G.R. No.

L-38204 September 24, 1991

THE MUNICIPALITY OF SOGOD, petitioner,

vs.
HON. AVELINO S. ROSAL, as Judge of the Court of First instance of Southern Leyte, Branch
III, THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF SOUTHERN LEYTE, HON. SALVACION O. YNIGUEZ, in her
capacity as Governor of Southern Leyte and the MUNICIPALITY OF BONTOC, respondents.

G.R. No. 38205 September 24, 1991

THE MUNICIPALITY OF SOGOD, petitioner,

vs.
HON. AVELINO S. ROSAL, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte, Branch
III and the Municipality of Bontoc, respondents.

Godofredo L. Cualteros for petitioner.

Francisco A. Puray, Sr. and Inego A. Gorduiz for Municipality of Bontoc.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This refers to two (2) petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and
set aside the accused orders of respondent judge which dismissed the complaints filed with the trial
court, as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, and to order the same respondent to
assume jurisdiction and proceed with the determination of the cases on the merits.

The antecedent facts of each case are as follows:

G.R. No. 38204

On June 15, 1950, Congress passed Republic Act No. 522 creating the municipality of Bontoc,
formerly a barrio of the municipality of Sogod in the province of Leyte, which shall be composed of the
barrios of Bontoc, Divisoria, Onion, Pacu, Beniton, Catmon, Hilaan, Taa, Sta. Cruz, Mahayahay and
their corresponding sitios.

A boundary dispute however, later arose between the municipality of Bontoc and the municipality of
Sogod with the latter claiming that the former exercised jurisdiction not only over the barrios above-
mentioned but also over other ten (10) barrios allegedly belonging to Sogod.

On June 17, 1952, the Provincial Board of Leyte issued Resolution No. 617 directing the holding of a
plebiscite among the barrios of Pangi, Taa part of Sta. Cruz, Tuburan, Laogawan and their
corresponding sitios. The purpose of the plebiscite is to determine whether the people in these barrios
would like to remain with the municipality of Sogod or with Bontoc. The plebiscite was conducted on
August 1, 1952, and the results thereof show that more votes were cast in favor of Sogod than those
in favor of Bontoc.

On April 4, 1959, the Provincial Board of Leyte issued Resolution No. 519 recommending to the
President of the Philippines and/or to the Congress of the Philippines that Republic Act 522 be
amended so as to include in said Act creating the municipality of Bontoc, the following barrios claimed
by Sogod which are in the heart of Bontoc but not included in said law, namely: Baugo, Himakilo,
Esperanza, Hibagwan, Pamahawan, Mahayahay, Bunga, Da-o and Maoylab The Board also
recommended that a law be enacted annexing to the municipality of Sogod the following barrios which
are very near Sogod and are claimed by the latter but are included in the law creating Bontoc, namely:
Laogawan, Taa Tuburan, Sta. Cruz and Pangi he board further recommended that the boundary line
between the two municipalities be placed at Granada Creek.

On December 28, 1959, Carlos P. Garcia, then President of the Philippines, promulgated Executive
Order No. 368, which approved the recommendation of the provincial board of Leyte, and reconstituted
the barrios and sitios which shag compose the municipalities of Bontoc and Sogod. The executive
order also specified Granada Creek as the boundary line separating Bontoc and Sogod.

However, on July 14, 1960, the President of the Philippines, thru then Executive Secretary Castillo
sent a telegram to the Provincial Board of Southern Leyte which states as follows:

BY DIRECTION OF PRESIDENT PLEASE SUSPEND IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE

ORDER 368 SERIES 1959 RECONSTITUTION (sic) BARRIOS AND SITIOS TO COMPOSE
MUNICIPALITIES OF SOGOD AND BONTOC AND READJUSTING TERRITORIES SAID
MUNICIPALITIES UNTIL FURTHER ADVISE STOP TO DETERMINE TRUE WISHES OF
INHABITANTS PLEASE SUPERVISE HOLDING OF PLEBISCITE IN BARRIO AND SITIOS
AFFECTED ADVISING THIS OFFICE IMMEDIATELY OF RESULT.

SEC. CASTILLO (P. 20, Rollo)

On July 18, 1960, the Provincial Board of Southern Leyte passed Resolution No. 62 suspending the
implementation of Executive Order 368. The Board also created a committee to conduct the holding
of a plebiscite in the barrios and sitios affected by Executive Order 368 and to finally settle the
boundary dispute.

On June 24, 1970, the municipality of Sogod filed Civil Case No. R-1706 for certiorari and prohibition
with the Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte (now Regional Trial Court), to enjoin the provincial
board and provincial governor from taking cognizance of the long pending boundary dispute between
the two municipalities and to enjoin the municipality of Bontoc from exercising territorial jurisdiction
over the barrios of Pangi, Taa Casao, Sta. Cruz, Tuburan and Laogawan all allegedly belonging to the
municipality of Sogod.

On August 31, 1973, the trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case. On December 17, 1973, the trial court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition was filed alleging that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing the case.

G.R. No. 38205

On December 7, 1970, the municipality of Sogod filed Civil Case No. R-1707 with the Court of First
Instance of Southern Leyte (now Regional Trial Court) for recovery of taxes with receivership against
the municipality of Bontoc. The complaint alleged that the municipality of Bontoc, without any legal
basis, exercised jurisdiction not only over the barrios enumerated in Republic Act No. 522 but also
over ten (10) barrios belonging to the complainant municipality of Sogod. The complaint prayed that
the municipality of Bontoc be ordered to pay Sogod onehalf of the total amount of taxes collected by
the former from the inhabitants of the aforesaid barrios during the period from 1950 to 1959.
On August 31, 1973, the trial court issued an order dismissing Civil Case No. R-1707 on the ground
that the right to collect taxes would ultimately depend on Civil Case No. R-1706, which was already
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and that the issue as to boundary dispute have not yet been decided
in a plebiscite for that purpose.

Hence this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the above order of the judge.

The common issue to be resolved in these petitions is whether or not the trial court gravely erred in
dismissing the two cases for lack of jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction has been defined as the power and authority to hear and determine a cause or the right
to act in a case (Herrera v. Barrette and Joaquin, 25 Phil. 245; Conchada v. Director of Prisons, 31
Phil. 4). Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. It cannot be fixed by the will of the
parties nor can it be acquired or diminished by any act of the parties. In determining whether a case
lies within or outside the jurisdiction of a court, reference to the applicable statute on the matter is
indispensable. It is a settled rule that jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the
time of commencement of action (Tolentino v. Social Security Commission, L-28870, September 6,
1985, 138 SCRA 428; Lee v. Municipal Trial Court of Legaspi City Br. 1, No. 68789, November 10,
1986, 145 SCRA 408; Dela Cruz v. Moya, No. 65192, April 27, 1988, 160 SCRA 838).

At the time the civil actions were filed with the trial court by petitioner municipality in 1970, the
applicable laws necessary for the determination of the question of whether the trial court has the
authority to decide on the municipal boundary dispute are the following: 1) Republic Act No. 522,
creating the municipality of Bontoc; 2) Republic Act No. 3590, the Revised Barrio Charter, revising
Republic Act No. 2370; and 3) Section 2167 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.

Republic Act No. 522 defines the jurisdiction of the municipality of Bontoc. It clearly enumerates the
barrios which shag compose the municipality of Bontoc, to wit: Bontoc, Divisoria, Onion, Pacu,
Beniton, Catmon, Hilaan, Taa Sta. Cruz, Mahayahay and their corresponding sitios. This means that
all the other barrios in Southern Leyte which are not included in the law creating the municipality of
Bontoc are deemed to remain under the jurisdiction of the municipality of Sogod. Although the said
law is clear as to which territories shall belong to each municipality, the law is silent however, as to the
specifications of the boundary line which will separate the two municipalities.

With the passage of Republic Act No. 2370 which took effect on January 1, 1960 as revised by
Republic Act No. 3590 on June 22, 1963, known as the Revised Barrio Charter, barrios may be created
and their boundaries altered only by Act of Congress or by the corresponding provincial board upon
petition of the majority of the voters in the area affected and the recommendation of the municipality
in which the proposed barrios are situated. Thus, the provincial board was empowered under the Id
law to determine and alter boundaries of municipalities and barrios.

Further, the law then vested the right to settle boundary disputes between municipalities on the
provincial board pursuant to Section 2167 of the Revised Administrative Code, which reads:

SEC. 2167. Municipal boundary disputes. — How settled — Disputes as to jurisdiction of

municipal governments over places or barrios shall be decided by the province boards of the
provinces in which such municipalities are situated, after an investigation at which the
municipalities concerned shall be duly heard. From the decision of the provincial board appeal
may be taken by the municipality aggrieved to the Secretary of the Interior (now the Office of
the Executive Secretary), whose decision shall be final. Where the places or barrios in dispute
are claimed by municipalities situated in different provinces, the provincial boards of the
provinces concerned shall come to an agreement if possible, but, in the event of their failing
 to agree, an appeal shall be had to the Secretary of Interior (Executive Secretary), whose
decision shall be final. (Municipality of Hinabangan v. Municipality of Wright, 107 Phil. 394).

It is clear from the aforestated legal provision that the authority to hear and resolve municipal boundary
disputes belongs to the provincial boards and not to the trial courts. The decisions of the boards are
then appealable to the Executive Secretary. Records in the instant case show that when petitioner
municipality filed the civil actions in 1970 before the trial court, the provincial board of Southern Leyte
had not yet conducted a plebiscite as ordered by the Executive Department in 1960 or rendered any
order settling the dispute. Petitioner municipality should have elevated the matter of delay to the then
Secretary of Interior (now Executive Secretary) for action instead of bringing it to the trial court.
Although existing laws then vested on the provincial board the power to determine or even alter
municipal boundaries, the Secretary of Interior or the Executive Department for that matter, was not
precluded during that time from taking necessary steps for the speedy settlement of the boundary
dispute. In Pelaez v. Auditor General, No. L-23825, December 24, 1965, 15 SCRA 569, which applied
Republic Act No. 2370, known as the Barrio Charter, We held that the power to fix common boundaries
in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities may also partake of
an administrative nature that can be decided by the administrative department, involving as it does,
the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the laws creating said municipalities.

Considering the foregoing, We find that the trial court acted correctly in dismissing the cases for want
of jurisdiction and in allowing the provincial board to continue with the pending investigation and
proceedings on the boundary dispute.

It is worthy to note however, that up to this time, the controversy between these two municipalities has
not been settled. However, this dispute has already been overtaken by events, namely, the enactment
of the 1987 Constitution and the New Local Government Code on February 10, 1983, which imposed
new mandatory requirements and procedures on the fixing of boundaries between municipalities. The
1987 Constitution now mandates that no province, city, municipality or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Hence, any alteration or modification of the boundaries
of the municipalities shall only be by a law to be enacted by Congress subject to the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the barrios affected (Section 134, Local Government Code).
Thus, under present laws, the function of the provincial board to fix the municipal boundaries are now
strictly limited to the factual determination of the boundary lines between municipalities, to be specified
by natural boundaries or by metes and bounds in accordance with the laws creating said
municipalities.

In view of the length of time that this municipal boundary dispute had remained unresolved, due to the
possibility that Republic Act No. 522 has lost its practicability or has become obsolete considering the
geographical location of barrios in Southern Leyte, especially those enumerated in Republic Act No.
522, which apparently, are much nearer to Sogod than to Bontoc, this Court finds that this matter
should be referred to the Congress of the Philippines for whatever legislative action that may be
necessary under the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the petitions are DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the respondent judge dated
August 31, 1973 and December 17, 1973 in G.R. No. L-38204 and orders dated August 31, 1973 and
December 17, 1973 in G.R. No. L-38205 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. 92981-83 January 9, 1992

INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR and ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION (ALU), respondents.

E.B. Ramos & Associates for petitioner.

Celso C. Reales for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

The issue before us is whether or not the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment has
the power to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute and its incidental controversies, including unfair
labor practice cases, causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the
national interest.

The operative facts which culminated in the present recourse are undisputed.

Prior to the expiration on January 1, 1989 of the collective bargaining agreement between petitioner
International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (hereafter, Company) and the Associated Labor Union (Union, for
brevity), the latter submitted to the Company its economic and political demands. These were not met
by the Company, hence a deadlock ensued.

On June 27, 1989, the Union filed a notice of strike with Regional Office No. VII of the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board, Department of Labor and Employment, which was docketed as
NCMB-RBVII-NS-06-050-89. After all conciliation efforts had failed, the Union went on strike on August
8, 1989 and the Company's operations were completely paralyzed.

