Almeda v.
Heirs of Almeda presumption of regularity, and petitioners failed to overcome this presumption by clear and
Facts:
Spouses Venancio Almeda (Venancio) and Leonila Laurel-Almeda (Leonila) were the parents of
nine children, including Ponciano L. Almeda (Ponciano).
On May 19, 1976, a Power of Attorney 6 was executed by Venancio and Leonila, who were
then 80 and 81 years old respectively, 7 granting Ponciano, among others, the authority to sell
the parcels of land, which Leonila inherited 8 from her parents.
Venancio died at the age of 90 on February 27, 1985; Leonila died eight years later on April 3,
1993, aged 97. 11 Within the year of Leonila's death on April 17, 1993, 12 Rafael, Emerlina,
Alodia, Leticia and Norma 􏰀led a notice of adverse claim
A Complaint for Nullity of Contracts, Partition of Properties and Reconveyance of Titles with
Damages, 14 docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1643, was 􏰀led before the RTC of Tagaytay City by
the petitioners against Ponciano and his wife Eufemia Perez Almeda (Eufemia).
Petitioners alleged that the parties were the only heirs of the late spouses Venancio and
Leonila who died without leaving any will and without any legal obligation.
Petitioners claimed that Ponciano, taking advantage of his being the eldest child and his close
relationship with their parents, caused the simulation and forgery
According to petitioners, their parents did not sign the October 3, 1978 Deed of Absolute Sale
(1978 Deed) in favor of Ponciano and their signatures may have been forged.
They also averred that their parents did not receive due consideration for the transaction, and
if Ponciano succeeded in making them sign said 1978 Deed, they did so without knowledge of
its import.
They also averred that their parents did not receive due consideration for the transaction, and
if Ponciano succeeded in making them sign said 1978 Deed, they did so without knowledge of
its import.
When petitioners could no longer wait, they filed their notice of adverse claim with the
Register of Deeds
In their Answer, 27 Ponciano and his wife, Eufemia, denied that the 1978 Deed was simulated
or forged, asserting its genuineness and execution for valuable consideration from which some
of the petitioners, including Rafael, received substantial pecuniary benefits.
Ponciano died on October 16, 1997 and was substituted by his wife and children.
RTC: The RTC held that the questioned documents(Agreement to Sell & Deed of Sale), having
been notarized and executed in the presence of two instrumental witnesses, enjoy the
convincing evidence.
CA: The CA held that petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proving the purported
forgery with clear and convincing evidence. The CA stressed that such evidence was especially
needed in this case given that the assailed documents, being notarized, enjoy the presumption
of regularity and of due execution and authenticity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the notarized documents can be given presumption of regularity
HELD: YES. notarized Deed of Absolute Sale has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and
it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. 49 It is
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity and is entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face.
BURDEN OF PROOF: Absent evidence of falsity so clear, strong and convincing, and not merely
preponderant, the presumption of regularity must be upheld. 52 The burden of proof to
overcome the presumption of due execution of a notarial document lies on the party
contesting the same.
The party claiming absence of capacity to contract has the burden of proof and discharging this
burden requires that clear and convincing evidence be adduced. Petitioners have not
satisfactorily shown that their parents' mental faculties were impaired as to deprive them of
reason or hinder them from freely exercising their own will or from comprehending the
provisions of the sale in favor of Ponciano.
Payment is not merely presumed from the fact that the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated
April 28, 1989 has gone through the regular procedure as evidenced by the transfer
certi􏰀􏰀cates of title issued in petitioners' names by the Register of Deeds. In other words,
whosoever alleges the fraud or invalidity of a notarized document has the burden of proving
the same by evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant.
it is a basic rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a
preponderance of evidence. The parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence and
not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent. This rule holds true especially
when the latter has had no opportunity to present evidence because of a default order.
Needless to say, the extent of the relief that may be granted can only be so much as has been
alleged and proved with preponderant evidence required under Section 1 of Rule 133.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 25, 2010 and Resolution dated
October 13, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86953 are AFFIRMED.
People v. Rodriguez
Facts:
1

Rodriguez was charged with the crime of qualified trafficking. The evidence for the prosecution
is anchored solely on the testimony of Police Officer 1 Raymond Escober (PO1 Escober), on the
joint sworn affidavit of the arresting officers dated 9 August 2006, and on a photocopy of the
pre-marked P500.00 bill.
