G.R. no. 158466 (June 15, 2004)
If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
PABLO V. OCAMP, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND MARIO B. CRESPO a.k.a. MARK
JIMENEZ
Judge: SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J
The wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner
to the repudiated (rejected) loser because the law then as now only
authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who obtained
a plurality of votes and does not entitle a candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes to be declared elected.
Facts
1. On May 23, 2001, Mario B. Crespo, a.k.a. Mark Jimenez was
proclaimed to be the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District
of Manila pursuant to the May 14, 2001 elections with 32,097 votes
or a margin of 768 votes over Ocampo who obtained 31,329 votes.
2. On May 31, 2001, Ocampo filed with the HRET an electoral protest
against Mark Jimenez, impugning the election on the following
grounds: (1) misreading of votes garnered by petitioner Ocampo;
(2) falsification of election returns; (3) substitution of election returns;
(4) use of marked, spurious, fake and stray ballots; and (5)
presence of ballots written by one person or two persons. Ocampo
then prayed that a revision and appreciation of the ballots be
conducted; and that, thereafter, he be proclaimed the duly elected
Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.
3. On June 18, 2001, Mark Jimenez filed his answer with counter-
protest vehemently (very passionate or intense) denying that he
engaged in massive vote buying and there is No need for the
revision and appreciation of ballots.
4. On March 6, 2003, on cases of Mark Jimenez against Buenvido
Abante, Prudencio Jalandon; Rosenda M. Ocampo, the HRET
issued a resolution declaring that Mark Jimenez is "ineligible for
the Office of Representative of Sixth District of Manila for lack
of residence in the district" and ordering "him to vacate his
office." He filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
5. On March 12, 2003, petitioner filed a motion to implement Section
6 of Republic Act No. 6646, which reads:
"Section 6. Effects of Disqualification Case . – Any candidate
who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted.
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof, order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong."
6. Ocampo averred that since Mark Jimenez was declared
disqualified (because of lack of residency requirement), the votes
cast for him should not be counted. And having garnered the
second highest number of votes, he (Ocampo) should be declared
the winner in the May 14, 2001 elections and proclaimed the duly
elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila. On March 26,
2003, Mark Jimenez filed an opposition to petitioner’s motion to
implement the afore-quoted provision.
7. On March 27, 2003, the HRET issued a Resolution holding that
Mark Jimenez was guilty of vote-buying and disqualifying him as
Congressman of the 6th District of Manila. Anent the second issue
of whether petitioner can be proclaimed the duly elected
Congressman, the HRET held:
"x x x Jurisprudence has long established the doctrine that a
second placer cannot be proclaimed the first among the remaining
qualified candidates. The fact that the candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or
not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not
necessarily give the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes the right to be declared the winner of
the elective office. x x x
Congressional elections are different from local government
elections. In local government elections, when the winning
candidate for governor or mayor is subsequently disqualified, the
vice-governor or the vice-mayor, as the case may be, succeeds to
the position by virtue of the Local Government Code. It is different
in elections for representative. When a voter chooses his
congressional candidate, he chooses only one. If his choice is
concurred in by the majority of voters, that candidate is declared the
winner. Voters are not afforded the opportunity of electing a
‘substitute congressman’ in the eventuality that their first choice
dies, resigns, is disqualified, or in any other way leaves the post
vacant. There can only be one representative for that particular
legislative district. There are no runners-up or second placers. Thus,
 when the person vested with the mandate of the majority is
disqualified from holding the post he was elected to, the only
recourse to ascertain the new choice of the electorate is to
hold another election. X
This does not mean that the Sixth Legislative District of Manila
will be without adequate representation in Congress. Article VI,
Section 9 of the Constitution, and Republic Act No. 6645 allows
Congress to call a special election to fill up this vacancy. There
are at least 13 months until the next congressional elections,
which is more than sufficient time within which to hold a special
election to enable the electorate of the Sixth District of Manila to
elect their representative.
8. Pablo Ocampo filed a petition for certiorari (a writ or order by which
higher courts reviews the decision of lower courts) against the
HRET on the ground of committing grave abuse of discretion in his
case with Mario Crespo (a.ka. Mark Jimenez). The resolution
(March 27, 2003) on that case was Ocampo (the protestant) cannot
be proclaimed the duly elected Representative of the 6th District of
Manila since being a second placer, he "cannot be proclaimed the
first among the remaining qualified candidates. In addition, his
motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Issues:
1. Whether the votes cast in favor of Pablo Ocampo should not be
counted pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646
In Codilla,Sr. vs. De Venecia , we expounded on the application of
Section 6, R.A. No. 6646. There, we emphasized that there must
be a final judgment BEFORE the election in order
that the votes of a disqualified candidate can be
considered "stray". In the present case, private respondent was
declared disqualified almost twenty-two (22) months after the May 14,
2001 elections. Obviously, the requirement of "final judgment
before election" is absent. Therefore, petitioner cannot invoke
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646. Hence, when a candidate has not yet been
disqualified by final judgment during the election day and was voted for,
the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would
amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty
resides." The obvious rationale behind the foregoing ruling is that in
voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment
during the election day, the people voted for him bona fide
(genuinely), without any intention to misapply their franchise, and
in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the
person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of
government.
2. Whether Ocampo, a second placer in the May 14, 2001
congressional elections, can be proclaimed the duly elected
Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.
Anent the second issue, we revert back to the settled jurisprudence
that the subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtained
the highest number of votes does not entitle the candidate who
garnered the second highest number of votes to be declared the
winner. This principle has been reiterated in a number our decisions,
even as early as 1912, it was held that the candidate who lost in an
election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event that the candidate
who won is found to be ineligible for the office for which he was elected.
In Geronimo vs. Ramos, if the winning candidate is not qualified
and cannot qualify for the office to which he was elected, a permanent
vacancy is thus created. The second placer is just that, a second placer
– he lost in the elections, he was repudiated by either the majority or
plurality of voters. He could not be proclaimed winner as he could not
be considered the first among the qualified candidates. It still remains
that he did not receive the MANDATE OF MAJORITY during the
elections. To rule otherwise is to misconstrue the nature of the
democratic electroral process and the sociological and psychological
underpinnings behind voters’ preferences. At any rate, the petition has
become moot and academic. The Twelfth Congress formally adjourned
on June 11, 2004. And on May 17, 2004, the City Board of Canvassers
proclaimed Bienvenido Abante the duly elected Congressman of the
Sixth District of Manila pursuant to the May 10, 2004 elections.