Subsequently, three other labor cases involving the same parties were filed with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) to wit:

1. International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. vs. Associated Labor Union, NLRC Case No.
VII-09-0810-89, 1 a petition for injunction and damages with temporary restraining
order filed by the Company against the Union and some of its members for picketing
the Company's establishment in Cebu, Davao, and Metro Manila allegedly without the
required majority of the employees approving and agreeing to the strike and with
simulated strike votes, in direct violation of the provisions of their collective bargaining
agreement and in total and complete defiance of the provisions of the Labor Code;

2. Associated Labor Union vs. International Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., NLRC Case
No-VII-08-0715-89, 2 a complaint for unfair labor practice with prayer for damages and
attorney's fees filed by the Union against the Company, its personnel manager, and
the Workers Alliance of Trade Unions (WATU) as a result of the Company's refusal to
include the sales workers in the bargaining unit resulting in a deadlock in the
bargaining negotiations; for coddling the respondent WATU as a separate bargaining
agent of the sales workers despite a contrary ruling of the Med-Arbiter; and undue
interference by the Company in the right of the workers to self-organization through
harassment and dispersal of a peaceful picket during the strike; and
 3. International Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al. vs. Associated Labor Union, NLRC Case
No. VII-08-0742-89, 3 a petition to declare the strike illegal with prayer for damages
filed by the Company alleging, among others, that the notice of strike filed by the Union
with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board did not conform with the
requirements of the Labor Code, and that the Union, in violation of the Labor Code
provisions on the conduct of the strike, totally blockaded and continued to blockade
the ingress and egress of the Company's premises by human barricades, placards,
benches and other obstructions, completely paralyzing its business operations.

Meanwhile, considering that the Company belongs to an industry indispensable to national interest, it
being engaged in the manufacture of drugs and pharmaceuticals and employing around 600 workers,
then Acting Secretary of Labor, Ricardo C. Castro, invoking Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, issued
an order dated September 26, 1989 assuming jurisdiction over the aforesaid case docketed as NCMB-
RBVII-NS-06-050-89 and directing the parties to return to the status quo before the work stoppage.
The decretal portion of the order reads:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office hereby assumes jurisdiction

over the labor dispute at the International Pharmaceuticals, Incorporated pursuant to
Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended.

Accordingly, all striking workers are hereby directed to return to work and management
to accept them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the work
stoppage, within twenty four (24) hours from receipt of this Order. Management is
directed to post copies of this Order in three (3) conspicuous places in the company
premises.

The parties are likewise ordered to cease and desist from committing any and all acts
that will prejudice either party and aggravate the situation as well as the normalization
of operations.

SO ORDERED. 4

On January 15, 1990, the Union filed a motion in NCMB-RBVII-NS-06-050-85, the case over which
jurisdiction had been assumed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment (hereafter referred to as
the Secretary), seeking the consolidation of the three NLRC cases (NLRC Cases Nos. VII-09-0810-
89, VII-08-0715-89, and VII-08-0742-89) with the first stated case.

In an order dated January 31, 1990, Secretary of Labor Ruben D. Torres granted the motion and
ordered the consolidation of the three NLRC cases with NCMB-RBVII-NS-06-050-89, as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the Associated Labor Union's Motion to be meritorious, the

same is granted and NLRC Cases Nos. VII-09-0810-89, VII-08-0715-89 and VII-08-
0742-89 are hereby ordered consolidated with the instant proceedings. The Labor
Arbiter handling the same is directed to immediately transmit the records of the said
cases to the Asst. Regional Director, DOLE Regional Office No. 7 who has been
designated to hear and receive the evidence of the parties.

SO ORDERED. 5

The Company's subsequent motion for reconsideration of the order consolidating the cases was
denied by the Secretary on March 5, 1990. 6 Thereafter, the Assistant Regional Director of Regional
Office No. VII, as directed, assumed jurisdiction over the consolidated cases and set the same for
reception of evidence.

Petitioner Company now comes to this Court assailing the aforesaid orders and alleging grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the public respondent in the issuance thereof. The Union, as the bargaining
agent of the rank and file workers of the Company, was impleaded as the private respondent.

Petitioner Company submits that the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the three NLRC cases
above-specified is vested in the labor arbiter as provided in paragraph (a) (1) and (5) of Article 217 of
the Labor Code.

Moreover, petitioner insists that there is nothing in Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code which directs the
labor arbiter to hold in abeyance all proceedings in the NLRC cases and await instruction from the
Secretary. Otherwise, so it postulates, Section 6, Rule V of the Revised Rules of the NLRC which is
invoked by the Secretary is null and void since it orders the cessation of all proceedings before the
labor arbiter and orders him to await instructions from the Secretary in labor disputes where the
Secretary bas assumed jurisdiction, thereby amending Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code by enlarging
the jurisdiction of the Secretary.

Petitioner further contends that, granting arguendo that Section 6, Rule V of the Revised Rules of the
NLRC is in accordance with Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, still the Secretary should not have
ordered the consolidation of the three unfair labor practice cases with NCMB-RBVII-NS-06-050-89,
since the Secretary assumed jurisdiction only over the deadlock in the negotiation of the collective
bargaining agreement and the petition for contempt as a result of the said deadlock.

Respondents, on the other band, assert that the authority to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes,
vested in the Secretary by Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, extends to all questions and incidents
arising therein causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts in industries indispensable to national
interest.

Moreover, respondents counter that Section 6, Rule V of the Revised Rules of the NLRC is in
accordance with Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 217 of the
Labor Code. To rule otherwise, they point out, would encourage splitting of jurisdiction, multiplicity of
suits, and possible conflicting findings and decisions which could only result in delay and complications
in the disposition of the labor disputes.

It was also stressed that the three NLRC cases which respondent Secretary ordered consolidated with
the labor dispute over which he had assumed jurisdiction arose from or are directly related to and are
incidents of the said labor dispute.

Finally, respondents invoke the rule that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the
Labor Code provisions should be resolved in favor of labor. By virtue of the assailed orders, the Union
and its members were relieved of the burden of having to litigate their interrelated cases in different
fora.

There are three governing labor law provisions which are determinative of the present issue of
jurisdiction, viz.:

1. Article 217 (a) (1) and (5) of the Labor Code which provides:
 Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission — (a) Except as otherwise
provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide . . . the following cases involving all workers. . . .

1. Unfair labor practice cases;

xxx xxx xxx

5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions
involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; . . .

2. Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code which declares:

(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike
of lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor
and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the
same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. . . .

3. Section 6, Rule V of the Revised Rules of the NLRC which states:

Sec. 6. Disposition of cases. — . . .

Provided, that when the Minister (Secretary) of Labor and Employment has assumed
jurisdiction over a strike or lockout dispute or certified the same to the Commission,
the parties to such dispute shall immediately inform the Minister (Secretary) or the
Commission as the case may be, of all cases between them pending before any
Regional Arbitration Branch, and the Labor Arbiter handling the same of such
assumption or certification, whereupon all proceedings before the Labor Arbiter
concerning such cases shall cease and the Labor Arbiter shall await instructions from
the Minister (Secretary) or the Commission.

The foregoing provisions persuade us that the Secretary did not gravely abuse his discretion when he
issued the questioned orders.

As early as 1913, this Court laid down in Herrera vs. Baretto, et al., 7 the fundamental normative rule
that jurisdiction is the authority to bear and determine a cause — the right to act in a case. However,
this should be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a case at all and
not the decision rendered therein is what makes up jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction over the
person and the subject matter, the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise
of that jurisdiction. 8

In the present case, the Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor
dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same accordingly.
Necessarily, this authority to assume jurisdiction over the said labor dispute must include and extend to all questions and controversies arising
therefrom, including cases over which the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.

Moreover, Article 217 of the Labor Code is not without, but contemplates, exceptions thereto. This is
evident from the opening proviso therein reading "(e)xcept as otherwise provided under this Code . .
." Plainly, Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code was meant to make both the Secretary (or the various
regional directors) and the labor arbiters share jurisdiction, subject to certain conditions. 9 Otherwise,
the Secretary would not be able to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute. To hold
the contrary may even lead to the absurd and undesirable result wherein the Secretary and the labor
arbiter concerned may have diametrically opposed rulings. As we have said, "(i)t is fundamental that
a statute is to be read in a manner that would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it." 10

In fine, the issuance of the assailed orders is within the province of the Secretary as authorized by
Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code and Article 217 (a) (1) and (5) of the same Code, taken conjointly
and rationally construed to subserve the objective of the jurisdiction vested in the Secretary.

Our pronouncement on this point should be distinguished from the situation which obtained and our
consequent ruling in Servando's, Inc. vs. The Secretary of Labor and Employment, et al. 11 wherein we
referred to the appropriate labor arbiter a case previously decided by the Secretary. The said case
was declared to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter since the aggregate claims of
each of the employees involved exceeded P5,000.00. In Servando, the Secretary invoked his visitorial
and enforcement powers to assume jurisdiction over the case, the exclusive and original jurisdiction
of which belongs to the labor arbiter. We said that to uphold the Secretary would empower him, under
his visitorial powers, to hear and decide an employee's claim of more than P5,000.00. We held that
he could not do that and we, therefore, overruled him.

In the present case, however, by virtue of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, the Secretary has been
conferred jurisdiction over cases which would otherwise be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction
of labor arbiters. There was an existing labor dispute as a result of a deadlock in the negotiation for a
collective bargaining agreement and the consequent strike, over which the Secretary assumed
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code. The three NLRC cases were just offshoots
of the stalemate in the negotiations and the strike. We, therefore, uphold the Secretary's order to
consolidate the NLRC cases with the labor dispute pending before him and his subsequent assumption
of jurisdiction over the said NLRC cases for him to be able to competently and efficiently dispose of
the dispute in its totality.

Petitioner's thesis that Section 6, Rule V of the Revised Rules of the NLRC is null and void has no
merit. The aforesaid rule has been promulgated to implement and enforce Article 263 (g) of the Labor
Code. The rule is in harmony with the objectives sought to be achieved by Article 263 (g) of the Labor
Code, particularly the Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction over a labor dispute and his subsequent
disposition of the same in the most expeditious and conscientious manner. To be able to completely
dispose of a labor dispute, all its incidents would have to be taken into consideration. Clearly, the
purpose of the questioned regulation is to carry into effect the broad provisions of Article 263 (g) of the
Labor Code.

By and large, Section 6, Rule V of the Revised Rules of the NLRC is germane to the objects and
purposes of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, and it is not in contradiction with but conforms to the
standards the latter requires. Thus, we hold that the terms of the questioned regulation are within the
statutory power of the Secretary to promulgate as a necessary implementing rule or regulation for the
enforcement and administration of the Labor Code, in accordance with Article 5 of the same Code.

Besides, to uphold petitioner Company's arguments that the NLRC cases are alien and totally separate
and distinct from the deadlock in the negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement is to sanction
split jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice. 12

Moreover, the rule is that all doubts in the interpretation and implementation of labor laws should be
resolved in favor of labor. In upholding the assailed orders of the Secretary, the Court is only giving
meaning to this rule. The Court should help labor authorities provide workers immediate access to
their rights and benefits, without being hampered by arbitration or litigation processes that prove to be
not only nerve-wracking, but financially burdensome in the long run. 13 Administrative rules of
procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote their object and assist the parties,
especially the workingman, in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of their respective
claims and defenses. By virtue of the assailed orders. The Union and its members are relieved of the
burden of litigating their interrelated cases in different tribunals.

WHEREFORE. there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, the petition at bar is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.

Nocon, J., took no part

G.R. No. L-6287 December 1, 1911

THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, representing the Insular Government, et al., defendants-
appellants.

W. A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan, for appellant.

Antonio Constantino, for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac dismissing
the action before it on motion of the plaintiff upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the
subject matter of the controversy.

The question for our consideration and decision is the power and authority of a Court of First Instance
of one province to take cognizance of an action by a railroad company for the condemnation of real
estate located in another province.

In the month of December, 1907, the plaintiff began an action in the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Tarlac for the condemnation of certain real estate, stated by the plaintiff in his complaint
to be located in the Province of Tarlac. It is alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff is authorized by
law to construct a railroad line "from Paniqui to Tayug in the Province of Tarlac," and it is for the
purpose of condemning lands for the construction of such line that this action is brought. The land
sought to be condemned is 69,910 square meters in area. The complaint states that before beginning
the action the plaintiff had caused to be made a thorough search in the office of the registry of property
and of the tax where the lands sought to be condemned were located and to whom they belonged. As
a result of such investigations the plaintiff alleged that the lands in question were located in the
Province of Tarlac. The defendants in one action all of the different owners of or persons otherwise
interested in the 69,910 square meters of land to be condemned. After filing and duly serving the
complaint the plaintiff, pursuant to law and pending final determination of the action, took possession
of and occupied the lands described in the complaint, building its line and putting the same in
operation. During the progress of the action a commission to appraise the value of the lands was duly
appointed, which, after taking oral testimony, amounting to 140 typewritten pages when transcribed,
and after much labor and prolonged consideration, made a report consisting of about 55 typewritten
pages, resolving the question submitted to it. On the coming in of this report the court, by order entered
the 27th of September, 1909, set the 11th day of October following for the hearing thereon.

