
 "153. From the time when the commons established their right to be the
exclusive judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their members,
until the year 1770, two modes of proceeding prevailed, in the determination of
controverted elections, and rights of membership. One of the standing committee
appointed at the commencement of each session, was denominated the
committee of privileges and elections, whose function was to hear and
investigate all questions of this description which might be referred to them, and
to report their proceedings, with their opinion thereupon, to the house, from time
to time. When an election petition was referred to this committee, they heard the
parties and their witnesses and other evidence, and made a report of all the
evidence, together with their opinion thereupon, in the form of resolutions, which
were considered and agreed or disagreed to by the house. The other mode of
proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of the house itself. When this court was
adopted, the case was heard and decided by the house, in substantially the same
manner as by a committee. The committee of privileges and elections although
a select committee was usually what is called an open one; that is to say, in order
to constitute the committee, a quorum of the members named was required to
be present, but all the members of the house were at liberty to attend the
committee and vote if they pleased.
"154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions relating
to the right of membership gradually assumed a political character; so that for
many years previous to the year 1770, controverted elections had been tried and
determined by the house of commons, as mere party questions, upon which the
strength of contending factions might be tested. Thus, for example, in 1741, Sir
Robert Walpole, after repeated attacks upon his government, resigned his office
in consequence of an adverse vote upon the Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell
remarks, of the trial of election, cases, as conducted under this system, that
'Every principle of decency and justice were notoriously and openly prostituted,
from whence the younger part of the house were insensibly, but too successfully,
induced to adopt the same licentious conduct in more serious matters, and in
questions of higher importance to the public welfare.' Mr. George Grenville, a
distinguished member of the house of commons, undertook to propose a remedy
for the evil, and, on the 7th of March 1770, obtained the unanimous leave of the
house to bring in a bill, 'to regulate the trial of controverted elections, or returns
of members to serve in parliament.' In his speech to explain his plan, on the
motion for leave, Mr. Grenville alluded to the existing practice in the following
terms: 'Instead of trusting to the merits of their respective causes, the principal
dependence of both parties is their private interest among us; and it is
scandalously notorious that we are an earnestly canvassed to attend in favor of
the opposite sides, as if we were wholly self-elective, and not bound to act by the
principles of justice, but by the discretionary impulse of our own inclinations; nay,
it is well known, that in every contested election, many members of this house,
who are ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial capacity between the competitors,
enlist themselves as parties in the contention, and take upon themselves the
partial management of the very business, upon which they should determine with
the strictest impartiality.'
"155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr.
Grenville brought in a bill which met with the approbation of both houses, and
received the royal assent on the 12th of April, 1770. This was the celebrated law
since known by the name of the Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares, that
it 'was one of the noblest works, for the honor of the house of commons, and the
security of the constitution, that was ever devised by any minister or statesman.'
It is probable, that the magnitude of the evil, or the apparent success of the
 remedy, may have led many of the contemporaries of the measure to the
information of a judgment, which was not acquiesced in by some of the leading
statesmen of the day, and has not been entirely confirmed by subsequent
experience. The bill was objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey, afterwards chief
justice of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who had been clerk of the
house, and Mr. Charles James Fox, chiefly on the ground, that the introduction
of the new system was an essential alteration of the constitution of parliament,
and a total abrogation of one of the most important rights and jurisdictions of the
house of commons."
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring
the non-partisan settlement of the controverted elections of its members by abdicating its
prerogative to two judges of the King's Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota
in accordance with rules of court made for the purpose. Having proved successful, the practice
has become imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32
Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act, 1879 [42 &
43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act, 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51], s.
70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII, p.
408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which were originally
heard by the Committee of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts.
Likewise, in the Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which were originally
determined by each house, are since 1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic
law provides that all protests against the election of members of the Upper House of the Diet
are to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par.
6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Free
City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to decide contested elections to the
Diet or National Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative
contests, the Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of
the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Grecian
Republic of June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.
The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from
the legislature and the judiciary is by no means unknown in the United States. In the
presidential elections of 1876 there was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes received
by each of the two opposing candidates. As the Constitution made no adequate provision for
such a contingency, Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United States Statutes at
Large, vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral Commission composed of
five members elected by the Senate, five members elected by the House of Representatives,
and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the four designated
in the Act. The decision of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two
houses voting separately. Although there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived from the
experience of America in this regard, judging from the observations of Justice Field, who was
a member of that body on the part of the Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of
the United States and its Appellate Power under the Constitution [Albany, 1913]-Relentless
Partisanship of Electoral Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the experiment has at least abiding
historical interest.
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were
in their majority men mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar
with the history and political development of other countries of the world. When, therefore,
they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested
it with the exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in
the light of their own experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened
peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy
certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the
vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as
hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be
said now is that, upon the approval of the Constitution, the creation of
the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the people".
(Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.).
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose
was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters
pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It
was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents,
however, as the long-felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan
considerations which prompted the people, acting through their delegates to the Convention,
to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite
body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan
influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by
including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary
authority in the performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it
by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to
all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ.
It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to any other. The location of the
provision (section 4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative
Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its composition is also significant in that it
is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But it is a body separate from and
independent of the legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as
complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging
of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power
by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as
an express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs.
Whisman, 36 S. D., 260; L. R. A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the
National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of
the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period
within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be
ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case would be invested with the power to
determine contested cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members
of the National Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National
Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring
this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created
with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be
presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of
cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority effective
whenever and wherever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that
intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part
of the National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by
the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to
the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be
permitted.
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument of the learned counsel for the
petitioner regarding the importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and independence
of the National Assembly as a coordinate department of the government and of according
validity to its acts, to avoid what he characterized would be practically an unlimited power of
the commission in the admission of protests against members of the National Assembly. But
as we have pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it
ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests
intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a
general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise
of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations,
eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating
to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore,
the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been
lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner,
the Electoral Commission may abuse its regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any
reasonable time, to the disturbance of the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of
the National Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is not an argument against the concession
of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse. In the second place, if any
mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it
with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought
through the ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are
not intended to be corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating
the Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive
determination of the specified cases assigned to it, as they have given to the Supreme Court
in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies of the government were
designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional organ
working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be
animated with the same zealand honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which they were
created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave
much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the imperfections of human institutions.
In the third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in
the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or
unconstitutional, may not be challenged in appropriate cases over which the courts may
exercise jurisdiction.
But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there
are considerations of equitable character that should not be overlooked in the appreciation of
the intrinsic merits of the controversy. The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on
November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned in
section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new National Assembly convened on
November 25th of that year, and the resolution confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose
A. Angara, was approved by that body on December 3, 11935. The protest by the herein
respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the petitioner was filed on December 9 of the
same year. The pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was formally
organized but it does appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the
first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election
protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935,
confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly,
the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body has actually
been organized. As a matter of fact, according to certified copies of official records on file in
the archives division of the National Assembly attached to the record of this case upon the
petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court and the six members of the
National Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission were respectively designated only
on December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming non-
protested elections of members of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling
the time for the presentation of protests, the result would be that the National Assembly — on
the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power of regulation in such cases — had
already barred the presentation of protests before the Electoral Commission had had time to
organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to be followed in a matter entrusted to
is exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was not and could not have been
contemplated,and should be avoided.
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election
of members against whom no protests had been filed at the time of its passage on December
3, 1935, can not be construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election
contests. While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation
of the election of members of the legislature at the time when the power to decide election
contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be
construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its
constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said
election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its members against
whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As
contended by the Electoral Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the
motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua,
confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the Constitution before he can
discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial
board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the National Assembly
and to render him eligible to any office in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National
Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).
Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in the
Congress of the United States, confirmation is neither necessary in order to entitle a member-
elect to take his seat. The return of the proper election officers in sufficient, and the member-
elect presenting such return begins to enjoy the privileges of a member from the time that he
takes his oath of office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331, 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C.
A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases of contested elections
where the decision is adverse to the claims of the protestant. In England, the judges' decision
or report in controverted elections is certified to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and
the House, upon being informed of such certificate or report by the Speaker, is required to
enter the same upon the Journals, and to give such directions for confirming or altering the
return, or for the issue of a writ for a new election, or for carrying into execution the
determination as circumstances may require (31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United
States, it is believed, the order or decision of the particular house itself is generally regarded
as sufficient, without any actual alteration or amendment of the return (Cushing, Law and
Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).
Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still force, each house of the
Philippine Legislature fixed the time when protests against the election of any of its members
should be filed. This was expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making each
house the sole judge of the election, returns and qualifications of its members, as well as by
a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering each house to respectively prescribe by resolution
the time and manner of filing contest in the election of members of said bodies. As a matter
of formality, after the time fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had already expired, each
house passed a resolution confirming or approving the returns of such members against
whose election no protests had been filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted as
cutting off the filing of further protests against the election of those members not theretofore
contested (Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record-First
Period, p. 89; Urgello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature;
Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 637-
640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record-First
Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record-
First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The Constitution has repealed section 18 of
the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be deemed to have been impliedly abrogated
also, for the reason that with the power to determine all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is inseparably linked the
authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power. There was thus no law nor
constitutional provision which authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have
fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests against the election of its
members. And what the National Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by indirection
through the medium of confirmation.
Summarizing, we conclude:
(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the
theory of separation of powers into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and
duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies
thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional
mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate
cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of
the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with
specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to
the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government.
(f) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into
effect, each house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns,
and qualifications of their elective members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised
by the legislature with respect to contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
its members, to the Electoral Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was
full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to
prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.
(j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an
independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or
consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the
power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of
the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of
the elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act
No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing
contests against the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse
party,and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.
 (l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member,
irrespective of whether his election is contested or not, is not essential before such member-
elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against
whom no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive
the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protest
against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by
the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and
that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll
the time for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of
the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of
the Electoral Commission as a constitutional creation and as to the scope and extent of its
authority under the facts of the present controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine
whether the Electoral Commission is an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person within
the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby
denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
||| (Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. 45081, [July 15, 1936], 63 PHIL 139-187)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-3820. July 18, 1950.]
JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner, vs. LEON NAZARENO, Sergeant-at-Arms,
Philippine Senate, and EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, Director of
Prisons, respondents.
J. C. Orendain, Augusto Revilla and Eduardo Arboleda, for petitioner.
Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo, Lorenzo Sumulong, Lorenzo
Tañada, and Vicente J. Francisco, for respondents.

SYLLABUS
1.LAW; POWER OF EITHER HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY.
— The power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to
the legislative function.
2.ID.; RANGE OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY. — The Congress of the Philippines has a
wider range of legislative field than either the Congress of the United States or a State
Legislature, and the field of inquiry into which it may enter is also wider. It is difficult to define
any limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded. Sufficed it to say that it
must be coextensive with the range of legislative power.
3.ID.; POWER OF HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO PUNISH A WITNESS FOR
CONTEMPT. — No person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House
unless his testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire.
4.ID.; ID. — Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of
a legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to
answer any question pertinent to the subject of the inquiry, subject of the course to his
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
 5.ID.; ID.; MATERIALITY OF THE QUESTION. — The materiality of a question that it
may be propounded to a witness is determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry
and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation.
6.ID.; ID.; POWER OF THE COURT TO PASS UPON MATERIALITY. — Where the
immateriality of the information sought by the legislative body from a witness is relied upon to
contest its jurisdiction, the Court is in duty bound to pass upon the contention. Although the
legislative body has the power to make the inquiry, the Court is empowered to correct a clear
abuse of discretion in the exercise of that power .
7.ID.; LACK OF POWER OF THE COURT TO INTERFERE WITH LEGISLATIVE
ACTION. — Since the Court has no power to determine what legislation to approve or not to
approve, it cannot say that the information sought from a witness which is material to the
subject of the legislative inquiry is immaterial to any proposed or possible legislation. It is not
within the province of the Court to determine or imagine what legislative measures Congress
may take after the completion of the legislative investigation.
8.ID.; AUTHORITY OF EITHER HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO COMMIT A WITNESS
FOR CONTEMPT BEYOND PERIOD OF LEGISLATIVE SESSION. — There is no sound
reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every
session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. While
the existence of the House of Representatives is limited to four years, that of the Senate is
not so limited. The Senate is a continuing body which does not ceases to exist upon the
periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as
to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may
constitutionally be exerted.
9.ID.; PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; REFUSAL OF WITNESS TO
ANSWER. — Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify
and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable.
10.ID.; ID.; POWER OF THE COURT TO DETERMINE WHETHER QUESTION IS
INCRIMINATORY. — It is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate,
as he is not the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear
reasonable and real to the court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well
as from his general conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus developed,
it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct answer to a question may criminate
or not. The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for
protection against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.
11.ID.; RIGHT AND OBLIGATION OF A CITIZEN. — It is the duty of every citizen to
give frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent authority. His Constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination, unless clearly established, must yield to that duty. when a
specific right and specific obligation conflict wit each other, and one is doubtful or uncertain
while the other is clear and imperative, the former must yield to the latter. The right to live is
one of the most sacred that the citizen may claim, and yet the state may deprive him of it if he
violates his corresponding obligation to respect the life of others.
DECISION

OZAETA, J p:

This is an original petition for habeas corpus to relieve the petitioner from his
confinement in the New Bilibid Prison to which he has been committed by virtue of a resolution
adopted by the Senate on May 15, 1950, which reads as follows:
 "Whereas, Jean L. Arnault refused to reveal the name of the person to
whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions related
to the said amount; Now, therefore, be it.
"Resolved, That for his refusal to reveal the name of the person to whom
he gave the P440,000 Jean L. Arnault be committed to the custody of the
Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal,
until discharged by further order of the Senate or by the special committee
created by Senate Resolution No. 8, such discharge to be ordered when he shall
have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate or to the said special
committee the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as
answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith."
The facts that gave rise to the adoption of said resolution, insofar as pertinent here,
may be briefly stated as follows:
In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural
Progress Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the
sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. Of the first sum, P1,000,000 was paid to
Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, the
Associated Estates, Inc., represented by Jean L. Arnault, for alleged interest of the said Burt
in the Buenavista Estate. The second sum of P500,000 was all paid to the same Ernest H.
Burt through his other attorney-in-fact, the North Manila Development Co., Inc., also
represented by Jean L. Arnault, for the alleged interest of the said Burt in the Tambobong
Estate.
The original owner of the Buenavista Estate was the San Juan de Dios Hospital. The
Philippine Government held a 25-year lease contract on said estate, with an option to
purchase it for P3,000,000 within the same period of 25 years counted from January 1, 1939.
The occupation republic of the Philippines purported to exercise that option by tendering to
the owner the sum of P3,000,000 and, upon its rejection, by depositing it in court on June 21,
1944, together with the accrued rentals amounting to P324,000. Since 1939 the Government
has remained in possession of the estate.
On June 29, 1946, the San Juan de Dios Hospital sold the Buenavista Estate for
P5,000,000 to Ernest H. Burt, who made a down payment of P10,000 only and agreed to pay
P500,000 within one year and the remainder in annual installments of P500,000 each, with
the stipulation that failure on his part to make any of said payments would cause the forfeiture
of his down payment of P10,000 and would entitle the Hospital to rescind the sale to him.
Aside from the down payment of P10,000, Burt has made no other payment on account of the
purchase price of said estate.
The original owner of the Tambobong Estate was the Philippine Trust Company. On
May 14, 1946, the Philippine Trust Company sold said estate for the sum of P1,200,000 to
Ernest H. Burt, who paid P10,000 down and promised to pay P90,000 within nine months and
the balance of P1,100,000 in ten successive annual installments of P110,000 each. The nine-
month period within which to pay the first installment of P90,000 expired on February 14,
1947, without Burt's having paid the said or any other amount then or afterwards. On
September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the
Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress Administration by an absolute deed of sale in
consideration of the sum of P750,000. On February 5, 1948, the Rural Progress
Administration made, under article 1504 of the Civil Code, a notarial demand upon Burt for
the resolution and cancellation of his contract of purchase with the Philippine Trust Company
due to his failure to pay the installment of P90,000 within the period of nine months.
Subsequently the Court of First Instance of Rizal ordered the cancellation of Burt's certificate
of title and the issuance of a new one in the name of the Rural Progress Administration, from
which order he appealed to the Supreme Court. 1
 It was in the face of the antecedents sketched in the last three preceding paragraphs
that the Philippine Government, through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of
the Philippine National Bank, from which the money was borrowed, accomplished the
purchase of the two estates in the latter part of October, 1949, as stated at the outset.
On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which reads as
follows:
"RESOLUTION CREATING A SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
BUENAVISTA AND THE TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL.
"WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine Government, through the
Rural Progress Administration, has bought the Buenavista and the Tambobong
Estates for the aggregate sum of five million pesos;
"WHEREAS, it is reported that under the decision of the Supreme Court
dated October 31, 1949, the Buenavista Estate could have been bought for three
million pesos by virtue of a contract entered into between the San Juan de Dios
Hospital and Philippine Government in 1939;
"WHEREAS, it is even alleged that the Philippine Government did not
have to purchase the Buenavista Estate because the occupation government
had made tender of payment in the amount of three million pesos, Japanese
currency, which fact is believed sufficient to vest title of ownership in the Republic
of the Philippines pursuant to decisions of the Supreme Court sustaining the
validity of payments made in Japanese military notes during the occupation;
"WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine Government did not have
to pay a single centavo for the Tambobong Estate as it was already practically
owned by the Philippine Government by virtue of a deed of sale from the
Philippine Trust Company dated September 3, 1947, for seven hundred and fifty
thousand pesos, and by virtue of the rescission of the contract through which
Ernest H. Burt had an interest in the estate; Now, therefore, be it.
"RESOLVED, That a Special Committee, be, as it hereby is, created,
composed of five members to be appointed by the President of the Senate to
investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estate deals. It shall be the duty of
the said Committee to determine whether the said purchase was honest, valid,
and proper and whether the price involved in the deal was fair and just, the
parties responsible therefor, and any other facts the Committee may deem
proper in the premises. Said Committee shall have the power to conduct public
hearings; issue subpoena or subpoena duces tecum to compel the attendance
of witnesses or the production of documents before it; and may require any
official or employee of any bureau, office, branch, subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality of the government to assist or otherwise cooperate with the
Special Committee in the performance of its functions and duties. Said
Committee shall submit its report of findings and recommendations within two
weeks from the adoption of this Resolution."
The special committee created by the above resolution called and examined various
witnesses, among the most important of whom was the herein petitioner, Jean L. Arnault. An
intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was that involved in the apparent
unnecessariness and irregularity of the Government's paying to Burt the total sum of
P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to
have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who
were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the
Government.
 Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were
delivered to him on the afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a
new account in the name of Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine National Bank in which he
deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000; and that on the same occasion he drew
on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the
Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000
payable to cash, which he himself cashed. It was the desire of the committee to determine the
ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave rise to the present case.
On May 15, 1950, the petitioner was haled before the bar of the Senate, which
approved and read to him the following resolution:
"Be it resolved by the Senate of the Philippines in Session assembled:
"That Jean L. Arnault, now at the bar of the Senate, be arraigned for
contempt consisting of contumacious acts committed by him during the
investigation conducted by the Special Committee created by Senate Resolution
No. 8 to probe the Tambobong and Buenavista estates deal of October 21, 1940,
and that the President of the Senate propounded to him the following
interrogatories:
"1.What excuse have you for persistently refusing to reveal the name of
the person to whom you gave the P440,000 on October 29, 1949, a person
whose name it is impossible for you not to remember not only because of the big
amount of money you gave to him without receipt, but also because by your own
statements you knew him as early as 1946 when General Ernest B. Burt was still
in the Philippines, you made two other deliveries of money to him without receipt,
and the last time you saw him was in December 1949?"
Thereupon petitioner's attorney, Mr. Orendain, submitted for him a written answer
alleging that the questions were incriminatory in nature and begging leave to be allowed to
stand on his constitutional right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. Not
satisfied with that written answer Senator Sumulong, over the objection of counsel for the
petitioner, propounded to the latter the following question:
"Sen. SUMULONG. During the investigation, when the Committee asked
you for the name of that person to whom you gave the P440,000, you said that
you can [could] not remember his name. That was your reason then for refusing
to reveal the name of the person. Now, in the answer that you have just cited,
you are refusing to reveal the name of that person to whom you gave the
P440,000 on the ground that your answer will be self-incriminating. Now do I
understand from you that you are abandoning your former claim that you cannot
remember the name of that person and that your reason now for your refusal the
name of that person is that your answer might be self-incriminating? In other
words, the question is this: What is your real reason for refusing to reveal the
name of that parson to whom you gave the P440,000: that you do not remember
his name or that your answer would be self-incriminating?
xxx xxx xxx
"Mr. Orendain. Mr. President, we are begging for the rules of procedure
that the accused should not be required to testify unless he so desires.
"The President. It is the duty of the respondent to answer the question.
The question is very clear. It does not incriminate him.
xxx xxx xxx
"Mr. ARNAULT. I stand by every statement that I have made before the
senate Committee on the first, second, and third hearings to which I was made
 to testify. I stand by the statements that I have made in my letter to this Senate
of May 2, 1950, in which I gave all the reasons that were in my powers to give,
as requested. I cannot change anything in those statements that I made because
they represent the best that I can do, to the best of my ability.
"The PRESIDENT. You are not answering the question. The answer has
nothing to do with the question is very clear. It does not incriminate him.
The Senate then deliberated and adopted the resolution of May 15 hereinabove
quoted whereby the petitioner was committed to the custody of the Sergeant-at-arms and
imprisoned until "he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate or to the
aforesaid Special Committee the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well
as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith."
The Senate also adopted on the same date anther resolution (No. 16), to wit:
"That Special Committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8 be
empowered and directed to continue its investigation of the Tambobong and
Buenavista Estates deal of October 21, 1949, more particularly to continue its
examination of Jean L. Arnault regarding the name of the person to whom he
gave the P440,000 an other matters related therewith."
The first session of the Second Congress was adjourned at midnight on May 18, 1950.
The case was argued twice before us. W have given it earnest and prolonged
consideration because it is the first of its kind to arise the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines was adopted. For the first time this court is called upon to define the power of
either House of Congress to punish a person not a member for contempt; and we are fully
conscious that our pronouncement here will set an important precedent for the future guidance
of all concerned.
Before discussing the specific issues raised by the parties, we deem it necessary to
lay down the general principles of law which form the background of those issues.
Patterned after the American system, our Constitution vests the powers of the
Government in three independent but coordinate Departments — Legislative, Executive, and
Judicial. The Legislative is vested in the Congress, which consists of the Senate and the
House of Representatives. (Section 1, Article VI.) Each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-
thirds of all its Member. (Section 10 Article VI.) The judicial power is vested in the Supreme
Court and in such inferior courts as may me established by law. (Section 1, Article VIII.) Like
the Constitution of the United States, ours does not contain an express provision empowering
either of the two House of Congress to punish nonmembers for contempt. It may also be noted
that whereas in the United States the legislative power is shared between the Congress of the
United State, on the one hand, and the respective legislatures of the different States, on the
other — the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by
it to States being reserved to the states, respectively, or to the people — in the Philippines,
the legislative power is vested in the Congress of the Philippines alone. It may therefore be
said that the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than the
Congress of the United States or any State Legislature.
Our form of government being patterned after the American system — the framers
of our Constitution having been drawn largely from American institution and practices — we
can, in this case. properly draw also from American precedents in interpreting analogous
provisions of our Constitution, as we have done in other cases in the past.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of
Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may
exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to
the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry — with process
to enforce it — is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative
body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislations is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative
body does not itself possess the requisite information — which is not frequently true —
recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests
for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not
always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is
needed. (McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S., 135; 71 L. ed., 580; 50 A. L. R., 1.) The fact that
the Constitution expressly hives to congress the power to punish its Members for disorderly
behaviour, does not by necessary implication exclude the power to punish for contempt any
other person. (Anderson vs. Dunn, 6 Wheaton. 204; 5 L ed., 242.)
But no person can punish for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his
testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire.
(Killbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377.)
Since, as we noted, the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative
field than either the congress of the United States or a State Legislature, we think it is correct
to say that the field of inquiry into which it may enter is also wider. It would be difficult to define
any limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded. It is necessary for us to
do so in this case. Suffice it to say it must be coextensive with the range of the legislative
power.
In the present case the jurisdiction of the Senate, thru the special Committee created
by it, to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal is not challenged by the
petitioner; and we entertain no doubt as to the Senate's authority to do so and as to the validity
of Resolution No. 8 hereinabove quoted. the transaction involved a questionable and allegedly
unnecessary and irregular expenditure of no less than P5,000,000 of public funds, of which
the Congress is the constitutional guardian. It is also involved government agencies created
by Congress and officers whose positions it is within the power of Congress to regulate or
even abolish. As a result of the yet uncompleted investigation, the investigating committee
has recommended and the Senate has approved three bills (1) prohibiting the Secretary of
Justice or any other department head from discharging functions and exercising powers than
those attached to his own office, without previous congressional authorization; (2) prohibiting
brothers and near relatives of any President of the Philippines from intervening directly or
indirectly and in whatever capacity in transactions in which the Government is a party, more
particularly where the decision lies in the hands of executive or administrative officers who
are appointees of the President; and (3) providing that purchases of the Rural Progress
Administration of big landed estates at a price of P100,000 or more, and loans guaranteed by
the Government involving P100,000 or more, shall not become effective without previous
congressional confirmation. 2
We shall now consider and pass upon each of the questions raised by the petitioner
in support of his contention that his commitment is unlawful.
First. He contends that the senate has no power to punish him for contempt for refusing
to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, because such informations
is immaterial to, and will not serve, any intended or purported legislation and his refusal to
answer the question has not embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative prices. It is
argued that since the investigating committee has already rendered its report and has made
all its recommendations as to what legislative measures should be taken pursuant to its
findings, there is no necessity to force the petitioner to give information desired other than that
mentioned in its report, to wit: "In justice to Judge Quirino and to Secretary Nepomuceno, this
atmosphere of suspicion that now pervades the public mind must be dissipated, and it can
only be done if appropriate steps are taken by the senate to compel Arnault to stop pretending
that he cannot remember the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 and answer
questions which will definitely of that person . . . ." Senator Sumulong, Chairman of the
Committee, who appeared and argued the case for the respondents, denied that that was the
only purpose of the Senate in seeking the information from the witness, He said that the
investigation had not been completed, because, due to the contumacy of the witness, his
committee had not yet determined the parties responsible for the anomalous transaction as
required by Resolution No. 8; that, by Resolution No. 19, his committee was empowered and
directed to continue its investigation, more particularly to continue its examination of the
witness regarding the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 and other matters
related herewith; that the bills recommended by his committee had not been approved by the
House and might not be approved pending the completion of the investigation; and that those
bills were not necessarily all the measures that congress might deem it necessary to pass
after the investigation is finished.
Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative
body to make, we think the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to
answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right
against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to
make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution,
such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is
empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the
inquiry or investigation. So a witness may not be coerced to answer a question that obviously
has no relation to the subject of the inquiry. But from this it does not follow that every question
that may propounded to a witness must be material to any proposed or possible legislation.
In other words, the materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the
subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation.
The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and
character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered
as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single
question.
In this connection, it is suggested by counsel for the respondents that the power of the
Court is limited to determining whether the legislative body has jurisdiction to institute the
inquiry or investigation; that once that jurisdiction is conceded, this Court cannot control the
exercise of that jurisdiction or the use of Congressional discretion; and, it is insinuated, that
the ruling of the Senate on the materiality of the question propounded to the witness is not
subject to review by this Court under the principle of the separation of powers. We have to
qualify this proposition. As we said by the Court of Appeals of New York: "We are bound to
presume that the action of the legislative body was with a legitimate object if it is capable of
being so construed, and we have no right to assume that the contrary was intended."
(People ex rel Mc. Donald vs. Keeler. 99 N. Y., 463; 52 Am. Rep., 49; 2 N. E., 615, quoted
with approval by the Supreme Court of the United States in McGrain vs. Daugherty, supra.)
Applying this principle to the question at hand, we may concede that the ruling of the Senate
on the materiality of the information sought from the witness is presumed to be correct. But,
as noted by the Supreme Court of the United States in the said case of
McGrain vs. Daugherty, it is a necessary deduction from the decision in Re Chapman, 41 L.
ed., 1154, that were the questions are not pertinent to the matter under the inquiry a witness
rightfully may refuse to answer. So we are of the opinion that were the alleged immateriality
of the information sought by the legislative body from a witness is relied upon to contest its
jurisdiction, the court is in duty bound to pass upon the contention. The fact that the legislative
body has jurisdiction or the power to make the inquiry would not preclude judicial intervention
to correct a clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of that power.
Applying the criterion laid down in the last two preceding paragraphs to the resolution
of the issue under consideration, we find that the question for the refusal to answer which the
petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate which the petitioner was held in contempt by
the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed.
Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner requires the
Special Committee, among other things to determine the parties responsible for the
Buenavista an Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the person to whom
the witness gave the P440,000 it is in fact the very things sought to be determined. The
contention that the question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has in relation
or materiality to any proposed legislation. We have already indicated that it is not necessary
for the legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is material to any
proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that it be pertinent to the matter under
inquiry.
The Court cannot determine, any more that it can direct Congress, what legislation to
approve or not to approve; that would be an invasion of the legislative prerogative. The Court,
therefore, may not say that the information sought from the witness which is material to the
subject of the legislative inquiry is immaterial to any proposed or possible legislation.
It is said that the Senate has already approved the three bills recommended by the
Committee as a result of the uncompleted investigation and that there is no need for it to know
the name of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000. But aside from the fact that
those bills have not yet been approved by the lower court house and by the President and
that they may be withdrawn or modified if after the inquiry is completed they should be found
unnecessary or inadequate, there is nothing to prevent the Congress from approving other
measures it may deem necessary after completing the investigation. We are not called upon,
nor is it within our province, to determine or imagine what those measures may be. And our
inability to do so is no reason for overruling the question propounded by the Senate to the
witness.
The case of Re Chapman, 166 U.S., 661; 41 L. ed., 1554, is in point here. The inquiry
there in question was conducted under a resolution of the Senate and related to charges,
publish in the press, that senators were yielding to corrupt influences in considering a tariff bill
then before the Senate and were speculating in stocks the value of which would be affected
by pending amendments to the bill. Chapman, a member of a firm of stock brokers dealing in
the stock of the American Sugar Refining Company, appeared before the committee in
response to a subpoena and was asked, among others, the following questions:
"Had the firm, during the month of March 1894, bought or sold any stock
or securities, known as sugar stocks, for or in the interest, directly or indirectly,
of any United States senator?
"Was the said firm at that time carrying any sugar stock for the benefit of,
or in the interest, directly or indirectly, of any United Senate senator?"
He refused to answer those questions and was prosecuted under an act of Congress for
contempt of the Senate Upon being convicted and sent to jail he petitioned the Supreme Court
of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus. One of the questions decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States in that case was whether the committee had the right to compel the
witness to answer said questions, and the Court held that the committee did have such right,
saying:
"The questions were undoubtedly pertinent to the subject matter of the
inquiry. The resolution directed the committee to inquire 'whether any senator
has been, or is, speculating in what are known as sugar stocks during the
consideration of the tariff bill now before the Senate." What the Senate might or
might not do upon the facts when ascertained, we cannot say, nor are we called
upon to inquire whether such ventures might be defensible, as contended in
argument, but it is plain that negative answers should have cleared that the body
of what the Senate regarded as offensive imputations, while affirmative answer
might have led to further action on the part of the Senate within its constitutional
powers." (Emphasis ours.)
 It may be contended that the determination of the parties responsible for the deal is
incumbent upon the judicial rather than upon the legislative branch. But we think there is no
basis in fact or in a law for such assumption. The petitioner has not challenged the validity of
Senate Resolution No. 8, and that resolution expressly requires the committee to determine
the parties responsible for the deal. We are bound to presume that the Senate has acted in
the due performance of its constitutional function in instituting the inquiry, if the act is capable
of being construed. On the other hand, there is no suggestion that the judiciary has instituted
an inquiry to determine the parties responsible for the deal. Under the circumstances of the
case, it appearing that the questioned transaction was affected by the head of the Department
of Justice himself, it is not reasonable to expect that the Fiscal; or the Court of First Instance
of Manila will take the initiative to investigate and prosecute the parties responsible for the
deal and unless the Senate shall have determined who those parties are and shall have taken
such measures as may be within its competence to take the redress the wrong that may have
been committed against the people as a result of the transaction. As we have said, the
transaction involved no less than P5,000,000 of public funds. That certainly is a matter of
public concern, which it is the duty of the constitutional guardian of the treasury to investigate.
If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate
legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony called relate to that subject, obedience to its
process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment. (Sulivan vs. Hill. 73 W. Va., 49;
79 S. E., 670; 40 Ann. Cas. [1926 B.], 1115.)
The decision in the case of Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377, relied upon by the
petitioner, is not applicable here. In that case the inquiry instituted by the House of
Representatives of the United States related to a private real-estate pool or partnership in the
District of Columbia. Jay Cook & Company had had an interest in the pool but had become
bankrupts, and their estate was in course of administration in a federal bankruptcy court in
Pennsylvania. The United States was one of their creditors. the trustee in the bankruptcy
proceeding had effected a settlement of the bankrupts' interest in the pool, and of course his
action was subject to examination and approval or disapproval by the bankruptcy court. Some
of the creditors, including the United States, were dissatisfied with the settlement. The
resolution of the House directed the Committee "to inquire into the nature and history of said
real-estate pool and the character of said settlement with the amount of property involved, in
which Jay Cooked & Co. were interested, and the amount paid or to be paid in said settlement,
with power to send for persons and papers, and report to this House." The Supreme Court of
the United States, speaking thru Mr. Justice Miller, pointed out that the resolution contained
no suggestion of contemplated legislation; that the matter was one in respect of which no valid
legislation could be had; that the bankrupts' estate and the trustee's settlement were still
pending in the bankruptcy court; and that the United States and other creditors were free to
press their claims in that proceeding. And on these grounds the court held that in undertaking
the investigation "the house of Representatives not only exceeded the limit of its own authority,
but assumed a power which could only be properly exercised by another branch of the
government, because the power was in its nature clearly judicial." The principles announced
and applied in that case are: that neither House of congress possesses a "general power of
making actually possessed is limited to inquiries relating to matters of which the particular
House of jurisdiction and in respect of which it rightfully may take other action; that if the inquiry
relates to a matter wherein relief or redress could be had only judicial proceeding, it is not
within the range of this power, but must be left to the courts, conformably to
the constitution separation of governmental powers.
That case differs from the present case into two important respects: (1) There the court
found that the subject of the inquiry, which related to a private real-estate pool or partnership,
was not within the jurisdiction of either House of Congress; while here it is not disputed that
the subject of the inquiry, which relates to a transaction involving a questionable expenditure
by the Government of P5,000,000 of public funds, is within the jurisdiction of the Senate. (2)
There the claim of the government as a creditor of Jay Cooke & Company, which had had an
interest in the pool, was pending adjudication by the court; while here the interposition of the
judicial power on the subject of the inquiry cannot be expected, as we have pointed out above,
until after the Senate shall have determined who the parties responsible are shall have taken
such measures as may be within its competence to take redress the wrong that may have
been committed against the people as a result of the transaction.
It is interesting to note that the decision in the case of Kilbourn vs. Thompson has
evoked strong criticisms from legal scholars. (See Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to
Punish for Contempt [1926], 74 U. Pa L. Rev., 692-699; Janes M. Landis, Constitutional
Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation [1926], 40 Harvard L. Rev., 153, 214-
220.) We quote the following from Professor Landis' criticism: "Mr. Justice Miller saw the case
purely as an attempt by the House to secure to the Government certain priority rights as
creditors of the bankrupt concern. To him it assumed the character of a lawsuit between the
Government and Jay Cooke & Co., with the Government, acting through the House,
attempting to override the orderliness of established procedure and thereby prefer a creditors'
bill not before the courts but before Congress. That the bankruptcy proceedings had already
been instituted against Jay Cooke & Co. in a federal court gave added impetus to such a
conception. The House was seeking to oust of prior acquired jurisdiction by an extraordinary
and unwarranted of assumption of 'judicial power'! The broader aspect of the investigation
had not been disclosed to the Court. That Jay Cooke & Co.'s indebtedness and the particular
funds in question were only part of the great administrative problem connected with the use
and disposition of public monies, that the particular failure was of consequence mainly in
relation to the security demanded for all government deposits, that the facts connected with
one such default revealed the possibility of other and greater maladministration, such
consideration had not been put before the Court. Nor had it been acquainted with the every-
day nature of the particular investigation and the powers there exerted by the House, powers
whose exercise was customary and familiar in legislative practice. Instead of assuming the
character of an extraordinary judicial proceeding, the inquiry, placed in its proper background,
should have been regarded as a normal and customary part of the legislative process. detailed
definiteness of legislative purpose was thus made the demand of the Court in
Kilbourn vs. Thompson. But investigators cannot foretell the results that may be achieved.
The power of Congress to exercise control over a real-estate pool is not a matter for abstract
speculation but one to be determined only after an exhaustive examination of the problem.
Relationship, and not their possibilities, determine the extent of congressional power.
Constitutionality depends upon such disclosure. their presence, whether determinative of
legislative or judicial power, cannot be relegated to guesswork. Neither Congress nor the
Court can predict, prior to the event, the result of investigation."
The other case relied upon by the petitioner is Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U.S., 521; 61
L. ed., 881. The question there was whether the House of Representatives exceeded its power
in punishing, as for contempt of its authority, the district Attorney of the Southern District of
New York, who had written, published, and sent to the chairman of one of its committees an
ill-tempered and irritating letter respecting the action and purposes of the committee in
interfering with the investigation by the grand jury of alleged illegal activities of a member of
the House of Representatives. Power to make inquiries and obtain evidence by compulsory
process was not involved. The court recognized distinctly that the House of Representative
had implied power to punish a person not a member for contempt, but held that its action in
this instance was without constitutional justification. The decision was put on the ground that
the letter, while offensive and vexatious, was not calculated or likely to affect the House in any
of its proceedings or in the exercise of any of its functions. This brief statement of the facts
and the issues decided in that case is sufficient to show the inapplicability thereof to the
present case. There the contempt involved consisted in the district attorney's writing to the
chairman of the committee an offensive and vexatious letter, while here the contempt involved
consists in the refusal of the witness to answer questions pertinent to the subject of an inquiry
which the Senates has the power and jurisdiction to make. But in that case it was recognized
that the House of Representatives has implied power to punish a person not a member for
contempt. In that respect the case is applicable here in favor of the Senate's (not not of the
petitioner's) contention.
Second. It is next contended for the petitioner that the Senate lacks authority to commit
him for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session, which ended on May 18,
1950. This contention is based on the opinion of Mr. Justice Malcolm, concurred in by Justices
Street and Villa-Real in the case of Lopez vs. De los Reyes (1930), 55 Phil., 170. In that case
it appears that on October 23, 1929, Candido Lopez assaulted a member of the House of
Representative while the latter was going to the hall of the House of Representatives to attend
the session which was then about to begin as a result of which assault said representative
was unable to attend the session on that day and those of the two days next following by
reason of the threats which Candido Lopez made against him. By resolution of the House
adopted November 6, 1929, Lopez was declared guilty of contempt of the House of
Representatives and ordered punished by confinement in Bilibid Prison for a period of twenty-
four hours. That resolution was not complied with because the session of the House of
Representatives adjourned at the next session on September 16, 1930. Lopez was
subsequently arrested, whereupon he applied for the writ of habeas corpus in the Court of
First Instance of Manila, which denied the application. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, six
justices voted to grant the writ: Justices Malcolm, Street, and Villa-Real, on the ground that
the term of imprisonment meted out to the petitioner could not legally be extended beyond the
session of the body in which the contempt occurred; and Justices Johns, Villamor, and
Ostrands, on the ground that the Philippine Legislature had no power to punish for contempt
because it was a creature merely of an Act of the Congress of the United States and not of
a Constitution adopted by the people. Chief Justice Avanceña, Justice Johnson, and Justice
Romualdez wrote a separate opinions, concurring with Justice Malcolm, Street and Villa-Real,
that the Legislature has inherent power to punish for contempt but dissenting from the opinion
that the order of commitment could only be executed during the particular session in which
the act of contempt was committed.
Thus, on the question under consideration, the Court was equally divided and no
decisive pronouncement was made. The opinion of Mr. Justice Malcolm is based mainly on
the following passage in the case of Anderson vs. Dunn, supra:
"And although the legislative power continues perpetual, the legislative
body ceases to exist on the amount of its adjournment or periodical dissolution.
It follows that imprisonment must terminate with that adjournment."
as well as on the following quotation from Marshall vs. Gordon, supra:
And the essential nature of the power also makes clear the cogency and
application of the two limitations which were expressly pointed out in
Anderson vs. Dunn, supra, that is, that the power even when applied to subjects
which justified its exercise is limited to imprisonment and such imprisonment may
not extended beyond the session of the body in which the contempt occurred."
Interpreting the above quotations, Chief Justice Avanceña held:
"From this doctrine it follows, in my judgment, that the imposition of the
penalty is limited to the existence of the legislative body, which ceases to function
upon its final periodical dissolution. The doctrine refers to its existence and not
to any particular session thereof. This must be so, inasmuch as the basis of the
power to impose such penalty is the right which the Legislature has to self-
preservation, and which right is enforceable during the existence of the
legislative body. Many causes might be conceived to constitute contempt to the
Legislature, which would continue to be a menace to its prevention during the
existence of the legislative body against which contempt was committed.
 "If the basis of the power of the legislature to punish for contempt exists
while the legislative body exercising it is in session, then that power and the
exercise thereof must be perforce continue until its final adjournment and the
election of its successor."
Mr. Justice Johnson's more elaborate opinion, supported by quotations from
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations and from Jefferson's Manual, is to the same effect. Mr.
Justice Romualdez said: "In my opinion, where, as in the case before us, the members
composing the legislative body against which the contempt was committed have not yet
completed their three-year term, the House may take action against the petitioner herein."
We note that the quotations from Anderson vs. Dunn. and Marshall vs. Gordon relied
upon by Justice Malcolm are obiter dicta. Anderson vs. Dunn was an action of trespass
against the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives of the United States for assault
of the United states for assault and battery and false imprisonment. The plaintiff had been
arrested for contempt of the House, brought before the bar of the House, and reprimanded by
the Speaker, and then discharge from custody. The question as to the duration of the penalty
was not involved in that case. The question there presented was "whether the House of
Representatives can take cognizance of contempts committed against themselves, under any
circumstances." The court there held that the House of Representatives had the power to
punish for contempt, and affirmed the judgment of the lower court in favor of the defendant.
In Marshall vs. Gordon, the question presented was whether the House had the power under
the Constitution to deal with the conduct of the district attorney in writing a vexatious letter as
a contempt of its authority, and to inflict punishment upon the writer for such contempt as a
matter of legislative power. The court held that the House had no such power because the
writing of the letter did not obstruct the performance of legislative duty and did not endanger
the preservation of the power of the House to carry out its legislative authority. Upon that
ground alone, and not because the House had adjourned, the court ordered the discharge of
the petitioner from custody.
The case where the question was squarely decided is McGrain vs. Daugherty, supra.
There it appears that the Senate had adopted a resolution authorizing and directing a select
committee of five senators to investigate various charges of misfeasance and nonfeasance in
the Department of Justice after Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty became its supervising
head. In the course of the investigation the committee caused to be served on Mally S.
Daugherty, brother of Harry M. Daugherty and president of the Midland National Bank of
Washington Court, Ohio, a subpoena commanding him to appear before it for the purpose of
giving testimony relating to the subject under consideration. The witness failed to appear
without offering any excuse for his failure. The committee reported the matter to the Senate
and the latter adopted a resolution, "That the President of the Senate pro tempore issue his
warrant commanding the Sergeant-at-Arms or his deputy to take into custody the body of the
said M. S. Daugherty wherever found, and to bring the said M. S. Daugherty before the bar of
the Senate, then and there to answer such questions pertinent to the matter under inquiry as
the Senate may order the President of the Senate pro tempore to propound; and to keep the
said M. S. Daugherty in custody to await the further order of the Senate." Upon being arrested,
the witness petitioned the federal court in Cincinnati for a writ of habeas corpus. The federal
court granted the writ and discharged the witness on the ground that the Senate, in directing
the investigation and in ordering the arrest, exceeded its power under the Constitution. Upon
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, one of the contentions of the witness was
that the case had become moot because the investigation was ordered and the committee
was appointed during the Sixty-eighth Congress, which expired on March 4, 1926. In
overruling the contention, the court said:
". . . The resolution ordering the investigation in terms limited the
committee's authority to the period of the Sixty-eight Congress; but this
apparently was changed by a later and amendatory resolution authorizing the
 committee to sit at such times and places as it might deem advisable or
necessary. It is said in Jefferson's Manual: 'Neither House can continue any
portion of itself in any parliamentary function beyond the end of the session
without the consent of the other two branches. When done, it is by a bill
constituting them commissioners for the particular purpose.' But the context
shows that the reference is to the two houses of Parliament when adjourned by
prorogation or dissolution by the King. The rule may be the same with the House
of Representatives whose members are all elected for the period of a single
Congress; but it cannot well be the same with the Senate, which is a continuing
body whose members are all elected for a term of six years and so divided into
classes that the seats of one third only become vacant at the end of each
Congress, two thirds always continuing into the next Congress, save as
vacancies may occur through death or resignation.
"Mr. Hinds in his collection of precedents, says: 'The Senate, as a
continuing body, may continue its committees through the recess following the
expiration of a Congress;' and, after quoting the above statement from
Jefferson's Manual, he says: 'The Senate, however, being a continuing body,
gives authority to its committees during the recess after the expiration of a
Congress.' So far as we are advised the select committee having this
investigation in charge has neither made a final report nor been discharged; nor
has it been continued by an affirmative order. Apparently its activities have been
suspended pending the decision of this case. But, be this as it may, it is certain
that the committee may be continued or revived now by motion to that effect,
and, if continued or revived, will have all its original powers. This being so, and
the Senate being a continuing body, the case cannot be said to have become
moot in the ordinary sense. The situation is measurably like that in Southern P.
Terminal Co. vs. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S., 498, 514-516; 55
L. ed., 310, 315, 316; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 279, where it was held that a suit to
enjoin the enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission did
not become moot through the expiration of the order where it was capable of
repetition by the Commission and was a matter of public interest. Our judgment
may yet be carried into effect and the investigation proceeded with from the point
at which it apparently was interrupted by reason of the habeas corpus
proceedings. In these circumstances we think a judgment should be rendered as
was done in the case cited.
"What has been said requires that the final order in the District Court
discharging the witness from custody be reversed."
Like the Senate of the United States, the Senate of the Philippines is a continuing body
whose members are elected for a term of six years and so divided that the seats of only one-
third become vacant every two years, two-thirds always continuing into the next Congress
save as vacancies may occur thru death or resignation. Members of the House of
Representatives are all elected for a term of four years; so that the term of every Congress is
four years. The Second Congress of the Philippines was constituted on December 30, 1949,
and will expire on December 30, 1953. The resolution of the Senate committing the petitioner
was adopted during the first session of the Second Congress, which began on the fourth
Monday of January and ended on May 18, 1950.
Had said resolution of commitment been adopted by the House of Representatives,
we think it could be enforced until the final adjournment of the last session of the Second
Congress in 1953. We find no sound reason to limit the power of a legislative body to punish
for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the
existence of that body. The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt
is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or
obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly
constituted committees charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting
hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the power of inquiry
with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that power is
recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to its legislative
function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to
be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which
is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the
Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's
power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in
the present case.
Mere reflection upon the situation at hand convinces us of the soundness of this
proposition. The Senate has ordered an investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong
estates deal, which we have found it is within its competence to make. That investigation has
not been completed because of the refusal of the petitioner as a witness to answer certain
questions pertinent to the subject of the inquiry. The Senate has empowered the committee
to continue the investigation during the recess. By refusing to answer the questions, the
witness has obstructed the performance by the Senate of its legislative function, and the
Senate has the power to remove the obstruction by compelling the witness to answer the
questions thru restraint of his liberty until he shall have answered them. That power subsists
as long as the Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in performing the particular
legislative function involved. To hold that it may punish the witness for contempt only during
the session in which investigation was begun, would be to recognize the right of the Senate
to perform its function but at the same time to deny to it an essential and appropriate means
for its performance. Aside from this, if we should hold that the power to punish for contempt
terminates upon the adjournment of the session, the Senate would have to resume the
investigation at the next and succeeding sessions and repeat the contempt proceedings
against the witness until the investigation is completed — an absurd, unnecessary, and
vexatious procedure, which should be avoided.
As against the foregoing conclusion it is argued for the petitioner that the power may
be abusively and oppressively exerted by the Senate which might keep the witness in prison
for life. But we must assume that the Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond
its proper bounds. And if, contrary to this assumption, proper limitations are disregarded, the
portals of this Court are always open to those whose rights might thus be transgressed.
Third. Lastly, the petitioner invokes the privilege against self- incrimination. He
contends that he would incriminate himself if he should reveal the name of the person to whom
he gave the P440,000 because if that person be a public official he (witness) might be accused
of bribery, and if that person be a private individual the latter might accuse him of oral
defamation.
The ground upon which the witness' claim is based is too shaky, infirm, and slippery
to afford him safety. At first he told the Committee that the transactions were legal, that no
laws were violated, and that all requisites had been complied with; but at the same time he
begged to be excused from making answers "which might later be used against me." A little
later he explained that although the transactions were legal he refused to answer questions
concerning them "because it violates the rights of a citizen to privacy in his dealings with other
people. . . . I simply stand on my privilege to dispose of the money that has been paid to me
as a result of a legal transaction without having to account for any use of it." But after being
apparently convinced by the Committee that his position was untenable, the witness testified
that, without securing any receipt, he turned over the P440,000 to a certain person, a
representative of Burt, in compliance with Burt's verbal instruction made in 1946; that, as far
as he know, that certain person had nothing to do with the negotiations for the settlement of
the Buenavista and Tambobong cases; that he had seen that person several times before he
gave him the P440,000 on October 29, 1949, and that since then he had seen him again two
or three times, the last time being in December, 1949, in Manila; that the person was a male,
39 to 40 years of age, between 5 feet, 2 inches and 5 feet, 6 inches in height. But the witness
would not reveal the name of that person on these pretexts: "I don't remember the name; he
was a representative of Burt." "I am not sure; I don't remember the name."
We are satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, What is
the name of that person to whom you gave the P440,000? were obviously false. His insistent
claim before the bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate
himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave
P440,000 to a person to him unknown.
"Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and
is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable." (12 Am.
Jur., sec. 15, Contempt, pp. 399-400.) In the case of Mason vs. U. S., 61 L. ed., 1198, it
appears that Mason was called to testify before a grand jury engaged in investigating a charge
of gambling against six other men. After stating that he was sitting at a table with said men
when they were arrested, he refused to answer two questions, claiming so to do might tend
to incriminate him: (1) "Was there a game of cards being played on this particular evening at
the table at which you were sitting?" (2) "Was there a game of cards being played at another
table at this time?" The foreman of the grand jury reported the matter to the judge, who ruled
"that each and all of said questions are proper and that the answers thereto would not tend to
incriminate the witnesses." Mason was again called and he refused to answer the first
question propounded to him, but, half yielding to frustration, he said in response to the second
question: "I don't know." In affirming the conviction for contempt, the Supreme Court of the
United States among other things said:
"In the present case the witnesses certainly were not relieved from
answering merely because they declared that so to do might incriminate them.
The wisdom of the rule in this regard is well illustrated by the enforced answer, 'I
don't know,' given by Mason to the second question, after he had refused to reply
under a claim of constitutional privilege."
Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the
P440,000 to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter's verbal instruction, we find
no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might
incriminate him. There is no conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:
"Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the
determination of the Court. At least, it is not enough for the witness to say that
the answer will incriminate him, as he is not the sole judge of his liability. The
danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court, from
all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general
conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is
the province of the court to determine whether a direct answer to a question may
criminate or not. . . . The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to show
that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection
of the constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same
time liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot
assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an
imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person." (3 Wharton's Criminal
Evidence, 11th ed., secs. 1135, 1136.)
"It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and
circumstances of the case whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer.
(People vs. Gonzo, 23 N. E. [2d], 210 [Ill. App., 1939].) A witness is not relieved
 from answering merely on his own declaration that an answer might incriminate
him, but rather it is for the trial judge to decide that question." (Mason vs. U. S.,
244 U. S., 362; 61 L. ed., 1193, 1200.)
As against witness's inconsistent and unjustified claim to a constitutional right, is his
clear duty as a citizen to give frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent
authority. The state has the right to exact fulfillment of a citizen's obligation, consistent of
course with his right under the Constitution. The witness in this case has been vociferous and
militant in claiming constitutional rights and privileges but patently recreant to his duties and
obligations to the Government which protects those rights under the law. When a specific right
and a specific obligation conflict with each other, and one is doubtful or uncertain while the
other is clear and imperative, the former must give way to the latter. The right to life is one of
the most sacred that the citizen may claim, and yet the state may deprive him of it if he violates
his corresponding obligation to respect the life of others. As Mr. Justice Johnson said in
Anderson vs. Dunn: "The wretch beneath the gallows may repine at the fate which awaits him,
and yet it is not less certain that the laws under which he suffers were made for the security."
Paraphrasing and applying that pronouncement here, the petitioner may not relish the
restraint of his liberty pending the fulfillment by him of his duty, but it is no less certain that the
laws under which his liberty is restrained were made for his welfare.
From all the foregoing, it follows that the petition must be denied, and it is so ordered,
with costs.
Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor and Reyes JJ., concur.
||| (Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, [July 18, 1950], 87 PHIL 29-77)

EN BANC
[January 21, 1949.]
In re VICENTE SOTTO, for contempt of court.
Vicente Sotto in his own behalf.
SYLLABUS
1. CONTEMPT; POWER TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT IS INHERENT IN ALL
COURTS OF SUPERIOR JURISDICTION. — That the power to punish for contempt is
inherent in all courts of superior jurisdiction independently of any special expression of statute,
is a doctrine or principle uniformly accepted and applied by the courts of last resort in the
United States, which is applicable in this jurisdiction since our Constitution and courts of
justice are patterned after those of that country.
2. ID.; CRITICISM OR COMMENT ON DECISIONS OF SUPREME COURT, EXTENT
AND SCOPE OF. — Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness
or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be
tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction
of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken and obviously erroneous it should, in no way,
influence the court in reversing or modifying its decision.
3. ID.; ID. — To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years
committing deliberately "so many blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it has been
deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse
party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, would tend necessarily
to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this
court, and consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice.
4. ID.; ID.— The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last
bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or
protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this court and believe that they can
 not expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and
disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result.
5. ID.; ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; DUTIES TOWARD THE SUPREME COURT. — As a
member of the bar and an officer of the courts, Attorney V. S., like any other, is in duty bound
to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath
he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.
Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty
would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
6. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS;
MAINTENANCE OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY. — The constitutional guaranty
of freedom of speech and the press must be protected to its fullest extent, but license or abuse
of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense.
As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of
the citizen, is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though
separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The
press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the
principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its prerogative and the
latter its jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and care
taken at all times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary, in order to
dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair the
impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, this Court will not
hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must be permitted
to proceed with the disposition of its business in an orderly manner free from outside
interference obstructive of the constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital
to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense,
it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal.
DECISION

FERIA, J p:

This is a proceeding for contempt of court against the respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto,
who was required by this Court on December 7, 1948, to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt of court for having issued a written statement in connection with the
decision of this Court in In re Angel Parazo for contempt of court, which statement, as
published in the Manila Times and other daily newspapers of the locality, reads as follows:
"As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53), interpreted
by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who
now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of
a news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only
erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in evidence the
incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members. In the wake
of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last
years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change
the members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce that one of the
first measures, which I will introduce in the coming congressional sessions, will
have as its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now
constituted, the Supreme Court of today constituted a constant peril to liberty and
democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear:
the Supreme Court of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice
 of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo
and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine
Judiciary."
Upon his request, the respondent was granted ten days more besides the five
originally given him to file his answer, and although his answer was filed after the expiration
of the period of time given him the said answer was admitted. This Court could have rendered
a judgment for contempt after considering his answer, because he does not deny the
authenticity of the statement as it has been published. But, in order to give the respondent
ample opportunity to defend himself or justify the publication of such libelous statement, the
case was set for hearing or oral argument on January 4, the hearing being later postponed to
January 10, 1949. As the respondent did not appear at the date set for hearing, the case was
submitted for decision.
In his answer, the respondent does not deny having published the above quoted threat
and intimidation as well as false and calumnious charges against this Supreme Court. But he
therein contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon this
Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure,
"this Court has no power to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and that the
Supreme Court can only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and a law has to
be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the Chief Executive." And he also
alleges in his answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed by
the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith
and with no intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of this high
Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked,
nor intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any one." The other arguments set forth by
the respondent in his defenses deserve no consideration.
Rule 64 of the rules promulgated by this Court does not punish as for contempt of
court an act which was not punishable as such under the law and the inherent powers of the
Court to punish for contempt. The provisions of sections 1 and 3 of said Rule 64 are a mere
reproduction of sections 231 and 232 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, as
amended, in connection with the doctrine laid down by this Court on the inherent power of the
superior courts to punish for contempt in several cases, among them In re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944.
That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of superior jurisdiction
independently of any special expression of statute, is a doctrine or principle uniformly
accepted and applied by the courts of last resort in the United States, which is
applicable in this jurisdiction since our Constitution and courts of justice are patterned after
those of that country. The doctrine or principle as expounded in American Jurisprudence is as
follows:
"The power of inflicting punishment upon persons guilty of contempt of
court may be regarded as an essential element of judicial authority. It is
possessed as a past of the judicial authority granted to courts created by
the Constitution of the United States or by the Constitutions of the several states.
It is a power said to be inherent in all courts of general jurisdiction, whether they
are State or Federal; such power exists in courts of general jurisdiction
independently of any special or express grant of statute. In many instances the
right of certain courts or tribunals to punish for contempt is expressly bestowed
by statute, but such statutory authorization is unnecessary, so far as the courts
of general jurisdiction are concerned, and in general adds nothing to their power,
although so far as concerns the inferior courts statutory authority may be
necessary to empower them to act." (Contempt, 12 Am. Jur., pp. 418, 419.)
In conformity with the principle enunciated in the above quotation from American
Jurisprudence, this Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:
 "The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause,
respecting the same, has always been considered as misbehavior, tending to
obstruct the administration of justice, and subjects such persons to contempt
proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried
fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public
clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the
fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the protection
and forms of law, free from outside coercion or interference. Any publication,
pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the parties, the officers of the court, the
counsel, etc., with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of
the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable. The power to punish for
contempt is inherent in all courts. The summary power to commit and punish for
contempt tending to obstruct or degrade the administration of justice, as
inherent in courts as essential to the execution of their powers and to the
maintenance of their authority is a part of the law of the land." (In re Kelly, 35
Phil., 944, 945.)
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be
tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction
of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way,
influence the court in reversing or modifying its decision. Had the respondent in the present
case limited himself to a statement that our decision is wrong or that our construction of the
intention of the law is not correct, because it is different from what he, as proponent of the
original bill which became a law had intended, his criticism might in that case be tolerated, for
it could not in any way influence the final disposition of the Parazo case by the court; inasmuch
as it is of judicial notice that the bill presented by the respondent was amended by both houses
of Congress, and the clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the
interest of the State" was added or inserted; and that, as the Act was passed by Congress
and not by any particular member thereof, the intention of Congress and not that of the
respondent must be the one to be determined by this Court in applying said Act. But in the
above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the respondent
does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and
still is pending reconsideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends
to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of
which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members
of Justices from eleven to seven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided
the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow
minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass
or obstruct the administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and
integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into
disrepute and degrading the administration of justice, for in his above-quoted statement he
says:
"In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed
during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much
evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce
that one of the first measures, which I will introduce in the coming congressional
sessions, will have as its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme
Court. As it is now the Supreme Court of today constitutes a constant peril to
liberty and democracy."
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately "so many blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor
of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on
the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last
years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and
integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower or degrade the administration
of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the
last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or
protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they
cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands,
and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer
of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such
attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts
guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on
a very shaky foundation.
Respondent's assertion in his answer that "he made his statement in the press with
the utmost good faith and without intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable
members of this high Tribunal," if true may mitigate but not exempt him from liability for
contempt of court; but it is belied by his acts and statements during the pendency of this
proceeding. The respondent in his petition of December 11, alleges that Justice Gregorio
Perfecto is the principal promoter of this proceeding for contempt, conveying thereby the idea
that this Court acted in the case through the instigation of Mr. Justice Perfecto.
It is true that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and the press must be
protected to its fullest extent, but license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen
should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as the maintenance of an
unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the right of the citizen, is the maintenance of the
independence of the judiciary. As Judge Holmes very appropriately said in U. S. vs. Sullens
(1929), 36 Fed. (2nd), 230, 238, 239: "The administration of justice and the freedom of the
press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the
other. The press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to
uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its
prerogative and the latter its jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously
recognized and care taken at all times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is
necessary, in order to dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications which
reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration
of justice, this court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for contempt.
This Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in an orderly
manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will
be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises
the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal. . . ."
It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is under special
obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts, he may be
removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct
(17 L. R. A. [N. S.], 586, 594).
In view of all the foregoing, we find the respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto guilty of
contempt of this Court by virtue of the above- quoted publication, and he is hereby sentenced
to pay, within the period of fifteen days from the promulgation of this judgment, a fine of
P1,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The respondent is also hereby required to appear, within the same period, and show
cause to this Court why he should not be disbarred from practicing as an attorney-at-
law in any of the courts of this Republic, for said publication and the following statements
made by him during the pendency of the case against Angel Parazo for contempt of Court.
 In his statement to the press as published in the Manila Times in its issue of
December 9, 1948, the respondent said "The Supreme Court can send me to jail, but it cannot
close my mouth;" and in his other statement published on December 10, 1948, in the same
paper, he stated among others: "It is not the imprisonment that is degrading, but the cause of
the imprisonment." In his Rizal day speech at the Abellana High School in Cebu, published
on January 3, 1949, in the Manila Daily Bulletin, the respondent said that "there was more
freedom of speech when American Justices sat in the Tribunal than now when it is composed
of our countrymen;" reiterated that "even if it succeeds in placing him behind bars, the court
can not close his mouth," and added: "I would consider imprisonment a precious heritage to
leave for those who would follow me because the cause is noble and lofty." And the Manila
Chronicle of January 5 published the statement of the respondent in Cebu to the effect that
this Court "acted with malice" in citing him to appear before this Court on January 4 when "the
members of this Court know that I came here on vacation." In all said statements the
respondent misrepresents to the public the cause of the charge against him for contempt of
court. He says that the cause is for criticizing the decision of this Court in said Parazo
case in defense of the freedom of the press, when in truth and in fact he is charged with
intending to interfere and influence the final disposition of said case through intimidation and
false accusations against this Supreme Court. So ordered.

||| (In re: Vicente Sotto, [January 21, 1949])

EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 99289-90. January 27, 1993.]

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ,
Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Special Prosecutor;
SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA, respondents.

Marciano P. Defensor for petitioner.