G.R. No. 195649 (April 16, 2013)
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING vs. COMELEC, ROMMEL ARNADO y
CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA,
SERENO, CJ.:
WHAT:
Petition for Certiorari to review the Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) for applying Sec. 44 of the Local
Government Code. (while the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc
dated 2 February 2011 is being questioned for finding that respondent
Rommel Arnado y Cagoco (respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a
Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office despite his continued
use of a U.S. passport)
FACTS:
1. Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. But was
naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America. Arnado
applied for repatriation (RA 9225) and took the Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day
an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition was issued in his favor.
2. On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another
mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte on the ground that he is not a
resident nor a citizen because of his continued use of his US
passport.
3. But during 2010 elections, Arnado garnered the highest number of
votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate
for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, Arnardo filed his verified
answer attaching documents like affidavit of Renunciation as
evidence.
4. The COMELEC First Division issued a resolution in which they
considered the petition as one for disqualification. Arnado’s
continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado
had no real intention to renounce his US citizenship and that he only
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for office.
We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between
Arnado’s unexplained use of a US passport six times and his claim
that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his US
citizenship. Therefore, petition for disqualification of Arnado is
hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s proclamation as the
winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Nore is hereby ANNULLED.
5. While Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the
COMELEC on the ground that "the evidence is insufficient to justify
the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to law,
Petitioner Maquiling, another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan,
and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010
elections, intervened in the case where he argued that while the
First Division correctly disqualified Arnando, the order of
succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not
applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the
cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his
proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained
the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the
winner.
6. Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that
intervention is prohibited after a decision has already been
rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost
the elections.
The COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the
First Division and granted Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration, on the
following premises: By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by
R.A. No. 9225, Arnando embraced his Philippine citizenship as
though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time,
April 3, 2009, that the Arnando became a pure Philippine Citizen again.
Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes
cited that the use of foreign passport is not one of the grounds
provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through
which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes
of the law, his having received the highest number of votes does not
validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for
disqualification was filed before election against a candidate but was
adversely resolved AGAINST him after election, his having obtained
the highest number of votes did not make his election valid. His ouster
from office does not violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex
because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions
on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. To apply it is to
breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who expressed it when
they ratified the Constitution and when they elected their
representatives who enacted the law.
1. Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety
(suitabillity/capacity) of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public
office despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that
Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race
in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
2. That there was both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error
on the part of the COMELEC En Banc for ruling that Arnado is a
Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport,
Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of the COMELEC En
Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification
case.
Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is
proper when there has not yet been any proclamation of the
winner. Maquiling intervened at the stage when Arnado filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution
before the COMELEC En Banc. Clearly then, Maquiling has the
right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc
has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites
for the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v.
COMELEC are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by
the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right
to elevate the matter before this Court. Arnado’s claim that the
main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and
respondents therein have not appealed the decision of the
COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The elevation of the
case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is
only after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant
petition that the disqualification case originally filed by Balua against
Arnado will attain finality.
2. Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing
foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public
office.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign
citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to
one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest (remove) Filipino
citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants (bawiin ang
pinahayag) the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run
for an elective position.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be
solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation
under the laws of the foreign country. However, this legal
presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack
when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs
positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign
citizenship.
The Court has previously ruled that: Qualifications for public
office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only
at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but
during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. The
COMELEC EN BANC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet,
as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the
respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels
abroad." We cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months from
June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his Philippine passport
as soon as he was in possession of it, he would not have used his
US passport on 24 November 2009.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of
identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded
by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty
to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who
acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage,
those who seek election or appointment to public office are required
to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public
trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance
to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after
renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath
of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government
Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding
the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May
2010 elections
3. Whether or not the rule on succession in the Local
Government Code is applicable to this case.
The rule on succession under the Local Government Code will
not apply.

The doctrine that “a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the
winner in an election contest” must be re- examined and its
soundness once again put to the test to address the ever-recurring
issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate
cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
The popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a candidate.
Candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know
that an election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may
have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass
election eligibility requirements.
Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained the highest
number of votes from among the qualified candidates
With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner
in the election as he obtained the highest number of votes from among
the qualified candidates. We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea
v. COMELEC and Jalosjos v. COMELEC that a void COC cannot
produce any legal effect. Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible
candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an
election.
disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his
certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It
could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado
rendered it impossible to effect
his disqualification PRIOR TO THE ELECTIONS because he filed his
ANSWER to the petition when the elections were conducted already
and he was already proclaimed the winner. To hold that such
proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the
disqualification which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification,
although made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all
in the May 201 0 elections. Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes
cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling
as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes.
Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code
will not apply.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC that when
the voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s
disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then
the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may
be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further
complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed
second to ineligible ones.

The second-placer in the vote count is actually the

first-placer among the qualified candidates. That the
disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed
office is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a
substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As

earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and an American citizen
when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen
G.R. No. L-14639 (March 25, 1919)
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN.
Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners. City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.
MALCOLM, J. :
— Shall the judiciary permit a government of the men instead of a
government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands?
The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, ordered the
segregated district for women of ill repute (being held in low esteem by
the public), which had been permitted for a number of years in the city
of Manila, CLOSED. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the
women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the
police while the city authorities perfected arrangements with the Bureau
of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers.
October 25 midnight, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief
of police Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila Justo
Lukban, forcibly hustled 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed
them aboard the steamers. Those women were given no opportunity to
collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that
they were being taken to a police station for an investigation--- no
knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao nor consent
and without opportunity to consult friends and family or to defend their
rights.
On October 29, the vessels reached Davao. The women were
landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial
governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. Sales
and Yñigo had no previous notification that those were prostitutes who
had been expelled from Manila.
The attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable
number of the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus
(an order to bring a jailed person before a ourt to find out if those
persons should really be in jail) to the Supreme Court on the ground
that the women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban,
Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city
of Manila, and by certain unknown parties.
Respondents contended……………………..