On the 4th day of October the plaintiff gave notice to the defendants that on the 9th day of October a
motion would be made to the court to dismiss the action upon the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction of the subject matter, it having just been ascertained by the plaintiff that the land sought to
be condemned was situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija, instead of the Province of Tarlac, as
alleged in the complaint. This motion was heard and, after due consideration, the trial court dismissed
the action upon the ground presented by the plaintiff. This appeal is taken from said judgment of
dismissal.

The decision of the learned trial court was based entirely upon the proposition, already referred to,
that in condemnation proceedings, and in all other proceedings affecting title to land, the Court of First
Instance of a given province has no jurisdiction, power or authority where the land is located in another
province, and that no such power, authority, or jurisdiction can be conferred by the parties.

Sections 55 and 56 of Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission confer jurisdiction upon the Courts of
First Instance of these Islands with respect to real estate in the following words: 1awphi1.net

SEC. 55. Jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. — The jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance
shall be of two kinds:

1. Original; and

2. Appellate.

SEC. 56. Its original jurisdiction. — Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction: .

xxx xxx xxx

2. In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or any interest
therein, or the legality of any tax, impost, or assessment, except actions of forcible entry into,
and detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction of which is by this Act conferred upon
courts of justice of the peace.

It is apparent from the wording of these sections that it was the intention of the Philippine Commission
to give to the Courts of First Instance the most perfect and complete jurisdiction possible over the
subject matters mentioned in connection therewith. Such jurisdiction is not made to depend upon
locality. There is no suggestion of limitation. The jurisdiction is universal. Nor do the provisions of
sections 48, 49, 50, 51, and 52 at all militate against the universality of that jurisdiction. Those
provisions simply arrange for the convenient and effective transaction of business in the courts and
do not relate to their power, authority, or jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. While it is
provided in these sections that a particular court shall hold its sessions in any other province (except
under certain specified conditions), the assertions is nevertheless true that the jurisdiction of a
particular court is in no wise and in no sense limited; and it is nowhere suggested, much less provided,
that a Court of First Instance of one province, regularly sitting in said province, may not under certain
conditions take cognizance of an action arising in another province or of an action relating to real
estate located outside of the boundaries of the province to which it may at the time be assigned.

Certain statutes confer jurisdiction, power, or authority. Other provide for the procedure by which that
power or authority is projected into judgment. The one class deals with the powers of the Court in the
real and substantive sense; the other with the procedure by which such powers are put into action.
The one is the thing itself; the other is the vehicle by which the thing is transferred from the court to
the parties. The whole purpose and object of procedure is to make the powers of the court fully and
completely available for justice. The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that which gives
opportunity for the most complete and perfect exercise of the powers of the court within the limitations
set by natural justice. It is that one which, in other words, gives the most perfect opportunity for the
powers of the courts to transmute themselves into concrete acts of justice between the parties before
it. The purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter,
but to give it effective facility in righteous action. It may be said in passing that the most salient
objection which can be urged against procedure to-day is that it so restricts the exercise of the court's
powers by technicalities that the part of its authority effective for justice between the parties is many
times an inconsiderable portion of the whole. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its
proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was
created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not
constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the
means best adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end. It is the means by
which the powers of the court are made effective in just judgments. When it loses the character of the
one and takes on that of the other the administration of justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory
and lays itself open to grave criticism.

The proper result of a system of procedure is to insure a fair and convenient hearing to the parties
with complete justice between them as a result. While a fair hearing is as essential as the substantive
power of the court to administer justice in the premises, and while the one is the natural result o the
other, it is different in its nature and relates to a different thing. The power or authority of the court over
the subject matter existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began. Procedure does
not alter or change that power or authority; it simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and
justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with the
provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise
it legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter. It means simply that he
may thereby lose jurisdiction of the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective
for lack of something essential to sustain it. There is, of course, an important distinction between
person and subject matter are both conferred by law. As to the subject matter, nothing can change the
jurisdiction of the court over diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or when it shall be removed. That
is a matter of legislative enactment which none but the legislature may change. On the other hand,
the jurisdiction of the court over the person is, in some instances, made to defend on the consent or
objection, on the acts or omissions of the parties or any of them. Jurisdiction over the person, however,
may be conferred by consent, expressly or impliedly given, or it may, by an objection, be prevented
from attaching or removed after it has attached.

In the light of these observations, we proceed to a consideration of those provisions of the law which
the plaintiff claims are decisive of his contention that a Court of First Instance of one province has no
jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action by a railroad company to condemn lands located in
another province. The plaintiff relies for the success of its cause upon section 377 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and upon the special laws relating to the condemnation of lands railroad corporations. We
take up first the section of the Code of Civil Procedure referred to.

The fact that such a provision appears in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that
it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. It becomes merely a matter
of method, of convenience to the parties litigant. If their interests are best subserved by bringing in the
Court Instance of the city of Manila an action affecting lands in the Province of Ilocos Norte, there is
no controlling reason why such a course should not be followed. The matter is, under the law, entirely
within the control of either party. The plaintiff's interests select the venue. If such selection is not in
accordance with section 377, the defendant may make timely objection and, as a result, the venue is
changed to meet the requirements of the law. It is true that this court has more than once held than
an agreement to submit a controversy to a court which, under the procedural law, has not been
selected as the appropriate court, generally speaking, to hear such controversy, can not be enforced.
This means simply that either party to such a contract may ignore it at pleasure. The law will not
compel the fulfillment of an agreement which deprives one of the parties to it of the right to present his
cause to that court which the law designates as the most appropriate. But the principle asserted in the
cases which hold thus is no authority for the proposition that two persons having a controversy which
they desire to have decided by a competent tribunal may not, by appropriate procedure, submit it t any
court having jurisdiction in the premises. In the one case the relation is contractual to be enforced over
the objection of one of the contracting parties. In the other relation is not contractual because not
between the parties; but, rather, between the parties and the court. In the one case it is a contract to
be enforced; in the other, a condition to be met.
This being so, we say again, even though it be repetition, that after jurisdiction over real property in
the Islands has been conferred so generally and fully by Act No. 136, it is not to
be presumed or construed that the legislature intended to modify or restrict that jurisdiction when it
came to frame a Code of Civil Procedure the object of which is to make that jurisdiction effective. Such
modification or restriction should be held only by virtue of the clearest and most express provisions.

The wording of that section should be carefully examined. It reads as follows:

SEC. 377. Venue of actions. — Actions to confirm title to real estate, or to secure a partition
of real estate, or to cancel clouds, or remove doubts from the title to real estate, or to obtain
possession of real estate, or to recover damages for injuries to real estate, or to establish any
interest, right, or title in or to real estate, or actions for the condemnation of real estate for
public use, shall be brought in the province were the lands, or some part thereof, is situated;
actions against executors, administrators, and guardians touching the performance of their
official duties, and actions for account and settlement by them, and actions for the distribution
of the estates of deceased persons among the heirs and distributes, and actions for the
payment of legacies, shall be brought in the province in which the will was admitted to probate,
or letters of administration were granted, or the guardian was appointed. And all actions not
herein otherwise provided for may be brought in any province where the defendant or any
necessary party defendant may reside or be found, or in any province where the plaintiff,
except in cases were other special provision is made in this Code. In case neither the plaintiff
nor the defendant resides within the Philippine Islands and the action is brought to seize or
obtain title to property of the defendant within the Philippine Islands and the action is brought
to seize or obtain title to property of the defendant within the Philippine Islands, the action shall
be brought in the province where the property which the plaintiff seeks to seize or to obtain
title to is situated or is found: Provided, that in an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage upon
real estate, when the service upon the defendant is not personal, but is by publication, in
accordance with law, the action must be brought in the province where the land lies. And in all
cases process may issue from the court in which an action or special proceeding is pending,
to be enforced in any province to bring in defendants and to enforce all orders and decrees of
the court. The failure of a defendant to object t the venue of the action at the time of entering
his appearance in the action shall be deemed a waiver on his part of all objection to the place
or tribunal in which the action is brought, except in the actions referred to in the first sixteen
lines of this section relating to real estate, and actions against executors, administrators, and
guardians, and for the distribution of estates and payment of legacies.

Leaving out of discussion for the moment actions and proceedings affecting estates of deceased
persons, they resting upon a different footing being governed by special laws, it is to be observed that
the section contains no express inhibition against the court. It provides simply that certain actions
affecting real estate "shall be brought in the province where the land, or some part thereof, is situated."
The prohibition here is clearly directed against the one who begins the action and lays the venue. The
court, before the action is commenced, has nothing to do with either. The plaintiff does both. Only
when that is done does the section begin to operate effectively so far as the court is concerned. The
prohibition is nor a limitation on the power of the court but on the rights of the plaintiff. It is not to take
something from the court but to grant something to the defendant. Its wording clearly deprives the
court of nothing which it had, but gives the defendant, as against the plaintiff, certain rights which he
did not have. It establishes a relation not between the court and the subject ,after, but between the
plaintiff and the defendant. It relates not to jurisdiction but to trial. It touches convenience, not
substance. It simply gives to defendant the unqualified right, if he desires it, to have the trial take place
where his land lies and where, probably, all of his witnesses live. Its object is to secure to him a
convenient trial. If it had been the intention of the law-makers by section 377 to put a limitation to the
jurisdiction of the court, how easy it would have been to say so squarely. "No Court of First Instance
shall have or take jurisdiction of an action touching title to or interest in real property lying wholly in a
province other than that in which such court is authorized to hold sessions," or a similar provision,
would have been sufficient. This would have been clearly a limitation on the court rather than the party.
There would have been no room for doubt. The legislature, however, did not do so. It, rather, chose
to use language which imposes a limitation on the rights of the plaintiff.

In saying this we do not desire to force construction. Courts should give to language its plain meaning,
1awphil.net

leaving the legislature to take care of the consequences. The Philippine Commission having, in fullest
phrase, given the Courts of First Instance unrestricted jurisdiction over real estate in the Islands by
Act No. 136, we are of the opinion that the jurisdiction ought not to be held to be withdrawn except by
virtue of an Act equally express, or so clearly inconsistent as to amount to the same thing. The fact
that section 377 is not such Act, that it is found in code of Procedure rather than in the substantive
law, that it deals with the relative procedural rights of parties rather than the power of the court, that it
relates to the place rather than to the thing, that it composes the whole of a chapter headed simply
"Venue," lead us to hold that the Court of First Instance of Tarlac had full jurisdiction of the subject
matter of this action at the time when it was dismissed.

That it had jurisdiction of the persons of all the parties is indisputable. That jurisdiction was obtained
not only by the usual course of practice — that is, by the process of the court — but also by consent
expressly given, is apparent. The plaintiff submitted itself to the jurisdiction by beginning the action.
(Ayers vs. Watson, 113 U.S., 594; Fisher vs. Shropshire, 147 U.S., 133.) The defendants are now in
this court asking that the action be not dismissed but continued. They are not only nor objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court but, rather, are here on this appeal for the purpose of maintaining that very
jurisdiction over them.

Nor is the plaintiff in any position to asked for favors. It is clearly guilty of gross negligence in the
allegations of its complaint, if the land does not lie in Tarlac as it now asserts. It alleged in its complaint:

4. That, according to the information secured after a minute investigation in the offices of the
land registry and of the land-tax record of the municipalities within whose jurisdiction lie all the
parcels composing the tract of land in question, the owners and occupants of the same, with
their names as they appear on the plan, are as follows.

At the time it commenced the action it was possessed of every fact which a complete knowledge of
the location of the lands sought to be condemned required. It had the map of its entire line from Paniqui
to Tayug, showing the provinces and the various municipalities through which it runs. Not only that:
Before beginning its action it had to know the name of every necessary defendant, the land he owned,
and the extent of that portion to be condemned. The investigation required to ascertain these facts
would of necessity force into plaintiff's mind the knowledge required to bring the action in the proper
court. That the plaintiff at the time it commenced this action did not know in what province its proposed
stations and terminals were is difficult to believe. That it did not know in what province the land lay
which it was about to make the subject of so important a proceeding is still more difficult to believe. In
spite of all this, however, it deliberately laid the venue in a province where no part of the land lay, took
possession of the land in controversy, constructed its line, switches, and stations, and after nearly two
years of litigation, accompanied with great trouble to the court and trouble and expense to the parties,
calmly asks the dismissal of the case for the reason that it did not know where its own railroad was
located. Under such circumstances a dismissal of the action over the objection of the defendants ought
not to be permitted expect upon absolute necessity and then only on payment of the costs and
expenses of the defendants and of the actin. (Ayers vs. Watson and Fisher vs. Shropshire, supra.)

