EN BANC

[G.R. No. 130612. May 11, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BERNARDINO DOMANTAY, @ JUNIOR
OTOT, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This case is here on appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City (Branch 57), finding
accused-appellant guilty of rape with homicide and sentencing him to death, and to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the amount of P480,000.00, and to pay the costs.
The facts hark back to the afternoon of October 17, 1996, at around 4 oclock, when the body of six-year old
Jennifer Domantay was found sprawled amidst a bamboo grove in Guilig, Malasiqui, Pangasinan. The childs
body bore several stab wounds. Jennifer had been missing since lunch time.
The medical examination conducted the following day by Dr. Ma. Fe Leticia Macaranas, the rural health
physician of Malasiqui, showed that Jennifer died of multiple organ failure and hypovolemic shock secondary
to 38 stab wounds at the back. Dr. Macaranas found no lacerations or signs of inflammation of the outer and
inner labia and the vaginal walls of the victims genitalia, although the vaginal canal easily admitted the little
finger with minimal resistance. Noting possible commission of acts of lasciviousness, Dr. Macaranas
recommended an autopsy by a medico-legal expert of the NBI.2cräläwvirtualibräry
The investigation by the Malasiqui police pointed to accused-appellant Bernardino Domantay, a cousin of the
victims grandfather, as the lone suspect in the gruesome crime. At around 6:30 in the evening of that day,
police officers Montemayor, de la Cruz, and de Guzman of the Malasiqui Philippine National Police (PNP)
picked up accused-appellant at the Malasiqui public market and took him to the police station where accused-
appellant, upon questioning by SPO1 Antonio Espinoza, confessed to killing Jennifer Domantay. He likewise
disclosed that at around 3:30 that afternoon, he had given the fatal weapon used, a bayonet, to Elsa and Jorge
Casingal, his aunt and uncle respectively, in Poblacion Sur, Bayambang, Pangasinan. The next day, October 18,
1996, SPO1 Espinoza and another policeman took accused-appellant to Bayambang and recovered the
bayonet from a tricycle belonging to the Casingal spouses. The police officers executed a receipt to evidence
the confiscation of the weapon.3cräläwvirtualibräry
On the basis of the post-mortem findings of Dr. Macaranas, SPO4 Juan Carpizo, the Philippine National Police
chief investigator at Malasiqui, filed, on October 21, 1996, a criminal complaint for murder against accused-
appellant before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Malasiqui. On October 25, 1996, Dr. Ronald Bandonill,
medico-legal expert of the NBI, performed an autopsy on the embalmed body of Jennifer. The result of his
examination of the victims genitalia indicated that the childs hymen had been completely lacerated on the
right side. Based on this finding, SPO4 Carpizo amended the criminal complaint against accused-appellant to
rape with homicide. Subsequently, the following information was filed:4cräläwvirtualibräry
That on or about the 17th day of October, 1996, in the afternoon, in barangay Guilig, Municipality of
Malasiqui, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with lewd design and armed with a bayonnete, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with Jennifer Domantay, a minor of 6 years old against her will and
consent, and on the same occasion, the said accused with intent to kill, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously stab with the use of a bayonnete, the said Jennifer Domantay, inflicting upon her multiple stab
wounds, which resulted to her death, to the damage and prejudice of her heirs.
At the trial, the prosecution presented seven witnesses, namely, Edward, Jiezl, Lorenzo, all surnamed
Domantay, Joselito Mejia, Antonio Espinoza, Celso Manuel, and Dr. Ronald Bandonill, to establish its charge
that accused-appellant had raped and killed Jennifer Domantay.
Edward Domantay testified that in the morning of October 17, 1996, accused-appellant and his two brothers-
in-law, Jaime Caballero and Daudencio Macasaeb, had a round of drinks in front of the latters house in Guilig,

1
Malasiqui, Pangasinan. Edward Domantay said that he was in front of Macasaebs house, tending to some
pigeons in his yard.5 After the group had consumed several bottles of San Miguel gin, accused-appellant gave
money to Edward Domantay and asked him to buy two bottles of gin and a bottle of Sprite. 6 Edward said he
joined the group and sat between Daudencio Macasaeb and accused-appellant.7 Edward said that accused-
appellant, who, apparently had one too many then, rolled up his shirt and said: No diad Antipolo tan L[i]pa et
walay massacre, diad Guilig wala, walay massacren kod dia, walay onakis-akis (In Antipolo and Lipa, there
were massacres; here in Guilig, there will also be a massacre. I will massacre somebody here, and they will cry
and cry). Edward Domantay saw that tucked in the left side of accused-appellants waistline was a bayonet
without a cover handle.8 It was not the first time that Edward had seen accused-appellant with the knife as
the latter usually carried it with him.9cräläwvirtualibräry
Jiezl Domantay, 10, likewise testified. She said that, at about 2 oclock in the afternoon on October 17, 1996,
she and four other children were playing in front of their house in Guilig, Malasiqui, Pangasinan. Jiezl saw
accused-appellant and Jennifer Domantay walking towards the bamboo grove of Amparo Domantay where
Jennifers body was later found. Accused-appellant was about two meters ahead of Jennifer. The bamboo
grove was about 8 to 10 meters from the house of Jiezl Domantay.10cräläwvirtualibräry
Lorenzo Domantay, a relative of the victim, corroborated Jiezls testimony that accused-appellant had gone to
Amparo Domantays bamboo grove in the afternoon of October 17, 1996. Lorenzo said that that afternoon, on
his way to his farm, he saw accused-appellant about 30 meters away, standing at the spot in the bamboo
grove where Jennifers body was later found. Accused-appellant appeared restless and worried as he kept
looking around. However, as Lorenzo was in a hurry, he did not try to find out why accused-appellant
appeared to be nervous.11cräläwvirtualibräry
Prosecution witness Joselito Mejia, a tricycle driver, said that, in the afternoon of October 17, 1996, he was
about to take his lunch at home in Alacan, a neighboring barangay about half a kilometer from Guilig, when
accused-appellant implored Mejia to take him to Malasiqui at once. Mejia told accused-appellant that he was
going to take his lunch first, but the latter pleaded with him, saying they will not be gone for long. Mejia,
therefore, agreed. Mejia noticed that accused-appellant was nervous and afraid. Accused-appellant later
changed his mind. Instead of going to the town proper, he alighted near the Mormons church, outside
Malasiqui.12cräläwvirtualibräry
In addition, the prosecution presented SPO1 Antonio Espinoza and Celso Manuel who testified that, on
separate occasions, accused-appellant had confessed to the brutal killing of Jennifer Domantay.
SPO1 Espinoza testified that he investigated accused-appellant after the latter had been brought to the
Malasiqui police station in the evening of October 17, 1996. Before he commenced his questioning, he
apprised accused-appellant of his constitutional right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel, in English, which was later translated into Pangasinense.13 According to SPO1 Espinoza,
accused-appellant agreed to answer the questions of the investigator even in the absence of counsel and
admitted killing the victim. Accused-appellant also disclosed the location of the bayonet he used in killing the
victim.14 On cross-examination, Espinoza admitted that at no time during the course of his questioning was
accused-appellant assisted by counsel. Neither was accused-appellants confession reduced in
writing.15 Espinozas testimony was admitted by the trial court over the objection of the defense.
Celso Manuel, for his part, testified that he is a radio reporter of station DWPR, an AM station based in
Dagupan City. He covers the third district of Pangasinan, including Malasiqui. Sometime in October 1996, an
uncle of the victim came to Dagupan City and informed the station about Jennifer Domantays case.16 On
October 23, 1996, Manuel went to Malasiqui to interview accused-appellant who was then detained in the
municipal jail. He described what transpired during the interview thus: 17cräläwvirtualibräry
PROS. QUINIT:
Q Did you introduce yourself as a media practitioner?
A Yes, sir.
Q How did you introduce yourself to the accused?

2
A I showed to Bernardino Domantay alias Junior Otot my I.D. card and I presented myself as a media
practitioner with my tape recorder [in] my hand, sir.
Q What was his reaction to your request for an interview?
A He was willing to state what had happened, sir.
Q What are those matters which you brought out in that interview with the accused Bernardino Domantay
alias Junior Otot?
A I asked him what was his purpose for human interests sake as a reporter, why did he commit that alleged
crime. And I asked also if he committed the crime and he answered yes. Thats it.
....
PROS. QUINIT:
Q You mentioned about accused admitting to you on the commi[ssion] of the crime, how did you ask him
that?
A I asked him very politely.
Q More or less what have you asked him on that particular matter?
A I asked Junior Otot, Bernardino Domantay, Kung pinagsisisihan mo ba ang iyong ginawa? Opo sabi niya, Ibig
mo bang sabihin Jun, ikaw ang pumatay kay Jennifer?, Ako nga po. The [l]ast part of my interview, Kung
nakikinig ang mga magulang ni Jennifer, ano ang gusto mong iparating?, kung gusto nilang makamtan ang
hustisya ay tatanggapin ko. That is what he said, and I also asked Junior Otot, what was his purpose, and he
said, it was about the boundary dispute, and he used that little girl in his revenge.
On cross-examination, Manuel explained that the interview was conducted in the jail, about two to three
meters away from the police station. An uncle of the victim was with him and the nearest policemen present
were about two to three meters from him, including those who were in the radio room.18 There was no
lawyer present. Before interviewing accused-appellant, Manuel said he talked to the chief of police and asked
permission to interview accused-appellant.19 On questioning by the court, Manuel said that it was the first
time he had been called to testify regarding an interview he had conducted. 20 As in the case of the testimony
of SPO1 Espinoza, the defense objected to the admission of Manuels testimony, but the lower court allowed it.
Dr. Bandonill, the NBI medico-legal who conducted an autopsy of the victim on October 25, 1996, testified
that Jennifer Domantay died as a result of the numerous stab wounds she sustained on her back, 21 the
average depth of which was six inches.22 He opined that the wounds were probably caused by a pointed
sharp-edged instrument.23 He also noted contusions on the forehead, neck, and breast bone of the victim.24 As
for the results of the genital examination of the victim, Dr. Bandonill said he found that the laceration on the
right side of the hymen was caused within 24 hours of her death. He added that the genital area showed signs
of inflammation.25cräläwvirtualibräry
Pacifico Bulatao, the photographer who took the pictures of the scene of the crime and of the victim after the
latters body was brought to her parents house, identified and authenticated the five pictures (Exhibits A, B, C,
D, and E) offered by the prosecution.
The defense then presented accused-appellant as its lone witness. Accused-appellant denied the allegations
against him. He testified he is an uncle of Jennifer Domantay (he and her grandfather are cousins) and that he
worked as a janitor at the Malasiqui Municipal Hall. He said that at around 1 oclock in the afternoon of
October 17, 1996, he was bathing his pigs outside the house of his brother-in-law Daudencio Macasaeb in
Guilig, Malasiqui, Pangasinan. He confirmed that Daudencio was then having drinks in front of his
(Macasaebs) house. Accused-appellant claimed, however, that he did not join in the drinking and that it was
Edward Domantay, whom the prosecution had presented as witness, and a certain Jaime Caballero who
joined the party. He also claimed that it was he whom Macasaeb had requested to buy some more liquor, for
which reason he gave money to Edward Domantay so that the latter could get two bottles of gin, a bottle of