Nestor P. Ifurong for Maria S. Tatoy.
Danilo C. Cunanan for respondents.
SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE OF ACCUSED

WHEREBY COURT ACQUIRES JURISDICTION; INSTANCES. — It has been held that
where after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is
issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the court or
was duly arrested, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The
voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person,
is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or
other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's jurisdiction thereover, appearing for
arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; BAIL CANNOT BE POSTED BEFORE CUSTODY OF ACCUSED
EITHER BY ARREST OR VOLUNTARY SURRENDER. — On the matter of bail, since the
same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot
be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either
by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONER ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING SHE WAS DENIED
DUE PROCESS AFTER SHE RECOGNIZED THE COURT'S JURISDICTION. — We find and
so hold that petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of
respondent court upon the filing of her aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance
of Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago" wherein she expressly
sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the
Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings," and categorically
prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and
that by said motion "she be considered as having placed herself under the custody" of said
court. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim otherwise for, by her own representations, she
is effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she had earlier recognized the
jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the aforestated
pleadings she filed therein.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FILING OF MOTIONS IN INSTANT CASE, AN ADMISSION OF
ACQUIESCENCE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PROPRIETY OF CASH BOND. — It
cannot be denied that petitioner has posted a cash bail bond of P15,000.00 for her provisional
release as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 4292925 dated May 15, 1991 and which is even
attached as Annex C-2 to her own motion now under consideration. This is further buttressed
by the fact that petitioner thereafter also filed a motion for the cancellation of said cash bond
and for the court to allow her provisional liberty upon the security of a recognizance. With the
filing of the foregoing motions, petitioner should accordingly and necessarily admit her
acquiescence to and acknowledgment of the propriety of the cash bond she posted, instead
of adopting a stance which ignores the injunction for candor and sincerity in dealing with the
courts of justice.
5. ID.; EXECUTION, SATISFACTION AND EFFECT OF JUDGMENT; TEMPORARY
INJUNCTION TERMINATES AUTOMATICALLY UPON DISMISSAL OF ACTION. — Section
4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that, unless otherwise ordered by the court, a
judgment in an action for injunction shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal
is taken or during the pendency of an appeal. And, the rule is that the execution of a judgment
decreeing the dissolution of a writ of preliminary injunction shall not be stayed before an
appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal, and we see no reason why the foregoing
considerations should not apply to a temporary restraining order. The rationale therefor is that
even in cases where an appeal is taken from a judgment dismissing an action on the merits,
the appeal does not suspend the judgment, hence the general rule applies that a temporary
injunction terminates automatically on the dismissal of the action.
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Where, as in the present case, a hold departure
order has been issued ex parte or motu proprio by said court, the party concerned must first
exhaust the appropriate remedies therein, through a motion for reconsideration or other
proper submissions, or by the filing of the requisite application for travel abroad. Only where
all the conditions and requirements for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus indubitably obtain against a disposition of the lower courts may our
power of supervision over said tribunals be invoked through the appropriate petition assailing
on jurisdictional or clearly valid grounds their actuations therein.
RESOLUTION

REGALADO, J p:
Filed directly with the Court, ostensibly as an incident in the present special civil action,
is petitioner's so-called "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold
Departure Order with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction, with Motion to Set Pending Incident for Hearing." Despite the
impropriety of the mode adopted in elevating the issue to us, as will hereinafter be discussed,
we will disregard the procedural gaffe in the interest of an early resolution hereof.
The chronology of events preceding the instant motion is best summarized to readily
provide a clear understanding and perspective of our disposition of this matter, thus:
1. On May 13, 1991, an information dated May 9, 1991 and docketed as Criminal Case
No. 16698 was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of Section
3(e), Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
2. On May 14, 1991, an order of arrest was issued in said case against herein
petitioner by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, with bail for the
release of the accused fixed at P15,000.00. 1
3. On even date, petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash
Bail Bond for and in Behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago," 2 which pertinently states in
part:
xxx xxx xxx
"3. As a result of the vehicular collision, she suffered extensive physical
injuries which required surgical intervention. As of this time, her injuries,
specifically in the jaw or gum area of the mouth, prevents her to speak (sic)
because of extreme pain. Further, she cannot for an extended period be on her
feet because she is still in physical pain. . . .
"4. On the other hand, the accused Miriam Defensor Santiago seeks
leave of this Honorable Court that she be considered as having placed herself
under the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, for purposes of the required trial
and other proceedings and further seeks leave of this Honorable Court that the
recommended bail bond of P15,000.00 that she is posting in cash be accepted.
xxx xxx xxx
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that
the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000 00 be duly accepted, and
that by this motion, she be considered as having placed herself under the
custody of this Honorable Court and dispensing of her personal appearance
for now until such time she will (sic) have recovered sufficiently from her recent
near fatal accident.
"Further, on the above basis, it is also respectfully prayed that the
warrant for her arrest be immediately recalled."
xxx xxx xxx
4. Also on the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution 3 authorizing
petitioner to post a cash bond for her provisional liberty without need for her physical
appearance until June 5, 1991 at the latest, unless by that time her condition does not yet
permit her physical appearance before said court. On May 15, 1991, petitioner filed a cash
bond in the amount of P15,000 00, aside from the other legal fees. 4
5. On May 21, 1991, respondent Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez filed with the
Sandiganbayan a manifestation "that accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago appeared in his
office in the second floor of the Old NAWASA Building located in Arroceros Street, Ermita,
Manila at around 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon of May 20, 1991. She was accompanied by a
brother who represented himself to be Atty. Arthur Defensor and a lady who is said to be a
physician. She came and left unaided, after staying for about fifteen minutes." 5
6. Acting on said manifestation, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution also on May
21, 1991, setting the arraignment of the accused for May 27, 1991, and setting aside the
court's resolution of May 14, 1991 which ordered her appearance before the deputy clerk of
the First Division of said court on or before June 5, 1991. 6
7. In a motion dated May 22, 1991, petitioner asked that her cash bond be cancelled
and that she be allowed provisional liberty upon a recognizance. She contended that for her
to continue remaining under bail bond may imply to other people that she has intentions of
fleeing, an intention she would like to prove as baseless. 7
8. Likewise on May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction, and a subsequent addendum thereto, seeking to enjoin
the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila from proceeding with Criminal
Cases Nos. 12298 (for violation of Section 3[e] of Republic Act No. 3019), 91-94555 (violation
of Presidential Decree No. 46), and 91-94897 (for libel), respectively. Consequently, a
temporary restraining order was issued by this Court on May 24, 1991, enjoining the
Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 3, from proceeding with the
criminal cases pending before them. This Court, in issuing said order, took into consideration
the fact that according to petitioner, her arraignment, originally set for June 5, 1991, was
inexplicably advanced to May 27, 1991, hence the advisability of conserving and affording her
the opportunity to avail herself of any remedial right to meet said contingency.
9. On May 27, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued an order deferring: (a) the arraignment
of petitioner until further advice from the Supreme Court; and (b) the consideration of herein
petitioner's motion to cancel her cash bond until further initiative from her through counsel. 8
10. On January 18, 1992, this Court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for
certiorari and lifting and setting aside the temporary restraining order previously issued. 9 The
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was eventually denied with finality in this Court's
resolution dated September 10, 1992.
11. Meanwhile, in a resolution adopted on July 6, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued a
hold departure order against petitioner which reads as follows:
"Considering the information in media to the effect that accused
Santiago intends to leave the country soon for an extended stay abroad for
study purposes, considering the recent decision of the Supreme Court
dismissing her petition promulgated on January 13, 1992, although the same
is still subject of a Motion for Reconsideration from the accused, considering
that the accused has not yet been arraigned, nor that she has not (sic) even
posted bail the same having been by reason of her earlier claim of being
seriously indisposed, all of which were overtaken by a restraining order issued
by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 99289 and No. 99290 dated May 24, 1991,
the accused is ordered not to leave the country and the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation is ordered not to allow the departure of the
accused unless authorized from (sic) this Court." 10
The hold departure order was issued by reason of the announcement made by
petitioner, which was widely publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she would be
leaving for the United States to accept a fellowship supposedly offered by the John F.
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Petitioner likewise disclosed that she
would be addressing Filipino communities in the United States in line with her crusade against
election fraud and other aspects of graft and corruption. llcd
In the instant motion submitted for our resolution, petitioner argues that:
1. The Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and
with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the hold departure order considering
that it had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
 2. The Sandiganbayan blatantly disregarded basic principles of judicial
comity and due deference owing to a superior tribunal when it issued the hold
departure order despite the pendency of petitioner's motion for reconsideration
with this Honorable Court.
3. The right to due process of law, the right to travel and the right to
freedom of speech are preferred, pre-eminent rights enshrined not only in
the Constitution but also in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which
can be validly impaired only under stringent criteria which do not obtain in the
instant case.
4. The hold departure order in the instant case was issued under
disturbing circumstances which suggest political harassment and persecution.
5. On the basis of petitioner's creditable career in the bench and bar
and her characteristic transparency and candor, there is no reasonable ground
to fear that petitioner will surreptitiously flee the country to evade judicial
processes. 11
I. Petitioner initially postulates that respondent court never acquired jurisdiction over
her person considering that she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily
surrendered, aside from the fact that she has not validly posted bail since she never personally
appeared before said court. We reject her thesis for being factually and legally untenable.
It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for
the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily
submitted himself to the court or was duly arrested, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over
the person of the accused. 12 The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court
acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such
as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's
jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter
of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule
the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial
authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender. 13

In the case at bar, it becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether respondent

court acquired jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner and, correlatively, whether there
was a valid posting of bail bond.
We find and so hold that petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to
the jurisdiction of respondent court upon the filing of her aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte Motion
for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago" wherein
she expressly sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under the
jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings,"
and categorically prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be
duly accepted" and that by said motion "she be considered as having placed herself under
the custody" of said court. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim otherwise for, by her own
representations, she is effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she had earlier
recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the
aforestated pleadings she filed therein.
It cannot be denied that petitioner has posted a cash bail bond of P15,000.00 for her
provisional release as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 4292925 dated May 15, 1991 and
which is even attached as Annex C-2 to her own motion now under consideration. This is
further buttressed by the fact that petitioner thereafter also filed a motion for the cancellation
of said cash bond and for the court to allow her provisional liberty upon the security of a
recognizance. With the filing of the foregoing motions, petitioner should accordingly and
necessarily admit her acquiescence to and acknowledgment of the propriety of the cash bond
she posted, instead of adopting a stance which ignores the injunction for candor and sincerity
in dealing with the courts of justice. LexLib
Petitioner would also like to make capital of the fact that she did not personally appear
before respondent court to file her cash bond, thereby rendering the same ineffectual. Suffice
it to say that in this case, it was petitioner herself, in her motion for the acceptance of the cash
bond, who requested respondent court to dispense with her personal appearance until she
shall have recovered sufficiently from her vehicular accident. It is distressing that petitioner
should now turn around and fault respondent court for taking a compassionate stand on the
matter and accommodating her own request for acceptance of the cash bond posted in her
absence.
II. Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan disregarded the rule of judicial comity
when it issued the hold departure order despite the pendency of her motion for reconsideration
of the decision of this Court which dismissed her petition. She claims that if the principle of
judicial comity applies to prevent a court from interfering with the proceedings undertaken by
a coordinate court, with more reason should it operate to prevent an inferior court, such as
the Sandiganbayan, from interfering with the instant case where a motion for reconsideration
was still pending before this Court. She contends further that the hold departure order
contravenes the temporary restraining order previously issued by this Court enjoining the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the criminal case pending before it.
It will be remembered that the Court rendered a decision in the present case on
January 18, 1992 dismissing the petition for certiorari filed in this case and lifting and setting
aside the temporary restraining order it previously issued. It is petitioner's submission that the
filing of her motion for reconsideration stayed the lifting of the temporary restraining order,
hence respondent court continued to be enjoined from acting on and proceeding with the case
during the pendency of the motion for reconsideration. We likewise reject this contention which
is bereft of merit.
Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that, unless otherwise ordered by
the court, a judgment in an action for injunction shall not be stayed after its rendition and
before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal. And, the rule is that the
execution of a judgment decreeing the dissolution of a writ of preliminary injunction shall not
be stayed before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal, 14 and we see no
reason why the foregoing considerations should not apply to a temporary restraining order.
The rationale therefor is that even in cases where an appeal is taken from a judgment
dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not suspend the judgment, hence the
general rule applies that a temporary injunction terminates automatically on the dismissal of
the action. 15
It has similarly been held that an order of dissolution of an injunction may be
immediately effective, even though it is not final. 16 A dismissal, discontinuance, or non-suit
of an action in which a restraining order or temporary injunction has been granted operates
as a dissolution of the restraining order or temporary injunction 17 and no formal order of
dissolution is necessary to effect such dissolution. 18 Consequently, a special order of the
court is necessary for the reinstatement of an injunction. 19 There must be a new exercise of
judicial power. 20
The reason advanced in support of the general rule has long since been duly
explained, to wit:
". . . The court of this State, relying upon the last of the two clauses
quoted, held that an appeal from an order dissolving an injunction continued
the injunction in force. The evils which would result from such a holding are
 forcibly pointed out by Judge Mitchell in a dissenting opinion. He said:
'Although a plaintiff's papers are so insufficient on their face or so false in their
allegations that if he should apply on notice for an injunction, any court would,
on a hearing, promptly refuse to grant one, yet, if he can find anywhere in the
State a judge or court commissioner who will improvidently grant one ex parte,
which the court on the first and only hearing ever had dissolves, he can, by
appealing and filing a bond, make the ex parte injunction impervious to all
judicial interference until the appeal is determined in this court.' . . . Such a
result is so unjust and so utterly inconsistent with all known rules of equity
practice that no court should adopt such a construction unless absolutely shut
up to it by the clear and unequivocal language of the statute . . ." 21
This ruling has remained undisturbed over the decades and was reiterated in a case
squarely in point and of more recent vintage:
"The SEC's orders dated June 27, 1989 and July 21, 1989 (directing
the secretary of UDMC to call a stockholders' meeting, etc.) are not premature,
despite the petitioner's then pending motion for reconsideration of the decision
of the Court of Appeals. The lifting by the Court of Appeals of its writ of
preliminary injunction in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 17435 cleared the way for the
implementation by the SEC's en banc resolution in SEC EB Case No. 191. The
SEC need not wait for the Court of Appeals to resolve the petitioner's motion
for reconsideration for a judgment decreeing the dissolution of a preliminary
injunction is immediately executory. It shall not be stayed after its rendition and
before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal . . ." 22
On the bases of the foregoing pronouncements, there is no question that with the
dismissal of the petition for certiorari and the lifting of the restraining order, nothing stood to
hinder the Sandiganbayan from acting on and proceeding with the criminal cases filed against
herein petitioner. At any rate, as we have earlier mentioned, the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner was denied with finality in our resolution dated September 10, 1992. LibLex
Petitioner further posits, however, that the filing of the instant special civil action for
certiorari divested the Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction over the case therein. Whether
generated by misconception or design, we shall address this proposition which, in the first
place, had no reason for being and should not hereafter be advanced under like or similar
procedural scenarios.
The original and special civil action filed with this Court is, for all intents and purposes,
an invocation for the exercise of its supervisory powers over the lower courts. It does not have
the effect of divesting the inferior courts of jurisdiction validly acquired over the case pending
before them. It is elementary that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari,
commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court, does not even interrupt the
course of the latter when there is no writ of injunction restraining it. 23 The inevitable
conclusion is that for as long as no writ of injunction or restraining order is issued in the special
civil action for certiorari, no impediment exists and there is nothing to prevent the lower court
from exercising its jurisdiction and proceeding with the case pending before it. And, even if
such injunctive writ or order is issued, the lower court nevertheless continues to retain its
jurisdiction over the principal action.
III. It is further submitted by petitioner that the hold departure order violates her right
to due process, right to travel and freedom of speech.
First, it is averred that the hold departure order was issued without notice and hearing.
Much is made by petitioner of the fact that there was no showing that a motion to issue a hold
departure order was filed by the prosecution and, instead, the same was issued ex mero
motu by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is in error.
 Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a
general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. 24 These
inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of
jurisdiction; 25 or essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, 26 as well as
to the due administration of justice; 27 or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to
the execution of their granted powers; 28 and include the power to maintain the court's
jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants. 29

Therefore, while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to
effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation,
implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to
existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has the power to
do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope
of its jurisdiction. Hence, demands, matters, or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing
out of, the main action, and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of
by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal
matter, even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which,
as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance.
Furthermore, a court has the inherent power to make interlocutory orders necessary
to protect its jurisdiction. 30 Such being the case, with more reason may a party litigant be
subjected to proper coercive measures where he disobeys a proper order, or commits a fraud
on the court or the opposing party, the result of which is that the jurisdiction of the court would
be ineffectual. What ought to be done depends upon the particular circumstances. 31
Turning now to the case at bar, petitioner does not deny and, as a matter of fact, even
made a public statement that she had every intention of leaving the country allegedly to pursue
higher studies abroad. We uphold the course of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan in
taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioner's plan to go abroad and in thereafter issuing sua
sponte the hold departure order, in justified consonance with our preceding disquisition. To
reiterate, the hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent court's inherent power to
preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of
the accused.
Second, petitioner asseverates that considering that she is leaving for abroad to
pursue further studies, there is no sufficient justification for the impairment of her constitutional
right to travel; and that under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the right to travel
may be impaired only when so required in the interest of national security, public safety or
public health, as may be provided by law. LLphil
It will be recalled that petitioner has posted bail which we have declared legally valid
and complete despite the absence of petitioner at the time of filing thereof, by reason of the
peculiar circumstances and grounds hereinbefore enunciated and which warrant a relaxation
of the aforecited doctrine in Feliciano. Perforce, since under the obligations assumed by
petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and processes
of the court, she may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of
the case. This was the ruling we handed down in Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 32 to the effect that:
"A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving
the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of
a bail bond.
"Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security
required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law,
that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required
as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.
"Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the
burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the
accused as much under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the
proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer
the call of the court and do what the law may require of him.
"The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all
times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction
on his right to travel. As we have held in People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil 404
(1935):
'. . . the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to
hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of
the lower court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction
of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be
nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they
issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have
no binding force outside of said jurisdiction.'
"Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without
sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts."
This was reiterated in a more recent case where we held:
"Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can
impair the right to travel only on the grounds of 'national security, public safety,
or public health.'
"The submission is not well taken.
"Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to
mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order,
the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed
with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on
the basis of 'national security, public safety, or public health' and 'as may be
provided by law,' a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text
(The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G , S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 197, p. 263).
Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban
on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a
Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon
application of an interested party (See Salonga v. Hermoso & Travel
Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).
"Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be
construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means
necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before
them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all
auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may
be employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court).
xxx xxx xxx
". . . Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts
by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid
restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with
law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the
 Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their
course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding
himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes." 33
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the
part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who
initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by
seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower
courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law
to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon
the precious time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended
or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the
lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve
the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that
this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in
the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment
of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we elucidate that such policy includes the
matter of petitions or motions involving hold departure orders of the trial or lower courts.
Parties with pending cases therein should apply for permission to leave the country from the
very same courts which, in the first instance, are in the best position to pass upon such
applications and to impose the appropriate conditions therefor since they are conversant with
the facts of the cases and the ramifications or implications thereof. Where, as in the present
case, a hold departure order has been issued ex parte or motu proprio by said court, the party
concerned must first exhaust the appropriate remedies therein, through a motion for
reconsideration or other proper submissions, or by the filing of the requisite application for
travel abroad. Only where all the conditions and requirements for the issuance of the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus indubitably obtain against a
disposition of the lower courts may our power of supervision over said tribunals be invoked
through the appropriate petition assailing on jurisdictional or clearly valid grounds their
actuations therein.
WHEREFORE, with respect to and acting on the motion now before us for resolution,
the same is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Santiago v. Vasquez, G.R. Nos. 99289-90 (Resolution), [January 27, 1993], 291 PHIL 664-
684)

EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 171947-48. February 15, 2011.]

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, , petitioners, vs.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by
DIVINA V. ILAS, SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH
DELA PEÑA, PAUL DENNIS QUINTERO, and JAIME AGUSTIN R.
OPOSA, respondents.

RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J p:
 On December 18, 2008, this Court rendered a Decision in G.R. Nos. 171947-
48 ordering petitioners to clean up, rehabilitate and preserve Manila Bay in their different
capacities. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005
Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the
September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99 are
AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent developments or
supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed
defendant-government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila
Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per
Water Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to
make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.
In particular:
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and
proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, and Sec. 19
of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary government agency
responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully
implement its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the
rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest
possible time. It is ordered to call regular coordination meetings with concerned
government departments and agencies to ensure the successful implementation
of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated completion
schedules. EcIaTA
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code
of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the DILG, in
exercising the President's power of general supervision and its duty to
promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs under Sec.
43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro
Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all
factories, commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks of the
major river systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not
limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las
Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the
Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the
Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways
that eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the
bay, to determine whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic
septic tanks as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and
regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to require non-
complying establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks
within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and human
wastes from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay,
under pain of closure or imposition of fines and other sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the MWSS is directed to provide,
install, operate, and maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment
facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the earliest possible
time.
 (4) Pursuant to RA 9275, the LWUA, through the local water districts and
in coordination with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and
maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe collection,
treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,
Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550, the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered
to improve and restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to
assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga,
and Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic
resources in the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime
Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other,
shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and
regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513 and the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to
immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid
and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters
from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators. aSIATD
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and
projects for flood control projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in
coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group,
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other
agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other
encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable
laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote,
Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and
connecting waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal
implementor of programs and projects for flood control services in the rest of the
country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna,
in coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC,
and other concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish all
structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA
7279 and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando
(Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna
De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge
wastewater into the Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a
sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from
finality of this Decision. On matters within its territorial jurisdiction and in
connection with the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary
landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension and
filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective penal
provisions of RA 9003, Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other
existing laws on pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA
9275, within one (1) year from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed
septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the treatment and
disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall
give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time within which
 to set up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental
sanitation clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152, Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56
of RA 9003, the DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste
management, environmental protection, and like subjects in the school curricula
of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and, through them,
their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward achieving and
maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire
Philippine archipelago.
(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the
General Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses
relating to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the water quality of the
Manila Bay, in line with the country's development objective to attain economic
growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of
our marine waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA,
DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and
PPA, in line with the principle of "continuing mandamus," shall, from finality of
this Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report of the
activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision. cHSIDa
SO ORDERED.
The government agencies did not file any motion for reconsideration and the Decision
became final in January 2009.
The case is now in the execution phase of the final and executory December 18, 2008
Decision. The Manila Bay Advisory Committee was created to receive and evaluate the
quarterly progressive reports on the activities undertaken by the agencies in accordance with
said decision and to monitor the execution phase.
In the absence of specific completion periods, the Committee recommended that time
frames be set for the agencies to perform their assigned tasks. This may be viewed as an
encroachment over the powers and functions of the Executive Branch headed by the
President of the Philippines.
This view is misplaced.
The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial
power under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an
integral part of the adjudicative function of the Court. None of the agencies ever questioned
the power of the Court to implement the December 18, 2008 Decision nor has any of them
raised the alleged encroachment by the Court over executive functions.
While additional activities are required of the agencies like submission of plans of
action, data or status reports, these directives are but part and parcel of the execution stage
of a final decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Section 47 of Rule 39 reads:
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a
judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction
to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties of their successors in
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment
or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or
 which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear that the final judgment includes not only what appears upon its face to have
been so adjudged but also those matters "actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto." Certainly, any activity that is needed to fully implement a final judgment
is necessarily encompassed by said judgment.
Moreover, the submission of periodic reports is sanctioned by Secs. 7 and 8, Rule 8
of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases:
Sec. 7. Judgment. — If warranted, the court shall grant the privilege of
the writ of continuing mandamus requiring respondent to perform an act or series
of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied and to grant such other reliefs as may
be warranted resulting from the wrongful or illegal acts of the respondent. The
court shall require the respondent to submit periodic reports detailing the
progress and execution of the judgment, and the court may, by itself or
through a commissioner or the appropriate government agency, evaluate
and monitor compliance. The petitioner may submit its comments or
observations on the execution of the judgment. EDISTc
Sec. 8. Return of the writ. — The periodic reports submitted by the
respondent detailing compliance with the judgment shall be contained in partial
returns of the writ. Upon full satisfaction of the judgment, a final return of the writ
shall be made to the court by the respondent. If the court finds that the judgment
has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the
court docket. (Emphasis supplied.)
With the final and executory judgment in MMDA, the writ of
continuing mandamus issued in MMDA means that until petitioner-agencies have shown full
compliance with the Court's orders, the Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until
full execution of the judgment.
There being no encroachment over executive functions to speak of, We shall now
proceed to the recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee.
Several problems were encountered by the Manila Bay Advisory Committee. 2 An
evaluation of the quarterly progressive reports has shown that (1) there are voluminous
quarterly progressive reports that are being submitted; (2) petitioner-agencies do not have a
uniform manner of reporting their cleanup, rehabilitation and preservation activities; (3) as yet
no definite deadlines have been set by petitioner DENR as to petitioner-agencies' timeframe
for their respective duties; (4) as of June 2010 there has been a change in leadership in both
the national and local levels; and (5) some agencies have encountered difficulties in complying
with the Court's directives.
In order to implement the afore-quoted Decision, certain directives have to be issued
by the Court to address the said concerns.
Acting on the recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee, the Court
hereby resolves to ORDER the following:
(1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), as lead agency
in the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004, shall submit to the Court on or before June 30,
2011 the updated Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy.
The DENR is ordered to submit summarized data on the overall quality of Manila Bay
waters for all four quarters of 2010 on or before June 30, 2011.
 The DENR is further ordered to submit the names and addresses of persons and
companies in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan that
generate toxic and hazardous waste on or before September 30, 2011. DEaCSA
(2) On or before June 30, 2011, the Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG) shall order the Mayors of all cities in Metro Manila; the Governors of Rizal, Laguna,
Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan; and the Mayors of all the cities and towns in said
provinces to inspect all factories, commercial establishments and private homes along the
banks of the major river systems — such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan
Rivers, the National Capital Region (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-
Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the
Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, and the Laguna De Bay — and other minor
rivers and waterways within their jurisdiction that eventually discharge water into the Manila
Bay and the lands abutting it, to determine if they have wastewater treatment facilities and/or
hygienic septic tanks, as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, rules and regulations. Said
local government unit (LGU) officials are given up to September 30, 2011 to finish the
inspection of said establishments and houses.
In case of non-compliance, the LGU officials shall take appropriate action to ensure
compliance by non-complying factories, commercial establishments and private homes with
said law, rules and regulations requiring the construction or installment of wastewater
treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks.
The aforementioned governors and mayors shall submit to the DILG on or before
December 31, 2011 their respective compliance reports which will contain the names and
addresses or offices of the owners of all the non-complying factories, commercial
establishments and private homes, copy furnished the concerned environmental agency, be
it the local DENR office or the Laguna Lake Development Authority.
The DILG is required to submit a five-year plan of action that will contain measures
intended to ensure compliance of all non-complying factories, commercial establishments,
and private homes.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DILG and the mayors of all cities in Metro Manila shall
consider providing land for the wastewater facilities of the Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System (MWSS) or its concessionaires (Maynilad and Manila Water, Inc.) within
their respective jurisdictions.
(3) The MWSS shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the list of areas
in Metro Manila, Rizal and Cavite that do not have the necessary wastewater treatment
facilities. Within the same period, the concessionaires of the MWSS shall submit their plans
and projects for the construction of wastewater treatment facilities in all the aforesaid areas
and the completion period for said facilities, which shall not go beyond 2037.
On or before June 30, 2011, the MWSS is further required to have its two
concessionaires submit a report on the amount collected as sewerage fees in their respective
areas of operation as of December 31, 2010.
(4) The Local Water Utilities Administration is ordered to submit on or before
September 30, 2011 its plan to provide, install, operate and maintain sewerage and sanitation
facilities in said cities and towns and the completion period for said works, which shall be fully
implemented by December 31, 2020. TEDAHI
(5) The Department of Agriculture (DA), through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources, shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 a report on areas in Manila
Bay where marine life has to be restored or improved and the assistance it has extended to
the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan in
developing the fisheries and aquatic resources in Manila Bay. The report shall contain
monitoring data on the marine life in said areas. Within the same period, it shall submit its five-
year plan to restore and improve the marine life in Manila Bay, its future activities to assist the
aforementioned LGUs for that purpose, and the completion period for said undertakings.
The DA shall submit to the Court on or before September 30, 2011 the baseline data
as of September 30, 2010 on the pollution loading into the Manila Bay system from agricultural
and livestock sources.
(6) The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) shall incorporate in its quarterly reports the
list of violators it has apprehended and the status of their cases. The PPA is further ordered
to include in its report the names, make and capacity of the ships that dock in PPA ports. The
PPA shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the measures it intends to undertake
to implement its compliance with paragraph 7 of the dispositive portion of the MMDA Decision
and the completion dates of such measures.
The PPA should include in its report the activities of its concessionaire that collects
and disposes of the solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes, which shall state
the names, make and capacity of the ships serviced by it since August 2003 up to the present
date, the dates the ships docked at PPA ports, the number of days the ship was at sea with
the corresponding number of passengers and crew per trip, the volume of solid, liquid and
other wastes collected from said ships, the treatment undertaken and the disposal site for said
wastes.
(7) The Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group shall submit on or before
June 30, 2011 its five-year plan of action on the measures and activities it intends to undertake
to apprehend the violators of Republic Act No. (RA) 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of
1998 and other pertinent laws, ordinances and regulations to prevent marine pollution in
Manila Bay and to ensure the successful prosecution of violators.
The Philippine Coast Guard shall likewise submit on or before June 30, 2011 its five-
year plan of action on the measures and activities they intend to undertake to apprehend the
violators of Presidential Decree No. 979 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976 and RA
9993 or the Philippine Coast Guard Law of 2009 and other pertinent laws and regulations to
prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay and to ensure the successful prosecution of violators.
(8) The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) shall submit to the Court
on or before June 30, 2011 the names and addresses of the informal settlers in Metro Manila
who, as of December 31, 2010, own and occupy houses, structures, constructions and other
encroachments established or built along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR
(Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers,
and connecting waterways and esteros, in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws. On
or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA shall submit its plan for the removal of said informal
settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid houses, structures, constructions and
encroachments, as well as the completion dates for said activities, which shall be fully
implemented not later than December 31, 2015. HIcTDE
The MMDA is ordered to submit a status report, within thirty (30) days from receipt of
this Resolution, on the establishment of a sanitary landfill facility for Metro Manila in
compliance with the standards under RA 9003 or the Ecological Solid Waste Management
Act.
On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA shall submit a report of the location of open
and controlled dumps in Metro Manila whose operations are illegal after February 21,
2006, 3 pursuant to Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003, and its plan for the closure of these open
and controlled dumps to be accomplished not later than December 31, 2012. Also, on or
before June 30, 2011, the DENR Secretary, as Chairperson of the National Solid Waste
Management Commission (NSWMC), shall submit a report on the location of all open and
controlled dumps in Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan.
 On or before June 30, 2011, the DENR Secretary, in his capacity as NSWMC
Chairperson, shall submit a report on whether or not the following landfills strictly comply with
Secs. 41 and 42 of RA 9003 on the establishment and operation of sanitary landfills, to wit:
On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA and the seventeen (17) LGUs in Metro Manila
are ordered to jointly submit a report on the average amount of garbage collected monthly per
district in all the cities in Metro Manila from January 2009 up to December 31, 2010 vis-à-vis
the average amount of garbage disposed monthly in landfills and dumpsites. In its quarterly
report for the last quarter of 2010 and thereafter, MMDA shall report on the apprehensions for
violations of the penal provisions of RA 9003, RA 9275 and other laws on pollution for the said
period. HcSDIE
On or before June 30, 2011, the DPWH and the LGUs in Rizal, Laguna, Cavite,
Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan shall submit the names and addresses of the informal
settlers in their respective areas who, as of September 30, 2010, own or occupy houses,
structures, constructions, and other encroachments built along the Meycauayan-Marilao-
Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna de
Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways and esteros that discharge wastewater into the
Manila Bay, in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws. On or before June 30, 2011, the
DPWH and the aforesaid LGUs shall jointly submit their plan for the removal of said informal
settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid structures, constructions and encroachments, as
well as the completion dates for such activities which shall be implemented not later than
December 31, 2012.
(9) The Department of Health (DOH) shall submit to the Court on or before June 30,
2011 the names and addresses of the owners of septic and sludge companies including those
that do not have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage
coming from septic tanks.
The DOH shall implement rules and regulations on Environmental Sanitation
Clearances and shall require companies to procure a license to operate from the DOH.
The DOH and DENR-Environmental Management Bureau shall develop a toxic and
hazardous waste management system by June 30, 2011 which will implement segregation of
hospital/toxic/hazardous wastes and prevent mixing with municipal solid waste.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DOH shall submit a plan of action to ensure that the
said companies have proper disposal facilities and the completion dates of compliance.
(10) The Department of Education (DepEd) shall submit to the Court on or before May
31, 2011 a report on the specific subjects on pollution prevention, waste management,
environmental protection, environmental laws and the like that it has integrated into the school
curricula in all levels for the school year 2011-2012.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DepEd shall also submit its plan of action to ensure
compliance of all the schools under its supervision with respect to the integration of the
aforementioned subjects in the school curricula which shall be fully implemented by June 30,
2012.
(11) All the agencies are required to submit their quarterly reports electronically using
the forms below. The agencies may add other key performance indicators that they have
identified. aICHEc
SO ORDERED.
||| (Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos.
171947-48 (Resolution), [February 15, 2011], 658 PHIL 223-275)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 57883. March 12, 1982.]
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court
of Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN
C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN,
JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON
AGUILA, petitioners, vs. MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO
TANTUITCO, Chairman, Commission on Audit, and RICARDO PUNO,
Minister of Justice, respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled "An Act
Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefore and for other Purposes," the same
being contrary to the security of tenure provision of the Constitution as it separates from the
judiciary Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit
courts except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless
appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act. They likewise impute lack of good
faith in its enactment and characterize as undue delegation of legislative power to the
President his authority to fix the compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges
thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the reorganization shall be
deemed completed. The Solicitor General maintains that there is no valid justification for the
attack on the constitutionality of the statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the power vested
in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the allegations of absence of good
faith as well as the attack on the independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and devoid
of any support in law.
After an intensive and rigorous study of all the legal aspects of the case, the Supreme
Court dismissed the petition, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having
been shown. It held that the enactment thereof was in answer to a pressing and urgent need
for a major reorganization of the judiciary; that the attendant abolition of the inferior courts
which shall cause their incumbents to cease from holding office does not impair the
independence of the judiciary and the security of tenure guarantee as incumbent justices and
judges with good performance and clean records can be named anew in legal contemplation
without interruption in the continuity of their service; that the provision granting the President
authority to fix the compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges survives the test
of undue delegation of legislative power, a standard having been clearly adopted therefor; that
the reorganization provided by the challenged Act will be carried out in accordance with the
President's constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and the
judiciary's commitment to guard constitutional rights.
The petition was dismissed. Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee dissented in a
separate opinion; Justices Felix V. Makasiar and Venicio Escolin concurred with the main
opinion; Justice Hermogenes Concepcion concurred in the result; Justices Antonio P.
Barredo, Ramon C. Aquino, Ramon C. Fernandez, Juvenal K Guerrero, Ameurfina Melencio-
Herrera and Vicente G. Ericta concurred in separate opinions; Justices Vicente Abad-Santos
and Efren I. Plana submitted separate concurring and dissenting opinions.
SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTIONS; PARTIES; CAPACITY TO SUE;

PETITIONERS' LEGAL STANDING DEMONSTRATED. — The argument as to the lack of
standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as Judge de Ia Llana is concerned, he
certainly falls within the principle set forth in Justice Laurel's opinion in People vs. Vera, 65
Phil. 56 (1937). Thus: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a
statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." The other petitioners as members
of the bar and officers of the court cannot be considered as devoid of "any personal and
substantial interest" on the matter. There is relevance to this excerpt from a separate opinion
in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, L-40004, Jan. 31, 1975; "Then there is the attack
on the standing of petitioners, as vindicating at most what they consider a public right and not
protecting their rights as individuals. This is to conjure the specter of the public right dogma
at an inhibition to parties intent on keeping public officials staying on the path of
constitutionalism. As was so well put by Jaffe: `The protection of private right is an essential
constituent of public interest and, conversely, without a well-ordered state there could be no
enforcement of private rights. Private and public interests are, both in a substantive and
procedural sense, aspects of the totality of the legal order.' Moreover, petitioners have
convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers, their standing to sue has been amply
demonstrated.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF
1980; ENACTMENT THEREOF IN ANSWER TO A PRESSING AND URGENT NEED; GOOD
FAITH OBSERVED IN ITS ENACTMENT. — The enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 would firstly, result in the attainment "of more efficiency in the disposal of cases.
Secondly, the improvement in the quality of justice dispensed by the courts is expected as a
necessary consequence of the easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly, the structural changes
introduced in the bill, together with the reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the rules
of procedure, are designated to suit the court system to the exigencies of the present day
Philippine society, and hopefully, of the foreseeable future." It may be observed that the
volume containing the minutes of the proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa show that 590
pages were devoted to its discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable time and
effort as well as exhaustive study before the act was signed by the President on August 14,
1981. With such a background, it become quite manifest how lacking in factual basis is the
allegation that its enactment is tainted by the vice of arbitrariness. What appears undoubted
and undeniable is the good faith that characterized its enactment from its inception to the
affixing of the Presidential signature. cdasia
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESULTING ABOLITION OF COURTS IN GOOD FAITH, WITH DUE
RECOGNITION OF THE SECURITY OF TENURE GUARANTEE; VALIDITY OF ABOLITION
OF AN OFFICE, SETTLED RULE. — Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition
of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no
infirmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr., L-28573, June 13,
1968, reiterated such a doctrine: "We find this point urged by respondents, to be without merit.
No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is here involved, but the validity of
the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue that is for the Courts to decide. It is well-
known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the
incumbents. . . . And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have
ceased to hold office. The preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the merits of the case.
As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal
of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good
faith." The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Bendanillo, Sr. vs. Provincial Governor,
L-28614, Jan. 17, 1974, two earlier cases enunciating a similar doctrine having preceded it.
As with the offices in the other branches of the government, so it is with the Judiciary. The
test remains whether the abolition is in good faith. As that element is conspicuously present
in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition becomes
even more apparent.
4. ID.; ID; ID.; ENACTMENT THEREOF MAINTAINS UNIMPAIRED THE
INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY; TERMINATION BY VIRTUE OF THE ABOLITION
OF THE OFFICE DOES NOT IMPAIR SECURITY OF TENURE; SUPREME COURT TO BE
CONSULTED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REORGANIZATION OF THE
JUDICIARY. — Petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing Inferior Courts collides
with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X, Section
7 of the Constitution. There was a similar provision the 1935 Constitution. It did not, however,
go as far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise administratively inferior courts.
Moreover, this Court is empowered "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at
least eight members, order their dismissal. "Thus it possesses the competence to remove
judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power.
Removal is, of course, to be, distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the
office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office
with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the stand-
point of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Nonetheless, for the incumbents of 'Inferior Courts abolished, the effect is one of separation.
As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office.
Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the Judiciary. In the
implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted
principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are
concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded, the fullest consideration.
No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that
this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the
case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two
departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter
has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant
positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom
it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial
power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any
plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the Inferior
Courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or
disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one
not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a
construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives
between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to
be preferred. There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters into
and forms part of every act to avoid any unconstitutional taint must be applied.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO FIX THE COMPENSATION
AND ALLOWANCES OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES NOT AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER; EXISTENCE OF A STANDARD TO AVOID THE TAINT OF UNDUE
DELEGATION CLEAR. — Petitioners would characterize as an undue delegation of
legislative power to the President the grant of authority to fix the compensation and the
allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. A more careful reading of the
challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have cautioned them against raising such an
issue. The language of the statute is quite clear. The questioned provision reads as follows:
"Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, Municipal
Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such compensation and
allowances as may be authorized by the President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of
Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1597." (Chapter IV, Sec. 41 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) The existence of a
standard is thus clear. The basic postulate that underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is that
it is the legislative body which is entrusted with the competence to make laws and to alter and
repeal them, the test being the completeness of the statute in all its terms and provisions when
enacted. As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta, L-32096, Oct. 24, 1970, "To avoid the taint of unlawful
delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself
determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of
complete abdication may be hard to repeal. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks
its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by
which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office
designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and
regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation
objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It
could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole."
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTICIPATION OF SEVERAL JUSTICES IN THE PREPARATION
OF AN ALTERNATIVE PLAN FOR REORGANIZATION NOT OBJECTIONABLE; SUPREME
COURT DIRECTLY INVOLVED WITH JUDICIAL REFORM. — On the morning of the hearing
of the petition, petitioners sought to disqualify the Chief Justice and Associate Justices Ramon
Aquino and Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera because the first named was the Chairman and the
other two, members of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization. The motion was denied. It
was made clear then and there that not one of the three members of the Court had any hand
in the framing or in the discussion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They were not consulted.
They did not testify. The challenged legislation is entirely the product of the efforts of the
legislative body. Their work was limited, as set forth in the Executive Order, to submitting
alternative plan for reorganization. That is more in the nature of scholarly studies. Ever since
1973, this Tribunal has had administrative supervision over inferior courts. It has had the
opportunity to inform itself as to the way judicial business is conducted and how it may be
improved. Even prior to the 1973 Constitution, either the then Chairman or members of the
Committee on Justice of the then Senate of the Philippines consulted members of the Court
in drafting proposed legislation affecting the judiciary. It is not inappropriate to cite this excerpt
from an article in the 1975 Supreme Court Review: "In the Twentieth century the Chief Justice
of the United States has played a leading part in judicial reform. A variety of conditions have
been responsible for the development of this role, and foremost among them has been the
creation of explicit institutional structures designed to facilitate reform." Also: "Thus the Chief
Justice cannot avoid exposure to and direct involvement in judicial reform at the federal level
and, to the extent issues of judicial federalism arise, at the state level as well." (Fish, William
Howard Taft and Charles Evan Hughes, 1975 Supreme Court Review 123)
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; GUARANTEE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE OBSERVED. — It is a
cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are endowed with
rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it
has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they exercise not for
their own benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in the language of
ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." (Art. XIII, Sec. I) That is more than a moral
adjuration. It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public official certain rights. It does
so to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is
from that standpoint that the security of tenure provision to assure judicial independence is to
be viewed. It is an added guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice undeterred
by any fear of reprisal or untoward consequence. Their judgments then are even more likely
to be inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and the dictates of their conscience, free
from the corrupting influence of base or unworthy motives. The independence of which they
are assured is impressed with a significance transcending that of a purely personal right. As
thus viewed, it is not solely for their welfare. The challenged legislation was thus subjected to
the most rigorous scrutiny by this Tribunal, lest by lack of due care and circumspection, it
allows the erosion of that ideal so firmly embedded in the national consciousness.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE PRESERVED DESPITE THE
REORGANIZATION OF INFERIOR COURTS. — At emphasized by former Chief Justice
Paras in Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 57 O.G. 147(1955) "there is no surer guarantee of
 judicial independence than the God-given character and fitness of those appointed to the
Bench. The judges may be guaranteed a fixed tenure of office during good behaviour, but if
they are of such stuff as allows them to be subservient to one administration after another, or
to cater to the wishes of one litigant after another, the independence of the Judiciary will be
nothing more than a myth or any empty ideal. Our judges, we are confident, can be of the type
of Lord Coke, regardless or in spite of the power of Congress — we do not say unlimited but
as herein exercised — to reorganize inferior courts."
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; UPHOLDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY THEREOF WILL NOT
RESULT IN DELETERIOUS CONSEQUENCES TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
— There is no reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 would be attended with deleterious consequences to the administration of justice. It does
not follow that the abolition In good faith of the existing inferior courts except the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a
judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its solemn duty or one recreant
to the trust reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear that less than good faith will attend the
exercise of the appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an
independent and efficient Judiciary is something to the credit of any administration. Well and
truly has it been said that the fundamental principle of separation of powers assumes, and
justifiably so, that the three departments are as one in their determination to pursue the ideals
and aspirations and to fulfill the hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in
the Constitution. Justice Malcolm in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Company, 57
Phil. 600 (1932) said: "Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights,
should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as
strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred
on it by the Organic Act." To that basic postulate underlying our constitutional system, this
Court remains committed.
DECISION
FERNANDO, C .J p:
This Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility of passing upon the validity of any
executive or legislative act in an appropriate case, has to resolve the crucial issue of the
constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes." The task of judicial review, aptly
characterized as exacting and delicate, is never more so than when a conceded legislative
power, that of judicial reorganization, 1 may possibly collide with the time-honored principle of
the independence of the judiciary 2 as protected and safeguarded by this constitutional
provision: "The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall hold office
during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline
judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Members, order their dismissal." 3 For
the assailed legislation mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of
Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court
of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be
considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for
petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure
provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded. cdphil
That is the fundamental issue raised in this proceeding, erroneously entitled Petition
for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition 4 considered by this Court as an action for
prohibition, seeking to enjoin respondent Minister of the Budget, respondent Chairman of the
Commission on Audit, and respondent Minister of Justice from taking any action
implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Petitioners 5 sought to bolster their claim by
imputing lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue delegation of
legislative power to the President his authority to fix the compensation and allowances of the
Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the
reorganization shall be deemed completed. In the very comprehensive and scholarly Answer
of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 6 it was pointed out that there is no valid justification
for the attack on the constitutionality of this statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the power
vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the allegations of absence of
good faith as well as the attack on the Independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and
devoid of any support in law. A Supplemental Answer was likewise filed on October 8, 1981,
followed by a Reply of petitioners on October 13. After the hearing in the morning and
afternoon of October 15, in which not only petitioners and respondents were heard through
counsel but also the amici curiae, 7 and thereafter submission of the minutes of the
proceeding on the debate on Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, this petition was deemed submitted
for decision.
The importance of the crucial question raised called for intensive and rigorous study
of all the legal aspects of the case. After such exhaustive deliberation in several sessions, the
exchange of views being supplemented by memoranda from the members of the Court, it is
our opinion and so hold that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional.
1. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as
Judge de la Llana is concerned, he certainly falls within the principle set forth in Justice
Laurel's opinion in People v. Vera. 8 Thus: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." 9 The
other petitioners as members of the bar and officers of the court cannot be considered as
devoid of "any personal and substantial interest" on the matter. There is relevance to this
excerpt from a separate opinion in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections: 10 "Then there is
the attack on the standing of petitioners, as vindicating at most what they consider a public
right and not protecting their rights as individuals. This is to conjure the specter of the public
right dogma as an inhibition to parties intent on keeping public officials staying on the path of
constitutionalism. As was so well put by Jaffe: 'The protection of private rights is an essential
constituent of public interest and, conversely, without a well-ordered state there could be no
enforcement of private rights. Private and public interests are, both in a substantive and
procedural sense, aspects of the totality of the legal order.' Moreover, petitioners have
convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers, their standing to sue has been amply
demonstrated. There would be a retreat from the liberal approach followed in Pascual v.
Secretary of Public Works, foreshadowed by the very decision of People vs. Vera where the
doctrine was first fully discussed, if we act differently now. I do not think we are prepared to
take that step. Respondents, however, would hark back to the American Supreme Court
doctrine in Mellon v. Frothingham, with their claim that what petitioners possess 'is an interest
which is shared in common by other people and is comparatively so minute and indeterminate
as to afford any basis and assurance that the judicial process can act on it.' That is to speak
in the language of a bygone era, even in the United States. For as Chief Justice Warren clearly
pointed out in the later case of Flast v. Cohen, the barrier thus set up if not breached has
definitely been lowered." 11
2. The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the enactment of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 to demonstrate lack of good faith does manifest violence to the facts.
Petitioners should have exercised greater care in informing themselves as to its antecedents.
They have laid themselves open to the accusation of reckless disregard for the truth. On
August 7, 1980, a Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization was organized. 12 This
Executive Order was later amended by Executive Order No. 619-A, dated September 5 of that
year. It clearly specified the task assigned to it: "1. The Committee shall formulate plans on
the reorganization of the Judiciary which shall be submitted within seventy (70) days from
August 7, 1980 to provide the President sufficient options for the reorganization of the entire
Judiciary which shall embrace all lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, the Courts of
First Instance, the City and Municipal Courts, and all Special Courts, but excluding the
Sandiganbayan." 13 On October 17, 1980, a Report was submitted by such Committee on
Judicial Reorganization. It began with this paragraph: "The Committee on Judicial
Reorganization has the honor to submit the following Report. It expresses at the outset its
appreciation for the opportunity accorded it to study ways and means for what today is a basic
and urgent need, nothing less than the restructuring of the judicial system. There are
problems, both grave and pressing, that call for remedial measures. The felt necessities of
the time, to borrow a phrase from Holmes, admit of no delay, for if no step be taken and at the
earliest opportunity, it is not too much to say that the people's faith in the administration of
justice could be shaken. It is imperative that there be a greater efficiency in the disposition of
cases and that litigants, especially those of modest means — much more so, the poorest and
the humblest — can vindicate their rights in an expeditious and inexpensive manner. The
rectitude and the fairness in the way the courts operate must be manifest to all members of
the community and particularly to those whose interests are affected by the exercise of their
functions. It is to that task that the Committee addresses itself and hopes that the plans
submitted could be a starting point for an institutional reform in the Philippine judiciary. The
experience of the Supreme Court, which since 1973 has been empowered to supervise
inferior courts, from the Court of Appeals to the municipal courts, has proven that reliance on
improved court management as well as training of judges for more efficient administration
does not suffice. Hence, to repeat, there is need for a major reform in the judicial system. It is
worth noting that it will be the first of its kind since the Judiciary Act became effective on June
16, 1901." 14 It went on to say: "It does not admit of doubt that the last two decades of this
century are likely to be attended with problems of even greater complexity and delicacy. New
social interests are pressing for recognition in the courts. Groups long inarticulate, primarily
those economically underprivileged, have found legal spokesmen and are asserting
grievances previously ignored. Fortunately, the judiciary has not proved inattentive. Its task
has thus become even more formidable. For so much grist is added to the mills of justice.
Moreover, they are likely to be quite novel. The need for an innovative approach is thus
apparent. The national leadership, as is well-known, has been constantly on the search for
solutions that will prove to be both acceptable and satisfactory. Only thus may there be
continued national progress." 15 After which comes: "To be less abstract, the thrust is on
development. That has been repeatedly stressed — and rightly so. All efforts are geared to
its realization." Nor, unlike in the past, was it to be "considered as simply the movement
towards economic progress and growth measured in terms of sustained increases in per
capita income and Gross National Product (GNP)." 16 For the New Society, its implication
goes further than economic advance, extending to "the sharing, or more appropriately, the
democratization of social and economic opportunities, the substantiation of the true meaning
of social justice." 17 This process of modernization and change compels the government to
extend its field of activity and its scope of operations. The efforts towards reducing the gap
between the wealthy and the poor elements in the nation call for more regulatory legislation.
That way the social justice and protection to labor mandates of the Constitution could be
effectively implemented" 18 There is likelihood then "that some measures deemed inimical by
interests adversely affected would be challenged in court on grounds of validity. Even if the
question does not go that far, suits may be filed concerning their interpretation and application.
. . . There could be pleas for injunction or restraining orders. Lack of success of such moves
would not, even so, result in their prompt final disposition. Thus delay in the execution of the
policies embodied in law could thus be reasonably expected. That is not conducive to progress
in development." 19 For, as mentioned in such Report, equally of vital concern is the problem
of clogged dockets, which "as is well known, is one of the utmost gravity. Notwithstanding the
most determined efforts exerted by the Supreme Court, through the leadership of both retired
Chief Justice Querube Makalintal and the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, from the time
supervision of the courts was vested in it under the 1973 Constitution, the trend towards more
and more cases has continued." 20 It is understandable why. With the accelerated economic
development, the growth of population, the increasing urbanization, and other similar factors,
the judiciary is called upon much oftener to resolve controversies. Thus confronted with what
appears to be a crisis situation that calls for a remedy, the Batasang Pambansa had no choice.
It had to act, before the ailment became even worse. Time was of the essence, and yet it did
not hesitate to be duly mindful, as it ought to be, of the extent of its coverage before
enacting Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
3. There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms," characterized in
the Report as "both pressing and urgent." 21 It is worth noting, likewise, as therein pointed
out, that a major reorganization of such scope, if it were to take place, would be the most
thorough after four generations. 22 The reference was to the basic Judiciary Act enacted in
June of 1901, 23 amended in a significant way, only twice previous to the Commonwealth.
There was, of course, the creation of the Court of Appeals in 1935, originally composed "of a
Presiding Judge and ten appellate Judges, who shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the National
Assembly." 24 It could "sit en banc, but it may sit in two divisions, one of six and another of
five Judges, to transact business, and the two divisions may sit at the same time." 25 Two
years after the establishment of independence of the Republic of the Philippines, the Judiciary
Act of 1948 26 was passed. It continued the existing system of regular inferior courts, namely,
the Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, 27 the Municipal Courts, at present the City
Courts, and the Justice of the Peace Courts, now the Municipal Circuit Courts and Municipal
Courts. The membership of the Court of Appeals has been continuously increased. 28 Under
a 1978 Presidential Decree, there would be forty-five members, a Presiding Justice and forty-
four Associate Justices, with fifteen divisions. 29 Special courts were likewise created. The
first was the Court of Tax Appeals in 1954, 30 next came the Court of Agrarian Relations in
1955, 31 and then in the same year a Court of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations for Manila
in 1955, 32 subsequently followed by the creation of two other such courts for Iloilo and
Quezon City in 1966. 33 In 1967, Circuit Criminal Courts were established, with the Judges
having the same qualifications, rank, compensation, and privileges as judges of Courts of First
Instance. 34
4. After the submission of such Report, Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the
basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was introduced. After setting forth the background as
above narrated, its Explanatory Note continues: "Pursuant to the President's instructions, this
proposed legislation has been drafted in accordance with the guidelines of that report with
particular attention to certain objectives of the reorganization, to wit, the attainment of more
efficiency in disposal of cases, a reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which
do not tend to the proper meting out of justice. In consultation with, and upon a consensus of,
the governmental and parliamentary leadership, however, it was felt that some options set
forth in the Report be not availed of. Instead of the proposal to confine the jurisdiction of the
intermediate appellate court merely to appellate adjudication, the preference has been opted
to increase rather than diminish its jurisdiction in order to enable it to effectively assist the
Supreme Court. This preference has been translated into one of the innovations in the
proposed Bill." 35 In accordance with the parliamentary procedure, the Bill was sponsored by
the Chairman of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to which it
was referred. Thereafter, Committee Report No. 225 was submitted by such Committee to the
Batasang Pambansa recommending the approval with some amendments. In the sponsorship
speech of Minister Ricardo C. Puno, there was reference to the Presidential Committee on
Judicial Reorganization. Thus: "On October 17, 1980, the Presidential Committee on Judicial
Reorganization submitted its report to the President which contained the 'Proposed Guidelines
for Judicial Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill No. 42 was drafted substantially in accordance with
the options presented by these guidelines. Some options set forth in the aforesaid report were
not availed of upon consultation with and upon consensus of the government and
parliamentary leadership. Moreover, some amendments to the bill were adopted by the
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, to which the bill was referred,
following the public hearings on the bill held in December of 1980. The hearings consisted of
dialogues with the distinguished members of the bench and the bar who had submitted written
proposals, suggestions, and position papers on the bill upon the invitation of the Committee
on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government." 36 The sponsor stressed that the
enactment of such Cabinet Bill would result in the attainment "of more efficiency in the disposal
of cases [and] the improvement in the quality of justice dispensed by the courts" expected to
follow from the dockets being less clogged, with the structural changes introduced in the bill,
together with the reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of procedure, [being]
designated to suit the court system to the exigencies of the present day Philippine society,
and hopefully, of the foreseeable future." 37 It may be observed that the volume containing
the minutes of the proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa show that 590 pages were devoted
to its discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable time and effort as well as
exhaustive study before the act was signed by the President on August 14, 1981. With such
a background, it becomes quite manifest how lacking in factual basis is the allegation that its
enactment is tainted by the vice of arbitrariness. What appears undoubted and undeniable is
the good faith that characterized its enactment from its inception to the affixing of the
Presidential signature.
5. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the
competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of
Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. 38 reiterated such a doctrine: "We find this point
urged by respondents, to be without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the
service is here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue
that is for the Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither
removal nor separation of the incumbents. . . . And, of course, if the abolition is void, the
incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The preliminary question laid at
rest, we pass to the merits of the case. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office
does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid,
the abolition must be made in good faith." 39 The above excerpt was quoted with approval in
Bendanillo, Sr. v. Provincial Governor, 40 two earlier cases enunciating a similar doctrine
having preceded it. 41 As with the offices in the other branches of the government, so it is
with the judiciary. The test remains whether the abolition is in good faith. As that element is
conspicuously present in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of merit
of this petition becomes even more apparent. The concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in
Zandueta v. De la Costa 42 cannot be any clearer. In this quo warranto proceeding, petitioner
claimed that he, and not respondent, was entitled to the office of judge of the Fifth Branch of
the Court of First Instance of Manila. The Judicial Reorganization Act of 1936, 43 a year after
the inauguration of the Commonwealth, amended the Administrative Code to organize courts
of original jurisdiction likewise called, as was the case before, Courts of First Instance. Prior
to such statute, petitioner was the incumbent of one such court. Thereafter, he received an ad
interim appointment, this time to the Fourth Judicial District, under the new legislation.
Unfortunately for him, the Commission on Appointments of the then National Assembly
disapproved the same, with respondent being appointed in his place. He contested the validity
of the Act insofar as it resulted in his being forced to vacate his position. This Court did not
rule squarely on the matter. His petition was dismissed on the ground of estoppel.
Nonetheless, the separate concurrence in the result of Justice Laurel, to repeat, reaffirms in
no uncertain terms the standard of good faith as the test of the validity of an act abolishing an
inferior court, and this too with due recognition of the security of tenure guarantee. Thus: "I
am of the opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so far as it reorganizes, among other
judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and establishes an entirely new district comprising
Manila and the provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is valid and constitutional. This conclusion
flows from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the
Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby
necessitating new appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of
the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define, prescribe and apportion
the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain limitations in the case of the Supreme
Court. It is admitted that Section 9 of the same Article of the Constitution provides for the
security of tenure of all the judges. The principles embodied in these two sections of the same
Article of the Constitution must be coordinated and harmonized. A mere enunciation of a
principle will not decide actual cases and controversies of every sort. (Justice Holmes in
Lochner vs. New York, 198 U.S., 45; 49 Law. ed., 937)" 44 Justice Laurel continued: "I am
not insensible to the argument that the National Assembly may abuse its power and move
deliberately to defeat the constitutional provision guaranteeing security of tenure to all judges.
But, is this the case? One need not share the view of Story, Miller and Tucker on the one
hand, or the opinion of Cooley, Watson and Baldwin on the other, to realize that the application
of a legal or constitutional principle is necessarily factual and circumstantial and that fixity of
principle is the rigidity of the dead and the unprogressive. I do say, and emphatically, however,
that cases may arise where the violation of the constitutional provision regarding security of
tenure is palpable and plain, and that legislative power of reorganization may be sought to
cloak an unconstitutional and evil purpose. When a case of that kind arises, it will be the time
to make the hammer fall and heavily. But not until then. I am satisfied that, as to the particular
point here discussed, the purpose was the fulfillment of what was considered a great public
need by the legislative department and that Commonwealth Act No. 145 was not enacted
purposely to affect adversely the tenure of judges or of any particular judge. Under these
circumstances, I am for sustaining the power of the legislative department under
the Constitution. To be sure, there was greater necessity for reorganization consequent upon
the establishment of the new government than at the time Acts Nos. 2347 and 4007 were
approved by the defunct Philippine Legislature, and although in the case of these two Acts
there was an express provision providing for the vacation by the judges of their offices
whereas in the case of Commonwealth Act No. 145 doubt is engendered by its silence, this
doubt should be resolved in favor of the valid exercise of the legislative power." 45
6. A few more words on the question of abolition. In the abovecited opinion of Justice
Laurel in Zandueta, reference was made to Act No. 2347 46 on the reorganization of the
Courts of First Instance and to Act No. 4007 47 on the reorganization of all branches of the
government, including the courts of first instance. In both of them, the then Courts of First
Instance were replaced by new courts with the same appellation. As Justice Laurel pointed
out, there was no question as to the fact of abolition. He was equally categorical as to
Commonwealth Act No. 145, where also the system of the courts of first instance was provided
for expressly. It was pointed out by Justice Laurel that the mere creation of an entirely new
district of the same court is valid and constitutional, such conclusion flowing "from the
fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court
and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new
appointments and commissions." 48 The challenged statute creates an intermediate
appellate court, 49 regional trial courts, 50 metropolitan trial courts of the national capital
region, 51 and other metropolitan trial courts, 52 municipal trial courts in cities, 53 as well as
in municipalities, 54 and municipal circuit trial courts. 55 There is even less reason then to
doubt the fact that existing inferior courts were abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the
establishment of such new inferior courts was the appropriate response to the grave and
urgent problems that pressed for solution. Certainly, there could be differences of opinion as
to the appropriate remedy. The choice, however, was for the Batasan to make, not for this
Court, which deals only with the question of power. It bears mentioning that in Brillo v.
Enage 56 this Court, in a unanimous opinion penned by the late Justice Diokno, citing
Zandueta v. De la Costa, ruled: "La segunda cuestion que el recurrido plantea es que la Carta
de Tacloban ha abolido el puesto. Si efectivamente ha sido abolido el cargo, entonces ha
quedado extinguido el derecho de recurrente a acuparlo y a cobrar el salario correspondiente.
McCulley vs. State, 46 LRA, 567. El derecho de un juez de desempenarlo hasta los 70 años
de edad o se incapacite no priva al Congreso de su facultad de abolir, fusionar o reorganizar
juzgados no constitucionales." 57 Nonetheless, such well-established principle was not held
applicable to the situation there obtaining, the Charter of Tacloban City creating a city court in
place of the former justice of the peace of court. Thus: "Pero en el caso de autos el Juzgado
de Tacloban no ha sido abolido. Solo se le ha cambiado el nombre con el cambio de forma
del gobierno local." 58 The present case is anything but that. Petitioners did not and could not
prove that the challenged statute was not within the bounds of legislative authority. cdasia
7. This opinion then could very well stop at this point. The implementation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, concededly a task incumbent on the Executive, may give rise, however,
to questions affecting a judiciary that should be kept independent. The all embracing scope
of the assailed legislation as far as all inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal
courts are concerned, with the exception solely of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax
Appeals, 59 gave rise, and understandably so, to misgivings as to its effect on such cherished
ideal. The first paragraph of the section on the transitory provision reads: "The provisions of
this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued
by the President. The Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal
Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the
City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue to function
as presently constituted and organized, until the completion of the reorganization provided in
this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed
automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office." 60 There is all
the more reason then why this Court has no choice but to inquire further into the allegation by
petitioners that the security of tenure provision, an assurance of a judiciary free from
extraneous influences, is thereby reduced to a barren form of words. The amended
Constitution adheres even more clearly to the long-established tradition of a strong executive
that antedated the 1935 Charter. As noted in the work of former Vice-Governor Hayden, a
noted political scientist, President Claro M. Recto of the 1934 Constitutional Convention
stressed such a concept in his closing address. The 1935 Constitution, he stated, provided
for "an Executive power which, subject to the fiscalization of the Assembly, and of public
opinion, will not only know how to govern, but will actually govern, with a firm and steady hand,
unembarrassed by vexatious interferences by other departments, by unholy alliances with this
and that social group." 61 The above excerpt was cited with approval by Justice Laurel in
Planas v. Gil. 62 The 1981 Amendments embody the same philosophy, this notwithstanding
that once again the principle of separation of powers, to quote from the same jurist
as ponente in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 "obtains not through express provision but
by actual division." 64 The President, under Article VII, "shall be the head of state and chief
executive of the Republic of the Philippines." 65 Moreover, all the powers he possessed under
the 1935 Constitution are vested in him anew "unless the Batasang Pambansa provides
otherwise." 66 Article VII of the 1935 Constitution speaks categorically: "The Executive power
shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." 67 As originally framed, the 1973
Constitution created the position of President as the "symbolic head of state." 68 In addition,
there was a provision for a Prime Minister as the head of government to exercise the executive
power with the assistance of the Cabinet. 69 Clearly, a modified parliamentary system was
established. In the light of the 1981 amendments though, this Court in Free Telephone
Workers Union v. Minister of Labor 7 0 could state: "The adoption of certain aspects of a
parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential
character." 71 The retention, however, of the position of the Prime Minister with the Cabinet,
a majority of the members of which shall come from the regional representatives of the
Batasang Pambansa and the creation of an Executive Committee composed of the Prime
Minister as Chairman and not more than fourteen other members at least half of whom shall
be members of the Batasang Pambansa, clearly indicate the evolving nature of the system of
government that is now operative. 72 What is equally apparent is that the strongest ties bind
the executive and legislative departments. It is likewise undeniable that the Batasang
Pambansa retains its full authority to enact whatever legislation may be necessary to carry
out national policy as usually formulated in a caucus of the majority party. It is understandable
then why in Fortun v. Labang, 73 it was stressed that with the provision transferring to the
Supreme Court administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there is a greater need "to
preserve unimpaired the independence of the judiciary, especially so at present, where to all
intents and purposes, there is a fusion between the executive and the legislative
branches." 74
8. To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior
courts collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges Under
Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution. There was a similar provision in the 1935 Constitution.
It did not, however, go as far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise
administratively inferior courts. 75 Moreover, this Court is empowered "to discipline judges of
inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal." 76 Thus it
possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President
who was vested with such power. 77 Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from
termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent
office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office
with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the
standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation.
As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office.
Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the
implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted
principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are
concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No
fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this
Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case,
certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two
departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter
has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant
positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom
it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial
power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any
plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior
courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or
disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one
not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a
construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives
between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to
be preferred. 78 There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters
into and forms part of every act to avoid any unconstitutional taint must be applied. Nuñez v.
Sandiganbayan, 79 promulgated last January, has this relevant excerpt: "It is true that other
Sections of the Decree could have been so worded as to avoid any constitutional objection.
As of now, however, no ruling is called for. The view is given expression in the concurring and
dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree from the dire
fate of invalidity, they must be construed in such a way as to preclude any possible erosion
on the powers vested in this Court by the Constitution. That is a proposition too plain to be
contested. It commends itself for approval." 80 Nor would such a step be unprecedented. The
Presidential Decree constituting Municipal Courts into Municipal Circuit Courts, specifically
provides: "The Supreme Court shall carry out the provisions of this Decree through
implementing orders, on a province-to-province basis." 81 It is true there is no such provision
in this Act, but the spirit that informs it should not be ignored in the Executive Order
contemplated under its Section 44. 82 Thus Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand the most
rigorous test of constitutionality. 83
 9. Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to reconcile
or harmonize constitutional provisions. To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly
vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process to abolish existing
ones. As noted in the preceding paragraph, the termination of office of their occupants, as a
necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable from the practical
standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in this Tribunal. It is of the essence of
constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is precluded from acting within the boundaries
of its conceded competence. That is why it has long been well-settled under the constitutional
system we have adopted that this Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid the task of
reconciliation. As Justice Laurel put it so well in the previously cited Angara decision, while in
the main, "the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of
power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government, the
overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments,
however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other
begins." 84 It is well to recall another classic utterance from the same jurist, even more
emphatic in its affirmation of such a view, moreover buttressed by one of those insights for
which Holmes was so famous: "The classical separation of government powers, whether
viewed in the light of the political philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, or Montesquieu, or of the
postulations of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a relative theory of government. There is
more truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation of powers,
for as observed by Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine origin, we cannot lay down 'with
mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertight compartments' not only
because 'the great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black
and white' but also because 'even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a
penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other.'" 85 This too from Justice Tuazon,
likewise expressing with force and clarity why the need for reconciliation or balancing is well-
nigh unavoidable under the fundamental principle of separation of powers: "The constitutional
structure is a complicated system, and overlappings of governmental functions are
recognized, unavoidable, and inherent necessities of governmental coordination." 86 In the
same way that the academe has noted the existence in constitutional litigation of right versus
right, there are instances, and this is one of them, where, without this attempt at harmonizing
the provisions in question, there could be a case of power against power. That we should
avoid. LLjur
10. There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty. Petitioners would
characterize as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President the grant of authority
to fix the compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed.
A more careful reading of the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have cautioned
them against raising such an issue. The language of the statute is quite clear. The questioned
provision reads as follows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such compensation and allowances as may be
authorized by the President along the guidelines set forth in letter of Implementation No. 93
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1597." 87 The existence of a standard is thus clear. The basic postulate that underlies the
doctrine of non-delegation is that it is the legislative body which is entrusted with the
competence to make laws and to alter and repeal them, the test being the completeness of
the statute in all its terms and provisions when enacted. As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: 88 "To
avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least
that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy.
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.
It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or
administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate
supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the
former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be
spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered
as a whole." 89 The undeniably strong links that bind the executive and legislative
departments under the amended Constitution assure that the framing of policies as well as
their implementation can be accomplished with unity, promptitude, and efficiency. There is
accuracy, therefore, to this observation in the Free Telephone Workers Union decision: "There
is accordingly more receptivity to laws leaving to administrative and executive agencies the
adoption of such means as may be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative purpose. It is
worth noting that a highly-respected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe, as early as 1947, could
speak of delegation as the 'dynamo of modern government.'" 90 He warned against a
"restrictive approach" which could be "a deterrent factor to much-needed
legislation." 91 Further on this point from the same opinion: "The spectre of the non-delegation
concept need not haunt, therefore, party caucuses, cabinet sessions or legislative
chambers." 92 Another objection based on the absence in the statute of what petitioners refer
to as a "definite time frame limitation" is equally bereft of merit. They ignore the categorical
language of this provision: "The Supreme Court shall submit to the President, within thirty (30)
days from the date of the effectivity of this act, a staffing pattern for all courts constituted
pursuant to this Act which shall be the basis of the implementing order to be issued by the
President in accordance with the immediately succeeding section." 93 The first sentence of
the next Section is even more categorical: "The provisions of this Act shall be immediately
carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the
President." 94 Certainly, petitioners cannot be heard to argue that the President is insensible
to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 95 In the meanwhile,
the existing inferior courts affected continue functioning as before, "until the completion of the
reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the
said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease
to hold office." 96 There is no ambiguity. The incumbents of the courts thus automatically
abolished "shall cease to hold office." No fear need be entertained by incumbents whose
length of service, quality of performance, and clean record justify their being named
anew, 97 in legal contemplation, without any interruption in the continuity of their service. 98 It
is equally reasonable to assume that from the ranks of lawyers, either in the government
service, private practice, or law professors will come the new appointees. In the event that in
certain cases, a little more time is necessary in the appraisal of whether or not certain
incumbents deserve reappointment, it is not from their standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would
be a reaffirmation of the good faith that will characterize its implementation by the Executive.
There is pertinence of this observation of Justice Holmes that even acceptance to the
generalization that courts ordinarily should not supply omissions in a law, a generalization
qualified as earlier shown by the principle that to save a statute that could be done, "there is
no canon against using common sense in consuming laws as saying what they obviously
mean." 99 Where then is the unconstitutional flaw?
11. In the morning of the hearing of this petition on September 8, 1981, petitioners
sought to have the writer of this opinion and Justices Ramon C. Aquino and Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera disqualified because the first-named was the Chairman and the other two,
members of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization. At the hearing, the motion was denied.
It was made clear then and there that not one of the three members of the Court had any hand
in the framing or in the discussion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They were not consulted.
They did not testify. The challenged legislation is entirely the product of the efforts of the
legislative body. 100 Their work was limited, as set forth in the Executive Order, to submitting
alternative plans for reorganization. That is more in the nature of scholarly studies. That they
undertook. There could be no possible objection to such activity. Even since 1973, this
Tribunal has had administrative supervision over inferior courts. It has had the opportunity to
inform itself as to the way judicial business is conducted and how it may be improved. Even
prior to the 1973 Constitution, it is the recollection of the writer of this opinion that either the
then Chairman or members of the Committee on Justice of the then Senate of the
Philippines 101 consulted members of the Court in drafting proposed legislation affecting the
judiciary. It is not inappropriate to cite this excerpt from an article in the 1975 Supreme Court
Review: "In the twentieth century the Chief Justice of the United States has played a leading
part in judicial reform. A variety of conditions have been responsible for the development of
this role, and foremost among them has been the creation of explicit institutional structures
designed to facilitate reform." 102 Also: "Thus the Chief Justice cannot avoid exposure to and
direct involvement in judicial reform at the federal level and, to the extent issues of judicial
federalism arise, at the state level as well." 103
12. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who
are endowed with rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does through
public officials, it has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they
exercise not for their own benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in
the language of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." 104 That is more than a moral
adjuration. It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public official certain rights. It does
so to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is
from that standpoint that the security of tenure provision to assure judicial independence is to
be viewed. It is an added guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice undeterred
by any fear of reprisal or untoward consequence. Their judgments then are even more likely
to be inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and the dictates of their conscience, free
from the corrupting influence of base or unworthy motives. The independence of which they
are assured is impressed with a significance transcending that of a purely personal right. As
thus viewed, it is not solely for their welfare. The challenged legislation was thus subjected to
the most rigorous scrutiny by this Tribunal, lest by lack of due care and circumspection, it
allows the erosion of that ideal so firmly embedded in the national consciousness. There is
this further thought to consider. Independence in thought and action necessarily is rooted in
one's mind and heart. As emphasized by former Chief Justice Paras in Ocampo v. Secretary
of Justice, 105 "there is no surer guarantee of judicial independence than the God-given
character and fitness of those appointed to the Bench. The judges may be guaranteed a fixed
tenure of office during good behavior, but if they are of such stuff as allows them to be
subservient to one administration after another, or to cater to the wishes of one litigant after
another, the independence of the judiciary will be nothing more than a myth or an empty ideal.
Our judges, we are confident, can be of the type of Lord Coke, regardless or in spite of the
power of Congress — we do not say unlimited but as herein exercised — to reorganize inferior
courts." 106 That is to recall one of the greatest Common Law jurists, who at the cost of his
office made clear that he would not just blindly obey the King's order but "will do what becomes
[him] as a judge." So it was pointed out in the first leading case stressing the independence
of the judiciary, Borromeo v. Mariano. 107 The ponencia of Justice Malcolm identified good
judges with "men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in
accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by
outside influence, and who are independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial
system equal and coordinate to the other two departments of government." 108 There is no
reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 would be
attended with deleterious consequences to the administration of justice. It does not follow that
the abolition in good faith of the existing inferior courts except the Sandiganbayan and the
Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a judiciary unable or unwilling
to discharge with independence its solemn duty or one recreant to the trust reposed in it. Nor
should there be any fear that less than good faith will attend the exercise of the appointing
power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an independent and efficient judiciary
is something to the credit of any administration. Well and truly has it been said that the
fundamental principle of separation of powers assumes, and justifiably so, that the three
departments are as one in their determination to pursue the ideals and aspirations and to fulfill
 the hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in the Constitution. There is wisdom as well
as validity to this pronouncement of Justice Malcolm in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay
Transportation Company, 109 a decision promulgated almost half a century ago: "Just as the
Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by
any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of
influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act." 110 To
that basic postulate underlying our constitutional system, this Court remains committed.
WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been
shown, this petition is dismissed. No costs. cdasia
||| (De la Llana v. Alba, G.R. No. 57883, [March 12, 1982], 198 PHIL 1-130)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 231658. July 4, 2017.]

REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, GARY
C. ALEJANO, EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, AND TEDDY BRAWNER
BAGUILAT, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. DELFIN N. LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND MARTIAL
LAW ADMINISTRATOR; AND GEN. EDUARDO AÑO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MARTIAL
LAW IMPLEMENTOR, respondents.

||| (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774, [July 4, 2017], 812 PHIL 179-
853)
DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J p:

Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo
Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. CAIHTE
The full text of Proclamation No. 216 reads as follows:
WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 55, series of 2016, was issued on 04
September 2016 declaring a state of national emergency on account of lawless
violence in Mindanao;
WHEREAS, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution provides that 'x x
x In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he (the
President) may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law x x x';
WHEREAS, Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. No. 6968, provides that 'the crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed
by rising and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing
from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic
of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed
 forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially,
of any of their powers or prerogatives';
WHEREAS, part of the reasons for the issuance of Proclamation No.
55 was the series of violent acts committed by the Maute terrorist group such
as the attack on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur in February 2016,
killing and wounding several soldiers, and the mass jailbreak in Marawi City in
August 2016, freeing their arrested comrades and other detainees;
WHEREAS, today 23 May 2017, the same Maute terrorist group has
taken over a hospital in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, established several
checkpoints within the City, burned down certain government and private
facilities and inflicted casualties on the part of Government forces, and started
flying the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas,
thereby openly attempting to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine
Government this part of Mindanao and deprive the Chief Executive of his
powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public
order and safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of rebellion; and
WHEREAS, this recent attack shows the capability of the Maute group
and other rebel groups to sow terror, and cause death and damage to property
not only in Lanao del Sur but also in other parts of Mindanao.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE, President of the
Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution and by law, do hereby proclaim as follows:
SECTION 1. There is hereby declared a state of martial law in the
Mindanao group of islands for a period not exceeding sixty days, effective as
of the date hereof.
SECTION 2. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall likewise
be suspended in the aforesaid area for the duration of the state of martial law.
DONE in the Russian Federation, this 23rd day of May in the year of
our Lord, Two Thousand and Seventeen.
Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation
No. 216.
The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion
and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time.
Mindanao has been the hotbed of violent extremism and a brewing
rebellion for decades. In more recent years, we have witnessed the
perpetration of numerous acts of violence challenging the authority of the duly
constituted authorities, i.e., the Zamboanga siege, the Davao bombing, the
Mamasapano carnage, and the bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu,
and Basilan, among others. Two armed groups have figured prominently in all
these, namely, the Abu Sayaff Group (ASG) and the ISIS-backed Maute
Group. 1
The President went on to explain that on May 23, 2017, a government operation to
capture the high-ranking officers of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Maute Group was
conducted. These groups, which have been unleashing havoc in Mindanao, however,
confronted the government operation by intensifying their efforts at sowing violence aimed not
only against the government authorities and its facilities but likewise against civilians and their
properties. As narrated in the President's Report:
 On 23 May 2017, a government operation to capture Isnilon Hapilon, a
senior leader of the ASG, and Maute Group operational leaders, Abdullah and
Omarkhayam Maute, was confronted with armed resistance which escalated
into open hostility against the government. Through these groups' armed siege
and acts of violence directed towards civilians and government authorities,
institutions and establishments, they were able to take control of major social,
economic, and political foundations of Marawi City which led to its paralysis.
This sudden taking of control was intended to lay the groundwork for the
eventual establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province in Mindanao.
Based on verified intelligence reports, the Maute Group, as of the end
of 2016, consisted of around two hundred sixty-three (263) members, fully
armed and prepared to wage combat in furtherance of its aims. The group
chiefly operates in the province of Lanao del Sur, but has extensive networks
and linkages with foreign and local armed groups such as the Jemaah
Islamiyah, Mujahidin Indonesia Timur and the ASG. It adheres to the ideals
being espoused by the DAESH, as evidenced by, among others, its publication
of a video footage declaring its allegiance to the DAESH. Reports abound that
foreign-based terrorist groups, the ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) in
particular, as well as illegal drug money, provide financial and logistical support
to the Maute Group.
The events commencing on 23 May 2017 put on public display the
groups' clear intention to establish an Islamic State and their capability to
deprive the duly constituted authorities — the President, foremost — of their
powers and prerogatives. 2
In particular, the President chronicled in his Report the events which took place on
May 23, 2017 in Marawi City which impelled him to declare a state of martial law and suspend
the privilege of writ of habeas corpus, to wit:
The unfolding of these events, as well as the classified reports he received, led the
President to conclude that —
These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear
attempt to establish the groups' seat of power in Marawi City for their planned
establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province covering the entire Mindanao.
The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the recruitment
of young Muslims to further expand their ranks and strengthen their force; the
armed consolidation of their members throughout Marawi City; the decimation
of a segment of the city population who resist; and the brazen display of
DAESH flags constitute a clear, pronounced, and unmistakable intent to
remove Marawi City, and eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its allegiance
to the Government.
There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to
deprive the President of his power, authority, and prerogatives within Marawi
City as a precedent to spreading their control over the entire Mindanao, in an
attempt to undermine his control over executive departments, bureaus, and
offices in said area; defeat his mandate to ensure that all laws are faithfully
executed; and remove his supervisory powers over local governments. 4
According to the Report, the lawless activities of the ASG, Maute Group, and other
criminals, brought about undue constraints and difficulties to the military and government
personnel, particularly in the performance of their duties and functions, and untold hardships
to the civilians, viz.:
 Law enforcement and other government agencies now face
pronounced difficulty sending their reports to the Chief Executive due to the
city-wide power outages. Personnel from the BJMP have been prevented from
performing their functions. Through the attack and occupation of several
hospitals, medical services in Marawi City have been adversely affected. The
bridge and road blockades set up by the groups effectively deprive the
government of its ability to deliver basic services to its citizens. Troop
reinforcements have been hampered, preventing the government from
restoring peace and order in the area. Movement by both civilians and
government personnel to and from the city is likewise hindered.
The taking up of arms by lawless armed groups in the area, with support
being provided by foreign-based terrorists and illegal drug money, and their
blatant acts of defiance which embolden other armed groups in Mindanao,
have resulted in the deterioration of public order and safety in Marawi City; they
have likewise compromised the security of the entire Island of Mindanao. 5
The Report highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and
significant role it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. In addition, the Report
pointed out the possible tragic repercussions once Marawi City falls under the control of the
lawless groups.
The groups' occupation of Marawi City fulfills a strategic objective
because of its terrain and the easy access it provides to other parts of
Mindanao. Lawless armed groups have historically used provinces adjoining
Marawi City as escape routes, supply lines, and backdoor passages.
Considering the network and alliance-building activities among terrorist
groups, local criminals, and lawless armed men, the siege of Marawi City is a
vital cog in attaining their long-standing goal: absolute control over the entirety
of Mindanao. These circumstances demand swift and decisive action to ensure
the safety and security of the Filipino people and preserve our national
integrity. 6
The President ended his Report in this wise:
While the government is presently conducting legitimate operations to
address the on-going rebellion, if not the seeds of invasion, public safety
necessitates the continued implementation of martial law and the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao until such
time that the rebellion is completely quelled. 7
In addition to the Report, representatives from the Executive Department, the military
and police authorities conducted briefings with the Senate and the House of Representatives
relative to the declaration of martial law.
After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S. Resolution
No. 388 8 expressing full support to the martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation
No. 216 "to be satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law." In the same
Resolution, the Senate declared that it found "no compelling reason to revoke the same." The
Senate thus resolved as follows:
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, by
way of the sense of the Senate, that the Senate finds the issuance
of Proclamation No. 216 to be satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance
with the law. The Senate hereby supports fully Proclamation No. 216 and finds
no compelling reason to revoke the same. 9
 The Senate's counterpart in the lower house shared the same sentiments. The House
of Representatives likewise issued House Resolution No. 1050 10 "EXPRESSING THE FULL
SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO PRESIDENT RODRIGO
DUTERTE AS IT FINDS NO REASON TO REVOKE PROCLAMATION NO. 216,
ENTITLED 'DECLARING A STATE OF MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENDING THE PRIVILEGE
OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE WHOLE OF MINDANAO.'"
The Petitions aDSIHc

A) G.R. No. 231658 (Lagman Petition)

On June 5, 2017, Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Tomasito S. Villarin, Gary C.

Alejano, Emmanuel A. Billones, and Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr. filed a Petition 11 Under the
Third Paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
First, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient
factual basis because there is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any part of
Mindanao. It argues that acts of terrorism in Mindanao do not constitute rebellion 12 since
there is no proof that its purpose is to remove Mindanao or any part thereof from allegiance
to the Philippines, its laws, or its territory. 13 It labels the flying of ISIS flag by the Maute Group
in Marawi City and other outlying areas as mere propaganda 14 and not an open attempt to
remove such areas from the allegiance to the Philippine Government and deprive the Chief
Executive of the assertion and exercise of his powers and prerogatives therein. It contends
that the Maute Group is a mere private army, citing as basis the alleged interview of Vera
Files with Joseph Franco wherein the latter allegedly mentioned that the Maute Group is more
of a "clan's private militia latching into the IS brand theatrically to inflate perceived
capability." 15 The Lagman Petition insists that during the briefing, representatives of the
military and defense authorities did not categorically admit nor deny the presence of an ISIS
threat in the country but that they merely gave an evasive answer 16 that "there is ISIS in the
Philippines." 17 The Lagman Petition also avers that Lt. Gen. Salvador Mison, Jr. himself
admitted that the current armed conflict in Marawi City was precipitated or initiated by the
government in its bid to capture Hapilon. 18 Based on said statement, it concludes that the
objective of the Maute Group's armed resistance was merely to shield Hapilon and the Maute
brothers from the government forces, and not to lay siege on Marawi City and remove its
allegiance to the Philippine Republic. 19 It then posits that if at all, there is only a threat of
rebellion in Marawi City which is akin to "imminent danger" of rebellion, which is no longer a
valid ground for the declaration of martial law. 20
Second, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no
sufficient factual basis because the President's Report contained "false, inaccurate, contrived
and hyperbolic accounts." 21
It labels as false the claim in the President's Report that the Maute Group attacked
Amai Pakpak Medical Center. Citing online reports on the interview of Dr. Amer Saber (Dr.
Saber), the hospital's Chief, the Lagman Petition insists that the Maute Group merely brought
an injured member to the hospital for treatment but did not overrun the hospital or harass the
hospital personnel. 22 The Lagman Petition also refutes the claim in the President's Report
that a branch of the Landbank of the Philippines was ransacked and its armored vehicle
commandeered. It alleges that the bank employees themselves clarified that the bank was
not ransacked while the armored vehicle was owned by a third party and was empty at the
time it was commandeered. 23 It also labels as false the report on the burning of the Senator
Ninoy Aquino College Foundation and the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School. It avers
that the Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation is intact as of May 24, 2017 and that
according to Asst. Superintendent Ana Alonto, the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School
was not burned by the terrorists. 24 Lastly, it points out as false the report on the beheading
of the police chief of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, and the occupation of the Marawi City Hall and
part of the Mindanao State University. 25
Third, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient
factual basis since the President's Report mistakenly included the attack on the military
outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur in February 2016, the mass jail break in Marawi City in August
2016, the Zamboanga siege, the Davao market bombing, the Mamasapano carnage and other
bombing incidents in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, and Basilan, as additional factual bases for
the proclamation of martial law. It contends that these events either took place long before the
conflict in Marawi City began, had long been resolved, or with the culprits having already been
arrested. 26
Fourth, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient
factual basis considering that the President acted alone and did not consult the military
establishment or any ranking official 27 before making the proclamation.
Finally, the Lagman Petition claims that the President's proclamation of martial
law lacks sufficient factual basis owing to the fact that during the presentation before the
Committee of the Whole of the House of Representatives, it was shown that the military was
even successful in pre-empting the ASG and the Maute Group's plan to take over Marawi City
and other parts of Mindanao; there was absence of any hostile plan by the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front; and the number of foreign fighters allied with ISIS was
"undetermined" 28 which indicates that there are only a meager number of foreign fighters
who can lend support to the Maute Group. 29
Based on the foregoing argumentation, the Lagman Petition asks the Court to: (1)
"exercise its specific and special jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual basis
of Proclamation No. 216"; and (2) render "a Decision voiding and nullifying Proclamation No.
216" for lack of sufficient factual basis. 30
In a Resolution 31 dated June 6, 2017, the Court required respondents to comment
on the Lagman Petition and set the case for oral argument on June 13, 14, and 15, 2017.
On June 9, 2017, two other similar petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 231771 and
231774 were filed and eventually consolidated with G.R. No. 231658. 32
B) G.R. No. 231771 (Cullamat Petition)

The Cullamat Petition, "anchored on Section 18, Article VII" 33 of the Constitution,
likewise seeks the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 for being unconstitutional because it
lacks sufficient factual basis that there is rebellion in Mindanao and that public safety warrants
its declaration. 34
In particular, it avers that the supposed rebellion described in Proclamation No.
216 relates to events happening in Marawi City only and not in the entire region of Mindanao.
It concludes that Proclamation No. 216 "failed to show any factual basis for the imposition
of martial law in the entire Mindanao," 35 "failed to allege any act of rebellion outside Marawi
City, much less x x x allege that public safety requires the imposition of martial law in the
whole of Mindanao." 36
The Cullamat Petition claims that the alleged "capability of the Maute Group and other
rebel groups to sow terror and cause death and damage to property" 37 does not rise to the
level of rebellion sufficient to declare martial law in the whole of Mindanao. 38 It also posits
that there is no lawless violence in other parts of Mindanao similar to that in Marawi City. 39
Moreover, the Cullamat Petition assails the inclusion of the phrase "other rebel groups"
in the last Whereas Clause of Proclamation No. 216 for being vague as it failed to identify
these rebel groups and specify the acts of rebellion that they were supposedly waging. 40
 In addition, the Cullamat Petition cites alleged inaccuracies, exaggerations, and
falsities in the Report of the President to Congress, particularly the attack at the Amai Pakpak
Hospital, the ambush and burning of the Marawi Police Station, the killing of five teachers of
Dansalan College Foundation, and the attacks on various government facilities. 41
In fine, the Cullamat Petition prays for the Court to declare Proclamation No. 216 as
unconstitutional or in the alternative, should the Court find justification for the declaration
of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Marawi City, to
declare the same as unconstitutional insofar as its inclusion of the other parts of
Mindanao. 42 ETHIDa
C) G.R. No. 231774 (Mohamad Petition)

The Mohamad Petition, denominated as a "Petition for Review of the Sufficiency of

[the] Factual Basis of [the] Declaration of Martial Law and [the] Suspension of the Privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus," 43 labels itself as "a special proceeding" 44 or an "appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen" 45 authorized under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
The Mohamad Petition posits that martial law is a measure of last resort 46 and should
be invoked by the President only after exhaustion of less severe remedies. 47 It contends that
the extraordinary powers of the President should be dispensed sequentially, i.e., first, the
power to call out the armed forces; second, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus; and finally, the power to declare martial law. 48 It maintains that the
President has no discretion to choose which extraordinary power to use; moreover, his choice
must be dictated only by, and commensurate to, the exigencies of the situation. 49
According to the Mohamad Petition, the factual situation in Marawi is not so grave as
to require the imposition of martial law. 50 It asserts that the Marawi incidents "do not equate
to the existence of a public necessity brought about by an actual rebellion, which would
compel the imposition of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habea
corpus." 51 It proposes that "[m]artial law can only be justified if the rebellion or invasion has
reached such gravity that [its] imposition x x x is compelled by the needs of public
safety" 52 which, it believes, is not yet present in Mindanao.
Moreover, it alleges that the statements contained in the President's Report to the
Congress, to wit: that the Maute Group intended to establish an Islamic State; that they have
the capability to deprive the duly constituted authorities of their powers and prerogatives; and
that the Marawi armed hostilities is merely a prelude to a grander plan of taking over the whole
of Mindanao, are conclusions bereft of substantiation. 53
The Mohamad Petition posits that immediately after the declaration of martial law, and
without waiting for a congressional action, a suit may already be brought before the Court to
assail the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.
Finally, in invoking this Court's power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis for
the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
the Mohamad Petition insists that the Court may "look into the wisdom of the [President's]
actions, [and] not just the presence of arbitrariness." 54 Further, it asserts that since it is
making a negative assertion, then the burden to prove the sufficiency of the factual basis is
shifted to and lies on the respondents. 55 It thus asks the Court "to compel the [r]espondents
to divulge relevant information" 56 in order for it to review the sufficiency of the factual basis.
In closing, the Mohamad Petition prays for the Court to exercise its power to review,
"compel respondents to present proof on the factual basis [of] the declaration of martial
law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao" 57 and
declare as unconstitutional Proclamation No. 216 for lack of sufficient factual basis.
The Consolidated Comment
 The respondents' Consolidated Comment 58 was filed on June 12, 2017, as required
by the Court. Noting that the same coincided with the celebration of the 119th anniversary of
the independence of this Republic, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) felt that
"defending the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 216" should serve as "a rallying call for
every Filipino to unite behind one true flag and defend it against all threats from within and
outside our shores." 59
The OSG acknowledges that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution vests the Court
with the authority or power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration
of martial law. 60 The OSG, however, posits that although Section 18, Article VII lays the basis
for the exercise of such authority or power, the same constitutional provision failed to specify
the vehicle, mode or remedy through which the "appropriate proceeding" mentioned therein
may be resorted to. The OSG suggests that the "appropriate proceeding" referred to in Section
18, Article VII may be availed of using the vehicle, mode or remedy of a certiorari petition,
either under Section 1 or 5, of Article VIII. 61 Corollarily, the OSG maintains that the review
power is not mandatory, but discretionary only, on the part of the Court. 62 The Court has the
discretion not to give due course to the petition. 63
Prescinding from the foregoing, the OSG contends that the sufficiency of the factual
basis of Proclamation No. 216 should be reviewed by the Court "under the lens of grave abuse
of discretion" 64 and not the yardstick of correctness of the facts. 65 Arbitrariness, not
correctness, should be the standard in reviewing the sufficiency of factual basis.
The OSG maintains that the burden lies not with the respondents but with the
petitioners to prove that Proclamation No. 216 is bereft of factual basis. It thus takes issue
with petitioners' attempt to shift the burden of proof when they asked the Court "to compel
[the] respondents to present proof on the factual basis" 66 of Proclamation No. 216. For the
OSG, "he who alleges must prove" 67 and that governmental actions are presumed to be
valid and constitutional. 68
Likewise, the OSG posits that the sufficiency of the factual basis must be assessed
from the trajectory or point of view of the President and based on the facts available to him at
the time the decision was made. 69 It argues that the sufficiency of the factual basis should
be examined not based on the facts discovered after the President had made his decision to
declare martial law because to do so would subject the exercise of the President's discretion
to an impossible standard. 70 It reiterates that the President's decision should be guided only
by the information and data available to him at the time he made the determination. 71 The
OSG thus asserts that facts that were established after the declaration of martial
law should not be considered in the review of the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law. The OSG suggests that the assessment of after-proclamation-
facts lies with the President and Congress for the purpose of determining the propriety of
revoking or extending the martial law. The OSG fears that if the Court considers after-
proclamation-facts in its review of the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation, it
would in effect usurp the powers of the Congress to determine whether martial law should be
revoked or extended. 72
It is also the assertion of the OSG that the President could validly rely on intelligence
reports coming from the Armed Forces of the Philippines; 73 and that he could not be
expected to personally determine the veracity of the contents of the reports. 74 Also, since
the power to impose martial law is vested solely on the President as Commander-in-Chief,
the lack of recommendation from the Defense Secretary, or any official for that matter, will not
nullify the said declaration, or affect its validity, or compromise the sufficiency of the factual
basis.
Moreover, the OSG opines that the petitioners miserably failed to validly refute the
facts cited by the President in Proclamation No. 216 and in his Report to the Congress by
merely citing news reports that supposedly contradict the facts asserted therein or by
criticizing in piecemeal the happenings in Marawi. For the OSG, the said news articles are
"hearsay evidence, twice removed," 75 and thus inadmissible and without probative value,
and could not overcome the "legal presumption bestowed on governmental acts." 76
Finally, the OSG points out that it has no duty or burden to prove that Proclamation
No. 216 has sufficient factual basis. It maintains that the burden rests with the petitioners.
However, the OSG still endeavors to lay out the factual basis relied upon by the President "if
only to remove any doubt as to the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 216." 77
The facts laid out by the OSG in its Consolidated Comment will be discussed in detail
in the Court's Ruling.
ISSUES
The issues as contained in the revised Advisory 78 are as follows:
1. Whether or not the petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771, and
231774 are the "appropriate proceeding" covered by Paragraph 3,
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of
review required of this Court when a declaration of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is promulgated;
2. Whether or not the President in declaring martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus: cSEDTC
a. is required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his
appreciation of facts;
b. is required to obtain the favorable recommendation thereon of the
Secretary of National Defense;
c. is required to take into account only the situation at the time of the
proclamation, even if subsequent events prove the situation to
have not been accurately reported;
3. Whether or not the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual
basis [of] the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is independent of the actual actions
that have been taken by Congress jointly or separately;
4. Whether or not there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus;
a. What are the parameters for review?
b. Who has the burden of proof?
c. What is the threshold of evidence?
5. Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court involves the
calibration of graduated powers granted the President as Commander-
in-Chief, namely calling out powers, suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, and declaration of martial law;
6. Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 may be considered
vague and thus null and void:
a. with its inclusion of "other rebel groups;" or
b. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters
within the entire Mindanao region;
 7. Whether or not the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and
in the Report of the President to Congress are sufficient [bases]:
a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or
b. for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region;
8. Whether or not terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism are equivalent to
actual rebellion and the requirements of public safety sufficient to
declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
and
9. Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 will:
a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or
b. also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to
quell lawless violence in Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao
region.
After the oral argument, the parties submitted their respective memoranda and
supplemental memoranda.
OUR RULING
I. Locus standi of petitioners.

One of the requisites for judicial review is locus standi, i.e., "the constitutional question
is brought before [the Court] by a party having the requisite 'standing' to challenge it." 79 As
a general rule, the challenger must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." 80 Over the
years, there has been a trend towards relaxation of the rule on legal standing, a prime example
of which is found in Section 18 of Article VII which provides that any citizen may file the
appropriate proceeding to assail the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. "[T]he only requisite for
standing to challenge the validity of the suspension is that the challenger be a citizen. He need
not even be a taxpayer." 81
Petitioners in the Cullamat Petition claim to be "suing in their capacities as citizens of
the Republic;" 82 similarly, petitioners in the Mohamad Petition all claim to be "Filipino
citizens, all women, all of legal [age], and residents of Marawi City." 83 In the Lagman Petition,
however, petitioners therein did not categorically mention that they are suing as citizens but
merely referred to themselves as duly elected Representatives. 84 That they are suing in their
official capacities as Members of Congress could have elicited a vigorous discussion
considering the issuance by the House of Representatives of House Resolution No. 1050
expressing full support to President Duterte and finding no reason to revoke Proclamation No.
216. By such resolution, the House of Representatives is declaring that it finds no reason to
review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the martial law declaration, which is in direct
contrast to the views and arguments being espoused by the petitioners in the Lagman Petition.
Considering, however, the trend towards relaxation of the rules on legal standing, as well as
the transcendental issues involved in the present Petitions, the Court will exercise judicial self-
restraint 85 and will not venture into this matter. After all, "the Court is not entirely without
discretion to accept a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of a [bona fide] case or of
standing. Considerations paramount to [the requirement of legal standing] could compel
assumption of jurisdiction." 86 In any case, the Court can take judicial cognizance of the fact
that petitioners in the Lagman Petition are all citizens of the Philippines since Philippine
citizenship is a requirement for them to be elected as representatives. We will therefore
consider them as suing in their own behalf as citizens of this country. Besides, respondents
did not question petitioners' legal standing.
II. Whether or not the petitions are the
"appropriate proceeding" covered by paragraph
3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
sufficient to invoke the mode of review required
by the Court.

All three petitions beseech the cognizance of this Court based on the third paragraph
of Section 18, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by
any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and
must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
During the oral argument, the petitioners theorized that the jurisdiction of this Court
under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is sui generis. 87 It is a special and specific
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of
Article VIII. 88
The Court agrees.
a) Jurisdiction must be
specifically conferred by the
Constitution or by law.
It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution
or by the law. 89 Unless jurisdiction has been specifically conferred by the Constitution or by
some legislative act, no body or tribunal has the power to act or pass upon a matter brought
before it for resolution. It is likewise settled that in the absence of a clear legislative intent,
jurisdiction cannot be implied from the language of the Constitution or a statute. 90 It must
appear clearly from the law or it will not be held to exist. 91
A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically
grants authority to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
b) "In an appropriate
proceeding" does not refer to a
petition for certiorari filed under
Section 1 or 5 of Article VIII.
It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the phrase
"in an appropriate proceeding" would refer to a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or
Section 5 of Article VIII. The standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the
respondent has committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is not the proper tool to review
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension. It must be emphasized
that under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the President's exercise of emergency powers. Put differently, if this Court
applies the standard of review used in a petition for certiorari, the same would emasculate its
constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII. SDAaTC
c) Purpose/significance of
Section 18, Article VII is to
constitutionalize the pre-Marcos
martial law ruling in In the Matter of
the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Lansang.
The third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII was inserted by the framers of the 1987
Constitution to constitutionalize the pre-Marcos martial law ruling of this Court in In the Matter
of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang, 92 to wit: that the factual basis of the
declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not
a political question but precisely within the ambit of judicial review.
"In determining the meaning, intent, and purpose of a law or constitutional provision,
the history of the times out of which it grew and to which it may be rationally supposed to bear
some direct relationship, the evils intended to be remedied, and the good to be accomplished
are proper subjects of inquiry." 93 Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. (Fr. Bernas), a member of the
Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution, explained:
The Commander-in-Chief provisions of the 1935 Constitution had
enabled President Ferdinand Marcos to impose authoritarian rule on the
Philippines from 1972 to 1986. Supreme Court decisions during that period
upholding the actions taken by Mr. Marcos made authoritarian rule part
of Philippine constitutional jurisprudence. The members of the
Constitutional Commission, very much aware of these facts, went about
reformulating the Commander-in-Chief powers with a view to dismantling what
had been constructed during the authoritarian years. The new formula included
revised grounds for the activation of emergency powers, the manner of
activating them, the scope of the powers, and review of presidential
action. 94 (Emphasis supplied)
To recall, the Court held in the 1951 case of Montenegro v. Castañeda 95 that the
authority to decide whether there is a state of rebellion requiring the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is lodged with the President and his decision thereon is
final and conclusive upon the courts. This ruling was reversed in the 1971 case
of Lansang where it was held that the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political question and is within
the ambit of judicial review. 96 However, in 1983, or after the declaration of martial law by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, the Court, in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, 97 abandoned
the ruling in Lansang and reverted to Montenegro. According to the Supreme Court, the
constitutional power of the President to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
not subject to judicial inquiry. 98
Thus, by inserting Section 18 in Article VII which allows judicial review of the
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
framers of the 1987 Constitution in effect constitutionalized and reverted to the Lansang
doctrine.
d) Purpose of Section 18,
Article VII is to provide additional
safeguard against possible abuse by
the President on the exercise of the
extraordinary powers.
Section 18, Article VII is meant to provide additional safeguard against possible abuse
by the President in the exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. Reeling from the aftermath of the Marcos martial law, the framers
of the Constitution deemed it wise to insert the now third paragraph of Section 18 of Article
VII. 99 This is clear from the records of the Constitutional Commission when its members
were deliberating on whether the President could proclaim martial law even without the
concurrence of Congress. Thus:
 MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President.
The Commissioner is proposing a very substantial amendment
because this means that he is vesting exclusively unto the President the right
to determine the factors which may lead to the declaration of martial law and
the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. I suppose he has strong and
compelling reasons in seeking to delete this particular phrase. May we be
informed of his good and substantial reasons?
MR. MONSOD. This situation arises in cases of invasion or rebellion.
And in previous interpellations regarding this phrase, even during the
discussions on the Bill of Rights, as I understand it, the interpretation is a
situation of actual invasion or rebellion. In these situations, the President has
to act quickly. Secondly, this declaration has a time fuse. It is only good for a
maximum of 60 days. At the end of 60 days, it automatically terminates. Thirdly,
the right of the judiciary to inquire into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation always exists, even during those first 60 days.
MR. SUAREZ. Given our traumatic experience during the past
administration, if we give exclusive right to the President to determine these
factors, especially the existence of an invasion or rebellion and the second
factor of determining whether the public safety requires it or not, may I call the
attention of the Gentleman to what happened to us during the past
administration. Proclamation No. 1081 was issued by Ferdinand E. Marcos in
his capacity as President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested upon
him purportedly under Article VII, Section 10 (2) of the Constitution, wherein he
made this predicate under the "Whereas" provision:
Whereas, the rebellion and armed action undertaken by these lawless
elements of the Communists and other armed aggrupations organized to
overthrow the Republic of the Philippines by armed violence and force
have assumed the magnitude of an actual state of war against our people
and the Republic of the Philippines.
And may I also call the attention of the Gentleman to General Order
No. 3, also promulgated by Ferdinand E. Marcos, in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines and pursuant
to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972 wherein he said, among
other things:
Whereas, martial law having been declared because of wanton
destruction of lives and properties, widespread lawlessness and anarchy
and chaos and disorder now prevailing throughout the country, which
condition has been brought about by groups of men who are actively
engaged in a criminal conspiracy to seize political and state power in the
Philippines in order to take over the government by force and violence,
the extent of which has now assumed the proportion of an actual war
against our people and the legitimate government . . .
And he gave all reasons in order to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus and declare martial law in our country without justifiable
reason. Would the Gentleman still insist on the deletion of the phrase 'and, with
the concurrence of at least a majority of all the members of the
Congress'? EcTCAD
MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, in the case of Mr. Marcos,
he is undoubtedly an aberration in our history and national
consciousness. But given the possibility that there would be another
 Marcos, our Constitution now has sufficient safeguards. As I said, it is
not really true, as the Gentleman has mentioned, that there is an
exclusive right to determine the factual basis because the paragraph
beginning on line 9 precisely tells us that the Supreme Court may review,
in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof and must promulgate its
decision on the same within 30 days from its filing.
I believe that there are enough safeguards. The Constitution is
supposed to balance the interests of the country. And here we are trying to
balance the public interest in case of invasion or rebellion as against the rights
of citizens. And I am saying that there are enough safeguards, unlike in 1972
when Mr. Marcos was able to do all those things mentioned. 100
To give more teeth to this additional safeguard, the framers of the 1987 Constitution
not only placed the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus within the ambit of judicial review, it also relaxed the rule on standing
by allowing any citizen to question before this Court the sufficiency of the factual basis of such
proclamation or suspension. Moreover, the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII veritably
conferred upon any citizen a demandable right to challenge the sufficiency of the factual basis
of said proclamation or suspension. It further designated this Court as the reviewing tribunal
to examine, in an appropriate proceeding, the sufficiency of the factual basis and to render its
decision thereon within a limited period of 30 days from date of filing.
e) Purpose of Section 18,
Article VII is to curtail the extent of
the powers of the President.
The most important objective, however, of Section 18, Article VII is the curtailment of
the extent of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief. This is the primary reason why the
provision was not placed in Article VIII or the Judicial Department but remained under Article
VII or the Executive Department.
During the closing session of the Constitutional Commission's deliberations, President
Cecilia Muñoz Palma expressed her sentiments on the 1987 Constitution. She said:
The executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines
elected by the people for a six-year term with no reelection for the duration of
his/her life. While traditional powers inherent in the office of the President
are granted, nonetheless for the first time, there are specific provisions
which curtail the extent of such powers. Most significant is the power of
the Chief Executive to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or proclaim martial law.
The flagrant abuse of that power of the Commander-in-Chief by Mr.
Marcos caused the imposition of martial law for more than eight years and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ even after the lifting of martial law in
1981. The new Constitution now provides that those powers can be exercised
only in two cases, invasion or rebellion when public safety demands it, only for
a period not exceeding 60 days, and reserving to Congress the power to revoke
such suspension or proclamation of martial law which congressional action
may not be revoked by the President. More importantly, the action of the
President is made subject to judicial review, thereby again discarding
jurisprudence which render[s] the executive action a political question and
beyond the jurisdiction of the courts to adjudicate.
 For the first time, there is a provision that the state of martial law does
not suspend the operation of the Constitution nor abolish civil courts or
legislative assemblies, or vest jurisdiction to military tribunals over civilians, or
suspend the privilege of the writ. Please forgive me if, at this point, I state that
this constitutional provision vindicates the dissenting opinions I have written
during my tenure in the Supreme Court in the martial law cases. 101
f) To interpret "appropriate
proceeding" as filed under Section 1
of Article VIII would be contrary to
the intent of the Constitution.
To conclude that the "appropriate proceeding" refers to a Petition for Certiorari filed
under the expanded jurisdiction of this Court would, therefore, contradict the clear intention of
the framers of the Constitution to place additional safeguards against possible martial
law abuse for, invariably, the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII would be subsumed
under Section 1 of Article VIII. In other words, the framers of the Constitution added the
safeguard under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII on top of the expanded
jurisdiction of this Court.
g) Jurisdiction of the Court is
not restricted to those enumerated in
Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII.
The jurisdiction of this Court is not restricted to those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5
of Article VIII. For instance, its jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President can be found in the last
paragraph of Section 4, Article VII. 102 The power of the Court to review on certiorari the
decision, order, or ruling of the Commission on Elections and Commission on Audit can be
found in Section 7, Article IX (A). 103
h) Unique features of the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII
make it sui generis.
The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate
that it should be treated as sui generis separate and different from those enumerated in Article
VIII. Under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will
follow a different rule on standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the Constitution
also limits the issue to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive
of his emergency powers. The usual period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari is
likewise not applicable under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII considering the
limited period within which this Court has to promulgate its decision.
A proceeding "[i]n its general acceptation, [is] the form in which actions are to be
brought and defended, the manner of intervening in suits, of conducting them, the mode of
deciding them, of opposing judgments, and of executing." 104 In fine, the phrase "in an
appropriate proceeding" appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to
any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It could
be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.
III. The power of the Court to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is
independent of the actions taken by Congress.
 During the oral argument, 105 the OSG urged the Court to give deference to the
actions of the two co-equal branches of the Government: on the part of the President as
Commander-in-Chief, in resorting to his extraordinary powers to declare martial law and
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and on the part of Congress, in giving its
imprimatur to Proclamation No. 216 and not revoking the same.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the scope of the extraordinary
powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief and the review of the said presidential action.
In particular, the President's extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus and imposing martial law are subject to the veto powers of the Court and
Congress.
a) The judicial power to review
versus the congressional power to
revoke.
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand,
Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside
by the President. HSAcaE
In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the
Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time
of the declaration; it is not allowed to "undertake an independent investigation beyond the
pleadings." 106 On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data
available prior to, but likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court which
does not look into the absolute correctness of the factual basis as will be discussed below,
Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented
before it.
In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a
petition "in an appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress' review
mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time
after the proclamation or suspension was made.
Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not
only totally different but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have
the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to
say, the power of the Court to review can be exercised independently from the power of
revocation of Congress.
b) The framers of the 1987
Constitution intended the judicial
power to review to be exercised
independently from the congressional
power to revoke.
If only to show that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution was to vest the
Court and Congress with veto powers independently from each other, we quote the following
exchange:
MS. QUESADA.
Yesterday, the understanding of many was that there would be safeguards
that Congress will be able to revoke such proclamation.
MR. RAMA.
Yes.
 MS. QUESADA.
But now, if they cannot meet because they have been arrested or that the
Congress has been padlocked, then who is going to declare that such a
proclamation was not warranted?
xxx xxx xxx
MR. REGALADO.
May I also inform Commissioner Quesada that the judiciary is not exactly just
standing by. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus, if the Members are
detained, can immediately be applied for, and the Supreme Court shall
also review the factual basis. x x x 107
c) Re-examination of the
Court's pronouncement in Fortun v.
President Macapagal-Arroyo.
Considering the above discussion, the Court finds it imperative to re-examine,
reconsider, and set aside its pronouncement in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo 108 to
the effect that:
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme
Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must
allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather
than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the
Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final
rampart. The constitutional validity of the President's proclamation of martial
law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the
hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the
Court. 109
xxx xxx xxx
If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty
respecting the proclamation or suspension within the short time expected of it,
then the Court can step in, hear the petitions challenging the President's action,
and ascertain if it has a factual basis. x x x 110
By the above pronouncement, the Court willingly but unwittingly clipped its own power
and surrendered the same to Congress as well as abdicated from its bounden duty to review.
Worse, the Court considered itself just on stand-by, waiting and willing to act as a substitute
in case Congress "defaults." It is an aberration, a stray declaration, which must be rectified
and set aside in this proceeding. 111
We, therefore, hold that the Court can simultaneously exercise its power of review
with, and independently from, the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived
inaction or default on the part of Congress does not deprive or deny the Court of its power to
review.
IV. The judicial power to review the sufficiency
of factual basis of the declaration of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration
of the President's decision of which among his
graduated powers he will avail of in a given
situation.
 The President as the Commander-in-Chief wields the extraordinary powers of: a)
calling out the armed forces; b) suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and c)
declaring martial law. 112 These powers may be resorted to only under specified conditions.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the powers of the Commander-in-
Chief by revising the "grounds for the activation of emergency powers, the manner of
activating them, the scope of the powers, and review of presidential action." 113
a) Extraordinary powers of the
President distinguished.
Among the three extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the most benign and
involves ordinary police action. 114 The President may resort to this extraordinary
power whenever it becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or
rebellion. "[T]he power to call is fully discretionary to the President;" 115 the only limitations
being that he acts within permissible constitutional boundaries or in a manner not constituting
grave abuse of discretion. 116 In fact, "the actual use to which the President puts the armed
forces is x x x not subject to judicial review." 117
The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the wit of habeas
corpus and/or declaring martial law may be exercised only when there is actual invasion or
rebellion, and public safety requires it. The 1987 Constitution imposed the following limits in
the exercise of these powers: "(1) a time limit of sixty days; (2) review and possible revocation
by Congress; [and] (3) review and possible nullification by the Supreme Court." 118
The framers of the 1987 Constitution eliminated insurrection, and the phrase
"imminent danger thereof" as grounds for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or declaration of martial law. 119 They perceived the phrase "imminent danger" to be
"fraught with possibilities of abuse;" 120 besides, the calling out power of the President "is
sufficient for handling imminent danger." 121
The powers to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus involve curtailment and suppression of civil rights and individual freedom. Thus, the
declaration of martial law serves as a warning to citizens that the Executive Department has
called upon the military to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and while the
emergency remains, the citizens must, under pain of arrest and punishment, not act in a
manner that will render it more difficult to restore order and enforce the law. 122 As such, their
exercise requires more stringent safeguards by the Congress, and review by the Court. 123
b) What really happens during
martial law?
During the oral argument, the following questions cropped up: What really happens
during the imposition of martial law? What powers could the President exercise during martial
law that he could not exercise if there is no martial law? Interestingly, these questions were
also discussed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution, viz.: HESIcT
FR. BERNAS. That same question was asked during the meetings of
the Committee: What precisely does martial law add to the power of the
President to call on the armed forces? The first and second lines in this
provision state:
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution,
nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies .
..
The provision is put there, precisely, to reverse the doctrine of the
Supreme Court. I think it is the case of Aquino v. COMELEC where the
Supreme Court said that in times of martial law, the President automatically
 has legislative power. So these two clauses denied that. A state of martial
law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution; therefore, it does not
suspend the principle of separation of powers.
The question now is: During martial law, can the President issue
decrees? The answer we gave to that question in the Committee was:
During martial law, the President may have the powers of a commanding
general in a theatre of war. In actual war when there is fighting in an area, the
President as the commanding general has the authority to issue orders which
have the effect of law but strictly in a theater of war, not in the situation we had
during the period of martial law. In other words, there is an effort here to return
to the traditional concept of martial law as it was developed especially in
American jurisprudence, where martial law has reference to the theater of
war. 124
xxx xxx xxx
FR. BERNAS. This phrase was precisely put here because we have
clarified the meaning of martial law; meaning, limiting it to martial law as it has
existed in the jurisprudence in international law, that it is a law for the theater
of war. In a theater of war, civil courts are unable to function. If in the actual
theater of war civil courts, in fact, are unable to function, then the military
commander is authorized to give jurisdiction even over civilians to military
courts precisely because the civil courts are closed in that area. But in the
general area where the civil courts are open then in no case can the military
courts be given jurisdiction over civilians. This is in reference to a theater of
war where the civil courts, in fact, are unable to function.
MR. FOZ. It is a state of things brought about by the realities of the
situation in that specified critical area.
FR. BERNAS. That is correct.
MR. FOZ. And it is not something that is brought about by a declaration
of the Commander-in-Chief.
FR. BERNAS. It is not brought about by a declaration of the
Commander-in-Chief. The understanding here is that the phrase 'nor authorize
the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians' has
reference to the practice under the Marcos regime where military courts were
given jurisdiction over civilians. We say here that we will never allow that except
in areas where civil courts are, in fact, unable to function and it becomes
necessary for some kind of court to function. 125
A state of martial law is peculiar because the President, at such a time, exercises
police power, which is normally a function of the Legislature. In particular, the President
exercises police power, with the military's assistance, to ensure public safety and in place of
government agencies which for the time being are unable to cope with the condition in a
locality, which remains under the control of the State. 126
In David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, 127 the Court, quoting Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza's (Justice Mendoza) Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice on March
13, 2006, stated that under a valid declaration of martial law, the President as Commander-
in-Chief may order the "(a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public
assemblies; (c) [takeover] of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d)
issuance of Presidential Decrees x x x." 128
Worthy to note, however, that the above-cited acts that the President may perform do
not give him unbridled discretion to infringe on the rights of civilians during martial law. This is
because martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, neither does it
supplant the operation of civil courts or legislative assemblies. Moreover, the guarantees
under the Bill of Rights remain in place during its pendency. And in such instance where the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is also suspended, such suspension applies only to
those judicially charged with rebellion or offenses connected with invasion. 129
Clearly, from the foregoing, while martial law poses the most severe threat to civil
liberties, 130 the Constitution has safeguards against the President's prerogative to declare a
state of martial law.
c) "Graduation " of powers
refers to hierarchy based on scope
and effect; it does not refer to a
sequence, order, or arrangement by
which the Commander-in-Chief must
adhere to.
Indeed, the 1987 Constitution gives the "President, as Commander-in-Chief, a
'sequence' of 'graduated power[s].' From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling
out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to
declare martial law." 131 It must be stressed, however, that the graduation refers only to
hierarchy based on scope and effect. It does not in any manner refer to a sequence,
arrangement, or order which the Commander-in-Chief must follow. This so-called "graduation
of powers" does not dictate or restrict the manner by which the President decides which power
to choose.
These extraordinary powers are conferred by the Constitution with the President as
Commander-in-Chief; it therefore necessarily follows that the power and prerogative to
determine whether the situation warrants a mere exercise of the calling out power; or whether
the situation demands suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; or whether it
calls for the declaration of martial law, also lies, at least initially, with the President. The power
to choose, initially, which among these extraordinary powers to wield in a given set of
conditions is a judgment call on the part of the President. As Commander-in-Chief, his powers
are broad enough to include his prerogative to address exigencies or threats that endanger
the government, and the very integrity of the State. 132
It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating
the President's decision pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts
or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the
Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the
President.
d) The framers of the 1987
Constitution intended the Congress
not to interfere a priori in the
decision-making process of the
President.
The elimination by the framers of the 1987 Constitution of the requirement of prior
concurrence of the Congress in the initial imposition of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus further supports the conclusion that judicial review does
not include the calibration of the President's decision of which of his graduated powers will be
availed of in a given situation. Voting 28 to 12, the framers of the 1987 Constitution removed
the requirement of congressional concurrence in the first imposition of martial law and
suspension of the privilege. 133
MR. PADILLA. x x x
 We all agree with the suspension of the writ or the proclamation of martial
law should not require beforehand the concurrence of the majority of the
Members of the Congress. However, as provided by the Committee, the
Congress may revoke, amend, or shorten or even increase the period of
such suspension. 134
xxx xxx xxx
MR. NATIVIDAD.
First and foremost, we agree with the Commissioner's thesis that in the first
imposition of martial law there is no need for concurrence of the Members
of Congress because the provision says 'in case of actual invasion or
rebellion.' If there is actual invasion and rebellion, as Commissioner
Crispino de Castro said, there is a need for immediate response because
there is an attack. Second, the fact of securing a concurrence may be
impractical because the roads might be blocked or barricaded. x x x So
the requirement of an initial concurrence of the majority of all Members
of the Congress in case of an invasion or rebellion might be impractical
as I can see it. caITAC
Second, Section 15 states that the Congress may revoke the declaration or
lift the suspension.
And third, the matter of declaring martial law is already a justiciable question
and no longer a political one in that it is subject to judicial review at any
point in time. So on that basis, I agree that there is no need for
concurrence as a prerequisite to declare martial law or to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. x x x 135
xxx xxx xxx
MR. SUAREZ.
Thank you.
The Commissioner is suggesting that in connection with Section 15, we delete
the phrase 'and, with the concurrence of at least a majority of all the
Members of the Congress . . .'
MR. PADILLA.
That is correct especially for the initial suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or also the declaration of martial law.
MR. SUAREZ.
So in both instances, the Commissioner is suggesting that this would be an
exclusive prerogative of the President?
MR. PADILLA.
At least initially, for a period of 60 days. But even that period of 60 days may
be shortened by the Congress or the Senate because the next sentence
says that the Congress or the Senate may even revoke the
proclamation. 136
xxx xxx xxx
MR. SUAREZ. x x x
The Commissioner is proposing a very substantial amendment because this
means that he is vesting exclusively unto the President the right to
 determine the factors which may lead to the declaration of martial
law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. I suppose he has
strong and compelling reasons in seeking to delete this particular phrase.
May we be informed of his good and substantial reasons?
MR. MONSOD.
This situation arises in cases of invasion or rebellion. And in previous
interpellations regarding this phrase, even during the discussions on the
Bill of Rights, as I understand it, the interpretation is a situation of actual
invasion or rebellion. In these situations, the President has to act quickly.
Secondly, this declaration has a time fuse. It is only good for a maximum
of 60 days. At the end of 60 days, it automatically terminates. Thirdly, the
right of the judiciary to inquire into the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the proclamation always exists, even during those first 60 days.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD.
Yes, Madam President, in the case of Mr. Marcos[,] he is undoubtedly an
aberration in our history and national consciousness. But given the
possibility that there would be another Marcos, our Constitution now has
sufficient safeguards. As I said, it is not really true, as the Gentleman
mentioned, that there is an exclusive right to determine the factual basis
because the paragraph being on line 9 precisely tells us that the Supreme
court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof and must
promulgate its decision on the same within 30 days from its filing.
I believe that there are enough safeguards. The Constitution is supposed to
balance the interests of the country. And here we are trying to balance
the public interest in case of invasion or rebellion as against the rights of
citizens. x x x
MR. SUAREZ.
Will that prevent a future President from doing what Mr. Marcos had done?
MR. MONSOD.
There is nothing absolute in this world, and there may be another Marcos.
What we are looking for are safeguards that are reasonable and, I
believe, adequate at this point. On the other hand, in case of invasion or
rebellion, even during the first 60 days when the intention here is to
protect the country in that situation, it would be unreasonable to ask that
there should be a concurrence on the part of the Congress, which
situation is automatically terminated at the end of such 60 days.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. SUAREZ.
Would the Gentleman not feel more comfortable if we provide for a legislative
check on this awesome power of the Chief Executive acting as
Commander-in-Chief?
MR. MONSOD.
 I would be less comfortable if we have a presidency that cannot act under
those conditions.
MR. SUAREZ.
But he can act with the concurrence of the proper or appropriate authority?
MR. MONSOD.
Yes. But when those situations arise, it is very unlikely that the concurrence
of Congress would be available; and, secondly, the President will be able
to act quickly in order to deal with the circumstances.
MR. SUAREZ.
So, we would be subordinating actual circumstances to expediency?
MR. MONSOD.
I do not believe it is expediency when one is trying to protect the country in
the event of an invasion or a rebellion. 137
The foregoing exchange clearly manifests the intent of the Constitution not to allow
Congress to interfere a priori in the President's choice of extraordinary powers.
e) The Court must similarly
and necessarily refrain from
calibrating the President's decision of
which among his extraordinary
powers to avail given a certain
situation or condition.
It cannot be overemphasized that time is paramount in situations necessitating the
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It was
precisely this time element that prompted the Constitutional Commission to eliminate the
requirement of concurrence of the Congress in the initial imposition by the President of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Considering that the
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is now
anchored on actual invasion or rebellion and when public safety requires it, and is no longer
under threat or in imminent danger thereof, there is a necessity and urgency for the President
to act quickly to protect the country. 138 The Court, as Congress does, must thus accord the
President the same leeway by not wading into the realm that is reserved exclusively by the
Constitution to the Executive Department.
f) The recommendation of the
Defense Secretary is not a condition
for the declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
Even the recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of National Defense,
or other high-ranking military officials, is not a condition for the President to declare martial
law. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the President's
power to declare martial law is not subject to any condition except for the requirements of
actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to
common sense if the decision of the President is made dependent on the recommendation of
his mere alter ego. Rightly so, it is only on the President and no other that the exercise of the
powers of the Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is
bestowed. ICHDca
 g) In any event, the President
initially employed the most benign
action — the calling out power —
before he declared martial law and
suspended the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.
At this juncture, it must be stressed that prior to Proclamation No. 216 or the
declaration of martial law on May 23, 2017, the President had already issued Proclamation
No. 55 on September 4, 2016, declaring a state of national emergency on account of lawless
violence in Mindanao. This, in fact, is extant in the first Whereas Clause of Proclamation No.
216. Based on the foregoing presidential actions, it can be gleaned that although there is no
obligation or requirement on his part to use his extraordinary powers on a graduated or
sequential basis, still the President made the conscious and deliberate effort to first employ
the most benign from among his extraordinary powers. As the initial and preliminary step
towards suppressing and preventing the armed hostilities in Mindanao, the President decided
to use his calling out power first. Unfortunately, the situation did not improve; on the contrary,
it only worsened. Thus, exercising his sole and exclusive prerogative, the President decided
to impose martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on the belief that
the armed hostilities in Mindanao already amount to actual rebellion and public safety requires
it.
V. Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 may
be considered vague and thus void because of (a)
its inclusion of "other rebel groups"; and (b) the
absence of any guideline specifying its actual
operational parameters within the entire
Mindanao region.