There is no equitable ground, then, upon which the plaintiff may claim that it has not yielded itself to
the jurisdiction of the court. Nor, as we have seen, is there a legal ground. As we have already said,
the plaintiff, having brought the action, of necessity submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court. It
took advantage of the situation it itself created to take possession of the lands described in the
complaint, construct its lines, switches, stations, yards and terminals, and to carry the cause through
two years of expensive litigation. It now attempts to make all this go for naught alleging its own
negligence as a reason for such attempt. (Ayers vs. Watson and Fisher vs. Shropshire, supra.)

While the latter part of section 377 provides that "the failure of a defendant to object to the venue of
the action at the time of entering his appearance in the action shall be deemed a waiver on his part of
all objection to the place or tribunal in which the action is brought," except, a month other things, in
actions affecting real estate, we apprehend that it was not intended that a defendant can not waive
such objection in such excepted cases. Nor we do believe that such provision is controlling in this
case. In the first place, the application is restricted to "the time of entering his appearance in the
action." It might well have been in the mind of the lawmakers that, at the time of entering his
appearance in the action, the defendant would not ordinarily be fully informed of all the facts of the
case, at least not sufficiently to warrant his being held to a waiver of important rights; whereas, later
in the cause, as when he files his answer or goes to trial, being fully informed, he might justly be held
to have waived his right to make such objection. for this reason it might well be that the Legislature
purposely refrained from extending the time for his protection beyond the "time of entering his
appearance in the action." Moreover, there is, in said clause, no prohibition against an express waiver
of his rights by the defendant. The general rule of law is that a person may renounce any right which
the law gives unless such renunciation is expressly prohibited or the right conferred is of such a nature
that its renunciation would be against public policy. This right of renunciation is so thoroughly
established, and was at the time of the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, that its exercise by
a defendant in relation to the venue of the action will not be held to have been abridged by section
377 without very clear provision therein to that effect. There is no part of that section clear enough to
warrant such a holding. Even though the terms of said section were much clearer than they are in this
respect, we should still hold, if they were much short of express, that the right of renunciation is not
abridged, founding ourselves not only upon the principles already laid down but also upon the
proposition of general law embodied in section 294 of the code of Civil Procedure which provides that:

When a statute or instrument is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one in favor of

natural right and the other against it, the former is to be adopted. itc-alf

Moreover, it should be noted that this prohibition, if it be such, against waiver refers exclusively to the
defendant. The plaintiff is given no rights respecting it. Yet it is the plaintiff who is here calling for the
application of the provision even against the declared will of the person who is expressly named as
the sole beneficiary. We will not by interpretation extend this provision so as to contravene the
principles of natural rights. We will not construed it so as to included in its terms nor named as its
beneficiary. But even if the plaintiff were entitled to invoke the aid of the provision he is estopped from
so doing. (Wanzer vs. Howland, 10 Wis., 7; Babcock vs. Farewell, 146 Ill. App., 307; White vs. Conn.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 4 Dill (U.S.), 183; Shuttle vs. Thompson, 15 Wall., 159; Beecher vs. Mill Co., 45
Mich., 103; Tomb vs. Rochester R. R. Co., 18 Barb., 585; Ferguson vs. Landram, 5 Bush (Ky.), 230;
State vs. Mitchell, 31 Ohio State, 592; Counterman vs. Dublin, 38 Ohio State, 515;
McCarthy vs. Lavasche, 89 Ill., 270; Ricketts vs. Spraker, 77 Ind., 371; Strosser vs. City of Fort
Wayne, 100 Ind., 443). Section 333 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:

Conclusive presumptions. — The following presumptions or deductions, which the law

expressly directs to be made from particular facts, are deemed conclusive:

1. Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately
led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he can not, in any
litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to falsity it.
(Rodriguez vs. Martinez, 5 Phil. Rep., 67; 69; Municipality of Oas vs. Roa, 7 Phil. Rep., 20, 22;
Trinidad vs. Ricafort et al., 7 Phil. Rep., 449, 453; Macke et al vs. Camps, 7 Phil. Rep., 553, 555.)

The fact is, there are very few rights which may not be renounced, expressly or impliedly.
(Christenson vs. Charleton, 34 Atl., 226, 227, 69 Vt., 91; Donahue vs. Windsor County Ins. Co., 56
Vt., 91; Donahaue vs. Windsor Ins. co., 33 Atl., 902, 904, 66 Conn., 21, 40; Fitzpatrick vs. Hartford
Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 56 Conn., 116, 134, 17 Atl., 411, 7 Am. St. Rep., 288; Lewis vs. Phoenix Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 44 Conn., 72, 91; State vs. Hartley, 52 Atl., 615, 617, 75 Conn., 104; First Nat.
Bank vs. Hartford L. & A. Ins. Co., 45 Conn., 22, 44; Johnson vs. Schar, 70 N.W., 838, 839, 9 S. D.,
536; Corey vs. Bolton, 63 N.Y., Supp., 915, 917, 31 Misc. Rep., 138; Mason's Supply Co. vs. Jones,
68 N. Y. Supp., 806, 809, 58 App. Div., 231; Monroe Waterworks Co. vs. City of Monroe, 85 N.W.,
685, 688, 100 Wis., 11; Fraser vs. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 90 N.W., 476, 481, 114 Wis., 510; Cedar Rapids
Water Co. vs. Cedat Rapids, 90 N.W., 746, 749, 117 Iowa, 250; Kennedy vs. Roberts, 75 N.W., 363,
366, 105 Iowa, 521; Shaw vs. Spencer, 100 Mass., 382, 395, 97 Am. Dec., 107, 1 Am. Rep., 115;
West vs. Platt, 127 Mass., 367, 367, 372; Fulkerson vs. Lynn, 64 Mo. App., 649, 653; Michigan
Savings & Loan Ass'n. vs. Missouri, K & T. Trust Co., 73 Mo. App., 161, 165; Perin vs. Parker, 18 N.
E., 747, 748, 126 Ill., 201, 2 L.R.A., 336, 9 Am. St. Rep., 571; Keller vs. Robinson & Co., 38 N. E.,
1072, 1075, 152 Ull. 458; Star Brewery Co. vs. Primas, 45 N.E., 145, 148, 163 Ill., 652; United
Firemen's Ins. Co. vs. Thomas (U.S.), 82 Fed., 406, 408, 27 C.C. A., 42, 47 L.R.A., 450;
Rice vs. Fidelity & Deposit Co. (U.S.), 103 Fed., 427, 43 C.C.A., 270; Sidway vs. Missouri Land & Live
Stock Co. (U.S.), 116 Fed., 381, 395; able vs. United States Life Ins. Co. (U.S.), 111 Fed., 19, 31, 49
C.C.A., 216L Peninsular Land Transp., etc., Co. vs. Franklin Ins. Co., 35 W. Va., 666, 676, 14 S.E.,
237; Dey vs. Martin, 78 Va., 1, 7; Liverpool & L.& G. Ins. Co. vs. T.M. Richardson Lumber Co., 69
Pac., 938, 951, 11 Okl., 585; Livesey vs. Omaha Hotel, 5 Neb., 50, 69; Cutler vs. Roberts, 7 Nebr., 4,
14, 29 Am. Rep., 371; Warren vs. Crane, 50 Mich., 300, 301, 15 N.W., 465; Portland & R.R.
Co. vs. Spillman, 23 Oreg., 587, 592, 32 Pac., 688, 689; First Nat. Bank vs. Maxwell, 55 Pac., 980,
982, 123 Cal., 360, 69 Am. St. Rep., 64; Robinson vs. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co., 38 Atl., 320, 322,
90 Me., 385; Reed vs. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 61 Pac., 21, 21 Utah, 295; Dale vs. Continental Ins.
Co., 31 S.W., 266, 269, 95 Tenn., 38; Supreme Lodge K.P. vs. Quinn, 29 South., 826, 829, 95 Tenn.,
38; Supreme Lodge K.P. vs. Quinn, 29 South., 826, 827, 78 Miss., 525; Bucklen vs. Johnson, 49 N.E.,
612, 617, 19 Ind. App., 406.)

We have delayed until this moment the citation of authorities relative to the proposition that venue is
not jurisdictional as to subject matter and that defendant's rights in respect thereto are such that they
may be waived, expressly or by implication, for the reason that we desired that the principles which
rule the case should first be discussed and presented in the abstract form. In the case of First National
Bank of Charlotte vs. Morgan (132 U.S., 141), it was held that the exemption of national banks from
suits in State courts in counties other than the county or city in which the association was located was
a personal privilege which could be waived was located was a personal privilege which could be
waived by appearing in such brought in another county, but in a court of the same dignity, and making
a defense without claiming the immunity granted by Congress. the court said:

This exemption of national banking associations from suits in State courts, established
elsewhere than in the county or city in which such associations were located, was, we do not
doubt, prescribed for the convenience of those institutions, and prevent interruption in their
business that might result from their books being sent to distant counties in obedience to
process from State courts. (First Nat. Bank of Bethel vs. National Pahquioque Bank, 14 Wall.,
383, 394; Croker vs. Marine Nat. Bank, 101 Mass., 240.) But, without indulging in conjecture
as to the object of the exemption in question, it is sufficient that it was granted by Congress,
and, if it had been claimed by the defendant when appearing in the superior court of Cleveland
County, must have been recognized. The defendant did not, however, choose to claim
immunity from suit in that court. It made defense upon the merits, and, having been
unsuccessful, prosecuted a writ of error to the supreme court of the State, and in the latter
 tribunal, for the first time, claimed the immunity granted to it by Congress. This was too late.
Considering the object as well as the words of the statute authorizing suit against a national
banking association to be brought in the proper State court of the county where it is located,
we are of opinion that its exemption from suits in other courts of the same State was a personal
privilege that it would waive, and, which, in this case, the defendant did waive, and, which, in
this case, the defendant did waive, by appearing and making defense without claiming the
immunity granted by Congress. No reason can be suggested why one court of a State, rather
than another, both being of the same dignity, should take cognizance of a suit against a
national bank, except the convenience of the bank. And this consideration supports the view
that the exemption of a national bank from suit in any State court except one of the county or
city in which it is located is a personal privilege, which it could claim or not, as it deemed
necessary.

In the case of Ex parte Schollenberger (96 U.S., 369), the court said:

The Act of Congress prescribing the place where a person may be sued is not one affecting
the general jurisdiction of the courts. It is rather in the nature of a personal exemption in favor
of a defendant, and it is one which he may waive. If the citizenship of the parties is sufficient,
a defendant may consent to be sued anywhere he pleases, and certainly jurisdiction will not
be ousted because he has consented. Here, the defendant companies have provided that they
can be found in a district other than that in which they reside, if a particular mode of proceeding
is adopted, and they have been so found. In our opinion, therefore, the circuit court has
jurisdiction of the causes, and should proceed to hear and decide them.

