G.R. No.

42108 December 29, 1989

OSCAR D. RAMOS and LUZ AGUDO

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ADELAIDA RAMOS and LAZARO E.
MENESES

FACTS:

Private respondent filed with the then CFI Tarlac for declaration of
nullity of orders, reformation of instrument, recovery of possession
with preliminary injunction and damages. Petitioners specifically deny
the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation and interposed as
defense the fact that the questioned conditional sales of were
voluntarily executed by private respondent and truly expressed the
intention of the parties; that the action, if any, has long prescribed;
that the questioned orders approving the consolidation of ownership
of the lands in question in favor of petitioner were within the
jurisdiction of the lower court, in its capacity as a probate court and
acting as a cadastral court with respect to the other.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court has jurisdiction?

RULING:

The probate jurisdiction of the former court of first instance or the

present regional trial court relates only to matters having to do with
the settlement of the estate and probate of wills of deceased persons,
and the appointment and removal of administrators, executors,
guardians and trustees. Subject to settled exceptions not present in
this case, the law does not extend the jurisdiction of a probate court
to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceeding. The parties concerned may choose to bring a separate
action as a matter of convenience in the preparation or presentation
of evidence.

G.R. No. 91606 December 17, 1991

ESTRELLA R. EMPAYNADO AND ERODITA
EMPAYNADO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ELENITA CANJA AND ROLANDO
CANJA, respondents

FACTS:

This petition for review on certiorari filed by the Empaynados seeks to

reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 26, 1989,
which set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City, which rendered in favor of the plaintiff against the herein
defendants ordering the latter and all persons claiming rights under
her to vacate the premises and pay damaged. CA also dismissed the
complaint for unlawful detainer filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Caloocan City, Branch 53, on the ground of lack of conciliation
between the parties at the barangay level.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in its decision of dismissal on MTC?

RULING:

Yes. Nowhere in the said pleading did they discuss the procedural
issue they now vigorously raise. In effect, they abandoned such issue
for the more substantial issues aforestated. It was only when the
MTC decided the case against the private respondents that they took
up the matter of non-confrontation seriously. But, it was too late. They
themselves dealt the final blow to their defense when they and the
petitioners admitted that there is no possibility of settling the case
amicably (Rollo, p. 36) at the preliminary conference before the
MTC.

G.R. No. L-25134 October 30, 1969

THE CITY OF BACOLOD, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SAN MIGUEL BREWERY, INC., defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
The city of Bacolod passed an ordinance imposing upon manufacture
corporations engaged in bottling of soft drinks a fee of 1/24 of a
centavo, plus 2% surcharge every month, but in no case exceeding
24% for one year for delinquent payers. Respondent refused to pay
so petitioner filed a case against it at the CFI Negros Occ., where the
latter prayed for the payment of the fee, but without mention of the
surcharge. Respondent lost in the CFI and so it raised the
constitutionality of the ordinance before the SC where the SC upheld
its constitutionality and affirmed the CFI decision. Failing to collect the
surcharge, however, petitioner filed another case before the CFI for
the collection of the surcharge.

Issue: WON there is a splitting of cause of action

Ruling: Yes, there is a splitting of cause of action.

For a single cause of action or violation of a right, the plaintiff may be
entitled to several reliefs. It is the filing of separate complaints for
these several reliefs that constitutes splitting of action.

In the case at bar, when respondent failed and refused to pay the
difference in bottling charges, it violated the right of petitioner, thus
the latter being entitled to two reliefs: (1) recovery of basic charges;
and (2) payment of corresponding surcharge, the latter being merely
a consequence of the failure to pay the former. In other words, the
obligation of respondent to pay the surcharges arose from the
violation by it of the same right of the petitioner from which the
obligation to pay the basic charges also arose.

G.R. No. L-35453 September 15, 1989

INDUSTRIAL FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
HON. SERGIO A.F. APOSTOL, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XVI, Quezon City, JUAN DELMENDO
and HONORATA DELMENDO and JOAQUIN PADILLA and
SOCORRO PADILLA, respondents.

FACTS:
Private respondents filed a complaint against petitioner IFC, as
principal party, and the Padilla spouses, as formal parties, in CFI. The
Delmendos alleged that they were the transferees of the real property
which was mortgaged earlier by the Padillas to the Industrial
Transport and Equipment, Inc. to secure the payment of a promissory
note and then assigned to petitioner IFC. The Delmendos prayed for
the cancellation of the mortgage lien and the delivery to them by
petitioner of the owner's copy of said title with damages and
attorney's fees, considering that petitioner IFC had waived its rights
over the mortgage when it instituted a personal action against the
Padillas for collection of a sum of money.

ISSUE:

Whether or not by filing a personal action for the recovery of a debt

secured by a real estate mortgage, petitioner is deemed to have
abandoned, ipso jure, its mortgage lien on the property in question.

RULING:

The Court that, in the absence of express statutory provisions, a

mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a
personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In
other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both.
By such election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired,
for each of the two remedies is complete in itself.

Thus, an election to bring a personal action will leave open to him all
the properties of the debtor for attachment and execution, even
including the mortgaged property itself. And, if he waives such
personal action and pursues his remedy against the mortgaged
property, an unsatisfied judgment thereon would still give him the
right to sue for a deficiency judgment, in which case, all the properties
of the defendant, other than the mortgaged property, are again open
to him for the satisfaction of the deficiency.

G.R. No. L-17739 December 24, 1964

ITOGON-SUYOC MINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
JOSE BALDO, SANGILO-ITOGON WORKERS UNION and COURT
OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

FACTS:

The petitioner argues that the first unfair labor practice theretofore
mentioned covers the second unfair labor practice suit - the case at
hand. And this, because "all acts of unfair labor practice allegedly
committed by the herein petitioner prior to November 18, 1958
against the members of respondent union [Sañgilo] constituted one
single cause of action." Petitioner continues onto say that since the
prior CIR case has been finally decided by this Court in a decision
promulgated on December 24, 1964, said case is a bar to the present
action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is splitting of cause of action

RULING:

The rule against splitting of a cause of action applies only where the
actions are between the same parties. Here, the parties in the two
cases aforecited are different. The first case involves only two (2)
laborers, namely, Jose Baldo and A. Manaois the second refers to
the claim of other laborers numbering 107 in all. These two cases, it
is true, were brought in the name of Sañgilo. However, the real
parties in interest in both cases are the dismissed employees.
Sañgilo merely represented its members before CIR. It found that the
members "are not situated under similar circumstances", and that
their alleged dismissal "took pace on different dates". Each one of
these employees has a cause of action arising from his particular
dismissal. And the cause of action of one is separate and distinct
from the others. 17 Although, of course, they may be joined and
brought in the name of the union. Res judicata has not attached.