In open court, the fiscal admitted that these women had been
sent out of Manila without their consent. The court awarded the writ, in
an order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city
of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila,
Francisco Sales, governor of Davao, and Feliciano Yñigo, an
hacendero of Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein
named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December 2, 1918.
Seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense and
their testimony were taken. On the other hand, Respondents Sales said
that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because
the women had never been under his control, because they were at
liberty in the Province of Davao, and because they had married or
signed contracts as laborers. Second order was promulgated by the
court directing that those of the women not in Manila be brought before
the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yñigo on
January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in written statements
voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk
of that court, renounce the right, or unless the respondents should
demonstrate some other legal motives that made compliance
impossible
On January 13, 1919, the respondents technically presented
before the Court the women who had returned to the city through their
own efforts and eight others who had been brought to Manila by the
respondents. It was stated that the respondents, through their
representatives and agents, had succeeded in bringing from Davao
with their consent 8 women; that 81 women were found in Davao who
on notice that if they desired they could return to Manila, transportation
fee, renounced the right through sworn statements; that 59 had already
returned to Manila by other means, and that despite all efforts to find
them 26 could not be located.
Reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus:
1. these 170 women were isolated from society, and then at night,
without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with
friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board
steamers for transportation to regions unknown. These officers of
the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy
acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically
admitted by the respondents.
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in
conformity with an Act of congress. The Governor- General can order
the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands.But
one can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even
hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police
of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands — and these
women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless
not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional
guaranties as are other citizens — to change their domicile from Manila
to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically
punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law
or regulation, compels any person to change his residence.
Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman shall be taken, or
imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs,
or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass
upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by
the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to
any man either justice or right."
RULE OF LAW: No official, no matter how high, is above
the law. The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard
individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law, (said
Justice Miller –US SC) is the only supreme power in our system of
government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its
functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy,
and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the
authority which it gives. Ours is government of law and not of men.
We follow the rule of law. That no man in this country is high and
above the law; that no officer of the law may set the law at defiance
(pagsalungat/ violates) with impunity (exception from
punishment).
Remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression:
1. Civil action- optional but rather slow process by which the
aggrieved party may recoup money damages
2. Criminal action- It is true that there is such criminal law in the
Philippines and violation of it may institute and press a criminal
prosecution of the public official in this action.
3. Habeas corpus- was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the
best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further
rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the writ,
whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.
Defenses against the Respondents Claim:
1. .WRIT SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE
PETITIONERS WERE NOT PROPER PARTIES. The petitioners
were relatives and friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion
was conducted by the city officials made it impossible for the
women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently
proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf.
Petitioners had standing in court.
2. WRIT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ASKED FOR IN THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF DAVAO or should have been made
returnable before that court. It is a general rule of good practice that,
to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for
habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the
court of first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ
of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any
judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. On the
other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their attorneys,
and the two original respondents with their attorney, were in Manila;
it was shown that the case involved parties situated in different parts
of the Islands; it was shown that the women might still be
imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the
writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of
and decided immediately by the appellate court. The failure of the
superior court to consider the application and then to grant the writ
would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.
3. respondents did not have any of the women under their
custody or control, the parties in whose behalf it was asked
were under no restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in
Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police
did not extend beyond the city limits. A prime specification of an
application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The
essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is
illegal.
The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that
city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in
a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion
just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao
without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented
from exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased.
The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the
aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they
freely and truly waived his right.
Issue: Whether the respondent complied with the two orders of the
Supreme Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus , and if it be found
that they did not, whether the contempt should be punished or be taken
as purged.
The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were
thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply with the writ.
As far as the record discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila waited
until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the provincial
governor of Davao. According to the response of the attorney for the
Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao
women who desired to return to Manila, but who should not be
permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. The half-
hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being
brought before the court on the day named.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three
optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies
of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could
have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those
persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could
have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their
attorney waived the right to be present. But they did not do anything of
those mentioned and instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting
to show that the women were contended with their life in Davao, some
of which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to
the return
In the second order, respondent appear to be more zealous,
Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were posted, the
constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women,
and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided we come
to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it.
Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a
substantial compliance with it, nothing further in this connection
remains to be done. The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find
in contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton
Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and
Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila,
Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yñigo,
an hacender o of Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city of Manila.
The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle. When one is
commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and does
not offer a valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge
the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must order him either
imprisoned or fined. An officer's failure to produce the body of a person
in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do so,
is a contempt committed in the face of the court.
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial
regard for human imperfections, we cannot say that any of the
respondents, with the possible exception of the first named, has flatly
disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its authority.
Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed
the orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law of public officers,
this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful
mitigating circumstance. The official who was primarily responsible for
the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish the
same, who made arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary,
who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later,
as the head of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate
the return of the unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the
Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was
commendable. His methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ
of habeas corpus issued by the court was only tardily and
reluctantly acknowledged. The failure of respondent Lukban to obey
the first mandate of the court tended to belittle and embarrass the
administration of justice to such an extent that his later activity may be
considered only as extenuating his conduct
In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas
corpus is necessary. The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax,
Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz are found not to be in contempt of court.
Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay
into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the
sum of one hundred pesos (P100). Costs shall be taxed against
respondents.
G.R. No. 188550 (August 19, 2013)
DEUTSCHE BANK AG MANILA BRANCH vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE
SERENO, CJ.:
Petition for Review filed by Deutsche Bank assailing the CTA
En Banc Decision (May 9, 2009 & July 1, 2009)
Facts:
1. In accordance with Sec. 28 of NIRC, Deutsche Bank Manila
withheld (refuse to give) and remitted to Commisioner of Internal
Revenue the amount of PHP 67,688,553.51, which represented the
15% branch profit remittance tax (BPRT) on its regular banking unit
(RBU) net income remitted to Deutsche Bank Germany (DB
Germany) for 2002 and prior taxable year
2. Deutsche Bank Manila believed that they made an overpayment of
BRPT therefore they filed an administrative claim for refund or
issuance of tax credit certificate in amount of P22,562,851.17.
Deutsche Bank Manila also requested from International Tax Affairs
Division (ITAD) a confirmation of its entitlement to the preferential
tax of 10% under RP-Germany Tax Treaty.
3. BIR’s allege inaction on the adimistrative claim, DB Manila filed a
petition for review with the CTA- refund for the alleged excess on
BRPT paid to DB Germany.