According to his testimony, at around 11:00 P.M. on 8 August 2006, PO1 Escober was at the
police station preparing for the police operation called Oplan Bugaw for the purpose of
eliminating prostitution on Quezon Avenue in Quezon City. 6 PO1 Escober, designated to pose
as customer, was accompanied by PO2 Reynaldo Bereber (PO2 Bereber) as his backup, and
Police Inspector Pruli James D. Lopez (P/Insp. Lopez).
PO1 Escober was 􏰀agged down by Rodriguez who allegedly offered the sexual services of three
(3) pickup girls. 8 PO1 Escober readily gave Rodriguez the pre-marked P500.00 bill as
payment.9 This signaled his backup to enter the scene and aid in the arrest.
RTC: RTC found Rodriguez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large-scale trafficking.
On appeal, Rodriguez anchored his defense on the failure of the prosecution to present any
evidence that would establish that he recruited, transported, or transferred the alleged three
(3) women for the purpose of prostitution. These women, in fact, were not presented in court
and neither did they execute any sworn statement.
Rodriguez also faulted the prosecution for not presenting the original marked money despite
the fact that it was in P/Insp. Lopez's possession. In addition, the prosecution did not present
any evidence of the alleged request from the barangay officials to get rid of prostitutes in the
area.
CA: Unmoved, the CA a􏰀rmed the trial court's decision and gave great weight to its factual
findings.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence against the accused was enough for his conviction
HELD: NO. A careful review of the records shows that the prosecution failed to prove the
presence of these elements beyond reasonable doubt, nor did we 􏰀nd the second and third
elements proven by the prosecution.
A review of emerging jurisprudence on human tra􏰀cking readily shows that a successful
prosecution, to a certain extent, relies greatly on entrapment operations. 31 Thus, just like in
any operation that involves capturing the perpetrator in 􏰀agrante delicto, the testimonies of
the apprehending o􏰀cers on what transpired are crucial for a conviction.
Apart from the de􏰀cient testimony of PO1 Escober, the prosecution did not bother to present
the testimonies of the alleged victims. It is grossly erroneous to say that "the non-presentation
of the three women is not fatal to the prosecution." Their testimonies that they were sexually
exploited against their will through force, threat or other means of coercion are material to
the cause of the prosecution.
These women would be in the best position to say that Rodriguez had recruited or used these
women by giving them payments or bene􏰀ts in exchange for sexual exploitation. To rely solely
on the testimony of PO1 Escober as basis for convicting Rodriguez would run riot against logic
and reason, and against the law. To sustain this whimsical reasoning would encourage anyone
to accuse a person of "tra􏰀cking in persons" or of any other crime, without presenting the
material testimony of the alleged victim.
Given that PO1 Escober's testimony is missing on material details, the prosecution should have
presented in court at least one of the three (3) women that indeed they were sexually exploited
or recruited by the accused for prostitution as alleged in the information.
All said, absent any direct or circumstantial evidence to prove with moral certainty that
Rodriguez had offered three (3) women to PO1 Escober, his appeal warrants an acquittal. The
gravamen of the crime of human tra􏰀cking is not so much the offer of a woman or child; it is
the act of recruiting or using, with or without consent, a fellow human being for sexual
exploitation. In this case, the prosecution miserably failed to prove this.
EQUIPOISE RULE: Where there is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, he must be
acquitted even though his innocence may be doubted since the constitutional right to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty can only be overthrown by proof beyond reasonable
doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The 5 December 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05335 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, WILLINGTON RODRIGUEZ y
HERMOSA is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged. His IMMEDIATE RELEASE from
detention is hereby ORDERED, unless he is being held for another lawful cause.
B. Admissibility
Mancol v. DBP
Facts:
Respondent Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), scheduled an Invitation to Bid for
Negotiated Sale on October 13, 2004 at the Mezzanine Floor, over a residential lot with a two-
storey building
In line with this, Fernando Mancol, Jr. (petitioner) executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
10 appointing his father, Fernando Mancol, Sr. (Mancol, Sr.), to represent and negotiate, on
his behalf, the sale of the subject property
During the negotiations, DBP o􏰀cials allegedly agreed, albeit verbally, to: (1) arrange and effect
the transfer of title of the lot in petitioner's name, including the payment of capital gains tax
(CGT); and (2) to get rid of the occupants of the subject property.
