Precinct No.
3, Matina, Davao City, received an information WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution alone
[G.R. No. 133917. February 19, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMAT @ BOBONG and
GREGORIO MULA y MALAGURA @ arrested.[8]
BOBOY, accused-appellants.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
To sanction disrespect and disregard for the
Constitution in the name of protecting the society from
lawbreakers is to make the government itself lawless and to
subvert those values upon which our ultimate freedom and
liberty depend.[1]
For automatic review is the Decision[2] of the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No.
37,264-96, finding accused-appellants Nasario Molina y
Manamat alias Bobong and Gregorio Mula y appellants as the pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded
Malagura alias Boboy, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 8,[3] of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
(Republic Act No. 6425), as amended by Republic Act No.
7659,[4] and sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty
of death.
The information against accused-appellants reads:
That on or about August 8, 1996, in the City of Davao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with each
other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously was found in their possession 946.9 grams of
dried marijuana which are prohibited.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Upon arraignment on September 4, 1996, accused-
appellants pleaded not guilty to the accusation against
them.[6] Trial ensued, wherein the prosecution presented
Police Superintendent Eriel Mallorca, SPO1 Leonardo Y.
Pamplona, Jr., and SPO1 Marino S. Paguidopon, Jr. as
witnesses.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then
a member of the Philippine National Police detailed at
regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in
Davao City.[7] The first time he came to see the said
marijuana pusher in person was during the first week of July
1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer when a
motorcycle passed by. His informer pointed to the
motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula, as the
pusher. As to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon
had no occasion to see him before the arrest. Moreover, the
names and addresses of the accused-appellants came to the
knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were
At about 7:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1
Paguidopon received an information that the alleged pusher
will be passing at NHA, Ma-a, Davao City any time that
morning.[9] Consequently, at around 8:00 A.M. of the same
day, he called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct No. 3,
Matina, Davao City, which immediately dispatched the team
of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon
(brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona,
to proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where
they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by.[10]
At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, while
the team were positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon,
a trisikad carrying the accused-appellants passed by. At that
instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to the accused-
their vehicle and overtook the trisikad. [11] SPO1 Paguidopon
was left in his house, thirty meters from where the accused-
appellants were accosted.[12]
The police officers then ordered the trisikad to
stop. At that point, accused-appellant Mula who was holding
a black bag handed the same to accused-appellant
Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as
a police officer and asked accused-appellant Molina to open
the bag.[13] Molina replied, Boss, if possible we will settle
this.[14] SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which
revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter,
accused-appellants Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the
police officers.[15]
On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants, through
counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence, contending
that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is
inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in
violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.[16] The demurrer was denied by the
trial court.[17] A motion for reconsideration was filed by
accused-appellants, but this was likewise denied. Accused-
appellants waived presentation of evidence and opted to file
a joint memorandum.
On April 25, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed
decision,[18] the decretal portion of which reads:
without any evidence from both accused who waived
presentation of their own evidence through their counsels,
more than sufficient to prove the guilt of both accused of
the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt, pursuant to
Sec. 20, sub. par. 5 of Republic Act 7659, accused NASARIO
MOLINA and GREGORIO MULA, are sentenced to suffer a
SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH through lethal injection under
Republic Act 8176, to be effected and implemented as
therein provided for by law, in relation to Sec. 24 of Rep.
Act 7659.
The Branch Clerk of Court of this court, is ordered to
immediately elevate the entire records of this case with
the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, Manila, for the
automatic review of their case by the Supreme Court and
its appropriate action as the case may be.
SO ORDERED.[19]
Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and
Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the case was
elevated to this Court on automatic review. Accused-
appellants contend:
I.
THAT THE MARIJUANA IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE
FOR HAVING BEEN SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF
APPELLANTS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;
II.
THAT ASSUMING IT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, THE
GOVERNMENT HAS NOT OTHERWISE PROVED THEIR
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; AND
III.
THAT, FINALLY, ASSUMING THEIR GUILT HAS BEEN
PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, THE
IMPOSABLE PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 8 OF RA
No. 7659 (sic), IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, IS LIFE
IMPRISONMENT, NOT DEATH.[20]
The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion
(In Lieu of Brief), wherein he prayed for the acquittal of both
accused-appellants.
The fundamental law of the land mandates that
searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable fashion,
that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant
predicated upon the existence of a probable cause. The
pertinent provision of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.[21]
Complementary to the foregoing provision is the
exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III, Section 3,
paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures.[22] Thus:
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a form
of words, valueless and undeserving of mention in a
perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties; so too,
without this rule, the freedom from state invasions of
privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from
its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish
means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Courts high
regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.[23]
The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is
not without exceptions. Search and seizure may be made
without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may
be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident
to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3)
search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence
in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right
against unreasonable searches and seizures;[24] and (6) stop
and frisk situations (Terry search).[25]
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful
arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and seizure
pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must
precede the search. In this instance, the law requires that
there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made -
-- the process cannot be reversed.[26] As a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of
arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible
warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person
may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
(arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just
been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in
hot pursuit); and (c) when the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another (arrest
of escaped prisoners).[27]
In the case at bar, the court a quo anchored its
judgment of conviction on a finding that the warrantless
arrest of accused-appellants, and the subsequent search
conducted by the peace officers, are valid because accused-
appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of
prohibited drugs.[28] This brings us to the issue of whether or
not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure in the present
case fall within the recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement.