3
Sprite, and a pack of cigarettes.26 He denied Edward Domantays claim that he (accused-appellant) had raised
his shirt to show a bayonet tucked in his waistline and that he had said he would massacre someone in
Guilig.27cräläwvirtualibräry
Accused-appellant also confirmed that, at about 2 oclock in the afternoon, he went to Alacan passing on the
trail beside the bamboo grove of Amparo Domantay. But he said he did not know that Jennifer Domantay was
following him. He further confirmed that in Alacan, he took a tricycle to Malasiqui. The tricycle was driven by
Joselito Mejia. He said he alighted near the Mormon church, just outside of the town proper of Malasiqui to
meet his brother. As his brother did not come, accused-appellant proceeded to town and reported for work.
That night, while he was in the Malasiqui public market, he was picked up by three policemen and brought to
the Malasiqui police station where he was interrogated by SPO1 Espinoza regarding the killing of Jennifer
Domantay. He denied having owned to the killing of Jennifer Domantay to SPO1 Espinoza. He denied he had a
grudge against the victims parents because of a boundary dispute.28 With respect to his extrajudicial
confession to Celso Manuel, he admitted that he had been interviewed by the latter, but he denied that he ever
admitted anything to the former.29cräläwvirtualibräry
As already stated, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of its
decision reads:30
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Court hereby finds the accused, Bernardino Domantay @ Junior
Otot guilty beyond reasonable doubt with the crime of Rape with Homicide defined and penalized under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation and as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 and accordingly,
the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection, and to indemnify the heirs of
the victim in the total amount of Four Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos (P480,000.00), 31 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
In this appeal, accused-appellant alleges that:32
I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION[S] MADE BY THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
First. Accused-appellant contends that his alleged confessions to SPO1 Antonio Espinoza and Celso Manuel
are inadmissible in evidence because they had been obtained in violation of Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution
and that, with these vital pieces of evidence excluded, the remaining proof of his alleged guilt, consisting of
circumstantial evidence, is inadequate to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 33cräläwvirtualibräry
Art. III, 12 of the Constitution in part provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
....
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this section or section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
This provision applies to the stage of custodial investigation, that is, when the investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect.34 R.A. No. 7438
has extended the constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested
but has merely been invited for questioning.35cräläwvirtualibräry

4
Decisions36 of this Court hold that for an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the
following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to the Malasiqui police station in the evening of
October 17, 1996,37 he was already a suspect, in fact the only one, in the brutal slaying of Jennifer Domantay.
He was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed in Art. III, 12(1) of the
Constitution applied to him. SPO1 Espinoza narrated what transpired during accused-appellants
interrogation:38cräläwvirtualibräry
[I] interrogated Bernardino Domantay, prior to the interrogation conducted to him, I informed him of his
constitutional right as follows; that he has the right to remain silent; that he has the right to a competent
lawyer of his own choice and if he can not afford [a counsel] then he will be provided with one, and further
informed [him] that all he will say will be reduced into writing and will be used the same in the proceedings
of the case, but he told me that he will cooperate even in the absence of his counsel; that he admitted to me
that he killed Jennifer Domantay, and he revealed also the weapon used [and] where he gave [it] to.
But though he waived the assistance of counsel, the waiver was neither put in writing nor made in the
presence of counsel. For this reason, the waiver is invalid and his confession is inadmissible. SPO1 Espinozas
testimony on the alleged confession of accused-appellant should have been excluded by the trial court. So is
the bayonet inadmissible in evidence, being, as it were, the fruit of the poisonous tree. As explained in People
v. Alicando:39cräläwvirtualibräry
. . . According to this rule, once the primary source (the tree) is shown to have been unlawfully obtained,
any secondary or derivative evidence (the fruit) derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally
seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree is at
least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the
principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the
originally illegal obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.
We agree with the Solicitor General, however, that accused-appellants confession to the radio reporter, Celso
Manuel, is admissible. In People v. Andan,40 the accused in a rape with homicide case confessed to the crime
during interviews with the media. In holding the confession admissible, despite the fact that the accused gave
his answers without the assistance of counsel, this Court said:41cräläwvirtualibräry
[A]ppellants [oral] confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and
another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein
are primarily addressed to the State and its agents.
Accused-appellant claims, however, that the atmosphere in the jail when he was interviewed was tense and
intimidating and was similar to that which prevails in a custodial investigation. 42 We are not persuaded.
Accused-appellant was interviewed while he was inside his cell. The interviewer stayed outside the cell and
the only person besides him was an uncle of the victim. Accused-appellant could have refused to be
interviewed, but instead, he agreed. He answered questions freely and spontaneously. According to Celso
Manuel, he said he was willing to accept the consequences of his act.
Celso Manuel admitted that there were indeed some police officers around because about two to three meters
from the jail were the police station and the radio room.43 We do not think the presence of the police officers
exerted any undue pressure or influence on accused-appellant and coerced him into giving his confession.
Accused-appellant contends that it is . . . not altogether improbable for the police investigators to ask the
police reporter (Manuel) to try to elicit some incriminating information from the accused. 44 This is pure
conjecture. Although he testified that he had interviewed inmates before, there is no evidence to show that
Celso was a police beat reporter. Even assuming that he was, it has not been shown that, in conducting the
interview in question, his purpose was to elicit incriminating information from accused-appellant. To the
contrary, the media are known to take an opposite stance against the government by exposing official
wrongdoings.

5
Indeed, there is no showing that the radio reporter was acting for the police or that the interview was
conducted under circumstances where it is apparent that accused-appellant confessed to the killing out of
fear. As already stated, the interview was conducted on October 23, 1996, 6 days after accused-appellant had
already confessed to the killing to the police.
Accused-appellants extrajudicial confession is corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti, namely, the fact of
death of Jennifer Domantay. In addition, the circumstantial evidence furnished by the other prosecution
witnesses dovetails in material points with his confession. He was seen walking toward the bamboo grove,
followed by the victim. Later, he was seen standing near the bamboo grove where the childs body was found.
Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. An extrajudicial confession made by an accused,
shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
4. Evidence necessary in treason cases. No person charged with treason shall be convicted unless on the
testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.
Accused-appellant argues that it was improbable for a brutal killing to have been committed without the
children who were playing about eight to ten meters from Amparo Domantays grove, where the crime took
place, having heard any commotion.45 The contention has no merit. Accused-appellant could have covered the
young childs mouth to prevent her from making any sound. In fact, Dr. Bandonill noted a five by two inch (5 x
2) contusion on the left side of the victims forehead, which he said could have been caused by a hard blunt
instrument or by impact as her head hit the ground.46 The blow could have rendered her unconscious, thus
precluding her from shouting or crying.
Accused-appellant also contends that the testimony of Jiezl Domantay contradicts that of Lorenzo Domantay
because while Jiezl said she had seen accused-appellant walking towards the bamboo grove, followed by the
victim, at around 2 oclock in the afternoon on October 17, 1996, Lorenzo said he saw accused-appellant
standing near the bamboo grove at about the same time.
These witnesses, however, did not testify concerning what they saw at exactly the same time. What they told
the court was what they had seen at around 2 oclock in the afternoon. There could have been a difference in
time, however little it was, between the time Jiezl saw accused-appellant and the victim walking and the time
Lorenzo saw accused-appellant near the place where the victims body was later found. Far from contradicting
each other, these witnesses confirmed what each had said each one saw. What is striking about their
testimonies is that while Jiezl said she saw accused-appellant going toward the bamboo grove followed by the
victim at around 2 oclock in the afternoon on October 17, 1996, Lorenzo said he had seen accused-appellant
near the bamboo grove at around that time. He described accused-appellant as nervous and worried. There is
no reason to doubt the claim of these witnesses. Lorenzo is a relative of accused-appellant. There is no reason
he would testify falsely against the latter. Jiezl, on the other hand, is also surnamed Domantay and could also
be related to accused-appellant and has not been shown to have any reason to testify falsely against accused-
appellant. At the time of the incident, she was only 10 years old.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court is convinced of accused-appellants guilt with respect to the killing of the
child. It is clear that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant is guilty of
homicide. Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 [parricide] shall kill another without the
attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article [murder], shall be deemed
guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.
The killing was committed with the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The
record shows that the victim, Jennifer Domantay, was six years old at the time of the killing. She was a child of
small build, 46 in height.47 It is clear then that she could not have put up much of a defense against accused-
appellants assault, the latter being a fully grown man of 29 years. Indeed, the physical evidence supports a
finding of abuse of superior strength: accused-appellant had a weapon, while the victim was not shown to
have had any; there were 38 stab wounds; and all the knife wounds are located at the back of Jennifers body.

6
But we think the lower court erred in finding that the killing was committed with cruelty. 48 The trial court
appears to have been led to this conclusion by the number of wounds inflicted on the victim. But the number
of wounds is not a test for determining whether there was cruelty as an aggravating circumstance. 49 The test .
. . is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the victims suffering thus . . . there must be
proof that the victim was made to agonize before the [the accused] rendered the blow which snuffed out [her]
life.50 In this case, there is no such proof of cruelty. Dr. Bandonill testified that any of the major wounds on the
victims back could have caused her death as they penetrated her heart, lungs and liver, kidney and
intestines.51cräläwvirtualibräry
Second. There is, however, no sufficient evidence to hold accused-appellant guilty of raping Jennifer
Domantay. Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in part provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances.
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
As the victim here was six years old, only carnal knowledge had to be proved to establish rape. Carnal
knowledge is defined as the act of a man having sexual intercourse or sexual bodily connections with a
woman.52 For this purpose, it is enough if there was even the slightest contact of the male sex organ with the
labia of the victims genitalia.53 However, there must be proof, by direct or indirect evidence, of such contact.
Dr. Ronald Bandonills report on the genital examination he had performed on the deceased
reads:54cräläwvirtualibräry
GENITAL EXAMINATION; showed a complete laceration of the right side of the hymen. The surrounding
genital area shows signs of inflamation.
....
REMARKS: 1) Findings at the genital area indicate the probability of penetration of that area by a hard, rigid
instrument.
Hymenal laceration is not necessary to prove rape;55 neither does its presence prove its commission. As held
in People v. Ulili,56 a medical certificate or the testimony of the physician is presented not to prove that the
victim was raped but to show that the latter had lost her virginity. Consequently, standing alone, a physicians
finding that the hymen of the alleged victim was lacerated does not prove rape. It is only when this is
corroborated by other evidence proving carnal knowledge that rape may be deemed to have been
established.57cräläwvirtualibräry
This conclusion is based on the medically accepted fact that a hymenal tear may be caused by objects other
than the male sex organ58 or may arise from other causes.59 Dr. Bandonill himself admitted this. He testified
that the right side of the victims hymen had been completely lacerated while the surrounding genital area
showed signs of inflammation.60 He opined that the laceration had been inflicted within 24 hours of the
victims death and that the inflammation was due to a trauma in that area.61 When asked by the private
prosecutor whether the lacerations of the hymen could have been caused by the insertion of a male organ he
said this was possible. But he also said when questioned by the defense that the lacerations could have been
caused by something blunt other than the male organ. Thus, he testified:62cräläwvirtualibräry
PROS. F. QUINIT:
Q Now, what might have caused the complete laceration of the right side of the hymen, doctor?
A Well, sir, if you look at my report there is a remark and it says there; findings at the genital area indicated
the probability of penetration of that area by a hard rigid instrument.

