PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – EMANCIPATION TO FINAL PROVISIONS
Elcano v. Hill committing the crime by means of the gun which was freely
FACTS
Reginal Hill was married and a minor who was then
still living in care of his father, Atty. Marvin Hill. Reginald Hill
was prosecuted criminally for killing Agapito Elcano. Reginald
was acquitted on the ground that his acts were not criminal
because of “lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistakes. The
father of Agapito Elcano then filed a civil action against
Reginald and his father (Marvin Hill) for damages based on
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is
barred by his son’s acquittal in the criminal case; and that if
ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the
fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of
his marriage.
ISSUES
1. WON Atty. Marvin Hill has a vicarious liability being the
father of a minor child who committed a tort.
RULING
The law clearly stated that parental authority is
terminated upon emancipation of the child according to Title
X of Family Code; Emancipation and Age of Majority,
emancipation takes place by marriage of the minor. However,
such emancipation is not absolute and full. Reginald although
married, was living with his father and still dependent from the
latter. ART 2180 applies to Atty. Marvin Hill notwithstanding
the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. Therefore, Article
2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill – the SC however ruled since
at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvin’s
liability should be subsidiary only – as a matter of equity.
Libi v. IAC
FACTS
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell
Libi died, each from a single gunshot wound from a revolver
licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi. The
respondents, parents of Julie Ann, filed a case against the
parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the
latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
The trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the IAC set
aside the judgment of the lower court dismissing the
complaint of Julie Ann’s parents.
ISSUES
1. WON Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly
interpreted by the respondent Court to make petitioners
liable for vicarious liability.
RULING
YES. The petitioners were gravely remiss in their
duties as parents in not diligently supervising the activities of
their son. Both parents were wanting in their duty and
responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of their
son. The petitioners utterly failed to exercise all the diligence
of a good father of a family in preventing their son from
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accessible to Wendell Libi because they have not regularly
checked whether the gun was still under lock, but learned that
it was missing from the safety deposit box only after the crime
had been committed. The civil liability of parents for quasi-
delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180,
is primary and not subsidiary.
Republic v. CA
FACTS
Apolinaria Malinao filed a petition before the
Ormoc Regional Trial Court for the Declaration of Presumptive
Death of her Absentee Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc. The
petition was thereafter granted by the trial court. The
Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a
Notice of Appeal. The trial court disapproved the Notice of
Appeal on the ground that the present case is
a special proceeding which requires that a record of appeal be
filed and served pursuant to Section 2 (a) Rule 41 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Republic filed a Petition for
Certiorari before the Court of Appeals contending that the
declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41
of the Family Code is not a special proceeding. The CA affirmed
the trial court‘s decision.
ISSUES
1. WON a petition for declaration of the presumptive death
of a person is in the nature of a special proceeding.
RULING
Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY
JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW contains Article
238 which provides that unless modified by the Supreme
Court, the procedural rules in the said Title shall apply in
all cases provided for in the Code requiring summary
court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an
expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.
The petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required and is
therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family Code as
her purpose was to contract a valid subsequent marriage, not
a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal
for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a
summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal
from the trial court‘s order sufficed.
Bernabe v. Alejo
FACTS
The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a
son with his secretary Carolina Alejo and was named Adrian
Bernabe who was born on September 18, 1981. After Ernesto
Bernabe and Rosalina (legal wife) died, the sole surviving heir
left was Ernestina. Carolina, in behalf of his son Adrian, filed a
complaint that Adrian be declared an acknowledged
illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and be given a share of his
father’s estate.
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – EMANCIPATION TO FINAL PROVISIONS
Trial court’s ruling: Under the new law, an action for
the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within
the lifetime of the alleged parent to give the latter an
opportunity to either affirm or deny the child’s filiation.
CA ruling: The rights of Adrian are governed under
Article 285 of the Civil Code which allows an action for
recognition to be filed within 4 years after the child has
attained the age of majority and that subsequent enactment
of the Family Code did not take away his right.
ISSUES
1. WON Adrian Bernabe may be declared an acknowledged
illegitimate son.
RULING
The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the
former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the
putative parent is given by the new code a chance to dispute
the claim, considering that “illegitimate children” are usually
begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate
family being aware of their existence.
Furthermore, the grounds or instances for the
acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish
the filiation of spurious children.
Hence, the petition is denied and assailed decision
was affirmed.
Marquino v. IAC
FACTS
Respondent Bibiana filed action for Judicial
Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition, Support and
Damages against Eutiquio. Bibiana was born on December
1926 allegedly of Eutiquio and in that time was single. It was
alleged that the Marquino family personally knew her since
she was hired as domestic helper in their household at
Dumaguete. She likewise received financial assistance from
them hence; she enjoyed continuous possession of the status
of an acknowledged natural child by direct and unequivocal
acts of the father and his family. The Marquinos denied all
these. Respondent was not able to finish presenting her
evidence since she died on March 1979 but the suit for
compulsory recognition was done while Eustiquio was still
alive. Her heirs were ordered to substitute her as parties-
plaintiffs.