In People v. Chua Ho San,[29] the Court held that in
cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person
when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must
have personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent case law
adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. As
discussed in People v. Doria,[30]probable cause means an
actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The
grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of
actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A
reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officers making the arrest.
As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled
that reliable information alone, absent any overt act
indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and
within the view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient
to constitute probable cause that would justify an in
flagrante delicto arrest. Thus, in People v. Aminnudin,[31] it
was held that the accused-appellant was not, at the moment
of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he
was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was
doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and
there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To
all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers
innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when
the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana
that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to
apprehension.
Likewise, in People v. Mengote,[32] the Court did not
consider eyes... darting from side to side ... [while] holding
... [ones] abdomen, in a crowded street at 11:30 in the
morning, as overt acts and circumstances sufficient to
arouse suspicion and indicative of probable cause. According
to the Court, [b]y no stretch of the imagination could it have
been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been
committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least
being attempted in [the arresting officers] presence. So
also, in People v. Encinada,[33] the Court ruled that no
probable cause is gleanable from the act of riding
a motorela while holding two plastic baby chairs.
Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals,[34] the trial
court concluded that petitioner was attempting to commit a
crime as he was standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda and
Quezon Boulevard with his eyes moving very fast and looking
at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them. [35] In
declaring the warrantless arrest therein illegal, the Court
said:
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante
delicto ... arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of
personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer,
or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner,
indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being
committed or was going to be committed.[36]
It went on to state that -
Second, there was nothing in petitioners behavior or
conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere
suspicion other than that his eyes were moving very fast -
an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his
teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was
already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his
companions were merely standing at the corner and were
not creating any commotion or trouble...
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to
believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly
weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the
alleged grenade was discovered inside the front waistline
of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance
between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming
that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not
have been visible to Yu.[37]
Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante
delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.[38]

In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no
outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding
a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be
said to be committing, attempting to commit or have
committed a crime. It matters not that accused-appellant
Molina responded Boss, if possible we will settle this to the
request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response
which allegedly reinforced the suspicion of the arresting
officers that accused-appellants were committing a crime,
is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not
constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante delicto
arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon
(who did not participate in the arrest but merely pointed
accused-appellants to the arresting officers), accused-
appellants could not be the subject of any suspicion,
reasonable or otherwise.
While SPO1 Paguidopon claimed that he and his
informer conducted a surveillance of accused-appellant
Mula, SPO1 Paguidopon, however, admitted that he only
learned Mulas name and address after the arrest. What is
more, it is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed recognized
accused-appellant Mula. It is worthy to note that, before the
arrest, he was able to see Mula in person only once,
pinpointed to him by his informer while they were on the
side of the road. These circumstances could not have
afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look at accused-appellant
Mula, considering that the latter was then driving a
motorcycle when SPO1 Paguidopon caught a glimpse of
him. With respect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1
Paguidopon admitted that he had never seen him before the
arrest.
This belies the claim of SPO1 Pamplona that he knew
the name of accused-appellants even before the arrest, to
wit -
Q- When you said that certain Mula handed a black bag
to another person and how did you know that it
was Mula who handed the black bag to another
person?
A- Because I have already information from
Paguidopon, regarding Mula and Molina, when
they pass by through the street near the
residence of Paguidopon. He told that the one
who is big one that is Gregorio Mula and the thin
one is Nazario Molina[39]
The aforecited testimony of SPO1 Pamplona,
therefore, is entirely baseless. SPO1 Pamplona could not
have learned the name of accused-appellants from SPO1
Paguipodon because Paguipodon himself, who allegedly
conducted the surveillance, was not even aware of accused-
appellants name and address prior to the arrest.
Evidently, SPO1 Paguidopon, who acted as informer of
the arresting officers, more so the arresting officers
themselves, could not have been certain of accused-
[1]
appellants identity, and were, from all indications, merely Dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan in Stone v. Powell,
fishing for evidence at the time of the arrest. 428 U.S. 465, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067, 1105 [1976].