7
Q Could it have been caused by a human organ?
A If the human male organ is erect, fully erect and hard then it is possible, sir.
....
ATTY. VALDEZ:
Q In your remarks; finding at the genital area indicates the probability of penetration of that area by a hard
rigid instrument, this may have also been caused by a dagger used in the killing of Jennifer Domantay is that
correct?
A Well, sir when I say hard rigid instrument it should not be sharp pointed and sharp rigid, it should be a hard
bl[u]nt instrument.
Q Do you consider a bolo a bl[u]nt instrument, or a dagger?
A The dagger is a sharp rigid but it is not a bl[u]nt instrument, sir.
Q This Genital Examination showed a complete laceration of the right side of the hymen, this may have been
possibly caused by a dagger, is it not?
A No, sir. I wont say that this would have been caused by a dagger, because a dagger would have made at its
incision . . . not a laceration, sir.
Q But this laceration may also have been caused by other factors other the human male organ, is that correct?
A A hard bl[u]nt instrument, sir could show.
Q My question is other than the human male organ?
A Possible, sir.
....
COURT:
Q You mentioned that the hymen was lacerated on the right side?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q And if there is a complete erection by a human organ is this possible that the laceration can only be on the
right side of the hymen?
A Yes, your Honor, its possible.
Q How about if the penetration was done by a finger, was it the same as the human organ?
A Well, it depends on the size of the finger that penetrat[es] the organ, if the finger is small it could the
superficial laceration, and if the finger is large then it is possible your honor.
Q How about two fingers?
A Possible, sir.
To be sure, this Court has sustained a number of convictions for rape with homicide based on purely
circumstantial evidence. In those instances, however, the prosecution was able to present other tell-tale signs
of rape such as the location and description of the victims clothings, especially her undergarments, the
position of the body when found and the like.63 In People v. Macalino,64 for instance, the Court affirmed a
conviction for the rape of a two year-old child on the basis of circumstantial evidence:65
The Court notes that the testimony or medical opinion of Dr. Gajardo that the fresh laceration had been
produced by sexual intercourse is corroborated by the testimony given by complainant Elizabeth that when

8
she rushed upstairs upon hearing her daughter suddenly cry out, she found appellant Macalino beside the child
buttoning his own pants and that she found some sticky fluid on the childs buttocks and some blood on her
private part. (Emphasis in the original)
In contrast, in the case at bar, there is no circumstantial evidence from which to infer that accused-appellant
sexually abused the victim. The only circumstance from which such inference might be made is that accused-
appellant was seen with the victim walking toward the place where the girls body was found. Maybe he raped
the girl. Maybe he did not. Maybe he simply inserted a blunt object into her organ, thus causing the
lacerations in the hymen. Otherwise, there is no circumstance from which it might reasonably be inferred that
he abused her, e.g., that he was zipping up his pants, that there was spermatozoa in the girls vaginal canal.
Indeed, the very autopsy report of Dr. Bandonill militates against the finding of rape. In describing the stab
wounds on the body of the victim, he testified:66cräläwvirtualibräry
[A]fter examining the body I took note that there were several stab wounds . . . these were all found at the back
area sir . . . extending from the back shoulder down to the lower back area from the left to the right.
Considering the relative physical positions of the accused and the victim in crimes of rape, the usual location
of the external bodily injuries of the victim is on the face, 67 neck,68 and anterior portion69 of her body.
Although it is not unnatural to find contusions on the posterior side, these are usually caused by the
downward pressure on the victims body during the sexual assault.70 It is unquestionably different when, as in
this case, all the stab wounds (except for a minor cut in the lower left leg) had their entry points at the back
running from the upper left shoulder to the lower right buttocks.
It is noteworthy that the deceased was fully clothed in blue shorts and white shirt when her body was
brought to her parents house immediately after it was found.71 Furthermore, there is a huge bloodstain in the
back portion of her shorts.72 This must be because she was wearing this piece of clothing when the stab
wounds were inflicted or immediately thereafter, thus allowing the blood to seep into her shorts to such an
extent. As accused-appellant would naturally have to pull down the girls lower garments in order to
consummate the rape, then, he must have, regardless of when the stab wounds were inflicted, pulled up the
victims shorts and undergarments after the alleged rape, otherwise, the victims shorts would not have been
stained so extensively. Again, this is contrary to ordinary human experience.
Even assuming that Jennifer had been raped, there is no sufficient proof that it was accused-appellant who
had raped her. He did not confess to having raped the victim.
From the foregoing, we cannot find that accused-appellant also committed rape. In the special complex crime
of rape with homicide, both the rape and the homicide must be established beyond reasonable
doubt.73cräläwvirtualibräry
Third. The trial court ordered accused-appellant to pay the heirs of Jennifer Domantay the amount
of P30,000.00 as actual damages. However, the list of expenses produced by the victims father, Jaime
Domantay, only totaled P28,430.00. Of this amount, only P12,000.00 was supported by a receipt. Art. 2199 of
the Civil Code provides that a party may recover actual or compensatory damages only for such loss as he has
duly proved. Therefore, the award of actual damages should be reduced to P12,000.00.
In addition, the heirs of Jennifer Domantay are entitled to recover exemplary damages in view of the presence
of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Art. 2230 of the Civil Code provides for the
payment of exemplary damages when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstance. An
amount of P25,000.00 is deemed appropriate.74cräläwvirtualibräry
In accordance with our rulings in People v. Robles75 and People v. Mengote,76 the indemnity should be fixed
at P50,000.00 and the moral damages at P50,000.00.77cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is SET ASIDE and another one is rendered FINDING accused-
appellant guilty of homicide with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength and sentencing
him to a prison term of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and ORDERING him to pay the heirs of Jennifer Domantay the amounts of P50,000.00, as

9
indemnity, P50,000.00, as moral damages, P25,000.00, as exemplary damages, and P12,000.00, as actual
damages, and the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Gonzaga-
Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Purisima, and Buena, JJ., took no part in the deliberations.

[G.R. No. 130656. June 29, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ARMANDO REANZARES* also known as ARMANDO
RIANZARES, Accused-Appellant.*

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This case is with us on automatic review of the 26 May 1997 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan,
Batangas, finding accused ARMANDO REANZARES also known as "Armando Rianzares" guilty of Highway
Robbery with Homicide under PD 5322 and sentencing him to the extreme penalty of death. He was also
ordered to pay the heirs of his victim Lilia Tactacan P172,000.00 for funeral, burial and related

10
expenses, P50,000.00 as indemnity for death, P1,000.00 for the cash taken from her bag, and to reimburse
Gregorio Tactacan P2,500.00 for the Seiko wristwatch taken from him.

The facts, except as to the identity of accused Armando Reanzares, are undisputed. Spouses Gregorio
Tactacan and Lilia Tactacan owned a sari-sari store in San Miguel, Sto. Tomas, Batangas. On 10 May 1994 at
around 8:10 in the evening, the Tactacan spouses closed their store and left for home in Barangay San Roque,
Sto. Tomas, Batangas on board their passenger-type jeepney. As Gregorio was maneuvering his jeep
backwards from where it was parked two (2) unidentified men suddenly climbed on board. His wife Lilia
immediately asked them where they were going and they answered that they were bound for the town
proper. When Lilia informed them that they were not going to pass through the town proper, the two (2) said
they would just get off at the nearest intersection. After negotiating some 500 meters, one of the hitchhikers
pointed a .38 caliber revolver at Gregorio while the other poked a balisong at Lilia's neck and ordered
Gregorio to stop the vehicle. Two (2) other persons, one of whom was later identified as accused Armando
Reanzares, were seen waiting for them at a distance. As soon as the vehicle stopped, the accused and his
companion approached the vehicle. Gregorio was then pulled from the driver's seat to the back of the vehicle.
They gagged and blindfolded him and tied his hands and feet. They also took his Seiko wristwatch
worth P2,500.00. The accused then drove the vehicle after being told by one of them, "Sige i-drive mo
na."3cräläwvirtualibräry

Gregorio did not know where they were headed for as he was blindfolded. After several minutes, he felt the
vehicle making a u-turn and stopped after ten (10) minutes. During the entire trip, his wife kept
uttering, "Maawa kayo sa amin, marami kaming anak, kunin nyo na lahat ng gusto ninyo." Immediately after
the last time she uttered these words a commotion ensued and Lilia was heard saying, "aray!" Gregorio heard
her but could not do anything. After three (3) minutes the commotion ceased. Then he heard someone tell
him, "Huwag kang kikilos diyan, ha," and left. Gregorio then untied his hands and feet, removed his gag and
blindfold and jumped out of the vehicle. The culprits were all gone, including his wife. He ran to San Roque
East shouting for help.4cräläwvirtualibräry

When Gregorio returned to the crime scene, the jeepney was still there. He went to the drivers seat. There he
saw his wife lying on the floor of the jeepney with blood splattered all over her body. Her bag
containing P1,200.00 was missing. He brought her immediately to the C. P. Reyes Hospital where she was
pronounced dead on arrival.5cräläwvirtualibräry

At the time of her death Lilia Tactacan was forty-eight (48) years old. According to Gregorio, he was deeply
depressed by her death; that he incurred funeral, burial and other related expenses, and that his wife was
earning P3,430.00 a month as a teacher.6cräläwvirtualibräry

Dr. Lily D. Nunes, Medical Health Officer of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, conducted a post-mortem examination on
the body of the victim. Her medieport disclosed that the victim sustained eight (8) stab wounds on the chest
and abdominal region of the body. She testified that a sharp pointed object like a long knife could have caused
those wounds which must have been inflicted by more than one (1) person, and that all those wounds except
the non-penetrating one caused the immediate death of the victim.7cräläwvirtualibräry

Subsequently, two (2) Informations were filed against accused Armando Reanzares and three (3) John Does
in relation to the incident. The first was for violation of PD 532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law of 1974 for allegedly conspiring, with intent to gain and armed with bladed weapons
and a .38 caliber revolver, to rob and carry away one (1) Seiko wristwatch owned by Gregorio Tactacan
and P1,000.00 cash of Lilia Tactacan, and on the occasion thereof, killed her. The second was for violation of
RA 6539, An Act Preventing and Penalizing Carnapping, for taking away by means of violence and intimidation
of persons one (1) passenger-type jeepney with Plate No. DBP 235 owned and driven by Gregorio Tactacan
and valued at P110,000.00. Only the accused Armando Reanzares was arrested. The other three (3) have
remained unidentified and at large.

