ABAKADA Guro Partylist v.

Purisima
(G.R. NO. 166715)
Facts:

RA 9335 or Attrition Act of 2005 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation

capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. The law intends to encourage their
officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards
and sanctions through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund and Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board.

The Boards in the BIR and BOC to be composed by their respective Commissioners, DOF,
DBM, and NEDA, were tasked to prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation,
distribution and release of the fund, to set criteria and procedures for removing service
officials and employees whose revenue collection fall short of the target; and further, to
issue rules and regulations. Also, the law tasked the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and
the CSC to promulgate and issue the IRR of RA 9335, subject to the approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created solely for the purpose of approving the
formulated IRR. Later, the JCOO having approved a formulated IRR by the agencies,
JCOO became functus officio and ceased to exist.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers, filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335 and sought to prevent herein respondents from implementing
and enforcing said law.

Petitioners assail, among others, the creation of a congressional oversight committee on

the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers, as it permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law, when legislative function
should have been deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment of the law.
Respondents, through the OSG, counter this by asserting that the creation of the
congressional oversight committee under the law enhances rather than violates separation
of powers, as it ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy.

Issue:
Whether the creation of the congressional oversight committee violates the doctrine of
separation of powers under the Constitution

(As for the other issue on constitutional principles of bicameralism and rule on
presentment, click this link)
Ruling: YES.

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 having approved the IRR
formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC on May 22, 2006, it became
functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the
executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and
academic.
This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to confront
the issue of the constitutionality of the Joint Congressional.

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Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily

constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the
constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances
inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation
of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.

However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment “beyond the legislative

sphere,” the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may
not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or judicial power.
And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the “single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedures” specified under the Constitution, including the
procedure for enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-enactment congressional
measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular,
congressional oversight must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings
conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before
and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its
power of confirmation and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed
by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency

to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by
itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or
disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form
of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation
designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to
an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically
changes the design or structure of the Constitution‘s diagram of power as it entrusts to
Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.

Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret

the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect.
Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality
by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of
powers established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve or
disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they conformed with
the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power
exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.

From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress
or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law
violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this
principle, a provision that requires Congress or its members to approve the implementing
rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision
that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling made by the
members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby partially granted. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and
regulations of the law is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and
VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of RA 9335 is upheld.
BELGICA VS OCHOA
* FACTS:
HISTORY
In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” (a term of American-English origin) has been commonly referred
to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature (“Congressional Pork Barrel”).
However, it has also come to refer to certain funds to the Executive. The “Congressional Pork Barrel”
can be traced from Act 3044 (Public Works Act of 1922), the Support for Local Development Projects
during the Marcos period, the Mindanao Development Fund and Visayas Development Fund and later
the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under the Corazon Aquino presidency, and the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) under the Joseph Estrada administration, as continued by the
Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and the present Benigno Aquino III administrations.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF THE 2013 PDAF ARTICLE

2. Project Identification. Identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to
the priority list, standard or design prepared by each implementing agency: PROVIDED, That
preference shall be given to projects located in the 4th to 6th class municipalities or indigents identified
under the MHTS-PR by the DSWD. For this purpose, the implementing agency shall submit to
Congress said priority list, standard or design within ninety (90) days from effectivity of this Act.

All programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships, identified by a
member of the House of Representatives outside of his/her legislative district shall have the written
concurrence of the member of the House of Representatives of the recipient or beneficiary legislative
district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

3. Legislator’s Allocation. The Total amount of projects to be identified by legislators shall be as follows:

a. For Congressional District or Party-List Representative: Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000) for soft
programs and projects listed under Item A and Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000) for infrastructure
projects listed under Item B, the purposes of which are in the project menu of Special Provision No. 1;
and

b. For Senators: One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for soft programs and projects listed
under Item A and One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for infrastructure projects listed under
Item B, the purposes of which are in the project menu of Special Provision No. 1.

Subject to the approved fiscal program for the year and applicable Special Provisions on the use and
release of fund, only fifty percent (50%) of the foregoing amounts may be released in the first semester
and the remaining fifty percent (50%) may be released in the second semester.

4. Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund may only be allowed once. The Secretaries of
Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works
and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry are also authorized to
approve realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment received from this Fund,
subject to the following: (i) for infrastructure projects, realignment is within the same implementing unit
and same project category as the original project; (ii) allotment released has not yet been obligated
for the original project/scope of work; and (iii) request is with the concurrence of the legislator
concerned. The DBM must be informed in writing of any realignment within five (5) calendar days from
approval thereof: PROVIDED, That any realignment under this Fund shall be limited within the same
classification of soft or hard programs/projects listed under Special Provision 1 hereof: PROVIDED,
FURTHER, That in case of realignments, modifications and revisions of projects to be implemented
by LGUs, the LGU concerned shall certify that the cash has not yet been disbursed and the funds
have been deposited back to the BTr.

Any realignment, modification and revision of the project identification shall be submitted to the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, for favorable endorsement to
the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be.

5. Release of Funds. All request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents prescribed
under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and
the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be. Funds shall be released to the implementing
agencies subject to the conditions under Special Provision No. 1 and the limits prescribed under
Special Provision No. 3.

PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL

The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the petitioners include the Malampaya Fund and the
Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8,
Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by then-President Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify, strengthen, and
consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous
energy resources vital to economic growth. The Presidential Social Fund was created under Section
12, Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR), as amended by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The Presidential Social Fund has been
described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management
Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not
funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate
gross earnings of PAGCOR.

* ISSUES:
A. Procedural Issues
1.) Whether or not (WON) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and
justiciable controversy

2.) WON the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy subject to judicial review

3.) WON petitioners have legal standing to sue

4.) WON the 1994 Decision of the Supreme Court (the Court) on Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez (Philconsa) and the 2012 Decision of the Court on Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty
v. Secretary of Budget and Management (LAMP) bar the re-litigation of the issue of constitutionality of the
“pork barrel system” under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis
B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”
WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on…

1.) …separation of powers

2.) …non-delegability of legislative power

3.) …checks and balances

4.) …accountability

5.) …political dynasties

6.) …local autonomy

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C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”

WON the phrases:
(a) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD
910 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and
(b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of
the President of the Philippines” under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to
the Presidential Social Fund,

are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power

* HELD AND RATIO:
A. Procedural Issues
No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and
decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely:
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the
person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1.) YES. There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases. The requirement of contrariety
of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the
“Pork Barrel System.” Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since
the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the
PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential
Social Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened
injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court dispelled the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered
moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no
more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the
merits. The respondents’ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor
diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014
budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally
effective and existing. Neither will the President’s declaration that he had already “abolished the PDAF”
render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no
constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence.
Even on the assumption of mootness, nevertheless, jurisprudence dictates that “the ‘moot and
academic’ principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a
case.” The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if:
i.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution: This is clear from the fundamental posture of
petitioners – they essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to the principles of
separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local
autonomy.
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ii.) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved: This is also
apparent from the nature of the interests involved – the constitutionality of the very system within which
significant amounts of public funds have been and continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly
presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public interest. The
present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the system’s flaws have never before been
magnified. To the Court’s mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-
blowers, and the government’s own recognition that reforms are needed “to address the reported
abuses of the PDAF” demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the
importance of the matter.
It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners’ claims as not merely theorized, speculative or
hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the
constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. if only for the purpose of validating the
existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings under
the CoA Report to be sufficient.
iii.) When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public: This is applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the
system’s constitutionality. There is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to the
issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious
resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may
be guided on how public funds should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.
iv.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. This is called for by the recognition that the
preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual
occurrence. The myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not
resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial
review.
2.) YES. The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the
wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has
commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is
a task that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an
exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary
the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith (Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution).
3. YES. Petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases. Petitioners have come before
the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they “dutifully
contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury.” As taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to
question the validity of the existing “Pork Barrel System” under which the taxes they pay have been and
continue to be utilized. They are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the
Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds
are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public
funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues
they have raised may be classified as matters “of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance
to society, or of paramount public interest.” The CoA Chairperson’s statement during the Oral
Arguments that the present controversy involves “not [merely] a systems failure” but a “complete
breakdown of controls” amplifies the seriousness of the issues involved. Indeed, of greater import than
the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the
fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.
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4.) NO. On the one hand, res judicata states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second
actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. This required
identity is not attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP involved constitutional challenges against
the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article respectively. However, the cases at bar call for a broader
constitutional scrutiny of the entire “Pork Barrel System”. Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a
dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits. Thus, res
judicata cannot apply.
On the other hand, the doctrine of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate where
the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated
as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court. Absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Philconsa was a limited response to
a separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment
identification authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more
holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each
other, formative as they are of the entire “Pork Barrel System” as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-
enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those
related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment.
The complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore,
considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis
principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent
constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. Since
the Court now benefits from hindsight and current findings (such as the CoA Report), it must partially
abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification
authority of Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory.
Again, since LAMP was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling
doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases, stare decisis would
not apply.
B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”
1.) YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the
projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the
2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be
construed from Special Provisions 1 to 3 and the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. Legislators
have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release (Special Provision 5
under the 2013 PDAF Article) and realignment (Special Provision 4, paragraphs 1 and 2 under the
2013 PDAF Article).
Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in “the various operational
aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities” and
the “regulation and release of funds”, in violation of the separation of powers principle. That the said
authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since
the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the
Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa. The Court also points out that respondents
have failed to substantiate their position that the identification authority of legislators is only of
recommendatory import.
In addition to declaring the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly
allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement
of the budget, the Court also declared that informal practices, through which legislators have effectively
intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional
treatment.
2.) YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are effectively
allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in
Congress. The power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section
29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” The power of appropriation, as held by the
Court in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor, involves (a) setting apart by law a certain
sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Under the 2013 PDAF Article,
individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how
much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also
determine. Since these two acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described
in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same,
undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not,
however, allow.
3.) YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would
then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate
PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by
legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it means that the actual items of
PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus
effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification
budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget within a budget” which subverts the prescribed
procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President’s power of item veto. As petitioners
aptly point out, the President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF
allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent
with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with
legitimate projects.
Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain
constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding
source allotted for multiple purposes of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical missions, assistance to
indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc). This setup
connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for
further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject
to the President’s power of item veto.
The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, “limit[ed] state auditors
from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization
of said Funds.” Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a “line by line budget or amount per
proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency.”