CTA 2nd Devision: the claim of DB Manila for a refund was DENIED on
the ground that application for a tax treaty relief was not filed with ITAD
prior to the payment of its BRPT. that before the benefits of the tax
treaty may be extended to a foreign corporation wishing to avail itself
thereof, the latter should first invoke the provisions of the tax treaty and
prove that they indeed apply to the corporation. They violated the 15-
day period of RMO.
CTA EN BANC: Affirmed CTA 2nd division applying the principle of
Stare Decisis (once a case has been decided in one way, any other
case involving exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the
same manner.); Citing Mirant, the CTA En Banc held that a ruling from
the ITAD of the BIR must be secured prior to the availment of a
preferential tax rate under a tax treat
ISSUE : Whether the failure to strictly comply with the 15-day rule under
RMO No. 1-2000 will deprive persons or corporations of the benefit of
a tax treaty.
Ruling:
Petition is meritorious.
Under Section 28(A)(5) of the NIRC, any profit remitted to its
head office shall be subject to a tax of 15% based on the total profits
applied for or earmarked for remittance without any deduction of the tax
component. However, petitioner invokes paragraph 6, Article 10 of the
RP-Germany Tax Treaty, which provides that where a resident of the
Federal Republic of Germany has a branch in the Republic of the
Philippines, this branch may be subjected to the branch profits
remittance tax withheld at source in accordance with Philippine law but
shall not exceed 10% of the gross amount of the profits remitted by that
branch to the head office.
By virtue of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty, we are bound to
extend to a branch in the Philippines, remitting to its head office in
Germany, the benefit of a preferential rate equivalent to 10% BPRT.
On the other hand, the BIR issued RMO No. 1-2000, which
requires that any availment of the tax treaty relief must be preceded by
an application with ITAD at least 15 days before the transaction. The
Order was issued to streamline the processing of the application of tax
treaty relief in order to improve efficiency and service to the taxpayers.
Further, it also aims to prevent the consequences of an erroneous
interpretation and/or application of the treaty provisions (i.e., filing a
claim for a tax refund/credit for the overpayment of taxes or for
deficiency tax liabilities for underpayment
DB Manila argued that CTA erred in denying its claim solely on
thr basis of RMO but Respondent CIR counters that requirements
under RMO is mandatory in character and noncompliance with this is
fatal to the taxpayer’s availment of the preferential tax rate.
COURT:
Court’s minute resolution in Mirant is not a binding precedent.
With respect to the same subject matter and the same issues
concerning the same parties, it constitutes res judicata. However, if
other parties or another subject matter (even with the same parties and
issues) is involved, the minute resolution is not binding precedent. The
Court ruled that the previous case "ha(d) no bearing" on the latter
case because the two cases involved different subject matters as
they were concerned with the taxable income of different taxable
years. Besides a minute resolution is signed only by the clerk of court
by authority of the justices, unlike a decision. It does not require the
certification of the Chief Justice and not even published in the Philippine
Reports.
Our Constitution provides for adherence to the general
principles of international law as part of the law of the land.The
time-honored international principle of pacta sunt servanda demands
the performance in good faith of treaty obligations on the part of the
states that enter into the agreement. Treaties have the force and
effect of law in this jurisdiction. Tax treaties are entered into "to
reconcile the national fiscal legislations of the contracting parties and,
in turn, help the taxpayer avoid simultaneous taxations in two different
jurisdictions." - rationale for doing away with double taxation is to
encourage the free flow of goods and services and the movement of
capital, technology and persons between countries, conditions deemed
vital in creating robust and dynamic economies.
"A state that has contracted valid international obligations is
bound to make in its legislations those modifications that may be
necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. Thus,
laws and issuances must ensure that the reliefs granted under tax
treaties are accorded to the parties entitled thereto. The BIR must
not impose additional requirements that would negate the
availment of the reliefs provided for under international agreements.
More so, when the RP-Germany Tax Treaty does not provide for any
pre-requisite for the availment of the benefits under said agreement.
nothing in RMO No. 1-2000 which would indicate a deprivation
of entitlement to a tax treaty relief for failure to comply with the 15-day
period. We recognize the clear intention of the BIR in implementing
RMO No. 1-2000, but the CTA’s outright denial of a tax treaty relief for
failure to strictly comply with the prescribed period is not in harmony
with the objectives of the contracting state to ensure that the benefits
granted under tax treaties are enjoyed by duly entitled persons or
corporations. Bearing in mind the rationale of tax treaties, the period of
application for the availment of tax treaty relief as required by RMO No.
1-2000 should not operate to divest entitlement to the relief as it would
constitute a violation of the duty required by good faith in complying
with a tax treaty. The obligation to comply with a tax treaty must
take precedence over the objective of RMO No. 1-2000. we cannot
totally deprive those who are entitled to the benefit of a treaty for
failure to strictly comply with an administrative issuance requiring
prior application for tax treaty relief.
Prior application with the BIR becomes moot in refund cases.
Since the DB Manila invoked the provisions of the RP-Germany Tax
Treaty when it requested for a confirmation from the ITAD before filing
an administrative claim for a refund should be deemed substantial
compliance with RMO No. 1-2000. Section 229 of the NIRC provides
the taxpayer a remedy for tax recovery when there has been an
erroneous payment of tax. The outright denial of petitioner’s claim for a
refund, on the sole ground of failure to apply for a tax treaty relief prior
to the payment of the BPRT, would defeat the purpose of Section 229.
Petitioner is entitled to a refund.
Instant Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court of Tax
Appeals En Banc Decision dated 29 May 2009 and Resolution dated 1
July 2009 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Ordering respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue to
refund or issue a tax credit certificate in favor of petitioner Deutsche
Bank AG Manila Branch the amount of PHP 22,562,851.17
representing the erroneously paid BPRT for 2002 and prior taxable
years.
ADHERENCE TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW- ARTICLE II,
SECTION 2
THE PHILIPPINES RENOUNCES WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
NATIONAL POLICY, ADOPTS THE GENERAL ACCEPTED
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS PART OF THE LAND
AND ADHERES TO THE POLICY OF PEACE, EQUALITY, JUSTICE,
FREEDOM, COOPERATION AND AMITY WITH ALL NATIONS.