11
The accused testified in his defense and claimed that he could not have perpetrated the crimes imputed to
him with three (3) others as he was in Barangay Tagnipa, Garchitorena, Camarines Sur, for the baptism of his
daughter Jessica when the incident happened.8 His father, Jose Reanzares, corroborated his story. Jose
claimed that the accused borrowed P500.00 from him for the latter's trip to Bicol although he could not say
that he actually saw the accused leave for his intended destination.9 To bolster the alibi of the accused, his
brother Romeo Reanzares also took the witness stand and alleged that he saw the accused off on 9 May 1994,
the day before the incident. Romeo maintained that he accompanied the accused to the bus stop that day and
even helped the latter carry his things to the bus. He however could not categorically state where and when
the accused alighted or that he in fact reached Bicol.10cräläwvirtualibräry

On 26 May 1997 the trial court found the prosecutions evidence credible and ruled that the alibi of the
accused could not prevail over his positive identification by complaining witness Gregorio Tactacan. The
court a quo declared him guilty of Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD 532 and sentenced him to
death. It further ordered him to pay the heirs of Lilia Tactacan P50,000.00 as indemnity for
death, P172,000.00 for funeral, burial and related expenses, and P1,000.00 for the cash taken from her bag.
The accused was also ordered to reimburse Gregorio Tactacan P2,500.00 for the Seiko wristwatch taken from
him.11 But the trial court exonerated the accused from the charge of carnapping under RA 6539 for
insufficiency of evidence.

The accused insists before us that his conviction for Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD 532 is
erroneous as his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. He claims that the testimony of private
complainant Gregorio Tactacan, who implicated him as one of the perpetrators of the crime, is incredible. He
maintains that Gregorio failed to identify him because when the latter was questioned he stated that he did
not know any of the culprits. He also claims that in the publication of Hotline by Tony Calvento in People's
Tonight, Gregorio even asked the readers to help him identify the malefactors.

The trial court observed that Gregorio Tactacan testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and
frank manner, and was consistent on cross-examination. Indeed, Gregorio might not have immediately
revealed the name of accused Armando Reanzares to the police authorities when he was first investigated but
the delay was not an indication of a fabricated charge and should not undermine his credibility considering
that he satisfactorily explained his reasons therefor. According to him, he did not immediately tell the police
about the accused because he feared for the safety of his family as his neighbors told him that they saw some
people lurking around his house on the day of the incident. Moreover, he was advised not to mention any
names until after the burial of his wife. No ill motive could be attributed to him for implicating the accused. If
at all, the fact that his wife died by reason of the incident even lends credence to his testimony since his
natural interest in securing the conviction of the guilty would deter him from implicating persons other than
the real culprits, otherwise, those responsible for the perpetration of the crime would escape prosecution.

To further undermine the credibility of Gregorio, the accused underscores Gregorio's refusal to be subjected
to a lie detector test. We cannot subscribe to this contention as the procedure of ascertaining the truth by
means of a lie detector test has never been accepted in our jurisdiction; thus, any findings based thereon
cannot be considered conclusive.

Finally, the accused chides Gregorio for supposedly suppressing a very material piece of evidence, i.e., the
latter failed to present as witnesses a certain Renato and his wife who allegedly saw the holduppers running
away from the crime scene. But this is only a disputable presumption under Sec. 3, par. (e), Rule 131, of the
Rules of Court on evidence, which does not apply in the present case as the evidence allegedly omitted is
equally accessible and available to the defense.

These attempts of the accused to discredit Gregorio obviously cannot hold ground. Neither can they bolster
his alibi. For alibi to be believed it must be shown that (a) the accused was in another place at the time of the
commission of the offense, and (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime
scene.12cräläwvirtualibräry

12
In this case, the accused claims to have left for Bicol the day before the incident. To prove this, he presented
his father and brother but their testimonies did not meet the requisite quantum to establish his alibi. While
his father testified that the accused borrowed money from him for his fare to Bicol for the baptism of a
daughter, he could not say whether the accused actually went to Bicol. As regards the claim of Romeo, brother
of the accused, that he accompanied the accused to the bus stop on 9 May 1994 and even helped him with his
things, seeing the accused off is not the same as seeing him actually get off at his destination. Given the
circumstances of this case, it is possible for the accused to have alighted from the bus before reaching Bicol,
perpetrated the crime in the evening of 10 May 2000, proceeded to Bicol and arrived there on 12 May 2000
for his daughters baptism.

Thus the trial court was correct in disregarding the alibi of the accused not only because he was positively
identified by Gregorio Tactacan but also because it was not shown that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the crime scene on the date and time of the incident.

Indeed the accused is guilty. But that the accused was guilty of Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD
532 was erroneous. As held in a number of cases, conviction for highway robbery requires proof that several
accused were organized for the purpose of committing it indiscriminately.13 There is no proof in the instant
case that the accused and his cohorts organized themselves to commit highway robbery. Neither is there
proof that they attempted to commit similar robberies to show the "indiscriminate" perpetration thereof. On
the other hand, what the prosecution established was only a single act of robbery against the particular
persons of the Tactacan spouses. Clearly, this single act of depredation is not what is contemplated under PD
532 as its objective is to deter and punish lawless elements who commit acts of depredation upon persons
and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another thereby
disturbing the peace and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social progress of the
people.

Consequently, the accused should be held liable for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 765914 as the allegations in the Information are
enough to convict him therefor. In the interpretation of an information, what controls is the description of the
offense charged and not merely its designation.15cräläwvirtualibräry

Article 294, par. (1), of the Revised Penal Code as amended punishes the crime of robbery with homicide
by reclusion perpetua to death. Applying Art. 63, second par., subpar. 2, of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that "[i]n all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof: x x x 2. [w]hen there are neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied," the lesser penalty
of reclusion perpetua is imposed in the absence of any modifying circumstance.

As to the damages awarded by the trial court to the heirs of the victim, we sustain the award of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity for the wrongful death of Lilia Tactacan. In addition, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages is ordered. Also, damages for loss of earning capacity of Lilia Tactacan must be granted to her heirs.
The testimony of Gregorio Tactacan, the victims husband, on the earning capacity of his wife, together with a
copy of his wifes payroll, is enough to establish the basis for the award. The formula for determining the life
expectancy of Lilia Tactacan, applying the American Expectancy Table of Mortality, is as follows: 2/3
multiplied by (80 minus the age of the deceased).16 Since Lilia was 48 years of age at the time of her
death,17 then her life expectancy was 21.33 years.

At the time of her death, Lilia was earning P3,430.00 a month as a teacher at the San Roque Elementaryhool
so that her annual income was P41,160.00. From this amount, 50% should be deducted as reasonable and
necessary living expenses to arrive at her net earnings. Thus, her net earning capacity was P438,971.40
computed as follows: Net earning capacity equals life expectancy times gross annual income less reasonable
and necessary living expenses

13
 Net earning = Life expectancy x Gross annual reasonable &
income - necessary living
capacity (x) expenses

x = 2 (80-48) x [P41,160.00 P20,580.00]

-
...... 3

= 21.33 x P20,580.00

= P438,971.40

However, the award of P1,000.00 representing the cash taken from Lilia Tactacan must be increased
to P1,200.00 as this was the amount established by the prosecution without objection from the defense. The
award of P172,000.00 for funeral, burial and related expenses must be reduced to P22,000.00 as this was the
only amount sufficiently substantiated.18 There was no other competent evidence presented to support the
original award.

The amount of P2,500.00 as reimbursement for the Seiko wristwatch taken from Gregorio Tactacan must be
deleted in the absence of receipts or any other competent evidence aside from the self-serving valuation
made by the prosecution. An ordinary witness cannot establish the value of jewelry and the trial court can
only take judicial notice of the value of goods which is a matter of public knowledge or is capable of
unquestionable demonstration. The value of jewelry therefore does not fall under either category of which
the court can take judicial notice.19cräläwvirtualibräry

WHEREFORE , the Decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Accused ARMANDO REANZARES also known as
"Armando Rianzares" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide under Art. 294 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the heirs of
the victim P50,000.00 as indemnity for death, another P50,000.00 for moral damages, P1,200.00 for actual
damages, P438,971.40 for loss of earning capacity, and P22,000.00 for funeral, burial and related expenses.
Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 87434 August 5, 1992

PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC. and TAGUM PLASTICS, INC., petitioners,
vs.
SWEET LINES, INC., DAVAO VETERANS ARRASTRE AND PORT SERVICES, INC. and HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

De Lara, De Lunas & Rosales for petitioners.

Carlo L. Aquino for Sweet Lines, Inc.

REGALADO, J.:

14
A maritime suit 1 was commenced on May 12, 1978 by herein Petitioner Philippine American General
Insurance Co., Inc. (Philamgen) and Tagum Plastics, Inc. (TPI) against private respondents Sweet Lines, Inc.
(SLI) and Davao Veterans Arrastre and Port Services, Inc. (DVAPSI), along with S.C.I. Line (The Shipping
Corporation of India Limited) and F.E. Zuellig, Inc., as co-defendants in the court a quo, seeking recovery of
the cost of lost or damaged shipment plus exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs allegedly due to
defendants' negligence, with the following factual backdrop yielded by the findings of the court below and
adopted by respondent court:

It would appear that in or about March 1977, the vessel SS "VISHVA YASH" belonging to or
operated by the foreign common carrier, took on board at Baton Rouge, LA, two (2)
consignments of cargoes for shipment to Manila and later for transhipment to Davao City,
consisting of 600 bags Low Density Polyethylene 631 and another 6,400 bags Low Density
Polyethylene 647, both consigned to the order of Far East Bank and Trust Company of
Manila, with arrival notice to Tagum Plastics, Inc., Madaum, Tagum, Davao City. Said cargoes
were covered, respectively, by Bills of Lading Nos. 6 and 7 issued by the foreign common
carrier (Exhs. E and F). The necessary packing or Weight List (Exhs. A and B), as well as the
Commercial Invoices (Exhs. C and D) accompanied the shipment. The cargoes were likewise
insured by the Tagum Plastics Inc. with plaintiff Philippine American General Insurance Co.,
Inc., (Exh. G).