2
Petitioner paid the balance in the amount of P1,060,800, as evidenced by O.R. No. 3440451 15
dated December 10, 2004. Thereafter, DBP, through its Branch Manager Jorge B. Albarillo,
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, 16 in petitioner's favor.
Sometime in 2006, DBP reneged on its undertaking based on the oral agreement. DBP returned
to the petitioner all the pertinent documents of the sale and issued a Manager's Check (MC)
No. 0000956475 18 in the amount of P99,450
BP, through its Letter 21 dated April 22, 2006, disregarded the subsequent oral agreement and
reminded petitioner that DBP has no obligation to eject the occupants and to cause the
transfer of title of the lot in petitioner's name.
On August 24, 2006, petitioner 􏰀led a Complaint 26 for damages for breach of contract against
DBP before the RTC of Calbayog City, Branch 31. He prayed that DBP be found to have breached
its obligation with petitioner
In its Answer with Counter-Claim, 27 DBP alleged that the terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale
stated no condition that DBP will work on the document of transfer and to eject the occupants
thereon. 28 Assuming that DBP's o􏰀cials made such a promise, DBP alleged that the same
would not be possible since the petitioner did not give any money to DBP for other expenses
in going to and from Calbayog City.
RTC: On April 14, 2008, the RTC Decision 39 ruled in favor of the petitioner, and ordered DBP
to return to petitioner the amount of P99,450 deposited to it for payment of the CGT and DST;
Mancol, Sr. testi􏰀ed 34 that he signed the Negotiated Offer to Purchase and Negotiated Sale
Rules and Procedures/Disposition of Assets on a First-Come First Served Basis on behalf of his
son, by virtue of the SPA. 35 He stated that after the execution and delivery of the Deed of
Absolute Sale, DBP verbally agreed to facilitate the transfer of the title, the payment of the
CGT, and to cause the vacation of the occupants of the house and lot. Although he admitted
that the verbal agreement contradicted the negotiated rules and agreement.
Thereafter, DBP moved for the reconsideration 41 of the RTC's Decision. DBP alleged, among
others, that the testimonies of Villanueva and Mancol, Sr. were hearsay because their
statements were based on facts relayed to them by other people and not based on their
personal knowledge.
On June 13, 2008, the RTC Order 42 granted DBP's motion and dismissed petitioner's
complaint.
ADMISSABILITY: For the 􏰀rst time, petitioner alleged that through his father, Mancol, Sr., he
entered into a contemporaneous verbal agreement with DBP. He argued that since his father
was his attorney-in-fact, then his father had personal knowledge of all transactions involving
the sale of the subject property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies of Villanueva and Mancol Sr. are based on personal
knowledge and not hearsay evidence
HELD: NO. Villanueva's testimony falls within the category of hearsay evidence. Contrary to
petitioner's claim, Villanueva had no personal inkling as to the contemporaneous verbal
agreement between petitioner and DBP. In fact, there was no such verbal agreement. As
admitted by the petitioner, the alleged verbal agreement was entered into between DBP and
Mancol, Sr., by virtue of the SPA. Villanueva has no personal knowledge of such fact.
The same conclusion can be drawn from Mancol, Sr.'s testimony. Although the records show
that by virtue of an SPA executed by the petitioner, Mancol, Sr. signed the Negotiated Offer to
Purchase, including the Negotiated Sale Rules and Procedures/Disposition of Assets on a First-
Come First Served Basis, and that he made the initial payment for the sale, there is dearth of
evidence to prove that indeed, he personally entered into a verbal agreement with DBP. Upon
being asked what transpired after the delivery of the Deed of Absolute Sale, Mancol, Sr. simply
answered that DBP agreed to undertake the transfer of title of the lot, and to oust the
occupants.
There was no mention as to who actually and personally appeared before DBP or any of its
officials in order to forge the alleged verbal agreement.
ADMISSABILITY: The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while
the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and
persuade."
The admissibility of a particular item of evidence has to do with whether it meets various tests
by which its reliability is to be determined, so as to be considered with other evidence admitted
in the case in arriving at a decision as to the truth.
Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered
at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves
an issue."
"Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on
judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence."