Petitioners, legitimate children of Eutiquio, assailed
decision of respondent court in holding that the heirs of
Bibiana, allegedly a natural child of Eutiquio, can continue the
action already filed by her to compel recognition and the death
of the putative parent will not extinguish such action and can
be continued by the heirs substituting the said deceased
parent.
ISSUES
1. WON the right of action for acknowledgement as a natural
child be transmitted to the heirs and;
2. WON Article 173 can be given retroactive effect.
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RULING
1. The first issue to be resolved is whether or not the right of
action to compel recognition is in transmissible in
character.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides that an action
for recognition of natural children may be brought only
during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the
following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of
the child, in which case the latter may file the
action before the expiration of four years from
the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a
document should appear of which nothing had
been heard and in which either or both parents
recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within
four years from discovery of the document. The rationale
for the rule is to give the alleged parents opportunity to
be heard. The reason for the exceptions is to protect the
heirs.
Our law providing for the intransmissibility of an
action for recognition, however, has been superseded by
the New Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Under Article 173 of the Family Code, it is now provided:
Article 173 of the Family Code states that “The action
to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his
or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should
the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In
these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five (5) years
within which to institute the action.”
The action commenced by the child shall survive
notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
Pursuant to this provision, the child can bring the action
during his or her entire lifetime (not during the lifetime of
the parents) and even after the death of the parents. In
other words, the action does not prescribe as long as he
lives.
2. The ruling of the second issue is with Article 173 of the
Family Code states that it cannot be given retroactive
effect so as to apply to the case at bench because it will
prejudice the vested rights of petitioners transmitted to
them at the time of the death of their father, Eutiquio
Marquino. “Vested right” is a right in property which has
become fixed and established and is no longer open to
doubt or controversy. It expresses the concept of present
fixed interest, which in right reason and natural justice
should be protected against arbitrary State action.
Belcodero v. CA
FACTS
This case involves the question of ownership over a
piece of property acquired by a husband living with a
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – EMANCIPATION TO FINAL PROVISIONS
paramour and after having deserted his lawful wife and
children.
Alayo Bosing married Juliana Oday in 1927 and had 3
children. In 1946, he abandoned them and lived with Josefa
Rivera whom he acknowleged as a common-law wife Josefa
Bosing. They had one child, Josephine Bosing, now Josephine
Belcodero.
He married Josefa Bosing in 1958 while still married
to Juliana.
Alayo purchased a land on installment basis in 1949
and in his deed he named Josefa Bosing as his wife and
transferred the lot in her name. Final deed executed in 1959.
Alayo died in March 1967. In 1970, Josefa and
Josephine executed a document of extra judicial partition and
sale of the lot, which was described as conjugal property.
Josefa’s share went to Josephine for P10,000, so Josephine
Belcodero had full ownership. Notice was published.
In October 1980, Juliana (real widow) and 3 children
filed for reconveyance of property. Trial Court and CA ruled in
favor of Juliana.
ISSUES
1. WON the said property registered under the name of the
common-law wife is not an exclusive property but a
conjugal property of Alayo and his legitimate wife Juliana.
RULING
YES. The property remained as belonging to the
conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife Juliana.
Under both the new Civil Code (Article 116) and the old Civil
Code (Article 1407), “all property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that
it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” This
presumption has not been convincingly rebutted.
It cannot be seriously contended that, simply because
the property was titled in the name of Josefa at Alayo’s
request, she should thereby be deemed to be its owner. The
property unquestionably was acquired by Alayo and it was just
transferred to Josefa.
Tayag v. CA
FACTS
Chad Cuyugan, son of the deceased Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo, the fruit of his illicit amorous relationship with
EMILIE, the plaintiff and legal guardian, was born in Angeles
City on October 5, 1980 bad been sired, showered with
exceptional affection, fervent love and care by his putative
father for being his only son as can be gleaned from
indubitable letters and documents of the late Atty. Ocampo to
herein plaintiff. CORITO, the daughter of the deceased and
herein defendant, is the known administratrix of the real and
personal properties left by her deceased father, said Atty.
Ocampo, who died intestate in Angeles City on September 28,
1983. The defendant contended that the suit as barred by
prescription and Cuyugan has no legal and judicial personality
to bring the suit. Petitioner submits that Article 175 of the
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Family Code applies in which case the complaint should have
been filed during the lifetime of the putative father, failing
which the same must be dismissed on the ground of
prescription. Private respondent, however, insists that Article
285 of the Civil Code is controlling and, since the alleged parent
died during the minority of the child, the action for filiation
may be filed within four years from the attainment of majority
of the minor child
Chad Cuyugan, son of the deceased Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo, the fruit of his illicit amorous relationship with
EMILIE, the plaintiff and legal guardian, was born in Angeles
City on October 5, 1980 bad been sired, showered with
exceptional affection, fervent love and care by his putative
father for being his only son as can be gleaned from
indubitable letters and documents of the late Atty. Ocampo to
herein plaintiff. CORITO, the daughter of the deceased and
herein defendant, is the known administratrix of the real and
personal properties left by her deceased father, said Atty.