In the course of time, the said vessel arrived at Manila and discharged its cargoes in the Port
of Manila for transhipment to Davao City. For this purpose, the foreign carrier awaited and
made use of the services of the vessel called M/V "Sweet Love" owned and operated by
defendant interisland carrier.

Subject cargoes were loaded in Holds Nos. 2 and 3 of the interisland carrier. These were
commingled with similar cargoes belonging to Evergreen Plantation and also Standfilco.

On May 15, 1977, the shipment(s) were discharged from the interisland carrier into the
custody of the consignee. A later survey conducted on July 8, 1977, upon the instance of the
plaintiff, shows the following:

Of the cargo covered by Bill of Lading No. 25 or (2)6, supposed to contain 6,400 bags of Low
Density Polyethylene 647 originally inside 160 pallets, there were delivered to the consignee
5,413 bags in good order condition. The survey shows shortages, damages and losses to be
as follows:

Undelivered/Damaged bags as tallied during discharge from vessel-173

bags; undelivered and damaged as noted and observed whilst stored at the
pier-699 bags; and shortlanded-110 bags (Exhs. P and P-1).

Of the 600 bags of Low Density Polyethylene 631, the survey conducted on the same day
shows an actual delivery to the consignee of only 507 bags in good order condition. Likewise
noted were the following losses, damages and shortages, to wit:

Undelivered/damaged bags and tally sheets during discharge from vessel-

17 bags.

Undelivered and damaged as noted and observed whilst stored at the pier-
66 bags; Shortlanded-10 bags.

Therefore, of said shipment totalling 7,000 bags, originally contained in 175 pallets, only a
total of 5,820 bags were delivered to the consignee in good order condition, leaving a

15
 balance of 1,080 bags. Such loss from this particular shipment is what any or all defendants
may be answerable to (sic).

As already stated, some bags were either shortlanded or were missing, and some of the
1,080 bags were torn, the contents thereof partly spilled or were fully/partially emptied, but,
worse, the contents thereof contaminated with foreign matters and therefore could no
longer serve their intended purpose. The position taken by the consignee was that even
those bags which still had some contents were considered as total losses as the remaining
contents were contaminated with foreign matters and therefore did not (sic) longer serve
the intended purpose of the material. Each bag was valued, taking into account the customs
duties and other taxes paid as well as charges and the conversion value then of a dollar to
the peso, at P110.28 per bag (see Exhs. L and L-1 M and O). 2

Before trial, a compromise agreement was entered into between petitioners, as plaintiffs, and defendants
S.C.I. Line and F.E. Zuellig, upon the latter's payment of P532.65 in settlement of the claim against them.
Whereupon, the trial court in its order of August 12, 1981 3 granted plaintiffs' motion to dismiss grounded on
said amicable settlement and the case as to S.C.I. Line and F.E. Zuellig was consequently "dismissed with
prejudice and without pronouncement as to costs."

The trial court thereafter rendered judgment in favor of herein petitioners on this dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Philippine General

American Insurance Company Inc. and against the remaining defendants, Sweet Lines Inc.
and Davao Veterans Arrastre Inc. as follows:

Defendant Sweet Lines, Inc. is ordered to pay said plaintiff the sum of P34,902.00, with legal
interest thereon from date of extrajudicial demand on April 28, 1978 (Exh. M) until fully
paid;

Defendant Sweet Lines Inc. and Davao Veterans Arrastre and (Port) Services Inc. are
directed to pay jointly and severally, the plaintiff the sum of P49,747.55, with legal interest
thereon from April 28, 1978 until fully paid;

Each of said defendants are ordered to pay the plaintiffs the additional sum of P5,000 is
reimbursable attorney's fees and other litigation expenses;

Each of said defendants shall pay one-fourth (1/4) costs. 4

Due to the reversal on appeal by respondent court of the trial court's decision on the ground of
prescription, 5 in effect dismissing the complaint of herein petitioners, and the denial of their motion for
reconsideration, 6 petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, faulting respondent appellate
court with the following errors: (1) in upholding, without proof, the existence of the so-called prescriptive
period; (2) granting arguendo that the said prescriptive period does exist, in not finding the same to be null
and void; and (3) assuming arguendo that the said prescriptive period is valid and legal, in failing to conclude
that petitioners substantially complied therewith. 7

Parenthetically, we observe that herein petitioners are jointly pursuing this case, considering their common
interest in the shipment subject of the present controversy, to obviate any question as to who the real party in
interest is and to protect their respective rights as insurer and insured. In any case, there is no impediment to
the legal standing of Petitioner Philamgen, even if it alone were to sue herein private respondents in its own
capacity as insurer, it having been subrogated to all rights of recovery for loss of or damage to the shipment
insured under its Marine Risk Note No. 438734 dated March 31, 1977 8 in view of the full settlement of the

16
claim thereunder as evidenced by the subrogation receipt 9 issued in its favor by Far East Bank and Trust Co.,
Davao Branch, for the account of petitioner TPI.

Upon payment of the loss covered by the policy, the insurer's entitlement to subrogation pro tanto, being of
the highest equity, equips it with a cause of action against a third party in case of contractual
breach. 10 Further, the insurer's subrogatory right to sue for recovery under the bill of lading in case of loss of
or damage to the cargo is jurisprudentially upheld. 11 However, if an insurer, in the exercise of its subrogatory
right, may proceed against the erring carrier and for all intents and purposes stands in the place and in
substitution of the consignee, a fortiori such insurer is presumed to know and is just as bound by the
contractual terms under the bill of lading as the insured.

On the first issue, petitioners contend that it was error for the Court of Appeals to reverse the appealed
decision on the supposed ground of prescription when SLI failed to adduce any evidence in support thereof
and that the bills of lading said to contain the shortened periods for filing a claim and for instituting a court
action against the carrier were never offered in evidence. Considering that the existence and tenor of this
stipulation on the aforesaid periods have allegedly not been established, petitioners maintain that it is
inconceivable how they can possibly comply therewith. 12 In refutation, SLI avers that it is standard practice
in its operations to issue bills of lading for shipments entrusted to it for carriage and that it in fact issued bills
of lading numbered MD-25 and MD-26 therefor with proof of their existence manifest in the records of the
case. 13 For its part, DVAPSI insists on the propriety of the dismissal of the complaint as to it due to
petitioners' failure to prove its direct responsibility for the loss of and/or damage to the cargo. 14

On this point, in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals resolved that although
the bills of lading were not offered in evidence, the litigation obviously revolves on such bills of lading which
are practically the documents or contracts sued upon, hence, they are inevitably involved and their provisions
cannot be disregarded in the determination of the relative rights of the parties thereto. 15

Respondent court correctly passed upon the matter of prescription, since that defense was so considered and
controverted by the parties. This issue may accordingly be taken cognizance of by the court even if not
inceptively raised as a defense so long as its existence is plainly apparent on the face of relevant
pleadings. 16 In the case at bar, prescription as an affirmative defense was seasonably raised by SLI in its
answer, 17 except that the bills of lading embodying the same were not formally offered in evidence, thus
reducing the bone of contention to whether or not prescription can be maintained as such defense and, as in
this case, consequently upheld on the strength of mere references thereto.

As petitioners are suing upon SLI's contractual obligation under the contract of carriage as contained in the
bills of lading, such bills of lading can be categorized as actionable documents which under the Rules must be
properly pleaded either as causes of action or defenses, 18 and the genuineness and due execution of which
are deemed admitted unless specifically denied under oath by the adverse party. 19 The rules on actionable
documents cover and apply to both a cause of action or defense based on said documents. 20

In the present case and under the aforestated assumption that the time limit involved is a prescriptive period,
respondent carrier duly raised prescription as an affirmative defense in its answer setting forth paragraph 5
of the pertinent bills of lading which comprised the stipulation thereon by parties, to wit:

5. Claims for shortage, damage, must be made at the time of delivery to consignee or agent, if
container shows exterior signs of damage or shortage. Claims for non-delivery, misdelivery,
loss or damage must be filed within 30 days from accrual. Suits arising from shortage,
damage or loss, non-delivery or misdelivery shall be instituted within 60 days from date of
accrual of right of action. Failure to file claims or institute judicial proceedings as herein
provided constitutes waiver of claim or right of action. In no case shall carrier be liable for
any delay, non-delivery, misdelivery, loss of damage to cargo while cargo is not in actual
custody of carrier. 21

17
In their reply thereto, herein petitioners, by their own assertions that —

2. In connection with Pars. 14 and 15 of defendant Sweet Lines, Inc.'s Answer, plaintiffs state
that such agreements are what the Supreme Court considers as contracts of adhesion
(see Sweet Lines, Inc. vs. Hon. Bernardo Teves, et al., G.R. No. L-37750, May 19, 1978) and,
consequently, the provisions therein which are contrary to law and public policy cannot be
availed of by answering defendant as valid defenses. 22

thereby failed to controvert the existence of the bills of lading and the aforequoted provisions therein, hence
they impliedly admitted the same when they merely assailed the validity of subject stipulations.

Petitioners' failure to specifically deny the existence, much less the genuineness and due execution, of the
instruments in question amounts to an admission. Judicial admissions, verbal or written, made by the parties
in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive, no evidence
being required to prove the same, and cannot be contradicted unless shown to have been made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. 23 Moreover, when the due execution and genuineness
of an instrument are deemed admitted because of the adverse party's failure to make a specific verified denial
thereof, the instrument need not be presented formally in evidence for it may be considered an admitted
fact. 24

Even granting that petitioners' averment in their reply amounts to a denial, it has the procedural earmarks of
what in the law on pleadings is called a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the admission of the
substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It is in effect an admission of the
averment it is directed to. 25 Thus, while petitioners objected to the validity of such agreement for being
contrary to public policy, the existence of the bills of lading and said stipulations were nevertheless impliedly
admitted by them.

We find merit in respondent court's comments that petitioners failed to touch on the matter of the non-
presentation of the bills of lading in their brief and earlier on in the appellate proceedings in this case, hence
it is too late in the day to now allow the litigation to be overturned on that score, for to do so would mean an
over-indulgence in technicalities. Hence, for the reasons already advanced, the non-inclusion of the
controverted bills of lading in the formal offer of evidence cannot, under the facts of this particular case, be
considered a fatal procedural lapse as would bar respondent carrier from raising the defense of prescription.
Petitioners' feigned ignorance of the provisions of the bills of lading, particularly on the time limitations for
filing a claim and for commencing a suit in court, as their excuse for non-compliance therewith does not
deserve serious attention.