HEARSAY: It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts that he knows
of his own personal knowledge, i.e., those which are derived from his own perception. 66 A
witness may not testify on what he merely learned, read or heard from others because such
testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has
learned, read or heard
Assuming for argument's sake that Mancol, Sr., on behalf of petitioner, entered into a verbal
agreement with DBP, such agreement would remain unenforceable. Despite petitioner's
insistence, the act of entering into a verbal agreement was not stipulated in the SPA. The
authority given to Mancol, Sr. was limited to representing and negotiating, on petitioner's
behalf.
There is nothing in the language of the SPA from which We could deduce the intention of
petitioner to authorize Mancol, Sr. to enter into a verbal agreement with DBP. Indeed, it has
been held that "[w]here powers and duties are speci􏰀ed and de􏰀ned in an instrument, all such
3
powers and duties are limited and are con􏰀ned to those which are speci􏰀ed and de􏰀ned, and
all other powers and duties are excluded."
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 22, 2012 and Resolution
dated September 27, 2012 of the Court of Appeals, Visayas Station in CA- G.R. CEB-CV No.
03030 are AFFIRMED.
OCA v. Judge Lerma
Facts:
Five (5) administrative cases were filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) against
Judge Alberto L. Lerma (respondent judge) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 256,
Muntinlupa City, for violating Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars, for making
untruthful statements in his certi􏰀cates of service, for gross ignorance of the law and/or gross
negligence, for delay in rendering an order, for abusing judicial authority and discretion, and
for serious irregularity.
HELD: YES. The Court agrees with the OCA that the respondent judge is guilty of abuse of
judicial discretion and authority.
Section 4, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides that "evidence must have such a relation to
the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence." "Relevancy is, therefore,
determinable by the rules of logic and human experience . . . Relevant evidence is any class of
evidence which has 'rational probative value' to the issue in controversy."
Logic and human experience teach us that the documents relied upon by respondent do not
constitute the best evidence to prove the existence or non-existence of the condominium
units. To repeat, the best evidence would have been adduced by an ocular inspection of the
units themselves.
Judge Lerma should also have exercised caution in determining the existence of probable
cause. At the very least, he should have asked the prosecutor to present additional evidence,
in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or, in the
alternative, to show cause why the case should not be dismissed instead of precipitately
ordering the dismissal of the case. The circumstances required the exercise of caution
considering that the case involved estafa in the considerable amount of P20 Million for which
the complainant paid P129,970.00 in docket fees before the O􏰀ce of the City Prosecutor and
later P167,114.60 as docket fee for the filing of the Information before the RTC.
Respondent judge failed to live up to the judiciary's exacting standards, and this Court will
not withhold penalty when called for to uphold the people's faith in the Judiciary.
People v. Fatallo
Facts:
Fatallo was charged for violation of Sections 5 and 15, Article II of R.A. 9165.
On March 1, 2004, at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, the team conducted a buy-bust
operation on [Fatallo] at Jean's Store located at T. Calo, Butuan City. Eyewitness SPO[1] Delos
Santos testi􏰀ed that as soon as the poseur-buyer arrived at the store of [Fatallo], the latter
immediately came out from the store and the two had a conversation. Not long after, [Fatallo]
handed something to the poseur-buyer x x x and the latter, in return, got something from his
pocket and handed the same to [Fatallo].
Defense Version: When [Fatallo] opened the door, he saw two (2) persons pointing their guns
at him. Thereafter, the two (2) persons ordered [Fatallo] to lie down, facing towards the 􏰀oor.
Afterwards, without the presence of any barangay o􏰀cial and without showing any piece of
paper or any sort of authority, the operatives frisked x x x him and searched his room for about
thirty (30) minutes. The police o􏰀cers found nothing from [Fatallo]. However, on top of the bed
of [Fatallo], the police o􏰀cers con􏰀scated his wallet containing P4,500.00 to make it as
evidence.
RTC: The RTC found that the prosecution, by testimonial and documentary evidence,
successfully proved the elements of the offenses and established the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
CA: The CA sustained Fatallo's conviction and held that the prosecution su􏰀ciently discharged
its burden of establishing the elements of the crimes charged 14 and proving Fatallo's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. 15 The CA held that the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer as a
witness is not fatal to the prosecution's case since the police o􏰀cers were able to testify
positively and categorically that the sale of illegal drugs actually took place
Issue: Whether or not the prosecution complied with the mandatory requirements of Sec. 21
to successfully convict
Fatallo was charged with the crimes of illegal sale and illegal use of dangerous drugs, de􏰀ned
and penalized under Sections 5 and 15, Article II of R.A. 9165, respectively. To sustain a
conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove the following
elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
In cases involving dangerous drugs, the con􏰀scated drug constitutes the very corpus delicti of
the offense19 and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction. 20 It is
essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs be established with
moral certainty.
