0 Bewertungen0% fanden dieses Dokument nützlich (0 Abstimmungen)
75 Ansichten27 Seiten
This presentation addresses six issues: Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper's geo-strategic outlook, Australia’s alliance with the United States, trilateral security dialogue, quadrilateral security dialogue, strategic partnerships, and South China Sea Code of Conduct.
Originaltitel
PP Thayer Sharing Maritime Security Perspectives in the South China Sea Final
This presentation addresses six issues: Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper's geo-strategic outlook, Australia’s alliance with the United States, trilateral security dialogue, quadrilateral security dialogue, strategic partnerships, and South China Sea Code of Conduct.
This presentation addresses six issues: Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper's geo-strategic outlook, Australia’s alliance with the United States, trilateral security dialogue, quadrilateral security dialogue, strategic partnerships, and South China Sea Code of Conduct.
Presentation to Session 2, Workshop on Maritime Security in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean Region: Exploring Convergent Views co-sponsored by National Maritime Foundation and Embassy of Japan Jacaranda Hall, India Habitat Centre, New Delhi, India January 30, 2020 Six Talking Points 1. Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper 2. U.S.-Australia Alliance 3. Trilateral Security Dialogue 4. Quadrilateral Security Dialogue 5. Strategic Partnerships 6. South China Sea Code of Conduct 1. Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper (DWP) • Indo-Pacific region is a framework for defence planners, the maritime arc across the Indian Ocean, South China Sea and Western Pacific • Strategic trends – greatest geopolitical realignment since 1945 • Major power rivalries – coercion, grey zone tactics • Norms and international law are being undermined • U.S.-China relations are the defining factor for peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region • Sea Control • $50bn Future Submarines, $35bn Future Frigates Current Strategic Appreciation Defence Minister Linda Reynolds* • DWP 2016 underestimated speed at which the strategic outlook has changed in the Indo-Pacific • What was thought likely in 2030 has already happened • China – new ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, stealth drones, autonomous vehicles, cyber and space; rail guns to be mounted on war ships • Military modernization challenges Australia’s capability lead • Concern U.S.-China competition may shift to adversarial relations • Reassessment of strategic assumptions that underpinned DWP 2016 is underway *Address to Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Conference, Sydney, October 8, 2019 2. U.S.-Australia Alliance 29th AUSMIN August 2019 • Networked structure of alliances and partnerships to maintain a ‘free and open’ Indo-Pacific • Japan, India, South Korea, ASEAN members, • Infrastructure investment and defence cooperation • Strong support for ASEAN centrality and the ASEAN-led regional architecture, underlining the value of the East Asia Summit as the region’s premier Leaders-led forum for addressing political and security challenges. • Maritime security and oceans governance, cyber security, counter- terrorism and transnational crime 3. Trilateral Security Dialogue August 2019 • Cooperation on capacity building for maritime security and safety • Broad convergence with ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific • Support for ASEAN centrality and unity, and the East Asia Summit as the region’s premier Leaders-led forum • Maritime and security cooperation to promote regional resilience, quality infrastructure, finance, and financial institutions • South China Sea – advanced weapons, coercive unilateral actions. Arbitral Tribunal Award binding on all parties, COC should not prejudice interests of third parties 4. Quadrilateral Security Dialogue • Quad 2.0 security dialogue revived (2017) • India, Japan, United States and Australia • Biennial meetings, no binding joint statement • A work in progress • Inclusion of non-security issues • private sector development, good governance • Support for ASEAN centrality and IORA and Pacific Islands Forum • Free and Open Indo-Pacific, rules-based order 5. Australia’s Strategic Partnerships • Singapore Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2015) • Malaysia Strategic Partnership (2015) • Five Power Defence Arrangements or FPDA • Philippines Comprehensive Partnership (2015) • Annual joint defence consultations, navy to navy strategy talks (2017) • Indonesia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2018) • Joint Declaration on Maritime Cooperation (2017) • Maritime Cooperation Plan of Action • 5 pillars – includes maritime cooperation, contribution to Indo-Pacific stability Australia’s Strategic Partnerships • Vietnam Strategic Partnership (2018) • Annual meeting of PMs and Defence ministers • Defence, intelligence and security cooperation • Maritime and aviation security/Maritime policy making • France Enhanced Strategic Partnership (2017) • Strategic Partnership (2012) • Logistics agreement • Germany Intent on Strategic Partnership (2012) • United Kingdom Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty (2013) • Hunter-class frigates • China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2014) 6. South China Sea Code of Conduct • Focus on military-to-military cooperation in draft COC text • Section 2c. Basic undertakings iii. Self-restraint / Promotion of trust and confidence • China made the most detailed proposals on mil-to-mil cooperation • Vietnam’s Option was to replace China’s (and other) Options with a long list of proposals setting out the normative and legal basis for military-to-military cooperation and a highly specific list of seven “no nots” China’s Proposals for Military-to-Military Cooperation in the Draft COC • Option 2: [CH = China] • 