Proclamation No. 216 is being facially challenged on the ground of "vagueness" by the
insertion of the phrase "other rebel groups" 139 in its Whereas Clause and for lack of available
guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region,
making the proclamation susceptible to broad interpretation, misinterpretation, or confusion.
This argument lacks legal basis.
a) Void-for-vagueness doctrine.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if "men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." 140 "[A]
statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. [In
such instance, the statute] is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle." 141
b) Vagueness doctrine applies
only in free speech cases.
The vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces"
statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment
cases. 142 A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and also to one which
is overbroad because of possible "'chilling effect' on protected speech that comes from
statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a
crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to
avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence." 143
 It is best to stress that the vagueness doctrine has a special application only to free-
speech cases. They are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes. 144 Justice
Mendoza explained the reason as follows:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one
which is overbroad because of possible 'chilling effect' upon protected speech.
The theory is that '[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily
apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes
in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate
that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity.' The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected
speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected
speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented
from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law,
the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are
analytical tools developed for testing 'on their faces' statutes in free speech
cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They
cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With
respect to such statute, the established rule is that 'one to whom application of
a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground
that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other
situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.' As has been
pointed out, 'vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like
overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes
found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as
applied' to a particular defendant.' x x x 145
Invalidation of statutes "on its face" should be used sparingly because it results in
striking down statutes entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before
the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. 146 "Such invalidation would
constitute a departure from the usual requirement of 'actual case and controversy' and permit
decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness." 147
c) Proclamation No. 216
cannot be facially challenged using
the vagueness doctrine.
Clearly, facial review of Proclamation No. 216 on the grounds of vagueness is
unwarranted. Proclamation No. 216 does not regulate speech, religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights that may be facially challenged. 148 What it seeks to penalize is conduct,
not speech.
As held by the Court in David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, 149 the facial review
of Proclamation No. 1017, issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo declaring a
state of national emergency, on ground of vagueness is uncalled for since a plain reading
of Proclamation No. 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed at speech or even speech-
related conduct. It is actually a call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to prevent
or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Like Proclamation No. 1017, Proclamation No.
216 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state
regulation.
d) Inclusion of "other rebel
groups" does not make Proclamation
No. 216 vague.
The contention that the phrase "other rebel groups" leaves Proclamation No. 216 open
to broad interpretation, misinterpretation, and confusion, cannot be sustained.
In People v. Nazario, 150 the Court enunciated that:
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men 'of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.' It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targetted by it, fair notice of the conduct to
avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be
clarified by either a saving clause or by construction. Thus, in Coates v. City of
Cincinnati, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had made
it illegal for 'three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there
conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by.' Clearly, the
ordinance imposed no standard at all 'because one may never know in
advance what annoys some people but does not annoy others.' TCAScE
Coates highlights what has been referred to as a 'perfectly vague' act
whose obscurity is evident on its face. It is to be distinguished, however, from
legislation couched in imprecise language — but which nonetheless specifies
a standard though defectively phrased — in which case, it may be 'saved' by
proper construction. 151
The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed
in the context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers
to "other rebel groups" found in Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of reference in its
Whereas clauses.
e) Lack of guidelines/
operational parameters does not
make Proclamation No. 216 vague.
Neither could Proclamation No. 216 be described as vague, and thus void, on the
ground that it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire
Mindanao region. Besides, operational guidelines will serve only as mere tools for the
implementation of the proclamation. In Part III, we declared that judicial review covers only
the sufficiency of information or data available to or known to the President prior to, or at the
time of, the declaration or suspension. And, as will be discussed exhaustively in Part VII, the
review will be confined to the proclamation itself and the Report submitted to Congress.
Clearly, therefore, there is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of
the implementing and/or operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders
issued after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act committed under
the said orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws, such as criminal acts or human
rights violations, should be resolved in a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the
Court wades into these areas, it would be deemed as trespassing into the sphere that is
reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its power to revoke.
VI. Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No.
216 will (a) have the effect of recalling
Proclamation No. 55; or (b) also nullify the acts
of the President in calling out the armed forces to
quell lawless violence in Marawi and other parts
of the Mindanao region.

a) The calling out power is in a

different category from the power to
declare martial law and the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus; nullification of
Proclamation No. 216 will not affect
Proclamation No. 55.
The Court's ruling in these cases will not, in any way, affect the President's declaration
of a state of national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao
through Proclamation No. 55 dated September 4, 2016, where he called upon the Armed
Forces and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to undertake such measures to suppress any
and all forms of lawless violence in the Mindanao region, and to prevent such lawless violence
from spreading and escalating elsewhere in the Philippines.
In Kulayan v. Tan, 152 the Court ruled that the President's calling out power is in
a different category from the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
the power to declare martial law:
x x x Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the
Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there
is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of
the President's action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places
the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial
law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together
the three powers and provided for their revocation and review without any
qualification. 153
In other words, the President may exercise the power to call out the Armed
Forces independently of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
to declare martial law, although, of course, it may also be a prelude to a possible future
exercise of the latter powers, as in this case.
Even so, the Court's review of the President's declaration of martial law and his calling
out the Armed Forces necessarily entails separate proceedings instituted for that particular
purpose.
As explained in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 154 the President's
exercise of his power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion may only be examined by the Court as to whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion. 155
In Zamora, the Court categorically ruled that the Integrated Bar of the Philippines had
failed to sufficiently comply with the requisites of locus standi, as it was not able to show any
specific injury which it had suffered or could suffer by virtue of President Joseph Estrada's
order deploying the Philippine Marines to join the PNP in visibility patrols around the
metropolis. 156
 This locus standi requirement, however, need not be complied with in so far as the
Court's jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's declaration
of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is concerned. In fact,
by constitutional design, such review may be instituted by any citizen before the
Court, 157 without the need to prove that he or she stands to sustain a direct and personal
injury as a consequence of the questioned Presidential act/s.
But, even assuming arguendo that the Court finds no sufficient basis for the
declaration of martial law in this case, such ruling could not affect the President's exercise of
his calling out power through Proclamation No. 55.
b) The operative fact doctrine.
Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in the nullification of the
acts of the President done pursuant thereto. Under the "operative fact doctrine," the
unconstitutional statute is recognized as an "operative fact" before it is declared
unconstitutional. 158
Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found by the judiciary
to be contrary to the Constitution, it is null and void. As the new Civil Code puts
it: 'When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive
acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to
the laws or the Constitution.' The above provision of the Civil Code reflects the
orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, whether legislative or executive, is
not a law, confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection. This
doctrine admits of qualifications, however. As the American Supreme Court
stated: 'The actual existence of a statute prior to such a determination [of
constitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to the invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects, — with respect to particular regulations, individual and corporate, and
particular conduct, private and official.
The orthodox view finds support in the well-settled doctrine that the
Constitution is supreme and provides the measure for the validity of legislative
or executive acts. Clearly then, neither the legislative nor the executive branch,
and for that matter much less, this Court, has power under the Constitution to
act contrary to its terms. Any attempted exercise of power in violation of its
provisions is to that extent unwarranted and null.
The growing awareness of the role of the judiciary as the governmental
organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive
measure is valid leads to a more appreciative attitude of the emerging concept
that a declaration of nullity may have legal consequences which the more
orthodox view would deny. That for a period of time such a statute, treaty,
executive order, or ordinance was in 'actual existence' appears to be
indisputable. What is more appropriate and logical then than to consider
it as 'an operative fact?' (Emphasis supplied) 159 cTDaEH
However, it must also be stressed that this "operative fact doctrine" is not a fool-proof
shield that would repulse any challenge to acts performed during the effectivity of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, purportedly in furtherance of
quelling rebellion or invasion, and promotion of public safety, when evidence shows otherwise.
VII. The Scope of the Power to Review.
 a) The scope of the power of
review under the 1987 Constitution
refers only to the determination of the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the
declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of habeas
corpus.
To recall, the Court, in the case of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Lansang, 160 which was decided under the 1935 Constitution, 161 held that it can inquire
into, within proper bounds, whether there has been adherence to or compliance with the
constitutionally-imposed limitations on the Presidential power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. 162 "Lansang limited the review function of the Court to a very
prudentially narrow test of arbitrariness." 163 Fr. Bernas described the "proper bounds"
in Lansang as follows:
What, however, are these 'proper bounds' on the power of the courts?
The Court first gave the general answer that its power was 'merely to check —
not to supplant — the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power
vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. More specifically, the Court
said that its power was not 'even comparable with its power over civil or criminal
cases elevated thereto by appeal . . . in which cases the appellate court has all
the powers of the court of origin,' nor to its power of quasi-judicial administrative
decisions where the Court is limited to asking whether 'there is
some evidentiary basis' for the administrative finding. Instead, the Court
accepted the Solicitor General's suggestion that it 'go no further than to satisfy
[itself] not that the President's decision is correct and that public safety was
endangered by the rebellion and justified the suspension of the writ, but that in
suspending the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily.' 164
Lansang, however, was decided under the 1935 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution,
by providing only for judicial review based on the determination of the sufficiency of the factual
bases, has in fact done away with the test of arbitrariness as provided in Lansang.
b) The "sufficiency of factual
basis test."
Similarly, under the doctrine of contemporaneous construction, the framers of the 1987
Constitution are presumed to know the prevailing jurisprudence at the time they were drafting
the Constitution. Thus, the phrase "sufficiency of factual basis" in Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution should be understood as the only test for judicial review of the President's power
to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution. The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the President's
decision is correct, rather it only needs to determine whether the President's decision had
sufficient factual bases.
We conclude, therefore, that Section 18, Article VII limits the scope of judicial review
by the introduction of the "sufficiency of the factual basis" test.
As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial
law and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of
Congress and the review of this Court. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call
of the President, the determination of this Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis
for the exercise of such, must be based only on facts or information known by or available to
the President at the time he made the declaration or suspension, which facts or information
are found in the proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress.
These may be based on the situation existing at the time the declaration was made or past
events. As to how far the past events should be from the present depends on the President.
Past events may be considered as justifications for the declaration and/or suspension as long
as these are connected or related to the current situation existing at the time of the declaration.
As to what facts must be stated in the proclamation and the written Report is up to the
President. 165 As Commander-in-Chief, he has sole discretion to determine what to include
and what not to include in the proclamation and the written Report taking into account the
urgency of the situation as well as national security. He cannot be forced to divulge intelligence
reports and confidential information that may prejudice the operations and the safety of the
military.
Similarly, events that happened after the issuance of the proclamation, which are
included in the written report, cannot be considered in determining the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus since these happened after the President had already issued the
proclamation. If at all, they may be used only as tools, guides or reference in the Court's
determination of the sufficiency of factual basis, but not as part or component of the portfolio
of the factual basis itself.
In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the
suspension, the Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and
not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of the
facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the President could not be
expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of
the situation. To require precision in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden
him and therefore impede the process of his decision-making. Such a requirement will
practically necessitate the President to be on the ground to confirm the correctness of the
reports submitted to him within a period that only the circumstances obtaining would be able
to dictate. Such a scenario, of course, would not only place the President in peril but would
also defeat the very purpose of the grant of emergency powers upon him, that is, to borrow
the words of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun, to "immediately put an end to the root cause
of the emergency." 166 Possibly, by the time the President is satisfied with the correctness of
the facts in his possession, it would be too late in the day as the invasion or rebellion could
have already escalated to a level that is hard, if not impossible, to curtail.
Besides, the framers of the 1987 Constitution considered intelligence reports of
military officers as credible evidence that the President can appraise and to which he can
anchor his judgment, 167 as appears to be the case here.
At this point, it is wise to quote the pertinent portions of the Dissenting Opinion of
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco Jr. in Fortun:
President Arroyo cannot be blamed for relying upon the information
given to her by the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police, considering that the matter of the supposed armed uprising was within
their realm of competence, and that a state of emergency has also been
declared in Central Mindanao to prevent lawless violence similar to the
'Maguindanao massacre,' which may be an indication that there is a threat to
the public safety warranting a declaration of martial law or suspension of the
writ.
Certainly, the President cannot be expected to risk being too late before
declaring martial law or suspending the writ of habeas corpus. The
Constitution, as couched, does not require precision in establishing the fact of
rebellion. The President is called to act as public safety requires. 168
 Corollary, as the President is expected to decide quickly on whether there is a need to
proclaim martial law even only on the basis of intelligence reports, it is irrelevant, for purposes
of the Court's review, if subsequent events prove that the situation had not been accurately
reported to him. After all, the Court's review is confined to the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the
information at hand during the declaration or suspension; subsequent events do not have any
bearing insofar as the Court's review is concerned. In any event, safeguards under Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution are in place to cover such a situation, e.g., the martial
law period is good only for 60 days; Congress may choose to revoke it even immediately after
the proclamation is made; and, this Court may investigate the factual background of the
declaration. 169
Hence, the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus finds no application in this case.
Falsities of and/or inaccuracies in some of the facts stated in the proclamation and the written
report are not enough reasons for the Court to invalidate the declaration and/or suspension
as long as there are other facts in the proclamation and the written Report that support the
conclusion that there is an actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires the
declaration and/or suspension. cSaATC
In sum, the Court's power to review is limited to the determination of whether the
President in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus had sufficient factual basis. Thus, our review would be limited to an examination on
whether the President acted within the bounds set by the Constitution, i.e., whether the facts
in his possession prior to and at the time of the declaration or suspension are sufficient for
him to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
VIII. The parameters for determining the
sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration
of martial law and/or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

a) Actual invasion or rebellion,

and public safety requirement.
Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the sufficiency of the
factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, "namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the
exercise of such power." 170 Without the concurrence of the two conditions, the President's
declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must
be struck down.
As a general rule, a word used in a statute which has a technical or legal meaning, is
construed to have the same technical or legal meaning. 171 Since the Constitution did not
define the term "rebellion," it must be understood to have the same meaning as the crime of
"rebellion" in the Revised Penal Code (RPC). 172
During the July 29, 1986 deliberation of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, then
Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado alluded to actual rebellion as one defined under Article
134 of the RPC:
MR. DE LOS REYES.
As I see it now, the Committee envisions actual rebellion and no longer
imminent rebellion. Does the Committee mean that there should be
actual shooting or actual attack on the legislature or Malacañang, for
example? Let us take for example a contemporary event — this Manila
Hotel incident, everybody knows what happened. Would the Committee
consider that an actual act of rebellion?
 MR. REGALADO.
If we consider the definition of rebellion under Articles 134 and 135 of the
Revised Penal Code, that presupposes an actual assemblage of men in
an armed public uprising for the purposes mentioned in Article 134 and
by the means employed under Article 135. x x x 173
Thus, rebellion as mentioned in the Constitution could only refer to rebellion as defined
under Article 134 of the RPC. To give it a different definition would not only create confusion
but would also give the President wide latitude of discretion, which may be abused — a
situation that the Constitution seeks to prevent. 174
Article 134 of the RPC states:
Art. 134. Rebellion or insurrection; How committed. — The crime of
rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against
the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said
Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part
thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, depriving the Chief
Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives.
Thus, for rebellion to exist, the following elements must be present, to wit: "(1) there is
a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and (2) the purpose of the
uprising or movement is either (a) to remove from the allegiance to the Government or its
laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval, or
other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of
any of their powers and prerogatives." 175
b) Probable cause is the
allowable standard of proof for the
President.
In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to convince himself
that there is probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than not a rebellion was
committed or is being committed. 176 To require him to satisfy a higher standard of proof
would restrict the exercise of his emergency powers. Along this line, Justice Carpio, in his
Dissent in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, concluded that the President needs only to
satisfy probable cause as the standard of proof in determining the existence of either invasion
or rebellion for purposes of declaring martial law, and that probable cause is the most
reasonable, most practical and most expedient standard by which the President can fully
ascertain the existence or non-existence of rebellion necessary for a declaration of martial
law or suspension of the writ. This is because unlike other standards of proof, which, in order
to be met, would require much from the President and therefore unduly restrain his exercise
of emergency powers, the requirement of probable cause is much simpler. It merely
necessitates an "average man [to weigh] the facts and circumstances without resorting to the
calibration of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He [merely] relies
on common sense [and] x x x needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than
not, a crime has been committed x x x by the accused." 177
To summarize, the parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as
follows: 1) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements
must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual
rebellion or invasion.
Having laid down the parameters for review, the Court shall now proceed to the core
of the controversy — whether Proclamation No. 216, Declaring a State of Martial Law and
Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the whole of Mindanao, lacks
sufficient factual basis.
IX. There is sufficient factual basis for the
declaration of martial law and the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus.

At this juncture, it bears to emphasize that the purpose of judicial review is not the
determination of accuracy or veracity of the facts upon which the President anchored his
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; rather,
only the sufficiency of the factual basis as to convince the President that there is probable
cause that rebellion exists. It must also be reiterated that martial law is a matter of urgency
and much leeway and flexibility should be accorded the President. As such, he is not expected
to completely validate all the information he received before declaring martial law or
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
We restate the elements of rebellion for reference:
1. That there be (a) public uprising, and (b) taking up arms against the
Government; and
2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either: (a) to remove from
the allegiance to said Government or its laws the territory of the Philippines or
any part thereof, or any body of land, naval or other armed forces or (b) to
deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their
powers or prerogatives. 178
Petitioners concede that there is an armed public uprising in Marawi
City. 179 However, they insist that the armed hostilities do not constitute rebellion in the
absence of the element of culpable political purpose, i.e., the removal from the allegiance to
the Philippine Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or
(ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or
Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.
The contention lacks merit.
a) Facts, events and
information upon which the President
anchored his decision to declare
martial law and suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.
Since the President supposedly signed Proclamation No. 216 on May 23, 2017 at
10:00 PM, 180 the Court will consider only those facts and/or events which were known to or
have transpired on or before that time, consistent with the scope of judicial review. Thus, the
following facts and/or events were deemed to have been considered by the President in
issuing Proclamation No. 216, as plucked from and extant in Proclamation No. 216 itself:
1. clamatioPron No. 55 issued on September 4, 2016, declaring a state of
national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao; 181
2. Series of violent acts 182 committed by the Maute terrorist group including:
a) Attack on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur in February 2016,
killing and wounding several soldiers;
b) Mass jailbreak in Marawi City in August 2016 of the arrested comrades
of the Maute Group and other detainees;
3. On May 23, 2017: 183
 a) Takeover of a hospital in Marawi; cHDAIS
b) Establishment of several checkpoints within Marawi;
c) Burning of certain government and private facilities;
d) Mounting casualties on the part of the government;
e) Hoisting the flag of ISIS in several areas; and
f) Capability of the Maute Group and other rebel groups to sow terror, and
cause death and damage to property not only in Lanao del Sur but also
in other parts of Mindanao;
and the Report 184 submitted to Congress:

1. Zamboanga siege; 185

2. Davao bombing; 186
3. Mamasapano carnage; 187
4. Cotabato bombings; 188
5. Sultan Kudarat bombings; 189
6. Sulu bombings; 190
7. Basilan bombings; 191
8. Attempt to capture Hapilon was confronted with armed resistance by
combined forces of ASG and the Maute Group; 192
9. Escalation of armed hostility against the government troops; 193
10. Acts of violence directed not only against government authorities and
establishments but civilians as well; 194
11. Takeover of major social, economic and political foundations which
paralyzed Marawi City; 195
12. The object of the armed hostilities was to lay the groundwork for the
establishment of a DAESH/ISIS wilayat or province; 196
13. Maute Group has 263 active members, armed and combat-ready; 197
14. Extensive networks or linkages of the Maute Group with foreign and local
armed groups; 198
15. Adherence of the Maute Group to the ideals espoused by ISIS; 199
16. Publication of a video showing Maute Group's declaration of allegiance to
ISIS; 200
17. Foreign-based terrorist groups provide financial and logistical support to
the Maute Group; 201
18. Events on May 23, 2017 in Marawi City, particularly:
a) at 2:00 PM, members and sympathizers of the Maute Group and ASG
attacked various government and privately-owned facilities;
b) at 4:00 PM, around fifty (50) armed criminals forcibly entered the
Marawi City Jail; facilitated the escape of inmates; killed a member of
PDEA; assaulted and disarmed on-duty personnel and/or locked them
inside the cells; confiscated cellphones, personnel-issued firearms, and
vehicles; 203
 c) by 4:30 PM, interruption of power supply; sporadic gunfights; city-wide
power outage by evening; 204
d) from 6:00 PM to 7:00 PM, Maute Group ambushed and burned the
Marawi Police Station; commandeered a police car; 205
e) BJMP personnel evacuated the Marawi City Jail and other affected
areas; 206
f) control over three bridges in Lanao del Sur, namely, Lilod, Bangulo,
and Sauiaran, was taken by the rebels; 207
g) road blockades and checkpoints set up by lawless armed groups at
the Iligan-Marawi junction; 208
h) burning of Dansalan College Foundation, Cathedral of Maria
Auxiliadora, the nuns' quarters in the church, and the Shia Masjid
Moncado Colony; 209
i) taking of hostages from the church; 210
j) killing of five faculty members of Dansalan College Foundation; 211
k) burning of Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation and Marawi
Central Elementary Pilot School; 212
l) overrunning of Amai Pakpak Hospital; 213
m) hoisting the ISIS flag in several areas; 214
n) attacking and burning of the Filipino-Libyan Friendship Hospital; 215
o) ransacking of a branch of Landbank of the Philippines and
commandeering an armored vehicle; 216
p) reports regarding Maute Group's plan to execute Christians; 217
q) preventing Maranaos from leaving their homes; 218
r) forcing young Muslims to join their group; 219 and
s) intelligence reports regarding the existence of strategic mass action of
lawless armed groups in Marawi City, seizing public and private facilities,
perpetrating killings of government personnel, and committing armed
uprising against and open defiance of the Government. 220
b) The President's Conclusion
After the assessment by the President of the aforementioned facts, he arrived at the
following conclusions, as mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and the Report:
1) The Maute Group is "openly attempting to remove from the allegiance to the
Philippine Government this part of Mindanao and deprive the Chief Executive of his powers
and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety in
Mindanao, constituting the crime of rebellion." 221
2) "[L]awless armed groups have taken up arms and committed public uprising against
the duly constituted government and against the people of Mindanao, for the purpose of
removing Mindanao — starting with the City of Marawi, Lanao del Sur — from its allegiance
to the Government and its laws and depriving the Chief Executive of his powers and
prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety in
Mindanao, to the great damage, prejudice, and detriment of the people therein and the nation
as a whole." 222
 3) The May 23, 2017 events "put on public display the groups' clear intention to
establish an Islamic State and their capability to deprive the duly constituted authorities — the
President, foremost — of their powers and prerogatives." 223
4) "These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a clear attempt to
establish the groups' seat of power in Marawi City for their planned establishment of a
DAESH wilayat or province covering the entire Mindanao." 224
5) "The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the recruitment of young
Muslims to further expand their ranks and strengthen their force; the armed consolidation of
their members throughout Marawi City; the decimation of a segment of the city population who
resist; and the brazen display of DAESH flags constitute a clear, pronounced, and
unmistakable intent to remove Marawi City, and eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its
allegiance to the Government." 225
6) "There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to deprive the
President of his power, authority, and prerogatives within Marawi City as a precedent to
spreading their control over the entire Mindanao, in an attempt to undermine his control over
executive departments, bureaus, and offices in said area; defeat his mandate to ensure that
all laws are faithfully executed; and remove his supervisory powers over local
governments." 226
7) "Law enforcement and other government agencies now face pronounced difficulty
sending their reports to the Chief Executive due to the city-wide power outages. Personnel
from the BJMP have been prevented from performing their functions. Through the attack and
occupation of several hospitals, medical services in Marawi City have been adversely
affected. The bridge and road blockades set up by the groups effectively deprive the
government of its ability to deliver basic services to its citizens. Troop reinforcements have
been hampered, preventing the government from restoring peace and order in the area.
Movement by both civilians and government personnel to and from the city is likewise
hindered." 227 ISHCcT
8) "The taking up of arms by lawless armed groups in the area, with support being
provided by foreign-based terrorists and illegal drug money, and their blatant acts of defiance
which embolden other armed groups in Mindanao, have resulted in the deterioration of public
order and safety in Marawi City; they have likewise compromised the security of the entire
Island of Mindanao." 228
9) "Considering the network and alliance-building activities among terrorist groups,
local criminals, and lawless armed men, the siege of Marawi City is a vital cog in attaining
their long-standing goal: absolute control over the entirety of Mindanao. These circumstances
demand swift and decisive action to ensure the safety and security of the Filipino people and
preserve our national integrity." 229
Thus, the President deduced from the facts available to him that there was an armed
public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to the
Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of
his powers and prerogatives, leading the President to believe that there was probable cause
that the crime of rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety requires the
imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the President,
in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual
rebellion exists. The President's conclusion, that there was an armed public uprising, the
culpable purpose of which was the removal from the allegiance of the Philippine Government
a portion of its territory and the deprivation of the President from performing his powers and
prerogatives, was reached after a tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the President
satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof.
 After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for
a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
As Justice Carpio decreed in his Dissent in Fortun:
x x x [T]he Constitution does not compel the President to produce such
amount of proof as to unduly burden and effectively incapacitate her from
exercising such powers.
Definitely, the President need not gather proof beyond reasonable
doubt, which is the standard of proof required for convicting an accused
charged with a criminal offense. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the highest quantum of evidence,
and to require the President to establish the existence of rebellion or invasion
with such amount of proof before declaring martial law or suspending the writ
amounts to an excessive restriction on 'the President's power to act as to
practically tie her hands and disable her from effectively protecting the nation
against threats to public safety.'
Neither clear and convincing evidence, which is employed in either
criminal or civil cases, is indispensable for a lawful declaration of martial law or
suspension of the writ. This amount of proof likewise unduly restrains the
President in exercising her emergency powers, as it requires proof greater than
preponderance of evidence although not beyond reasonable doubt.
Not even preponderance of evidence, which is the degree of proof
necessary in civil cases, is demanded for a lawful declaration of martial law.
xxx xxx xxx
Weighing the superiority of the evidence on hand, from at least two
opposing sides, before she can act and impose martial law or suspend the writ
unreasonably curtails the President's emergency powers.
Similarly, substantial evidence constitutes an unnecessary restriction
on the President's use of her emergency powers. Substantial evidence is the
amount of proof required in administrative or quasi-judicial cases, or that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.
I am of the view that probable cause of the existence of either invasion
or rebellion suffices and satisfies the standard of proof for a valid declaration
of martial law and suspension of the writ.
Probable cause is the same amount of proof required for the filing of a
criminal information by the prosecutor and for the issuance of an arrest warrant
by a judge. Probable cause has been defined as a 'set of facts and
circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that the offense charged in the Information or any offense included therein has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested.'
In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of
which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding
of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely
than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the
accused. Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than
evidence that would justify conviction.
 Probable cause, basically premised on common sense, is the most
reasonable, most practical, and most expedient standard by which the
President can fully ascertain the existence or non-existence of rebellion,
necessary for a declaration of martial law x x x 230
c) Inaccuracies, simulations,
falsities, and hyperboles.
The allegation in the Lagman Petition that the facts stated in Proclamation No. 216 and
the Report are false, inaccurate, simulated, and/or hyperbolic, does not persuade. As
mentioned, the Court is not concerned about absolute correctness, accuracy, or precision of
the facts because to do so would unduly tie the hands of the President in responding to an
urgent situation.
Specifically, it alleges that the following facts are not true as shown by its counter-
evidence: 231
FACTUAL STATEMENTS COUNTER-EVIDENCE
(1) that the Maute group attacked Amai Statements made by:
Pakpak Hospital and hoisted the
(a) Dr. Amer Saber, Chief of the
DAESH flag there, among several
Hospital
locations. As of 0600H of 24 May
2017, members of the Maute Group (b) Health Secretary Paulyn Ubial;
were seen guarding the entry gates (c) PNP Spokesperson Senior Supt.
of the Amai Pakpak Hospital and Dionardo Carlos;
that they held hostage the
employees of the Hospital and took (d) AFP Public Affairs Office Chief Co.
over the PhilHealth office located Edgard Arevalo; and
thereat (Proclamation No. 216 and (e) Marawi City Mayor Majul Gandamra
Report); denying that the hospital was
attacked by the Maute
Group citing on-line news
articles of Philstar, Sunstar,
Inquirer, and Bombo Radyo. 232
2. that the Maute Group ambushed and Statements made by PNP
burned the Marawi Police Station Director General Ronald dela Rosa
(Proclamation No. 216 and the and Marawi City Mayor Majul
Report); Gandamra in the on-line news
reports of ABS-CBN News and
CNN Philippines 233 denying that
the Maute group occupied the
Marawi Police Station.
 3. that lawless armed groups likewise
ransacked the Landbank of the
Philippines and commandeered one
of its armored vehicles (Report);
Statement made by the bank
officials in the on-line news article
of Philstar 234 that the Marawi City
branch was not ransacked but
sustained damages from the
attacks.

4. that the Marawi Central Elementary Statements in the on-line

Pilot School was burned news article of Philstar 235 made
(Proclamation No. 216 and the by the Marawi City Schools Division
Report); Assistant Superintendent Ana
Alonto denying that the school was
burned and Department of
Education Assistant Secretary
Tonisito Umali stating that they have
not received any report of damage.

5. that the Maute Group attacked various Statement in the on-line

government facilities (Proclamation
No. 216 and the Report).
news article of Inquirer 236 made
by Marawi City Mayor Majul
Gandamra stating that the ASG and
the Maute Terror Groups have not
taken over any government facility
in Marawi City.

However, the so-called counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified news
articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the
contents thereof. It was not even shown that efforts were made to secure such affirmation
albeit the circumstances proved futile. As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are
hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus without any probative value, unless offered
for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. 237 This pronouncement
applies with equal force to the Cullamat Petition which likewise submitted online news
articles 238 as basis for their claim of insufficiency of factual basis.
 Again, it bears to reiterate that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus finds no
application in these cases. As long as there are other facts in the proclamation and the written
Report indubitably showing the presence of an actual invasion or rebellion and that public
safety requires the declaration and/or suspension, the finding of sufficiency of factual basis,
stands.
d) Ruling in Bedol v.
Commission on Elections not
applicable.
Petitioners, however, insist that in Bedol v. Commission on Elections, 239 news
reports may be admitted on grounds of relevance, trustworthiness, and necessity. Petitioners'
reliance on this case is misplaced. The Court in Bedol made it clear that the doctrine of
independent relevant statement, which is an exception to the hearsay rule, applies in cases
"where only the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof
is immaterial." 240 Here, the question is not whether such statements were made by Saber, et
al., but rather whether what they said are true. Thus, contrary to the view of petitioners, the
exception in Bedol finds no application here. CAacTH
e) There are other independent
facts which support the finding that,
more likely than not, rebellion exists
and that public safety requires it.
Moreover, the alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels
of the Report; along with these alleged false data is an arsenal of other independent facts
showing that more likely than not, actual rebellion exists, and public safety requires the
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. To be
precise, the alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are only five out of the several
statements bulleted in the President's Report. Notably, in the interpellation by Justice Francis
H. Jardeleza during the second day of the oral argument, petitioner Lagman admitted that he
was not aware or that he had no personal knowledge of the other incidents cited. 241 As it
thus stands, there is no question or challenge with respect to the reliability of the other
incidents, which by themselves are ample to preclude the conclusion that the President's
report is unreliable and that Proclamation No. 216 was without sufficient factual basis.
Verily, there is no credence to petitioners' claim that the bases for the President's
imposition of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus were mostly inaccurate,
simulated, false and/or hyperbolic.
X. Public safety requires the declaration of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao.

Invasion or rebellion alone may justify resort to the calling out power but definitely not
the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. For
a declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to be
valid, there must be a concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion and the public safety
requirement. In his Report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the
ASG and the Maute Group were directed not only against government forces or
establishments but likewise against civilians and their properties. 242 In addition and in
relation to the armed hostilities, bomb threats were issued; 243 road blockades and
checkpoints were set up; 244 schools and churches were burned; 245 civilian hostages were
taken and killed; 246 non-Muslims or Christians were targeted; 247 young male Muslims were
forced to join their group; 248 medical services and delivery of basic services were
hampered; 249 reinforcements of government troops and civilian movement were
hindered; 250 and the security of the entire Mindanao Island was compromised. 251
These particular scenarios convinced the President that the atrocities had already
escalated to a level that risked public safety and thus impelled him to declare martial law and
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In the last paragraph of his Report, the
President declared:
While the government is presently conducting legitimate operations to
address the on-going rebellion, if not the seeds of invasion, public safety
necessitates the continued implementation of martial law and the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao until such
time that the rebellion is completely quelled. 252
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the parameters for the declaration of martial
law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus have been properly and fully
complied with. Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual basis there being probable cause
to believe that rebellion exists and that public safety requires the martial law declaration and
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
XI. Whole of Mindanao

a) The overriding and

paramount concern of martial law is
the protection of the security of the
nation and the good and safety of the
public.
Considering the nation's and its people's traumatic experience of martial law under the
Marcos regime, one would expect the framers of the 1987 Constitution to stop at nothing
from not resuscitating the law. Yet it would appear that the constitutional writers
entertained no doubt about the necessity and practicality of such specie of extraordinary
power and thus, once again, bestowed on the Commander-in-Chief the power to
declare martial law albeit in its diluted form.
Indeed, martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus are necessary for the protection of the security of the nation; suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is "precautionary, and although it might [curtail] certain
rights of individuals, [it] is for the purpose of defending and protecting the security of the state
or the entire country and our sovereign people." 253 Commissioner Ople referred to the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as a "form of immobilization" or "as a
means of immobilizing potential internal enemies" "especially in areas like Mindanao." 254
Aside from protecting the security of the country, martial law also guarantees and
promotes public safety. It is worthy of mention that rebellion alone does not justify the
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; the public
safety requirement must likewise be present.
b) As Commander-in-Chief, the
President receives vital, relevant,
classified, and live information which
equip and assist him in making
decisions.
In Parts IX and X, the Court laid down the arsenal of facts and events that formed the
basis for Proclamation No. 216. For the President, the totality of facts and events, more likely
than not, shows that actual rebellion exists and that public safety requires the declaration
of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Otherwise stated,
the President believes that there is probable cause that actual rebellion exists and public
safety warrants the issuance of Proclamation No. 216. In turn, the Court notes that the
President, in arriving at such a conclusion, relied on the facts and events included in the
Report, which we find sufficient.
To be sure, the facts mentioned in the Proclamation and the Report are far from being
exhaustive or all-encompassing. At this juncture, it may not be amiss to state that as
Commander-in-Chief, the President has possession of documents and information classified
as "confidential," the contents of which cannot be included in the Proclamation or Report for
reasons of national security. These documents may contain information detailing the position
of government troops and rebels, stock of firearms or ammunitions, ground commands and
operations, names of suspects and sympathizers, etc. In fact, during the closed door session
held by the Court, some information came to light, although not mentioned in the Proclamation
or Report. But then again, the discretion whether to include the same in the Proclamation or
Report is the judgment call of the President. In fact, petitioners concede to this. During the
oral argument, petitioner Lagman admitted that "the assertion of facts [in the Proclamation
and Report] is the call of the President." 255
It is beyond cavil that the President can rely on intelligence reports and classified
documents. "It is for the President as [C]ommander-in-[C]hief of the Armed Forces to appraise
these [classified evidence or documents/]reports and be satisfied that the public safety
demands the suspension of the writ." 256 Significantly, respect to these so-called classified
documents is accorded even "when [the] authors of or witnesses to these documents may not
be revealed." 257 IAETDc
In fine, not only does the President have a wide array of information before him, he
also has the right, prerogative, and the means to access vital, relevant, and confidential data,
concomitant with his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
c) The Court has no machinery
or tool equal to that of the
Commander-in-Chief to ably and
properly assess the ground
conditions.
In contrast, the Court does not have the same resources available to the President.
However, this should not be considered as a constitutional lapse. On the contrary, this is in
line with the function of the Court, particularly in this instance, to determine the sufficiency of
factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. As thoroughly discussed in Part VIII, the determination
by the Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to the facts and information
mentioned in the Report and Proclamation. In fact, the Court, in David v. President
Macapagal-Arroyo, 258 cautioned not to "undertake an independent investigation beyond the
pleadings." In this regard, "the Court will have to rely on the fact-finding capabilities of the
[E]xecutive [D]epartment;" 259 in turn, the Executive Department will have to open its findings
to the Court, 260 which it did during the closed door session last June 15, 2017.
d) The 1987 Constitution
grants to the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, the discretion
to determine the territorial coverage
or application of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states that "[i]n case of invasion or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it, [the President] may x x x suspend the privilege of writ
of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law." Clearly,
the Constitution grants to the President the discretion to determine the territorial coverage
of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. He may put
the entire Philippines or only a part thereof under martial law.
This is both an acknowledgement and a recognition that it is the Executive
Department, particularly the President as Commander-in-Chief, who is the repository of vital,
classified, and live information necessary for and relevant in calibrating the territorial
application of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It,
too, is a concession that the President has the tactical and military support, and thus has a
more informed understanding of what is happening on the ground. Thus, the Constitution
imposed a limitation on the period of application, which is 60 days, unless sooner nullified,
revoked or extended, but not on the territorial scope or area of coverage; it merely stated "the
Philippines or any part thereof," depending on the assessment of the President.
e) The Constitution has
provided sufficient safeguards against
possible abuses of Commander-in-
Chief's powers; further curtailment of
Presidential powers should not only
be discouraged but also avoided.
Considering the country's history, it is understandable that the resurgence of martial
law would engender apprehensions among the citizenry. Even the Court as an institution
cannot project a stance of nonchalance. However, the importance of martial law in the context
of our society should outweigh one's prejudices and apprehensions against it. The
significance of martial law should not be undermined by unjustified fears and past experience.
After all, martial law is critical and crucial to the promotion of public safety, the preservation of
the nation's sovereignty and ultimately, the survival of our country. It is vital for the protection
of the country not only against internal enemies but also against those enemies lurking from
beyond our shores. As such, martial law should not be cast aside, or its scope and potency
limited and diluted, based on bias and unsubstantiated assumptions.
Conscious of these fears and apprehensions, the Constitution placed several
safeguards which effectively watered down the power to declare martial law. The 1987
Constitution "[clipped] the powers of [the] Commander-in-Chief because of [the] experience
with the previous regime." 261 Not only were the grounds limited to actual invasion or
rebellion, but its duration was likewise fixed at 60 days, unless sooner revoked, nullified, or
extended; at the same time, it is subject to the veto powers of the Court and Congress.
Commissioner Monsod, who, incidentally, is a counsel for the Mohamad Petition, even
exhorted his colleagues in the Constitutional Convention to look at martial law from a new
perspective by elaborating on the sufficiency of the proposed safeguards:
MR. MONSOD. x x x
Second, we have been given a spectre of non sequitur, that the mere
declaration of martial law for a fixed period not exceeding 60 days, which
is subject to judicial review, is going to result in numerous violations of
human rights, the predominance of the military forever and in untold
sufferings. Madam President, we are talking about invasion and rebellion.
We may not have any freedom to speak of after 60 days, if we put as a
precondition the concurrence of Congress. That might prevent the
President from acting at that time in order to meet the problem. So I would
like to suggest that, perhaps, we should look at this in its proper
perspective. We are only looking at a very specific case. We are only
looking at a case of the first 60 days at its maximum. And we are looking
 at actual invasion and rebellion, and there are other safeguards in those
cases. 262
Even Bishop Bacani was convinced that the 1987 Constitution has enough safeguards
against presidential abuses and commission of human rights violations. In voting yes for the
elimination of the requirement of prior concurrence of Congress, Bishop Bacani stated, viz.:
BISHOP BACANI.
Yes, just two sentences. The reason I vote yes is that despite my concern for
human rights, I believe that a good President can also safeguard human
rights and human lives as well. And I do not want to unduly emasculate
the powers of the President. x x x 263
Commissioner De los Reyes shared the same sentiment, to wit:
MR. DE LOS REYES.
May I explain my vote, Madam President.
x x x The power of the President to impose martial law is doubtless of a very
high and delicate nature. A free people are naturally jealous of the
exercise of military power, and the power to impose martial law is
certainly felt to be one of no ordinary magnitude. But as presented by the
Committee, there are many safeguards: 1) it is limited to 60 days; 2)
Congress can revoke it; 3) the Supreme Court can still review as to the
sufficiency of factual basis; and 4) it does not suspend the operation of
the Constitution. To repeat what I have quoted when I interpellated
Commissioner Monsod, it is said that the power to impose martial law is
dangerous to liberty and may be abused. All powers may be abused if
placed in unworthy hands. But it would be difficult, we think, to point
out any other hands in which this power will be more safe and at the
same time equally effectual. When citizens of the State are in arms
against each other and the constituted authorities are unable to execute
the laws, the action of the President must be prompt or it is of little value.
x x x 264 (Emphasis supplied)
At this juncture, it bears to stress that it was the collective sentiment of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution that sufficient safeguards against possible misuse and abuse by the
Commander-in-Chief of his extraordinary powers are already in place and that no further
emasculation of the presidential powers is called for in the guise of additional safeguards. The
Constitution recognizes that any further curtailment, encumbrance, or emasculation of the
presidential powers would not generate any good among the three co-equal branches, and to
the country and its citizens as a whole. Thus: DcHSEa
MR. OPLE.
The reason for my concern, Madam President, is that when we put all of
these encumbrances on the President and Commander-in-Chief
during an actual invasion or rebellion, given an intractable
Congress that may be dominated by opposition parties, we may be
actually impelling the President to use the sword of Alexander to
cut the Gordian knot by just declaring a revolutionary government
that sets him free to deal with the invasion or the insurrection. x x
x 265 (Emphasis supplied)
f) Rebellion and public safety;
nature, scope, and range.
 It has been said that the "gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising
against the government;" 266 and that by nature, "rebellion is x x x a crime of masses or
multitudes, involving crowd action, that cannot be confined a priori, within predetermined
bounds." 267 We understand this to mean that the precise extent or range of the rebellion
could not be measured by exact metes and bounds.
To illustrate: A contingent armed with high-powered firearms publicly assembled in
Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila where the Court's compound is situated. They overpowered the
guards, entered the Court's premises, and hoisted the ISIS flag. Their motive was political, i.e.,
they want to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine government a part of the territory of
the Philippines, particularly the Court's compound and establish it as an ISIS-territory.
Based on the foregoing illustration, and vis-à-vis the nature of the crime of rebellion,
could we validly say that the rebellion is confined only within the Court's compound? Definitely
not. The possibility that there are other rebels positioned in the nearby buildings or compound
of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) or the Manila Science High School (MSHS) could
not be discounted. There is no way of knowing that all participants in the rebellion went and
stayed inside the Court's compound.
Neither could it be validly argued that the armed contingent positioned in PGH or
MSHS is not engaged in rebellion because there is no publicity in their acts as, in fact, they
were merely lurking inside the compound of PGH and MSHS. However, it must be pointed out
that for the crime of rebellion to be consummated, it is not required that all armed participants
should congregate in one place, in this case, the Court's compound, and publicly rise in arms
against the government for the attainment of their culpable purpose. It suffices that a portion of
the contingent gathered and formed a mass or a crowd and engaged in an armed public
uprising against the government. Similarly, it cannot be validly concluded that the grounds on
which the armed public uprising actually took place should be the measure of the extent,
scope or range, of the actual rebellion. This is logical since the other rebels positioned in PGH,
MSHS, or elsewhere, whose participation did not involve the publicity aspect of rebellion, may
also be considered as engaging in the crime of rebellion.
Proceeding from the same illustration, suppose we say that the President, after finding
probable cause that there exists actual rebellion and that public safety requires it,
declares martial law and suspends the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Metro Manila,
could we then say that the territorial coverage of the proclamation is too expansive?
To answer this question, we revert back to the premise that the discretion to determine
the territorial scope of martial law lies with the President. The Constitution grants him the
prerogative whether to put the entire Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. There
is no constitutional edict that martial law should be confined only in the particular place where
the armed public uprising actually transpired. This is not only practical but also logical. Martial
law is an urgent measure since at stake is the nation's territorial sovereignty and survival. As
such, the President has to respond quickly. After the rebellion in the Court's compound, he
need not wait for another rebellion to be mounted in Quezon City before he could
impose martial law thereat. If that is the case, then the President would have to wait until every
remote corner in the country is infested with rebels before he could declare martial law in
the entire Philippines. For sure, this is not the scenario envisioned by the Constitution.
Going back to the illustration above, although the President is not required to
impose martial law only within the Court's compound because it is where the armed public
uprising actually transpired, he may do so if he sees fit. At the same time, however, he is not
precluded from expanding the coverage of martial law beyond the Court's compound. After
all, rebellion is not confined within predetermined bounds.
Public safety, which is another component element for the declaration of martial law,
"involves the prevention of and protection from events that could endanger the safety of the
general public from significant danger, injury/harm, or damage, such as crimes or
disasters." 268 Public safety is an abstract term; it does not take any physical form. Plainly,
its range, extent or scope could not be physically measured by metes and bounds.
Perhaps another reason why the territorial scope of martial law should not necessarily
be limited to the particular vicinity where the armed public uprising actually transpired, is
because of the unique characteristic of rebellion as a crime. "The crime of rebellion consists
of many acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts
committed in furtherance of rebellion[,] though crimes in themselves[,] are deemed absorbed
in one single crime of rebellion." 269 Rebellion absorbs "other acts committed in its
pursuance." 270 Direct assault, 271 murder, 272 homicide, 273 arson, 274 robbery, 275 and
kidnapping, 276 just to name a few, are absorbed in the crime of rebellion if committed in
furtherance of rebellion; "[i]t cannot be made a basis of a separate charge." 277 Jurisprudence
also teaches that not only common crimes may be absorbed in rebellion but also "offenses
under special laws [such as Presidential Decree No. 1829] 278 which are perpetrated in
furtherance of the political offense." 279 "All crimes, whether punishable under a special law
or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance
thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as
separate crimes in themselves." 280
Thus, by the theory of absorption, the crime of murder committed in Makati City, if
committed in furtherance of the crime of rebellion being hypothetically staged in Padre Faura,
Ermita, Manila, is stripped of its common complexion and is absorbed in the crime of rebellion.
This all the more makes it difficult to confine the application of martial law only to the place
where the armed public uprising is actually taking place. In the illustration above, Padre Faura
could only be the nerve center of the rebellion but at the same time rebellion is also happening
in Makati City.
In fine, it is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial scope of martial law in direct
proportion to the "range" of actual rebellion and public safety simply because rebellion and
public safety have no fixed physical dimensions. Their transitory and abstract nature defies
precise measurements; hence, the determination of the territorial scope of martial law could
only be drawn from arbitrary, not fixed, variables. The Constitution must have considered
these limitations when it granted the President wide leeway and flexibility in determining the
territorial scope of martial law.
Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and public safety is not limited only
to the place where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other areas where the present
hostilities are in danger of spilling over. It is not intended merely to prevent the escape of
lawless elements from Marawi City, but also to avoid enemy reinforcements and to cut their
supply lines coming from different parts of Mindanao. Thus, limiting the proclamation and/or
suspension to the place where there is actual rebellion would not only defeat the purpose of
declaring martial law, it will make the exercise thereof ineffective and useless.
g) The Court must stay within
the confines of its power.
The Court can only act within the confines of its power. For the Court to overreach is
to infringe upon another's territory. Clearly, the power to determine the scope of territorial
application belongs to the President. "The Court cannot indulge in judicial legislation without
violating the principle of separation of powers, and, hence, undermining the foundation of our
republican system." 281
To reiterate, the Court is not equipped with the competence and logistical machinery
to determine the strategical value of other places in the military's efforts to quell the rebellion
and restore peace. It would be engaging in an act of adventurism if it dares to embark on a
mission of deciphering the territorial metes and bounds of martial law. To be blunt about it,
hours after the proclamation of martial law none of the members of this Court could have
divined that more than ten thousand souls would be forced to evacuate to Iligan and Cagayan
de Oro and that the military would have to secure those places also; none of us could have
predicted that Cayamora Maute would be arrested in Davao City or that his wife Ominta
Romato Maute would be apprehended in Masiu, Lanao del Sur; and, none of us had an inkling
that the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) would launch an attack in Cotabato
City. The Court has no military background and technical expertise to predict that. In the same
manner, the Court lacks the technical capability to determine which part of Mindanao would
best serve as forward operating base of the military in their present endeavor in Mindanao.
Until now the Court is in a quandary and can only speculate whether the 60-day lifespan
of Proclamation No. 216 could outlive the present hostilities in Mindanao. It is on this score
that the Court should give the President sufficient leeway to address the peace and order
problem in Mindanao. SCaITA
Thus, considering the current situation, it will not serve any purpose if the President is
goaded into using "the sword of Alexander to cut the Gordian knot" 282 by attempting to
impose another encumbrance; after all, "the declaration of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is essentially an executive act." 283
Some sectors, impelled perhaps by feelings of patriotism, may wish to subdue, rein in,
or give the President a nudge, so to speak, as some sort of a reminder of the nation's
experience under the Marcos-styled martial law. However, it is not fair to judge President
Duterte based on the ills some of us may have experienced during the Marcos-martial law era.
At this point, the Court quotes the insightful discourse of Commissioner Ople:
MR. OPLE. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
Madam President, there is a tendency to equate patriotism with
rendering the executive branch of the government impotent, as though by
reducing drastically the powers of the executive, we are rendering a service to
human welfare. I think it is also important to understand that the extraordinary
measures contemplated in the Article on the Executive pertain to a practical
state of war existing in this country when national security will become a
common bond of patriotism of all Filipinos, especially if it is an actual invasion
or an actual rebellion, and the President may have to be given a minimum
flexibility to cope with such unprecedented threats to the survival of a nation. I
think the Commission has done so but at the same time has not, in any manner,
shunned the task of putting these powers under a whole system of checks and
balances, including the possible revocation at any time of a proclamation
of martial law by the Congress, and in any case a definite determination of
these extraordinary powers, subject only to another extension to be determined
by Congress in the event that it is necessary to do so because the emergency
persists.
So, I think this Article on the Executive for which I voted is
completely responsible; it is attuned to the freedom and the rights of the
citizenry. It does not render the presidency impotent and, at the same
time, it allows for a vigorous representation of the people through their
Congress when an emergency measure is in force and effect. 284
h) Several local armed groups
have formed linkages aimed at
committing rebellion and acts in
furtherance thereof in the whole of
Mindanao.
 With a predominantly Muslim population, Marawi City is "the only Islamic City of the
South." 285 On April 15, 1980, it was conferred the official title of "Islamic City of
Marawi." 286 The city's first name, "Dansalan," "was derived from the word 'dansal,' meaning
a destination point or rendezvous. Literally, it also means arrival or coming." 287 Marawi lies
in the heart of Mindanao. In fact, the Kilometer Zero marker in Mindanao is found in Marawi
City thereby making Marawi City the point of reference of all roads in Mindanao.
Thus, there is reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is only the staging point of the
rebellion, both for symbolic and strategic reasons. Marawi may not be the target but the whole
of Mindanao. As mentioned in the Report, "[l]awless armed groups have historically used
provinces adjoining Marawi City as escape routes, supply lines, and backdoor
passages;" 288 there is also the plan to establish a wilayat in Mindanao by staging the siege
of Marawi. The report that prior to May 23, 2017, Abdullah Maute had already dispatched
some of his men to various places in Mindanao, such as Marawi, Iligan, and Cagayan de Oro
for bombing operations, carnapping, and the murder of military and police
personnel, 289 must also be considered. Indeed, there is some semblance of truth to the
contention that Marawi is only the start, and Mindanao the end.
Other events also show that the atrocities were not concentrated in Marawi City.
Consider these:
a. On January 13, 2017, an improvised explosive device (IED) exploded in
Barangay Campo Uno, Lamita City, Basilan. A civilian was killed while another
was wounded. 290
b. On January 19, 2017, the ASG kidnapped three Indonesians near Bakungan
Island, Taganak, Tawi-Tawi. 291
c. On January 29, 2017, the ASG detonated an IED in Barangay Danapah,
Albarka, Basilan resulting in the death of two children and the wounding of
three others. 292
d. From March to May 2017, there were eleven (11) separate instances of IED
explosions by the BIFF in Mindanao. These resulted in the death and wounding
of several personalities. 293
e. On February 26, 2017, the ASG beheaded its kidnap victim, Juergen
Kantner in Sulu. 294
f. On April 11, 2017, the ASG infiltrated Inabaga, Bohol resulting in firefights
between rebels and government troops. 295
g. On April 13, 2017, the ASG beheaded Filipino kidnap victim Noel
Besconde. 296
h. On April 20, 2017, the ASG kidnapped SSg. Anni Siraji and beheaded him
three days later. 297
There were also intelligence reports from the military about offensives committed by
the ASG and other local rebel groups. All these suggest that the rebellion in Marawi has
already spilled over to other parts of Mindanao.
Moreover, considering the widespread atrocities in Mindanao and the linkages
established among rebel groups, the armed uprising that was initially staged in Marawi cannot
be justified as confined only to Marawi. The Court therefore will not simply disregard the
events that happened during the Davao City bombing, the Mamasapano massacre, the
Zamboanga City siege, and the countless bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and
Basilan, among others. 298 The Court cannot simply take the battle of Marawi in isolation. As
a crime without predetermined bounds, the President has reasonable basis to believe that the
declaration of martial law, as well as the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the whole of Mindanao, is most necessary, effective, and called for by the
circumstances.
i) Terrorism neither negates
nor absorbs rebellion.
It is also of judicial notice that the insurgency in Mindanao has been ongoing for
decades. While some groups have sought legal and peaceful means, others have resorted to
violent extremism and terrorism. Rebellion may be subsumed under the crime of terrorism,
which has a broader scope covering a wide range of predicate crimes. In fact, rebellion is only
one of the various means by which terrorism can be committed. 299 However, while the scope
of terrorism may be comprehensive, its purpose is distinct and well-defined. The objective of
a "terrorist" is to sow and create a condition of widespread fear among the populace in order
to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand. This condition of widespread fear
is traditionally achieved through bombing, kidnapping, mass killing, and beheading, among
others. In contrast, the purpose of rebellion, as previously discussed, is political, i.e., (a) to
remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the
Philippines or any part thereof; (ii) any body of land, naval, or armed forces; or (b) to deprive
the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.
In determining what crime was committed, we have to look into the main objective of
the malefactors. If it is political, such as for the purpose of severing the allegiance of Mindanao
to the Philippine Government to establish a wilayat therein, the crime is rebellion. If, on the
other hand, the primary objective is to sow and create a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in order to coerce the government to give
in to an unlawful demand, the crime is terrorism. Here, we have already explained and ruled
that the President did not err in believing that what is going on in Marawi City is one
contemplated under the crime of rebellion.
In any case, even assuming that the insurgency in Marawi City can also be
characterized as terrorism, the same will not in any manner affect Proclamation No. 216.
Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of
2007 expressly provides that "[n]othing in this Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment,
restriction or diminution of constitutionally recognized powers of the executive branch of the
government." Thus, as long as the President complies with all the requirements of Section 18,
Article VII, the existence of terrorism cannot prevent him from exercising his extraordinary
power of proclaiming martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
After all, the extraordinary powers of the President are bestowed on him by the Constitution.
No act of Congress can, therefore, curtail or diminish such powers. aTHCSE
Besides, there is nothing in Art. 134 of the RPC and RA 9372 which states that
rebellion and terrorism are mutually 300
Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region.
At the end of the day, however ardently and passionately we may believe in the validity
or correctness of the varied and contentious causes or principles that we espouse, advocate
or champion, let us not forget that at this point in time we, the Filipino people, are confronted
with a crisis of such magnitude and proportion that we all need to summon the spirit of unity
and act as one undivided nation, if we are to overcome and prevail in the struggle at hand.
Let us face up to the fact that the siege in Marawi City has entered the second month
and only God or Allah knows when it would end. Let us take notice of the fact that the
casualties of the war are mounting. To date, 418 have died. Out of that were 303 Maute rebels
as against 71 government troops and 44 civilians.
 Can we not sheathe our swords and pause for a while to bury our dead, including our
differences and prejudices?
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance
of Proclamation No. 216 and DECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly, the
consolidated Petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774, [July 4, 2017], 812 PHIL 179-
853)

EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. L-6355-56. August 31, 1953.]

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees, vs.
SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.

Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro for appellant.
Manuel O. Chan for appellees.
SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; TAXATION; INTERPRETATION OF LAWS, A JUDICIAL

FUNCTION. — The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the
salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the
Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise. "Defining and interpreting the law is a
judicial function and the legislative branch may not limit or restrict the power granted to the
courts by the Constitution." (Bandy vs. Mickelson et al., 44 N.W., 2nd, 341, 342; see also 11
Am. Jur., 714- 715 and 905.) The act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the
Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the
Judiciary.
2. ID.; SEPARATION OF POWERS. — Under our system of constitutional
government, the Legislative department is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The
Executive department is charged with the execution or carrying out of the provisions of said
laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial
department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution.
Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret
and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the
Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there
is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
3. TAXATION; INCOME TAX; TAXING SALARIES OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS, A
DIMINUTION OF THEIR COMPENSATION AS FIXED BY LAW. — The doctrine laid down in
the case of Perfecto vs. Meer (85 Phil., 552) to the effect that the collection of income tax on
the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution, is
reiterated.
DECISION

MONTEMAYOR, J p:
 This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring
section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant
Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to refund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia the
sum of P1,744.45, representing the income tax collected on his salary as Associate Justice
of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46,
representing the income tax collected on his salary from January 1, 1950 to October 19, 1950,
as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to December 31,
1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, without special pronouncement as to costs.
Because of the similarity of the two cases, involving as they do the same question of
law, they were jointly submitted for determination in the lower court. Judge Higinio B.
Macadaeg presiding, in a rather exhaustive and well considered decision found and held that
under the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the
collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a
diminution of their compensation and therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the
Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes.
We see no profit and necessity in again discussing and considering the proposition
and the arguments pro and con involved in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, which are
raised, brought up and presented here. In that case, we have held despite the ruling
enunciated by the United States Federal Supreme Court in the case of
O'Malley vs. Woodrought 307 U. S., 277, that taxing the salary of a judicial officer in the
Philippines is a diminution of such salary and so violates the Constitution. We shall now
confine ourselves to a discussion and determination of the remaining question of whether or
not Republic Act No. 590, particularly section 13, can justify and legalize the collection of
income tax on the salary of judicial officers.
According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of
Internal Revenue, our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received
favorably by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation, Congress
enacted Republic Act No. 590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduces what
he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which
became Republic Act No. 590.
For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 9, Article VIII of our
Constitution:
"SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior
courts shall hold office during good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy
years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. They shall
receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office. Until the Congress shall provide
otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual
compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen
thousand pesos."
As already stated construing and applying the above constitutional provision, we held
in the Perfecto case that judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax on their
salaries, because the collection thereof by the Government was a decrease or diminution of
their salaries during their continuance in office, a thing which is expressly prohibited by the
Constitution. Thereafter, according to the Solicitor General, because Congress did not
favorably receive the decision in the Perfecto case, Congress promulgated Republic Act No.
590, if not to counteract the ruling in that decision, at least now to authorize and legalize the
collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers. We quote section 13 of Republic
Act No. 590:
"SEC. 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of
the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which
 is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution
or by law."
So we have this situation. The Supreme Court in a decision interpreting the
Constitution, particularly section 9, Article VIII, has held that judicial officers are exempt from
payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection thereof was a diminution of
such salaries, specifically prohibited by the Constitution. Now comes the Legislature and in
section 13, Republic Act No. 590, says that "no salary wherever received by any public officer
of the Republic (naturally including a judicial officer) shall be considered as exempt from the
income tax," and proceeds to declare that payment of said income tax is not a diminution of
his compensation. Can the Legislature validly do this? May the Legislature lawfully declare
the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a
decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise? To
determine this question, we shall have to go back to the fundamental principles regarding
separation of powers.
Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned
the power to make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution
or carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said
laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply
the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is
constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law,
but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict
between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared
invalid and unconstitutional.
"Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative
branch may not limit or restrict the power granted to the courts by the
Constitution." (Bandy vs. Mickelson et al., 44 N. W., 2nd 341, 342.)
"When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the
legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act
unconstitutional because they cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths
of office. This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental
law of the state is imperative and unceasing; and, as Chief Justice Marshall said,
whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law, the courts must so
adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Any other course would lead
to the destruction of the Constitution. Since the question as to the
constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter, the courts will not decline the
exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action might be taken by political
agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals." 11 Am. Jur., 714-
715.)
"Under the American system of constitutional government, among the
most important functions intrusted to the judiciary are the interpreting of
Constitutions and, as a closely connected power, the determination of whether
laws and acts of the legislature are or are not contrary to the provisions of the
Federal and State Constitutions." (11 Am. Jur., 905.)
By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress says
that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear
example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office," found in section 9, Article VIII of the
Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution
or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established
province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
 "The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any
declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as
to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as
used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise,
the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. (11 Am.
Jur., 914, emphasis supplied).
"The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a
constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the
courts, by a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the
constitutional inhibition." (11 Am. Jur., 919, emphasis supplied).
We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned
the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true
with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the
sphere of the Legislative department. If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or
what a specific portion of the Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual
case ascertain its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely
cause confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a
system, a final court determination of a case based on a judicial interpretation of the law or of
the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and different
interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative department. That would be
neither wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative of the fundamental principles of our
constitutional system of government, particularly those governing the separation of powers.
So much for the constitutional aspect of the case. Considering the practical side
thereof, we believe that the collection of income tax on a salary is an actual and evident
diminution thereof. Under the old system where the income tax was paid at the end of the
year or sometime thereafter, the decrease may not be so apparent and clear. All that the
official who had previously received his full salary was called upon to do, was to fulfill his
obligation and to exercise his privilege of paying his income tax on his salary. His salary fixed
by law was received by him in full, and when he later pays his income tax, especially when
the amount of said tax comes from his other sources of income, he may not fully realize the
fact that his salary had been decreased in the amount of said income tax. But under the
present system of withholding the income tax at the source, where the full amount of the
income tax corresponding to his salary is computed in advance and divided into equal portions
corresponding to the number of paydays during the year and actually deducted from his salary
corresponding to each payday, said official actually does not receive his salary in full, because
the income tax is deducted therefrom every payday, that is to say, twice a month. Let us take
the case of Justice Endencia. As Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, his salary is fixed
at P12,000 a year, that is to say, he should receive P1,000 a month or P500 every payday,
— fifteenth and end of month. In the present case, the amount collected by the Collector of
Internal Revenue on said salary is P1,744.45 for one year. Divided by twelve (months) we
shall have P145.37 a month. And further dividing it by two paydays will bring it down to
P72.685, which is the income tax deducted from and collected on his salary each half month.
So, if Justice Endencia's salary as a judicial officer were not exempt from payment of the
income tax, instead of receiving P500 every payday, he would be actually receiving P427.31
only, and instead of receiving P12,000 a year, he would be receiving but P10,255.55. Is it not
therefore clear that every payday, his salary is actually decreased by P72.685 and every year
is decreased by P1,744.45?
Reading the discussion in the lower House in connection with House Bill No. 1127,
which became Republic Act No. 590, it would seem that one of the main reasons behind the
enactment of the law was the feeling among certain legislators that members of the Supreme
Court should not enjoy any exemption and that as citizens, out of patriotism and love for their
country, they should pay income tax on their salaries. It might be stated in this connection that
the exemption is not enjoyed by the members of the Supreme Court alone but also by all
judicial officers including Justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of inferior courts. The
exemption also extends to other constitutional officers, like the President of the Republic, the
Auditor General, the members of the Commission on Elections, and possibly members of the
Board of Tax Appeals, commissioners of the Public Service Commission, and judges of the
Court of Industrial Relations. Compared to the number of all these officials, that of the
Supreme Court Justices is relatively insignificant. There are more than 990 other judicial
officers enjoying the exemption, including 15 Justices of the Court of Appeals, about 107
Judges of First Instance, 38 Municipal Judges and about 830 Justices of the Peace. The
reason behind the exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal
Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not only of
this High Tribunal but of the other courts, whose present membership number more than 990
judicial officials.
The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit judicial officers, but was grounded
on public policy. As said by Justice Van Devanter of the United States Supreme Court in the
case of Evans vs. Gore (253 U. S., 245):
"The primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was not to
benefit the judges, but, like the clause in respect of tenure, to attract good and
competent men to the bench and to promote that independence of action and
judgment which is essential to the maintenance of the guaranties, limitations and
pervading principles of the Constitution and to the administration of justice
without respect to persons and with equal concern for the poor and the rich. Such
being its purpose, it is to be construed, not as a private grant, but as a limitation
imposed in the public interest; in other words, not restrictively, but in accord with
its spirit and the principle on which it proceeds."
Having in mind the limited number of judicial officers in the Philippines enjoying this
exemption, especially when the great bulk thereof are justices of the peace, many of them
receiving, as low as P200 a month, and considering further the other exemptions allowed by
the income tax law, such as P3,000 for a married person and P600 for each dependent, the
amount of national revenue to be derived from income tax on the salaries of judicial officers,
were if not for the constitutional exemption, could not be large or substantial. But even if it
were otherwise, it should not affect, much less outweigh the purpose and the considerations
that prompted the establishment of the constitutional exemption. In the same case of
Evans vs. Gore, supra, the Federal Supreme Court declared "that they (fathers of the
Constitution) regarded the independence of the judges as of far greater importance than any
revenue that could come from taxing their salaries."
When a judicial officer assumes office, he does not exactly ask for exemption from
payment of income tax on his salary, as a privilege. It is already attached to his office, provided
and secured by the fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on public interest,
to secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought and action. When we come to
the members of the Supreme Court, this exemption to them is relatively of short duration.
Because of the limited membership in this High Tribunal, eleven, and due to the high
standards of experience, practice and training required, one generally enters its portals and
comes to join its membership quite late in life, on the average, around his sixtieth year, and
being required to retire at seventy, assuming that he does not die or become incapacitated
earlier, naturally he is not in a position to receive the benefit of exemption for long. It is rather
to the justices of the peace that the exemption can give more benefit. They are relatively more
numerous, and because of the meager salary they receive, they can less afford to pay the
income tax on it and its diminution by the amount of the income tax if paid would be real,
substantial and onerous.
Considering exemption in the abstract, there is nothing unusual or abhorrent in it, as
long as it is based on public policy or public interest. While all other citizens are subject to
 arrest when charged with the commission of a crime, members of the Senate and House of
Representatives except in cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace are exempt from
arrest, during their attendance in the session of the Legislature; and while all other citizens
are generally liable for any speech, remark or statement, oral or written, tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person or to blacken the memory of
one who is dead, Senators and Congressmen in making such statements during their
sessions are extended immunity and exemption.
And as to tax exemption, there are not a few citizens who enjoy this exemption.
Persons, natural and juridical, are exempt from taxes on their lands, buildings and
improvements thereon when used exclusively for educational purposes, even if they derive
income therefrom. (Art. VI, Sec. 22 [3].) Holders of government bonds are exempted from the
payment of taxes on the income or interest they receive therefrom (sec. 29 (b) [4], National
Internal Revenue Code as amended by Republic Act No. 566). Payments or income received
by any person residing in the Philippines under the laws of the United States administered by
the United States Veterans Administration are exempt from taxation. (Republic Act No. 360).
Funds received by officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Army who served in the Armed
Forces of the United States, allowances earned by virtue of such services corresponding to
the taxable years 1942 to 1945, inclusive, are exempted from income tax. (Republic Act No.
210). The payment of wages and allowances of officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines sent to Korea are also exempted from taxation. (Republic Act No. 815). New
and necessary industries are also exempted from taxation for a certain number of years.
(Republic Act No. 35). In other words, for reasons of public policy and public interest, a citizen
may justifiably by constitutional provision or statute be exempted from his ordinary obligation
of paying taxes on his income. Under the same public policy and perhaps for the same it not
higher considerations, the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise and necessary to
exempt judicial officers from paying taxes on their salaries so as not to decrease their
compensation, thereby insuring the independence of the Judiciary.