In the present case, none of the three (3) required witnesses was present at the time of seizure
and con􏰀scation and even during the conduct of the inventory. Based on the narrations of
SPO1 Delos Santos 29 and PO2 Coquilla, 30 not one of the required witnesses was present at
the time the plastic sachets were allegedly seized from Fatallo or during the inventory of the
recovered drugs at the police station.
4
It bears emphasis that the presence of the required witnesses at the time of the apprehension
and inventory is mandatory, and that the law imposes the said requirement because their
presence serves an essential purpose.
EXCLUSIONARY PRINCIPLE: Fatallo was subjected to a drug test as a result of his apprehension
which, as already explained, was conducted in violation of Section 21, R.A. 9165. Section 21,
R.A. 9165 is a statutory exclusionary rule of evidence, bearing in mind that, under the Rules of
Court, "evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law
or these rules.
The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be
used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all
evidence subsequently obtained.
Applied in the present case, since the apprehension of Fatallo by the police o􏰀cers was illegal
for non-compliance with the procedure provided by Section 21, R.A. 9165, it therefore follows
that the drug test conducted on him was likewise illegal for it is an indirect result of his arrest.
Otherwise stated, if the Fatallo was not arrested in the 􏰀rst place, he would not have been
subjected to a drug test because Section 38 refers to "any person apprehended or arrested for
violating the provisions of this Act." 60
As the Fatallo was not proved to have violated any of the provisions of R.A. 9165, then the drug
test conducted on him has no leg to stand on. Fatallo's acquittal for the charge of violating
Section 15, R.A. 9165 must necessarily follow.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated
April 30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals, Twenty-Third Division, Cagayan de Oro City, in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 01034-MIN is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-
appellant Alvin Fatallo y Alecarte a.k.a. Alvin Patallo y Alecarte is ACQUITTED of the crimes
charged on the ground of reasonable doubt, and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from
detention unless he is being lawfully held for another cause. Let an entry of final judgment
be issued immediately.
Padayhag v. Director of Lands
Facts:
This case involves six (6) parcels of land identi􏰀ed as Lot Nos. 2883, 2888, 2921, 2922, 2102,
and 2104. These lots are claimed by two (2) parties, namely: the Heirs of Lourdes Padayhag,
and Southern Mindanao Colleges (SMC).
The Director of Lands, acting for and in behalf of the Government, instituted with the then
Court of First instance of Zamboanga del Sur (now RTC of Pagadian City) Cadastral Case No. N-
17, GLRO CAD Rec. No. N-468 pursuant to the government's initiative to place all lands under
the Cadastral System.
The Heirs of Lourdes Padayhag [Padayhags] claim that the Spouses Federico and Lourdes
Padayhag are the original owners of [the Lumbia] Lots [(Lot Nos. 2883, 2888, 2921, and 2922)].
These lots are part of the 5-hectare landholding of their father, Federico Padayhag.
On August 31, 1948, Spouses Federico and Lourdes Padayhag and Southern Mindanao Institute
([SMI,] now Southern Mindanao Colleges) entered into an Agreement Referring to Real
Property conveying the possession of these lots to SMI in consideration of 30 shares of stock
of SMI.
When x x x [SMC] succeeded x x x SMI, x x x Lourdes Padayhag wanted to return the shares of
stock issued to them so that the Padayhags could get back the land subject of the contract.
As for [the Sta. Lucia Lots (Lot Nos. 2102 and 2104)], the Padayhags [claim] that since 1927
they occupied 300 square meters of Lot [No.] 2102 and 412 square meters of Lot [No.] 2104.
However, when a cadastral survey was made on [L]ot [N]os. 2102 and 2104, they were not able
to object as they were not informed of such survey. They protested with the Bureau of Lands
asserting that there was error in the survey of the boundaries.