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988_SARMIENTO, J.:
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment,
and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration,
PASEI- engaged in recruitment of Filipino workers, male or female, for
overseas placement
WHAT: PASEI filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging
the constitutional validity of Department Order no. 1 of DOLE-
Temporary Suspension of Overseas Deployment of female
workers. The measure is assailed for “discrimination against males
or females”.
PASEI invoked that workers should participate in policy decision
making processes affecting their rights and benefits wherein
Department Order no. 1 was passed in the absence of prior
consultations- a violation of Charter’s non-impairment clause.
SolGen, in behalf of the respondents, filed a comment informing the
court that Labor Secretary Drilon lifted the deployment ban in certain
countries and invoke that D.O no. 1 is in the nature of a POLICE
POWER of the state.
POLICE POWER- state authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights.
PASEI has shown NO SATISFACTORY REASON why the contested
measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department
Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not
thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-
settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not
import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits
of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply
equally to all members of the same class.
The Court is well aware of physical and personal abuse or maltreatment
suffered by migrant Filipina workers. As precisely the caretaker of
Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of
exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's
efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. There is no
prohibition against overseas deployment of males because the danger
is not directed to them. The petitioner has proffered NO ARGUMENT
that the Government should act similarly with respect to male workers.
Therefore, Discrimination in this case is justified.
There is NO DOUBT that such a classification is germane to the
purpose behind the measure. It is the avowed objective of Department
Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas
workers". The assailed Order clearly accords protection to certain
women workers, and not the contrary.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the
petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targetted by the
Government. 31 Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other
freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction,
where laissez fair e has never been fully accepted as a controlling
economic way of life.
This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order
has on the business of recruitment. The concern of the Government,
however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the
ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of
Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a
decent living to its citizens. The Government has convinced the
Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the impugned
Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the
extraordinary relief prayed for.
petition is DISMISSED.No Costs.
Non-impairment Clause_Article III Section 10- No law impairing
the obligations of contract shall be passed.
G.R. No. 101083 (July 30, 1993) Davide, Jr., J
OPOSA vs. Factoran
The petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful
ecology.
ISSUE: Whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent
the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest
the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth
Plaintiff/ Petitioners are all minors joined by their respective
parents and Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. a domestic, non-stock
and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of engaging in
concerted action for the protection of our environment.
Factoran- Secretary of DENR
Plaintiffss alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use
and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is country’s virgin
tropical forest. They asservate Inter-generational responsibility
(personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations) and Inter-
generational Justice- they represent their generation as well as the
generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have
caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran,
Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds,
namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and
(2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which
properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of
Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the
petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and
unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the
action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's
abuse of discretion.
Respondent Judge issued the motion to dismiss by respondent
on the ground that that the complaint states no cause of action
against him and that it raises a political question. Judge further
ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of
the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari
and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the
ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the action.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably
states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning
their right to a sound environment. It is further claimed that the issue of
the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in
granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for
logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the
Constitution's non-impairment clause (Non-impairment
Clause_Article III Section 10- No law impairing the obligations of
contract shall be passed.), petitioners maintain that the same does
not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise
submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said
clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when
the public interest so requires.
Respondents averred that the petitioners failed to allege in
their complaint a SPECIfiC LEGAL RIGHT violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see
nothing in the complaint but an "environmental right" which supposedly
entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as
parens patriae. " Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a
valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question
of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political
question which should be properly addressed to the executive or
legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the
petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby
before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging
totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents
submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process
of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time
— usually for twenty- five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can
neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after
due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or
other forestry laws and regulations.
 The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right
— the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time
in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides: Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature. This right unites with the right to
health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them.
1. Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
A cause of action is defined as an act or omission of one
party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential
elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal
right.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, The court
finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima facie , the
claimed violation of their rights. A denial or violation of that right
by the other who has correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect
the same gives rise to CAUSE OF ACTION. Granting of TLA, which
they claim was done in grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to
balance and healthful ecology. Hence full protection thereof requires
that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates
the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the
purview of the due process clause; it is only A LICENSE OR
PRIVILEGE, which can be VALIDLY WITHDRAWN whenever dictated
by public interest or public welfare as in this case. Even if it is to be
assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve
a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or
modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non- impairment
clause cannot as yet be invoked. No LAW impairing, the obligation
of contracts shall be passed.
2. Whether or not the complaint raises a political question.
Yes. But it allows the court to rule upon even the question is
dependent upon the wisdom of the decision of the executive
and legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted by GRAVE ABUE OF
DISCRETION.
3. Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the
impairment of contracts.
NO. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of
the due process clause; it is only A LICENSE OR PRIVILEGE,
which can be VALIDLY WITHDRAWN whenever dictated by
public interest or public welfare as in this case. Even if it is to be
assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not
involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the
cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence,
the non- impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. No
LAW impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
This must yield to the police power of the State.
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
Imbong v. OCHOA (Case Notebook)
Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following
GROUNDS: Case Notebook
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments
raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining
(requiring) the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for
a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013
ISSUE :
Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
Courts Position:
1. Right to Life
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is
that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. In conformity with the above principle, the
traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described
and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life
begins at fertilization.
To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR
and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary effect
of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the
approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the
 unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section
12 of the Constitution."175 To repeat and emphasize, in all cases,
the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional
protection of life must be upheld
2. Right to Health
the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate
that hormonal contraceptives and intra- uterine devices are safe
and non-abortifacient. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to
determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or
intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient.. There must first
be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies.
There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of
contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective"
without the proper scientific examination..
3. Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether
the use of contraceptives or one's participation in the support of
modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious
standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to one's
dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing
with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law,
custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical
matters which are outside the province of the civil courts.
4. The Family
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2)
(i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by intruding into
marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity
and fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity
and total development.240 The Court agrees. The 1987
Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it
is the basic social institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is
devoted entirely to the family.
5. Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively force
educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even
if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their
students.
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of
Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on
age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only
speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that
will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will
contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their
apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this
particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or
validity.
6. Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from
vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the
Constitution. The arguments fail to persuade. The health care
service providers are not barred from expressing their own personal
opinions regarding the programs and services on reproductive
health, their right must be tempered with the need to provide public
health and safety. The public deserves no less.