In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of

Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a
judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. We further hold that the
interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive
province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature
may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a
Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting
said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter
to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes and Labrador, JJ., concur.
||| (Endencia v. David, G.R. Nos. L-6355-56, [August 31, 1953], 93 PHIL 696-708)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 203766. April 2, 2013.]

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan
Igot, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

||| (Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 203766, 203818-19, 203922 &
etc., [April 2, 2013], 707 PHIL 454-753)
The Issues
 We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating
in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under
the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations; and second, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down
in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency v. Commission on Elections 49 (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in
the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
The Court's Ruling
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following
prevailing decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13
May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters
in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby
abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we
remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are
qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
The Party-List System
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply
put, the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that
cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives. 50 The voter elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one
for his or her legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of choice.
The 1987 Constitution provides: cCTESa
Section 5, Article VI
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of
the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector.
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition
shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided
in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under
the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards,
boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies.
However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
 Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed
that "the party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral
representation." 51 The constitutional provisions on the party-list system should be read in light
of the following discussion among its framers: SEDaAH
MR. MONSOD:
....
I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal
for the party list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral
representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the
dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the members of the
sectors. In making the proposal on the party list system, we were made
aware of the problems precisely cited by Commissioner Bacani of which
sectors will have reserved seats. In effect, a sectoral representation in
the Assembly would mean that certain sectors would have reserved
seats; that they will choose among themselves who would sit in those
reserved seats. And then, we have the problem of which sector because
as we will notice in Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were the
farmers, fishermen, workers, students, professionals, business, military,
academic, ethnic and other similar groups. So these are the nine sectors
that were identified here as "sectoral representatives" to be represented
in this Commission. The problem we had in trying to approach sectoral
representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors
or include other sectors. And we went through the exercise in a caucus
of which sector should be included which went up to 14 sectors. And as
we all know, the longer we make our enumeration, the more limiting the
law become because when we make an enumeration we exclude those
who are not in the enumeration. Second, we had the problem of who
comprise the farmers. Let us just say the farmers and the laborers. These
days, there are many citizens who are called "hyphenated citizens." A
doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up
to the discretion of the person to say "I am a farmer" so he would be
included in that sector.
The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of
sectoral representation in the Assembly, we are, in effect, giving some
people two votes and other people one vote. We sought to avoid these
problems by presenting a party list system. Under the party list system,
there are no reserved seats for sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers
can form a sectoral party or a sectoral organization that will then register
and present candidates of their party. How do the mechanics go?
Essentially, under the party list system, every voter has two votes, so
there is no discrimination. First, he will vote for the representative of his
legislative district. That is one vote. In that same ballot, he will be asked:
What party or organization or coalition do you wish to be represented in
the Assembly? And here will be attached a list of the parties,
organizations or coalitions that have been registered with
the COMELEC and are entitled to be put in that list. This can be a
regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or
a regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he
wants the farmers' party to be represented in the Assembly. Any citizen
can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the COMELEC will then
tabulate the votes that had been garnered by each party or each
 organization — one does not have to be a political party and register in
order to participate as a party — and count the votes and from there
derive the percentage of the votes that had been cast in favor of a party,
organization or coalition. ScCIaA
When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50
of the 250 seats will be for the party list system. So, we have a limit of 30
percent of 50. That means that the maximum that any party can get out
of these 50 seats is 15. When the parties register they then submit a list
of 15 names. They have to submit these names because these nominees
have to meet the minimum qualifications of a Member of the National
Assembly. At the end of the day, when the votes are tabulated, one gets
the percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets 10 percent or 15 percent of the
votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a women's party gets 2 1/2 percent and
anybody who has at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote qualifies and the 50
seats are apportioned among all of these parties who get at least 2 1/2
percent of the vote.
What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a
constituency of, say, 500,000 nationwide gets a seat in the National
Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we allocate legislative
districts, we are saying that any district that has 200,000 votes gets a
seat. There is no reason why a group that has a national constituency,
even if it is a sectoral or special interest group, should not have a voice
in the National Assembly. It also means that, let us say, there are three
or four labor groups, they all register as a party or as a group. If each of
them gets only one percent or five of them get one percent, they are not
entitled to any representative. So, they will begin to think that if they really
have a common interest, they should band together, form a coalition and
get five percent of the vote and, therefore, have two seats in the
Assembly. Those are the dynamics of a party list system.
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral
representation while at the same time making sure that those who really
have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to
have a seat in the National Assembly. These sectors or these groups
may not have the constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis.
They may not be able to win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will
have votes on a nationwide basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found
out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes
nationwide; have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were
always third place or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have
no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six
representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in
legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and
objectives of the party list system. EcHaAC
BISHOP BACANI:
Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak now of
party list system though we refer to sectors, we would be referring to
sectoral party list rather than sectors and party list?
MR. MONSOD:
 As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do not
even have to mention sectors because the sectors would be included in
the party list system. They can be sectoral parties within the party list
system.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the
party list system because we wanted to open up the political system to a
pluralistic society through a multiparty system. . . . We are for opening
up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be
there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the
number of representatives from any single party that can sit within
the 50 allocated under the party list system. . . . . CcAHEI
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to
political parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for
example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political
parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they be
under the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA.
In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner
mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the
House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral
candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted,
of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD.
In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates
and can also participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA.
Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be
fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD.
May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list
system?
MR. VILLACORTA.
Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from
the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution.
MR. MONSOD.
Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says
that he represents the farmers, would he qualify? EaSCAH
MR. VILLACORTA.
No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD.
But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan
dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO.
Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political
parties, particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to
participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are
also organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD.
What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can
participate because it is precisely the contention of political parties that
they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are
represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO.
Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang
political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din
yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system.
Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa
marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din
ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD.
Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to
Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is
that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the
party list system? CDHaET
MR. VILLACORTA.
No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that
condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list
system.
MR. MONSOD.
May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO.
The same.
MR. VILLACORTA.
Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines. IcESaA
MR. MONSOD:
Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi
talagang labor leader or isang laborer? Halimbawa, abogado ito.
MR. TADEO:
 Iyong mechanics.
MR. MONSOD:
Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an inherent
problem of sectoral representation. My question is: Suppose UNIDO
fields a labor leader, would he qualify?
MR. TADEO:
The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a political
party is really organized along a specific sectoral line. If such is
verified or confirmed, the political party may submit a list of
individuals who are actually members of such sectors. The lists are
to be published to give individuals or organizations belonging to
such sector the chance to present evidence contradicting claims of
membership in the said sector or to question the claims of the
existence of such sectoral organizations or parties. This proceeding
shall be conducted by the COMELEC and shall be summary in
character. In other words, COMELEC decisions on this matter are
final and unappealable. 52 (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include
not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties
to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner
Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system "[F]or as long
as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall
designate in this Constitution." 53 DTAaCE
In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to sectoral
parties in the House of Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the party-list system
exclusively to sectoral parties. As clearly explained by Justice Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting
Opinion in Ang Bagong Bayani:
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5,
subsection (2), of the 1987 Constitution took off from two staunch positions —
the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 per
centum of the total seats in Congress to be allocated to party-list representatives
half were to be reserved to appointees from the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. The proposal was opposed by some Commissioners.
Mr. Monsod expressed the difficulty in delimiting the sectors that needed
representation. He was of the view that reserving seats for the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors would stunt their development into full-pledged parties
equipped with electoral machinery potent enough to further the sectoral interests
to be represented. The Villacorta group, on the other hand, was apprehensive
that pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral
contest would be like placing babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger
and more established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941
recognized this concern when it banned the first five major political parties on the
basis of party representation in the House of Representatives from participating
in the party-list system for the first party-list elections held in 1998 (and to be
automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The advocates for
permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort towards a
compromise — that the party-list system be open only to underrepresented and
marginalized sectors. This proposal was further whittled down by allocating only
half of the seats under the party-list system to candidates from the sectors which
 would garner the required number of votes. The majority was unyielding. Voting
19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in the alternative the
reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups, was voted
down. The only concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was an
assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors for three consecutive terms
after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by which time they would be
expected to gather and solidify their electoral base and brace themselves in the
multi-party electoral contest with the more veteran political
groups. 54 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was
outvoted. Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the
first three consecutive terms. 55 There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987
Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral
parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-
sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot
expect to win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least
the same number of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The
party-list system will be the entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for both
these non-traditional parties that could not compete in legislative district elections. TaDSHC
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list
system both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution, which states:
Section 5.(1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not
more that two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The commas
after the words "national[,]" and "regional[,]" separate national and regional parties from sectoral
parties. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at
the same time sectoral, they would have stated "national and regional sectoral parties." They did
not, precisely because it was never their intention to make the party-list system exclusively
sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5 (1), could not be
any clearer: the party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties
belong to only one of the three groups. The text of Section 5 (1) leaves no room for any doubt
that national and regional parties are separate from sectoral parties.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or
organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations.
National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and
need not represent any particular sector.
Moreover, Section 5 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first
three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of
the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and
such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly
shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious
reasons. ASETHC
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally
be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list
system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and
underrepresented." Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties
applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly
making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This
means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that
qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in
Section 5 (1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list
system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the
party-list system prescribed in the Constitution, provides:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. — (a) The party-list system is a
mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to
the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations
of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they
form part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general
conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of
securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its
leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical
territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its
constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the
cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of
groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics,
employment, interests or concerns. DCIEac
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national,
regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes.
(Emphasis supplied)
 Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral
party or a coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section
3 (c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a "political party refers to an organized group of
citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general
conduct of government." On the other hand, Section 3 (d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a
"sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a
sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and
regional parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented"
is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the
party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in
legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-
list system? To exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the
parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the
party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and
express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. aHcACT
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly
different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and
need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national
or regional political party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is
sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform,
or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as
citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals." 56 The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all
necessarily "marginalized and underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by definition
"marginalized and underrepresented," not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However,
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth may "lack well-defined political constituencies,"
and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy of the special interests and
concerns of their respective sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law
does not require national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of
R.A. No. 7941, to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Section 6 provides the
grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of parties or organizations after
due notice and hearing.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. —
The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested
party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association
organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
 (4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political
party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or
members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating
to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system
in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered. TcEaAS
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the
"marginalized and underrepresented."
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941,
in Section 2 on Declaration of Policy. 57 Section 2 seeks "to promote proportional representation
in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through the party-list system,"
which will enable Filipinos belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies," to become
members of the House of Representatives. While the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No.
7941 broadly refers to "marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,"
the specific implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require that the sectors,
organizations or parties must be "marginalized and underrepresented." On the contrary, to even
interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are "marginalized and underrepresented"
would lead to absurdities.
How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941
with its specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the 1987
Constitution on the matter?
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in
Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically "marginalized and
underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For
these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the
"marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees of the sectoral party either must
belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented.
Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean one must "wallow
in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle
class. More specifically, the economically "marginalized and underrepresented" are those who
fall in the low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination
Board. 58 TAaCED
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of
professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and
underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack "well-
defined political constituencies" a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the
other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of
society, will give the "marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats in
the House of Representatives.
 This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give
rise to a multi-party system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic
and ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the House of
Representatives. This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent,
eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as "wallowing
in poverty, destitution and infirmity," even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections.
Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack "well-
defined political constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors. Thus, the national or regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily
those that do not belong to major political parties. This automatically reserves the national
and regional parties under the party-list system to those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have members in the House of Representatives.
To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the
accreditation of parties under the party-list system, that "while even major political parties are
expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they
must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling 'Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the House of Representatives.'"
However, the requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its second guideline, that "the political party
. . . must represent the marginalized and underrepresented," automatically disqualified major
political parties from participating in the party-list system. This inherent inconsistency in Ang
Bagong Bayani has been compounded by the COMELEC's refusal to register sectoral wings
officially organized by major political parties. BANAT merely formalized the prevailing practice
when it expressly prohibited major political parties from participating in the party-list system,
even through their sectoral wings. STECDc
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the
Tenth Congress" from participating in the May 1988 party-list elections. 59 Thus, major political
parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is expressly
limited only to the 1988 party-list elections. However, major political parties should
participate in party-list elections only through their sectoral wings. The participation of
major political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are
"marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies,"
will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack
well-defined political constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in
party-list elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies
to the "marginalized and underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared
towards the entry, as members of the House of Representatives, of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them a voice
in law-making. Thus, to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields
candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list
system.
Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws,
platform or program of government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the
sector represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
major political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941,
which provides that "component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate
independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form part does not
participate in the party-list system."
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This
provision prescribes a special qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. — No person shall be
nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not
less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read
and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is
at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. aSTAcH
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five
(25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any
youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term
shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she
seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee
one must either belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy
for such sector.
In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those who desire
to participate in the party-list system:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in
Section 5 of RA 7941. . . .
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA
7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply
with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the House of
Representatives." . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Third, . . . the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list
system. . . . . cSCADE
xxx xxx xxx
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section
6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or
association, organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign
political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes;
 (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations
relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or
fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered."
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project
organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its
nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows: TCcIaA
"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. — No person
shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read
and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25)
years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be
twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of
the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the
expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must
represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its
nominees. . . . .
Eighth, . . . the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation
as a whole. (Emphasis supplied)
In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling
further. In BANAT, the majority officially excluded major political parties from participating in party-
list elections, 60 abandoning even the lip-service that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 that major political parties can participate in party-
list elections. TEacSA
The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in
the party-list system through their sectoral wings. The minority expressed that "[e]xcluding the
major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the
Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political
engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-
list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law." 61 The experimentations in socio-
political engineering have only resulted in confusion and absurdity in the party-list system. Such
experimentations, in clear contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now
come to an end.
We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in
disqualifying petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have
committed grave abuse of discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections,
we must now impose and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and
authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a new
formula in the allocation of party-list seats, reversing the COMELEC's allocation which followed
the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong Bayani. In BANAT, however, the Court did not declare
that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, even as we acknowledge here
that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, we declare that it would not be in
accord with the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT in determining who are qualified to participate in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule 62 that a party may appeal to
this Court from decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall
adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national
parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3)
sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not
need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register
under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative
district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields
candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-
list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register
under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition. cdtai
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It
is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and
underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies"
include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
"well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they
represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent
those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong
to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for
 their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they
have at least one nominee who remains qualified. THESAD
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those
that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or
organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and
(2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent.
Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties
they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent
may have been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors.
Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not
belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its
nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As
discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such
circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and
desist from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the
Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution.
Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because
petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-
list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have
been granted Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the names of
petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections only for
determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system under the
parameters prescribed in this Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013 party-
list elections. The 41 petitions, which have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the
names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections for
determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the parameters prescribed in this
Decision. The Commission on Elections may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for this
purpose. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 203766, 203818-19, 203922 &
etc., [April 2, 2013], 707 PHIL 454-753)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-6749. July 30, 1955.]

JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner-appellee, vs. EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, as
Director of Prisons, respondent-appellant.
 Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E.
Torres and Solicitor Jaime De Los Angeles for appellant.
Estanislao A. Fernandez and Roman B. Antonio for appellee.
SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEPARATION OF POWERS; ISSUANCE WHEN

JUDICIAL SUPREMACY MAY BE INVOKED. — The judicial department of the government
has no right or power or authority to review the findings of legislative bodies in the exercise of
the prerogative of legislation, or interfere with their proceedings or their discretion in what is
known as the legislative process, much in the same manner that the legislative department
may not invade the judicial realm in the ascertainment of truth and in the application of the
law, in what is known as the judicial process, because that would be in direct conflict with the
fundamental principle of separation of powers established by the Constitution. The only
instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoked are when there has been a
violation of a constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary exercise of the
legislative discretion.
2. ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS TO PUNISH RECALCITRANT WITNESSES. —
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses
is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to
the exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said power.
3. ID.; ID., ID.; LEGISLATURE'S AUTHORITY SUPREME COURT. — Provided the
contempt is related to the exercise of the legislature power and is committed in the course of
the legislature process, the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious
witness should be supreme, and unless there is a manifest and absolute disregard of
discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the each of constitutional
limitations the exercise of the authority is not subject to judicial interference. (Marshall vs.
Gordon, 61 L. ed. 881.).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGISLATIVE PROCESS DISTINGUISHED FROM JUDICIAL
PROCESS. — The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with by the legislature
in order to enable it to exercise its legislative power or authority must be distinguished from
the judicial process by which offenders are brought to courts of justice for the meting out of
the punishment which the criminal law imposes upon them. The former falls exclusively within
the legislative, the latter within the domain of the courts; because the former is a necessary
concomitant of the legislative power or process, While the latter has to do with the
enforcement and application of the criminal law.
5. ID.; ID.; PURGING OF CONTEMPT BY ANOTHER LIE IS REPETITION OF
OFFENSE. — No person guilty of contempt may purge himself by another lie or falsehood;
that would be a repetition of the offense. In the present case, the petitioner gave the name,
J.D.S., as that of the person to whom delivery of the sum of P440,000 was made. The Senate
Committee refused to believe, and justly, that that is the real name of the person whose
identity is being the subject of the injury. The Senate, therefore, held that the act of the
petitioner continued the original contempt, or reiterated it. Hence, the Senate resolution of
legislative power or an arbitrary exercise of legislative discretion.
DECISION

LABRADOR, J p:

This an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City
Branch, Honorable Jose F. Flores presiding, in habeas corpus proceeding, declaring that the
continued detention and confinement of Jean L. Arnault in the new Bilibid Prison, in pursuance
of Senate Resolution No. 114, dated November 8, 1952, is illegal, for the reason that the
Senate of the Philippines committed a clear abuse of discretion in considering his answer
naming one Jess D. Santos as the person to whom delivery of the sum of P440,000 was made
in the sale of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estate, as a refusal to answer the question
directed by the Senate committee to him, and on the further ground that said Jean L. Arnault,
by his answer, has purged himself of contempt and is consequently entitled to be released
and discharged.
Petitioner-appellee was an attorney in-fact of Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the
purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Government of the Philippines.
The purchase was effected on October 21, 1949 and the price paid for both estates was
P5,000,000. On February 27, 1950, the Senate of the Philippines adopted Resolution No. 8,
whereby it created a Special Committee to determine "whether the said purchase was honest,
valid and proper, and whether the price involved in the deal was fair and just, the parties
responsible therefor, any other facts the Committee may deem proper in the premises." In the
investigation conducted by the Committee in pursuance of said Resolution, petitioner-appellee
was asked to whom a part of the purchase price, or P440,000, was delivered. Petitioner-
appellee refused to answer this question, whereupon the Committee resolved on May 15,
1950, to order his commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the Philippines
Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison in Rizal until such time when he shall reveal
to the Senate or to the Special Committee the name of the person who received the P440,000
and to answer questions pertinent thereto. In G. R. No. L-3820, petitioner-appellee herein
questioned the validity of the confinement so ordered, by a petition for certiorari filed in this
Court. He contended that the Senate of the Philippines has no power to punish him for
contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he delivered the P440,000,
that the Legislature lacks authority to punish him for contempt beyond the term of the
legislative session, and that the question of the Senate which he refused to answer is an
incriminating question which the appellee is not bound to answer. All the above-mentioned
contentions were adversely passed upon by the decision of this Court, so his petition for
release was denied.
In the month of December, 1951, while still in confinement in Bilibid, petitioner-appellee
executed an affidavit, Exhibit A, wherein he gives in detail the history of his life, the events
surrounding the acquisition of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by Gen. Burt, the
supposed circumstances under which he met one by the name of Jess D. Santos. Upon the
presentation of the said affidavit to the said Senate Special Committee, the latter subjected
petitioner to questioning regarding the identity of Jess D. Santos, and after said investigation
and questioning the Committee adopted Resolution No. 114 on November 8, 1952. This
Resolution reads as follows:
"RESOLUTION APPROVING THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
TO INVESTIGATE THE BUENAVISTA AND TAMBOBONG ESTATES
DEAL, AND ORDERING THE DIRECTOR OF PRISON TO CONTINUE
HOLDING JEAN L. ARNAULT IN HIS CUSTODY, AND IN
CONFINEMENT AND DETENTION AT THE NEW BILIBID PRISON AT
MUNTINLUPA, RIZAL, UNTIL THE SAID ARNAULT SHALL HAVE
PURGED HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT OF THE SENATE.
"WHEREAS, on the 15th May 1950 the Senate of the Philippines,
transcending divisions of party and faction in the national interest, adopted a
Resolution ordering the detention and confinement of Jean L. Arnault at the New
Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa, Rizal, until he should have purged himself of
contempt of the Senate by revealing the person to whom he gave the sum of
P440,000 in connection with the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal, and
by answering other pertinent questions in connection therewith;
 "WHEREAS, after considering the lengthy testimony offered by the said
Jean L. Arnault, and the report thereon rendered by the Senate Special
Committee on the said deal, the Senate holds and finds that, despite numerous
and generous opportunities offered to him at his own instance and solicitation,
the said Jean L. Arnault has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse,
to reveal the person to whom he gave the said amount of P440,000, and to
answer other pertinent questions in connection with the Buenavista and
Tambobong estate deal;
"WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the situation of the said
Jean L. Arnault has not materially changed since he was committed to prison for
contempt of the Senate, and since the Supreme Court of the Philippines, in a
judgment long since become final, upheld the power and authority of the Senate
to hold the said Jean L. Arnault in custody, detention, and confinement, said
power and authority having been held to be coercive rather than punitive, and
fully justified until the said Jean L. Arnault should have given the information
which he had withheld and continues contumaciously to withhold;
"WHEREAS, the insolent and manifest untruthful statements made by the
said Jean L. Arnault on the occasions above referred to constitute a continuing
contempt of the Senate, and an added affront to its dignity and authority, such
that, were they to be condoned or over-looked, the power and authority of the
Senate to conduct investigations would become futile and ineffectual because
they could be defied by any person of sufficient stubbornness and malice;
"WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the identity of the person to
whom the said Jean L. Arnault gave the amount of P440,000 in connection with
the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and the further information which
the Senate requires and which the said Jean L. Arnault arrogantly and
contumaciously withholds, is required for the discharge of its legislative
functions, particularly so that adequate measures can be taken to prevent the
repetition of similar frauds upon the Government and the People of the
Philippines and to recover said amount; and
"WHEREAS, while not insensible to the appeal of understanding and
mercy, the Senate holds and finds that the said Jean L. Arnault, by his insolent
and contumacious defiance of the legitimate authority of the Senate, is trifling
with its proceedings, renders himself unworthy of mercy, and, in the language of
the Supreme Court, is his own jailer, because he could open the doors of his
prison at any time by revealing the truth; now therefore, be it.

"Resolved by the Senate of the Philippines, That the Senate hold and
find, as it hereby holds and finds, that Juan L. Arnault has not purged himself of
contempt of the Senate, and has in no way altered his situation since he has
committed to coercive not punitive, imprisonment for such contempt on the 15th
day of May, 1950; and that Senate order, as it hereby orders, the Director of
Prisons to hold the said Jean L. Arnualt, in his custody, and in confinement and
detention at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa, Rizal, in coercive
imprisonment, until he should have purged himself of the aforesaid contempt to
the satisfaction, and until order to that effect, of the Senate of the Philippines or
of its Special. Committee to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates
deal.
"Adopted, November 8, 1952:" (Exhibit O)
 In his petition for the writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance, petitioner-
appellee alleges: (1) That the acquisition by the Government, through the Rural Progress
Administration, of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates was not illegal nor irregular nor
scandalous nor malodorous, but was in fact beneficial to the Government; (2) that the decision
of this Court in G. R. No. L-3820 declared that the Senate did not imprison Arnault "beyond
proper limitations", i.e., beyond the period longer than arresto mayor, as this is the maximum
penalty that can be imposed under the provisions of Article 150 of the Revised Penal Code;
(3) that petitioner-appellee purged himself of the contempt charges when he disclosed the
fact that the one to whom he gave the P440,000 was Jess D. Santos, and submitted evidence
in corroboration thereof; (4) that the Senate is not justified in finding that the petitioner-
appellee did tell the truth when he mentioned Jess D. Santos as the person to whom he gave
the P440,000, specially on the basis of the evidence submitted to it; (5) that the legislative
purpose or intention, for which the Senate ordered the confinement may be considered as
having been accomplished, and, therefore, there is no reason for petitioner-appellee's
continued confinement.
The claim that the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates is beneficial
to the government and is neither illegal nor irregular is beside the point. To our mind, two
questions are decisive of this case. The first is: Did the Senate Special Committee believe the
statement of the petitioner-appellee that the person to whom he gave the P440,000 is one by
the name of Jess D. Santos and if it did not, may the court review said finding? And the second
is: If the Senate did not believe the statement, is the continued confinement and detention of
the petitioner-appellee, as ordered in Senate Resolution of November 8, 1952, valid?
On the first question, the Senate found as a fact that petitioner "has failed and refused,
and continues to fail and refuse, to reveal the person to whom he gave the amount of
P440,000" and that the situation of petitioner "has not materially changed since he was
committed to prison." In the first resolution of the Senate Special Committee of May 15, 1950,
it found that petitioner "refused to reveal the name of the persons to whom he gave the
P440,000, as well as to answer other pertinent questions related to said amount." It is clear
and evident that the Senate Committee did not believe petitioner's statement that the person
to whom he delivered the above-mentioned amount is one by the name of Jess D. Santos.
The court a quo,however, arrogating unto itself the power to review such finding, held that the
"petitioner has satisfactorily shown that the person of Jess D. Santos actually and physically
existed in the human flesh," that the opinion or conclusion of the Senate Committee is not
borne to out by the evidence produced at the investigation, that the Senate abused its
discretion in making its conclusion and that under these circumstances the only thing that
could in justice be done to petitioner is to order his release and have his case endorsed to the
prosecution branch of the judicial department for investigation and prosecution as the
circumstances warrant.
There is an inherent fundamental error in the course of action that the lower court
followed. It assumed that courts have the right to review the findings of legislative bodies in
the exercise of the prerogative of legislation, or interfere with their proceedings or their
discretion in what is known as the legislative process.
"The courts avoid encroachment upon the legislature in its exercise of
departmental discretion in the means used to accomplish legitimate legislative
ends. Since the legislature is given a large discretion in reference to the means
it may employ to promote the general welfare, and alone may judge what means
are necessary and appropriate to accomplish an end which the Constitution
makes legitimate, the courts cannot undertake to decide whether the means
adopted by the legislature are the only means or even the best means possible
to attain the end sought, for such course would best the exercise of the police
power of the state in the judicial department. It has been said that the methods,
regulations, and restrictions to be imposed to attain results consistent with the
 public welfare are purely of legislative cognizance, and the determination of the
legislature is final, except when so arbitrary as to be violative of the constitutional
rights of the citizen. Furthermore, in the absence of a clear violation of a
constitutional inhibition, the courts should assume that legislative discretion has
been properly exercised." (11 Am. Jur., pp. 901-902).
These the judicial department of the government has no right or power or authority to do,
much in the same manner that the legislative department may not invade the judicial realm in
the ascertainment of truth and in the application and interpretation of the law, in what is known
as the judicial process, because that would be in direct conflict with the fundamental principle
of separation of powers established by the Constitution. They only instances when judicial
intervention may lawfully be invoke are when there has been a violation of a constitutional
inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary exercise of the legislative discretion.
"Under our constitutional system, the powers of government are
distributed among three coordinate and substantially independent organs: the
legislative, the executive and the judicial. Each of these departments of the
government derives its authority from the Constitution which, in turn, is the
highest expression of the popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere." (People of
the Philippine Islands, et al. vs. Vera, et al 65 Phil, 56; See also
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139).
All that the courts may do, in relation to the proceedings taken against petitioner prior
to his incarceration, is to determine if the constitutional guarantee of due process has been
accorded him before his incarceration by legislative order, and this because of the mandate
of the Supreme Law of the land that no man shall be deprived life, liberty or property without
due process of law. In the case at bar such right has fully been extended the petitioner, he
having been given the opportunity to be heard personally and by counsel in all the proceedings
prior to the approval of the Resolution ordering his continued confinement.
The second question involves in turn the following propositions: Does the Philippines
Senate have the power and authority to pass its resolution ordering the continued confinement
of the petitioner? In the supposition that such power and authority exist, was such power
legitimately exercised after the petitioner had given the name Jess D. Santos? A study of the
text of the resolution readily shows that the Senate found that the petitioner-appellee did not
disclose, by the mere giving of the name Jess D. Santos, the identity of the person to whom
the sum of P440,000 was delivered, and, in addition thereto that petitioner withheld said
identity arrogantly and contumaciously in continued affront of the Senate's authority and
dignity. Although the resolution studiously avoids saying that the confinement is a punishment,
but merely seeks to coerce the petitioner into telling the truth, the intention is evident that the
continuation of the imprisonment ordered is in fact partly unitive. This may be inferred from
the confining made in the resolution that petitioner-appellee's acts were arrogant and
contumacious and constituted an affront to the Senate's dignity and authority. In a way,
therefore, the petitioner's assumption that the imprisonment is punitive is justified by the
language of the resolution, wherefore the issue now before Us is whether the Senate has the
power to punish the contempt committed against it under the circumstances of the case. This
question is thus squarely presented before Us for determination.
In the previous case of this same petitioner decided by this Court, G. R. No. L-
38201, Arnault vs. Nazareno, et al. (46 Off. Gaz., No. 7, 3100), it was admitted and we had
ruled that the Senate has the authority to commit a witness if he refuses to answer a question
pertinent to a legislative inquiry, to compel him to give the information, i. e., by reason of its
coercive power, not its punitive power. It is now contented by petitioner that if he committed
an offense of contempt or perjury against the legislative body, because he refused to reveal
the identity of the person in accordance with the demands of the Senate Committee, the
legislature may not punish him, for the punishment for his refusal should be sought through
the ordinary processes of the law, i.e., by the institution of a criminal action in a court of justice.
American legislative bodies, after which our own is patterned, have the power to
punish for contempt if the contempt has had the effect of obstructing the exercise by the
legislature of, or deterring or preventing it from exercising, its legitimate functions (Annotation
to Jurney vs. MacCraken, 79 L. ed. 814). While the power of the United States Senate to
punish for contempt was not clearly recognized in its earlier decision (See
Marshal vs. Gordon, 61 L. ed. 881), the Supreme Court of the United States two decades ago
held that such power and authority exist. In the case of Jurney vs. MacCraken (294 U. S. 123,
79 L. ed. 802), the question before it was whether or not the Senate could order the
confinement of a private citizen because of the destruction and removal by him of certain
papers required to be produced. The court said:

"First, The main contention of MacCracken is that the so-called power to

punish for contempt may never be exerted, in the case of a private citizen,
solely qua punishment. The argument is that the power may be used by the
legislative body merely as a means of removing an existing obstruction to the
performance of its duties; that the power to punish ceases as soon as the
obstruction has been removed, or its removal has become impossible; and
hence that there is no power to punish a witness who, having been requested to
produce papers, destroys them after service of the subpoena. The contention
rests upon a misconception of the limitations upon the power of the Houses of
Congress to punish for contempt. It is true that the scope of the power is narrow.
No act is so punishable unless it is of a nature to obstruct the performance of the
duties of the legislature. This may be lack of power, because, as in
Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 26 L. ed. 377, there was no legislative
duty to be performed; or because, as in Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 61
L. ed. 881, 37 S. Ct. 448, L. R. A. 1917F, 279, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 371, the act
complained of is deemed not to be of a character to obstruct the legislative
process. But, where the offending act was of a nature to obstruct the legislative
process, the fact that the obstruction has since been removed, or that its removal
has become impossible is without legal significance.
"The power to punish a private citizen for a past and completed act was
exerted by Congress as early as 1795; and since then it has been exercised on
several occasions. It was asserted, before the Revolution, by the colonial
assemblies, in intimation of the British House of Commons; and afterwards by
the Continental Congress and by state legislative bodies. In Anderson vs. Dunn,
6 Wheat, 204, 5 L. ed. 242, decided in 1821, it was held that the House had
power to punish a private citizen for an attempt to bribe a member. No case has
been found in which an exertion of the power to punish for contempt has been
successfully challenged on the ground that, before punishment, the offending act
had been consummated or that the obstruction suffered was irremediable. The
statement in the opinion in Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 61 L. ed. 881, 37
S. Ct. 448, L. R. A. 1917F, 279 Ann. Cas. 1918B, 371, supra, upon which
MacCrachen relies, must be read in the light of the particular facts. It was there
recognized that the only jurisdictional test to be applied by the court is the
character of the offense; and that the continuance of the obstruction, or the
likelihood of its repetition; are considerations for the discretion of the legislators
in meting out the punishment.
"Here, we are concerned not with an extension of congressional privilege,
but with vindication of the established and essential privilege of requiring the
production of evidence. For this purpose, the power to punish for a past contempt
 is an appropriate means. Compare Ex parte Nugent (C. C.) 1 Brunner, Col. Cas.
296, Fed. Cas. No. 10,375; Steward vs. Bleine, 1 MacArth. 453. The
apprehensions expressed from time to time in congressional debates, in
opposition to particular exercise of the contempt power concerned, not the power
to punish, as such, but the broad, undefined privileges which it was believed
might find sanction in that power. The ground for such fears has since been
effectively removed by the decisions of this Court which hold that assertions of
congressional privilege are subject to judicial review. Melbourn vs. Thompson
103 U. S. 163, 26 L. ed. 377, supra; and that the power to punish for contempt
may not be extended to slanderous attacks which presents no immediate
obstruction to legislative processes. Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 61 L.
ed. 881, 37 S. Ct. 448, L. R. A. 1917F, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 371 supra."
The principle that Congress or any o fits bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses
is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to
the exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said power. How could a
legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if
it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent
to punish a defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted
the principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its
respective authority, it must have intended each department's authority to be full and
complete, independently of the other's authority or power. And how could the authority and
power become complete if for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of
contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial department for the
appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with the
affronts committed against its authority or dignity. The process by which a contumacious
witness is dealt with by the legislature in order to enable it to exercise its legislative power or
authority must be distinguished from the judicial process by which offenders are brought to
the courts of justice for the meting of the punishment which the criminal law imposes upon
them. The former falls exclusively within the legislative authority, the latter within the domain
of the courts; because the former is a necessary concomitant of the legislative power or
process, while the latter has to do with the enforcement and application of the criminal law.
We must also and that provided the contempt is related to the exercise of the
legislative power and is committed in the course of the legislative process, the legislature's
authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious witness should be supreme, and unless
there is a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power
coming within the reach of constitutional limitations, the exercise of the authority is not subject
to judicial interference. (Marshal vs. Gordon, supra).
The next question concerns the claim that the petitioner has purged himself of
contempt, because he says he has already answered the original question which he had
previous]y been required to answer. In order that the petitioner may be considered as having
purged himself of the contempt, it is necessary that he should have testified truthfully,
disclosing the real identity of the person subject of the inquiry. No person guilty of contempt
may purge himself by another lie or falsehood; this would be repetition of the offense. It is true
that he gave a name, Jess D. Santos, as that of the person to whom delivery of the sum of
P440,000 was made. The Senate Committee refused to believe, and justly, that is the real
name of the person whose identity is being the subject of the inquiry. The Senate, therefore,
held that the act of the petitioner continued the original contempt, or reiterated it. Furthermore,
the act further interpreted as an affront to its dignity. It may well be taken as insult to the
intelligence of the honorable members of the body that conducted the investigation. The act
of defiance and contempt could not have been clearer and more evident. Certainly, the Senate
resolution declaring the petitioner in contempt may not be claimed as an exertion of an
arbitrary power.
 One last contention of petitioner remains to be considered. It is the claim that as the
period of imprisonment has lasted for a period which exceeded that provided by law
punishment for contempt, i.e., 6 months of arresto mayor,the petitioner is now entitled to be
released. This claim is not justified by the record. Petitioner was originally confined by
Resolution No. 17 on May 15, 1950. On December 13, 1951, he executed his affidavit and
thereafter he was called to testify again before the Senate Committee. The latter passed its
Resolution No. 114 on November 6, 1952, and he presented the petition for habeas corpus in
this case on March 3, 1953, i.e., five months after the last resolution when the Senate found
that the petitioner committed another contempt. It is not true, therefore, that the petitioner's
punishment is beyond the full period prescribed in the criminal law.
Besides, the last resolution of November 8, 1952 is also of a coercive nature, in the
sense that the Senate Committee still demands and requires the disclosure of the fact which
the petitioner had obstinately refused to divulge. While the Philippines Senate has not given
up hope that the petitioner may ultimately disclose the record, it is improper for the courts to
declare that the continued confinement is an abuse of the legislative power and thereby
interfere in the exercise of the legislative discretion.
The judgment appealed from should be, as it hereby is, reversed, and the petition for
the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus denied. The order of the court allowing the petitioner
to give bail is declared null and void and the petitioner is hereby ordered to be recommitted to
the custody of the respondent. With cost against the petitioner-appellee.
Bengzon, Acting C.J., Padilla and Reyes, A., JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, Concepcion and Reyes, J.B.L,., JJ., concur in the result.
||| (Arnault v. Balagtas, G.R. No. L-6749, [July 30, 1955], 97 PHIL 358-372)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-17144. October 28, 1960.]

SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., petitioner, vs. SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z.
GUINTO, JR., VICENTE L. PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO G.
TEVES, JOSE J. ROY, FAUSTO DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN
T. LIGOT, PEDRO G. TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO, FELIPE S. ABELEDA,
TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B. FERNANDEZ, and EUGENIO S.
BALTAO, in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created
by House Resolution No. 59, respondents.

A. Padilla, F. A. Rodrigo and T. T. Quiazon, Jr., for petitioner.

Antonio Y. de Pio in his own behalf.
F. S. Abeleda, A. B. Fernandez, E. S. Baltao and Tecla San Andres Ziga in their own
behalf.
C. T. Villareal and R. D. Bagatsing as amici curiae.
SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONGRESS; PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY OF

MEMBERS, NOT ABSOLUTE. — While parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator
complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil
actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall, however, it
does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words
and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. For
 unparliamentary conduct, members of Congress can be censured, committed to prison,
suspended, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.
2. ID.; ID.; PARLIAMENTARY RULES; FAILURE TO CONFORM TO RULES,
EFFECT OF. — Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the
courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action
taken by a deliberate body when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure.
3. ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS TO DETERMINE DISORDERLY BEHAVIOR OF
MEMBERS; SEPARATION OF POWERS. — The House of Representatives is the judge of
what constitutes disorderly behavior. The courts will not resume a jurisdiction in any case
which will amount to an interference by the judicial department with the legislature.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSONAL ATTACK UPON CHIEF EXECUTIVE CONSTITUTES
DISORDERLY BEHAVIOUR. — The House of Representatives of the United States has taken
the position that personal attacks upon the Chief Executive constitutes unparliamentary
conduct or breach of order. And in several instances, it took action against offenders, even
after other business had been considered.
5. ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS TO SUSPEND ITS MEMBERS. — While under
the Jones Law, the Senate had no power to suspend appointive member (Alejandrino vs.
Quezon, 46 Phil., 83), at present Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of
suspension which the Constitution did not impair.
DECISION

BENGZON, J p:

On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified
petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against
Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as
members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for
annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity;
he also asked, principally, that said members of the special committee be enjoined from
proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to
substantiate his charges against the President, with the admonition that if he failed to do so,
he must show cause why the House should not punish him.

The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, the pertinent portions of which
read as follows:
"WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of June, 1960, the Honorable Sergio
Osmeña, Jr., Member of the House of Representatives from the Second District
of the province of Cebu, took the floor of this Chamber on the one hour privilege
to deliver a speech, entitled 'A Message to Garcia;'
WHEREAS, in the course of said speech, the Congressman from the
Second District of Cebu stated the following:
xxx xxx xxx
"The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that under
your unpopular administration the free things they used to get from the
government are now for sale at premium prices. They say that even pardons are
for sale, and that regardless of the gravity or seriousness of a criminal case, the
 culprit can always be bailed out forever from jail as long as he can come across
with a handsome dole. I am afraid, such an anomalous situation would reflect
badly on the kind of justice that your administration is dispensing. . . ."
WHEREAS, the charges of the gentleman from the Second District of
Cebu, if made maliciously or recklessly and without basic in truth and in fact,
would constitute a serious assault upon the dignity and prestige of the Office of
the President, which is the one visible symbol of the sovereignty of the Filipino
people, and would expose said office to contempt and disrepute; . . .
Resolved by the House of Representatives, that a special committee of
fifteen Members to be appointed by the Speaker be, and the same hereby is,
created to investigate the truth of the charges against the President of the
Philippines made by Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in his privileges speech of
June 23, 1960, and for such purpose it is authorized to summon Honorable
Sergio Osmeña, Jr., to appear before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to
issue subpoena and/or subpoena duces tecum to require the attendance of
witnesses and/or the production of pertinent papers before it, and if Honorable
Sergio Osmeña, Jr., fails to do so to require him to show cause why he should
not be punished by the House. The special committee shall submit to the House
a report of its findings and recommendations before the adjournment of the
present special session of the Congress of the Philippines."
In support of his request, Congressman Osmeña alleged: first, the Resolution violated his
constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his
words constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and
words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of the House provides
that if other business has intervened after the Member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he
shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.
Although some members of the court expressed doubts of petitioner's cause of action and
the Court's jurisdiction, the majority decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents
to answer, without issuing any preliminary injunction. Evidently aware of such circumstance with
its implications, and pressed for time in view of the imminent adjournment of the legislative
session, the special committee continued to perform its task, and after giving Congressman
Osmeña a chance to defend himself, submitted its report on July 18, 1960, finding said
congressman guilty of serious disorderly behavior; and acting on such report, the House approved
on the same day — before closing its session — House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty
as recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months.
Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the exception of Congressmen De
Pio, Abeleda, San Andres Ziga, Fernandez and Baltao) 1 filed their answer, challenged the
jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its
members with suspension, upheld House Resolution No. 175 and then invited attention to the fact
that Congress having ended its session on July 18, 1960, the Committee — whose members are
the sole respondents — had thereby ceased to exist.
There is no question that Congressman Osmeña, in a privilege speech delivered before
the House, made the serious imputations of bribery against the President which are quoted in
Resolution No. 59, and that he refused to produce before the House Committee created for the
purpose, evidence to substantiate such imputations. There is also no question that for having
made the imputations and for failing to produce evidence in support thereof, he was, by resolution
of the House, suspended from office for a period of fifteen months, for serious disorderly
behaviour.
Resolution No. 175 states in part:
 "WHEREAS, the Special Committee created under and by virtue of
Resolution No. 59, adopted on July 8, 1960, found Representative Sergio
Osmeña, Jr., guilty of serious disorderly behaviour for making without basis in
truth and in fact, scurrilous, malicious, reckless and irresponsible charges
against the President of the Philippines in his privilege speech of June 23, 1960;
and
WHEREAS, the said charges are so vile in character that they affronted
and degraded the dignity of the House of Representatives: Now, Therefore, be
it.
RESOLVED by the House of Representatives, That Representative
Sergio Osmeña, Jr., be, as he hereby is, declared guilty of serious disorderly
behaviour; and . . ."
As previously stated, Osmeña contended in his petition that: (1) the Constitution gave him
complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be
questioned; (2) that his speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for which he could be
punished; and (3) supposing he could be questioned and disciplined therefor, the House had lost
the power to do so because it had taken up other business before approving House Resolution
No. 59. Now, he takes the additional position (4) that the House has no power, under
the Constitution, to suspend one of its members.
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in
Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representatives "shall not be questioned in
any other place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of
the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has always been understood
to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress,
the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that
"they shall not be questioned in any other place" than Congress.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec.
7), recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege
cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament,
its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust
with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty
of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful,
to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense." 2 Such immunity has come to this
country from the practices of Parliament as construed and applied by the Congress of the United
States. Its extent and application remain no longer in doubt in so far as related to the question
before us. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made
responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the
Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself
whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member
thereof. In the United States Congress, Congressman Fernando Wood of New York was censured
for using the following language on the floor of the House: "A monstrosity, a measure the most
infamous of the many infamous acts of the infamous Congress." (Hinds' Precedents, Vol. 2, pp.
798-799). Two other congressmen were censured for employing insulting words during debate.
(2 Hinds' Precedents, 799-801). In one case, a member of Congress was summoned to testify on
a statement made by him in debate, but invoked his parliamentary privilege. The Committee
rejected his plea. (3 Hinds' Precedents 123-124.)
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or could
be censured, committed to prison, 3 suspended, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.
The appendix to this decision amply attests to the consensus of informed opinion regarding the
practice and the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action against its
members, including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. It mentions one instance of
suspension of a legislator in a foreign country.
And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a senator
for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the
parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary
manner to its proceedings.
This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action against
me, he argues, because after my speech, and before approving Resolution No. 59, it had taken
up other business. Respondents answer that Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by
the House, that such approval amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to
standard parliamentary practice may be done by unanimous consent.
Granted, counters the petitioner, that the House may suspend the operation of its Rules,
it may not, however, affect past acts or renew its right to take action which had already lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared to laws 4 extending the period of limitation of
actions and making them applicable to actions that had lapsed. The Supreme Court of the United
States has upheld such laws as against the contention that they impaired vested rights in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment (Campbell vs. Holt, 115 U. S. 620). The states hold divergent
views. At any rate, courts have declared that "the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject
to revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them." 5 And it has been
said that "Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have
no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body." Consequently, "mere
failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative
body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure." 6
The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee:
"The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is
uniformly held that it is within the power of all deliberative bodies to abolish,
modify, or waive their own rules of procedure, adopted for the orderly conduct of
business, and as security against hasty action." (Bennet vs. New Bedford, 110
Mass, 433; Holt vs. Somerville, 127 Mass. 408, 411; City of Sadalia vs. Scott,
104 Mo. App. 595, 78 S. W. 276; Ex parte Mayor, etc., of Albany, 23 Wend. [N.Y.]
277, 280; Wheelock vs. City of Lowell, 196 Mass. 220, 230. 81 N. E. 977, 124
Am. St. Rep. 543, 12 Ann. Cas. 1109; City of Corinth vs. Sharp, 107 Miss. 696,
65 So. 888; McGraw vs. Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348, 28 N. W. 632; Tuell vs.
Meacham contracting Co. 145 Ky. 181, 186, 140 S. W. 159, Ann. Cas. 1913B,
802.) [Taken from the case of Rutherford vs. City of Nashville, 78 South Western
Reporter, p. 534.]
It may be noted in this connection, that in the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio,
who insulted the Speaker, for which Act a resolution of censure was presented, the House
approved the resolution, despite the argument that other business had intervened after the
objectionable remarks. (2 Hinds' Precedents pp. 799-800.)
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes
disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be disciplined, many arguments pro and con have
been advanced. We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly
behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because
the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which
can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For
one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña's conduct constituted
disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which
the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The
theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a
prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)
"SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature. — The principle is well
established that the courts will not assume a jurisdiction in any case which will
amount to an interference by the judicial department with the legislature since
each department is equally independent within the powers conferred upon it by
the Constitution. . . ."
"The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to
refuse to intervene in what are exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the
state Senate is given the power to expel a member, the courts will not review its
action or revise even a most arbitrary or unfair decision." (11 Am. Jur., Const.
Law, sec. 200, p. 902.) [Italics Ours.]
The above statement of American law merely abridged the landmark case of Clifford vs.
French. 7 In 1905, several senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of California for
having taken a bribe, filed mandamus proceedings to compel reinstatement, alleging the Senate
had given them no hearing, nor a chance to make defense, besides falsity of the charges of
bribery. The Supreme Court of California declined to interfere, explaining in orthodox juristic
language:
"Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to
revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, or
of either house thereof, taking in pursuance of the power committed exclusively
to that department by the Constitution. It had been held by high authority that,
even in the absence of an express provision conferring the power, every
legislative body in which is vested the general legislative power of the state has
the implied power to expel a member for any cause which it may deem sufficient.
In Hiss vs. Barlett. 3 Gray 473. 63 Am. Dec. 768, the supreme court of Mass.
says, in substance, that this power is inherent in every legislative body; that it is
necessary to enable the body 'to perform its high functions, and is necessary to
the safety of the state;' 'That it is a power of self-protection, and that the
legislative body must necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency which may
justify and require its exercise. '. . . There is no provision authorizing courts to
control, direct, supervise, or forbid the exercise by either house of the power to
expel a member. These powers are functions of the legislative department and
therefore, in the exercise of the power thus committed to it, the senate is
supreme. An attempt by this court to direct or control the legislature, or either
house thereof, in the exercise of the power, would be an attempt to exercise
legislative functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do."
We have underscored in the above quotation these lines which in our opinion emphasize
the principles controlling this litigation. Although referring to expulsion, they may as well be applied
to other disciplinary action. Their gist as applied to the case at bar: the House has exclusive
power; the courts have no jurisdiction to interfere.
Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as subconscious hesitation due to
discovery of impermissible course of action in the legislative chamber. Nothing of that sort: we
merely refuse to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which it is our special duty to
maintain. Indeed, in the interest of comity, we feel bound to state that in a conscientious survey
of governing principles and/or episodic illustrations, we found the House of Representatives of
the United States taking the position on at least two occasions, that personal attacks upon the
Chief Executive constitute unparliamentary conduct or breach of order. 8 And in several
instances, it took action against offenders, even after other business had been considered. 9
Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the Alejandrino
precedent. In 1924, Senator Alejandrino was, by resolution of the Senate, suspended from office
for 12 months because he had assaulted another member of that Body for certain phrases the
latter had uttered in the course of a debate. The Senator applied to this Court for reinstatement,
challenging the validity of the resolution. Although this Court held that in view of the separation of
powers, it had no jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate petitioner, it nevertheless went on
to say the Senate had no power to adopt the resolution because suspension for 12 months
amounted to removal, and the Jones Law (under which the Senate was then functioning) gave
the Senate no power to remove on appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino. The Jones
Law specifically provided that "each house may punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and,
with the concurrence of two-thirds votes, expel an elective member (sec. 18). Note particularly
the word "elective."
The Jones Law, it must be observed, empowered the Governor General to appoint
"without consent of the Senate and without restriction as to residence senators . . . who will, in his
opinion, best represent the Twelfth District." Alejandrino was one appointive Senator.
It is true, the opinion in that case contained an obiter dictum that "suspension deprives the
electoral district of representation without that district being afforded any means by which to fill
that vacancy." But that remark should be understood to refer particularly to the appointive
senator who was then the affected party and who was by the same Jones Law charged with the
duty to represent the Twelfth District and maybe the views of the Government of the United States
or of the Governor-General, who had appointed him.
It must be observed, however, that at that time the Legislature had only those powers
which were granted to it by the Jones Law; 10 whereas now the Congress has the full legislative
powers and prerogatives of a sovereign nation, except as restricted by the Constitution. In other
words, in the Alejandrino case, the Court reached the conclusion that the Jones Law did not give
the Senate the power it then exercised — the power of suspension for one year. Whereas now,
as we find, the Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension 11 which
the Constitution did not impair. In fact, as already pointed out, the Philippine Senate suspended
a Senator for 12 months in 1949.
"The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only
to such limitations as are found in the Republic's Constitution. So that any power
deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the
Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution provides otherwise." (Vera vs.
Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212.)
In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation can
not be more weighty in the matter of suspension than in the case of imprisonment of a legislator;
yet deliberative bodies have the power in proper cases, to commit one of their members to jail. 12
Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. The petition intended to prevent the
Special Committee from acting in pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. Because no preliminary
injunction had been issued, the Committee performed its task, reported to the House, and the
latter approved the suspension order. The House has closed its session, and the Committee has
ceased to exist as such. It would seem, therefore, the case should be dismissed for having
become moot or academic. 13 Of course, there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new
pleadings to include all members of the House as respondents, ask for reinstatement and thereby
to present a justiciable cause. Most probable outcome of such reformed suit, however, will be a
pronouncement of lack of jurisdiction, as in Vera vs. Avelino 14 and Alejandrino vs. Quezon.
 At any rate, having perceived suitable solutions to the important questions of political law,
the Court thought it proper to express at this time its conclusions on such issues as were deemed
relevant and decisive.
Accordingly, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So ordered.
Parás, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepción, Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon,
JJ., concur.
||| (Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun, G.R. No. L-17144, [October 28, 1960], 109 PHIL 863-888)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 179267. June 25, 2013.]