On the other hand, x x x SMC argued that it bought [L]ot [N]o. 2102 from Mangacop Ampato
evidenced by a Deed of Conveyance of Real Estate executed on January 22, 1960; and [L]ot
[N]o. 2104 from Adriano Arang evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on January 31,
1964.
On May 30, 2006, the RTC, sitting as Land Registration Court, rendered a Decision in favor of
SMC
On July 19, 2006, the Padayhags 􏰀led a motion for reconsideration which was granted in a
Resolution 11 dated December 27, 2007, the dispositive portion of which is quoted [below:]
12
"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered granting the Motion for
Reconsideration of the [c]laimant Heirs of Lourdes Padayhag
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, SMC appealed to the CA. The CA dismissed the appeal for lack
of merit and ruled that:
In the present case, there being no indication at all from the records that notice of the Order
for Initial Hearing was published in the O􏰀cial Gazette and in a newspaper of general
circulation, the decision rendered by the RTC of Pagadian City is void ab initio for having been
rendered without jurisdiction.
Public respondent Director of Lands, through the O􏰀ce of the Solicitor General (OSG), 􏰀led a
Comment 22 dated April 15, 2013. The OSG argued that the CA did not err in setting aside the
May 30, 2006 Decision and December 27, 2007 Resolution of the RTC for having been rendered
without jurisdiction and pointed to the lack of publication in the O􏰀cial Gazette of the notice
of the initial hearing as required by Act No. (Act) 2259, the Cadastral Act.
5
The OSG cited as additional ground the deprivation of the State of its day in court because the
OSG was allegedly not furnished with copies of the court orders, notices and decisions in the WHEREFORE, the Petition in G.R. No. 202872 is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals
cadastral case. Decision dated July 31, 2012 and, consequently, Resolution dated January 10, 2013 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 01642 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The consolidated cases are
The Padayhags 􏰀led a Reply 25 dated May 16, 2013. They argued that the requirement of REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for the resolution of the appeals on the merits.
publication of the notice of initial hearing was complied with. They mentioned that they have
attached the certi􏰀ed copies of the pertinent pages of the Official Gazette in their previous
submissions 26 with the Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lack of publication in a newspaper of general circulation justified
the dismissal of the RTC ruling favoring the Padayhags

HELD: NO. Given that the initial hearing based on the published notice was scheduled on
January 16, 1967, the applicable laws were Act 496 and Act 2259 which required only the
notice of initial hearing to bepublished twice, in successive issues of the O􏰀􏰀cial Gazette . Thus,
it was erroneous for the CA to have required an additional publication of the said notice in a
newspaper of general circulation. Such requirement was imposed only with the passage of PD
1529.

JUDICIAL NOTICE: Given that the O􏰀cial Gazette is the o􏰀cial publication of the government,
the Court can take judicial notice thereof pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 129, Rules of Court,
which provides:

SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice of matters which
are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be
known to judges because of their judicial functions.

Thus, the Court takes judicial notice of the publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing for
Cadastral Case No. N-17, LRC Cadastral Record No. N-468 in the issues of the O􏰀cial Gazette
on October 24 and 31, 1966, Volume 62, Number 43, pages 8044 to 8047, and Number 44,
pages 8312 to 8315.

Evidently, the herein cadastral proceedings were supposed to have been instituted by the then
Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General. For the OSG to now deny that it had no
involvement in or that it had not been noti􏰀ed of the proceedings is not in keeping with the
nature of cadastral proceedings.

The Court is not prepared to nullify the cadastral proceedings involving the then municipality
of Pagadian without due process being accorded to all the claimants involved therein and
without the OSG going thoroughly over the records of the entire cadastral proceedings to
verify whether it participated therein.

It must be noted that in these petitions, the RTC Decision was 􏰀nally rendered on May 30, 2006
after 40 years from June 2, 1966, the date of the Notice of Initial Hearing. To summarily nullify
the cadastral proceedings at this juncture would be unjust. Su􏰀ce it say that for purposes of
these cases, the Court is relying on the presumption that o􏰀cial duty has been regularly
performed pursuant to Section 3 (m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.