Ocampo, who died intestate in Angeles City on September 28,
1983. The defendant contended that the suit as barred by
prescription and Cuyugan has no legal and judicial personality
to bring the suit. Petitioner submits that Article 175 of the
Family Code applies in which case the complaint should have
been filed during the lifetime of the putative father, failing
which the same must be dismissed on the ground of
prescription. Private respondent, however, insists that Article
285 of the Civil Code is controlling and, since the alleged parent
died during the minority of the child, the action for filiation
may be filed within four years from the attainment of majority
of the minor child.
ISSUES
1. WON Article 175 of the Family Code should be given a
retroactive effect.
RULING
Article 256 of the Family Code states that "this Code
shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws." It becomes essential, therefore, to
determine whether the right of the minor child to file an action
for recognition is a vested right or not.
The Supreme Court ruled that under the
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the right of action
of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the
complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code. The court adopts the
ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., “the fact of filing of the petition already
vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same
proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in
force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced
or impaired by the enactment of a new law.” The trial court is
therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of
the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause
of action has not yet prescribed.
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Petition Denied.
Castro v. CA
FACTS
ISSUES
RULING
Uyguanco v. CA
FACTS
Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving
his wife, four legitimate children and properties which they
divided among themselves. Graciano Uyguangco filed a
complaint for partition against the petitioners, claiming that as
the illegitimate son of the deceased and a Anastacia Bacjao, he
must not be left out of the extrajudicial settlement of the
estate. He also claims that he received support from his father
while in high school and was also assigned by his father as
storekeeper at the Uyguangco store.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the case on the ground
that Graciano could not prove his alleged filiation having none
of the documents required in Art. 278 of the NCC (i.e. record
of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any
authentic writing. Neither may he resort to Art. 285 of the NCC
because he was already an adult when his alleged dad died.
Graciano insists however, that he is ―in continuous
possession of the status of a child of his alleged father by the
direct acts of the latter or of his family‖ as is under Art. 283 of
the NCC.
ISSUES
1. WON Graciano may adequately prove filiation.
RULING
NO. The Civil Code provisions they invoke have been
superseded or at least modified by the corresponding articles
n the FC. Since illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence
as legitimate children (Art 175), Graciano may establish his
filiation by the means given in Art. 172. Thus while he has no
record of birth appearing in the civil registrar or a final
judgment or an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned, he insists that he has nevertheless been
―in an open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child, which is admissible as evidence of filiation
under Art. 172.
As proof to this open and continuous possession—he
claims that he lived with his father from 1967 until 1973,
received support from him, used the name Uyguangco without
objection, a special power of attorney executed in his favor by
Apolinario‘s wife, and another one by Suplcio Uyguangco,
shared in the profits of the copra family business of the
Uyguangco‘s and was even given a share in his deceased
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father‘s estate as found in the addendum to the original
extrajudicial settlement concluded by the petitioners.
However, since his father has already died, his action
is now barred as Art. 172 specifically requires that when the
action is based on other proofs of filiation such as open and
continuous possession, the action must be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.
Mordequillo v. Breva
FACTS
Petitioners Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay
were ordered to pay jointly and severally to plaintiff- apellants
pertaining to damages arising from a vehicular accident killing
Audie Salinas and injuring Renato Culan.
On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied a parcel of
residentioal land located at Poblacion Malalag Surigao Del Sur
registered in the name of Jose Modequillo.
A Motion to quash and/or to set aside the levy of
execution was filed by Modequillo alleging therein that the
residential land is where their family home is built since 1969
prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152
and 153 of the Family Code except for the liabilities mentioned
in Article 155 thereof and that the judgement debt sought to
be enforced against the family home of Modequillo is not one
of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code.
Respondents on the other hand say that the said
house and lot only became a family home in 1988 when the
Family Code took effect. They say that under the Civil Code,
the house and lot did not qualify as a family home since the
Family Code provision on family homes do not retroact.
ISSUES
1. WON the Family Code provisions of family homes have a
retroactive application.
RULING
NO. The house and lot became a family home upon
the effectivity of the Family Code in August 3, 1988 but it does
not mean that all family residences not considered as family
homes prior to the Family Code would be retroactively
deemed as family homes at the time of their occupation. Since
the debt which arose from the time of the vehicular accident
(March 16, 1976) and the judgement was before the effectivity
of the Family Code (August 3, 1988), it is not exempt from
execution.
NOTE
Not a family home when the debt was incurred = not
exempt.
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