JESUS C. GARCIA, petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and
ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children,
namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed
GARCIA, respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:

Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos
— or 93 percent of a total population of 93.3 million — adhering to the teachings of Jesus
Christ. 1 Yet, the admonition for husbands to love their wives as their own bodies just as Christ
loved the church and gave himself up for her 2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the
pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women. The National Commission on the Role of
Filipino Women (NCRFW) reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female violence comprised
more than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases
were committed by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners." 3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups,
Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against
Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties
Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004. 4 aHDTAI
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against
women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e.,husband; former
husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman
has a common child. 5 The law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the courts
to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and responsibilities of
barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social workers, health care
providers, and other local government officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests
for assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being
violative of the equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial
power to barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents
 On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in
behalf of her minor children, a verified petition 6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her
husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of
physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity
on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial
support. 7
Private respondent's claims
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former
was eleven years her senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia,17 years
old, who is the natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone
J. Garcia,6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old. 8
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved
around her husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is
dominant, controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He forbade
private respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took up law,
and even when she was already working part time at a law office, petitioner trivialized her
ambitions and prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact that his
attractive wife still catches the eye of some men, at one point threatening that he would have any
man eyeing her killed. 9
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of
Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to
the affair when private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He even boasted to the
household help about his sexual relations with said bank manager. Petitioner told private
respondent, though, that he was just using the woman because of their accounts with the
bank. 10 EHTIcD
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically and
emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both arms
and shook her with such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit
private respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned
his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to his paramour and
whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times.
When private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for fear
that if the latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys are aware of private
respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said that when he grows up, he would beat up his
father because of his cruelty to private respondent. 11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of
despair. On December 17, 2005, while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She
was found by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her
to the hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time
petitioner never bothered to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private
respondent has been undergoing therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant
medications. 12
When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she intends
to file charges against the bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing the
manager's job. He then packed his things and told private respondent that he was leaving her for
good. He even told private respondent's mother, who lives with them in the family home, that
private respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his
paramour and has not sired a child with her. 13
 Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would
take her children from her and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously warned
her that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo. 14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells.
He is the President of three corporations — 326 Realty Holdings, Inc.,Negros Rotadrill
Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation — of which he and private respondent are both
stockholders. In contrast to the absolute control of petitioner over said corporations, private
respondent merely draws a monthly salary of P20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros
Rotadrill Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less than P200,000.00 a month are
paid for by private respondent through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same
corporation together with the bills for utilities. 15 cDCIHT
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of P60,000.00 from Negros
Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of
thousands of pesos from the corporations. 16 After private respondent confronted him about the
affair, petitioner forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the
businesses of the corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full information
about said businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private
respondent an accounting of the businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions
of pesos. 17
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the
private respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO 18 on
March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:
Respondent (petitioner herein),Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or
family home within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Restraining Order
and if he refuses, ordering that he be removed by police officers from the
conjugal dwelling; this order is enforceable notwithstanding that the house is
under the name of 236 Realty Holdings, Inc. (Republic Act No. 9262 states
"regardless of ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner (private respondent
herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling without any danger from the
Respondent. IcADSE
After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or
anytime the Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to remove
things, the Petitioner shall be assisted by police officers when re-entering the
family home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday,
26 March 2006 because of the danger that the Respondent will attempt to take
her children from her when he arrives from Manila and finds out about this suit.
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her
household help and driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter
the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the
Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or through other persons, or contact directly or
indirectly her children, mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards,
flowers, letters and the like. Visitation rights to the children may be subject of
a modified TPO in the future.
 d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther
PPK and ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit
and the Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's firearm
licenses. He should also be ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in
his possession or control.
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including
rental of a house for them, and educational and medical expenses.
f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business. aCTHEA
g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash
he received from all the corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March
2006, which himself and as President of the corporations and his Comptroller,
must submit to the Court not later than 2 April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting
of all these funds shall be reported to the court by the Comptroller, copy
furnished to the Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under pain of Indirect
Contempt of Court.
h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente
lite,and considering the financial resources of the Respondent and his threat
that if the Petitioner sues she will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is
ordered to put up a BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE
MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.
On April 24, 2006, upon motion 19 of private respondent, the trial court issued an
amended TPO, 20 effective for thirty (30) days, which included the following additional provisions:
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of
the Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van which they are using in Negros
Occidental.
j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in
Parañaque, the continued use of the Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever
they go to Manila.
k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two
sufficient sureties.
l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php150,000.00) per month plus rental
expenses of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) per month until the matter
of support could be finally resolved. cAaDCE
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO 21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the
grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing.
He further asked that the TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private
respondent and returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and (2)
cancelling or reducing the amount of the bond from P5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level
at P100,000.00.
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved 22 for the modification of the TPO to
allow him visitation rights to his children.
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the
following modifications prayed for by private respondent:
 a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal
belongings of Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for
Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by
his counsel, otherwise be declared in Indirect Contempt of Court;
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in
the conjugal house in Pitimini St.,Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City within
24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police
Headquarters to remove Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within eight
(8) hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and
that he cannot return until 48 hours after the petitioners have left, so that the
petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can remove things from the conjugal
home and make an inventory of the household furniture, equipment and other
things in the conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the Court.
d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental
and Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children within 24
hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise
be declared in indirect contempt of Court; DaHSIT
e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to
the Clerk of Court within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection
Order by his counsel;
f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children
upon presentation of proof of payment of such expenses. 23
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully
comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her and their children,
private respondent filed another application 24 for the issuance of a TPO ex parte.She
alleged inter alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc.,
of which the latter was purportedly no longer president, with the end in view of recovering the
Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by private respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was
served upon private respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long firearms that
scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard. 25
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly
attempted to kidnap him, which incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go back to
school. On another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and
threatened her. 26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a
criminal complaint against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids
working at the conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against private
respondent. This came about after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home to
get her and her children's belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's (Sheryl
Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private respondent filed a case for qualified theft against
Jamola. 27 CDTHSI
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO, 28 effective for thirty (30) days, which reads
as follows:
Respondent (petitioner herein),Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
 1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through
another, acts of violence against the offended party;
2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating in any form with the offended party, either directly or indirectly;
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives,
employees or agents, from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her
children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook
Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo Hontiveros, laundrywoman Mercedita
Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's other household
helpers from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the
subdivision where the Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well as from the
schools of the three children; Furthermore, that respondent shall not contact
the schools of the children directly or indirectly in any manner including,
ostensibly to pay for their tuition or other fees directly, otherwise he will have
access to the children through the schools and the TPO will be rendered
nugatory;
4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a
Walther PPK to the Court;
5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and
Php50,000.00 for rental for the period from August 6 to September 6, 2006;
and support in arrears from March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of
Php1,312,000.00; CIaDTE
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of
Php75,000.00 and Php25,000.00;
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW
508 and a Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the respondent fail
to deliver said vehicles, respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner another
vehicle which is the one taken by J Bros Tading;
8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise
dispose of the conjugal assets, or those real properties in the name of Jesus
Chua Garcia only and those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of the
Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent have an interest in, especially the
conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini St.,Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod
City, and other properties which are conjugal assets or those in which the
conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the
respondent have an interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2,"
including properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall
be served a copy of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and are
ordered not to allow the transfer, sale, encumbrance or disposition of these
above-cited properties to any person, entity or corporation without the personal
presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix her signature in the
presence of the Register of Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that her
signature will be forged in order to effect the encumbrance or sale of these
properties to defraud her or the conjugal partnership of gains.
In its Order 29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO
for another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show cause
why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's
manifestation, 30 however, that he has not received a copy of private respondent's motion to
modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its Order 31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner
be furnished a copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an Order 32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had
already been issued renewing the TPO dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted
hereunder: AacDHE
xxx xxx xxx
...it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the
Temporary Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and
extended for thirty (30) days and continuously extended and renewed for thirty
(30) days, after each expiration, until further orders, and subject to such
modifications as may be ordered by the court. STHAaD
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the
required comment to private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would
only be an "exercise in futility." 33
Proceedings before the CA
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals
(CA) a petition 34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and
temporary restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative
of the due process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO
issued in the civil case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining
Order 35 (TRO) against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders
pursuant thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed 36 the
petition for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial
court in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the
challenge to the validity of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the
protection orders issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the
Resolution 37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that —
The Issues
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE
THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED
AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION
CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE
LAW. EcHIAC
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO
CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND
VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT
FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
 IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES
VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS
A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A.
No. 9262 AS INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS
AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY
OFFICIALS. 38
The Ruling of the Court
Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality
of R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the petition
for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner. EDIHSC
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity
so that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in
the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. 39 Courts will not anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. 40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of
Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is
"inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality." 41
We disagree.
Family Courts have authority
and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level
as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997,"
family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence
against women and children. 42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from
among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key
cities identified. 43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now
provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz.:
SEC. 7. Venue. — The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family
Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence
against women and their children under this law. In the absence of such court
in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at
the option of the complainant. (Emphasis supplied) HIAESC
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of
authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil,
criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or
insolvency. 44 It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a
statute, 45 "this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to
determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the
fundamental law." 46 The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare
the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs. 47 We
said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA 48 that, "[p]lainly the Constitution contemplates that the
inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for
it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such
constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in
part as follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question. aADSIc
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A.
9262 could have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for
protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same,
subject to the review of this Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their
Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the
petition and not an answer. 49 Thus:
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. — (a) The respondent may file an opposition
to the petition which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the
affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent
protection order should not be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party complaint,but any cause of action which could be
the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis
supplied)
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim,
cross-claim and third-party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of
constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for
money or other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party. 50 A cross-
claim, on the other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction
or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim
therein. 51 Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of
court, file against a person not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any
other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim. 52 As pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-
de Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of
a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being
raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. IHcSCA
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a
quo because the right of private respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the very
statute the validity of which is being attacked 53 by petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all
intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection order.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have
deterred petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the
constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence. 54 Be
that as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing
to determine legal issues, among others, viz.:
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. — In case the court determines the need
for further hearing, it may issue an order containing the following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will
be presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies
in the form of affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be
done in one day, to the extent possible, within the 30-day period of the
effectivity of the temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when
necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection order
issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30)
days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or renewed
temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the private
respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the constitutional issues,
without necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary
procedure. DcAaSI
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for
prohibition with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No.
01698). Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior
court, he could be granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22 (j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-
SC expressly disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari,mandamus or prohibition against any
interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate
court in this case against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders
pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the case from taking its normal course
in an expeditious and summary manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is
prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its
enforcement, 55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a
time, 56 should not be enjoined.
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself
entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined. 57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr., 58 the Supreme Court of
the United States declared, thus:
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety
or with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted
as a matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or
member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his
 alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged
to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity
which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the
plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears
fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex
parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction
against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to
determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications. We have, time
and again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more
reason now, in view of private respondent's plea in her Comment 59 to the instant Petition that
we should put the challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.
Intent of Congress in
enacting R.A. 9262.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and
child abuse, which could very well be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone
is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the law. 60 IHTaCE
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723, 61 which became R.A.
9262, reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator
Loi Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a "synthesized measure" 62 — an
amalgamation of two measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of
Women in Intimate Relationships Act" 63 — providing protection to "all family members, leaving
no one in isolation" but at the same time giving special attention to women as the "usual victims"
of violence and abuse, 64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied protection
under the same measure. We quote pertinent portions of the deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some
women's groups have expressed concerns and relayed these concerns to me
that if we are to include domestic violence apart from against women as well
as other members of the household, including children or the husband, they
fear that this would weaken the efforts to address domestic violence of which
the main victims or the bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses or
the female partners in a relationship. We would like to place that on record.
How does the good Senator respond to this kind of observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call
themselves "WIIR" Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not want to
include men in this domestic violence. But plenty of men are also being abused
by women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of the family,
prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective measures for victims.
This includes the men, children, live-in, common-law wives, and those related
with the family. 65
xxx xxx xxx
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
xxx xxx xxx
The President Pro Tempore. ... SDITAC
 Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to
limit this to women and not to families which was the issue of the AWIR group.
The understanding that I have is that we would be having a broader scope
rather than just women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the
interpellation period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do
not get me wrong. However, I believe that there is a need to protect women's
rights especially in the domestic environment.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have
not had the opportunity to file a case against their spouses, their live-in partners
after years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to
include even the men, assuming they can at all be abused by the women or
their spouses, then it would not equalize the already difficult situation for
women, Mr. President. aIcDCA
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this
position. I am sure that the men in this Chamber who love their women in their
lives so dearly will agree with this representation. Whether we like it or not, it
is an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter how empowered the
women are, we are not given equal opportunities especially in the domestic
environment where the macho Filipino man would always feel that he is
stronger, more superior to the Filipino woman.
xxx xxx xxx
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up
with this bill because the family members have been included in this proposed
measure since the other members of the family other than women are also
possible victims of violence. While women are most likely the intended victims,
one reason incidentally why the measure focuses on women, the fact remains
that in some relatively few cases, men also stand to be victimized and that
children are almost always the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that
there may not be enough protection extended to other family members
particularly children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for
instance, more or less, addresses the special needs of abused children. The
same law is inadequate. Protection orders for one are not available in said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same
protection to men, fearing that they may use this law to justify their abusive
behavior against women. However, we should also recognize that there are
established procedures and standards in our courts which give credence to
evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically entertain
baseless complaints. cSCADE
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to
protect the family as the basic social institution. Though I recognize the unequal
power relations between men and women in our society, I believe we have an
 obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both husband and wife and
their immediate family members, particularly children.
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other
family members as a critical input arrived at after a series of
consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts, sports groups and other
affected sectors, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator
Legarda would be removing the "men and children" in this particular bill and
focus specifically on women alone. That will be the net effect of that proposed
amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the distinguished sponsor,
Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is inclined to
accept the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going
to accept this, I will propose an amendment to the amendment rather than
object to the amendment, Mr. President. EcATDH
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Sotto. ...May I propose an amendment to the amendment.
The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the
distinguished proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to
agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At
saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi iyan. Okey lang iyan.But
I cannot agree that we remove the children from this particular measure.
So, if I may propose an amendment —
The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.
Senator Sotto. — more than the women, the children are very much abused.
As a matter of fact, it is not limited to minors. The abuse is not limited to seven,
six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by
their fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to find out about
these things.
Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular
measure will update that. It will enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse of
children and not only women. DEScaT
 SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of
the men in the bill but not the children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND
CHILDREN.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being
none, the amendment, as amended, is approved. 66
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency
of a statute. 67 Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members
of Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and
children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding.
Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice
may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or
repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that
determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law. 68 We only step in when
there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.
R.A. 9262 does not violate
the guaranty of equal protection
of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated
disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union 69 is
instructive: cSICHD
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality
in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality,
that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality
of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons
merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding
them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not
require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they
were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to
things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in
the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or
practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree
with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple
inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes
without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the
matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the
purpose of the law;that it must not be limited to existing conditions only;and
 that it must apply equally to each member of the class.This Court has held
that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis
supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based
on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal
protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the
State extends its protection. IDAaCc
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more
likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against
women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice
McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences ...is the essence of true
equality." 70
A. Unequal power relationship
between men and women
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender
Equality and Women's Empowerment),violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely
linked with the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise known as
"gender-based violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the
leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers,
men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception
leads to men gaining more power over women. With power comes the need to control to retain
that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of controlling women to retain
power. 71 HSaIET
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its
Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on December
20, 1993 stating that "violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power
relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination
against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence
against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into
subordinate positions, compared with men." 72
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-
based violence and developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered
during the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the
pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against
women. The patriarch of a family was accorded the right to use force on
members of the family under his control. I quote the early studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in
patriarchy — the institutional rule of men. Women were seen in
virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both physically and
intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women whether
slave, concubine or wife, were under the authority of men. In
law, they were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or
even kill, his wife if she endangered his property right over her. Judaism,
Christianity and other religions oriented towards the patriarchal family
strengthened the male dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women.
Even the eminent Blackstone has been quoted in his commentaries as saying
husband and wife were one and that one was the husband. However, in the late
1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common law began to limit the right
of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of
thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker
than their thumb. TcDAHS
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to
chastise wives or inflict corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the
preservation of the family was given more importance than preventing violence
to women.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed
that of the English common law. In 1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama became
the first appellate court to strike down the common law right of a husband to beat
his wife:
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with
a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick her
about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not now
acknowledged by our law. ..In person, the wife is entitled to the
same protection of the law that the husband can invoke for
himself.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more
organized. The temperance leagues initiated it. These leagues had a simple
focus. They considered the evils of alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse.
Hence, they demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their husbands' other
watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was joined by suffragette
movements, expanding the liberation movement's agenda. They fought for
women's right to vote, to own property, and more. Since then, the feminist
movement was on the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic
violence to the public gaze. They succeeded in transforming the issue into an
important public concern. No less than the United States Supreme Court, in 1992
case Planned Parenthood v. Casey,noted:
In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately
two million women are the victims of severe assaults by their
male partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that nearly
one of every eight husbands had assaulted their wives during
the past year. The [American Medical Association] views these
figures as "marked underestimates," because the nature of
these incidents discourages women from reporting them, and
because surveys typically exclude the very poor, those who do
not speak English well, and women who are homeless or in
institutions or hospitals when the survey is conducted.
According to the AMA, "researchers on family violence agree
that the true incidence of partner violence is
probably double the above estimates; or four million severely
assaulted women per year." cIDHSC
 Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third
of all women will be physically assaulted by a partner or ex-
partner during their lifetime. ..Thus on an average day in the
United States, nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by
their male partners. Many of these incidents involve sexual
assault. ..In families where wife beating takes place, moreover,
child abuse is often present as well.
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical
violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological
abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of
women, is also common.
Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers,
perhaps because they perceive no superior alternative ...Many
abused women who find temporary refuge in shelters return to
their husbands, in large part because they have no other source
of income. ..Returning to one's abuser can be dangerous.
Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose that
8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United States are killed
by their spouses ...Thirty percent of female homicide victims are
killed by their male partners. CHTcSE
Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against
Women Act.
In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less
successful. The United States Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights affirmed the equality of all human beings. In 1979, the UN General
Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).In 1993, the UN General Assembly
also adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women.
World conferences on the role and rights of women have been regularly held in
Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself established a
Commission on the Status of Women. TEaADS
The Philippines has been in cadence with the half — and full — steps of
all these women's movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of our 1987
Constitution mandates the State to recognize the role of women in nation
building and to ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and
men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on the
Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8,
2004, enacted Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against
Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other Purposes." (Citations omitted)
B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"
victims of violence.
At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence against
women and children show that —
...physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002
representing 55.63% of total cases reported (9,903).And for the first semester
of 2003, there were 2,381 reported cases out of 4,354 cases which represent
54.31%....(T)he total number of women in especially difficult circumstances
served by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for the
 year 2002, there are 1,417 physically abused/maltreated cases out of the total
of 5,608 cases. ...(T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total number of 3,471
cases for the first semester of 2003. Female violence comprised more than
90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported
cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as their
husbands and live-in partners. 73
Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on
violence against women across an eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations
under R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different VAW categories since its implementation in
2004, 74 thus: ADECcI
Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004-2011*
Reported 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Cases
Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042 832
Incestuous Rape 38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23
Attempted Rape 194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201
Acts of 580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625
Lasciviousness
Physical 3,553 2,335 1,892 1,505 1,307 1,498 2,018 1,588
Injuries
Sexual 53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63
Harassment
RA 9262 218 924 1,269 2,387 3,599 5,285 9,974 9,021
Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213
Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15
Concubinage 121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128
RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62
Abduction/ 29 16 34 23 28 18 25 22
Kidnapping
Unjust Vexation 90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155
——— ———— ———— ———— ———— ———— ———— ————
—— —— —— —— —— —— —— ——
Total 6,271 5,374 4,881 5,729 6,905 9,485 15,104 12,948
===== ====== ====== ====== ====== ====== ====== ======
*2011 report covers only from January to
August
Source: Philippine National Police — Women and Children Protection Center
(WCPC)
On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and violence
against men in the Philippines because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps, because
many men will not even attempt to report the situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of women
who had ever experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or more) times, compared with
11% of the smaller number of men who had ever experienced domestic violence; and women
constituted 89% of all those who had experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic
violence. 75 Statistics in Canada show that spousal violence by a woman against a man is less
likely to cause injury than the other way around (18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who
experience violence from their spouses are much less likely to live in fear of violence at the hands
of their spouses, and much less likely to experience sexual assault. In fact, many cases of physical
violence by a woman against a spouse are in self-defense or the result of many years of physical
or emotional abuse. 76 CADSHI
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against
men in the Philippines, the same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-drawn
vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by their
vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance
was challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws as its application is limited
to owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those animals, although not utilized,
but similarly pass through the same streets.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may be
non-vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the city roads, "but their number must be
negligible and their appearance therein merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones,
as not to constitute a menace to the health of the community." 77 The mere fact that the legislative
classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for
every classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree,
but the law is not thereby rendered invalid. 78 TcSHaD
C. Gender bias and prejudices
From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes
against women are often treated differently and less seriously than other crimes. This was argued
by then United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,now Vice President, chief sponsor of the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),in defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of
the U.S. Congress' authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed
that the widespread gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized historic prejudices against
victims of rape or domestic violence, subjecting them to "double victimization" — first at the
hands of the offender and then of the legal system. 79
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No.
2723 that "(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter and
advise the parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to the
prosecutor, the latter is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be withdrawn. This
lack of response or reluctance to be involved by the police and prosecution reinforces the
escalating, recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence." 80
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our women.
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila
for Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent language in reference to
the complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a live-in
partner" and presenting her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate relationship."
Judge Amila even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of being motivated by "insatiable
greed" and of absconding with the contested property. 81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's
prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases
and prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures
focused on women does not discriminate against men. 82 Petitioner's contention, 83 therefore,
that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men"
law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to
take all appropriate measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or
on stereotyped roles for men and women." 84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he
paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense
will require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and
the judges." 85
II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which
is to address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of
Policy,as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared that the State values the
dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights.
The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members
particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal
safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence
committed against women and children in keeping with the fundamental
freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other
international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a
party. DHECac
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified
on August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the
Philippines on October 6, 2003. 86 This Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to
women equality with men before the law 87 and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations on the basis
of equality of men and women. 88 The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights
of the Child and its two protocols. 89 It is, thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective
protocols.
III. The classification is not limited to existing
conditions only, and apply equally to all members
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was
promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and
their children are threatened by violence and abuse.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse.
Section 3 thereof defines VAWC as:
...any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman
who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family
abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm
or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not
limited to, the following acts: SACHcD
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or
physical harm;
 B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature,
committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not
limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness,
treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making
demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically
attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing
her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent
shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent
acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and
mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep
together in the same room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to
engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force,
physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm
or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C."Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing
or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim
such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking,
damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated
verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes causing or
allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or
psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the
victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to
witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted
deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common
children. CDEaAI
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to
make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is not
limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the
victim from engaging in any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity, except in cases
wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid,
serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the
Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial
resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the
conjugal, community or property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or
solely controlling the conjugal money or properties.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are attributable
to research that has exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts described here
are also found in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. 90 Hence,
the argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of what constitutes abuse removes the
difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.
 There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse
petitioner in his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide adequate
contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient
definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and
need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application. 91 Yet, petitioner insists 92 that phrases
like "depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right," "solely controlling
the conjugal or common money or properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing mental or
emotional anguish" are so vague that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However,
we have stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty
for the statute to be upheld — not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner
seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the
metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely
because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions. 93
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or
father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-
neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman
encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be
related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship,
it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal
Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, 94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari
L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the
allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in
tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be
ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and
physically. TCIEcH
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all
protections afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of
family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of
seconds, without an inkling of what happened." 95
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women
and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its
purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their
daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. 96
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended
party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This
serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any
designated family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the
perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also
enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from
violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support." 97
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the
petitioner 98 thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein.
Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented," 99 the
court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the
life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the
order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to
prevent such violence, which is about to recur. 100
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex
parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to
attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition. 101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to
due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing
because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to
abscond or dispose of his property, 102 in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have
suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice
and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional
commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests, 103 among which is protection of women and
children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise
order that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within
five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and
TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially
effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent. 104
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance
and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition
within five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits
shall likewise be indicated on the notice. 105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be
accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent
protection order should not be issued. 106 HSCcTD
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order
should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side.
Thus, the fear of petitioner of being "stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future
employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is a
mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's
defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. 107
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006.
Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the modification of the TPO to allow him
visitation rights to his children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26, 2006, gave
him five days (5) within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed or extended.
Yet, he chose not to file the required comment arguing that it would just be an "exercise in futility,"
conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30
days) each time, and that he could prevent the continued renewal of said order if he can show
sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now be heard to complain that
he was denied due process of law.
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC
case from the residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a
"blank check" issued to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home. 108
 The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination
suggest that this is so. It states: aIETCA
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. — The protection order shall
include any, some or all of the following reliefs:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the
offended party, regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for
the purpose of protecting the offended party, or permanently where no property
rights are violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects from the
residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the
respondent to the residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered his
things and escort him from the residence;
xxx xxx xxx
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's residence,
regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal
and exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are violated. How then can the
private respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner seems to
suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case
to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging
mediation and counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed policy of the State to "protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution." 109
Under Section 23 (c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any
issue thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary
on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows: 110
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in
a proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a process by which
parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual
agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for
compromise.A process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence
implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a
proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because the petitioner is
frequently unable to participate equally with the person against whom the
protection order has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which,
under the Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may
be established by law" and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue
protection orders. 111 The pertinent provision reads, as follows: HCDAac
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs);Who May Issue and How. —
Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by
the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts
under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives
applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the
date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If
 the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the
application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the
BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an
attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was
unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for
fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO,
the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of
the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its
personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding
before the Punong Barangay.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. 112 On the other hand, executive power "is
generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the
laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance." 113
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong
Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the
perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening
to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus,
purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce
all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay." 114
We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the
existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official
conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise
of judicial powers." 115
In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or
proceeding "whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed
and the accused is probably guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable
ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the woman and her children exists
or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary investigation
conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds
true with the issuance of a BPO. DHEcCT
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and
other law enforcement agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of violence and
abuse, it would be very unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and that the
chances of acquittal are nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law
enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to maintain peace and
order.
Conclusion
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of, or
a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be
demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the
grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt. 116 In the instant case, however, no
concrete evidence and convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into
law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department. As we said in Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and
edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose
of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.
We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement
against domestic violence shows that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight against the
violence of law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of
women for equality but will be its fulfillment." 118 Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is,
as it should be, sustained.
WHEREFORE,the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, [June 25, 2013], 712 PHIL 44-176)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 177780. January 25, 2012.]

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK), represented by
ROSELLA A. SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. ANTONINO O. TOBIAS
III, respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J p:

This appeal assails the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) 1 that dismissed
the petition for certiorari brought by the petitioner to nullify and set aside the resolutions issued
by the Secretary of Justice on July 20, 2004 2 and November 18, 2005 3 directing the City
Prosecutor of Malabon City to withdraw the information in Criminal Case No. 27020
entitled People v. Antonino O. Tobias III.
We affirm the CA in keeping with the principle of non-interference with the prerogative
of the Secretary of Justice to review the resolutions of the public prosecutor in the latter's
determination of the existence of probable cause, absent any showing that the Secretary of
Justice thereby commits grave abuse of his discretion.
Antecedents
In 1997, Rosella A. Santiago, then the OIC-Branch Head of Metropolitan Bank & Trust
Company (METROBANK) in Valero Street, Makati City, was introduced to respondent
Antonino O. Tobias III (Tobias) by one Jose Eduardo Gonzales, a valued client of
METROBANK. Subsequently, Tobias opened a savings/current account for and in the name
of Adam Merchandising, his frozen meat business. Six months later, Tobias applied for a loan
from METROBANK, which in due course conducted trade and credit verification of Tobias that
resulted in negative findings. METROBANK next proceeded to appraise the property Tobias
offered as collateral by asking him for a photocopy of the title and other related
documents. 4 The property consisted of four parcels of land located in Malabon City, Metro
Manila with a total area of 6,080 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. M-16751. 5 Based on the financial statements submitted by Tobias, METROBANK
approved a credit line for P40,000,000.00. On August 15, 1997, Joselito Bermeo Moreno,
Lead Internal Affairs Investigator of METROBANK, proceeded to the Registry of Deeds of
Malabon to cause the annotation of the deed of real estate mortgage on TCT No. M-16751.
The annotation was Entry No. 26897. 6 cAaDCE
Thereafter, Tobias initially availed himself of P20,000,000, but took out the balance
within six months. 7 He paid the interest on the loan for about a year before defaulting. His
loan was restructured to 5-years upon his request. Yet, after two months, he again defaulted.
Thus, the mortgage was foreclosed, and the property was sold to METROBANK as the lone
bidder. 8 On June 11, 1999, the certificate of sale was issued in favor of METROBANK. 9
When the certificate of sale was presented for registration to the Registry of Deeds of
Malabon, no corresponding original copy of TCT No. M-16751 was found in the registry vault.
Atty. Sarah Principe-Bido, Deputy Register of Deeds of Malabon, went on to verify TCT No.
M-16751 and learned that Serial No. 4348590 appearing therein had been issued for TCT No.
M-15363 in the name of one Alberto Cruz; while TCT No. 16751 (now TCT No. 390146)
appeared to have been issued in the name of Eugenio S. Cruz and Co. for a parcel of land
located in Navotas. 10
Given such findings, METROBANK requested the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime
Task Force (PAOCTF) to investigate. 11 In its report dated May 29, 2000, 12 PAOCTF
concluded that TCT No. M-16751 and the tax declarations submitted by Tobias were fictitious.
PAOCTF recommended the filing against Tobias of a criminal complaint for estafa through
falsification of public documents under paragraph 2 (a) of Article 315, in relation to Articles
172 (1) and 171 (7) of the Revised Penal Code. 13
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon ultimately charged Tobias with estafa
through falsification of public documents through the following information, 14 viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about the 15th day of August, 1997 in the Municipality of
Malabon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of deceit, false pretense, fraudulent acts and
misrepresentation executed prior to or simultaneous with the commission of
fraud, represented to METROBANK, as represented by MS. ROSELLA S.
SANTIAGO, that he is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT
No. M-16751 which he represented to be true and genuine when he knew the
Certificate of Title No. M-16751 is fake and spurious and executed a Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of Metrobank and offered the same as collateral for a loan and
Rosella S. Santiago relying on said misrepresentation gave to accused, the
amount of P20,000,000.00 and once in possession of the amount, with intent to
defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously failed to deliver the land covered by
spurious title and misappropriate, misapply and converted the said amount of
P20,000,000.00 to his own personal use and benefit and despite repeated
demands accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to return the
amount to complainant METROBANK, and/or delivered the land covered in the
spurious title in the aforementioned amount of P20,000,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 15
Tobias filed a motion for re-investigation, 16 which was granted. TIEHDC
In his counter-affidavit submitted during the re-investigation, 17 Tobias averred that he
had bought the property from one Leonardo Fajardo through real estate brokers Augusto
Munsuyac and Carmelito Pilapil; that Natalio Bartolome, his financial consultant from Carwin
International, had convinced him to purchase the property due to its being an ideal site for his
meat processing plant and cold storage business; that the actual inspection of the property as
well as the verification made in the Registry of Deeds of Malabon City had ascertained the
veracity of TCT No. 106083 under the name of Leonardo Fajardo; that he had applied for the
loan from METROBANK to pay the purchase price by offering the property as collateral; that
in order for the final application to be processed and the loan proceeds to be released,
METROBANK had advised him to have the title first transferred to his name; that he had
executed a deed of absolute sale with Fajardo covering the property, and that said instrument
had been properly registered in the Registry of Deeds; that the transfer of the title, being under
the account of the seller, had been processed by seller Fajardo and his brokers Munsuyac
and Pilapil; that his title and the property had been inspected and verified by METROBANK's
personnel; and that he did not have any intention to defraud METROBANK.
Nonetheless, on December 27, 2002, the City Prosecutor of Malabon still found
probable cause against Tobias, and recommended his being charged with estafa through
falsification of public document. 18
Tobias appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ).
On July 20, 2004, then Acting Secretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez issued
a resolution directing the withdrawal of the information filed against Tobias, 19 to wit:
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of Malabon City is directed to cause the withdrawal
of the Information in Crim. Case No. 27020 against respondent Antonino O.
Tobias III, and report the action taken thereon within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Acting Secretary of Justice Gutierrez opined that Tobias had sufficiently established
his good faith in purchasing the property; that he had even used part of the proceeds of the
loan to pay the seller; that it was METROBANK that had caused the annotation of the
mortgage on the TCT, thereby creating an impression that the title had been existing in the
Registry of Deeds at that time; that, accordingly, the presumption that the possessor of a
falsified document was the author of the falsification did not apply because it was always
subject to the qualification or reference as to the approximate time of the commission of the
falsification.
METROBANK moved to reconsider, 20 arguing that Tobias had employed deceit or
false pretense in offering the property as collateral by using a fake title; and that the
presumption that the possessor of the document was the author of the falsification applied
because no other person could have falsified the TCT and would have benefitted therefrom
except Tobias himself.
On November 18, 2005, Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez denied
METROBANK's motion for reconsideration. 21 DSEIcT
Ruling of the CA
METROBANK challenged the adverse resolutions through certiorari.
On December 29, 2006, the CA promulgated its decision, 22 dismissing
METROBANK's petition for certiorari by holding that the presumption of authorship might be
disputed through a satisfactory explanation, viz.:
We are not unaware of the established presumption and rule that when
it is proved that a person has in his possession a falsified document and makes
use of the same, the presumption or inference is that such person is the forger
(Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 639, 651 [2003]), citing Koh Tieck
Heng vs. People, 192 SCRA 533, 546-547 [1990]). Yet, the Supreme Court
declared that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one who is found in
possession of a forged document and who used it is presumed to be the forger
(citing People vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120, 141 [1978]). Very clearly then, a
 satisfactory explanation could render ineffective the presumption which, after all,
is merely a disputable one.
It is in this score that We affirm the resolution of the Department of Justice
finding no probable cause against private respondent Tobias for estafa thru
falsification of public document. The record speaks well of Tobias' good faith and
lack of criminal intention and liability. Consider:
(a) Tobias has in his favor a similar presumption that good faith is
always presumed. Therefore, he who claims bad faith must prove it
(Prinsipio vs. The Honorable Oscar Barrientos, G.R. 167025, December
19, 2005). No such evidence of bad faith of Tobias appears on record;
(b) Tobias' actuation in securing the loan belies any criminal intent
on his part to deceive petitioner Bank. He was not in a hurry to obtain the
loan. He had to undergo the usual process of the investigative arm or
machine of the Bank not only on the location and the physical
appearance of the property but likewise the veracity of its title. Out of the
approved P40,000,000.00 loan he only availed of P20,000,000.00, for his
frozen meat business which upon investigation of the Bank failed to give
negative results;
(c) Tobias paid the necessary interests for one (1) year on the
loan and two (2) installments on the restructured loan; and
(d) More importantly, the loan was not released to him until after
the mortgage was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of Malabon
City and even paid the amount of P90,000.00 for the registration fees
therefor. TaCDIc
These actuations, for sure, can only foretell that Tobias has the least
intention to deceive the Bank in obtaining the loan. It may not be surprising to
find that Tobias could even be a victim himself by another person in purchasing
the properties he offered as security for the loan. 23
The CA stressed that the determination of probable cause was an executive function
within the discretion of the public prosecutor and, ultimately, of the Secretary of Justice, and
the courts of law could not interfere with such determination; 24 that the private complainant
in a criminal action was only concerned with its civil aspect; that should the State choose not
to file the criminal action, the private complainant might initiate a civil action based on Article
35 of the Civil Code, to wit:
In the eventuality that the Secretary of Justice refuses to file the criminal
complaint, the complainant, whose only interest is the civil aspect of the case
and not the criminal aspect thereof, is not left without a remedy. In Vda. De Jacob
vs. Puno, 131 SCRA 144, 149 [1984], the Supreme Court has this for an answer:
"The remedy of complainant in a case where the Minister of
Justice would not allow the filing of a criminal complaint against an
accused because it is his opinion that the evidence is not sufficient to
sustain an information for the complaint with which the respondents are
charged of, is to file a civil action as indicated in Article 35 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
'Art. 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a
criminal offense, charges another with the same, for which no
independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special law,
but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to
 believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting
attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the
complainant may bring a civil action for damages against the
alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a
preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the
court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the
defendant in case the complainant should be found to be
malicious. HTaIAC
'If during the pendency of the civil action, an information
should be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action
shall be suspended until the termination of the criminal
proceedings.'" 25
METROBANK sought reconsideration, but the CA denied its motion for that purpose,
emphasizing that the presumption that METROBANK firmly relied upon was overcome by
Tobias sufficiently establishing his good faith and lack of criminal intent. The CA relevantly
held:
Petitioner should be minded that the subject presumption that the
possessor and user of a forged or falsified document is presumed to be the
falsifier or forger is a mere disputable presumption and not a conclusive one.
Under the law on evidence, presumptions are divided into two (2) classes:
conclusive and rebuttable. Conclusive or absolute presumptions are rules
determining the quantity of evidence requisite for the support of any particular
averment which is not permitted to be overcome by any proof that the fact is
otherwise, if the basis facts are established (1 Greenleaf, Ev 44; 29 Am Jur 2d,
Evidence 164; 1 Jones on Evidence 6 ed, page 132). Upon the other hand, a
disputable presumption has been defined as species of evidence that may be
accepted and acted on when there is no other evidence to uphold the contention
for which it stands, or one which may be overcome by other evidence (31A
C.J.S., p. 197; People v. de Guzman, G.R. No. 106025, Feb. 9, 1994; Herrera,
Remedial Law, Vol. VI, 1999 Edition, pp. 40-41). In fact, Section 3 of Rule 131
provides that the disputable presumptions therein enumerated are satisfactory if
uncontradicted but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence. Thus,
as declared in Our decision in this case, private respondent had shown evidence
of good faith and lack of criminal intention and liability that can overthrow the
controversial disputable presumption. 26
Issue
In this appeal, METROBANK raises the lone issue of —
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED
A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR
WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT AND
THUS, COMMITTED PATENT ERROR IN RENDERING THE ASSAILED
DECISION DATED 29 DECEMBER 2006, DISMISSING METROBANK'S
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND AFFIRMING THE RESOLUTIONS DATED
20 JULY 2004 AND 18 NOVEMBER 2005 OF THE HON. SECRETARY OF
JUDTICE AND IN DENYING METROBANK'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION.
METROBANK submits that the presumption of authorship was sufficient to establish
probable cause to hold Tobias for trial; that the presumption applies when a person is found
in possession of the forged instrument, makes use of it, and benefits from it; that contrary to
the ruling of the CA, there is no requirement that the legal presumption shall only apply in the
absence of a valid explanation from the person found to have possessed, used and benefited
from the forged document; that the CA erred in declaring that Tobias was in good faith,
because good faith was merely evidentiary and best raised in the trial on the merits; and that
Tobias was heavily involved in a modus operandi of using fake titles because he was also
being tried for a similar crime in the RTC, Branch 133, in Makati City.
METROBANK maintains that what the Secretary of Justice did was to determine the
innocence of the accused, which should not be done during the preliminary investigation; and
that the CA disregarded such lapse. SCDaET
On the other hand, Tobias posits that the core function of the Department of Justice is
to prosecute the guilty in criminal cases, not to persecute; that although the prosecutors are
given latitude to determine the existence of probable cause, the review power of the Secretary
of Justice prevents overzealous prosecutors from persecuting the innocent; that in reversing
the resolution of Malabon City Assistant Prosecutor Ojer Pacis, the Secretary of Justice only
acted within his authority; that, indeed, the Secretary of Justice was correct in finding that
there was lack of evidence to prove that the purported fake title was the very cause that had
induced the petitioner to grant the loan; and that the Secretary likewise appropriately found
that Tobias dealt with the petitioner in good faith because of lack of proof that he had employed
fraud and deceit in securing the loan.
Lastly, Tobias argues that the presumption of forgery could not be applied in his case
because it was METROBANK, through a representative, who had annotated the real estate
mortgage with the Registry of Deeds; and that he had no access to and contact with the
Registry of Deeds, and whatever went wrong after the annotation was beyond his control.
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide
matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of
the Government, 27 or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive
Branch, 28 represented in this case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that
the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the purpose
of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. 29 That abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility. 30 For instance, in Balanganan v. Court of Appeals, Special Nineteenth Division,
Cebu City, 31 the Court ruled that the Secretary of Justice exceeded his jurisdiction when he
required "hard facts and solid evidence" in order to hold the defendant liable for criminal
prosecution when such requirement should have been left to the court after the conduct of a
trial.
In this regard, we stress that a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining
the existence of probable cause is not part of a trial. 32 At a preliminary investigation, the
investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice only determines whether the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. 33 Probable cause refers to facts
and circumstances that engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. 34 There is no definitive standard by which
probable cause is determined except to consider the attendant conditions; the existence of
probable cause depends upon the finding of the public prosecutor conducting the
examination, who is called upon not to disregard the facts presented, and to ensure that his
finding should not run counter to the clear dictates of reason. 35 IcSHTA
Tobias was charged with estafa through falsification of public document the elements
of which are: (a) the accused uses a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or
employs other similar deceits; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means
must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) the
offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means,
that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and (d) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damage. 36 It is required that the false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the
very cause or the only motive that induced the complainant to part with the thing. 37
METROBANK urges the application of the presumption of authorship against Tobias
based on his having offered the duplicate copy of the spurious title to secure the loan; and
posits that there is no requirement that the presumption shall apply only when there is absence
of a valid explanation from the person found to have possessed, used and benefited from the
forged document.
We cannot sustain METROBANK's urging.
Firstly, a presumption affects the burden of proof that is normally lodged in the
State. 38 The effect is to create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima
facie case that shall prevail in the absence of proof to the contrary. 39 As such, a presumption
of law is material during the actual trial of the criminal case where in the establishment thereof
the party against whom the inference is made should adduce evidence to rebut the
presumption and demolish the prima facie case. 40 This is not so in a preliminary
investigation, where the investigating prosecutor only determines the existence of a prima
facie case that warrants the prosecution of a criminal case in court. 41
Secondly, the presumption of authorship, being disputable, may be accepted and
acted upon where no evidence upholds the contention for which it stands. 42 It is not correct
to say, consequently, that the investigating prosecutor will try to determine the existence of
the presumption during preliminary investigation, and then to disregard the evidence offered
by the respondent. The fact that the finding of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation is an executive function does not excuse the investigating prosecutor or the
Secretary of Justice from discharging the duty to weigh the evidence submitted by the parties.
Towards that end, the investigating prosecutor, and, ultimately, the Secretary of Justice have
ample discretion to determine the existence of probable cause, 43 a discretion that must be
used to file only a criminal charge that the evidence and inferences can properly warrant.
The presumption that whoever possesses or uses a spurious document is its forger
applies only in the absence of a satisfactory explanation. 44 Accordingly, we cannot hold that
the Secretary of Justice erred in dismissing the information in the face of the controverting
explanation by Tobias showing how he came to possess the spurious document. Much less
can we consider the dismissal as done with abuse of discretion, least of all grave. We concur
with the erudite exposition of the CA on the matter, to wit:
It would seem that under the above proposition of the petitioner, the
moment a person has in his possession a falsified document and has made use
of it, probable cause or prima facie is already established and that no amount of
satisfactory explanation will prevent the filing of the case in court by the
investigating officer, for any such good explanation or defense can only be
threshed out in the trial on the merit. We are not to be persuaded. To give
meaning to such argumentation will surely defeat the very purpose for which
preliminary investigation is required in this jurisdiction. AaIDHS
A preliminary investigation is designed to secure the respondent involved
against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution. A preliminary investigation
is an inquiry to determine whether (a) a crime has been committed, and (b)
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof (De
 Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 480 SCRA 71 [2006]). It is a means of
discovering the person or persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime
(Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 478 SCRA 387, 410
[2005]). Prescindingly, under Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the respondent must be informed of the accusation against him and
shall have the right to examine the evidence against him and submit his counter-
affidavit to disprove criminal liability. By far, respondent in a criminal preliminary
investigation is legally entitled to explain his side of the accusation.
We are not unaware of the established presumption and rule that when
it is proved that a person has in his possession a falsified document and makes
use of the same the presumption or inference is that such person is the forger
(Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 639, 651 [2003]), citing Koh Tieck
Heng vs. People, 192 SCRA 533, 546-547 [1990]). Yet, the Supreme Court
declared that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one who is found in
possession of a forged document and who used it is presumed to be the forger
(citing People vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120, 141 [1978]). Very clearly then, a
satisfactory explanation could render ineffective the presumption which, after all,
is merely a disputable one. 45
We do not lose sight of the fact that METROBANK, a commercial bank dealing in real
property, had the duty to observe due diligence to ascertain the existence and condition of the
realty as well as the validity and integrity of the documents bearing on the realty. 46 Its duty
included the responsibility of dispatching its competent and experience representatives to the
realty to assess its actual location and condition, and of investigating who was its real
owner. 47 Yet, it is evident that METROBANK did not diligently perform a thorough check on
Tobias and the circumstances surrounding the realty he had offered as collateral. As such, it
had no one to blame but itself. Verily, banks are expected to exercise greater care and
prudence than others in their dealings because their business is impressed with public
interest. 48 Their failure to do so constitutes negligence on its part. 49
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari,
and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on December 29, 2006. The
petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. CHIScD
||| (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Tobias III, G.R. No. 177780, [January 25, 2012], 680 PHIL
173-191)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 174350. August 13, 2008.]

SPOUSES BERNYL BALANGAUAN & KATHERENE
BALANGAUAN, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
SPECIAL NINETEENTH (19TH) DIVISION, CEBU CITY & THE HONGKONG
AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, LTD., respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
 Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
assailing the 28 April 2006 Decision 1 and 29 June 2006 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00068, which annulled and set aside the 6 April 2004 3 and 30
August 2004 4 Resolutions of the Department of Justice (DOJ) in I.S. No. 02-9230-I,
entitled "The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation v. Katherine Balangauan, et
al." The twin resolutions of the DOJ affirmed, in essence, the Resolution of the Office of the
City Prosecutor, 5 Cebu City, which dismissed for lack of probable cause the criminal
complaint for Estafa and/or Qualified Estafa, filed against petitioner-Spouses Bernyl
Balangauan (Bernyl) and Katherene Balangauan (Katherene) by respondent Hong Kong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation, Ltd. (HSBC). DISEaC
In this Petition for Certiorari, petitioners Bernyl and Katherene urge this Court to
"reverse and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals, Special nineteenth (sic) [19th]
division (sic), Cebu City (sic) and accordingly, dismiss the complaint against the [petitioners
Bernyl and Katherene] in view of the absence of probable cause to warrant the filing of an
information before the Court and for utter lack of merit." 6
As culled from the records, the antecedents of the present case are as follows:
Petitioner Katherene was a Premier Customer Services Representative (PCSR) of
respondent bank, HSBC. As a PCSR, she managed the accounts of HSBC depositors
with Premier Status. One such client and/or depositor handled by her was Roger Dwayne
York (York).
York maintained several accounts with respondent HSBC. Sometime in April 2002, he
went to respondent HSBC's Cebu Branch to transact with petitioner Katherene respecting his
Dollar and Peso Accounts. Petitioner Katherene being on vacation at the time, York was
attended to by another PCSR. While at the bank, York inquired about the status of his time
deposit in the amount of P2,500,000.00. The PCSR representative who attended to him,
however, could not find any record of said placement in the bank's data base.
York adamantly insisted, though, that through petitioner Katherene, he made a
placement of the aforementioned amount in a higher-earning time deposit. York further
elaborated that petitioner Katherene explained to him that the alleged higher-earning time
deposit scheme was supposedly being offered to Premier clients only. Upon further scrutiny
and examination, respondent HSBC's bank personnel discovered that: (1) on 18 January
2002, York pre-terminated a P1,000,000.00 time deposit; (2) there were cash movement
tickets and withdrawal slips all signed by York for the amount of P1,000,000.00; and (3) there
were regular movements in York's accounts, i.e., beginning in the month of January 2002,
monthly deposits in the amount of P12,500.00 and P8,333.33 were made, which York denied
ever making, but surmised were the regular interest earnings from the placement of the
P2,500,000.00.
It was likewise discovered that the above-mentioned deposits were transacted using
petitioner Katherene's computer and work station using the code or personal password
"CEO8". The significance of code "CEO8", according to the bank personnel of respondent
HSBC, is that, "[i]t is only Ms. Balangauan who can transact from [the] computer in the work
station CEO-8, as she is provided with a swipe card which she keeps sole custody of and only
she can use, and which she utilizes for purposes of performing bank transactions from that
computer." 7 EHTISC
Bank personnel of respondent HSBC likewise recounted in their affidavits that prior to
the filing of the complaint for estafa and/or qualified estafa, they were in contact with
petitioners Bernyl and Katherene. Petitioner Bernyl supposedly met with them on two
occasions. At first he disavowed any knowledge regarding the whereabouts of York's money
but later on admitted that he knew that his wife invested the funds with Shell Company. He
likewise admitted that he made the phone banking deposit to credit York's account with the
P12,500.00 and the P8,333.33 using their landline telephone. With respect to petitioner
Katherene, she allegedly spoke to the bank personnel and York on several occasions and
admitted that the funds were indeed invested with Shell Company but that York knew about
this.
So as not to ruin its name and goodwill among its clients, respondent HSBC
reimbursed York the P2,500,000.00.
Based on the foregoing factual circumstances, respondent HSBC, through its
personnel, filed a criminal complaint for Estafa and/or Qualified Estafa before the Office of the
City Prosecutor, Cebu City. IcHEaA
Petitioners Bernyl and Katherene submitted their joint counter-affidavit basically
denying the allegations contained in the affidavits of the aforenamed employees of respondent
HSBC as well as that made by York. They argued that the allegations in the Complaint-
Affidavits were pure fabrications. Specifically, petitioner Katherene denied 1) having spoken
on the telephone with Dy and York; and 2) having admitted to the personnel of respondent
HSBC and York that she took the P2,500,000.00 of York and invested the same with Shell
Corporation. Petitioner Bernyl similarly denied 1) having met with Dy, Iñigo, Cortes and Arcuri;
and 2) having admitted to them that York knew about petitioner Katherene's move of investing
the former's money with Shell Corporation.
Respecting the P12,500.00 and P8,333.33 regular monthly deposits to York's account
made using the code "CEO8", petitioners Bernyl and Katherene, in their defense, argued that
since it was a deposit, it was her duty to accept the funds for deposit. As regards York's time
deposit with respondent HSBC, petitioners Bernyl and Katherene insisted that the funds
therein were never entrusted to Katherene in the latter's capacity as PCSR Employee of the
former because monies deposited "at any bank would not and will not be entrusted to specific
bank employee but to the bank as a whole".
Following the requisite preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP)
Victor C. Laborte, Prosecutor II of the OCP, Cebu City, in a Resolution 8 dated 21 February
2003, found no probable cause to hold petitioners Bernyl and Katherene liable to stand trial
for the criminal complaint of estafa and/or qualified estafa, particularly Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, the ACP recommended the dismissal of respondent
HSBC's complaint.
The ACP explained his finding, viz.:
As in any other cases, we may never know the ultimate truth of this
controversy. But on balance, the evidence on record tend to be supportive of
respondents' contention rather than that of complaint.
xxx xxx xxx
First of all, it is well to dwell on what Mr. York said in his affidavit. Thus:
'18. For purposes of opening these two time
deposits (sic) accounts, Ms. Balangauan asked me to sign several Bank
documents on several occasions, the nature of which I was unfamiliar
with.'
'20. I discovered later that these were withdrawal slips and cash
movement tickets, with which documents Ms. Balangauan apparently
was able to withdraw the amount from my accounts, and take the same
from the premises of the Bank.'
In determining the credibility of an evidence, it is well to consider the
probability or improbability of one's statements for it has been said that there
 is no test of the truth of human testimony except its conformity to our
knowledge, observation and experience.
Mr. York could not have been that unwary and unknowingly innocent to
claim unfamiliarity with withdrawal slips and cash movement tickets which Ms.
Balangauan made him to sign on several occasions. He is a premier client of
HSBC maintaining an account in millions of pesos. A withdrawal slip and cash
movement tickets could not have had such intricate wordings or terminology
so as to render them non-understandable even to an ordinary account holder.
Mr. York admittedly is a long-standing client of the bank. Within the period of
'long-standing' he certainly must have effected some withdrawals. It goes
without saying therefore that the occasions that Ms. Balangauan caused him
to sign withdrawal slips are not his first encounter with such kinds of
documents.
The one ineluctable conclusion therefore that can be drawn from the
premises is that Mr. York freely and knowingly knew what was going on with
his money, who has in possession of them and where it was invested. These
take out the elements of deceit, fraud, abuse of confidence and without the
owner's consent in the crimes charged. DAaIEc
The other leg on which complainant's cause of action stands rest on its
claim for sum of money against respondents allegedly after it reimbursed Mr.
York for his missing account supposedly taken/withdrawn by Ms. Balangauan.
The bank's action against respondents would be a civil suit against them which
apparently it already did after the bank steps into the shoes of Mr. York and
becomes the creditor of Ms. Balangauan. 9
The ACP then concluded that:
By and large, the evidence on record do (sic) not engender enough
bases to establish a probable cause against respondents. 10
On 1 July 2003, respondent HSBC appealed the above-quoted resolution and
foregoing comment to the Secretary of the DOJ by means of a Petition for Review.
In a Resolution dated 6 April 2004, the Chief State Prosecutor, Jovencito R. Zuño, for
the Secretary of the DOJ, dismissed the petition. In denying respondent HSBC's recourse, the
Chief State Prosecutor held that:
Sec. 12 (c) of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 2, 2000 provides
that the Secretary of Justice may, motu proprio, dismiss outright the petition if
there is no showing of any reversible error in the questioned resolution.
We carefully examined the petition and its attachments and found no
reversible error that would justify a reversal of the assailed resolution which is
in accord with the law and evidence on the matter.
Respondent HSBC's Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied with finality by
the DOJ in a lengthier Resolution dated 30 August 2004.
The DOJ justified its ruling in this wise:
A perusal of the motion reveals no new matter or argument which was
not taken into consideration in our review of the case. Hence, we find no cogent
reason to reconsider our resolution. Appellant failed to present any iota of
evidence directly showing that respondent Katherene Balangauan took the
money and invested it somewhere else. All it tried to establish was that
Katherene unlawfully took the money and fraudulently invested it somewhere
else . . ., because after the withdrawals were made, the money never reached
 Roger York as appellant adopted hook, line and sinker the latter's declaration,
despite York's signatures on the withdrawal slips covering the total amount of
P2,500,000.00 . . . . While appellant has every reason to suspect Katherene
for the loss of the P2,500,000.00 as per York's bank statements, the cash
deposits were identified by the numerals "CEO8" and it was only Katherene
who could transact from the computer in the work station CEO-8, plus alleged
photographs showing Katherene "leaving her office at 5:28 p.m. with a bulky
plastic bag presumably containing cash" since a portion of the funds was
withdrawn, we do not, however, dwell on possibilities, suspicion and
speculation. We rule based on hard facts and solid evidence. ATEHDc
Moreover, an examination of the petition for review reveals that
appellant failed to append thereto all annexes to respondents' urgent
manifestations . . . together with supplemental affidavits of Melanie de Ocampo
and Rex B. Balucan . . ., which are pertinent documents required under Section
5 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000. 11
Respondent HSBC then went to the Court of Appeals by means of a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
On 28 April 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision granting respondent
HSBC's petition, thereby annulling and setting aside the twin resolutions of the DOJ.
The fallo of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered by us GRANTING the petition filed in this case. The assailed
Resolutions dated April 6, 2004 and August 30, 2004 are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE.
The City Prosecutor of Cebu City is hereby ORDERED to file the
appropriate Information against the private respondents. 12
Petitioners Bernyl and Katherene's motion for reconsideration proved futile, as it was
denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated 29 June 2006.
Hence, this petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioners Bernyl and Katherene filed the present petition on the argument that the
Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing and setting aside the
resolutions of the DOJ when: (1) "[i]t reversed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, Manila
dated August 30, 2004 and correspondingly, gave due course to the Petition for Certiorari filed
by HSBC on April 28, 2006 despite want of probable cause to warrant the filing of an
information against the herein petitioners"; 13 (2) "[i]t appreciated the dubious evidence
adduced by HSBC albeit the absence of legal standing or personality of the latter"; 14 (3) "[i]t
denied the motions for reconsideration on June 29, 2006 notwithstanding the glaring evidence
proving the innocence of the petitioners"; 15 (4) "[i]t rebuffed the evidence of the herein
petitioners in spite of the fact that, examining such evidence alone would establish that the
money in question was already withdrawn by Mr. Roger Dwayne York"; 16 and (5) "[i]t failed
to dismiss outright the petition by HSBC considering that the required affidavit of service was
not made part or attached in the said petition pursuant to Section 13, Rule 13 in relation to
Section 3, Rule 46, and Section 2, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court." 17 IaAHCE
Required to comment on the petition, respondent HSBC remarked that the filing of the
present petition is improper and should be dismissed. It argued that the correct remedy is an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioners Bernyl and Katherene, on the other hand, asserted in their Reply 18 that
the petition filed under Rule 65 was rightfully filed considering that not only questions of law
were raised but questions of fact and error of jurisdiction as well. They insist that the Court of
Appeals "clearly usurped into the jurisdiction and authority of the Public Prosecutor/Secretary
of justice (sic) . . . ." 19
Given the foregoing arguments, there is need to address, first, the issue of the mode
of appeal resorted to by petitioners Bernyl and Katherene. The present petition is one
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Notice that what is being assailed
in this recourse is the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 28 April 2006 and
29 June 2006, respectively. The Revised Rules of Court, particularly Rule 45 thereof,
specifically provides that an appeal by certiorari from the judgments or final orders or
resolutions of the appellate court is by verified petition for review on certiorari. 20
In the present case, there is no question that the 28 April 2006 Decision and 29 June
2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals granting the respondent HSBC's petition in CA-G.R.
CEB. SP No. 00068 is already a disposition on the merits. Therefore, both decision and
resolution, issued by the Court of Appeals, are in the nature of a final disposition of the case
set before it, and which, under Rule 45, are appealable to this Court via a Petition for Review
on Certiorari, viz.:
SEC. 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts
whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition
for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which
must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is elementary in remedial law that a writ of certiorari will not issue where the remedy
of appeal is available to an aggrieved party. A remedy is considered "plain, speedy and
adequate" if it will promptly relieve the petitioners from the injurious effects of the judgment
and the acts of the lower court or agency. 21 In this case, appeal was not only available but
also a speedy and adequate remedy. 22 And while it is true that in accordance with the liberal
spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice, 23 this Court has,
before, 24 treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari, particularly if
the petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within which to file a petition
for review on certiorari; 25 this exception is not applicable to the present factual
milieu. aDSHIC
Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court:
SEC. 2. Time for filing; extension. — The petition shall be filed within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution
appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment. . . . .
a party litigant wishing to file a petition for review on certiorari must do so within 15 days from
receipt of the judgment, final order or resolution sought to be appealed. In this case, petitioners
Bernyl and Katherene's motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's Resolution was
denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 29 June 2006, a copy of which was
received by petitioners on 4 July 2006. The present petition was filed on 1 September 2006;
thus, at the time of the filing of said petition, 59 days had elapsed, way beyond the 15-day
period within which to file a petition for review under Rule 45, and even beyond an extended
period of 30 days, the maximum period for extension allowed by the rules had petitioners
sought to move for such extra time. As the facts stand, petitioners Bernyl and Katherene had
lost the right to appeal via Rule 45.
Be that as it may, alternatively, if the decision of the appellate court is attended by
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, then such ruling is fatally
defective on jurisdictional ground and may be questioned even after the lapse of the period of
appeal under Rule 45 26 but still within the period for filing a petition for certiorari under Rule
65.
We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court
or tribunal violates and contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. By
grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave, as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. 27 The word
"capricious", usually used in tandem with the term "arbitrary", conveys the notion of willful and
unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective hand of certiorari, a clear showing of
caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is imperative. 28
In reversing and setting aside the resolutions of the DOJ, petitioners Bernyl and
Katherene contend that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. ITSCED
The Court of Appeals, when it resolved to grant the petition in CA-G.R. CEB. SP No.
00068, did so on two grounds, i.e., 1) that "the public respondent (DOJ) gravely abused his
discretion in finding that there was no reversible error on the part of the Cebu City Prosecutor
dismissing the case against the private respondent without stating the facts and the law upon
which this conclusion was made"; 29 and 2) that "the public respondent (DOJ) made reference
to the facts and circumstances of the case leading to his finding that no probable cause exists,
. . . (the) very facts and circumstances (which) show that there exists a probable cause to
believe that indeed the private respondents committed the crimes . . . charged against
them." 30
It explained that:
In refusing to file the appropriate information against the private
respondents because he 'does not dwell on possibilities, suspicion and
speculation' and that he rules 'based on hard facts and solid evidence', (sic) the
public respondent exceeded his authority and gravely abused his discretion. It
must be remembered that a finding of probable cause does not require an
inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is
enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged. The term does not mean 'actual or positive cause;' (sic) nor
does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief. [Citation omitted.] A trial is there precisely for the reception of evidence
of the prosecution in support of the charge.
In this case, the petitioner had amply established that it has a prima
facie case against the private respondents. As observed by the public
respondent in his second assailed resolution, petitioner was able to present
photographs of private respondent Ms. Balangauan leaving her office carrying
a bulky plastic bag. There was also the fact that the transactions in Mr. York's
account used the code 'CEO8' which presumably point to the private
respondent Ms. Balangauan as the author thereof for she is the one assigned
to such work station. IHEDAT
Furthermore, petitioner was able to establish that it was Ms.
Balangauan who handled Mr. York's account and she was the one authorized
to make the placement of the sum of P2,500,000.00. Since said sum is
nowhere to be found in the records of the bank, then, apparently, Ms.
Balangauan must be made to account for the same. 31
The appellate court then concluded that:
 These facts engender a well-founded belief that that (sic) a crime has
been committed and that the private respondents are probably guilty thereof.
In refusing to file the corresponding information against the private
respondents despite the presence of the circumstances making out a prima
facie case against them, the public respondent gravely abused his discretion
amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 32
The Court of Appeals found fault in the DOJ's failure to identify and discuss the issues
raised by the respondent HSBC in its Petition for Review filed therewith. And, in support
thereof, respondent HSBC maintains that it is incorrect to argue that "it was not necessary for
the Secretary of Justice to have his resolution recite the facts and the law on which it was
based", because courts and quasi-judicial bodies should faithfully comply with Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution requiring that decisions rendered by them should state clearly
and distinctly the facts of the case and the law on which the decision is based. 33
Petitioners Bernyl and Katherene, joined by the Office of the Solicitor General, on the
other hand, defends the DOJ and assert that the questioned resolution was complete in that
it stated the legal basis for denying respondent HSBC's petition for review — "that (after) an
examination (of) the petition and its attachment [it] found no reversible error that would justify
a reversal of the assailed resolution which is in accord with the law and evidence on the
matter."
It must be remembered that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding, and that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function
when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause.
In Bautista v. Court of Appeals, 34 this Court held that a preliminary investigation is not a
quasi-judicial proceeding, thus:
[T]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-
making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often
the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged
with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It
is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of
determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal
makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for
it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the
fiscal. SEHACI
Though some cases 35 describe the public prosecutor's power to conduct a
preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like
quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department exercising
powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point. 36 A quasi-judicial body
is an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the
rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. 37 A quasi-judicial agency
performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their
decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a public
prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an
Information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice
is reviewing the former's order or resolutions. In this case, since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial
body, Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution finds no application. Be that as it may, the
DOJ rectified the shortness of its first resolution by issuing a lengthier one when it resolved
respondent HSBC's motion for reconsideration.
 Anent the substantial merit of the case, whether or not the Court of Appeals' decision
and resolution are tainted with grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause, this Court
finds the petition dismissible.
The Court of Appeals cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in reversing and setting aside the resolutions of the
DOJ. In the resolutions of the DOJ, it affirmed the recommendation of ACP Laborte that no
probable cause existed to warrant the filing in court of an Information for estafa and/or qualified
estafa against petitioners Bernyl and Katherene. It was the reasoning of the DOJ that "[w]hile
appellant has every reason to suspect Katherene for the loss of the P2,500,000.00 as per
York's bank statements, the cash deposits were identified by the numerals 'CEO8' and it was
only Katherene who could transact from the computer in the work station CEO-8, plus alleged
photographs showing Katherene 'leaving her office at 5:28 p.m. with a bulky plastic bag
presumably containing cash' since a portion of the funds was withdrawn, we do not, however,
dwell on possibilities, suspicion and speculation. We rule based on hard facts and solid
evidence." 38
We do not agree.
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances
as would excite belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. 39 A
finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt. 40 EIcSDC
The executive department of the government is accountable for the prosecution of
crimes, its principal obligation being the faithful execution of the laws of the land. A necessary
component of the power to execute the laws is the right to prosecute their violators, 41 the
responsibility for which is thrust upon the DOJ. Hence, the determination of whether or not
probable cause exists to warrant the prosecution in court of an accused is consigned and
entrusted to the DOJ. And by the nature of his office, a public prosecutor is under no
compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has
evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different
conclusion.
But this is not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on the part of the
prosecutor. It is entirely possible that the investigating prosecutor has erroneously exercised
the discretion lodged in him by law. This, however, does not render his act amenable to
correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, absent any showing of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. 42
And while it is this Court's general policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, leaving the investigating officers sufficient discretion to determine probable
cause, 43 we have nonetheless made some exceptions to the general rule, such as when the
acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority, 44 resulting from a grave abuse of
discretion. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable
cause, since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given
situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge
conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge
(public prosecutor) or run counter to the clear dictates of reason. 45
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present petition, the reasons of DOJ for
affirming the dismissal of the criminal complaints for estafa and/or qualified estafa are
determinative of whether or not it committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. In requiring "hard facts and solid evidence" as the basis for a finding of
probable cause to hold petitioners Bernyl and Katherene liable to stand trial for the crime
complained of, the DOJ disregards the definition of probable cause — that it is a reasonable
ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded, such a state of facts in the
mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe,
or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. 46 The term does not mean
"actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. 47 It is merely based on
opinion and reasonable belief; 48 that is, the belief that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged. While probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion",
it requires "less than evidence which would justify conviction". Herein, the DOJ reasoned as
if no evidence was actually presented by respondent HSBC when in fact the records of the
case were teeming; or it discounted the value of such substantiation when in fact the evidence
presented was adequate to excite in a reasonable mind the probability that petitioners Bernyl
and Katherene committed the crime/s complained of. In so doing, the DOJ whimsically and
capriciously exercised its discretion, amounting to grave abuse of discretion, which rendered
its resolutions amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari. aTCAcI
From the records of the case, it is clear that a prima facie case for estafa/qualified
estafa exists against petitioners Bernyl and Katherene. A perusal of the records, i.e., the
affidavits of respondent HSBC's witnesses, the documentary evidence presented, as well as
the analysis of the factual milieu of the case, leads this Court to agree with the Court of
Appeals that, taken together, they are enough to excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, that
the Spouses Bernyl Balangauan and Katherene Balangauan are guilty of the crime
complained of. Whether or not they will be convicted by a trial court based on the same
evidence is not a consideration. It is enough that acts or omissions complained of by
respondent HSBC constitute the crime of estafa and/or qualified estafa.
Collectively, the photographs of petitioner Katherene leaving the premises of
respondent HSBC carrying a bulky plastic bag and the affidavits of respondent HSBC's
witnesses sufficiently establish acts adequate to constitute the crime of estafa and/or qualified
estafa. What the affidavits bear out are the following: that York was a Premier Client of
respondent HSBC; that petitioner Katherene handled all the accounts of York; that not one of
York's accounts reflect the P2,500,000.00 allegedly deposited in a higher yielding account;
that prior to the discovery of her alleged acts and omissions, petitioner Katherene supposedly
persuaded York to invest in a "new product" of respondent HSBC, i.e., a higher interest
yielding time deposit; that York made a total of P2,500,000.00 investment in the "new product"
by authorizing petitioner Balangauan to transfer said funds to it; that petitioner Katherene
supposedly asked York to sign several transaction documents in order to transfer the funds
to the "new product"; that said documents turned out to be withdrawal slips and cash
movement tickets; that at no time did York receive the cash as a result of signing the
documents that turned out to be withdrawal slips/cash movement tickets; that York's account
was regularly credited "loose change" in the amounts of P12,500.00 and P8,333.33 beginning
in the month after the alleged "transfer" of York's funds to the "new product"; that the regular
deposits of loose change were transacted with the use of petitioner Katherene's work terminal
accessed by her password "CEO8"; that the "CEO8" password was keyed in with the use of
a swipe card always in the possession of petitioner Katherene; that one of the loose-change
deposits was transacted via the phone banking feature of respondent HSBC and that when
traced, the phone number used was the landline number of the house of petitioners Bernyl
and Katherene; that respondent HSBC's bank personnel, as well as York, supposedly a)
talked with petitioner Katherene on the phone, and that she allegedly admitted that the missing
funds were invested with Shell Company, of which York approved, and that it was only for one
year; and b) met with petitioner Bernyl, and that the latter at first denied having knowledge of
his wife's complicity, but later on admitted that he knew of the investment with Shell Company,
and that he supposedly made the loose-change deposit via phone banking; that after 23 April
2002, York was told that respondent HSBC had no "new product" or that it was promoting
investment with Shell Company; that York denied having any knowledge that his money was
invested outside of respondent HSBC; and that petitioner Katherene would not have been
 able to facilitate the alleged acts or omissions without taking advantage of her position or
office, as a consequence of which, HSBC had to reimburse York the missing P2,500,000.00.
From the above, the alleged circumstances of the case at bar make up the elements
of abuse of confidence, deceit or fraudulent means, and damage under Art. 315 of the Revised
Penal Code on estafa and/or qualified estafa. They give rise to the presumption or reasonable
belief that the offense of estafa has been committed; and, thus, the filing of an Information
against petitioners Bernyl and Katherene is warranted. That respondent HSBC is supposed
to have no personality to file any criminal complaint against petitioners Bernyl and Katherene
does not ipso facto clear them of prima facie guilt. The same goes for their basic denial of the
acts or omissions complained of; or their attempt at shifting the doubt to the person of York;
and their claim that witnesses of respondent HSBC are guilty of fabricating the whole scenario.
These are matters of defense; their validity needs to be tested in the crucible of a full-blown
trial. Lest it be forgotten, the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary
in nature and is a matter of defense, the truth of which can best be passed upon after a full-
blown trial on the merits. Litigation will prove petitioners Bernyl and Katherene's innocence if
their defense be true.
In fine, the relaxation of procedural rules may be allowed only when there are
exceptional circumstances to justify the same. Try as we might, this Court cannot find grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals, when it reversed and set aside the
resolutions of the DOJ. There is no showing that the appellate court acted in an arbitrary and
despotic manner, so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion or unilateral refusal to perform
its legally mandated duty. On the contrary, we find the assailed decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals to be more in accordance with the evidence on record and relevant laws and
jurisprudence than the resolutions of the DOJ. Cdpr
Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced and our disquisition
above, we hereby dismiss the instant petition for being the wrong remedy under the Revised
Rules of Court, as well as for petitioner Bernyl and Katherene's failure to sufficiently show that
the challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals were rendered in grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED
for lack of merit. The 28 April 2006 Decision and the 29 June 2006 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00068, are hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against
petitioners — Spouses Bernyl Balangauan and Katherene Balangauan.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Spouses Balanguan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174350, [August 13, 2008], 584 PHIL 183-
207)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-36142. March 31, 1973.]