In the case of St. Louis and San Francisco Railway Co. vs. McBride (141 U.S., 127), the court used
the following language:

The first part of section 1 of the Act of 1887, as amended in 1888, gives, generally, to the
circuit courts of the United States jurisdiction of controversies between citizens of different
States where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum of two thousand dollars exclusive of
interest and costs. Such a controversy was presented in this complaint. It was therefore a
controversy of which the circuit courts of the United States have jurisdiction. Assume that it is
true as defendant alleges, that this is not a case in which jurisdiction is founded only on the
fact that the controversy is between citizens of different States, but that it comes within the
scope of that other clause, which provides that "no civil sit shall be brought before either of
said courts, against any person, by any original process or proceeding, in any other district
than that whereof he is inhabitant," still the right to insist upon suit only in the one district is a
personal privilege which he may waive, and he does waive it by pleading to the merits. In Ex
parte Schollenberger (96 U.S., 369, 378), Chief Justice Waite said: "The Act of Congress
prescribing the place where a person may be sued is not one affecting the general jurisdiction
of the courts. It is rather in the nature of a personal exemption in favor of a defendant, and it
is one which he may waive." The Judiciary Act of 1789 (sec. 11, Stat., 79), besides giving
general jurisdiction to circuit courts over suits between citizens of different States, further
provided, generally, that no civil suit should be brought before either of said courts, against an
inhabitant of the United States, by any original process, in any other district than that of which
he was an inhabitant, or in which he should be found. In the case of Toland vs. Sprague (12
Pet., 300, 330), it appeared that the defendant was not an inhabitant of the State in which the
suit was brought, nor found therein. In that case the court observed: "It appears that the party
appeared and pleaded to issue. Now, if the case were one of the want of jurisdiction in the
court, it would not, according to well-established principles, be competent for the parties by
any acts of theirs to give it. But that is not the case. The court had jurisdiction over the parties
and the matter in dispute; the objection was that the party defendant, not being an inhabitant
of Pennsylvania, nor found therein, personal privilege or exemption, which it was competent
 for the party to waive. The cases of Pollard vs. Dwight (4 Cranch., 421) and Barry vs. Foyles (1
Pt., 311) are decisive to show that, after appearance and plea, the case stands as if the suit
were brought that exemption from liability to process and that in case of foreign attachment,
too, is a personal privilege, which may be waived, and that appearing and pleading will produce
that waiver." In (14 Wal., 282), the jurisdiction of the circuit court over a controversy between
citizens of different States was sustained in a case removed from the State court, although it
was conceded that the suit could not have been commenced in the first instance in the circuit
court. See also Claflin vs. Commonwealth Ins. Co. (110 U.S., 81 [28:76].) Without multiplying
authorities on this question, it is obvious that the party who in the first instance appears and
pleads to the merits waives any right to challenge thereafter the jurisdiction of the court on the
ground that the suit has been brought in the wrong district. (Charlotte Nat. Bank vs. Morgan,
132 U.S., 141; Fitzgerald E. M. Const. Co. vs. Fitzergerald, 137 U.S., 98.)

In the case of the Interior Construction and Improvement Co. vs. Gibney (160 U.S., 217), the court
held as follows:

The circuit courts of the United States are thus vested with general jurisdiction of civil actions,
involving the requisite pecuniary value, between citizens of different States. Diversity of
citizenship is a condition of jurisdiction, and, when that does not appear upon the record, the
court, of its own motion, will order the action to be dismissed. But The provision as to the
particular district in which the action shall be brought does not touch the general jurisdiction of
the court over such a cause between such parties; but affects only the proceedings taken to
bring the defendant within such jurisdiction, and is matter of personal privilege, which the
defendant may insist upon, or may waive, at his election; and the defendant's right to object
that an action within the general jurisdiction of the court is brought in the wrong district, is
waived by entering a general appearance, without taking the objection. (Gracie vs. Palmer, 8
Wheat, 699; Toland vs. Sprague, 12 Pet., 300, 330; Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S., 369,
378; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. vs. McBride, 141 U.S., 127; Southern Pacific Co. vs. Dento, 146
U.S., 202, 206; Texas & Pacific Railway Co. vs. Saunders, 151 U.S., 105; Central Trust
Co. vs. McGeorge, 151 U.S., 129; Southern Express Co. vs. Todd, 12 U.S. app., 351.)

In the case of Central Trust Co. vs. McGeorge (151 U.S., 129), the court disposed of the case as
follows:

The court below, in holding that it did not have jurisdiction of the cause, and in dismissing the
bill of complaint for the reason, acted in view of that clause of the Act of March 3, 1887, as
amended in August, 1888, which provides that "no suit shall be brought in the circuit courts of
the United States against any person, by any original process or proceeding, in any other
district than that whereof he is an inhabitant;" and, undoubtedly, if the defendant company,
which was sued in another district than that in which it had its domicile, had, by a proper plea
or motion, sought to avail itself of the statutory exemption, the action of the court would have
been right.

But the defendant company did not choose to plead that provision of the statute, but entered
a general appearance, and joined with the complainant in its prayer for the appointment of a
receiver, and thus was brought within the ruling of this court, so frequently made, that the
exemption from being such out of the district of its domicile is a personal privilege which may
be waive and which is waived by pleading to the merits.

(Improvement Co. vs. Gibney, 16 Sup. Ct., 272, 160 U.S., 217; 40 L. ed., 401; Walker vs. Windsor
Nat. Bank, 5 C. C. A., 421, 56 Fed., 76, 5 U.S. App., 423; Von Auw. vs. Chicago Toy & Fancy Goods
Co., 69 Fed., 448 McBride vs. Grand de Tour Plow Co., 40 Fed., 162; Black vs. Thorne, Fed. Cas. No.
1, 495 (10 Blatchf., 66, 5 Fish. Pat. Cas., 550); Norris vs. Atlas Steamship Co., 37 Fed., 279; Hoover
& Allen Co. vs. Columbia Straw Paper Co., 68 Fed., 945; Blackburn vs. Railroad Co., Fed., Fed., Cas.
No. 1, 467 (2 Flip., 525); Vermont Farm Mach. Co. vs. Gibson, 50 Fed., 423.)

In the case of Security Loan and Trust Co. vs. Kauffman (108 Cal., 214), the court said:

The constitution, Article VI, section 5, declares that, "All actions for the enforcement of liens"
shall be commenced in the county in which the real estate or some portion thereof is situated;
and at the time this action was "commenced" the property was situate within the boundaries
of San Diego. The constitution does not, however, require property is situated, and the
statutory provision in section 392 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that actions 'for the
foreclosure of liens and mortgages on real property' must be tried in the county in which the
subject of the action, or some part thereof, is situated, "subject to the power of the court to
change the place of trial," shows that "the place of trial" is not an element going to the
jurisdiction of the court, but is a matter of legislative regulation. The provision for the transfer
of certain actions to the superior court of the county of Riverside, which is contained in section
12 of the act providing for the organization of that county, shows the extent of this regulation
which the legislature deemed necessary, and implies that only the actions there designated
were to be transferred for trial.

In the case of Chouteau vs. Allen (70 Mo., 290), the court held as follows:

The statutory provision in respect to personal actions is more emphatic, requiring that "suits
instituted by summons, shall, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought: First, when the
defendant is a resident of the State, either in the county within which the defendant resides, or
in the county within which the plaintiff resides, and the defendant may be found," and yet it
was held in reference to this statute in the case of Hembree vs. Campbell (8 Mo., 572), that
though the suit was brought in the county in which the plaintiff resided, and service had upon
the defendant in the county of his residence, unless a plea in abatement to the jurisdiction of
the court over the person of the defendant, was interposed in the first instance, the objection
on the score of lack of jurisdiction could not subsequently be successfully raised. And this,
upon the generally recognized ground that the court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the suit, and that the defendant's plea to the merits acknowledged jurisdiction over his person,
and precluded objection on account of absence of regularity in the instituting of the action. So
also, in Ulrici vs. Papin (11 Mo.., 42), where the then existing statute required "suits in equity
concerning real estate, or whereby the same may be affected, shall be brought in the county
within which such real estate or greater part thereof is situate," and by demurrer to the bill it
was objected that the suit was not brought in the proper county in conformity with the statutory
provision, Judge Scott remarked: "That it does not clearly appear where the greater part of the
lands lie. This objection, if tenable, should have been raised by a plea to the jurisdiction." And
the same learned judge remarks, in Hembree vs. Campbell, supra, "No principle is better
established than that a plea in bar is a waiver of all dilatory matter of defense. That the matter
of abatement was apparent upon the writ can make no difference. Such matters are and should
be pleaded." And pleas to the jurisdiction are as necessary in local as in transitory actions. (1
Tidd. Prac., 630.)

It is not meant to convey the idea that the mere failure to plead to the jurisdiction of the court
would have the effect to confer jurisdiction where none existed before; for it is well settled that
even consent of parties can not confer jurisdiction. (Stone vs. Corbett, 20 Mo., 350.) But all
circuit courts have a general jurisdiction over the foreclosure of mortgages.
In the case of Armendiaz vs. Stillman (54 Texas, 623), the court disposed of the question involved in
the following words:

In our opinion, however, these common law rules respecting local and transitory actions have
no more to do in determining with us where a suit can be brought and maintained, than the
like rules in respect to the form and names of actions; but this is solely regulated by and
dependent upon the proper construction of the constitution and statutes of the State. In the
first, it is emphatically declared in the bill of rights as a fundamental principle of government,
"All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law." Now a party may not have an action in
rem for or concerning land in foreign jurisdiction, because redress can not be given or had by
such proceeding in due course of law; but personal damages may be given for such injury and
enforced by due process of law within the State. "And it would seem if the State failed to give
to one of its citizens a remedy against others for injuries of this kind, it would fail in the pledge
made in the constitution as plainly as if the injury had been in a foreign jurisdiction to one's
goods or person."

There is, as Judge Marshall himself says, no difference in principle in giving redress for injuries
to land in the jurisdiction where the defendant is found, which may not be equally applicable
in other cases. He says, speaking of the fiction upon which transitory actions are sustained,
where the cause of action occurred out of the jurisdiction where they are brought: "They have"
(i. e., the courts), "without legislative aid, applied this fiction to all personal torts, wherever the
wrong may have been committed, and to all contracts wherever executed. To this general rule
contracts respecting lands from no exception. It is admitted that on a contract respecting lands,
an action is sustainable wherever the defendant may be found. Yet in such case every difficulty
may occur that present itself in an action of trespass. An investigation of title may become
necessary, a question of boundary may arise, and a survey may be essential to the full merits
of the case. Yet these difficulties have not prevailed against the jurisdiction of the court. They
are countervailed by the opposing consideration, that if the action be disallowed, the injured
party may have a clear right without a remedy in a case where a person who has done the
wrong, and who ought to make the compensation, is within the power of the court. That this
consideration loses its influence where the action pursues anything not in the reach of the
court is inevitably necessary, but for the loss of its influence, where the remedy is against the
person, and is within the power of the court, I have not yet discovered a reason, other than a
technical one, which can satisfy my judgment.'

In the case of De La Vega vs. Keague (64 Texas, 205), the court said:

Our statutes in force at the time the reconvention was filed provided that suits for the recovery
of land should be brought in the county where the land or a part thereof is situated. This is one
of the exceptions to the general rule requiring suits to be brought in the county of the
defendant's residence. This requirement is not a matter that affects the jurisdiction of the
district courts over the subject matter of controversies about the title or possession of lands.
Every district court in the State has cognizance of such suits; the requirement as to the county
in which the suit may be brought is a mere personal privilege granted to the parties, which may
be waived like any other privilege of this character. (Ryan vs. Jackson, 11 Tex., 391;
Morris vs. Runnells, 12 Tex., 176.) A judgment rendered by the district court of Galveston
County, when the parties had submitted to the jurisdiction, would settle the title to land in
McLennan County as effectually as if rendered in its own district curt. Jurisdiction of causes
may be obtained by defendants in counties other than those in which the statute requires them
to be brought, in other ways than by express consent or by failure to claim the personal
privilege accorded by law. A suit upon a monied demand, brought in the county of a
defendant's residence by a resident of another county, may be met with a counter demand
 against the plaintiff, and a recovery may be had upon the counter demand, though if suit had
been originally commenced upon it, the county of the plaintiff's residence would have had
exclusive jurisdiction. And so with other cases that might be supposed. A plaintiff calling a
defendant into court for the purpose of obtaining relief against him invites him to set up all
defenses which may defeat the cause of action sued on, or any other appropriate and germane
to the subject matter of the suit, which should be settled between the parties before a proper
adjudication of the merits of the cause can be obtained. He grants him the privilege of setting
up all such counterclaims and cross actions as he holds against the plaintiff which may legally
be pleaded in such a suit.

This is particularly the case in our State, where a multiplicity of suit is abhorred, and a leading
object is to settle all disputes between the parties pertinent to the cause of action in the same
suit. The question of the original right to bring the cross action in the county where the suit is
pending can not be raised; otherwise this design would, in a large number of cases, be
defeated, and the various matters which could well be settled in the cause might have to seek
a number of different counties, and be asserted in a number of different suits, before the
controversy between the parties could be settled. The plaintiff must be considered as waiving
any privilege to plead to the jurisdiction in such cross actions, and as consenting that the
defendant may assert in the suit any demands which he could plead were it commenced in
the county where such demands were properly usable. The question then is, La Vega have
set up the matters pleaded in his answer in reconvention had the land sought to be partitioned
been situated in Galveston County? This question must be determined by the solution of
another, viz, can a defendant to a partition suit who claims through the title under which the
partition is sought set up a superior title to the whole land? "It is doubtless true that, in a
partition suit, a court of equity will not entertain any controversy as to the legal title, whether it
arises between the part owners as to their respective interests, or by reason of a claim set up
by one or more of them to the entire land by title superior to the one under which the partition
is asked to be decreed. In our State, where there is no distinction between law and equity in
the determination of causes, an action to settle disputed titles, whether legal or equitable, may
be combined with one to partition the land between the plaintiff and defendant. Hence there
can be no objection to determining any questions as to title between the coowners in a partition
suit in our State, and the strict rules of chancery do not prevail.