4.) YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested
with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they
themselves participate. Also, this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of
Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: “…[A Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for
his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.” Allowing
legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation renders them susceptible to
taking undue advantage of their own office.
However, the Court cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the
individual legislator’s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetrate himself in office. This
is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
Also, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between
legislators and the Executive department, through the former’s post-enactment participation, may
affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not
strictly concern the Pork Barrel System’s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject
of judicial assessment.

5.) NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-executing due to the
qualifying phrase “as may be defined by law.” In this respect, said provision does not, by and of
itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative
or executive action. Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy
on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since
it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political
dynasties.

6.) YES. The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed
intention of “making equal the unequal” (Philconsa, 1994). The gauge of PDAF and CDF
allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests
and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. As a result, a district representative of a highly-
urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural
province which would be relatively “underdeveloped” compared to the former. To add, what rouses
graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some years, even the
Vice-President – who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel
as well.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts
with the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally
mandated to “assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social
development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.” Considering that
LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs,
their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual
legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a
body.

C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”

YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the
President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it
reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other
purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the
purview of the law.
That the subject phrase may be confined only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government” under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word
or phrase is to be construed to include – or be restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same
kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase “energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government” states a singular
and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which
the general phrase “for such other purposes” may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the
class it represents, namely energy development programs of the government; and, third, the Executive
department has used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject
phrase, thereby contradicting respondents’ own position that it is limited only to “energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government.”
However, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds “to finance
energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government,” remains
legally effective and subsisting.

Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that
the Presidential Social Fund may be used “to [first,] finance the priority infrastructure development
projects and [second,] to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities,
as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.”
The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the
Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities. The first indicated
purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project
he may so determine as a “priority“. Verily, the law does not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure
development projects” and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same.
To note, the delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure” is too broad of a classification since the
said term could pertain to any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects” must be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to Section 8 of PD 910
– it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are severable,
all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and
subsisting.
David vs. Macapagal – Arroyo
MARCH 31, 2018 BY LAWISKOOL