It is to be noted that the carriage of the cargo involved was effected pursuant to an "Application for Delivery
of Cargoes without Original Bill of Lading" issued on May 20, 1977 in Davao City 26 with the notation therein
that said application corresponds to and is subject to the terms of bills of lading MD-25 and MD-26. It would
be a safe assessment to interpret this to mean that, sight unseen, petitioners acknowledged the existence of
said bills of lading. By having the cargo shipped on respondent carrier's vessel and later making a claim for
loss on the basis of the bills of lading, petitioners for all intents and purposes accepted said bills. Having done
so they are bound by all stipulations contained therein. 27 Verily, as petitioners are suing for recovery on the
contract, and in fact even went as far as assailing its validity by categorizing it as a contract of adhesion, then
they necessarily admit that there is such a contract, their knowledge of the existence of which with its
attendant stipulations they cannot now be allowed to deny.

On the issue of the validity of the controverted paragraph 5 of the bills of lading above quoted which
unequivocally prescribes a time frame of thirty (30) days for filing a claim with the carrier in case of loss of or
damage to the cargo and sixty (60) days from accrual of the right of action for instituting an action in court,
which periods must concur, petitioners posit that the alleged shorter prescriptive period which is in the
nature of a limitation on petitioners' right of recovery is unreasonable and that SLI has the burden of proving

18
otherwise, citing the earlier case of Southern Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 28 They postulate this on the
theory that the bills of lading containing the same constitute contracts of adhesion and are, therefore, void for
being contrary to public policy, supposedly pursuant to the dictum in Sweet Lines, Inc. vs. Teves, et al. 29

Furthermore, they contend, since the liability of private respondents has been clearly established, to bar
petitioners' right of recovery on a mere technicality will pave the way for unjust enrichment. 30 Contrarily, SLI
asserts and defends the reasonableness of the time limitation within which claims should be filed with the
carrier; the necessity for the same, as this condition for the carrier's liability is uniformly adopted by nearly
all shipping companies if they are to survive the concomitant rigors and risks of the shipping industry; and
the countervailing balance afforded by such stipulation to the legal presumption of negligence under which
the carrier labors in the event of loss of or damage to the cargo. 31

It has long been held that Article 366 of the Code of Commerce applies not only to overland and river
transportation but also to maritime
transportation. 32 Moreover, we agree that in this jurisdiction, as viewed from another angle, it is more
accurate to state that the filing of a claim with the carrier within the time limitation therefor under Article
366 actually constitutes a condition precedent to the accrual of a right of action against a carrier for damages
caused to the merchandise. The shipper or the consignee must allege and prove the fulfillment of the
condition and if he omits such allegations and proof, no right of action against the carrier can accrue in his
favor. As the requirements in Article 366, restated with a slight modification in the assailed paragraph 5 of
the bills of lading, are reasonable conditions precedent, they are not limitations of action. 33 Being conditions
precedent, their performance must precede a suit for enforcement 34 and the vesting of the right to file spit
does not take place until the happening of these conditions. 35

Now, before an action can properly be commenced all the essential elements of the cause of action must be in
existence, that is, the cause of action must be complete. All valid conditions precedent to the institution of the
particular action, whether prescribed by statute, fixed by agreement of the parties or implied by law must be
performed or complied with before commencing the action, unless the conduct of the adverse party has been
such as to prevent or waive performance or excuse non-performance of the condition. 36

It bears restating that a right of action is the right to presently enforce a cause of action, while a cause of
action consists of the operative facts which give rise to such right of action. The right of action does not arise
until the performance of all conditions precedent to the action and may be taken away by the running of the
statute of limitations, through estoppel, or by other circumstances which do not affect the cause of
action. 37 Performance or fulfillment of all conditions precedent upon which a right of action depends must be
sufficiently alleged, 38 considering that the burden of proof to show that a party has a right of action is upon
the person initiating the suit. 39

More particularly, where the contract of shipment contains a reasonable requirement of giving notice of loss
of or injury to the goods, the giving of such notice is a condition precedent to the action for loss or injury or
the right to enforce the carrier's liability. Such requirement is not an empty formalism. The fundamental
reason or purpose of such a stipulation is not to relieve the carrier from just liability, but reasonably to inform
it that the shipment has been damaged and that it is charged with liability therefor, and to give it an
opportunity to examine the nature and extent of the injury. This protects the carrier by affording it an
opportunity to make an investigation of a claim while the matter is fresh and easily investigated so as to
safeguard itself from false and fraudulent claims. 40

Stipulations in bills of lading or other contracts of shipment which require notice of claim for loss of or
damage to goods shipped in order to impose liability on the carrier operate to prevent the enforcement of the
contract when not complied with, that is, notice is a condition precedent and the carrier is not liable if notice
is not given in accordance with the stipulation, 41 as the failure to comply with such a stipulation in a contract
of carriage with respect to notice of loss or claim for damage bars recovery for the loss or damage suffered. 42

19
On the other hand, the validity of a contractual limitation of time for filing the suit itself against a carrier
shorter than the statutory period therefor has generally been upheld as such stipulation merely affects the
shipper's remedy and does not affect the liability of the carrier. In the absence of any statutory limitation and
subject only to the requirement on the reasonableness of the stipulated limitation period, the parties to a
contract of carriage may fix by agreement a shorter time for the bringing of suit on a claim for the loss of or
damage to the shipment than that provided by the statute of limitations. Such limitation is not contrary to
public policy for it does not in any way defeat the complete vestiture of the right to recover, but merely
requires the assertion of that right by action at an earlier period than would be necessary to defeat it through
the operation of the ordinary statute of limitations. 43

In the case at bar, there is neither any showing of compliance by petitioners with the requirement for the
filing of a notice of claim within the prescribed period nor any allegation to that effect. It may then be said
that while petitioners may possibly have a cause of action, for failure to comply with the above condition
precedent they lost whatever right of action they may have in their favor or, token in another sense, that
remedial right or right to relief had prescribed.44

The shipment in question was discharged into the custody of the consignee on May 15, 1977, and it was from
this date that petitioners' cause of action accrued, with thirty (30) days therefrom within which to file a claim
with the carrier for any loss or damage which may have been suffered by the cargo and thereby perfect their
right of action. The findings of respondent court as supported by petitioners' formal offer of evidence in the
court below show that the claim was filed with SLI only on April 28, 1978, way beyond the period provided in
the bills of lading 45 and violative of the contractual provision, the inevitable consequence of which is the loss
of petitioners' remedy or right to sue. Even the filing of the complaint on May 12, 1978 is of no remedial or
practical consequence, since the time limits for the filing thereof, whether viewed as a condition precedent or
as a prescriptive period, would in this case be productive of the same result, that is, that petitioners had no
right of action to begin with or, at any rate, their claim was time-barred.

What the court finds rather odd is the fact that petitioner TPI filed a provisional claim with DVAPSI as early as
June 14, 1977 46 and, as found by the trial court, a survey fixing the extent of loss of and/or damage to the
cargo was conducted on July 8, 1977 at the instance of petitioners. 47 If petitioners had the opportunity and
awareness to file such provisional claim and to cause a survey to be conducted soon after the discharge of the
cargo, then they could very easily have filed the necessary formal, or even a provisional, claim with SLI
itself 48 within the stipulated period therefor, instead of doing so only on April 28, 1978 despite the vessel's
arrival at the port of destination on May 15, 1977. Their failure to timely act brings us to no inference other
than the fact that petitioners slept on their rights and they must now face the consequences of such inaction.

The ratiocination of the Court of Appeals on this aspect is worth reproducing:

xxx xxx xxx

It must be noted, at this juncture, that the aforestated time limitation in the presentation of
claim for loss or damage, is but a restatement of the rule prescribed under Art. 366 of the
Code of Commerce which reads as follows:

Art. 366. Within the twenty-four hours following the receipt of the
merchandise, the claim against the carrier for damage or average which
may be found therein upon opening the packages, may be made, provided
that the indications of the damage or average which gives rise to the claim
cannot be ascertained from the outside part of the packages, in which case
the claims shall be admitted only at the time of the receipt.

20
 After the periods mentioned have elapsed, or the transportation charges
have been paid, no claim shall be admitted against the carrier with regard
to the condition in which the goods transported were delivered.

Gleanable therefrom is the fact that subject stipulation even lengthened the period for
presentation of claims thereunder. Such modification has been sanctioned by the Supreme
Court. In the case of Ong Yet (M)ua Hardware Co., Inc. vs. Mitsui Steamship Co., Ltd., et al., 59
O.G. No. 17, p. 2764, it ruled that Art. 366 of the Code of Commerce can be modified by a bill
of lading prescribing the period of 90 days after arrival of the ship, for filing of written claim
with the carrier or agent, instead of the 24-hour time limit after delivery provided in the
aforecited legal provision.

Tested, too, under paragraph 5 of said Bill of Lading, it is crystal clear that the
commencement of the instant suit on May 12, 1978 was indeed fatally late. In view of the
express provision that "suits arising from
. . . damage or loss shall be instituted within 60 days from date of accrual of right of action,"
the present action necessarily fails on ground of prescription.

In the absence of constitutional or statutory prohibition, it is usually held or

recognized that it is competent for the parties to a contract of shipment to
agree on a limitation of time shorter than the statutory period, within which
action for breach of the contract shall be brought, and such limitation will
be enforced if reasonable . . . (13 C.J.S. 496-497)

A perusal of the pertinent provisions of law on the matter would disclose that there is no
constitutional or statutory prohibition infirming paragraph 5 of subject Bill of Lading. The
stipulated period of 60 days is reasonable enough for appellees to ascertain the facts and
thereafter to sue, if need be, and the 60-day period agreed upon by the parties which
shortened the statutory period within which to bring action for breach of contract is valid
and binding. . . . (Emphasis in the original text.) 49

As explained above, the shortened period for filing suit is not unreasonable and has in fact been generally
recognized to be a valid business practice in the shipping industry. Petitioners' advertence to the Court's
holding in the Southern Lines case, supra, is futile as what was involved was a claim for refund of excess
payment. We ruled therein that non-compliance with the requirement of filing a notice of claim under Article
366 of the Code of Commerce does not affect the consignee's right of action against the carrier because said
requirement applies only to cases for recovery of damages on account of loss of or damage to cargo, not to an
action for refund of overpayment, and on the further consideration that neither the Code of Commerce nor
the bills of lading therein provided any time limitation for suing for refund of money paid in excess, except
only that it be filed within a reasonable time.

The ruling in Sweet Lines categorizing the stipulated limitation on venue of action provided in the subject bill
of lading as a contract of adhesion and, under the circumstances therein, void for being contrary to public
policy is evidently likewise unavailing in view of the discrete environmental facts involved and the fact that
the restriction therein was unreasonable. In any case, Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 50 instructs us that
"contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready-made form of contract on the other . . . are
contracts not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if
he adheres he gives his consent." In the present case, not even an allegation of ignorance of a party excuses
non-compliance with the contractual stipulations since the responsibility for ensuring full comprehension of
the provisions of a contract of carriage devolves not on the carrier but on the owner, shipper, or consignee as
the case may be.