In the case of Kipp vs. Cook (46 Minn., 535), the court made use of the following language:

1. The appellant contends that the district court for the county of Sibley, and of the eighth
judicial district, was without jurisdiction, and could not properly determine the rights or interests
of either litigant to lands located in Sherburne County, which is in the seventh judicial district;
but this question was passed upon many years since, in the case of Gill vs. Bradley (21 Minn.,
15), wherein it was held that, although the proper place for the trial of an action to recover real
property, or for the determination, in any form, of a right or interest therein, was, by virtue of
an existing statute — now found as Gen. St. 1878, c. 66, par. 47 — in the county wherein the
lands were situated, the district court of the county designated in the complaint had jurisdiction
over the subject matter, and had power to before the time for answering expired, in accordance
with the express provisions of another section — now section 51 — of the same chapter, and
the place of trial had actually been changed by order of the court or by consent of parties.

In the case of the west Point Iron Co. vs. Reymert (45 N.Y., 703), the court said:

The action was tried in the county of Dutches, and by the court without a jury, without objection
on the part of the defendants. If the trial should have been in Putnam, and by a jury, it was for
 the defendants to assert their rights at the trial; and by not them claiming them, they waived
them, and must be regarded as having assented to the place and mode of trial.

We transcribe the following from decisions of the supreme court of Spain:

Considering, further, that Pedrosa, instead of immediately objecting to the jurisdiction of the
court and asking for a change of venue, sued for recovery of title, thereby submitting himself
to the jurisdiction of the court of first instance, which reserved its decision thereon until plaintiff
had presented the petition in due form. (Judgment of May 30, 1860, 5 Civ. Jur., 465.)

Considering that although other proceedings were had in the first court (Salvador de Granada)
and in the courts of first instance of Sagrario and Guerra of said city subsequent to the death
of the count, the truth of the matter is that his daughter, the countess, the only party now
claiming relief, not only had the proceedings taken in the first of said courts dismissed but
asked the court of first instance of Castilla de la Nueva to accept, and the court accepted, her
express submission to its jurisdiction:

Considering that far from objecting, as she might have objected, to the jurisdiction of the court,
the countess acknowledged such jurisdiction as did the other coheirs when thru asked the
court to proceed with the testamentary proceedings, thus creating a jurisdictional situation
perfectly in harmony with the respective claims of the parties and so binding upon them that
they are now absolutely estopped from denying its importance or legal force. (Judgment of
May 30, 1860, 5 Civ. Jur., 465.)

He who by his own acts submits himself to the jurisdiction of a court shall not thereafter be
permitted to question such jurisdiction. (Judgment of December 30, 1893, 29 Civ. Jur., 64.)

According to article 305 (of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil) the plaintiff shall be presumed to
have tacitly submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by the mere act of filing his
complaint therein, and in the case of the defendant where the latter after appearing in the
action takes any step therein other than to object to such jurisdiction. (Judgment of September
21, 1878, 40 Civ. Jur., 232.)

Plaintiff and defendant are presumed to have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the
court, the former by the mere act of filing his complaint therein and the latter by his answering
the same and taking any step other than demurring to such jurisdiction as provided in articles
56 to 58 of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil. (Judgment of July 27, 1883, 52 Civ. Jur., 511.)

In order that a tacit submission based upon the mere act filing the complaint may be valid the
court must be one of ordinary jurisdiction as provided in article 4 of the Ley de Ebjuiciamiento
Civil. (Judgment of August 27, 1864, 10 Civ. Jur., 14.)

The following language is taken from The Earl of Halsbury's Laws of England (vol. 1, p. 50):

The old distinction between 'local' and 'transitory' actions, though of far less importance than
it was before the passing of the judicature acts, must still be borne in mind in connection with
actions relating to land situate outside the local jurisdiction of our courts. 'Transitory' actions
were those in which the facts in issue between the parties had no necessary connection with
a particular locality, e.g., contract, etc.; whilst "local" actions were those in which there was
such a connection, e.g., disputes as to the title to, or trespasses to, land.
 One importance of this distinction lay in the fact that in the case of local actions the plaintiff
was bound to lay the venue truly, i.e., in the county (originally in the actual hundred) in which
the land in question lay. In the case, however of a transitory action, he might lay it wherever
he pleased, subject to the power of the court to alter it in a proper case. Local venues have
now been abolished, and, therefore, so far as actions relating to land in England are
concerned, the distinction may be disregarded.

It is, however, important from another point of view, viz, that of jurisdiction as distinct from
procedure. In the case of real actions relating to land in the colonies or foreign countries the
English relating courts had, even before the judicature acts, no jurisdiction; and, therefore, the
removal by those acts of a difficulty of procedure — viz, the rule as to local venue — which
might have stood in the way, if they had and wished to exercise jurisdiction, did not in any way
confer jurisdiction in such cases. The lack of jurisdiction still exists, and our courts refuse to
adjudicate upon claims of title to foreign land in proceedings founded on an alleged invasion
of the proprietary rights attached thereto, and to award damages founded on that adjudication;
in other words, an action for trespass to, or for recovery of, foreign land can not be maintained
in England, at any rate if the defendant chooses to put in issue the ownership of such land.

There is no decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in conflict with the principles laid
down in this opinion. In the case of Serrano vs. Chanco (5 Phil. Rep., 431), the matter before the court
was the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance over the actions and proceedings relating to the
settlement of the estates of deceased persons. The determination of that question required the
consideration of section 602 of the code of Civil Procedure rather than section 377 of that code. The
argument of the court touching the last-named section, is inapplicable to the case at bar and would
not affect it if it were. The reference to the jurisdiction of the court made in that argument based on
section 377 was unnecessary to a decision of the case.

The case of Molina vs. De la Riva (6 Phil. Rep., 12), presented simply the question whether or not an
agreement between parties to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of a particular court to the
exclusion of the court provided by law as the appropriate court in the premises could be enforced. As
we have before intimated, it touched no question involved in the litigation at bar.

In the case of Molina vs. De la Riva (7 Phil. Rep., 302), the action was one to foreclose a mortgage
upon a real and personal property. In discussing the matter before it the court said:

The demurrer was also based upon the ground that this was an action to foreclose a mortgage
and by the provisions of sections 254 and 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure it should have
been brought in the Province of Albay where the property was situated. The action is clearly
an action to foreclose a mortgage, lien, or incumbrance upon property, but it will be noticed
that section 254 relates only to mortgages on real estate. This contract covered both real and
personal property, and while, perhaps, an action could not be maintained in the Court of First
Instance of Manila for the foreclosure of the alleged mortgage upon the real estate situated in
Albay, yet so far as the personal property was concerned, we know of no law which would
deprive that court of jurisdiction.

As will readily be observed, the court in the remarks above quoted was not discussing or deciding the
question whether or not an action could be maintained in the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila to foreclose a mortgage on real estate located in Albay; but, rather, whether or not an action
could be maintained in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to foreclose a mortgate
on personal property located in the Province of Albay. The remark of the court that perhaps the former
action could not be maintained was not intended to be decisive and was not thought at the time to be
an indication of what the decision of the court might be if that precise case were presented to it with
full argument and citation of authorities.

The case of Castano vs. Lobingier (9 Phil. Rep., 310), involved the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance to issue a writ of prohibition against a justice of the peace holding his court outside the
province in which the Court of First Instance was sitting at the time of issuing the writ. The
determination of the question presented different considerations and different provisions of law from
those which rule the decision of the case at bar.

We, therefore, hold that the terms of section 377 providing that actions affecting real property shall be
brought in the province where the land involved in the suit, or some part thereof, is located, do not
affect the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance over the land itself but relate simply to the personal
rights of parties as to the place of trial.

We come, now, to a consideration of the special laws relating to the condemnation of land by railroad
companies upon which also plaintiff relies. Of those laws only one is of importance in the decision of
this case. That is Act No. 1258. In it are found these provisions:

SECTION 1. In addition to the method of procedure authorized for the exercise of the power
of eminent domain by sections two hundred and forty-one to two hundred and fifty-three,
inclusive, of Act Numbered One hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act providing a Code of
Procedure in civil actions and special proceedings in the Philippine Islands," the procedure in
this Act provided may be adopted whenever a railroad corporation seeks to appropriate land
for the construction, extension, or operation of its railroad line.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 3. Whenever a railroad corporation is authorized by its charter, or by general law, to

exercise the power of eminent domain in the city of Manila or in any province, and has not
obtained by agreement with the owners thereof the lands necessary for its purposes as
authorized by law, it may in its complaint, which in each case shall be instituted in the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila if the land is situated in the city of Manila, or in the Court of
First Instance of the province where the lands is situated, join as defendants all persons owing
or claiming to own, or occupying, any of the lands sought to be condemned, or any interest
therein, within the city or province, respectively, showing, so far as practicable, the interest of
each defendant and stating with certainty the right of condemnation, and describing the
property sought to be condemned. Process requiring the defendants to appear in answer to
the complaint shall be served upon all occupants of the lands sought to be condemned, and
upon the owners and all persons claiming interest therein, so far as known. If the title to ant
lands sought to be condemned appears to be in the Insular Government, although the lands
are occupied by private individuals, or if it is uncertain whether the title is in the Insular
Government or in private individuals, or if the title is otherwise so obscure or doubtful that the
company can not with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners, averment may
be made by the company in its complaint to that effect. Process shall be served upon resident
and no residents in the same manner as provided therefor in Act Numbered One hundred and
ninety, and the rights of minors and persons of unsound mind shall be safeguarded in the
manner in such cases provided in said Act. The court may order additional and special notice
in any case where such additional or special notice is, in its opinion, required.

SEC. 4. Commissioners appointed in pursuance of such complaint, in accordance with section

two hundred and forty-three of Act Numbered One hundred ad ninety, shall have jurisdiction
over all the lands included in the complaint, situated within the city of Manila or within the
 province, as the case may be, and shall be governed in the performance of their duties by the
provisions of sections two hundred and forty-four and two hundred and forty-five, and the
action of the court upon the report of the commissioners shall be governed by section two
hundred and forty-six of Act Numbered One hundred and ninety.

The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referred to in these sections are, so far as material here,
the following:

SEC. 241. How the right of eminent domain may be exercised. — The Government of the
Philippine Islands, or of any province or department thereof, or of any municipality, and any
person, or public or private corporation having by law the right to condemn private property for
public use, shall exercise that right in the manner hereinafter prescribed.

SEC. 242. The complaint. — The complaint in condemnation proceedings shall state with
certainty the right of condemnation, and describe the property sought to be condemned,
showing the interest of each defendant separately.

SEC. 243. Appointment of Commissioners. — If the defendant concede that the right of
condemnation exists on the part of the plaintiff, or if, upon trial, the court finds that such right
exists, the court shall appoint three judicious and disinterested landowners of the province in
which the land to be condemned, or some portion of the same, is situated, to be commissioners
to hear the parties and view the premises, and assess damages to be paid for the
condemnation, and to report their proceedings in full to the court, and shall issue a commission
under the seal of the court to the commissioners authorizing the performance of the duties
herein prescribed.

We are of the opinion that what we have said in the discussion of the effect of section 377 relative to
the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance over lands is applicable generally to the sections of law just
quoted. The provisions regarding the place and method of trial are procedural. They touched not the
authority of the court over the land but, rather, the powers which it may exercise over the parties. They
relate not to the jurisdictional power of the court over the subject matter but to the place where that
jurisdiction is to be exercised. In other words, the jurisdiction is assured, whatever the place of its
exercise. The jurisdiction is the thing; the place of exercise its incident.

These special laws contain nothing which in any way indicates an intention of the legislature to alter
the nature or extent of the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance granted by Act No. 136. As we said
in discussing the provisions of section 277 of the Code of Civil Procedure, we can not hold that
jurisdiction to be limited unless by express provision or clear intendment.