JOSUE JAVELLANA, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, respondents.

||| (Javellana v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. L-36142, L-36164, L-36165, L-36236 & L-36283
(Resolution), [March 31, 1973], 151-A PHIL 35-427)
RESOLUTION
CONCEPCION, J p:
 The above entitled five (5) cases are a sequel of cases G.R. Nos. L-35925, L-35929,
L-35940, L-35941, L-35942, L-35948, L-35953, L-35961, L-35965 and L-35979, decided on
January 22, 1973, to which We will hereafter refer collectively as the plebiscite cases.
Background of the Plebiscite Cases.
The factual setting thereof is set forth in the decision therein rendered, from which We
quote:
"On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No.
2, which was amended by Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17,
1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the
Philippines. Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic
Act No. 6132, approved on August 24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which
the election of delegates to said Convention was held on November 10, 1970,
and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June
1, 1971. While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the
President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines
under Martial Law. On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved
its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day,
November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree
No. 73, 'submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor,' as well as setting
the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on
January 15, 1973.

"Soon after, or on December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed, with this Court,
Case G.R. No. L-35925, against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of
the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said 'respondents or their
agents from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until
further orders of the Court,' upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential
Decree 'has no force and effect as law because the calling . . . of such plebiscite,
the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the
ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the
appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged
exclusively in Congress . . .,' and 'there is no proper submission to the people of
said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of
speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the
people of the contents thereof.'

"Substantially identical actions were filed, on December 8, 1972, by Pablo

C. Sanidad against the Commission on Elections (Case G.R. No. L-35929); on
December 11, 1972, by Gerardo Roxas, et al., against the Commission on
Elections, the Director of Printing, the National Treasurer and the Auditor
General (Case G.R. No. L-35940), by Eddie B. Monteclaro against the
Commission on Elections and the Treasurer of the Philippines (Case G.R. No L-
35941), and by Sedfrey A. Ordoñez, et al. against the National Treasurer and
the Commission on Elections (Case G.R. No. L-35942); on December 12, 1972,
by Vidal Tan, et al., against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the
Philippines, the Auditor General and the Director of Printing (Case G.R. No. L-
35948), and by Jose W. Diokno and Benigno S. Aquino against the Commission
on Elections (Case G.R. No. L-35953); on December 14, 1972, by Jacinto
Jimenez against the Commission on Elections, the Auditor General, the
Treasurer of the Philippines and the Director of the Bureau of Printing (Case G.R.
No. L-35961), and by Raul M. Gonzales against the Commission on Elections,
the Budget Commissioner, the National Treasurer and the Auditor General (Case
G.R. No. L-35965), and on December 16, 1972, by Ernesto C. Hidalgo against
the Commission on Elections, the Secretary of Education, the National Treasurer
and the Auditor General (Case G.R. No. L-35979).

"In all these cases, except the last (G.R. No. L-35979), the respondents
were required to file their answers 'not later than 12:00 (o'clock) noon of
Saturday, December 16, 1972.' Said cases were, also, set for hearing and partly
heard on Monday, December 18, 1972, at 9:30 a.m. The hearing was continued
on December 19, 1972. By agreement of the parties, the aforementioned last
case — G.R. No. L-35979 — was, also, heard, jointly with the others, on
December 19, 1972. At the conclusion of the hearing, on that date, the parties in
all of the aforementioned cases were given a short period of time within which
'to submit their notes on the points they desire to stress.' Said notes were filed
on different dates, between December 21, 1972, and January 4, 1973.

"Meanwhile, or on December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order

temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of
free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution. On December 23, the
President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for ratification or
rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken
until January 7, 1973, when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing 'that the
plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1973 be postponed until further
notice.' Said General Order No. 20, moreover, 'suspended in the meantime' the
'order of December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation
No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution.'

"In view of these events relative to the postponement of the

aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being,
from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the conditions
under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially.
Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to
meet in regular session on January 22, 1973, and since the main objection
to Presidential Decree No. 73 was that the President does not have the
legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which
Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal
postponement of the plebiscite by the President — reportedly after consultation
with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission on Elections
— the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases.

"In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. L-
35948 filed an 'urgent motion,' praying that said case be decided 'as soon as
possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973.' It was alleged in said
motion, inter alia.
 '6. That the President subsequently announced the issuance
of Presidential Decree No. 86 organizing the so-called Citizens Assemblies, to
be consulted on certain public questions [Bulletin Today, January 1, 1973];

'7. That thereafter it was later announced that "the Assemblies will be
asked if they favor or oppose —

"[1] The New Society;

"[2] Reforms instituted under Martial Law;
"[3] The holding of a plebiscite on proposed new Constitution and
when (the tentative new dates given following postponement of the
plebiscite from the original date of January 15 are February 19 and March
5);
"[4] The opening of the regular session slated on January 22 in
accordance with the existing Constitution despite Martial Law." [Bulletin
Today, January 3, 1973.]
'8. That it was later reported that the following are to be the forms of the
questions to be asked to the Citizens Assemblies: —

"[1] Do you approve of the New Society?

"[2] Do you approve of the reform measures under martial law?
"[3] Do you think that Congress should meet again in regular
session?
"[4] How soon would you like the plebiscite on the new
Constitution to be held?" [Bulletin Today, January 5, 1973].
'9. That the voting by the so-called Citizens Assemblies was announced
to take place during the period from January 10 to January 15, 1973;

'10. That on January 10, 1973, it was reported that one more question
would be added to the four (4) questions previously announced, and that the
forms of the questions would be as follows: —

"[1] Do you like the New Society?

"[2] Do you like the reforms under martial law?
"[3] Do you like Congress again to hold sessions?
"[4] Do you like the plebiscite to be held later?
"[5] Do you like the way President Marcos is running the affairs of
the government?" [Bulletin Today, January 10, 1973; additional question
italicized.]
'11. That on January 11, 1973, it was reported that six (6) more questions
would be submitted to the so-called Citizens Assemblies: —
 "[1] Do you approve of the citizens assemblies as the base of
popular government to decide issues of national interests?
"[2] Do you approve of the new Constitution?
"[3] Do you want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new
Constitution?
"[4] Do you want the elections to be held in November, 1973 in
accordance with the provisions of the 1935 Constitution?
"[5] If the elections would not be held, when do you want the next
elections to be called?
"[6] Do you want martial law to continue?" [Bulletin Today,
January 11, 1973; italics supplied.]
'12. That according to reports, the returns with respect to the six (6)
additional questions quoted above will be on a form similar or identical to Annex
"A" hereof;

'13. That attached to page 1 of Annex "A" is another page, which we

marked as Annex "A-1", and which reads: —

"COMMENTS ON
QUESTION No. 1
In order to broaden the base of citizens' participation in
government.
QUESTION No. 2
But we do not want the Ad Interim Assembly to be convoked. Or if
it is to be convened at all, it should not be done so until after at least
seven (7) years from the approval of the New Constitution by the
Citizens Assemblies.
QUESTION No. 3
The vote of the Citizens Assemblies should already be considered
the plebiscite on the Constitution.
If the Citizens Assemblies approve of the New Constitution, then
the new Constitution should be deemed ratified.
QUESTION No. 4
We are sick and tired of too frequent elections. We are fed up with
politics, of so many debates and so much expenses.
QUESTION No. 5
Probably a period of at least seven (7) years moratorium on
elections will be enough for stability to be established in the country,
for reforms to take root and normalcy to return.
QUESTION No. 6
We want President Marcos to continue with Martial Law. We want
him to exercise his powers with more authority. We want him to be
strong and firm so that he can accomplish all his reform programs
 and establish normalcy in the country. If all other measures fail, we
want President Marcos to declare a revolutionary government
along the lines of the new Constitution without the ad
interim Assembly."
'Attention is respectfully invited to the comments on "Question No. 3,"
which reads: —

"QUESTION No. 3
The vote of the Citizens Assemblies should be considered the
plebiscite on the New Constitution.
If the Citizens Assemblies approve of the New Constitution, then
the new Constitution should be deemed ratified."
This, we are afraid, and therefore allege, is pregnant with ominous
possibilities.

'14. That, in the meantime, speaking on television and over the radio, on
January 7, 1973, the President announced that the limited freedom of debate on
the proposed Constitution was being withdrawn and that the proclamation
of martial law and the orders and decrees issued thereunder would thenceforth
strictly be enforced [Daily Express, January 8, 1973];

'15. That petitioners have reason to fear, and therefore state, that the
question added in the last list of questions to be asked to the Citizens
Assemblies, namely: —

"Do you approve of the New Constitution?" — in relation to the question

following it: —

"Do you still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?"
—
would be an attempt to by-pass and short-circuit this Honorable Court
before which the question of the validity of the plebiscite on the proposed
Constitution is now pending;

'16. That petitioners have reason to fear, and therefore allege, that if an
affirmative answer to the two questions just referred to will be reported then this
Honorable Court and the entire nation will be confronted with a fait
accompli which has been attained in a highly unconstitutional and undemocratic
manner;

'17. That the fait accompli would consist in the supposed expression of
the people approving the proposed Constitution;

'18. That, if such event would happen, then the case before this
Honorable Court could, to all intents and purposes, become moot because,
petitioners fear, and they therefore allege, that on the basis of such supposed
expression of the will of the people through the Citizens Assemblies, it would be
announced that the proposed Constitution, with all its defects, both congenital
and otherwise, has been ratified;

'19. That, in such a situation, the Philippines will be facing a real crisis
and there is likelihood of confusion if not chaos, because then, the people and
their officials will not know which Constitution is in force.

'20. That the crisis mentioned above can only be avoided if this
Honorable Court will immediately decide and announce its decision on the
present petition;

'21. That with the withdrawal by the President of the limited freedom of
discussion on the proposed Constitution which was given to the people pursuant
to See. 3 of Presidential Decree No. 73, the opposition of respondents to
petitioners' prayer that the proposed plebiscite be prohibited has now collapsed
and that a free plebiscite can no longer be held.'

"At about the same time, a similar prayer was made in a 'manifestation'
filed by the petitioners in L-35949, 'Gerardo Roxas, et al. vs. Commission on
Elections, et al.,' and L-35942, 'Sedfrey A. Ordoñez, et al. vs. The National
Treasurer, et al.'

"The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued
a resolution requiring the respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said
'urgent motion' and 'manifestation,' 'not later than Tuesday noon, January
16, 1973.' Prior thereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the
petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 filed a 'supplemental motion for
issuance of restraining order and inclusion of additional respondents,' praying —

'. . . that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining

respondent Commission on Elections, as well as the Department of Local
Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Roño; the Department of
Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National
Ratification Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de
Vega; their deputies, subordinates and substitutes, and all other officials
and persons who may be assigned such task, from collecting, certifying,
and announcing and reporting to the President or other officials
concerned, the so-called Citizens' Assemblies referendum results
allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have met during the
period comprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the two
questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion.'
"In support of this prayer, it was alleged —
'3. That petitioners are now before this Honorable Court in order
to ask further that this Honorable Court issue a restraining order enjoining
herein respondents, particularly respondent Commission on Elections as
well as the Department of Local Governments and its head, Secretary
Jose Roño; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary
Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification Coordinating Committee and
its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; and their deputies, subordinates and/or
substitutes, from collecting, certifying, announcing and reporting to the
President the supposed Citizens' Assemblies referendum results
allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have met during the
period between January 10 and January 15, 1973, particularly on the two
questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion;
'4. That the proceedings of the so-called Citizens' Assemblies are
illegal, null and void particularly insofar as such proceedings are being
made the basis of a supposed consensus for the ratification of
the proposed Constitution because: —
[a] The elections contemplated in the Constitution,
Article XV, at which the proposed constitutional
amendments are to be submitted for ratification, are
elections at which only qualified and duly registered voters
are permitted to vote, whereas, the so called Citizens'
Assemblies were participated in by persons 15 years of age
and older, regardless of qualifications or lack thereof, as
prescribed in the Election Code;
[b] Elections or plebiscites for the ratification of
constitutional amendments contemplated in Article XV
of the Constitution have provisions for the secrecy of choice
and of vote, which is one of the safeguards of freedom of
action, but votes in the Citizens' Assemblies were open and
were cast by raising hands;
[c] The Election Code makes ample provisions for
free, orderly and honest elections, and such provisions are
a minimum requirement for elections or plebiscites for the
ratification of constitutional amendments, but there were no
similar provisions to guide and regulate proceedings of the
so-called Citizens' Assemblies;
[d] It is seriously to be doubted that, for lack of
material time, more than a handful of the so-called Citizens'
Assemblies have been actually formed, because the
mechanics of their organization were still being discussed a
day or so before the day they were supposed to begin
functioning: —
'Provincial governors and city and municipal
mayors had been meeting with barrio captains and
community leaders since last Monday [January
8, 1973] to thresh out the mechanics in the formation
of the Citizens' Assemblies and the topics for
discussion." [Bulletin Today, January 10, 1973].
'It should be recalled that the Citizens' Assemblies were ordered
formed only at the beginning of the year [Daily Express, January 1, 1973],
and considering the lack of experience of the local organizers of said
assemblies, as well as the absence of sufficient guidelines for
organization, it is too much to believe that such assemblies could be
organized at such a short notice.
 '5. That for lack of material time, the appropriate amended petition
to include the additional officials and government agencies mentioned in
paragraph 3 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion could not be completed
because, as noted in the Urgent Motion of January 12, 1973, the
submission of the proposed Constitution to the Citizens' Assemblies was
not made known to the public until January 11, 1973. But be that as it
may, the said additional officials and agencies may be properly included
in the petition at bar because: —
[a] The herein petitioners have prayed in their
petition for the annulment not only of Presidential Decree
No. 73, but also of "any similar decree, proclamation, order
or instruction."
so that Presidential Decree No. 86, insofar at least as it attempts to
submit the proposed Constitution to a plebiscite by the so-called Citizens'
Assemblies, is properly in issue in this case, and those who enforce,
implement, or carry out the said Presidential Decree No. 86, and the
instructions incidental thereto clearly fall within the scope of this petition;
[b] In their petition, petitioners sought the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining not only the
respondents named in the petition but also their "agents"
from implementing not only Presidential Decree No. 73, but
also "any other similar decree, order, instruction, or
proclamation in relation to the holding of a plebiscite on
January 15, 1973 for the purpose of submitting to the
Filipino people for their ratification or rejection the 1972
Draft or proposed Constitution approved by
the Constitutional Convention on November 30, 1972"; and
finally,
[c] Petitioners prayed for such other relief which may
be just and equitable. [p. 39, Petition].
'Therefore, viewing the case from all angles, the officials and
government agencies mentioned in paragraph 3 of this Supplemental
Urgent Motion, can lawfully he reached by the processes of this
Honorable Court by reason of this petition, considering, furthermore, that
the Commission on Elections has under our laws the power, among
others, of: —
"(a) Direct and immediate supervision and control
over national, provincial, city, municipal and municipal
district officials required by law to perform duties relative to
the conduct of elections on matters pertaining to the
enforcement of the provisions of this Code . . .," [Election
Code of 1971, Sec. 3].
'6. That unless the petition at bar is decided immediately and the
Commission on Elections, together with the officials and government
agencies mentioned in paragraph 3 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion
are restrained or enjoined from collecting, certifying, reporting or
announcing to the President the results of the alleged voting of the so-
called Citizens' Assemblies, irreparable damage will be caused to the
Republic of the Philippines, the Filipino people, the cause of freedom and
democracy, and the petitioners herein because:
 [a] After the result of the supposed voting on the
questions mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof shall have been
announced, a conflict will arise between those who maintain
that the 1935 Constitution is still in force, on the one hand,
and those who will maintain that it has been superseded by
the proposed Constitution, on the other, thereby creating
confusion, if not chaos;
[b] Even the jurisdiction of this Court will be subject
to serious attack because the advocates of the theory that
the proposed Constitution has been ratified by reason of the
announcement of the results of the proceedings of the so-
called Citizens' Assemblies will argue that, General Order
No. 3, which shall also be deemed ratified pursuant to the
Transitory Provisions of the proposed Constitution, has
placed Presidential Decree Nos. 73 and 86 beyond the
reach and jurisdiction of this Honorable Court.'
"On the same date — January 15, 1973 — the Court passed a resolution
requiring the respondents in said case G.R. No. L-35948 to file 'file an answer to
the said motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16, 1973,' and setting
the motion for hearing 'on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 A.M.' While the case was
being heard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of Justice
called on the writer of this opinion and said that, upon instructions of the
President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering to him (the writer) a copy
of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the President.
Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the Court,
the parties in G.R. No. L-35948 — inasmuch as the hearing in connection
therewith was still going on — and the public there present that the President
had, according to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed
said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning. Thereupon, the writer
read Proclamation No. 1102 which is of the following tenor:

'BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

'PROCLAMATION NO. 1102
'ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE
OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.
'WHEREAS, the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred
seventy-one Constitutional Convention is subject to ratification by the
Filipino people;
'WHEREAS, Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in
municipalities and in districts/wards in chartered cities pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 86, dated December 31, 1972, composed of
all persons who are residents of the barrio, district or ward for at least six
months, fifteen years of age or over, citizens of the Philippines and who
are registered in the list of Citizen Assembly members kept by the barrio,
district or ward secretary;
'WHEREAS, the said Citizens Assemblies were established
precisely to broaden the base of citizen participation in the democratic
 process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizenry to express their
views on important national issues;
'WHEREAS, responding to the clamor of the people and pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 86-A, dated January 5, 1973, the following
questions were posed before the Citizens Assemblies or Barangays: Do
you approve of the New Constitution? Do you still want a plebiscite to be
called to ratify the new Constitution?
'WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy-six thousand
five hundred sixty-one (14,976,561) members of all the Barangays
(Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption of the proposed
Constitution, as against seven hundred forty-three thousand eight
hundred sixty-nine (743,869) who voted for its rejection; while on the
question as to whether or not the people would still like a plebiscite to be
called to ratify the new Constitution, fourteen million two hundred ninety-
eight thousand eight hundred fourteen (14,298,814) answered that there
was no need for a plebiscite and that the vote of the Barangays (Citizens
Assemblies) should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite;
'WHEREAS, since the referendum results show that more than
ninety-five (95) per cent of the members of the Barangays (Citizens
Assemblies) are in favor of the new Constitution, the Katipunan ng Mga
Barangay has strongly recommended that the new Constitution should
already be deemed ratified by the Filipino people;
'NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution,
do hereby certify and proclaim that the Constitution proposed by the
nineteen hundred and seventy-one (1971) Constitutional Convention has
been ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the
members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) throughout the
Philippines, and has thereby come into effect.
'IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
'Done in the City of Manila, this 17th day of January, in the year
of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-three.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
'President of the Philippines
'By the President:
'ALEJANDRO MELCHOR
'Executive Secretary'
"Such is the background of the cases submitted for Our determination.
After admitting some of the allegations made in the petition in L-35948 and
denying the other allegations thereof, respondents therein alleged in their answer
thereto, by way of affirmative defenses: 1) that the 'questions raised' in said
petition 'are political in character'; 2) that 'the Constitutional Convention acted
freely and had plenary authority to propose not only amendments but a
Constitution which would supersede the present Constitution' 3) that 'the
President's call for a plebiscite and the appropriation of funds for this purpose
are valid'; 4) that 'there is not an improper submission' and there can be a
plebiscite under Martial Law'; and 5) that the 'argument that the Proposed
Constitution is vague and incomplete, makes an unconstitutional delegation of
 power, includes a referendum on the proclamation of Martial Law and purports
to exercise judicial power' is 'not relevant and . . . without merit.' Identical
defenses were set up in the other cases under consideration.

"Immediately after the hearing held on January 17, 1973, or since the
afternoon of that date, the Members of the Court have been deliberating on the
aforementioned cases and, after extensive discussions on the merits thereof,
have deemed it best that each Member write his own views thereon and that
thereafter the Chief Justice should state the result or the votes thus cast on the
points in issue. Hence, the individual views of my brethren in the Court are set
forth in the opinions attached hereto, except that, instead of writing their separate
opinions, some Members have preferred to merely concur in the opinion of one
of our colleagues."

Then the writer of said decision expressed his own opinion on the issues involved
therein, after which he recapitulated the views of the Members of the Court, as follows:
"1. There is unanimity on the justiciable nature of the issue on the legality
of Presidential Decree No. 73.

"2. On the validity of the decree itself, Justices Makalintal, Castro,

Fernando, Teehankee, Esguerra and myself, or six (6) Members of the Court,
are of the opinion that the issue has become moot and academic, whereas
Justices Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio voted to uphold the validity of said
Decree.

"3. On the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to pass

the proposed Constitution or to incorporate therein the provisions contested by
the petitioners in L-35948, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Teehankee and Esguerra
opine that the issue has become moot and academic. Justices Fernando,
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and myself have voted to uphold the authority of the
Convention.

"4. Justice Fernando, likewise, expressed the view that the 1971
Constitutional Convention had authority to continue in the performance of its
functions despite the proclamation of Martial Law. In effect, Justices Barredo,
Makasiar and Antonio hold the same view.

"5. On the question whether the proclamation of Martial Law affected the
proper submission of the proposed Constitution to a plebiscite, insofar as the
freedom essential therefor is concerned Justice Fernando is of the opinion that
there is a repugnancy between the election contemplated under Art. XV of
the 1935 Constitution and the existence of Martial Law, and would, therefore,
grant the petitions were they not moot and academic. Justices Barredo, Antonio
and Esguerra are of the opinion that that issue involves questions of fact which
cannot be predetermined, and that Martial Law per se does not necessarily
preclude the factual possibility of adequate freedom for the purposes
contemplated.
 "6. On Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, the following views were
expressed:

"a. Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar,

Esguerra and myself are of the opinion that the question of validity of said
Proclamation has not been properly raised before the Court, which,
accordingly, should not pass upon such question.
"b. Justice Barredo holds that the issue on the constitutionality
of Proclamation No. 1102 has been submitted to and should be
determined by the Court, and that the purported ratification of
the Proposed Constitution . . . based on the referendum among Citizens'
Assemblies falls short of being in strict conformity with the requirements
of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution,' but that such unfortunate
drawback notwithstanding, considering all other related relevant
circumstances, . . . the new Constitution is legally recognizable and
should be recognized as legitimately in force.'
"c. Justice Zaldivar maintains unqualifiedly that the Proposed
Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of
the 1935 Constitution, and that, accordingly, it has no force and effect
whatsoever.
"d. Justice Antonio feels 'that the Court is not competent to act' on
the issue whether the Proposed Constitution has been ratified by the
people or not, 'in the absence of any judicially discoverable and
manageable standards,' since the issue 'poses a question of fact.'
"7. On the question whether or not these cases should be dismissed,
Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted in
the affirmative, for the reasons set forth in their respective opinions. Justices
Fernando, Teehankee, and the writer similarly voted, except as regards Case
No. L-35948 as to which they voted to grant to the petitioners therein a
reasonable period of time within which to file appropriate pleadings should they
wish to contest the legality of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102. Justice
Zaldivar favors the granting of said period to the petitioners in said Case No. L-
35948 for the aforementioned purpose, but he believes, in effect, that the Court
should go farther and decide on the merits everyone of the cases under
consideration."

Accordingly, the Court — acting in conformity with the position taken by six (6) of its
members, 1 with three (3) members dissenting, 2 with respect to G.R. No. L-35948, only, and
another member 3 dissenting, as regards all of the cases — dismissed the same, without
special pronouncement as to costs.
The Present Cases
Prior thereto, or on January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-
36142 against the Executive Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and
Finance, to restrain said respondents "and their subordinates or agents, from implementing
any of the provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present Constitution' —
referring to that of 1935. The petition therein, filed by Josue Javellana, as a "Filipino citizen,
and a qualified and registered voter" and as "a class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all
citizens and voters similarly situated," was amended on or about January 24, 1973. After
reciting in substance the facts set forth in the decision in the plebiscite cases, Javellana
alleged that the President had announced "the immediate implementation of the New
Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including," and that the latter "are acting without,
or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon the ground:
"that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without
authority to create the Citizens Assemblies"; that the same "are without power to approve
the proposed Constitution . . ."; "that the President is without power to proclaim the ratification
by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that the election held to ratify
the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void."
Similar actions were filed, on January 23, 1973, by Vidal Tan, J. Antonio Araneta,
Alejandro Roces, Manuel Crudo, Antonio U. Miranda, Emilio de Peralta and Lorenzo M.
Tañada against the Executive Secretary, the Secretaries of Finance, Justice, Land Reform,
and National Defense, the Auditor General, Budget Commissioner, the Chairman of the
Presidential Commission on Reorganization, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Commission
on Elections and the Commissioner of Civil Service; 4 on February 3, 1973, by Eddie
Monteclaro, personally and as President of the National Press Club of the Philippines, against
the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Public Information, the Auditor General, Budget
Commissioner and the National Treasurer; 5 and on February 12, 1973, by Napoleon V.
Dilag, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., Leonardo Asodisen, Jr. and Raul M. Gonzales, 6 against the
Executive Secretary, the Secretary of National Defense, the Budget Commissioner and the
Auditor General.
Likewise, on January 23, 1973, Gerardo Roxas, Ambrosio Padilla, Jovito R. Salonga,
Salvador H. Laurel, 7 Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. and Eva Estrada-Kalaw, the first as "duly elected
Senator and Minority Floor Leader of the Senate," and the others as "duly elected members"
thereof, filed Case G.R. No. L-36165, against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of
National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Secretary of
General Services, the President and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate. In their petition
— as amended on January 26, 1973 — petitioners Gerardo Roxas, et al. allege, inter alia,
that the term of office of three of the aforementioned petitioners 8 would expire en December
31, 1975, and that that of the others 9 on December 31, 1977; that pursuant to our 1935
Constitution, "which is still in force," Congress of the Philippines "must convene for its 8th
Session on Monday, January 22, 1973, at 10:00 A.M., which is the regular customary hour of
its opening session"; that "on said day, from 10:00 A.M. up to the afternoon," said petitioners,
"along with their other colleagues, were unlawfully prevented from using the Senate Session
Hall, the same having been closed by the authorities in physical possession and control of the
Legislative Building'; that "(a)t about 5:00 to 6:00 P.M. of the said day, the premises of the
entire Legislative Building were ordered cleared by the same authorities, and no one was
allowed to enter and have access to said premises"; that "(r)espondent Senate President Gil
J. Puyat and, in his absence, respondent President Pro Tempore Jose Roy were asked by
petitioning Senators to perform their duties under the law and the Rules of the Senate, but
unlawfully refrained and continue to refrain from doing so"; that the petitioners are ready and
willing to perform their duties as duly elected members of the Senate of the Philippines," but
respondents Secretary of National Defense, Executive Secretary and Chief of Staff, "through
their agents and representatives, are preventing petitioners from performing their duties as
duly elected Senators of the Philippines"; that "the Senate premises in the Congress of the
Philippines Building . . . are occupied by and are under the physical control of the elements of
military organizations under the direction of said respondents"; that, as per "official reports,
the Department of General Services . . . is now the civilian agency in custody of the premises
of the Legislative Building"; that respondents "have unlawfully excluded and prevented, and
continue to so exclude and prevent" the petitioners "from the performance of their sworn
duties, invoking the alleged approval of the 1972 (1973) Constitution of the Philippines by
action of the so-called Citizens' Assemblies on January 10, 1973 to January 15, 1973, as
stated in and by virtue of Proclamation No. 1102 signed and issued by the President of the
Philippines"; that "the alleged creation of the Citizens' Assemblies as instrumentalities for the
ratification of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines" is inherently illegal and
palpably unconstitutional; that respondents Senate President and Senate President Pro
Tempore "have unlawfully refrained and continue to refrain from and/or unlawfully neglected
and continue to neglect the performance of their duties and functions as such officers under
the law and the Rules of the Senate" quoted in the petition; that because of events
supervening the institution of the plebiscite cases, to which reference has been made in the
preceding pages, the Supreme Court dismissed said cases on January 22, 1973, by a majority
vote, upon the ground that the petitions therein had become moot and academic; that the
alleged ratification of the 1972 (1973) Constitution "is illegal, unconstitutional and void and . .
. can not have superseded and revoked the 1935 Constitution," for the reasons specified in
the petition as amended; that, by acting as they did, the respondents and their "agents,
representatives and subordinates . . . have excluded the petitioners from an office to which"
they "are lawfully entitled"; that "respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy have unlawfully
refrained from convening the Senate for its 8th session, assuming general jurisdiction over
the Session Hall and the premises of the Senate and . . . continue such inaction up to this
time and . . . a writ of mandamus is warranted in order to compel them to comply with the
duties and functions specifically enjoined by law"; and that "against the above mentioned
unlawful acts of the respondents, the petitioners have no appeal nor other speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except by invoking the equitable remedies
of mandamus and prohibition with the provisional remedy of preliminary mandatory
injunction."
Premised upon the foregoing allegations, said petitioners prayed that, "pending
hearing on the merits, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued ordering the
respondents Executive Secretary, the Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the . . . Secretary of General Services, as well as all
their agents, representatives and subordinates to vacate the premises of the Senate of the
Philippines and to deliver physical possession of the same to the President of the Senate or
his authorized representative"; and that "after hearing, judgment be rendered declaring null
and void Proclamation No. 1102 . . . and any order, decree, or proclamation having the same
import and objective, issuing the writs of prohibition and mandamus, as prayed for against the
above-mentioned respondents, and making the writ of injunction permanent; and that a writ
of mandamus be issued against the respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy directing them to
comply with their duties and functions as President and President Pro Tempore, respectively,
of the Senate of the Philippines, as provided by law and the Rules of the Senate."
Required to comment on the above-mentioned petitions and/or amended petitions,
respondents filed, with the leave of Court first had and obtained, a consolidated comment on
said petitions and/or amended petitions, alleging that the same ought to have been dismissed
outright; controverting petitioners' allegations concerning the alleged lack or impairment of the
freedom of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to approve the proposed Constitution, its
alleged lack of authority to incorporate certain contested provisions thereof, the alleged lack
of authority of the President to create and establish Citizens' Assemblies "for the purpose of
submitting to them the matter of ratification of the new Constitution," the alleged "improper or
inadequate submission of the proposed constitution," the "procedure for ratification adopted .
. . through the Citizens Assemblies"; and maintaining that: 1) "(t)he Court is without jurisdiction
to act on these petitions"; 2) the questions raised therein are "political in character and
therefore non-justiciable"; 3) "(t)here was substantial compliance with Article XV of the 1935
Constitution"; 4) "(t)he Constitution was properly submitted to the people in a free, orderly and
honest election"; 5) "Proclamation No. 1102, certifying the results of the election, is conclusive
upon the courts"; and 6) "(t)he amending process outlined in Article XV of the 1935
Constitution is not exclusive of other modes of amendment."
Respondents Puyat and Roy, in said Case G.R. No. L-36165, filed their separate
comment therein, alleging that "(t)he subject matter" of said case "is a highly political question
which, under the circumstances, this . . . Court would not be in a position to act upon judicially,"
and that, in view of the opinions expressed by three members of this Court in its decision in
the plebiscite cases, in effect upholding the validity of Proclamation No. 1102, "further
proceedings in this case may only be an academic exercise in futility."
On February 5, 1973, the Court issued a resolution requiring respondents in L-36236
to comment on the petition therein not later than Saturday, February 10, 1973, and setting the
case for hearing on February 12, 1973, at 9:30 a.m. By resolution dated February 7, 1973,
this Court resolved to consider the comments of the respondents in cases G.R. Nos. L-36142,
L-36164 and L-36165, as motions to dismiss the petitions therein, and to set said cases for
hearing on the same date and time as L-36236. On that date, the parties in G.R. No. L-
36283 10 agreed that the same be, likewise, heard, as it was, in fact, heard jointly with the
aforementioned cases G.R. Nos. L-36142, L-36164, L-36165 and L-36236. The hearing,
which began on February 12, 1973, shortly after 9:30 a.m., was continued not only that
afternoon, but, also, on February 13, 14, 15 and 16, morning and afternoon, after which the
parties were granted up to February 24, 1973, noon, within which to submit their notes of oral
arguments and additional arguments, as well as the documents required of them or whose
presentation was reserved by them. The same resolution granted the parties until March
1, 1973, to reply to the notes filed by their respective opponents. Counsel for the petitioners
in G.R. Nos. L-36164 and L-36165 filed their aforementioned notes on February 24, 1973, on
which date the Solicitor General sought an extension of time up to March 3, 1973, within which
to file his notes, which was granted, with the understanding that said notes shall include his
reply to the notes already filed by the petitioners in G.R. Nos. L-36164 and L-36165. Counsel
for the petitioners, likewise, moved and were granted an extension of time, to expire on March
10, 1973, within which to file, as they did, their notes in reply to those submitted by the Solicitor
General on March 3, 1973. On March 21, 1973, petitioners in L-36165 filed a "Manifestation
and Supplemental Rejoinder," whereas the Office of the Solicitor General submitted in all
these cases a "Rejoinder to Petitioners' Replies."
After deliberating on these cases, the members of the Court agreed that each would
write his own opinion and serve a copy thereof on his colleagues, and this they did.
Subsequently, the Court discussed said opinions and votes were cast thereon. Such individual
opinions are appended hereto.
Accordingly, the writer will first express his personal opinion on the issues before the
Court. After the exposition of his aforesaid opinion, the writer will make, concurrently with his
colleagues in the Court, a resumé of summary of the votes cast by them in these cases.
Writer's Personal Opinion
I
Alleged academic futility of further
proceedings in G.R. No. L-36165.
This defense or theory, set up by counsel for respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy
in G.R. No. L-36165, and, also, by the Solicitor General, is predicated upon the fact that, in
Our decision in the plebiscite cases, Mr. Justice Barredo had expressed the view that the 1935
Constitution had "pro tanto passed into history" and "been legitimately supplanted by the
Constitution now in force by virtue of Proclamation No. 1102 . . ."; that Mr. Justice Antonio did
not feel "that this Court is competent to act" in said cases "in the absence of any judicially
discoverable and manageable standards" and because "the access to relevant information is
insufficient to assure the correct determination of the issue," apart from the circumstance that
"the new constitution has been promulgated and great interests have already arisen under it"
and that the political organ of the Government has recognized its provisions; whereas, Mr.
Justice Esguerra had postulated that "(w)ithout any competent evidence . . . about the
circumstances attending the holding" of the "referendum or plebiscite" thru the Citizens'
Assemblies, he "cannot say that it was not lawfully held" and that, accordingly,
he assumed "that what the proclamation (No. 1102) says on its face is true and until overcome
by satisfactory evidence" he could not "subscribe to the claim that such plebiscite was not
held accordingly"; and that he accepted "as a fait accompli that the Constitution adopted (by
the 1971 Constitutional Convention) on November 30, 1972, has been duly ratified."
Counsel for respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy goes on to say that, under these
circumstances, "it seems remote or improbable that the necessary eight (8) votes under
the 1935 Constitution, and much less the ten (10) votes required by the 1972 (1973)
Constitution, can be obtained for the relief sought in the Amended Petition" in G.R. No. L-
36165.
I am unable to share this view. To begin with, Mr. Justice Barredo announced publicly,
in open court, during the hearing of these cases, that he was and is willing to be convinced
that his aforementioned opinion in the plebiscite cases should be reconsidered and changed.
In effect, he thus declared that he had an open mind in connection with the cases at bar, and
that in deciding the same he would not necessarily adhere to said opinion if the petitioners
herein succeeded in convincing him that their view should be sustained.
Secondly, counsel for the aforesaid respondents had apparently assumed that, under
the 1935 Constitution, eight (8) votes are necessary to declare invalid the
contested Proclamation No. 1102. I do not believe that this assumption is borne out by any
provision of said Constitution. Section 10 of Article VIII thereof reads:
"All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty or law shall be heard
and decided by the Supreme Court en banc, and no treaty or law may be
declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
members of the Court."

Pursuant to this section, the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the
Supreme Court is required only to declare a "treaty or law" unconstitutional. Construing said
provision, in a resolution dated September 16, 1949, then Chief Justice Moran, voicing
the unanimous view of the Members of this Court, postulated:
". . . There is nothing either in the Constitution or in the Judiciary
Act requiring the vote of eight Justices to nullify a rule or regulation or an
executive order issued by the President. It is very significant that in the previous
drafts of Section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution, 'execution order' and
'regulation' were included among those that required for their nullification the
vote of two-thirds of all the members of the Court. But 'executive order' and
'regulation' were later deleted from the final draft (Aruego, The Framing of
the Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, pp. 495, 496), and thus a mere majority of six
members of this Court is enough to nullify them." 11

The distinction is not without reasonable foundation. The two-thirds vote (eight [8]
votes) requirement, indeed, was made to apply only to treaty and law, because, in these
cases, the participation of the two other departments of the government — the Executive and
the Legislative — is present, which circumstance is absent in the case of rules, regulations
and executive orders. Indeed, a law(statute) passed by Congress is subject to the approval
or veto of the President, whose disapproval cannot be overridden except by the vote of two-
thirds (2/3) of all members of each House of Congress. 12 A treaty is entered into by the
President with the concurrence of the Senate, 13 which is not required in the case of rules,
regulations or executive orders which are exclusive acts of the President. Hence, to nullify the
same, a lesser number of votes is necessary in the Supreme Court than that required to
invalidate a law or treaty.
 Although the foregoing refers to rules, regulations and executive orders issued by the
President, the dictum applies with equal force to executive proclamations, like
said Proclamation No. 1102, inasmuch as the authority to issue the same is governed by
Section 63 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provides:
"Administrative acts and commands of the (Governor-General) President
of the Philippines touching the organization or mode of operation of the
Government or rearranging or readjusting any of the districts, divisions, parts, or
ports of the (Philippine Islands) Philippines and all acts and commands
governing the general performance of duties by public employees or disposing
of issues of general concern shall be made effective in executive orders.

"Executive orders fixing the dates when specific laws, resolutions, or

orders are to have or cease to (have) effect and any information concerning
matters of public moment determined by law, resolution, or executive orders,
may be promulgated in an executive proclamation, with all the force of an
executive order." 14

In fact, while executive orders embody administrative acts or commands of the

President, executive proclamations are mainly informative and declaratory in character, and
so does counsel for respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy maintain in G.R. No. L-
36165. 15 As consequence, an executive proclamation has no more than "the force of an
executive order," so that, for the Supreme Court to declare such proclamation
unconstitutional, under the 1935 Constitution, the same number of votes needed to invalidate
an executive order, rule or regulation — namely, six (6) votes — would suffice.
As regards the applicability of the provisions of the proposed new Constitution,
approved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, in the determination of the question whether
or not it is now in force, it is obvious that such question depends upon whether or not the
said new Constitution has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the 1935
Constitution, upon the authority of which said Constitutional Convention was called and
approved the proposed Constitution. It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an
amendment to the Constitution should be settled by applying the provisions of the
Constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification, or the old Constitution. 16
II
Does the issue on the validity of
Proclamation No. 1102 partake of the nature
of a political, and, hence,
non-justiciable question?
The Solicitor General maintains in his comment the affirmative view and this is his
main defense. In support thereof, he alleges that "petitioners would have this Court declare
as invalid the New Constitution of the Republic" from which — he claims — "this Court now
derives its authority"; that "nearly 15 million of our body politic from the age of 15 years have
mandated this Constitution to be the New Constitution and the prospect of unsettling acts
done in reliance on it caution against interposition of the power of judicial review"; that "in the
case of the New Constitution, the government has been recognized in accordance with
the New Constitution"; that "the country's foreign relations are now being conducted in
accordance with the new charter"; that "foreign governments have taken note of it"; that the
"plebiscite cases" are "not precedents for holding questions regarding proposal and ratification
justiciable"; and that "to abstain from judgment on the ultimate issue of constitutionality is not
to abdicate duty."
 At the outset, it is obvious to me that We are not being asked to "declare"
the new Constitution invalid. What petitioners dispute is the theory that it has been validly
ratified by the people, especially that they have done so in accordance with Article XV of
the 1935 Constitution. The petitioners maintain that the conclusion reached by the Chief
Executive in the dispositive portion of Proclamation No. 1102 is not borne out by the
whereases preceding the same, as the predicates from which said conclusion was drawn; that
the plebiscite or "election" required in said Article XV has not been held; that the Chief
Executive has no authority, under the 1935 Constitution, to dispense with said election or
plebiscite; that the proceedings before the Citizens' Assemblies did not constitution and may
not be considered as such plebiscite; that the facts of record abundantly show that the
aforementioned Assemblies could not have been held throughout the Philippines from
January 10 to January 15, 1973; and that, in any event, the proceedings in said Assemblies
are null and void as an alleged ratification of the new Constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention, not only because of the circumstances under which said
Assemblies had been created and held, but, also, because persons disqualified to vote under
Article V of the Constitution were allowed to participate therein, because the provisions of
our Election Code were not observed in said Assemblies, because the same were not held
under the supervision of the Commission on Elections, in violations of Section 2 of Article X
of the 1935 Constitution, and because the existence of Martial Law and General Order No.
20, withdrawing or suspending the limited freedom to discuss the merits and demerits of
said proposed Constitution, impaired the people's freedom in voting thereon, particularly,
a viva voce, as it was done in many instances, as well as their ability to have a reasonable
knowledge of the contents of the document on which they were allegedly called upon to
express their views.
Referring now more specifically to the issue on whether the new Constitution proposed
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified in accordance with the provisions of
Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is a political question or not, I do not hesitate to state that
the answer must be in the negative. Indeed, such is the position taken by this Court, 17 in an
endless line of decisions, too long to leave any room for possible doubt that said issue is
inherently and essentially justiciable. Such, also, has been the consistent position of the courts
of the United States of America, whose decisions have a persuasive effect in this jurisdiction,
our constitutional system in the 1935 Constitution being patterned after that of the United
States. Besides, no plausible reason has, to my mind, been advanced to warrant a departure
from said position, consistently with the form of government established under said
Constitution.
Thus, in the aforementioned plebiscite cases, 18 We rejected the theory of the
respondents therein that the question whether Presidential Decree No. 73 calling a plebiscite
to be held on January 15, 1973, for the ratification or rejection of the proposed new
Constitution, was valid or not, was not a proper subject of judicial inquiry because, they
claimed, it partook of a political nature; and We unanimously declared that the issue was
a justiciable one. With identical unanimity, We overruled the respondents' contention in the
1971 habeas corpus cases, 19 questioning Our authority to determine the constitutional
sufficiency of the factual bases of the Presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971, despite the opposite view taken by this Court
in Barcelon vs. Baker 20 and Montenegro vs. Castañeda, 21 insofar as it adhered to the
former case, which view We, accordingly abandoned and refused to apply. For the same
reason, We did not apply and expressly modified, in Gonzales vs. Commission on
Elections, 22 the political-question theory adopted in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito. 23 Hence,
respondents herein urge Us to reconsider the action thus taken by the Court and to revert to
and follow the views expressed in Barcelon v. Baker and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito. 24
The reasons adduced in support thereof are, however, substantially the same as those
given in support of the political-question theory advanced in said habeas corpus and plebiscite
cases, which were carefully considered by this Court and found by it to be legally unsound
and constitutionally untenable. As a consequence, Our decision in the
aforementioned habeas corpus cases partakes of the nature and effect of a stare decisis,
which gained added weight by its virtual reiteration in the plebiscite cases.
The reason why the issue under consideration and other issues of similar character
are justiciable, not political, is plain and simple. One of the principal bases of the non-
justiciability of so-called political questions is the principle of separation of powers —
characteristic of the Presidential system of government — the functions of which are classified
or divided, by reason of their nature, into three (8) categories, namely: 1) those involving the
making of laws, which are allocated to the legislative department; 2) those concerned mainly
with the enforcement of such laws and of judicial decisions applying and/or interpreting the
same, which belong to the executive department; and 3) those dealing with the settlement of
disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally
demandable and enforceable, which are apportioned to courts of justice. Within its own sphere
— but only within such sphere each department is supreme and independent of the others,
and each is devoid of authority, not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action
assigned to any of the other departments, but, also, to inquire into or pass upon the advisability
or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other departments
— provided that such acts, measures or decisions are within the area allocated thereto by the
Constitution. 25
This principle of separation of powers under the presidential system goes hand in hand
with the system of checks and balances, under which each department is vested by the
Fundamental Law with some powers to forestall, restrain or arrest a possible or actual misuse
or abuse of powers by the other departments. Hence, the appointing power of the Executive,
his pardoning power, his veto power, his authority to call the Legislature or Congress to special
sessions and even to prescribe or limit the object or objects of legislation that may be taken
up in such sessions, etc. Conversely, Congress or an agency or arm thereof — such as the
Commission on Appointments; — may approve or disapprove some appointments made by
the President. It, also, has the power of appropriation, to "define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts," as well as that of impeachment. Upon the other hand, under
the judicial power vested by the Constitution, the "Supreme Court and . . . such inferior courts
as may be established by law," may settle or decide with finality, not only justiciable
controversies between private individuals or entities, but, also, disputes or conflicts between
a private individual or entity, on the one hand, and an officer or branch of the government, on
the other, or between two (2) officers or branches of service, when the latter officer or branch
is charged with acting without jurisdiction or in excess thereof or in violation of law. And so,
when a power vested in said officer or branch of the government
is absolute or unqualified, the acts in the exercise of such power are said to be political in
nature, and, consequently, non-justiciable or beyond judicial review. Otherwise, courts of
justice would be arrogating upon themselves a power conferred by the Constitution upon
another branch of the service to the exclusion of the others. Hence, in Tañada vs.
Cuenco, 26 this Court quoted with approval from In re McConaughy, 27 the following:
"'At the threshold of the case we are met with the assertion that the
questions involved are political, and not judicial. If this is correct, the court has
no jurisdiction as the certificate of the state canvassing board would then be final,
regardless of the actual vote upon the amendment. The question thus raised is
a fundamental one; but it has been so often decided contrary to the view
contended for by the Attorney General that it would seem to be finally settled.

xxx xxx xxx

 "'. . . What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political,
and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be exercised by the people in
their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some
other department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power
to act. See State vs. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 497, N.W. 724, 15 L.R.A. 561; In re
Gunn, 50 Kan. 155; 32 Pac. 470, 948, 19 L.R.A. 519; Green vs. Mills, 69 Fed.
852, 16 C.C.A. 516, 30 L.R.A. 90; Fletcher vs. Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41 37 N.E. 683, 25
L.R.A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep. 220. Thus the Legislature may in its
discretion determine whether it will pass a law or submit a proposed
constitutional amendment to the people. The courts have no judicial control over
such matters, not merely because they involve political questions, but because
they are matters which the people have by the Constitution delegated to the
Legislature. The Governor may exercise the powers delegated to him, free from
judicial control, so long as he observes the laws and acts within the limits of the
power conferred. His discretionary acts cannot be controllable, not primarily
because they are of a political nature, but because the Constitution and laws
have placed the particular matter under his control. But every officer under a
constitutional government must act according to law and subject to its
restrictions, and every departure therefrom or disregard thereof must subject him
to that restraining and controlling power of the people, acting through the agency
of the judiciary; for it must be remembered that the people act through courts, as
well as through the executive or the Legislature. One department is just as
representative as the other, and the judiciary is the department which is charged
with the special duty of determining the limitations which the law places upon all
official action. The recognition of this principle, unknown except in Great Britain
and America, is necessary, to "the end that the government may be one of laws
and not of men" — words which Webster said were the greatest contained in any
written constitutional document.' (Italics supplied.)"

and, in an attempt to describe the nature of a political question in terms, it was hoped,
understandable to the laymen, We added that ". . . the term 'political question' connotes, in
legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy" in matters
concerning the government of a State, as a body politic. "In other words, in the language of
Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to 'those questions which, under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
government.' It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure."
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations,
the issue on whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the
limitations respected, is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one
of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications,
conditions or limitations — particularly those prescribed or imposed by the Constitution —
would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement
thereof are the main functions of courts of justice under the Presidential form of government
adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic
predicates. As a consequence, We have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline
passing upon said issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation — made particularly more
exacting and peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest Court of the land, to support
and defend the Constitution — to settle it. This explains why, in Miller vs. Johnson, 28 it was
held that courts have a "duty, rather than a power", to determine whether another branch of
the government has "kept within constitutional limits." Not satisfied with this postulate, the
court went farther and stressed that, if the Constitution provides how it may be amended —
as it is in our 1935 Constitution — "then, unless the manner is followed, the judiciary as the
interpreter of that constitution, will declare the amendment invalid." 29 In fact, this very Court
— speaking through Justice Laurel, an outstanding authority on Philippine Constitutional Law,
as well as one of the highly respected and foremost leaders of the Convention that drafted
the 1935 Constitution — declared, as early as July 15, 1936, that "(i)n times of social
disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is
the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments" of the government. 30
The Solicitor General has invoked Luther vs. Borden 31 in support of his stand that
the issue under consideration is non-justiciable in nature. Neither the factual background of
that case nor the action taken therein by the Federal Supreme Court has any similarity with
or bearing on the cases under consideration.
Luther vs. Borden was an action for trespass filed by Luther with the Circuit Court of
the United States against Borden and others for having forcibly entered into Luther's house,
in Rhode Island, sometime in 1842. The defendants who were in the military service of said
former colony of England, alleged in their defense that they had acted in obedience to the
commands of a superior officer, because Luther and others were engaged in a conspiracy to
overthrow the government by force and the state had been placed by competent authority
under Martial Law. Such authority was the charter government of Rhode Island at the time of
the Declaration of Independence, for — unlike other states which adopted a new
Constitution upon secession from England — Rhode Island retained its form of government
under a British Charter, making only such alterations, by acts of the Legislature, as were
necessary to adapt it to its subsequent condition as an independent state. It was under this
form of government when Rhode Island joined other American states in the Declaration of
Independence and, by subsequently ratifying the Constitution of the United States, became a
member of the Union. In 1843, it adopted a new Constitution.
Prior thereto, however, many citizens had become dissatisfied with the charter
government. Memorials addressed by them to the Legislature having failed to bring about the
desired effect, meetings were held and associations formed — by those who belonged to this
segment of the population — which eventually resulted in a convention called for the drafting
of a new Constitution to be submitted to the people for their adoption or rejection. The
convention was not authorized by any law of the existing government. The delegates to such
convention framed a new Constitution which was submitted to the people. Upon the return of
the votes cast by them, the convention declared that said Constitution had been adopted and
ratified by a majority of the people and became the paramount law and Constitution of Rhode
Island.
The charter government, which was supported by a large number of citizens of the
state, contested, however, the validity of said proceedings. This notwithstanding, one Thomas
W. Dorr, who had been elected governor under the new Constitution of the rebels, prepared
to assert authority by force of arms, and many citizens assembled to support him. Thereupon,
the charter government passed an Act declaring the state under Martial Law and adopted
measures to repel the threatened attack and subdue the rebels. This was the state of affairs
when the defendants, who were in the military service of the charter government and were to
arrest Luther, for engaging in the support of the rebel government — which was never able to
exercise any authority in the state — broke into his house.
Meanwhile, the charter government had taken measures to call its own convention to
revise the existing form of government. Eventually, a new constitution was drafted by a
convention held under the authority of the charter government, and thereafter was adopted
and ratified by the people. "(T)he times and places at which the votes were to be given, the
persons who were to receive and return them, and the qualifications of the voters having all
been previously authorized and provided for by law passed by the charter government," the
latter formally surrendered all of its power to the new government, established under its
authority, in May 1843, which had been in operation uninterruptedly since then.
About a year before, or in May 1842, Dorr, at the head of a military force, had made
an unsuccessful attempt to take possession of the state arsenal in Providence, but he was
repulsed, and, after an "assemblage of some hundreds of armed men under his command at
Chepatchet in the June following, which dispersed upon approach of the troops of the old
government, no further effort was made to establish" his government. ". . . until the
Constitution of 1843" — adopted under the auspices of the charter government — "went into
operation, the charter government continued to assert its authority and exercise its powers
and to enforce obedience throughout the state . . . ."
Having offered to introduce evidence to prove that the constitution of the rebels had
been ratified by the majority of the people, which the Circuit Court rejected, apart from
rendering judgment for the defendants, the plaintiff took the case for review to the Federal
Supreme Court which affirmed the action of the Circuit Court, stating:
"It is worthy of remark, however, when we are referring to the authority of
State decisions, that the trial of Thomas W. Dorr took place after the
constitution of 1843 when into operation. The judges who decided that the case
held their authority under that constitution; and it is admitted on all hands that it
was adopted by the people of the State, and is the lawful and established
government. It is the decision, therefore, of a State court, whose judicial authority
to decide upon the constitution and laws of Rhode Island is not questioned by
either party to this controversy, although the government under which it acted
was framed and adopted under the sanction and laws of the charter government.

"The point, then, raised here has been already decided by the courts of
Rhode Island. The question relates, altogether, to the constitution and laws of
that State; and the well settled rule in this court is, that the courts of the United
States adopt and follow the decisions of the State courts in questions which
concern merely the constitution and laws of the State.

"Upon what ground could the Circuit Court of United States which tried
this case have departed from this rule, and disregarded and overruled the
decisions of the courts of Rhode Island? Undoubtedly the courts of the United
States have certain powers under the Constitution and laws of the United States
which do not belong to the State courts. But the power of determining that a
State government has been lawfully established, which the courts of the State
disown and repudiate, is not one of them. Upon such a question the courts of the
United States are bound to follow the decisions of the State tribunals, and must
therefore regard the charter government as the lawful and established
government during the time of this contest." 32

It is thus apparent that the context within which the case of Luther vs. Borden was
decided is basically and fundamentally different from that of the cases at bar. To begin with,
the case did not involve a federal question, but one purely municipal in nature. Hence, the
Federal Supreme Court was "bound to follow the decisions of the State tribunals" of Rhode
Island upholding the constitution adopted under the authority of the charter government.
Whatever else was said in that case constitutes, therefore, an obiter dictum. Besides, no
decision analogous to that rendered by the State Court of Rhode Island exists in the cases at
bar. Secondly, the states of the Union have a measure of internal sovereignty upon which the
Federal Government may not encroach, whereas ours is a unitary form of government, under
which our local governments derive their authority from the national government.
Again, unlike our 1935 Constitution, the charter or organic law of Rhode Island
contained no provision on the manner, procedure or conditions for its amendment.
Then, too, the case of Luther v. Borden hinged more on the question of recognition
of government, than on recognition of constitution, and there is a fundamental difference
between these two (2) types of recognition, the first being generally conceded to be a political
question, whereas the nature of the latter depends upon a number of factors, one of them
being whether the new Constitution has been adopted in the manner prescribed in the
Constitution in force at the time of the purported ratification of the former, which
is essentially a justiciable question. There was, in Luther vs. Borden, a conflict
between two (2) rival governments, antagonistic to each other, which is absent in the present
cases. Here, the Government established under the 1935 Constitution is the very same
government whose Executive Department has urged the adoption of the new or revised
Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and now alleges that it has been
ratified by the people.
In short, the views expressed by the Federal Supreme Court in Luther vs.
Borden, decided in 1849, on matters other than those referring to its power to review
decisions of a state court concerning the constitution and government of that state, not
the Federal Constitution or Government, are manifestly neither controlling, nor even
persuasive in the present cases, having — as the Federal Supreme Court admitted
— no authority whatsoever to pass upon such matters or to review decisions of said state
court thereon. In fact, referring to that case, the Supreme Court of Minnesota had the following
to say:
"Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 12 L. Ed. 581, is always cited by those who
assert that the courts have no power to determine questions of a political
character. It is interesting historically, but it has not the slightest application to
the case at bar. When carefully analyzed, it appears that it merely determines
that the federal courts will accept as final and controlling a decision of the highest
court of a state upon a question of the construction of the Constitution of the
state. . . . ." 33

Baker vs. Carr, 34 cited by respondents, involved an action to annul a Tennessee

statute apportioning the seats in the General Assembly among the counties of the State, upon
the theory that the legislation violated the equal protection clause. A district court dismissed
the case upon the ground, among others, that the issue was a political one, but, after a
painstaking review of the jurisprudence on the matter, the Federal Supreme
Court reversed the appealed decision and held that said issue was justiciable and non-
political, inasmuch as: ". . . (d)eciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed
by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that
branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in
constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution. . . ."
Similarly, in Powell vs. McCormack, 35 the same Court, speaking through then Chief
Justice Warren, reversed a decision of the Court of Appeals of New York affirming that of a
Federal District Court, dismissing Powell's action for a declaratory judgment declaring
thereunder that he — whose qualifications were uncontested — had been unlawfully excluded
from the 90th Congress of the U.S. Said dismissal was predicated upon the ground, inter alia,
that the issue was political, but the Federal Supreme Court held that it was clearly a justiciable
one.
 The Supreme Court of Minnessota undertook a careful review of American
jurisprudence on the matter. Owing to the lucidity of its appraisal thereof, We append the same
to this opinion as Annex A thereof.
After an exhaustive analysis of the cases on this subject, the Court concluded:
"The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding that whether a
constitutional amendment has been properly adopted according to the
requirements of an existing Constitution is a judicial question. There can be little
doubt that the consensus of judicial opinion is to the effect that it is the absolute
duty of the judiciary to determine whether the Constitution has been amended in
the manner required by the Constitution, unless a special tribunal has been
created to determine the question; and even then many of the courts hold that
the tribunal cannot be permitted to illegally amend the organic law. . . . ." 36

In the light of the foregoing, and considering that Art. XV of our 1935
Constitution prescribes the method or procedure for its amendment, it is clear to my mind that
the question whether or not the revised Constitution drafted by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention has been ratified in accordance with said Art. XV is a justiciable one and non-
political in nature, and that it is not only subject to judicial inquiry, but, also, that it is the Court's
bounden duty to decide such question.
The Supreme Court of the United States has meaningfully postulated that "the
courts cannot reject as 'no law suit'" — because it allegedly involves a political question —
"a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated 'political' exceeds
constitutional authority." 37
||| (Javellana v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. L-36142, L-36164, L-36165, L-36236 & L-36283
(Resolution), [March 31, 1973], 151-A PHIL 35-427)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-44640. October 12, 1976.]

PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.

||| (Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. L-44640, L-44684 & L-44714, [October 12,
1976], 165 PHIL 303-447)
DECISION

MARTIN, J p:

The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with preliminary injunction relates
to the power of the incumbent President of the Philippines to propose amendments to
the present Constitution in the absence of the interim National Assembly which has not been
convened. LibLex
On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree
No. 991 calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies
("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly,
its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the
period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. 1
Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related
decree, Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991,
by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of voting
and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national
referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree No.
1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential Decree No. 991, the full text of which
(Section 4) is quoted in the footnote below. 2
On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree
No. 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on
October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued
opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such
body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new
interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-
plebiscite of October 16.
The questions ask, to wit:
"(1) Do your want martial law to be continued?
(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you
approve the following amendments to the Constitution? For the purpose of the
second question, the referendum shall have the effect of a plebiscite within the
contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:
1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim
Batasang Pambansa. Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa which shall
not be more than 120, unless otherwise provided by law, shall include the
incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected from the
different regions of the nation, those who shall not be less than eighteen years
of age elected by their respective sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent
President from the members of the Cabinet. Regional representatives shall be
apportioned among the regions in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio while
the sectors shall be determined by law. The number of representatives from
each region or sector and the, manner of their election shall be prescribed and
regulated by law.
2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and
its members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges,
and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National
Assembly and the members thereof. However, it shall not exercise the power
provided in Article VIII, Section 14(1) of the Constitution.
3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from
the election and selection of the members, convene the interim Batasang
Pambansa and preside over its sessions until the Speaker shall have been
elected. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister
and he shall continue to exercise all his powers even after the interim Batasang
Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge its functions and likewise he
shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the nineteen
hundred and thirty five. Constitution and the powers vested in the President
and the Prime Minister under this Constitution.
 4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the
powers and functions, and discharge the responsibilities of the regular
President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet, and shall be subject only to such
disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister) may prescribe. The
President (Prime Minister) if he so desires may appoint a Deputy Prime
Minister or as many Deputy Prime Ministers as he may deem necessary.
5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative
powers until martial law shall have been lifted.
6. Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there
exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the
interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable
to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires
immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary
decrees, orders or letters of instructions, which shall form part of the law of the
land.
7. The barangays and sanggunians shall continue as presently
constituted but their functions, powers, and composition may be altered by
law.
Referenda conducted thru the barangays and under the supervision of
the Commission on Elections may be called at any time the government deems
it necessary to ascertain the will of the people regarding any important matter
whether of national or local interest.
8. All provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of these
amendments shall continue in full force and effect.
9. These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President
shall have proclaimed that they have been ratified by a majority of the votes
cast in the referendum-plebiscite."
The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control
of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite.
On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and
son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the
Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October
16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they
propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as
it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the
Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.
Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to
the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new
Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no
constitutional or legal basis.
On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the comment for respondent
Commission on Elections. The Solicitor General principally maintains that petitioners have no
standing to sue; the issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of this Court;
at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise
constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.
On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction,
docketed as L-44684, was instituted by VICENTE M. GUZMAN, a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision
of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National
Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution. 3
Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on October 5,
1976 by RAUL M. GONZALES, his son RAUL, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, docketed
as L-44714, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming
Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.
These last petitioners argue that even granting him legislative powers under Martial
Law, the incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments
to the Constitution; a referendum-plebiscite is untenable under
the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973; the submission of the proposed amendments in such a
short period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity; to lift Martial Law, the
President need not consult the people via referendum; and allowing 15-year olds to vote
would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to
those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.
We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be devoid of merit.
I
Justiciability of question raised.
1. As a preliminary resolution, We rule that the petitioners in L-44640 (Pablo C.
Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad) possess locus standi to challenge the constitutional premise
of Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033. It is now an ancient rule that the valid source
of a statute — Presidential Decrees are of such nature — may be contested by one who will
sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws
providing for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. 4 The breadth of Presidential
Decree No. 991 carries an appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective implementation
of its purposes. 5 Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos
to carry out its provisions. 6 The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the
lawful expenditure of these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that
personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees appropriating said funds. Moreover, as
regards taxpayer's suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same or
not. 7 For the present case, We deem it sound to exercise that discretion affirmatively so that
the authority upon which the disputed Decrees are predicated may be inquired into.
2. The Solicitor General would consider the question at bar as a pure political one,
lying outside the domain of judicial review. We disagree. The amending process both as to
proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question. 8 This is especially true in cases where
the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a
function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of
the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in
the interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions).
After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose
amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1,
pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather
than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the
incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed
amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on
October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent
words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The
implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to
have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of
said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon.
Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the
constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the
Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared
unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .." The Supreme Court
has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the
Constitution itself. 9 The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in
form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that
authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits. LLpr
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a
particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the
contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the
Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the
Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a
constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to
propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be
found, the actuation of the President would merely he a brutum fulmen. If the
Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that
Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid
or not. 10
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-
justiciability, that the question of the President's authority to propose amendments and the
regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the proposals to the people ultimately
lie in the judgment of the latter. A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not that the
people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority and procedure for the
amending process when they ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore,
that constitutional provision has been followed or not is indisputably a proper subject of inquiry,
not by the people themselves — of course — who exercise no power of judicial review, but by
the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes
the competence to determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been
observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a priori not a posteriori, i.e., before the
submission to and ratification by the people.
Indeed, the precedents evolved by the Court on prior constitutional cases underline
the preference of the Court's majority to treat such issue of Presidential role in the amending
process as one of non-political impression. In the Plebiscite Cases, 11 the contention of the
Solicitor General that the issue on the legality of Presidential Decree No. 73 "submitting to the
Filipino people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating
funds therefor, "is a political one, was rejected and the Court unanimously considered the
issue as justiciable in nature. Subsequently, in the Ratification Cases 12 involving the issue
of whether or not the validity of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, "announcing the
Ratification by the Filipino people of the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention," partakes of the nature of a political question, the affirmative stand of the Solicitor
General was dismissed, the Court ruled that the question raised is justiciable. Chief Justice
Concepcion, expressing the majority view, said, "(T)hus, in the aforementioned plebiscite
cases, We rejected the theory of the respondents therein that the question-
whether Presidential Decree No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973, for
the ratification or rejection of the proposed new Constitution, was valid or not, was not a proper
subject of judicial inquiry because, they claimed, it partook of a political nature, and
We unanimously declared that the issue was a justiciable one. With identical unanimity. We
overruled the respondent's contention in the 1971 habeas corpus cases, questioning Our
authority to determine the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases of the Presidential
proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971,
despite the opposite view taken by this Court in Varcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs.
Castañeda, insofar as it adhered to the former case, which view We, accordingly, abandoned
and refused to apply. For the same reason, We did not apply and expressly modified,
in Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, the political-question thereby adopted in Mabanag
vs. Lopez Vito." 13 The return to Barcelon vs. Baker and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, urged by
the Solicitor General, was decisively refused by the Court. Chief Justice Concepcion
continued: "The reasons adduced in support thereof are, however, substantially the same as
those given in support of the political question theory advanced in said habeas corpus and
plebiscite cases, which were carefully considered by this Court and found by it to be legally
unsound and constitutionally untenable. As consequence. Our decisions in the
aforementioned habeas corpus cases partakes of the nature and effect of a stare
decisis which gained added weight by its virtual reiteration."
II
The amending process as laid out
in the new Constitution.
1. Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains:
"SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of,
this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of
three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention.
(2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its
Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in
an election.
SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall
be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall
be held not later than three months a after the approval of such amendment or
revision."
In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly
instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending power.
Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads:
"SECTION 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by
the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose
amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when
ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof."
There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation,
i.e., period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process
may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-
fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds
of all the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional
Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote
of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be
proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly upon special
call by the interim Prime Minister.
2. This Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, 14 had already settled that the incumbent
President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene
the interim National Assembly. Speaking for the majority opinion in that case, Justice
Makasiar said: "The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the
determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly,
consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country." Concurring,
Justice Fernandez, himself a member of that Constitutional Convention, revealed: "(W)hen
the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were
aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as
to when he could convene the interim National Assembly; it was so stated plainly by the
sponsor, Delegate Yaneza; as a matter of fact, the proposal that it be convened 'immediately',
made by Delegate Pimentel (V), was rejected." 15 The President's decision to defer the
convening of the interim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves.
In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was
submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the
referendum of July 24, 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign
will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of
February 27, 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be
initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and delegates
of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of
the interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of
January, 1973, the people had already resolved against it.
3. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of
amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not
legislating when engaged in the amending process. 16 Rather, it is exercising a peculiar
power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is
provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in
Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it
is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional
conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a
distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a
legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. 17 Such being the
case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. 18 The
prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of
legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the
Constitution. 19
III
Concentration of Powers
in the President during
crisis government.
1. In general, the governmental powers in crisis government — the Philippines is a
crisis government today — are more or less concentrated in the President. 20 According to
Rossiter, "(t)he concentration of government power in a democracy faced by an emergency
is a corrective to the crisis inefficiencies inherent in the doctrine of the separation of powers.
In most free states it has generally been regarded as Imperative that the total power of the
government be parceled out among three mutually independent branches — executive,
legislature, and judiciary. It is believed to be distructive of constitutionalism if any one branch
should exercise any two or more types of power, and certainly a total disregard of the
separation of powers is, as Madison wrote in the Federalist, No. 47, 'the very definition of
tyranny.' In normal times the separation of powers forms a distinct obstruction to arbitrary
governmental action. By this same token, in abnormal times it may form an insurmountable
barrier to a decisive emergency action in behalf of the state and its independent existence.
There are moments in the life of any government when all powers must work together in
unanimity of purpose and action, even if this means the temporary union of executive,
legislative, and judicial power in the hands of one man. The more complete the separation of
powers in a constitutional system, the more difficult and yet the more necessary will be their
fusion in time of crisis." This is evident in a comparison of the crisis potentialities of the cabinet
and presidential systems of government. In the former the all-important harmony of legislature
and executive is taken for granted; in the latter it is neither guaranteed nor to be to confidently
expected. As a result, cabinet is more easily established and more trustworthy than
presidential dictatorship. The power of the state in crisis must not only be concentrated and
expanded; it must also be freed from the normal system of constitutional and legal
limitations. 21 John Locke, on the other hand, claims for the executive in its own right a broad
discretion capable even of setting aside the ordinary laws in the meeting of special exigencies
for which the legislative power had not provided. 22 The rationale behind such broad
emergency powers of the Executive is the release of the government from "the paralysis of
constitutional restraints" so that the crisis may be ended and normal times restored.
2. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in times of martial law is now a
conceded valid act. That sun clear authority of the President is saddled on Section 3 (pars. 1
and 2) of the Transitory Provisions, thus: 23
"The incumbent President of the Philippines shall initially convene
the interim National Assembly and shall preside over its sessions until
the interim Speaker shall have been elected. He shall continue to exercise his
powers and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty-
five Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister
under this Constitution until he calls upon the interim National Assembly to
elect the interim President and the interim Prime Minister, who shall then
exercise their respective powers vested by this Constitution.
All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated,
issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land,
and shall remain valid, binding, and effective even after lifting of martial law or
the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by
subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the
incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed
by the regular National Assembly."
"It is unthinkable," said Justice Fernandez, a 1971 Constitutional Convention delegate, "that
the Constitutional Convention, while giving to the President the discretion when to call the
interim National Assembly to session, and knowing that it may not be convened soon, would
create a vacuum in the exercise of legislative powers. Otherwise, with no one to exercise the
lawmaking powers, there would be paralyzation of the entire governmental
machinery." 24 Paraphrasing Rossiter, this is an extremely important factor in any
constitutional dictatorship which extends over a period of time. The separation of executive —
and legislature ordained in the Constitution presents a distinct obstruction to efficient crisis
government. The steady increase in executive power is not too much a cause for worry as the
steady increase in the magnitude and complexity of the problems the President has been
called upon by the Filipino people to solve in their behalf, which involve rebellion, subversion,
secession, recession, inflation, and economic crisis — a. crisis greater than war. In short,
while conventional constitutional law just confines the President's power as Commander-in-
Chief to the direction of the operation of the national forces, yet the facts of our political, social,
and economic disturbances had convincingly shown that in meeting the same, indefinite
power should be attributed to the President to take emergency measures. 25
IV
Authority of the incumbent
President to propose
amendments to the Constitution.
1. As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to
the interim National Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial convening of
that Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in
the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer convening of that body in utter
recognition of the people's preference. Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to
propose amendments to the Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special
call by the President (Sec. 15 of the Transitory Provisions). Again, harking to the dictates of
the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim National Assembly. Would it
then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to assume that
constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's legislative
functions? The answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative
functions of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the
function of that Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct,
although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the President
has converted his office into a constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted by the
legislature. Rather, with the interim National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency
and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon
the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution. Parenthetically, by its very constitution, the Supreme Court possesses no
capacity to propose amendments without constitutional infractions. For the President to shy
away from that actuality and decline to undertake the amending process would leave the
governmental machinery at a stalemate or create in the powers of the State a destructive
vacuum, thereby impeding the objective of a crisis government "to end the crisis and restore
normal times." In these parlous times, that Presidential initiative to reduce into concrete forms
the constant voices of the people reigns supreme. After all, constituent assemblies or
constitutional conventions, like the President now, are mere agents of the people. 26
2. The President's action is not a unilateral move. As early as the referendums of
January 1973 and February 1975, the people had already rejected the calling of
the interim National Assembly. The Lupong Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng mga
Sanggunian, the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, and the Pambansang Katipunan
ng mga Barangay, representing 42,000 barangays, about the same number of Kabataang
Barangay organizations, Sanggunians in 1,458 municipalities, 72 provinces, 3 sub-provinces,
and 60 cities had informed the President that the prevailing sentiment of the people is for the
abolition of the interim National Assembly. Other issues concerned the lifting of martial
law and amendments to the Constitution. 27 The national organizations of Sangguniang
Bayan presently proposed to settle the issues of martial law, the interim Assembly, its
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the
President of its present powers in a referendum to be held on October 16. 28 The Batasang
Bayan (legislative council) created under Presidential Decree 995 of September 10, 1976,
composed of 19 cabinet members, 9 officials with cabinet rank, 91 members of the Lupong
Tagapagpaganap (executive committee) of the Katipunan ng mga Sangguniang Bayan voted
in session to submit directly to the people in a plebiscite on October 16, the previously quoted
proposed amendments to the Constitution, including the issue of martial law. 29 Similarly, the
"barangays" and the "sanggunians" endorsed to the President the submission of the proposed
amendments to the people on October 16. All the foregoing led the President to initiate the
proposal of amendments to the Constitution and the subsequent issuance of Presidential
Decree No. 1033 on September 22, 1976 submitting the questions (proposed amendments)
to the people in the National Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
V
The People as Sovereign.
1. Unlike in a federal state, the location of sovereignty in a unitary state is easily seen.
In the Philippines, a republican and unitary state, sovereignty "resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them. 30 In its fourth meaning, Savigny would treat
"people" as "that particular organized assembly of individuals in which, according to the
Constitution, the highest power exists." 31 This is the concept of popular sovereignty. It means
that the constitutional legislator, namely, the people, is sovereign. 32 In consequence, the
people may thus write into the Constitution their convictions on any subject they choose in the
absence of express constitutional prohibition. 33 This is because, as Holmes said, the
Constitution "is an experiment, as all life is an experiment." 34 "The necessities of orderly
government," wrote Rottschaefer, "do not require that one generation should be permitted to
permanently fetter all future generations." A constitution is based, therefore, upon a self-
limiting decision of the people when they adopt it. 35
2. The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the people to exercise
their sovereign power as constitutional legislator. The proposed amendments, as earlier
discussed, proceed not from the thinking of a single man. Rather, they are the collated
thoughts of the sovereign will reduced only into enabling forms by the authority who can
presently exercise the powers of the government. In equal vein, the submission of those
proposed amendments and the question of martial law in a referendum-plebiscite expresses
but the option of the people themselves implemented only by the authority of the President.
Indeed, it may well be said that the amending process is a sovereign act, although the
authority to initiate the same and the procedure to be followed reside somehow in a particular
body.
VI
Referendum-Plebiscite not
rendered nugatory by the
participation of the 15-year olds.
1. October 16 is in parts a referendum and a plebiscite. The question — (1) Do you
want martial law to be continued? — is a referendum question, wherein the 15-year olds may
participate. This was prompted by the desire of the Government to reach the larger mass of
the people so that their true pulse may be felt to guide the President in pursuing his program
for a New Order. For the succeeding question on the proposed amendments, only those of
voting age of 18 years may participate. This is the plebiscite aspect, as contemplated in
Section 2, Article XVI of the new Constitution. 36 On this second question, it would only be
the votes of those 18 years old and above which will have valid bearing on the results. The
fact that the voting populace are simultaneously asked to answer the referendum question
and the plebiscite question does not infirm the referendum-plebiscite. There is nothing
objectionable in consulting the people on a given issue, which is of current one and submitting
to them for ratification of proposed constitutional amendments. The fear of commingled votes
(15-year olds and 18-year olds above) is readily dispelled by the provision of two ballot boxes
for every barangay center, one containing the ballots of voters fifteen years of age and under
eighteen, and another containing the ballots of voters eighteen years of age and
above. 37 The ballots in the ballot box for voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen shall
be counted ahead of the ballots of voters eighteen years and above contained in another
ballot box. And, the results of the referendum-plebiscite shall be separately prepared for the
age groupings, i.e., ballots contained in each of the two boxes. 38
2. It is apt to distinguish here between a "referendum" and a "plebiscite." A
"referendum" is merely consultative in character. It is simply a means of assessing public
reaction to the given issues submitted to the people for their consideration, the calling of which
is derived from or within the totality of the executive power of the President. 39 It is participated
in by all citizens from the age of fifteen, regardless of whether or not they are illiterates, feeble-
minded, or ex-convicts. 40 A "plebiscite," on the other hand, involves the constituent act of
those "citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of
age or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election." 41 Literacy,
property, or any other substantive requirement is not imposed. It is generally associated with
the amending process of the Constitution, more particularly, the ratification aspect.
VII
Freedoms of expression and
assembly not disturbed.
1. There appears to be no valid basis for the claim that the regime of martial
law stultifies in main the freedom to dissent. That speaks of a bygone fear. The martial
law regime which, in the observation of Justice Fernando, "is impressed with a mild character"
recorded no State imposition for a muffled voice. To be sure, there are restraints of the
individual liberty, but on certain grounds no total suppression of that liberty is aimed at. The
machinery for the referendum-plebiscite on October 16 recognizes all the embracing
freedoms of expression and assembly. The President himself had announced that he would
not countenance any suppression of dissenting views on the issues, as he is not interested in
winning a "yes" or "no" vote, but on the genuine sentiment of the people on the issues at
hand. 42 Thus, the dissenters soon found their way to the public forums, voicing out loud and
clear their adverse views on the proposed amendments and even on the valid ratification of
the 1973 Constitution, which is already a settled matter. 43 Even government employees
have been held by the Civil Service Commission free to participate in public discussion and
even campaign for their stand on the referendum-plebiscite issues. 44
VIII
Time for deliberation
is not short.
1. The period from September 21 to October 16 or a period of 3 weeks is not too short
for free debates or discussions on the referendum-plebiscite issues. The questions are not
new. They are the issues of the day. The people have been living with them since the
proclamation of martial law four years ago. The referendums of 1973 and 1975 carried the
same issue of martial law. That notwithstanding, the contested brief period for discussion is
not without counterparts in previous plebiscites for constitutional amendments. Justice
Makasiar, in the Referendum Case, recalls: "Under the old Society, 15 days were allotted for
the publication in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette of the women's suffrage
amendment to the Constitution before the scheduled plebiscite on April 30, 1937 (Com. Act
No. 34). The constitutional amendment to append as ordinance the complicated Tydings-
Kocialskowski was published in only three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 10
days prior to the scheduled plebiscite (Com. Act 492). For the 1940 Constitutional
amendments providing for the bicameral Congress, the re-election of the President and Vice-
President, and the creation of the Commission on Elections, 20 days of publication in three
consecutive issues of the Official Gazette was fixed (Com. Act No. 517). And the Parity
Amendment, an involved constitutional amendment affecting the economy as well as the
independence of the Republic was publicized in three consecutive issues of the Official
Gazette for 20 days prior to the plebiscite (Rep. Act No. 73)." 45
2. It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the
specific date when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that it "shall be held not later
than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision." In Coleman v.
Miller, 46 the United States Supreme court held that this matter of submission involves "an
appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social and economic," which "are
essentially political and not justiciable." The constituent body or in the instant cases, the
President, may fix the time within which the people may act. This is because, first, proposal
and ratification are not treated as unrelated acts, but as succeeding steps in a single
endeavor, the natural inference being that they are not to be widely separated in time; second,
it is only when there is deemed to be a necessity therefor that amendments are to be
proposed, the reasonable implication being that when proposed, they are to be considered
and disposed of the presently, and third, ratification is but the expression of the approbation
of the people, hence, it must be done contemporaneously. 47 In the words of Jameson, "(a)n
alteration of the Constitution proposed today has relation to the sentiment and the felt needs
of today, and that, if not ratified early while that sentiment may fairly be supposed to exist, it
ought to be regarded as waived, and not again to be voted upon, unless a second time
proposed by [proper body]." 48
IN RESUME
The three issues are:
1. Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and
1033 political or justiciable?
2. During the present stage of the transition period, and under the environmental
circumstances now obtaining, does the President possess power to propose amendments
to the Constitution as well as set up the required machinery and prescribe the procedure for
the ratification of his proposals by the people?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame
allowed therefor a sufficient and proper submission?
Upon the first issue, Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and Associate Justices Enrique
M. Fernando, Claudio Teehankee, Antonio P. Barredo, Cecilia Muñoz Palma, Hermogenes
Concepcion Jr. and Ruperto G. Martin are of the view that the question posed is justiciable,
while Associate Justices Felix V. Makasiar, Felix Q. Antonio and Ramon C. Aquino hold the
view that the question is political.
Upon the second issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted in the affirmative, while Associate
Justices Teehankee and Muñoz Palma voted in the negative. Associate Justice Fernando,
conformably to his concurring and dissenting opinion in Aquino vs. Enrile (59 SCRA 183),
specifically dissents from the proposition that there is concentration of powers in the Executive
during periods of crisis, thus raising serious doubts as to the power of the President to propose
amendments.
Upon the third issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar,
Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin are of the view that there is a sufficient and proper
submission of the proposed amendments for ratification by the people. Associate Justices
Barredo and Makasiar expressed the hope, however, that the period of time may be extended.
Associate Justices Fernando, Makasiar and Antonio are of the view that the question is
political and therefore beyond the competence and cognizance of this Court. Associate
Justice Fernando adheres to his concurrence in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion
in Gonzales vs. COMELEC (21 SCRA 774). Associate Justices Teehankee and Muñoz Palma
hold that precinding from the President's lack of authority to exercise the constituent power to
propose the amendments, etc., as above stated, there is no fair and proper submission with
sufficient information and time to assure intelligent consent or rejection under the standards
set by this Court in the controlling cases of Gonzales, supra and Tolentino vs. COMELEC (41
SCRA 702).
Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino,
Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted to dismiss the three petitions at bar. For reasons as
expressed in his separate opinion, Associate Justice Fernando concurs in the result.
Associate Justices Teehankee and Muñoz Palma voted to grant the petitions.
ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions are hereby
dismissed. This decision is immediately executory.
 SO ORDERED.
||| (Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. L-44640, L-44684 & L-44714, [October 12,
1976], 165 PHIL 303-447)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.]

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA
MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention, WORLD WAR II
VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY
SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, respondents, 1 JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-
intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

||| (Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277,
160292, 160295, 160310, 160318, 160342, 160343, 160360, 160362, 160370, 160376, 160392,
160397, 160403 & 160405, [November 10, 2003], 460 PHIL 830-1126)
SYNOPSIS

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed with the Office of the
Secretary General of the House of Representatives, a verified impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and seven (7) other Associate Justices of the Court for
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and, committing high crimes. The House
Committee on Justice subsequently dismissed said complaint on October 22, 2003 for
insufficiency of substance.
The next day, or on October 23, 2003, Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr., First
District, Tarlac and Felix William B. Fuentebella, Third District, Camarines Sur, filed another
verified impeachment complaint with the Office of the Secretary General of the House against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., alleging underpayment of the COLA of the members and
personnel of the judiciary from the JDF and unlawful disbursement of said fund for various
infrastructure projects and acquisition of service vehicles and other equipment. Attached to
the second impeachment complaint was a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed
by at least one-third (1/3) of all the members of the House of Representatives. The complaint
was set to be transmitted to the Senate for appropriate action.
Subsequently, several petitions were filed with this Court by members of the bar,
members of the House of Representatives and private individuals, asserting their rights,
among others, as taxpayers, to stop the illegal spending of public funds for the impeachment
proceedings against the Chief Justice. Petitioners contended that the filing of second
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice was barred under Article XI, Sec. 3 (5) of
the 1987 Constitution which states that "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one year."
The Supreme Court held that the second impeachment complaint filed against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. was unconstitutional or barred under Article XI, Sec. 3 (5) of the
1987 Constitution. Petitioners, as taxpayers, had sufficient standing to file the petitions to
prevent disbursement of public funds amounting to millions of pesos for an illegal act. The
 petitions were justiciable or ripe for adjudication because there was an actual controversy
involving rights that are legally demandable. Whether the issues present a political question,
the Supreme Court held that only questions that are truly political questions are beyond judicial
review. The Supreme Court has the exclusive power to resolve with definitiveness the issues
of constitutionality. It is duty bound to take cognizance of the petitions to exercise the power
of judicial review as the guardian of the Constitution.
SYLLABUS

1.POLITICAL LAW; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW; INCLUDES THE DUTY TO

CURB GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY "ANY BRANCH OR INSTRUMENTALITY OF
GOVERNMENT." — This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch
of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. . . As pointed out
by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of
the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial
power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable.". . In the scholarly estimation of former
Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, ". . . judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers
among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of
the boundaries of authority and control between them." To him,"[j]udicial review is the chief,
indeed the only, medium of participation — or instrument of intervention — of the judiciary in
that balancing operation." To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave
abuse of discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of government." the afore-quoted
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block
letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this court.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE AND AUTHORITIES CONFERRING
UPON THE LEGISLATURE THE DETERMINATION OF ALL ISSUES PERTAINING TO
IMPEACHMENT TO THE TOTAL EXCLUSION OF THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
ARE OF DUBIOUS APPLICATION WITHIN OUR JURISDICTION; CASE AT BAR. —
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the
American Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition
that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under
Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of
judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it
reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the
inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment
proceedings. Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the
American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our
jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is
concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC, "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes,
[this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly
applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."
Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States,
their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful words of amicius curiae
Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT AND THAT OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINE AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONS. — The major
difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S.
Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S.
Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court
and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also
a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are also
glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect
to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S.
Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without
limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive
power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such
power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3). (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include
the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of
one and the same official.
4.ID.; ID.; POWER EXCLUSIVELY VESTED IN THE JUDICIARY; CONGRESS HAS
NO POWER TO RULE ON THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY. — The futility of seeking
remedies from either or both Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the
fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is
clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether
concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the
judiciary by the earlier quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be
sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.
5.ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL POWER IS NOT ONLY A POWER BUT ALSO A DUTY; ONLY
"TRULY POLITICAL QUESTIONS" ARE BEYOND JUDICIAL REVIEW. — From the
foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that
judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the
mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion
hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly
political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political
questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason being that respect for the
doctrine of separation of powers must be maintained. On the other hand. by virtue of Section
1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in
nature.
6.ID.; ID.; EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINT OVER JUSTICIABLE ISSUES IS
NOT AN OPTION; COURT IS DUTY BOUND TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF PETITIONS IN
CASE AT BAR. — The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option
before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally
disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the
controversy may be referred."Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested
under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this
Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions. In the august words of amicus
curiae Father Bernas "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be
renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty." Even in
cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot inhibit
itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do so. On
the occasion when this Court had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it had
acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and,
as always, with detachment and fairness." After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the
public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally
fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be
fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, toi be unafraid to displease any person, interest or
power and to equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptation lurking in [his]
office."
 7.POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; IMPEACHMENT POWER; ONE-
YEAR BAN PROHIBITING THE INITIATION OF IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
THE SAME OFFICIALS UNDER SECTION 3(5) OF THE CONSTITUTION; MEANING OF
TIE TERM "INITIATE"; CASE AT BAR. — From the records of the Constitutional Commission,
to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt
that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with
Congress' taking initial action on said complaint. Having concluded that the initiation takes
place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the
House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House
of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3(5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.
8.ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS TO MAKE AND INTERPRET ITS RULES ON
IMPEACHMENT IS NOT ABSOLUTE; IMPEACHMENT RULES MUST EFFECTIVELY
CARRY OUT THE PURPOSE OF THE CONSTITUTION. — Respondent House of
Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that
it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its
argument is premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its
rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced. Section 3(8) of Article XI provides that "The
Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of
this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase
"to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the
very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out.
Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to
make rules.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:

1.POLITICAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW; NOT

FORECLOSED BY THE ISSUE OF "POLITICAL QUESTION" ON AN ASSAILED ACT OF A
BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT WHERE DISCRETION HAS NOT, IN FACT BEEN VESTED,
YET ASSUMED AND EXERCISED. — The Court should not consider the issue of "political
question" as foreclosing judicial review on an assailed act of a branch of government in
instances where discretion has not, in fact, been vested, yet assumed and exercised. Where,
upon the other hand, such discretion is given, the "political question doctrine" may be ignored
only if the Court sees such review as necessary to void an action committed with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the latter case, the constitutional
grant of the power of judicial review vested by the Philippine Constitution on the Supreme
Court is rather clear and positive, certainly and textually broader and more potent than where
it has been borrowed.
2.ID.; ID.; SCOPE OF POWER UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, EXPANDED;
VIOLATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATES ARE SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL INQUIRY;
SUPREME COURT AS THE ULTIMATE ARBITER ON, AND THE ADJUDGED SENTINEL
OF THE CONSTITUTION. — The 1987 Constitution has, in good measure, "narrowed the
reach of the `political question doctrine' by expanding the power of judicial review of the
Supreme Court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not grave abuse of discretion
has attended an act of any branch or instrumentality of government. When constitutional limits
or proscriptions are expressed, discretion is effectively withheld. Thus, issues pertaining to
who are impeachable officers, the number of votes necessary to impeach and the prohibition
against initiation of impeachment proceeding twice against the same official in a single year,
provided for in Sections 2, 3, and 4, and 5 of Article XI of the Constitution, verily are subject
to judicial inquiry, and any violation or disregard of these explicit Constitutional mandates can
be struck down by the Court in the exercise of judicial power. In so doing, the Court does not
thereby arrogate unto itself, let alone assume superiority over, nor undue interference into the
domain of, a co-equal branch of government, but merely fulfills its constitutional duty to uphold
the supremacy of the Constitution. The judiciary may be the weakest among the three
branches of government but it concededly and rightly occupies the post of being the ultimate
arbiter on, and the adjudged sentinel of, the Constitution.
3.ID.; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS; ONE-YEAR
BAN PROHIBITING THE INITIATION OF A SECOND IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT
AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIALS UNDER SECTION 3(5) OF THE CONSTITUTION;
MEANING OF THE TERM, "INITIATE"; CASE AT BAR. — I would second the view that the
term "initiate" should be construed as the physical act of filing the complaint, coupled with an
action by the House taking cognizance of it, i.e., referring the complaint to the proper
Committee. Evidently, the House of Representatives had taken cognizance of the first
complaint and acted on it — 1) The complaint was filed on 02 June 2003 by former President
Joseph Estrada along with the resolutions of endorsement signed by three members of the
House of Representatives; 2) on 01 August 2003, the Speaker of the House directed the
chairman of the House Committee on Rules, to include in the Order of Business the complaint;
3) on 13 October 2003, the House Committee on Justice included the complaint in its Order
of Business and ruled that the complaint was sufficient in form; and 4) on 22 October 2003,
the House Committee on Justice dismissed the complaint for impeachment against the eight
justices, including Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., of the Supreme Court, for being insufficient
in substance. The following day, on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint
was filed by two members of the House of Representatives, accompanied by an endorsement
signed by at least one-third of its membership, against the Chief Justice.
PANGANIBAN, J. separate concurring opinion:

POLITICAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW; HAS THE

DUTY TO DETERMINE WHETHER ANY INCIDENT OF THE IMPEACHMENT
PROCEEDING VIOLATES ANY CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION; CASE AT BAR. —
The constitution imposes on the Supreme court the duty to rule on unconstitutional acts of
"any" branch or instrumentality of government. Such duty is plenary, extensive and admits of
no exceptions. While the Court is not authorized to pass upon the wisdom of an impeachment,
it is nonetheless obligated to determine whether any incident of the impeachment proceedings
violates any constitutional prohibition, condition or limitation imposed on its exercise.
Thus, normally, the Court may not inquire into how and why the house initiates an
impeachment complaint. But if in initiating one, it violates a constitutional prohibition, condition
or limitation on the exercise thereof, then the Court as the protector and interpreter of
the Constitution is duty-bound to intervene and "to settle" the issue. . . In the present cases,
the main issue is whether, in initiating the second Impeachment Complaint, the House of
Representatives violated Article XI, Section 3(5), which provides that "[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year." The interpretation of this constitutional prohibition or condition as it applies to the
second Impeachment Complaint clearly involves the "legality, not the wisdom" of the acts of
the House of Representatives. Thus, the Court must "settle it."
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., separate concurring opinion:

1.POLITICAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW; COURT

SHOULD DO ITS DUTY TO INTERPRET THE LAW EVEN IF THERE IS A DANGER OF
EXPOSING THE COURT'S INABILITY IN GIVING EFFICACY TO ITS JUDGMENT.
— Confronted with an issue involving constitutional infringement, should this Court shackle its
hands under the principle of judicial self restraint? The polarized opinions of the amici curiae is
that by asserting its power of judicial review, this Court can maintain the supremacy of
the Constitution but at the same time invites a disastrous confrontation with the House of
Representatives. A question repeated almost to satiety is — what if the House holds its ground
and refuses to respect the Decision of this Court? It is argued that there will be a Constitutional
crisis. Nonetheless, despite such impending scenario, I believe this Court should do its duty
mandated by the Constitution, seeing to it that it acts within the bounds of its authority. The
1987 Constitution speaks of judicial prerogative not only in terms of power but also of duty.
As the last guardian of the Constitution, the Court's duty is to uphold and defend it at all times
and for all persons. It is a duty this Court cannot abdicate. It is a mandatory and inescapable
obligation — made particularly more exacting and peremptory by the oath of each member of
this Court. Judicial reluctance on the face of a clear constitutional transgression may bring
about the death of the rule of law in this country. Yes, there is indeed a danger of exposing
the Court's inability in giving efficacy to its judgment. But is it not the way in our present system
of government? The Legislature enacts the law, the Judiciary interprets it and the Executive
implements it. It is not for the Court to withhold its judgment just because it would be a futile
exercise of authority. It should do its duty to interpret the law.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS; SUPREME COURT HAS POWER
TO DECLARE HOUSE RULES OR ACT UNCONSTITUTIONAL IF FORBIDDEN BY
THE CONSTITUTION. — While the power to initiate all cases of impeachment is regarded as
a matter of "exclusive" concern only of the House of Representatives, over which the other
departments may not exercise jurisdiction by virtue of the separation of powers established
by the fundamental law, it does not follow that the House of Representatives may not overstep
its own powers defined and limited by the Constitution. Indeed, it cannot, under the guise of
implementing its Rules, transgress the Constitution, for when it does, its act immediately
ceases to be a mere internal concern. Surely, by imposing limitations on specific powers of
the House of Representatives, a fortiori, the Constitution has prescribed a diminution of its
"exclusive power." I am sure that the honorable Members of the House who took part in the
promulgation and adoption of its internal rules on impeachment did not intend to disregard or
disobey the clear mandate of the Constitution — the law of the people. And I confidently
believe that they recognize, as fully as this Court does, that the Constitution is the supreme
law of the land, equally binding upon every branch or department of the government and upon
every citizen, high or low. It need not be stressed that under our present form of government,
the executive, legislative and judicial departments are coequal and co-important. But it does
not follow that this Court, whose Constitutional primary duty is to interpret the supreme law of
the land, has not the power to declare the House Rules unconstitutional. Of course, this Court
will not attempt to require the House of Representatives to adopt a particular action, but it is
authorized and empowered to pronounce an action null and void if found to be contrary to the
provisions of the Constitution.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPEACHMENT CASES; PETITIONERS, AS TAXPAYERS,
HAVE LOCUS STANDI TO QUESTION VALIDITY OF THE SECOND IMPEACHMENT
COMPLAINT AGAINST THE CHIEF JUSTICE. — Indeed, the present suits involve matters
of first impression and of immense importance to the public considering that, as previously
stated, this is the first time a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is being subjected to an
impeachment proceeding which, according to petitioners, is prohibited by the Constitution.
Obviously, if such proceeding is not prevented and nullified, public funds amounting to millions
of pesos will be disbursed for an illegal act. Undoubtedly, this is a grave national concern
involving paramount public interest. The petitions are properly instituted to avert such a
situation.
CORONA, J., separate opinion:

1.POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; IMPEACHMENT; PURPOSE;

INTENDED TO BE AN INSTRUMENT OF LAST RESORT. — Impeachment has been
described as sui generis and an "exceptional method of removing exceptional public officials
 (that must be) exercised by the Congress with exceptional caution." Thus, it is directed only
at an exclusive list of officials, providing for complex procedures, exclusive grounds and every
stringent limitations. The implied constitutional caveat on impeachment is that Congress
should use that awesome power only for protecting the welfare of the state and the people,
and not merely the personal interests of a few. There exists no doubt in my mind that the
framers of the Constitution intended impeachment to be an instrument of last resort, a
draconian measure to be exercised only when there are no other alternatives available. It was
never meant to be a bargaining chip, much less a weapon for political leverage.
Unsubstantiated allegations, mere suspicions of wrongdoing and other less than serious
grounds, needless to state, preclude its invocation or exercise.
2.POLITICAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW; SUPREME
COURT HAS THE DUTY TO DECIDE PENDING PETITIONS TO MAINTAIN THE
SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION IN CASE AT BAR. — The Court has the obligation
to decide on the issues before us to preserve the hierarchy of laws and to maintain the
supremacy of the rule of the Constitution over the rule of men, . . .The Court should not evade
its duty to decide the pending petitions because of its sworn responsibility as the guardian of
the Constitution. To refuse cognizance of the present petitions merely because they indirectly
concern the Chief Justice of this Court is to skirt the duty of dispensing fair and impartial
justice. Furthermore, refusing to assume jurisdiction under these circumstances will run afoul
of the great traditions of our democratic way of life and the very reason why this Court exists
in the first place.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SCOPE OF POWER UNDER THE
1987 CONSTITUTION EXPANDED. — Under the new definition of judicial power embodied
in Article VIII, Section 1, courts of justice have not only the authority but also the duty to "settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable" and "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." The
Court can therefore, in certain situations provided in the Constitution itself, inquire into the
acts of Congress and the President, though with great hesitation and prudence owing to
mutual respect and comity. Among these situations, in so far as the pending petitions are
concerned, are (1) issues involving constitutionality and (2) grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch of the government.
These are the strongest reasons for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction over the pending
cases before us.
DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J p:

There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate
and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the determination by the independent
branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional
powers where the Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times
turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is
confronted with one such today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has drawn
legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent
cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present
controversy subject of the instant petitions — whether the filing of the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls
within the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a
political question — has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that
it was brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to
address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally
pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of
resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of
the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever
mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the
legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute
autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by
the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been
carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three
branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended
as they are to insure that governmental power is wielded only for the good of the people,
mandate a relationship of interdependence and coordination among these branches where
the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve
a unity of governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-being of the
people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction
of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment. cEDIAa
SECTION 3.(1)The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2)A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of
the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement
by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within
ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt
thereof.
 (3)A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment
of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member
shall be recorded.
(4)In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by
at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5)No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.
(6)The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or
affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted
without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7)Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of
the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject
to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
(8)The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively
carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th
Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding
the previous House Impeachment Rules 1 approved by the 11th Congress.
The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are
shown in the following tabulation:
11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES

RULE II RULE V
INITIATING IMPEACHMENT BAR AGAINST INITIATION
OF IMPEACHMENT
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
THE SAME OFFICIAL

Section 2. Mode of Initiating Section 16. Impeachment Proceedings

Impeachment. — Impeachment
shall be initiated only by a verified
complaint for impeachment filed by
any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon
a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof or by a verified
complaint or resolution of impeachment
filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all
the Members of the House.
Deemed Initiated. — In cases where a
Member of the House files a verified
complaint of impeachment or a citizen
files a verified complaint that is endorsed
by a Member of the House through a
resolution of endorsement against an
impeachable officer, impeachment
proceedings against such official are
deemed initiated on the day the
Committee on Justice finds that the
verified complaint and/or resolution
 against such official, as the case may
be, is sufficient in substance, or on the
date the House votes to overturn or
affirm the finding of the said
Committee that the verified complaint
and/or resolution, as the case may
be, is not sufficient in substance.

In cases where a verified complaint or a

resolution of impeachment is filed or
endorsed, as the case may be, by at least one-
third (1/3) of the Members of the House,
impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated at the time of the filing of such
verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment with the Secretary General.

RULE V
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT

Section 14. Scope of Bar. — No Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of

impeachment proceedings shall be Impeachment Proceedings. — Within a
initiated against the same official more period of one (1) year from the date
than once within the period of one impeachment proceedings are deemed
(1) year. initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof,
no impeachment proceedings, as such,
can be initiated against the same official.
(Italics in the original; emphasis and
italics supplied)
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, 2 sponsored
by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF)." 3
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint 4 (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices 5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of
the public trust and other high crimes." 6 The complaint was endorsed by Representatives
Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, 7 and was referred to
the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 8 in accordance with Section 3(2) of
Article XI of the Constitution which reads: HSTCcD
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority
vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session
 days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The
resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session
days from receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was "sufficient in form," 9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for
being insufficient in substance. 10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet
been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of
the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or
on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the
second impeachment complaint 11 was filed with the Secretary General of the House 12 by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B.
Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House
of Representatives. 13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et al., most of
which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional
as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a
duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies
to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a
victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress," 14 posits that his right to bring an
impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to
the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved
on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections
16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this
Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et al. to
comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second
impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of Representatives, and
to promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently
enjoin respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et al., as citizens and
taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental importance, pray, in their
petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondent
House of Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice
with the Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate
and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the
Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with
the impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as
citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging
that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of public funds
necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for
the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings
on said second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has
recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases
of Chavez v. PCGG 15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation, 16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be
declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et al., as taxpayers and
members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting
respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to
the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno
from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. ESCTaA
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy
Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of Representatives, they
have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional impeachment proceedings are
initiated, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint
and any act proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al., claiming that they have a
right to be protected against all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers’ money and that
they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of
the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class
suit" and pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint
as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court
enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and
deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the
Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on the
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are
citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a
member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature
is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest and
pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment
complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member
of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner
Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of
Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is
mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7,
8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the
House of Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint. CTAIHc
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et al., in their
petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all
citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran 17 which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of
Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives
and the Senate from conducting further proceedings on the second impeachment complaint
and that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and the
acts of respondent House of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the
Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging
that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance
and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial
interest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging
their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the
House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and
the Senate from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition
for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the second
impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they acted
without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers
of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofileña,
alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding interest in the subject matter of their
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which they are
trying to inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the House of Representatives be
enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the
second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus
standi, but alleging that the second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether
or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that the
House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit
thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action
and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues
raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental
importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment
complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent
House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the
Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment
and from conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas, et al., as citizens and
taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment
complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and impeachment by the respondent
House of Representatives be declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate
President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against
the Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited
from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first
three of the eighteen which were filed before this Court, 18 prayed for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second
impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R.
No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House
Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.
 Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were
filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number
G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into
the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy
of the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a
motion was put forth that the second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the
Senate, but it was not carried because the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of
quorum, 19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be
forwarded to the Senate. TEHDIA
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and
Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban
inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of
October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House of
Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions
not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on
November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici
curiae. 20 In addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the status
quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing
acts that would render the petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through
Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special appearance,
submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less
prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch
of government under the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated
duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his
own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela) 21 and Comment, praying that
"the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues
affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of
the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one
where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the
provisions of Article XI of the Constitution." 22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a)
consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their
comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral
arguments on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin
M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly
premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the
petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to
constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of
Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain
exclusively to the proceedings in the House of Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in
G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status
quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would
unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the
dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed
in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein
Incorporated Petition in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November
5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-
Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292,
160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and
Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the
arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor
General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court
on November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked;
who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and whether it should be
exercised by this Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a)locus standi of petitioners;
b)ripeness (prematurity; mootness);
c)political question/justiciability;
d)House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;
e)Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment; aTADCE
f)constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section
3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and
g)judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the
instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and against the
grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1)
the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those
arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the
exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet
remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial
review to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
 Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice
Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission 23 after the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not
contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes.
Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:
. . . In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional
organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units
thereof .
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection
and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting
through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of
their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government
intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of
checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided
in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the
restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these
restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if
the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course
of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers
would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the
principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the
limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should
be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional
grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of
the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been
set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear
implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution. IAETDc
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to
determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself
has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when
the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert
any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to
them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy"
which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then,
this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to
the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
 conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner,
the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by
the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual
cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government. 24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and italics
supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper
allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts 25 as a necessary
consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." 26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly
conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the
1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison 27 that the power of judicial review was first
articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall
be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not
the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made
in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States
confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all
written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that
courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument. 28 (Italics in
the original; emphasis supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935
Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate
constitutionally infirm acts. 29 And as pointed out by noted political law professor and former
Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, 30 the executive and legislative branches of our
government in fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the
Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7.Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation
or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution,
the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid
only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis
supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 31 judicial review is indeed an
integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the
corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of
government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for
which it serves.
 The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in
our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance
of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does
not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct
that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government. . . . And the judiciary in turn, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in
the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive
and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. 32 (Emphasis and italics
supplied) THaAEC
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, ". .
. judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers
and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the
definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them." 33 To
him, "[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation — or instrument of
intervention — of the judiciary in that balancing operation." 34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion
by "any branch or instrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called
"expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are
mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief
Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
xxx xxx xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions.
It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in

such lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and
explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our
experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in
the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred
considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the
government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up
the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain
principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority
of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to
the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up the
 defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is
political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary
feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not
merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect,
encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the
agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other
words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but
a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the
courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by
claiming that such matters constitute a political question. 35 (Italics in the
original; emphasis and italics supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must
necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of
constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must
be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 36 this Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its
meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be
assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express
the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus
attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's
document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be
present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should
be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to
the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for
construction is reduced to a minimum. 37 (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of
the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did
this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 38 in this
wise: SHTaID
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the
Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the
times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was
framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of
the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be
 accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words
consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose. 39 (Emphasis
and italics supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 40 where, speaking through Madame
Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:

. . . The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental

principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic
law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of
the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It
may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were
guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. 41 (Emphasis and
italics supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.
Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon, 42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:
. . . [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have
dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person
without considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted
subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to
the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction
with all other provisions of that great document. 43 (Emphasis and italics
supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 44 this Court affirmed that:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one

provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be
considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are
to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great
purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be
considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of
the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any
reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must
lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than
one which may make the words idle and nugatory. 45 (Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids
is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court
expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and
purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other
guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of
the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional
convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and
as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views
of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens
whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We
think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The
proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the
 people adopting it than in the framers's understanding thereof . 46 (Emphasis
and italics supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and
jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review that respondents Speaker De
Venecia, et al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that
the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia, et al. that
impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any
question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the
reach of judicial review. 47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to
try" impeachment cases 48 (1) entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it; and
(2) necessarily includes the Senate’s power to determine constitutional questions relative to
impeachment proceedings. 49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are
outside the scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et al. and intervenor
Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, principally the majority opinion in the
case of Nixon v. United States. 50 Thus, they contend that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to
allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the
system of checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on
the judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning
relief. 51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US Constitution to show the
intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the
American Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition
that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under
Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of
judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it
reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the
inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment
proceedings. TEcAHI
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution,
are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have
only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in
the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC , 52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court]
should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because
they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs." 53 Indeed, although
the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of
development have long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut
the umbilical cord." DHacTC
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and
that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is
only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted
to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in
the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to
include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government
branch or instrumentality.
 There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine
Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment
proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House
of Representatives without limitation, 54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House of
Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, 55 provides for several
limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article
XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the
one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines
their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they
call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever
possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively,
recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride." 56
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned
safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the
matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-
defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr, 57 "judicially discoverable standards" for
determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez 58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon, 59 cited by
respondents in support of the argument that the impeachment power is beyond the scope of
judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of petitions for writs of
mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the
exercise of the power of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial
review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., 60 this Court ruled that
it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its
officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise
of their functions and prerogatives. In Tañada v. Angara, 61 in seeking to nullify an act of the
Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition
raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of
the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda, 62 this Court declared null and void a
resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the
election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative
of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra, 63 it held that the resolution
of whether the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on
proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of
the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson, 64 it held that the act of the
House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments
is subject to judicial review. In Tañada v. Cuenco, 65 it held that although under
the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract
from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara
v. Electoral Commission, 66 it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election
of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such
member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National
Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and
balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another." 67 Both are integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond
the powers assigned to it by the Constitution. ATHCDa
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial
review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations,
namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.
. . . Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties,
and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts
accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies
must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government. 68 (Italics in the original)
Standing

Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether
a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that
petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain
direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito
Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since
this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens,
legislators in cases involving paramount public interest 70 and transcendental
importance, 71 and that procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine whether
or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of
the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to
them. 72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same
opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule exception that, when
the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in
the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction
of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule
on standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure 73 while the latter has constitutional
underpinnings. 74 In view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court
to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc.v. Morato 75 to clarify what is meant by locus
standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has
been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that standing because
of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from
questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or
has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards
ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions
require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns
relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some
cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the
operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers
or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing
is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions." DTAcIa
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether
he is "the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party
entitled to the avails of the suit.'" 76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners asserts a
violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the
vindication of their own rights — as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or
in a class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession — which were supposedly
violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when
specific requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of
a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any
government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in
some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected
to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. 77 In fine, when
the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, 78 the mere fact that he is a citizen
satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds
are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or
that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. 79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must
specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money
raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of
the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest
common to all members of the public. 80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit
should be entertained. 81 This Court opted to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given
their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment
and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public
funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action
which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. 82 Indeed, a member of the House
of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in his office. 83
While an associationhas legal personality to represent its members, 84 especially
when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital
interests, 85 the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of
the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although
undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is
shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the petition shows that
it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. 86 It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax
the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons
intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned 87 to
enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit, 88 for a judgment in a
class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata principle,
binding on all members of the class whether or not they were before the court. 89 Where it
clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent
issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit
ought to fail. Since petitioners additionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however,
their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of
transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on
his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following
determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are
instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence
of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent
agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more
direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. 90 Applying these
determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental
importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of
a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the
people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public. 91 Such
liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party should have an interest
in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of
such interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos'
case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court
requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success
of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the
applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention. 92
 In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra’s case, they
seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional
issue, they raise the same issues and the same standing, and no objection on the part of
petitioners Candelaria, et al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted their
Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al.
sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens to
intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members of the
House of Representatives is successful," this Court found the requisites for intervention had
been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263,
160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 are of transcendental importance, World War II
Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to
Intervene" to raise the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment complaint
against the Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by
the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino,
Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal
interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited
purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President
Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does
will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once
the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly,
Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of
Congress against which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate
all substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and
he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue. IEcDCa
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for,
while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for
bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. COMELEC, 93 to wit:
. . . While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of
public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax
money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional
protection against abuses of legislative power," or that there is a misapplication
of such funds by respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected
to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from
wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law. 94 (Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of
petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected
to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not
suffice to clothe him with standing.

Ripeness and Prematurity

In Tan v. Macapagal, 95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a
case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then
been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture." 96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the
matter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment
Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The
questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been
filed with the House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already
promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be
accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied
with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are
premature. Amicus curiae former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may
be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on
questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the House
and Senate should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who
suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to
the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the House
Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions
themselves when the Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the
same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles are transmitted
to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a
motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives
of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their
constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned
second impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2)
and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution 97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer
their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both
Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously
discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power to
rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment
proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier
quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which
is bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability

In the leading case of Tañada v. Cuenco, 98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion

defined the term "political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means
in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language
of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. 99 (Italics in
the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme
or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved
political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political question
doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial review. 100 In other cases, however,
despite the seeming political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed
jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred
upon political bodies. 101 Even in the landmark case of Javellana v. Executive
Secretary 102 which raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in
force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and took cognizance thereof.
Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to
take jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice
Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of
judicial review and its application on issues involving political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose,
the usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the three major
branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive
the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or
commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after
all, reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful of all other powers without
exception. . . . And so, with the body’s indulgence, I will proceed to read the
provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions.
It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and
explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our
experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in
the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred
considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the
government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up
the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain
principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority
of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to
the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up the
defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is
political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary
feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not
merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect,
encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure
 the members of the Bar are familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the
Members of the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start
with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the
Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced on
September 22, although the proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious
reason for the delay in its publication was that the administration had
apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So that when
martial law was announced on September 22, the media hardly published
anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story not only because
our main writers were already incarcerated, but also because those who
succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of
wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June
1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it had
barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon
the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional
Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of them was our very own
colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution
was taken over by representatives of Malacañang. In 17 days, they finished what
the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to
accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was
presented to the President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President
issued a decree calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation of some
provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much less
public discussions of certain matters of public concern. The purpose was
presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a
plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous
by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft
of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that
Malacañang felt the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended
indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and announced that he would consult the
people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But the
questions to be submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve
of its scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision not of the
Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as "citizens
assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came into existence. The
questions to be propounded were released with proposed answers thereto,
suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers
given in the referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite.
Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding
of the referendum be suspended. When the motion was being heard before the
Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of
the President declaring that the new Constitution was already in force because
the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored the
Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I
proceeded to the session room where the case was being heard. I then informed
the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973
Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential
proclamation null and void. The main defense put up by the government was that
the issue was a political question and that the court had no jurisdiction to
entertain the case.
xxx xxx xxx
 The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to
January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note that all
members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of them had
been notified of any referendum in their respective places of residence, much
less did they participate in the alleged referendum. None of them saw any
referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority
of the members of the Court felt that there had been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big
difference between a referendum and a plebiscite. But another group of justices
upheld the defense that the issue was a political question. Whereupon, they
dismissed the case. This is not the only major case in which the plea of "political
question" was set up. There have been a number of other cases in the past.
. . . The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue
was clearly justiciable.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions,
it faced the following questions: What is judicial power? What is a political
question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle
actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and
enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be
enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband complained that his
wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell
your wife what her duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with them,
but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to her
husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that
to enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human
dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides
that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or
enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical
questions. In a presidential system of government, the Supreme Court has, also
another important function. The powers of government are generally considered
divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the
Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the
others. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is
valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the
agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other
words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but
a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
 This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the
courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by
claiming that such matters constitute a political question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners
may have an initial food for thought on the subject of the judiciary. 103 (Italics in
the original; emphasis supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion
further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but
judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in other lower
courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to
identify political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary
cases but where there is a question as to whether the government had authority
or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of
jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to
decide.
xxx xxx xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by
the Supreme Court according to the new numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the
political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of
discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction . . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to
do away with the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is
judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial power includes"
and the reason being that the definition that we might make may not cover all
possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising
from the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly
political questions are beyond the pale of judicial power. 104 (Emphasis
supplied)
 From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be
abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief
Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended
to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are
two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not
truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason being that respect
for the doctrine of separation of powers must be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly
political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of
Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are
not truly political following the effectivity of the present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus, 105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene
Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine
and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under
previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to
decide. 106 . . .
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla,
this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must
perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he
political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination
of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been
given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the
1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with the
applicability of the principle in appropriate cases." 108 (Emphasis and italics
supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson, 109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less
tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the
issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded
from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now
covers, in proper cases, even the political question. 110 . . . (Emphasis and
italics supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political
questions and non-justiciable political questions, however. Identification of these two species
of political questions may be problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American
case of Baker v. Carr 111 attempts to provide some:
. . . Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or
 an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already made;
or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question. 112 (emphasis supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion.
These standards are not separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that
the presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.

The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of
judicial review is radically different from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in determining whether they should
pass upon a constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable
political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our
courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government
properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present
controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I.Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute
valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
II.Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with
Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III.Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the
Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the
constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV.Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted
by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of
Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
V.Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of
Article XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which
this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this
Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission. 113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for
impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a
precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries
of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative
examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard
therefor. 114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political
question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
 It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of
a governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto
v. Commission on Elections, 115 this Court held:
. . . It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a
constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless
such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also
presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that
course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for
consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be
unavoidable. 116 [Emphasis and italics supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 117 where this
Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and
violative of due process, to wit:

It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial
inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case
or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by
the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to
the decision of the case itself . 118 [Emphasis supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly
unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of
the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon
which the outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining whether
one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is
guided by the related canon of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule
of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied." 119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other
reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a
Resolution 120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative
inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules
and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of
separation of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the
judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of the judiciary. 121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et al.'s claims, it is the studied
opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting
legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the second impeachment
complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to
form a rule of constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative
inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of these
consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have
raised other grounds in support of their petition which would not be adversely affected by the
Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has
already been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, 122 viz:
 The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI
thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by
the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the
investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under
the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the
right not be compelled to testify against one's self. 123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while
joining the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et al., introduce the new argument that
since the second impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by Representatives
Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provision
of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment
is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith
proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a
Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for the
application of the afore-mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all the Members of the House." With the
exception of Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are
alleged to have verified the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point
to the "Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of
the abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix
William B. Fuentebella . . .• 124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in
order for said second impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles of
Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that the verified complaint
be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the House of
Representatives. Not having complied with this requirement, they concede that the second
impeachment complaint should have been calendared and referred to the House Committee
on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority
vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session
days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The
 resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session
days from receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for
Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more
representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment complaint
as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice
Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at
least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives as endorsers is not the
resolution of impeachment contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement
being necessary only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files a verified
impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does
indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment, more
compelling considerations militate against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present
controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra,
intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second
impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the
instant consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the original
petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented by the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the
determination of the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal
and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et al., adopting the latter's arguments
and issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are,
constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule
V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for
violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result
thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of
the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint

Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the
Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power
of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et al. argue that "[t]here is a
moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all
the Members thereof are subject to impeachment." 125 But this argument is very much like
saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because
Members of the House of Representatives are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this
Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor
can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be
referred." 126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec.
1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound
to take cognizance of the instant petitions. 127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father
Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To
renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of
government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office has
the authority to do so. 128 On the occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the
controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge
of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness." 129 After all, "by [his]
appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence
that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this
reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to
displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough
to resist the temptations lurking in [his] office." 130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been
settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal. 131 In that case, the petitioners filed
with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the
Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the
ground that all of them were interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This would
have reduced the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members whose
disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of
any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate
without inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence, the
proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the
Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can
perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its
entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be
not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform,
the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its
being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers
of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election
contest that would involve all Senators — elect, six of whom would inevitably
have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in
the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats
in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode
for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated
to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations
must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense
of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and
collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in
judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may,
as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case
where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the
way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in
the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function
as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its
Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid
adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto, 132 it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a
majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its
 jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is
a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by
the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the
Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent
to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very heart
of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and
ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it
cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of
Justices. 133 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it
exercises its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba, 134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven
pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice
Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA 135 as follows:
1.The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly,
non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such questions
'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals.
It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten
in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the
constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2.The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the Court to decide
questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a
decision of the case.'
3.The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required
by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'
4.The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon
which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied
application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one
involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory
construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals
from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question
under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the
judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground.
5.The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one
who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many
applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right
of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the
challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his
official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court
affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have
the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts
v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained
although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6.The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of
one who has availed himself of its benefits.
 7.When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a
serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that
this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided (citations omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander
v. TVA from different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into
the following categories:
1.that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2.that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts
of the case
3.that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4.that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of
the statute
5.that the parties are not in estoppel
6.that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the
exercise of judicial review:
1.actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2.the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement
3.the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity
4.the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. 136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et al. raise another argument for judicial restraint
the possibility that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts
between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the appearance of
impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be
confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the
judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable
official. 137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to
enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority
and erode public confidence and faith in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the
Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for
this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot
abandon their constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a
crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.
. . . Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act
is not regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon the
constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but
also political consequences. Those political consequences may follow even
where the Court fails to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of
the necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or
 the other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at
least quasi-validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary 139 where this Court was split and "in the
end there were not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent's
claims," 140 the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for the
establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate
branches of the government would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty under
the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to
believe that any of the branches of government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk
social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental
law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine
in People v. Veneracion, to wit: 141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice.
If [public officers], under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to
roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to
exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government
of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those
acting under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the
Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist
encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their
own personal beliefs. 142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure for Impeachment Proceedings adopted by the 12th
Congress

Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that

Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5)
of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to
file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body,
which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not
possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution
provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment
by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House.
Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated
as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices
had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet
to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate."
Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner
Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the
meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner
Maambong during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner
Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held
on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking
initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice
appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial
action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin,
to commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes with
Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral
arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a
complexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is
the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists
of those deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the articles of
impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its
referral to the Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by
Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment is "deemed
initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the
House reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not
say "impeachment proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated.•
The language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction
there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and
italics supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the
intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried
from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure
and the substantive provisions on impeachment, I understand there have been
many proposals and, I think, these would need some time for Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a
resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been furnished
the Members of this body. This is borne out of my experience as a member of
the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took
charge of the last impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang
Pambansa. For the information of the Committee, the resolution covers several
steps in the impeachment proceedings starting with initiation, action of the
Speaker committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the report, transmittal
referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a
reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by Commissioner
Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do not really initiate
the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have
pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the
complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution
containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee
on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I
could cite examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President
Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the
recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body,
 and it was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates
it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the
Committee on Style could help in rearranging these words because we have to
be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the
House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me.
The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my
proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to
indicate this on record.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the
approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance,
but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of
Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this
provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words
which read: "to initiate impeachment proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert
on line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then
capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so
that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the
Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE
ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the
House of Representatives of the United States is concerned, really starts from
the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries
with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of
Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified
complaint of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will mention again,
Madam President, that my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It
is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of
the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam President. 143 (Italics in the
original; emphasis and italics supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted
by the Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers. 144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the
complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious
reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text
of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the
initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of
one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment
proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3,
paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution." 145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father
Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word
"initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing
must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word
"initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
 Section 3 (1).The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
xxx xxx xxx
(5)No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."

Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate."
The object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is
"impeachment proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term
"cases" must be distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal
controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that
the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in
that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other
body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a
"proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To
initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand,
proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not
in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified
complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed
by a Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint
by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the
resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded
to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by
the House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or
overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one third
of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and
transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It
is at this point that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she
is successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when
the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House
proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the
"impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on
to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of
the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the
proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps
that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus
when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the
Members of the House shall be necessary . . . to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was
met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate
impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does. 146 Thus the line was
deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding
shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year," it
means that no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on
Justice for action. By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common
understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that
the Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand
it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse
meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate
impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall
have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," this is a misreading of said
provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating
"impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two
former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to
the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said
complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or
endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the
filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary
General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed
against the same official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice
that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House
itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the
Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of
impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene
Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning
from filing and referral.
In his amicus curiaebrief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use
contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec. 3 (5) of Article XI,
citing Vera v. Avelino 147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal opinions (referring to
Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue expressed
during this Court's our deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recorded
utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court
likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed
in their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know more about the real meaning
because of the latter's balanced perspectives and disinterestedness. 148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are
at present only two members of this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission — Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not
taken part in these proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply
relied on the personal opinions now given by members of the Constitutional Commission, but
has examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI,
it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules
governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that Congress
has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to
promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of
the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3
of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:
Section 3.(1). . .
(2)A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of
the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement
by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within
ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt
thereof.
(3)A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment
of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member
shall be recorded.
(4)In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by
at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5)No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental
law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary
implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of
referendum.
In Osmeña v. Pendatun, 149 this Court held that it is within the province of either
House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted
"disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments, 150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and
quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v. Smith, 151 declared that where the construction
to be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question
becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia, 152 quoting United States v. Ballin,
Joseph & Co., 153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while
the Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its
rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should
be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule
and the result which is sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters
of method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De
Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more
emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to
inquire into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner
are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation
of power if we assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in the United States,
the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment
against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of
procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v. Ballin (144 US 1) as a
window to view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme
 Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review
congressional rules. It held:
"xxx xxx xxx
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house
may determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance
of this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its
rules:
Rule XV
3.On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the
Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall
of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in
the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names of the members
voting, and be counted and announced in determining the presence of a
quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The
question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what methods
the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence
of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own
volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for
judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only one of
power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or
violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and
the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all
matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is
no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better,
more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule
that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time.
The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted.
It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House,
and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge
of any other body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity
of congressional rules, i.e., whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was
examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore
any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its
method had a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By
examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the
mere invocation of the principle of separation of powers. 154
xxx xxx xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to
categorically reject the political question defense when its interposition will cover
up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally
cobbled to empower courts ". . . to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was
not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also
 xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The
CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our experience
under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were shielded from
judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the
eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and
sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-Ã -vis the Executive and the
Legislative departments of government. 155
xxx xxx xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is
not a mere power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this
disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down
any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its officials done
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly
or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court
against the other branches of government despite their more democratic
character, the President and the legislators being elected by the people. 156
xxx xxx xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts
of justice . . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the capstone of the efforts of
the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis-Ã -vis the
other branches of government. This provision was dictated by our experience
under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more independent judiciary
is needed to abort abuses in government. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of
government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new
Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This
transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not merely
evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this
Court approached constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot
do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress — this Court is
mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should
not do but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not
resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to
this new constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define
the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We
will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we
refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is
this exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly
emboldened other branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of
our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this
novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and
its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable
foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history
should provide us the light and not the experience of foreigners. 157 (Italics in
the original; emphasis and italics supplied)
 Thus, the ruling in Osmeña v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here,
the third parties alleging the violation of private rights and the Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US 158 as basis
for arguing that this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the
House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply
provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment." It
adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised.
No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the House of
Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment power of the
Philippine House of Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes
several provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules
which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the
House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in
substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the
filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a
verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House
thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning
different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3 (5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President
Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this
Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003,
the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion

If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon
that takes the center stage of our individual and collective consciousness as a people with our
characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the
seriousness of the controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two
weeks have proven to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting experience.
Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively believe
to be the correct position or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as
demonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets
armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors
of society — from the business, retired military, to the academe and denominations of faith —
offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the official relations of the
governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability upon areas of
national life.
 Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been
constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of any
kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the House of Representatives of the
impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public official. When the present
petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-
interference was made through what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-
justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that may
have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of
the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is
concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the Court found the existence in
full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty
of judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or
interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue
of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently
address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system
of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the Court's
jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of
impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis
in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the
merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief
Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did
not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable
issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to
assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government. Rather,
the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and
legislative of their own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having
founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the
impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court have actually
closed ranks to protect one of their brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on said
issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the
truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held
and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the
personalities involved in the suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice over the course
of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unafraid by whatever
imputations or speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to
the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions
just because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible
fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a government branch's official act
as tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of
any member of the judiciary from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify
this entire institution now from the suits at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely
incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non
sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system
which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority
and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is
 no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle
of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and
ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in
the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other
member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to
have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights
irrespective of his station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once
again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court
has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what many feared
would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this
Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it
went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve
differences without the use of force and aggression upon each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on
November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the
House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives,)