7. Equal Protection
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of
due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a
separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty
against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the
basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper
weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor
and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and
desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the
contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce
their number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives,
it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1)
explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population
growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive
health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of
children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon
couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise
that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have
children only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a
deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do
is to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of
government programs to promote basic reproductive health care.
 With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions
from the mandatory reproductive health education program under
Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of
those who are less fortunate attend public educational institutions
does not amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the
assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests
between public educational institutions and private educational
institutions, particularly because there is a need to recognize the
academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with
respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity
towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
8. Involuntary Servitude
A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress263 to
prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades
which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals,
and the public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or
trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it
should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt
from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions
do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona
or otherwise.
9. Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to
the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or
product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL).
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA
does not only have the power but also the competency to evaluate,
register and cover health services and methods. It is the only
government entity empowered to render such services and highly
proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and
methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with what
is ordinarily understood as "health products."
10. Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM.
There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be
construed as making the availability of these services mandatory
for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law
amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government
upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly,
the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
except with respect to the following provisions which are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a)
require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and
hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344,
to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-
parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods
of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s; 2)
Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider
who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and
services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs. 3)
Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as
they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case,
as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health
procedures without the consent of the spouse; 4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the
corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of
parental consent only to elective surgical procedures. 5) Section 23(a)(3) and
the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses
to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same
facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious
beliefs; 6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who
refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that
hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless
of his or her religious beliefs; 7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n
in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service
in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and 8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which
added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as
they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a)
of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19,
2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED,
insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein
declared as constitutional.
Estrada v. Escritor
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to
serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to promote
freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms,
the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious
beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the
establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious
belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words,
the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power
to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious
beliefs and practices.210
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State,
the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has
been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214
where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation,
whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework
underlying the Philippine Constitution."215 In the same case, it was
further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these
governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not
to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow
individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. "The
purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the
exercise of, a person's or institution's religion."216 "What is sought
under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of
unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its
application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the
courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the
compelling state interest test is proper.218 Underlying the compelling
state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right
and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny.219 In
Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these
limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free Exercise Clause,
American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present
danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to
be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case then
pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is
whether it violates the established institutions of society and law. The
Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as
well as the doctrine that a law of general applicability may burden
religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to
accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit
inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano ,
German went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the
"grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The
fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present
danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not
surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and present
danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one form or
another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom
of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German cases set
the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established
institutions of society and law. Gerona, however, which was the
authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which
employed the "grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the
only case that employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as
explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts
of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and
Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and present danger" and "grave and immediate
danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate effects.
The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not congruent
with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar
to Victoriano, the
present case involves purely conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state
interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct
has different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and short-
term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of
the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore
necessary. However, not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right
to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the
hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words
of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an
appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited government is
premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos
implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane society and
establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests
which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate.
Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right
to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling
one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less
powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between the
state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The "compelling
state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time
affording protection to the paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in
Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the
"compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks
to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved.
[Emphases in the original. Underlining supplied.]
COTESCUP vs. Secretary of Education
Before the Court are consolidated petitions under Rule 65,
assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 105332 (K to 12
Law), RA No. 101573 (Kindergarten Education Act), and related
issuances of the Department of Education (DepEd), Commission on
Higher Education (CHED), Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) and Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
(TESDA) implementing the K to 12 Basic Education Program.
History of the Philippines' Basic Education System
1. All schools established under the auspices of the Military
Government were made under the control of the officers of the
Department of Public Instruction6 and as early as this law, the
primary education established through it was considered free.
2. On March 10, 1917, Act No. 270610 was passed mandating the
recognition and inspection of private schools and colleges by the
Secretary of Public Instruction in order to maintain a general
standard of efficiency in all private schools and colleges.
3. On August 7, 1940, CA No. 586, 14 otherwise known as the
Educational Act of 1940, was enacted to comply with the
constitutional mandate on free public primary education. Every
parent or guardian or other person having custody of any child was
required to enroll such child in a public school upon attaining seven
years of age except when: ( 1) the child enrolled in or transferred in
a private school, (2) the distance from the home of the child to the
nearest public school exceeded three kilometers or the said public
school was not safely or conveniently accessible, (3) on account of
indigence, the child could not afford to be in school, ( 4) child could
not be accommodated because of excess enrollment, and (5) child
was being homeschooled, under the conditions prescribed by the
Secretary of Education
4. 1973 Philippine Constitution maintained the State's interest in a free
public elementary education. This concept of free education was,
however, expanded to the secondary level
5. In 2000, at the World Education Forum in Dakar, Senegal, one
hundred sixty four ( 164) governments, including the Philippines,
pledged to achieve, by 2015, the following six (6) Education for All
(EFA) goals: (1) expansion and improvement of early childhood
care and education; (2) universal access to complete free and
compulsory primary education of good quality; (3) equitable access
to appropriate learning and life skills program for youth and adult;
( 4) improvement of levels of adult literacy, especially for women;
( 5) gender parity and equality in education; and ( 6) improvement
of all aspects of the quality of education and ensuring their
excellence.
6. On January 20, 2012, the Philippine Congress took a pivotal step
towards the realization of the country's EFA goals with the
enactment of the Kindergarten Education Act. Section 2 thereof
declared it the policy of the State "to provide equal opportunities for
all children to avail of accessible mandatory and compulsory
kindergarten education that effectively promotes physical, social,
intellectual, emotional and skills stimulation and values formation to
sufficiently prepare them for formal elementary schooling" and "to
make education learner-oriented and responsive to the needs,
cognitive and cultural capacity, the circumstances and diversity of
learners, schools and communities through the appropriate
languages of teaching and learning."
7. Kindergarten Education Act institutionalized kindergarten education,
which is one ( 1) year of preparatory education for children at least
five years old, 53 as part of basic education, and is made mandatory
and compulsory for entrance to Grade 1.54 It also mandated the
use of the learner's mother tongue, or the language first learned by
a child.
8. Before the enactment of the K to 12 Law, the Philippines was the
only country in Asia and among the three remaining countries
(Djibouti and Angola) in the world that had a 10-year basic
education program. The expansion of the basic education
program, however, is an old proposal dating to 1925. The K to 12
Law seeks to achieve, among others, the following objectives: (1)
decongest the curriculum; (2) prepare the students for higher
education; (3) prepare the students for the labor market; and (4)
comply with global standards.