[2]
Compared to People v. Encinada, the arresting officer Dated April 25, 1997, Rollo, pp. 11-24.
in the said case knew appellant Encinada even before the
[3]
arrest because of the latters illegal gambling activities, thus, Sec. 8. - Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. - The
lending at least a semblance of validity on the arrest penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
effected by the peace officers. Nevertheless, the Court from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall
declared in said case that the warrantless arrest and the be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
consequent search were illegal, holding that [t]he shall possess or use any prohibited drug subject to the
prosecutions evidence did not show any suspicious behavior provisions of Section 20 hereof.
when the appellant disembarked from the ship or while he
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and
rode the motorela. No act or fact demonstrating a felonious
Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. -
enterprise could be ascribed to appellant under such bare
The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of
circumstances.[40]
Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this
Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any
Moreover, it could not be said that accused-appellants
waived their right against unreasonable searches and of the following quantities:
seizure. Implied acquiescence to the search, if there was
5) 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana;
any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity
given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is xxxxxxxxx
thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee.[41] Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the forgoing
quantities, the penalty shall range
Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused- from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending
appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the upon the quantity.
rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was
likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the [4]
An Act Imposing the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous
peace officers could not be admitted as evidence against Crimes.4
accused-appellants, and the Court is thus, left with no
[5]
Filed on August 10, 1996; Rollo, p. 7.
choice but to find in favor of accused-appellants.
While the Court strongly supports the campaign of the
[6]
Records, p. 14.
government against drug addiction and commends the
[7]
TSN, November 14, 1996, pp. 2-4.
efforts of our law-enforcement officers towards this drive,
all efforts for the achievement of a drug-free society must [8]
TSN, November 14, 1996, pp. 7-9.
not encroach on the fundamental rights and liberties of
individuals as guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which [9]
Id., pp. 10 and 18.
protection extends even to the basest of criminals.
[10]
TSN, November 26, 1996, pp. 4-5 (Direct examination of
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court SPO1 Pamplona).
of Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 37, 264-96, is
[11]
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish TSN, November 26, 1996, pp. 5-6.
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellants [12]
Nasario Molina y Manamat alias Bobong and Gregorio Mula y TSN, November 14, 1996, pp. 14-15
Malagura alias Boboy, are ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED [13]
TSN, November 26, 1996, pp. 6-8.
from confinement unless they are validly detained for other
offenses. No costs. [14]
Id., p. 14.14
SO ORDERED. [15]
Id., p. 9.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, [16]
Records, pp. 32-37.
Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, [17]
Records, pp. 39-43.
JJ., concur.
[18]
Penned by Judge Renato A. Fuentes.
[19]
Decision, Rollo, p. 24
[20]
Rollo, p. 40.
[21] [38]
Constitution, Article III, Section 2. Concurring Opinion of Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in
People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 720 (1999).
[22]
People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432, 443 [1999].
[39]
TSN, November 26, 1996, p. 7.
[23]
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. ed. 2d
[40]
1081, 1090 [1961]. People v. Encinada, supra.
[24] [41]
People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 705 [1999]; citing Id., at 91; citing Aniag v. Commission on Elections, 237
Hizon v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 517, 527 [1996]; SCRA 424, 436-437 [1994].
People v. Fernandez, 239 SCRA 174, 182-183 [1994];
Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687, 697 [1986]; Bernas, The
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, p. 169
[1996]; Cruz, Constitutional Law, pp. 147-153 [1986];
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 126, Section 12,
and Rule 113, Section 5; People v. Bagista, 214 SCRA 63, 69
[1992]; People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122, 126-128 [1991];
Roldan, Jr. v. Arca, 65 SCRA 336, 348 [1975]; Papa v. Mago,
22 SCRA 857, 871-874 [1968]; People v. Tabar, 222 SCRA 144,
153 [1993]; Alvarez v. CFI, 64 Phil. 33, 48 [1937]; and
People v. Kagui Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221, 226 [1936].
[25]
People v. Chua Ho San, supra.; citing Terry v. Ohio, 20 L
Ed 2d, 896 adopted in Posadas v. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA
288 [1990]; and People v. Ramos, 222 SCRA 557 [1993].
[26]
Id., at 449; citing Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA
159 , 175 [1997].
[27]
Id., at 444; and the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure (as amended), Rule 113, Section 5.
[28]
Decision, Rollo, p. 22.
[29]
People v. Chua Ho San, supra.; citing People v. Burgos,
144 SCRA 1 [1986]; People v. Encinada, 280 SCRA 72
[1997]; People v. Montilla, 285 SCRA 703 [1998];
People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646 [1988]; People v. Maspil,
Jr., 188 SCRA 751 [1988]; People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA
122 [1991]; People v. Tangliben 184 SCRA 220 [1990];
Posadas v. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 288 [1990];
People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401 [1991].
[30]
People v. Doria, supra.; citing Umil v. Ramos, 202 SCRA
251, 263 [1991]; United States v. Santos, 36 Phil. 851 [1917];
People v. Bati, 189 SCRA 97 [1990]; People v. Sucro, 195
SCRA 388 [1990] and People v. Ramos 186 SCRA 184 [1990].
[31]
163 SCRA 402, 409-410 [1988].
[32]
210 SCRA 174, 179-180 [1992]
[33]
280 SCRA 72, 86-87 [1997].
[34]
283 SCRA 159 [1997].
[35]
Id., at 169.
[36]
Id., at 175
[37]
Id., at 178.