GR 171396
May 3 2006
Facts:
 Special Civil Actions in the SC, Prohibition and Certiorari
 These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the
Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually
trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances
are void for being unconstitutional.
 In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan
Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA)
issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO
5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down
the government.
 NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me
by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: “The President . . . whenever it
becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress . . . rebellion . . . ,” and
in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence
as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section
17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
 She cited the following facts as basis:
 Over the past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the
extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military
adventurists—the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State—who are now in a tactical
alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down
the duly constituted Government elected in May 2004;
 these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down the President;
 the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national
media;
 this series of actions is hurting the Philippine State—by obstructing governance including hindering
the growth of the economy and sabotaging the people’s confidence in government and their faith in
the future of this country;
 these actions are adversely affecting the economy;
 these activities give totalitarian forces of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to
intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State;
 Article 2, Section 4 of the our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic
institutions and the State the primary duty of Government;
 the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a
clear and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino
people;
 O. 5: NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me
under the Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the
Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, do hereby
call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent
and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country; I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of
the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP and PNP, to immediately
carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism
and lawless violence.
 Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all
permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their
rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
 Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis Representative Satur Ocampo, Representative Rafael
Mariano, Bayan Muna Representative Teodoro Casiño and Gabriela Representative Liza Maza. Bayan
Muna Representative Josel Virador was arrested at the PAL Ticket Office in Davao City. Later, he was
turned over to the custody of the House of Representatives where the “Batasan 5” decided to stay
indefinitely.
 Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they
seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news
agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested.
 His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against
Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
 In March 3, 2006, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to
exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no
factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in
Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred
that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an
overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected
and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason
of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is
within the president’s calling out power, take care power and take over power.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
 In R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it
encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional
requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom
of the press, of speech and of assembly.
 In R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the
CIDG’s act of raiding the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of “censorship” or “prior restraint.” They
also claimed that the term “emergency” refers only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar
occurrences, hence, there is “absolutely no emergency” that warrants the issuance of PP 1017.
 In R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and twenty one
(21) other members of the House of Representatives, including Representatives Satur Ocampo, Rafael
Mariano, Teodoro Casiño, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador. They asserted that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
constitute “usurpation of legislative powers”; “violation of freedom of expression” and “a declaration of
martial law.” They alleged that President Arroyo “gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armed
forces without clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of lawless violence and a showing that
there is necessity to do so.”
 In R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their members averred that PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5 are unconstitutional because (1) they arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws and
decrees; (2) their issuance was without factual basis; and (3) they violate freedom of expression and
the right of the people to peaceably assemble to redress their grievances.
 In R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
are unconstitutional because they violate (a) Section 415 of Article II, (b) Sections 1,16 2,17 and 418 of
Article III, (c) Section 2319 of Article VI, and (d) Section 1720 of Article XII of the Constitution.
 15 The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call
upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under
conditions provided by law, to render personal military or civil service.
 16 No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
 17 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
 18 No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.
 19 (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting
separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.
 (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
 20 In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation
 In R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al., alleged that PP 1017 is an “arbitrary and
unlawful exercise by the President of her Martial Law powers.” And assuming that PP 1017 is not really
a declaration of Martial Law, petitioners argued that “it amounts to an exercise by the President of
emergency powers without congressional approval.” In addition, petitioners asserted that PP 1017 “goes
beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as defined under the Revised Administrative Code.”
 And lastly, in R. No. 171424, petitioner Loren B. Legarda maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
“unconstitutional for being violative of the freedom of expression, including its cognate rights such as
freedom of the press and the right to access to information on matters of public concern, all guaranteed
under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.” In this regard, she stated that these issuances
prevented her from fully prosecuting her election protest pending before the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal.
HELD:
PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is
still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP.
Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and
at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A
reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of
the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the
records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day,
the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the
communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the
Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented
nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the
President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the
incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she
believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must
not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
Because an overly broad law may deter constitutionally protected speech, the overbreadth doctrine allows
a party to whom the law may constitutionally be applied to challenge the statute on the ground that it violates
the First Amendment rights of others.
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’
statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases.
Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related
conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover,
the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that ‘reflects legitimate state interest
in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly,
lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected
conduct.’ Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their
terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have
been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free
speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the
President’s ‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this
does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional
limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that
GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a
‘sequence’ of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only
criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President
may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such criterion
has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art
6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress.
They assail the clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.’ The SC noted that such provision is similar to the
power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled
that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate
‘decrees.’ Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6
categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of
rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The
president can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily
Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the
constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a
distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers
does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from
Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise
of the calling out power of the president by the president.
What defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the President invoked
was her calling-out power.
The declaration of Martial Law is a “warn[ing] to citizens that the military power has been called upon by
the executive to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency lasts, they must,
upon pain of arrest and punishment, not commit any acts which will in any way render more difficult the
restoration of order and the enforcement of law.”
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar
as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless
violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In
addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take o ver
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should
implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined and made
punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The
warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU
and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were
committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of
standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the
Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.