We have thus far drawn an analogy between section 377 of the code of Civil Procedure and section 3
of Act No. 1258, asserting that neither the one nor the other was intended to restrict, much less deprive,
the Courts of First Instance of the jurisdiction over lands in the Philippine Islands conferred upon them
by Act No. 136. We have extended that analogy to include the proposition that the question of venue
as presented in the Acts mentioned does not relate to jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter,
it simply granting to the defendant certain rights and privileges as against the plaintiff relative to the
place of trial, which rights and privileges he might waive expressly or by implication. We do not,
however, extend that analogy further. On reading and comparing section 377 of the Code of Civil
Procedure with section 3 of Act No. 1258. both of which are hearing set forth, a difference is at once
apparent in the wording of the provisions relating to the place of trial. Section 277 stipulates that all
actions affecting real estate "shall be brought in the province where the land, or some part thereof, is
situated." Section 3 of Act No. 1258 provides that in an action brought by a railroad corporation to
condemn land for its uses the plaintiff "may in its complaint, which in each case shall be instituted . . .
in the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is situated, join as defendants all persons
owning, etc . . . land within the city or province . . ." Section 1 of that Act, as we have already seen,
says that: "In addition to the method of procedure authorized for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain by sections two hundred and forty-one to two hundred and fifty-three" of the Code of Civil
Procedure, "the procedure in this Act may be adopted whenever a railroad corporation seeks to
appropriate land . . . ."

From these provisions we note, first, that the procedure expressly made applicable to actions for the
condemnation of land by railroad corporations is not that contained in section 377 but that found in
sections 241 to 253 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 377 is nowhere expressly mentioned in
Act No. 1258 nor is it anywhere touched or referred to by implication. The procedure embodied in that
Act to consummate the purposes of its creation is complete of itself, rendered so either by provisions
contained in the Act itself, rendered so either by provisions contained in the Act itself or by reference
to specific sections of the Code of Civil Procedure which by such reference are made a part thereof.

In the second place, we observe that, so far as venue is concerned, Act No. 1258 and section 377 are
quite different in their wording. While the latter provides that the actions of which it treats shall be
commenced in the province where the land, or some part thereof, lies, Act No. 1258, section 3,
stipulates that the actions embraced in its terms shall be brought only in the province where the land
lies. This does not mean, of course, that if a single parcel of land under the same ownership, lying
party in one province and partly in another, is the subject of condemnation proceedings begun by a
railroad corporation, a separate action must be commenced in each province. Nor does it mean that
the aid of section 377 is required to obviate such necessity. The situation would be met and solved by
the general principles of law and application of which to every situation is an inherent or implied power
of every court. Such, for example, are the prohibition against multiplicity of actions, the rules against
division of actions into parts, and the general principle that jurisdiction over a subject matter singly
owned will not be divided among different courts, the one in which the action is first brought having
exclusive jurisdiction of the whole. The provisions of these two laws, section 377 and Act No. 1258,
differ in the manner indicated because they refer to subjects requiring inherently different treatment,
so different, in fact, as to be in some respects quite opposite. While it is true that section 377 speaks
of action for the condemnation of real estate, nevertheless it was intended to cover simply the ordinary
action affecting title to or interest in real estate, where the land involved is comparatively speaking,
compact together. Its provisions were not intended to meet a situation presented by an action to
condemn lands extending contiguously from one end of the country to the other. Act No. 1258 is a
special law, enacted for a particular purpose, and to meet a particular exigency. The conditions found
in an action for the condemnation of real estate by a railroad company might and generally would be
so different that the application of the provisions of section 377 permitting the venue to be laid in any
province where any part of the land lies would work a very great hardship to many defendants in such
an action. To hold that a railroad company desiring to build a line from Ilocos Norte to Batangas,
through substantially the whole of the Island of Luzon, might lay the venue in Batangas, it being a
province in which a part of the land described in the complaint was located, would be to require all the
parties defendant in Ilocos Norte and intervening provinces, with their witnesses, to go to Batangas,
with all the inconvenience and expense which the journey would entail, and submit the valuation of
their lands into only to the Court of First Instance of Batangas but to a commission appointed in that
province. The hardship to such defendants under such a holding is so manifest that we are of the
opinion that it was not intended that section 377 of the code of Civil Procedure should apply to actions
for condemnation. Under the provisions of that section, the defendant has no right to ask for a change
of venue if the land involved in the litigation, or any part thereof, is located in the province where the
court sits before which the action has been commenced. When, therefore, an action such as is detailed
above is begun by a railroad company in Batangas against persons whose lands lie in Ilocos Norte,
there being also involved lands lying in Batangas, such defendants would have no right under section
377, if it were applicable, to demand that the trial as to their lands take place in the Province of Ilocos
Norte. We do not believe that this was intended. We believe, rather, that under the provisions of the
special laws relating to the condemnation of real estate by railroad companies, the defendants in the
various provinces through which the line runs may compel, if they wish, a separate action to be
commenced in each province in order that they may have a fair and convenient trial not only before
the court but also before commissioner of their province who are not only before commissioners of
their province who are not only conveniently at hand, but who are best able to judge of the weight of
testimony relative to the value of land in that province.

We, therefore, hold that section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to actions by
railroad corporations to condemn lands; and that, while with the consent of defendants express or
implied the venue may be laid and the action tried in any province selected by the plaintiff nevertheless
the defendants whose lands lie in one province, or any one of such defendants, may, by timely
application to the court, require the venue as to their, or, if one defendant, his, lands to be changed to
the province where their or his lands lie. In such case the action as to all of the defendants not objecting
would continue in the province where originally begun. It would be severed as to the objecting
defendants and ordered continued before the court of the appropriate province or provinces. While we
are of that opinion and so hold it can not affect the decision in the case before us for the reason that
the defendants are not objecting to the venue and are not asking for a change thereof. They have not
only expressly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court but are here asking that that
jurisdiction be maintained against the efforts of the plaintiff to remove it.

The principles which we have herein laid down we do not apply to criminal cases. They seem to rest
on a different footing. There the people of the state is a party. The interests of the public require that,
to secure the best results and effects in the punishment of crime, it is necessary to prosecute and
punish the criminal in the very place, as near as may be, where he committed his crime. As a result it
has been the uniform legislation, both in statutes and in constitutions, that the venue of a criminal
action must be laid in the place where the crime was committed. While the laws here do not specifically
and in terms require it, we believe it is the established custom and the uniform holding that criminal
prosecutions must be brought and conducted, except in cases especially provided by law, in the
province where the crime is committed.

For these reasons the judgment below must be reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court
with direction to proceed with the action according to law. So ordered.

Torres, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-56449 August 31, 1987

JOSE CHING AND CARIDAD CHING, petitioners,

vs.
Hon. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, as Presiding Judge of the CFI of Laguna Branch II, and
Spouses CESAR ALVARADO and ARACELI Laguna Branch II, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks a reversal of the decision of the
respondent court nullifying the judgment of the municipal court in a forcible entry case on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. .

The petitioners had alleged in their complaint for ejectment that the private respondents had forced
their way into the disputed premises without any right whatsoever and had refused to vacate the same
despite repeated demands. These demands were based on the petitioners' case that they were the
owners of the said property, having acquired it by virtue of a valid sale. The private respondents, in
their answer, had challenged the claimed sale, arguing that the property belonged to them by right of
inheritance. At any rate, they had argued, as the basic question was one of ownership and not of mere
possession, the municipal court had no jurisdiction and should dismiss the complaint..

The municipal court, ** affirming its jurisdiction, proceeded to trial and thereafter rendered judgment ordering the private respondents
to vacate the disputed property. It also required them to pay the petitioners back and current rentals at P 1,000.00 a month until actual surrender
of the premises, as well as a P 3,000.00 attorney's fee plus the costs of the suit. 1 On appeal, this decision was set aside by the respondent
judge, who held that the municipal court had no competence to resolve the case as it involved a question of ownership. 2 The petitioners,
disagreeing, then came to us. At the outset, we reject the private respondents' submission that this petition is improper because the questions
involved are merely factual. Of course they are not. What we have to decide here is whether or not, in the light of the records of the case, and
particularly the adverse assertions of ownership over the property in issue, the municipal court had the authority to try and decide the same in
the first instance. This may be raised on certiorari. .

As the original complaint was filed on January 6, 1979, the question before us should be examined
under the provisions of R.A. No. 296, as amended, which was the law then in force. That law allowed
the municipal court to receive evidence upon the question of ownership in ejectment cases, but only
whenever it was necessary to do so for the purpose of determining the character and extent of
possession and damages for detention. .

The pertinent provisions of that law read as follows: .

Sec. 88. Original jurisdiction in civil cases. -In all civil actions, including those mentioned in Rules fifty-
nine and sixty-two (now Rule 57 and 60) of the Rules of Court, arising in his municipality or city, and
not exclusively cognizable by the Court of First Instance, the justice of the peace (now municipal judge)
and the judge of a municipal court (now city court) shall have exclusive original jurisdiction ... . In
forcible entry and detainer proceedings, the justice of the peace or judge of the municipal court shall
have original jurisdiction, but the said justice or judge may receive evidence upon the question of title
therein, whatever may be the value of the property, solely for the purpose of determining the character
and extent of possession and damages for detention. .

There should be no question by now that what determines the nature of an action- and correspondingly
the court which has jurisdiction over it-is the allegation made by the plaintiff in his
complaint. 3 Accordingly, the present case being one for forcible entry, it should normally come under
the jurisdiction of the municipal court, before which it was in fact filed. There was a complication,
however, as in their respective primary pleadings, the parties both injected the issue of ownership to
support their adversary claims to the possession of the property. This issue of ownership, in view of
the respondent court, had removed the case from the jurisdiction of the municipal court. .

It is settled that the mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an ejectment case will not oust
the municipal court of its summary jurisdiction. 4 This has to be so, for "were the principle otherwise,
the ends of justice would be frustrated by making the efficacy of this kind of actions depend upon the
defendant in all cases. 5 Accordingly, we have repeatedly held: .

The mere circumstance that proof of title, or evidence of ownership, had been introduced during the
trial before the Municipal Court would not deprive said court of jurisdiction to rule on the question of
who had the prior physical possession. 6 .

Even where defendant in a detainer or forcible entry alleges title to the property in his answer, it is
declared in a great number of cases that the Justice of the Peace or the Court of First Instance on
appeal will not be divested of its jurisdiction by such allegations alone. 7 .

There is one exception, however, and that is where it appears during the trial that, by the nature of the
evidence presented, the issue of possession cannot be decided without deciding the issue of
ownership. In such a case, the jurisdiction of the municipal court is lost and the action should be
dismissed. 8 An illustration is the case of Teodoro v. Balatbat, where the defendant claimed possession
by virtue of a deed of sale allegedly executed by the plaintiff, who in turn denied its authenticity. As
there was no indication that the defendant's claim was unfounded, the municipal court could not
continue with the case because it had lost the competence to decide it. 9 .

After examining the facts of this present case, the Court finds that it does not come under the exception
to the rule. .

The property in question consists of a residential house and lot covered by TCT No. T-85126 and
registered in the name of petitioner Jose Ching in the Registry of Deeds of Laguna. 10 The basis of the
registration is a deed of sale executed in his favor by Felix Carpio, the former owner, who had acquired it from Brigido Alvarado, Cesar
Alvarado's supposed father. 11 The record does not show that such registration has been challenged since the issuance in 1978 of the said
certificate of title, which in the absence of evidence to the contrary should be presumed valid. There is no encumbrance on the land, and there
is no adverse claim or notice of lis pendis annotated in the certificate. 12 Such registration, it may be added, is binding against the whole world
unless annulled for cause in proper cases. .

It is true that petitioner Cesar Alvarado had filed a complaint in the court of first instance of Laguna
against the petitioners and several others for the annulment of the deed of sale invoked by the
petitioners. 13 However, that fact alone could not divest the municipal court of jurisdiction to continue trying the question of possession,
more so since the question of ownership was appropriately being litigated in the annulment suit. Significantly, the deed of sale being challenged
in that action was different from the contract involved in the exception just cited. .

In the Balatbat case, the deed of sale invoked by the defendant was allegedly executed by the plaintiff,
who denied its authenticity. In other words, the transaction in question was purportedly between the
plaintiff and the defendant as vendor and vendee. In the instant case, the private respondents were
not a party to the contract of sale invoked by the petitioners. It was being challenged by respondent
Cesar Alvarado only as an alleged heir of Brigido Alvarado, who had transferred it to Felix Carpio, who
in turn had sold it to the petitioners. .

Without preempting any decision in that annulment case, we make the observation that even if the
private respondents should succeed therein, he would not thereby necessarily acquire full ownership
of the property in question. Assuming the validity of the holographic will be invoke, he would be entitled
to only an indefinite portion of the testator's estate as long as no partition thereof shall have been
effected. For this reason alone, the respondent's claim of ownership over the particular house and lots
in question could be dismissed as untimely and untenable. .
Finally, the fact that the petitioners themselves adduced evidence of ownership over the property in
question did not, as claimed, have the effect of divesting the municipal court of its jurisdiction. As
permitted in the above-cited Section 88 of R.A. No. 296, the plaintiff in an ejectment case may
introduce such evidence for the purpose of proving the character of his possession and the amount of
damages he is claiming for unjust deprivation of such possession. 14 The petitioners were only trying to prove their
right to possession and damages by establishing their right of ownership. .