6

Ocampo v. People
Facts:
On 01 June 2001, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of homicide under Article 249
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The accused, with intent to kill, did [then] and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack,
assault and use personal violence upon one MARIO DE LUNA y HALLARE, by then and there
firing his service firearm, .9 mm Barreta Pistol with Serial No. M19498Z, hitting the said Mario
De Luna y Hallare on the chest and other parts of the body thereby inflicting upon him gunshot
wounds which were necessarily fatal
For his part, accused-appellant admitted to having shot the victim to death, but claimed to
have done so in self-defense.6 In support of this claim, defense witness Marita averred that the
shooting incident was precipitated by the victim's unprovoked knife attack upon accused-
appellant. The latter was allegedly left with no other recourse but to use his service firearm to
neutralize the aggressor
Appellant (accused-appellant) had just arrived from his duty as police officer at the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Unit of the Western Police District and was changing into civilian
clothes when Marita came and apprised him of the situation.
Together with Marita, he proceeded to the site of the drinking spree. Noticing the group was
becoming rowdy, appellant (accused-appellant) approached Mario and asked if the latter knew
him. When Mario replied yes, appellant (accused-appellant) went on to tell the group to put
an end to their drinking session. Mario and Jaime immediately left the scene while the others
voluntarilydispersed.
Minutes later, Mario and Jaime went back to the locus. While standing beside appellant
(accused-appellant), Marita heard Mario shout towards their direction the words: "Walang
pulis-pulis sa akin!" Appellant (accused-appellant) likewise heard Mario's utterances: "Walang
pulis-pulis sa amin! Anong akala mo sa amin, basta-basta mo na lang pauuwiin." Mario then
pulled out a knife and lunged at appellant (accused-appellant) who evaded the first thrust.
Mario tried to stab appellant (accused-appellant) a second time but the latter dodged the
knife, drew his pistol and fired two successive shots at Mario.
RTC: The RTC convicted accused-appellant of homicide.
CA: The CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant, but modified some of the monetary
damages awarded. It affirmed the P50,000 civil indemnity in favor of the victim's heirs. 11 But
instead of the actual damages in the total amount of P2,877 (P2,577 for hospital expense plus
P300 for funeral expenses), temperate damages of P25,000 were awarded in their favor.
Issue: Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove accused-appellant's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Held: YES. In this case, accused-appellant has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
the first element of self-defense: unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
Appellant showed no attack or assault that had placed his life in imminent or actual danger.
The autopsy report stated that, on the basis of the bullet's trajectory, Dr. Aranas concluded
that the shooter must have been positioned higher than the victim when the shots were fired.
Thus, the trial court concluded that the results of the autopsy disproves appellant's claim that
he fired the shots while leaning backward after the victim tried to stab him a second time.
EVIDENCE: Indeed, physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it
ranks higher in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.25 In criminal cases such as
murder/homicide or rape, in which the accused stand to lose their liberty if found guilty, this
Court has, on many occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the
truth.26 Where the physical evidence on record runs counter to the testimonies of witnesses,
the primacy of the physical evidence must be upheld.
With regard to the second element of self-defense, the Court finds that the means employed
by accused-appellant was grossly disproportionate to the victim's alleged unlawful aggression.
The victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds in his chest and different parts of his
body.31 Besides, the Advance Information prepared by Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Virgo
Villareal, the investigator of the case, reveals that there was no mention of either a stabbing
incident that happened or a knife that was recovered from the crime scene.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals Manila in CA-G.R.
CR No. 30957 dated 23 April 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-
appellant PO1 CRISPIN OCAMPO y SANTOS is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of HOMICIDE and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
7
People v. Rullepa
Facts:
Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto (Rullepa), a houseboy, was charged with Rape before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City for allegedly having carnal knowledge with “AAA”, three (3)
years of age, a minor and against her will and without her consent.
“AAA” described her abuse under the hands of Rullepa in a plain and matter-of-fact manner in
her testimony.
Recalling what accused-appellant did to her, Cyra May declared at the witness stand: Sinaksak
nya ang titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko, at sa bunganga, thus causing her pain and drawing her to
cry. She added that accused-appellant did these to her twice in his bedroom.
The victim and her mother testified that she was only three years old at the time of the rape.
However, the prosecution did not offer the victim‘s certificate of live birth or similar authentic
documents in evidence.
In fine, the crime committed by accused-appellant is not merely acts of lasciviousness but
statutory rape.
The two elements of statutory rape are (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman,
and (2) that the woman is below twelve years of age.28 As shown in the previous discussion,
the first element, carnal knowledge, had been established beyond reasonable doubt. The same
is true with respect to the second element.