9. One of the salient features of the K to 12 Law is the expansion of
basic education from ten (10) years to thirteen (13) years,
encompassing "at least one ( 1) year of kindergarten education, six
( 6) years of elementary education, and six ( 6) years of secondary
education x x x. Secondary education includes four (4) years of
junior high school and two (2) years of senior high school education.
"
10. On September 4, 2013, the K to 12 implementing rules and
regulation (K to 12 IRR) were issued. 74 Rule VI of the K to 12 IRR
covers the implementation of RA No. 8545 for qualified students
enrolled in senior high school. The programs of assistance are
available primarily to students who complete junior high school in
 public schools and taking into consideration other factors such as
income background and financial needs of the students.75 The
forms of assistance that the DepEd may provide include a voucher
system, "where government issues a coupon directly to students to
enable them to enroll in eligible private education institutions or non-
DepEd public schools of their choice under a full or partial tuition or
schooling subsidy”.
11. In compliance with the foregoing mandate, DOLE organized three
area- wide tripartite education fora on K to 12 in Luzon, Visayas and
Mindanao. As a result of the tripartite consultations, DOLE, DepEd,
TESDA and CHED issued on May 30, 2014 the Joint Guidelines on
the Implementation of the Labor and Management Component of
Republic Act No. 10533 (Joint Guidelines). The Joint Guidelines
was issued to (a) ensure the sustainability of private and public
educational institutions; ( b) protect the rights, interests, and welfare
of teaching and non-teaching personnel; and ( c) optimize
employment retention or prevent, to the extent possible,
displacement of faculty and non-academic personnel in private and
public HEis during the transition from the existing 10 years basic
education cycle to the enhanced K to 12 basic education.
12. Accordingly, to accommodate the changes brought about by the K
to 12 Law, and after several public consultations with stakeholders
were held,83 CMO No. 20, entitled General Education Curriculum:
Holistic Understandings, Intellectual and Civic Competencies was
issued on June 28, 2013. CMO No. 20 provides the framework and
rationale of the revised General Education (GE) curriculum. It sets
the minimum standards for the GE component of all degree
programs that applies to private and public HEIs in the country.
13. Claiming that the K to 12 Basic Education Program violates various
constitutional provisions, the following petitions were filed before
the Court praying that the Kindergarten Education Act, K to 12 Law,
K to 12 IRR, DO No. 31, Joint Guidelines, and CMO No. 20, be
declared unconstitutional
14. The present consolidated petitions pray for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against the implementation of the K to 12 Law and other
administrative issuances in relation thereto. The Solicitor General,
on behalf of the public respondents, opposed these petitions. Court
issued a TRO in G.R. No. 217451, enjoining the implementation
ofCMO No. 20 insofar only as it excluded from the curriculum for
college the course Filipino and Panitikan as core courses.
ISSUES:
A. Procedural:
1. Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy;
- Yes. These consolidated cases present an actual case or
controversy that is ripe for adjudication. The assailed laws and
executive issuances have already taken effect and petitioners
herein, who are faculty members, students and parents, are
individuals directly and considerably affected by their
implementation.
As to Legal Standing, Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 216930 and
218465 include organizations/federations duly organized under the
laws of the Philippines, representing the interest of the faculty and
staff of their respective colleges and universities, who allegedly are
threatened to be demoted or removed from employment with the
implementation of the K to 12 Law. Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 217752
and 218045 are suing as citizens, taxpayers and in their personal
capacities as parents whose children would be directly affected by
the law in question. Petitioners in G .R. Nos. 218123 and 217 451
are suing in their capacities as teachers who allegedly are or will be
negatively affected by the implementation of the K to 12 Law and
CMO No. 20, respectively, through job displacement and diminution
of benefits; and as taxpayers who have the right to challenge the K
to 12 Law and CMO No. 20 as public funds are spent and will be
spent for its implementation.
Under the circumstances alleged in their respective petitions,
the Court finds that petitioners have sufficient legal interest in the
outcome of the controversy. And, considering that the instant cases
involve issues on education, which under the Constitution the State
is mandated to promote and protect, the stringent requirement of
direct and substantial interest may be dispensed with, and the mere
fact that petitioners are concerned citizens asserting a public right,
sufficiently clothes them with legal standing to initiate the instant
petition.
2. Whether certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are proper remedies
to assail the laws and issuances.
Under the Court's expanded jurisdiction, the writs of certiorari and
prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues
and to review and/or prohibit or nullify, on the ground of grave abuse
of discretion, any act of any branch or instrumentality of the
 government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions.
B. Substantive:
1. Whether the K to 12 Law was duly enacted;
K to 12 Law was duly enacted.
Petitioners question the validity of the enactment of the K to 12
Law claiming that: (1) sectors which would be directly affected by the K
to 12 Basic Education Program were deprived of their right, under
Section 16, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, to be consulted or
participate in matters which involved their interest prior to the passage
of the law; 125 (2) the enrolled bill which the President signed into law
varies significantly from the reconciled version of the bill as approved
by Congress and reported in the Senate Journal on January 30, 2013,
126 and that the Court, pursuant to its ruling in Astorga v. Villegas, 127
(Astorga) should look into the entries in the Journal to determine
whether the K to 12 Law was duly enacted; 128 and (3) the K to 12 Law
was incomplete because it failed to provide sufficient standards by
which the DepEd, CHED and TESDA.
The Court holds that, contrary to petitioners' contention, the K
to 12 Law was validly enacted.
First, petitioners' claim of lack of prior consultations is belied by the
nationwide regional consultations conducted by DepEd pursuant
DepEd Memorandum Nos. 38133 and 98, 134 series of2011. The
regional consultations, which aimed "to inform the public [and] to elicit
their opinions, thoughts, and suggestions about the K to 12
program,"135 ran from February to March 2011 and were participated
in by students, parents, teachers and administrators, government
representatives, and representatives from private schools and private
sectors. 136
The Philippine Congress, in the course of drafting the K to 12
Law, also conducted regional public hearings between March 2011 to
February 2012, wherein representatives from parents-teachers'
organizations, business, public/private school heads, civil society
groups/non-government organizations/private organizations and local
government officials and staffs were among the participants.137 And
even assuming that no consultations had been made prior to the
adoption of the K to 12, it has been held that the "[p ]enalty for failure
on the part of the government to consult could only be reflected in the
ballot box and would not nullify government action.