21
While it is true that substantial compliance with provisions on filing of claim for loss of or damage to cargo
may sometimes suffice, the invocation of such an assumption must be viewed vis-a-vis the object or purpose
which such a provision seeks to attain and that is to afford the carrier a reasonable opportunity to determine
the merits and validity of the claim and to protect itself against unfounded impositions. 51 Petitioners' would
nevertheless adopt an adamant posture hinged on the issuance by SLI of a "Report on Losses and Damages,"
dated May 15, 1977, 52 from which petitioners theorize that this charges private respondents with actual
knowledge of the loss and damage involved in the present case as would obviate the need for or render
superfluous the filing of a claim within the stipulated period.

Withal, it has merely to be pointed out that the aforementioned report bears this notation at the lower part
thereof: "Damaged by Mla. labor upon unloading; B/L noted at port of origin," as an explanation for the cause
of loss of and/or damage to the cargo, together with an iterative note stating that "(t)his Copy should be
submitted together with your claim invoice or receipt within 30 days from date of issue otherwise your claim
will not be honored."

Moreover, knowledge on the part of the carrier of the loss of or damage to the goods deducible from the
issuance of said report is not equivalent to nor does it approximate the legal purpose served by the filing of
the requisite claim, that is, to promptly apprise the carrier about a consignee's intention to file a claim and
thus cause the prompt investigation of the veracity and merit thereof for its protection. It would be an unfair
imposition to require the carrier, upon discovery in the process of preparing the report on losses or damages
of any and all such loss or damage, to presume the existence of a claim against it when at that time the carrier
is expectedly concerned merely with accounting for each and every shipment and assessing its condition.
Unless and until a notice of claim is therewith timely filed, the carrier cannot be expected to presume that for
every loss or damage tallied, a corresponding claim therefor has been filed or is already in existence as would
alert it to the urgency for an immediate investigation of the soundness of the claim. The report on losses and
damages is not the claim referred to and required by the bills of lading for it does not fix responsibility for the
loss or damage, but merely states the condition of the goods shipped. The claim contemplated herein, in
whatever form, must be something more than a notice that the goods have been lost or damaged; it must
contain a claim for compensation or indicate an intent to claim. 53

Thus, to put the legal effect of respondent carrier's report on losses or damages, the preparation of which is
standard procedure upon unloading of cargo at the port of destination, on the same level as that of a notice of
claim by imploring substantial compliance is definitely farfetched. Besides, the cited notation on the carrier's
report itself makes it clear that the filing of a notice of claim in any case is imperative if carrier is to be held
liable at all for the loss of or damage to cargo.

Turning now to respondent DVAPSI and considering that whatever right of action petitioners may have
against respondent carrier was lost due to their failure to seasonably file the requisite claim, it would be
awkward, to say the least, that by some convenient process of elimination DVAPSI should proverbially be left
holding the bag, and it would be pure speculation to assume that DVAPSI is probably responsible for the loss
of or damage to cargo. Unlike a common carrier, an arrastre operator does not labor under a presumption of
negligence in case of loss, destruction or deterioration of goods discharged into its custody. In other words, to
hold an arrastre operator liable for loss of and/or damage to goods entrusted to it there must be
preponderant evidence that it did not exercise due diligence in the handling and care of the goods.

Petitioners failed to pinpoint liability on any of the original defendants and in this seemingly wild goose-
chase, they cannot quite put their finger down on when, where, how and under whose responsibility the loss
or damage probably occurred, or as stated in paragraph 8 of their basic complaint filed in the court below,
whether "(u)pon discharge of the cargoes from the original carrying vessel, the SS VISHVA YASH," and/or
upon discharge of the cargoes from the interisland vessel the MV "SWEET LOVE," in Davao City and later
while in the custody of defendant arrastre operator. 54

22
The testimony of petitioners' own witness, Roberto Cabato, Jr., Marine and Aviation Claims Manager of
petitioner Philamgen, was definitely inconclusive and the responsibility for the loss or damage could still not
be ascertained therefrom:

Q In other words, Mr. Cabato, you only computed the loss on the basis of the
figures submitted to you and based on the documents like the survey
certificate and the certificate of the arrastre?

A Yes, sir.

Q Therefore, Mr. Cabato, you have no idea how or where these losses were
incurred?

A No, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Mr. Witness, you said that you processed and investigated the claim
involving the shipment in question. Is it not a fact that in your processing
and investigation you considered how the shipment was transported?
Where the losses could have occurred and what is the extent of the
respective responsibilities of the bailees and/or carriers involved?

xxx xxx xxx

A With respect to the shipment being transported, we have of course to get

into it in order to check whether the shipment coming in to this port is in
accordance with the policy condition, like in this particular case, the
shipment was transported to Manila and transhipped through an
interisland vessel in accordance with the policy. With respect to the
losses, we have a general view where losses could have occurred. Of course
we will have to consider the different bailees wherein the shipment must
have passed through, like the ocean vessel, the interisland vessel and the
arrastre, but definitely at that point and time we cannot determine the extent
of each liability. We are only interested at that point and time in the liability
as regards the underwriter in accordance with the policy that we issued.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Mr. Witness, from the documents, namely, the survey of Manila Adjusters
and Surveyors Company, the survey of Davao Arrastre contractor and the
bills of lading issued by the defendant Sweet Lines, will you be able to tell
the respective liabilities of the bailees and/or carriers concerned?

A No, sir. (Emphasis ours.) 55

Neither did nor could the trial court, much less the Court of Appeals, precisely establish the stage in the
course of the shipment when the goods were lost, destroyed or damaged. What can only be inferred from the
factual findings of the trial court is that by the time the cargo was discharged to DVAPSI, loss or damage had
already occurred and that the same could not have possibly occurred while the same was in the custody of
DVAPSI, as demonstrated by the observations of the trial court quoted at the start of this opinion.

23
ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED and the dismissal of the complaint
in the court a quo as decreed by respondent Court of Appeals in its challenged judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Phil. American Gen. Insurance v Sweet Lines, 212 SCRA 194

Facts:
The vessel SS VISHVA YASH belonging to or operated by SCI Line (Shipping Corp. of
India) took on board 2 consignment of cargoes for shipment from LA to Manila and Davao
covered by bills of lading issued by SCI Line. The cargoes were insured by Tagum Plastics and
PHILAMGEN.

G.R. No. 94093 August 10, 1993

24
FAR EAST MARBLE (PHILS.), INC., LUIS R. TABUENA, JR. and RAMON A. TABUENA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, respondents.

Minerva C. genevea for petitioners.

Sabino B. Padilla IV for Bank of the Philippines Islands.

MELO, J.:

This has reference to a petition for review by certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated June 26, 1990, in CA-G.R. CV No. 14404 (Bellosillo (P), Marigomen, Sempio-Diy, JJ.) which set
aside the order of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Manila, Branch XIV), dated
June 1, 1987 and remanded the case to the court a quo for further proceedings on the grounds that the
complaint for foreclosure of chattel mortgage with replevin had not prescribed and that, there being a cause
of action, further proceedings, including the resolution of the motion for summary judgment may be pursued.

The antecedent facts of the case may be chronicled as follows:

On February 5, 1987, herein respondent Bank of the Philippines Islands (BPI) filed a complaint for
foreclosure of chattel mortgage with replevin against petitioner Far East Marble (Phils.), Inc. (Far East),
Ramon A. Tabuena and Luis R. Tabuena, Jr. which was docketed as Civil Case No. 87-39345 of Branch XIV of
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila.

The complaint pertinently alleged:

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST FAR EAST

2. That on various dates and for valuable consideration, the defendant Far East received
from Commercial Bank and Trust Company . . . now merged with and into the plaintiff bank . .
. several loans evidenced by promissory notes executed by said Far East, photo copies of
which are attached hereto and made integral parts hereof as Annexes A, B and C.

3. That said promissory notes . . . .have long matured but despite repeated requests and
demands for payment thereof with interests and related charges due, Far East has failed and
refused to pay. The account due on said promissory notes with interests and related charges
as of 10 September 1986 is P4,471,854.32 itemized in a statement of account, copy of which
is attached hereto and made a part hereof as Annex D

4. That because of Far East's failure and refusal in bad faith to pay its long past due
obligations under the promissory notes above alleged, plaintiff was constrained to file this
suit . . .

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST FAR EAST

6. That on various dates and for valuable consideration, the defendant Far East received
from and was extended by . . . plaintiff
Bank . . . credit facilities in the form of Trust Receipts, photo copies of which are hereto
attached and made integral parts hereof as Annexes E, F, G, H, I and J.

25
 7. That said Trust Receipts . . . have long matured and despite repeated requests and
demands for payment thereof with interests and related charges due Far East has failed and
refused to pay. The amount due on said Trust Receipts with interests and related charges as
of 10 September 1986 is P2,170,476.62 as itemized in a statement of account, copy of which
is attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as
Annex K.

8. That because of far East's failure and refusal to pay its long past due obligations under the
Trust Receipts above alleged, plaintiff was constrained to file this suit . . .

xxx xxx xxx

10. That in September 1976 Far East executed in favor of . . . plaintiff Bank . . . a Chattel
Mortgage, photocopy of which is attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as Annex
L, to secure the payment of its loan obligations including interests and related charges. . .

xxx xxx xxx

CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS RAMON A. TABUENA AND LUIS R.

TABUENA, JR.

13. That in September 1976, defendants Ramon A. Tabuena and Luis R. Tabuena, Jr. executed
in favor of . . . plaintiff Bank . . . a "continuing guaranty" photocopy of which is attached
hereto and made a part hereof as Annex M, whereby they bind themselves, jointly and
severally, to answer for the loan obligations to the Bank of defendant Far East.

14. That despite requests and demands for their payment of Far East's long past due
accounts, said defendants Ramon A. Tabuena and Luis R. Tabuena, Jr. have failed and refused
to pay said Far East accounts and have already defaulted in their solidary obligation under
said "continuing Guaranty."

15. That because of the failure and refusal of defendants Ramon A. Tabuena and Luis R.
Tabuena, Jr. in bad faith to pay Far East's past due accounts under their solidary obligation
stipulated in said "Continuing Guaranty,". . . plaintiff has been constrained to file suit against
them . . .
(pp. 32-36, Rollo.)