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated January 5, 1981,
is set aside and that of the municipal court dated July 5, 1979, is reinstated, with costs against the
private respondents. This decision is immediately executory. .

SO ORDERED. .

Teehankee (C.J.), Narvasa, Paras and Gancayco, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 78206 March 19, 1990

PAULINO ZAMORA, LAURENTINO MEJORADA, PLACIDO JOSON, AGAPITO MEJORADA,

EZPERANZA ALAMBAN, CELEDONIO RINAN, POLICARUSO T. BUSIG, FRANCISCO T.
PILAPIL, JR., CELSO CABUNGCAG, RICARDO CUGDAN, GERARDO TABON, TERESA
MARTEL DY, LINO CACAYAN, PACIENCIA D. MEJORADA, GREGORIO OUANO, JUSTINIANO
BAJAO, ROMULO PADILLA, PEDRO ALBA, ANANCORITO B. TAN, BRAULIO REGIS,
SEGUNDO ANG, CERUNDIO ACERO, ROSARIO D. TANG-AN, COCOMIA CANETA, EDILBERTO
G. BAJAO, EUGENIA N. PUPOS, JACINTO M. BALISTOY, VIDAL T. AGUILAR, LUCIO R.
AGUILAR, ESMAEL T. WAHIMAN, ALUD PABULARIO, LEONILA LLORENTE, BERNABE
BATAHOY, MODITO JUMARITO, AGUIDO REMEGOSO, ANTONIO TAGAYLO, EMELIANO
LAGBAS, BRIGIDO AYUMAN, NATIVIDAD CABALDO, BERNARDINO DACAR, NICOLAS E.
YALMORIDA, DAMIAN LAGBAS, HILARIO MAGALLANES, FELIX ABAD, SERVANDO SIMON,
GALMACIO BACHARPA, GIL GACATGAT, DEMETERIO JAGAPE, EUSEBIO PADERO, VICENTE
MANZANO, JOSE CO, PEDRO BALILI, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MEDINA RECREATION CENTER, INC., FELOMINO
DELEGENCIA, JUAN PANKIAN, MELECIO BERSABAL, CATALINO IPANAAG, MATEO
DELEGENCIA, DEMOSTENES LIMBACO, respondents.

Mario D. Ortiz for petitioners.

Augusto G. Maderazo and Mateo G. Delegencia for private respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

This case involves a conflict of jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and the Securities and
Exchange Commission. The petitioners claim they are suing as members of an unregistered
association and so come under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The private respondents disagree,
insisting that they are being sued in an intra-corporate dispute covered by P.D. No. 902-A. The issue
was resolved by the respondent court in favor of the private respondents. We are now asked by the
petitioners to review its decision and to find that it has erred.

It is not disputed that sometime in 1966 the petitioners and the private respondents organized an
unregistered partnership called the Medina People's Cockpit Association, with its funds coming from
the contributions of its members. Such funds were used in 1975 for the purchase of a lot and the
construction of a building in the name of the association. Subsequently, in 1976, a corporation called
the Medina Recreation Center, Inc. was created, with respondent Felomino Delegencia and three of
his relatives among the incorporators. The properties of the association were transferred to the
corporation in 1977. The petitioners, alleging irregularities in the transfer, then filed a complaint against
the private respondents, first with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1979 and later with the
Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental in 1980. It is the propriety of these complaints that is now
before us.

We do not deal here with the merits of the questioned transfer of properties from the association to
the corporation. That will be resolved by the proper body. What we are examining here is which as
between the Regional Trial Court and the Securities and Exchange Commission has the appropriate
jurisdiction.
The record shows that after having filed their complaint with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on December 8, 1979,1 the petitioners either withdrew or did not pursue it and instead filed a similar
complaint five months later, on April 22, 1980, with the Court of First Instance. 2 Here they also alleged
that they should be regarded as stockholders of the corporation, prompting the defendants to move
for a bill of particulars on May 2, 1980, to determine in what capacity the plaintiffs were suing. This
was followed on May 7, 1980, by a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, 3 but the plaintiffs amended
their complaint on May 13, 1980, to delete therefrom the allegation that they were suing as
stockholders of the corporation. 4 The defendants then moved to strike out the amended complaint
and also to dismiss the original complaint for lack of jurisdiction. 5 These motions were denied on
January 2, 1981,6 and the defendants filed their answer on January 28, 1981, where they reiterated
their motion to dismiss and reserved the right to question the jurisdiction of the court. 7 Trial followed.
On January 23, 1985, the court placed the disputed properties under receivership.8 On March 13,
1985, the defendants reiterated their motions for reconsideration and to dismiss, and upon their denial
on June 17, 1985, filed with this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary
injunction.9 We issued a temporary restraining order on October 7, 1985, enjoining the trial court from
further proceeding with the case and then referred the petition to the respondent court.10 In its decision
dated November 13, 1986, the dispositive portion read as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Writ of certiorari and Prohibition with

preliminary injunction is hereby granted.

The Order dated January 2, 1981, denying the motion to strikeout amended complaint
with supplemental motion to dismiss; as well as the Order dated June 17, 1985,
denying reconsideration thereof, are hereby annulled.

The Order dated January 23, 1985, granting tile motion for appointment of receiver is
likewise reversed.

Finally, respondent judge is commanded to desist from taking further proceedings in

Civil Case No. 516-M.

SO ORDERED.

Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try and decide a
case. 11 Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law while jurisdiction
over the person is acquired by his voluntary submission to the authority of the court or through the
exercise of its coercive processes. Jurisdiction over the res is obtained by actual constructive seizure
placing the property under the orders of the court. 12

We are concerned here only with the first kind of jurisdiction, to wit, jurisdiction over the subject matter.

The private respondents point to the undenied fact that the petitioners first filed their complaint with
the Securities and Exchange Commission where they averred that they were stockholders of the
Medina Recreation Center, Inc. Later, the petitioners filed with the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Oriental a similar complaint, which they later amended to remove there from the allegation that they
were suing as stockholders of the said corporation. The private respondents argue that by such acts,
the petitioners are now estopped from denying such allegation. The amendment of the complaint did
not do the petitioners any good either because they were bound by their original averments, let alone
the fact that the said amendment was not made with leave of court.

The petitioners belittle these arguments, contending that the complaint filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission was only one of the several recourses taken by them, which included
complaints with the NBI and the PC. They were exhausting all possible remedies available to them
against the frauds perpetrated by the private respondents. Moreover, they later withdrew their
complaint from the SEC and amended their original complaint in the Court of First Instance, as allowed
by the trial judge, to make it clear that they were suing not as stockholders of the corporation but as
members of the association. The amendment was in fact proper even without prior leave of court
because this was done before the filing of responsive pleadings by the defendants.

The petitioners further stress that the motion to dismiss their complaint was denied in 1981, and it was
only in 1985 that the denial was questioned in the petition filed by the private respondents with this
Court and referred by us to the Court of Appeals. That petition having been clearly filed after more
than four years, it should not have been given due course by the respondent court.

It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be changed by agreement of the parties or
by the act of either of them that will contravene the legislative will. As this court has repeatedly held:

Nothing can change the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. None of the
parties to the litigation can enlarge or diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or when
it shall be removed. That power is a matter of legislative enactment which none but
the legislature may change. Thus, the (Congress) has the sole power to define,
prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts. 13

It follows that as a rule the filing of a complaint with one court which has no jurisdiction over it does
not prevent the plaintiff from filing the same complaint later with the competent court. The plaintiff is
not estopped from doing so simply because it made a mistake before in the choice of the proper forum.
In such a situation, the only authority the first court can exercise is to dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction. This has to be so as a contrary conclusion would allow a party to divest the competent
court of its jurisdiction, whether erroneously or even deliberately in derogation of the law.

Applying these principles, we hold that the mere fact that the petitioners first filed their complaint with
the Securities and Exchange Commission did not have the effect of precluding them from filing the
same complaint with the Court of First Instance if this was the court that was vested with the
appropriate jurisdiction. They would then be only rectifying their error. However, this is only on the
assumption that it is really the Court of First Instance and not the Securities and Exchange
Commission that should hear the petitioners' claims against the private respondents. The question is,
which as between the two bodies is the competent court?

We affirm the finding of the respondent court that the petitioners are actually suing as stockholders of
the corporation and not as members of the association. This is clear from their opening statement in
the letter-complaint they filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission where they categorically
declared:

The undersigned PETITIONERS are bonafide Stockholders of the Medina Recreation

Center, Inc., situated in Medina, Misamis Oriental, who are constrained to file this
petition to your Office to compel the Management of our Recreation Center, under the
leadership of Mr. Felomino Delegencia, to render and furnish
every bonafide stockholder, the following:

1. An annual or periodic financial report;

2. Statement of Assets and Liabilities;

3. Declaration of dividends, if any; and

 4. Holding of annual stockholders' meeting. 14

and from the testimony of several of them as cited in the private respondent's memorandum, which
the petitioners have not successfully refuted. 15 Moreover, there is the Deed of Transfer in Exchange
of Shares of Stocks dated February 1, 1977, by virtue of which the 484 members of the association
became stockholders of the corporation and in effect abolished the association. 16 It has also been
shown that they received stock and even cash dividends from the corporation, although they said they
later tried to return these.

From these findings, we conclude that it is really the Securities and Exchange Commission and not
the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental that has jurisdiction over the case in question. And as it
has been established that the petitioners are suing as stockholders of the Medina Recreation Center,
Inc., there should also be no question that their claim against the private respondents, as the officers
of such corporation, comes under the concept of an intra-corporate dispute. In their complaint, they
allege that the private respondents fraudulently transferred their properties to the corporation and are
now managing them to the detriment of the petitioner's interests. This is undoubtedly a matter falling
under Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A, which provides:

Sec. 5. — In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the Securities and
Exchange Commission over corporations, partnerships and other forms of
associations registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws and decrees,
it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:

(a) Devices or schemes employed by, or any acts of, the Board of Directors, business
associations, its officers or partners, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which
may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholder, partners,
members of associations or organizations registered with the Commission.

(b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and

among stockholders, members, or associates; between any and/or all of them and the
corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or
associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association
and the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such
entity.

(c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or

managers of such corporations, partnerships, or associations.

(d) Petitions or corporations, partnerships or associations to be declared in the state

of suspension of payments in cases where the corporation, partnership or association
possesses sufficient property to cover all its debts but foresees the impossibility of
meeting them when they respectively fall due or in cases where the corporation,
partnership or association has no sufficient assets to cover its liabilities but is under
the management of a Rehabilitation Receiver on Management Committee created
pursuant to this Decree.

The petitioners can no longer, deny that they are suing as stockholders of the corporation. It is thus
immaterial that the petitioners amended their original complaint in the Court of First Instance to delete
their allegation that they were suing in that capacity. Although they had a right to make that amendment
because the defendants had not yet filed their answer, the fact is that the statement made by the
petitioners in their complaint with the SEC was still binding on them as to estop them from alleging
otherwise.
Finally, it should be remembered that the question of jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even on
appeal, as by the petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction, 17 filed by the private
respondents in 1985. The record shows that when the original complaint was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Misamis Oriental in 1980, the defendants immediately moved to dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. While it is true that the defendants did not pursue this ground until after four years
later, such failure did not constitute laches and prevent them from raising the question again in the
said petition. As we have held:

The jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be objected to at any stage of
the proceedings, for such jurisdiction is conferred only by law and cannot be acquired
through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Hence, it may be alleged, for
the first time, on appeal, or considered by the Court motu proprio. 18

xxx xxx xxx

If the lower court had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the
theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such
jurisdiction, for the same must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by
consent of the parties or by estoppel. 19

The reason for the rule is that a court without jurisdiction cannot render a valid judgment. The exception
announced in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy 20 does not apply here because the private respondents had from
the very start questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental.

We reiterate as we conclude this opinion that we are not ruling now on the validity of the transfer of
the properties of the Medina People's Cockpit Association to the Medina Recreation Center, Inc. That
is a factual question that has yet to be resolved by the proper body. We merely declare here that the
competent forum for the resolution of that dispute is not the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental
but the Securities and Exchange Commission. It is before this agency that the petitioners may still
prosecute their complaint against the private respondent in accordance with P.D. No. 902-A.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners. It is so
ordered.

Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.