The victims age is relevant in rape cases since it may constitute an element of the offense.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,29 provides:
Finding for the prosecution, the RTC rendered judgment finding Rullepa guilty beyond
easonable doubt of rape and accordingly sentenced him to death. The case was placed for
automatic review of the Supreme Court
Issue: Whether or not a person’s appearance is admissible as object evidence
2nd Issue: Whether or not the death penalty was rightfully imposed on Rullepa
Held:
Yes. A person’s appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being
addressed to the senses of the court. As to the weight to accord such appearance, especially
in rape cases, the Court in People v. Pruna laid down the guideline.
The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy
of the certificate of live birth of such party.
In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as
baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim
would suffice to prove age.
If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s
mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 18 years old.
In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the
victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The
failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be
taken against him.
The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
2nd Ruling: NO. Under the above guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to
the age of the victim is sufficient to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases
(a), (b) and (c) above. In such cases, the disparity between the allegation and the proof
of age is so great that the court can easily determine from the appearance of the victim
the veracity of the testimony. The appearance corroborates the relatives testimony.
As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the persons appearance,
as object evidence of her age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her true age becomes
greater and, following Agadas, supra, such doubt must be resolved in favor of the
accused.
This is because in the era of modernism and rapid growth, the victims mere physical
appearance is not enough to gauge her exact age. For the extreme penalty of death to
be upheld, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime must be substantiated. Verily, the minority of the victim should be
not only alleged but likewise proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime
itself. Be it remembered that the proof of the victims age in the present case spells the
difference between life and death.
8
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age
sought to be proved (below twelve years), the trial court would have had no difficulty
ascertaining the victims age from her appearance. No reasonable doubt, therefore,
exists that the second element of statutory rape, i.e., that the victim was below twelve
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, is present.
Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here,
reasonable doubt exists. A mature three and a half-year old can easily be mistaken for
an underdeveloped seven-year old. The appearance of the victim, as object evidence,
cannot be accorded much weight and, following Pruna, the testimony of the mother is,
by itself, insufficient.
As it has not been established with moral certainty that Cyra May was below seven
years old at the time of the commission of the offense, accused-appellant cannot be
sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be
imposed upon him.
A persons appearance, as evidence of age (for example, of infancy, or of being under
the age of consent to intercourse), is usually regarded as relevant; and, if so, the
tribunal may properly observe the person brought before it.
Experience teaches that corporal appearances are approximately an index of the age of
their bearer, particularly for the marked extremes of old age and youth. In every case
such evidence should be accepted and weighed for what it may be in each case worth.
In particular, the outward physical appearance of an alleged minor may be considered
in judging his age; a contrary rule would for such an inference be pedantically over-
cautious.
Consequently, the jury or the court trying an issue of fact may be allowed to judge the
age of persons in court by observation of such persons. The formal offer of the person
as evidence is not necessary. The examination and cross-examination of a party before
the jury are equivalent to exhibiting him before the jury and an offer of such person as
an exhibit is properly refused

JUDICIAL ADMISSION: The process by which the trier of facts judges a persons age from
his or her appearance cannot be categorized as judicial notice. Judicial notice is based
upon convenience and expediency for it would certainly be superfluous, inconvenient,
and expensive both to parties and the court to require proof, in the ordinary way, of
facts which are already known to courts.38 As Tundag puts it, it is the cognizance of
certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof because they
already know them. Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, where the provisions governing
judicial notice are found, is entitled What Need Not Be Proved. When the trier of facts
observes the appearance of a person to ascertain his or her age, he is not taking judicial
notice of such fact; rather, he is conducting an examination of the evidence, the
evidence being the appearance of the person. Such a process militates against the very
concept of judicial notice, the object of which is to do away with the presentation of
evidence.

Several cases31 suggest that courts may take judicial notice of the appearance of the
victim in determining her age.

For example, the Court, in People v. Tipay,32 qualified the ruling in People v.
Javier,33 which required the presentation of the birth certificate to prove the rape
victims age, with the following pronouncement:

This does not mean, however, that the presentation of the certificate of birth is at all
times necessary to prove minority. The minority of a victim of tender age who may be
below the age of ten is quite manifest and the court can take judicial notice thereof.
The crucial years pertain to the ages of fifteen to seventeen where minority may seem
to be dubitable due to ones physical appearance.