On March 10, 1987, Far East filed an answer with compulsory counterclaim admitting the genuineness and
due execution of the promissory notes attached as Annexes A, B, and C to the complaint, but alleging further
that said notes became due and demandable on November 19, 1976, respectively. On the basis of the maturity
dates of the notes, Far East thereupon raised the affirmative defenses of prescription and lack of cause of
action as it denied the allegation of the complaint that BPI had made previous repeated requests and
demands for payment. Far East claimed that during the more than 10 years which elapsed from the dates of
maturity of said obligations up to the time the action for foreclosure of the chattel mortgage securing said
obligations was filed, it had not received from BPI or its predecessor any demand for payment and thus, it had
"labored under the belief that they [the obligations] have already been written off" in the books of BPI.
Moreover, Far East denied the genuineness and due execution of the trust receipts and of the Statement of
Account (pp. 78-79, Rollo). A motion to hear affirmative defenses was attached to the answer.

On March 16, 1987, BPI filed an opposition to the motion to hear affirmative defenses, alleging that its cause
of action against Far East have not prescribed, since within 10 years from the time its cause of action accrued,
various written extrajudicial demands (attached thereto as Annexes "A" and
"A-1") were sent by BPI and received by Far East. Moreover, BPI offered several written documents whereby

26
Far East supposedly acknowledged its debt to BPI (Annexes "B" to "B-6). Withal, BPI maintained, the ten-
years prescriptive period to enforce its written contract had not only been interrupted, but was renewed.

On the same date, BPI filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that since Far East had admitted
the genuineness and due execution of the promissory notes and the deed of chattel mortgage annexed to its
complaint, there was no genuine issue as to any material fact, thus entitling BPI to a favorable judgment as a
matter of law in regard to its causes of action and on its right to foreclose the chattel mortgage.

On June 1, 1987, the trial court issued an order to the following effect:

WHEREFORE, the Court issues this Order:

1 — Dismissing the complaint against the defendant Far East Marble (Phils.) Inc. for lack of
cause of action and on grounds of pre[s]cription:

2 — Denying for lack of merit the Motion for Summary Judgment and the Supplemental
Motion for Summary Judgment;

3 — Striking off from the records the order of March 6, 1987 and recalling the writ of
replevin issued by this Court, and dismissing all the contempt charges;

4 — Ordering the Sheriff to desist permanently from enforcing the writ of seizure and to
return all the property seized by him under the Writ of Replevin, to the defendant Far East
Marble (Phils.) Inc. immediately from receipt of a copy of this order, and in case of his failure
to do so, the value thereof shall be charged against the replevin bond. (pp. 89-90, Rollo.)

An appeal therefrom was forthwith interposed by BPI, assailing the findings of the trial court with respect to
its finding that BPI's cause of action has prescribed and the consequent denial of the motion for summary
judgment.

On June 26, 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision setting aside the June 1, 1987 order of the court of
origin and remanding the case to said court for further proceedings, "including the resolution anew of
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment . . ., reception of the evidence of the parties and, thereafter, to decide
the case as the facts may warrant." (pp. 98-99, Rollo.)

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by Far East, anchored on the following assigned
errors:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL
COURT THAT PRESCRIPTION HAS SET IN OBLIVIOUS OF THE FACT THAT THIS FINDING
WAS REACHED AFTER DUE HEARING.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING FOR A REOPENING OF THE TRIAL
FOR THE RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE ON BOTH ISSUES OF PRESCRIPTION AND SUMMARY
JUDGMENT WHEN THESE WERE ALREADY TRIED AND WEIGHED BY THE TRIAL COURT.

III

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 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE
CONSIDERING THAT THE ISSUES RAISED THEREIN INVOLVE PURE QUESTIONS OF LAW. (p.
14, Rollo.)

The issue of jurisdiction being basis, we shall endeavor to dispose of it ahead of the other topics raised by
petitioners

Petitioner Far East maintains the position that the Court of Appeals stepped beyond the limits of its authority
when it assumed jurisdiction over the appeal filed by BPI inasmuch as said appeal raised only the pure
questions of law or whether or not the trial court erred: (1) in dismissing BPI's complaint for lack of cause of
action; (2) in finding that BPI's cause of action had prescribed; and (3) in ruling that BPI is not entitled to
summary judgment on its causes of action against Far East. Consequently, Far East contends, BPI should have
taken its case directly to this Court.

There is no dispute with respect to the fact that when an appeal raises only pure questions of law, it is only
this Court which has jurisdiction to entertain the same (Article VIII, Section 5 (2) (e), 1987 Constitution; Rule
45, Rules of Court; see also Santos, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 152 SCRA 378 [1987]). On the other hand, appeals
involving both questions of law and fact fall within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
At this point, there seems to be a need to distinguish a question of law from a question of fact.

It has been held in a number of cases (Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., 191 SCRA 218 [1990]; Gan vs. Licup Design
Group, Inc., G.R. NO. 94264, July 24, 1990, En Banc, Minute Resolution; Pilar Development Corp. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 146 SCRA 215 [1986]; Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 19 SCRA 289
[1967]; Consolidated Mines, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., 58 SCRA 618 [1974]), that there is a "question
of law" when there is doubt or difference of opinion as to what the law is on certain state of facts and which
does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the
other hand, there is a "question of fact" when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion
drawn therefrom is correct is a question of law.

In the case at bar, BPI alleged in its complaint (Rollo, p. 42) that on various dates and for valuable
consideration, it extended to Far East several loans, evidenced by promissory notes, and credit facilities in the
form of trust receipts, and that despite repeated requests and demands for payment thereof, Far East had failed
and refused to pay. Thus BPI sought foreclosure of the chattel mortgage securing such indebtedness.

In its answer (Rollo, p. 78), Far East admitted the genuineness and due execution of the promissory notes
involved in the case, but denied BPI's allegation that repeated demands for payment were made by BPI on it.
Far East then raised the affirmative defenses of prescription and lack of cause of action, arguing that since the
promissory notes matured in 1976 while BPI filed its action to foreclose the chattel mortgage only in 1987 (or
more than 10 years from the time its cause of action accrued), and there being no demand for payment which
would interrupt the period of prescription for instituting said action, BPI's claims have prescribed.

BPI, however, countered that its allegation of repeated demands on Far East for payment sufficiently stated a
cause of action; that within ten years from the time its cause of action accrued in 1976, it sent written
extrajudicial demands on Far East requesting payment of its due and outstanding obligations; that within that
10-years period, it received written acknowledgments of debt from Far East; and, that these demands for
payment and acknowledgments of debt effectively interrupted and renewed the prescriptive period. Worth
noting is the fact that the acknowledgment of debt and the demands for payment, including the affidavits of
BPI's counsel who prepared the demand letter and that of BPI's messenger who allegedly personally
delivered said letters to Far East were duly annexed to BPI's pleadings.

From the foregoing exchange of pleading, the conflicting allegations of fact by the contending parties sprung
forth. It is thus quite obvious that the controversy centered on, and the doubt arose with respect to, the very

28
existence of previous demands for payment allegedly made by BPI on petitioner Far East, receipt of which
was denied by the latter. This dispute or controversy inevitably raised a question of fact. Such being the case,
the appeal taken by BPI to the Court of Appeals was proper.

We now come to petitioner's first two assigned errors.

The trial court's finding that BPI's claims due to prescription, can no longer prosper, is inextricably connected
with, and underpinned by, its other conclusion that BPI's allegation that it made "repeated requests and
demands for payment" is not sufficient to state a cause of action. Moreover, in its questioned Order (Rollo, p.
88) dated June 1, 1987, the trial court held that:

Apart from the fact that the complaint failed to allege that the period of prescription was
interrupted, the phrase "repeated requests and demands for payment" is vague and
incomplete as to establish in the minds of the defendant, or to enable the Court to draw a
conclusion, that demands or acknowledgment [of debt] were made that could have
interrupted the period of prescription. (p. 88, Rollo.).

Seemingly, therefore, the trial court believed that the interruption of the prescriptive period to institute an
action is an ULTIMATE FACT which had to be expressly and indispensably pleaded by BPI in its complaint,
and that failure to so alleged such circumstance is fatal to BPI's cause of action.

We believe and hold otherwise.

Section 3 of Rule 6 state that a "complaint is a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiff's cause or causes of action." Further elaborating thereon, Section 1 of Rule 8 declares that every
pleading, including, of course, a complaint, "shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and
direct statement of the ultimate facts . . . omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts." "Ultimate facts"
are the essential and substantial facts which either form the basis of the primary right and duty or which
directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant (Tantuico, Jr. vs. Republic of the Phil., et al.,
204 SCRA 428 [1991]), while "evidentiary facts" are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate
facts.

What then are the ultimate facts which BPI had to allege in its complaint so as to sufficiently establish its
cause of action?

Basically, a cause of action consists of three elements, namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff; (2) the
correlative obligation of the defendant; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal
right (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 193 SCRA 732 [1991]); Rebollido vs. Court of Appeals et al., 170 SCRA
800 [1989]). These elements are manifest in BPI's complaint, particularly when it was therein alleged that:
(1) for valuable consideration, BPI granted several loans, evidenced by promissory notes, and extended credit
facilities in the form of trust receipts to Far East (photocopies of said notes and receipts were duly attached to
the Complaint); (2) said promissory notes and trust receipts had matured; and (3) despite repeated requests
and demands for payment thereof, Far East had failed and refused to pay.

Clearly then, the general allegation of BPI that "despite repeated requests and demands for payment, Far East
has failed to pay" is sufficient to establish BPI's cause of action. Besides, prescription is not a cause of action; it
is a defense which, having been raised, should, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals (DBP vs. Ozarraga,
15 SCRA 48 [1965]), be supported by competent evidence. But even as Far East raised the defense of
prescription, BPI countered to the effect that the prescriptive period was interrupted and renewed by written
extrajudicial demands for payment and acknowledgment by Far East of the debt.

A complaint is sufficient if it contains sufficient notice of the cause of action even though the allegation may be
vague or indefinite, for in such case, the recourse of the defendant would be to file a motion for a bill of

29
particulars (Ramos vs. Condez, 20 SCRA 1146 [1967]). It is indeed the better rule that, pleadings, as well as
remedial laws, should be liberally construed so that the litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their
respective claims so as to avoid possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities (Adamo, et al.
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 191 SCRA 195 [1990]).

In the case at bar, the circumstances of BPI extending loans and credits to Far East and the failure of the latter
to pay and discharge the same upon maturity are the only ultimate facts which have to be pleaded, although
the facts necessary to make the mortgage valid enforceable must be proven during the trial (Ortiz v. Garcia,
15 Phil. 192 [1910]).

In fine, the finding of the trial court that prescription has set in is primarily premised on a misappreciation of
the sufficiency of BPI's allegation as above discussed. The records will show that the hearing conducted by the
trial court was merely pro forma and the trial judge did not sufficiently address the issue of whether or not a
demand for payment in fact made by BPI and duly received by herein petitioner Far East.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals hereby
AFFIRMED. No special pronouncement is made as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Vitug, JJ., concur.

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