Second, the enrolled bill doctrine applies in this case. Under the
"enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House
and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both
Houses of Congress that it was passed is conclusive not only as to its
provisions but also as to its due enactment.1
3. Whether the K to 12 Law constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power;
There is no undue delegation of legislative power in the enactment
of the K to 12 Law.
In determining whether or not a statute constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests: the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test,
the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves
the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he
will have to do is to enforce it.148 The policy to be executed, carried
out or implemented by the delegate must be set forth therein. 149 The
sufficient standard test, on the other hand, mandates adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the
delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be
sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate's
authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions
under which it is to be implemented.150
The K to 12 Law adequately provides the legislative policy that it
seeks to implement.
4. Whether DO No. 31 is valid and enforceable;
DO No. 31 is valid and en/ orceahle
Petitioners also claim that DO No. 31 is a usurpation of
legislative authority as it creates a law without delegation of power.154
According to petitioners, DO No. 31, which changed the curriculum and
added two (2) more years to basic education, has no statutory basis. It
also violates the constitutional right of parents to participate in planning
programs that affect them and the right to information on matters of
public concem.155 Petitioners further contend that since DO No. 31
imposes additional obligations to parents and children, public
consultations should have been conducted prior to its adoption and that
the assailed DO should have been published and registered first with
the Office of the National Administrative Register before it can take
effect.156
Again, petitioners' arguments lack factual and legal bases. DO
No. 31 did not add two (2) years to basic education nor did it impose
additional obligations to parents and children. DO No. 31 is an
administrative regulation addressed to DepEd personnel providing for
general guidelines on the implementation of a new curriculum for
Grades 1 to 10 in preparation for the K to 12 basic education. DO No.
31 was issued in accordance with the DepEd' s mandate to establish
and maintain a complete, adequate and integrated system of education
relevant to the goals of national development, 157 formulate, plan,
implement, and coordinate and ensure access to, promote equity in,
and improve the quality of basic education; 158 and pursuant to the
Secretary's authority to formulate and promulgate national educational
policies, 159 under existing laws.
There is also no merit in petitioners' claim that publication is
necessary for DO No. 31 to be effective. Interpretative regulations and
those merely internal in nature, including the rules and guidelines to be
followed by subordinates in the performance of their duties are not
required to be published.162 At any rate, the Court notes that DO No.
31 was already forwarded to the University of the Philippines Law
Center for filing in accordance with Sections 3 and 4 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 and took effect pursuant to said provisions.
4. Whether the K to 12 Law, K to 12 IRR, DO No. 31 and/or the Joint
Guidelines contravene provisions of the Philippine Constitution on: p.56
5. Whether CMO No. 20 contravenes provisions of the Philippine
Constitution on: …… page 75
CMO No. 20 is constitutional. page 75
6. Whether CMO No. 20 violates the following laws:
CMO No. 20 does not contravene any other laws page 77
7. Whether the K to 12 Law violates petitioners' right to substantive
due process and equal protection of the laws.
The K to 12 Law does not violate substantive due process
and equal protection of the laws.
There is no conflict between the K to 12 Law and right of due
process of the students.
Here, the K to 12 Law does not offend the substantive due
process of petitioners. The assailed law’s declaration of policy itself
reveals that, contrary to the claims of petitioners, the objectives of
the law serve the interest of the public and not only of a particular
class:RA No. I 0533, Sec. 2 All students are intended to benefit from
the law.
contrary to the claims of petitioners, the assailed law caters to the
interest of the public in general, as opposed to only a particular
group of people.
Furthermore, the means employed by the assailed law are
commensurate with its objectives. Again, the restructuring of the
curriculum with the corresponding additional years in senior high
school were meant to improve the quality of basic education and to
make the country’s graduates more competitive in the international
arena.
The students of Manila Science High School (MSHS), petitioners in
G.R. No. 218465, aver, in particular, that the decongestion of the
originally existing basic education curriculum and the lengthening of
the basic education cycle do not, and should not, be made to apply
to them as their curriculum is supposedly congested on purpose.
what these petitioners are saying is that the K to 12 Law did not
make a substantial distinction between MSHS students and the rest
of the high school students in the country when it, in fact, should
have done so.
Those adversely affected may invoke the equal protection clause
only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from
being inspired by the attainment of the common goal, was prompted
by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds
no support in reason. Bautista v. Juinio, 212 Phil. 307, 317 (1984).
This, petitioners’ failed to sufficiently show. For this reason, the
Court holds that the K to 12 Law did not violate petitioners’ right to
due process nor did it violate the equal protection clause.
To emphasize, valid classifications require real and substantial
differences to justify the variance of treatment between the classes.
The MSHS students did not offer any substantial basis for the Court
to create a valid classification between them and the rest of the high
school students in the Philippines. Otherwise stated, the equal
protection clause would, in fact, be violated if the assailed law
treated the MSHS students differently from the rest of the high
school students in the country.
To be clear, the Court is not saying that petitioners are not gifted,
contrary to their claims. The Court is merely saying that the K to 12
Law was not infirm in treating all high school students equally. The
MSHS students are, after all, high school students just like all the
other students who are, and will be, subjected to the revised
curriculum.
Section 2, Article XIV of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is a non-
self-executing provision of the Constitution.
The restrictions expressed in Section 4(2), Article XIV only refer to
ownership, control, and administration of individual schools, and
these do not apply to the State’s exercise of reasonable supervision
and regulation of educational institutions under Section 4(1 ), Article
XIV.
Accordingly, the Court declares Republic Act No. 10533, Republic
Act No. 10157, CHED Memorandum Order No. 20, Series of 2013,
Department of Education Order No. 31, Series of 2012, and Joint
Guidelines on the Implementation of the Labor and Management
Component of Republic Act No. 10533, as CONSTITUTIONAL

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby DENIED.

Accordingly, the Court declares Republic Act No. 10533, Republic
Act No. 10157, CHED Memorandum Order No. 20, Series of 2013,
Department of Education Order No. 31, Series of 2012, and Joint
Guidelines on the Implementation of the Labor and Management
Component of Republic Act No. 10533, as CONSTITUTIONAL. The
Temporary Restraining Order dated April 21, 2015 issued in G.R.
No. 217451 is hereby LIFTED