2. Pending the peaceful settlement of territorial and jurisdictional disputes, the Parties concerned undertake to intensify efforts to seek ways, in a spirit of cooperation and understanding, to build trust and confidence between and among them, including but not limited to: [CH] a. Undertaking that military activities in the region shall be conducive to enhancing mutual trust among the countries concerned and to maintaining peace and stability of the region; [CH] China’s Proposals for Military-to-Military Cooperation in the Draft COC • Option 2: [CH] continued • b. Enhancing exchanges and cooperation among the defence and military forces, promoting maritime cooperation, dialogue and exchanges at all levels, setting up and improving platforms for regular communication and dialogue, and carrying out activities such as mutual port calls of military vessels and joint patrol on a regular basis; [CH] China’s Proposals for Military-to-Military Cooperation in the Draft COC • c. Undertaking joint military exercises among China and ASEAN Members States on a regular basis; [CH]
• d. The Parties shall establish a notification mechanism on
military activities, and to notify each other of major military activities if deemed necessary. The Parties shall not hold joint military exercises with countries from outside the region, unless the parties concerned are notified beforehand and express no objection; [CH] Other Options for Notification of Military Exercises • 2c. Basic undertakings iii. Self-restraint/Promotion of trust and confidence • Option 1 [ID = Indonesia] • 5(c) notifying on a voluntary basis, other Parties concerned of any impending joint/combined military exercise • Alternate (for entire Point 2c) [VN = Vietnam] • 1(q) Notify other Contracting States of any impending joint/combined military exercise/drill to be taken place within the South China Sea. Such notifications shall be made 60 days before the commencement of such military exercise/drill. China’s Proposals for Military-to-Military Cooperation in the Draft COC • e. Military vessels and military aircraft enjoy sovereign immunity and are therefore immune from the jurisdiction of any State other than their flag state. Military vessels and military aircraft are entitled to self-defence under international law, but should have due regard for the other side’s military vessels and military aircraft while exercising the right of self- defence; [CH] Proposals for the Management of Incidents in the Draft COC • 2 v. Management of incidents • On the management of incidents/collisions at sea, the Parties agree to comply with the 1972 COLREG and the 1974 SOLAS [SG]; [SG’s comment: These instruments, cited in the previous section, also cover the management of incidents.] • 2. Encourage the application of international standards for the safety of navigation at sea such as International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPC Code), Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), etc., in accordance with the specific scope of each document [TH]; • SG- Singapore, TH = Thailand Proposals for the Management of Incidents in the Draft COC • 3. In order to improve operational safety of naval ships and naval aircrafts in air and at sea, and ensure mutual trust among all Parties, Parties agree to use the safety and communication procedures for the safety of all Parties’ naval ships and naval aircrafts, as set out in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) CUES when they encounter each other in the South China Sea; [CA, CH, SG] • CA = Cambodia, CH -= China, SG = Singapore Proposals for the Management of Incidents in the Draft COC • 4. The Parties agree to carry out joint exercises for the implementation of CUES; [CH]
• 5. The Parties are encouraged to develop bilateral and
multilateral codes for maritime and air encounters of military ships and aircraft, consistent with the purposes and principles of the COC; [CH] Proposals for the Management of Incidents in the Draft COC 8. In managing and resolving incidents, the concerned Parties abide by the following rules and procedures: [ID] • c. The chiefs of naval operation or naval attaches/military attaches of the parties involved shall discuss the incident immediately after it occurs; [ID] • ID = Indonesia Proposals for the Management of Incidents in the Draft COC • 9. Establish in a gradual manner bilateral and multilateral military hotlines among the defence authorities at all levels; [CH] • 10. Establish hotline platforms among maritime law enforcement agencies in a step-by-step manner; [CH] • 11. Launch “the Hotline Platform on Search and Rescue Among China and ASEAN Member states” at an early date. Explore the possibilities to establish hotline platforms in other fields where there is a practical need. [CH] Vietnam’s Proposal to Replace All Other Options – 7 Do Nots • Alternate (for entire point 2c on Basic Undertakings) [VN] • 2. The Contracting States shall not: • a. Resort to threat or use of force, coercive actions or any other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment against persons from other Contracting States while conducting law enforcement activities; • b. Conduct construction of any artificial island in the South China Sea; Vietnam’s Proposal to Replace All Other Options – 7 Do Nots • c. Initiate, participating in, or allow the use of its territories for any policy or activity that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability; • d. Militarize occupied features in the South China Sea; • e. Blockade vessels carrying provisions or personnel for rotation; • f. Declare an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea; • g. Conduct simulated attacks that aim guns, missile launches, inter alia, at targets of other countries. Conclusion • Australia and its Regional Partners • Training, exercises, capability, maritime domain awareness • Increased Australian Military Presence in Indo-Pacific Region • Build Collaborative Regional Architecture • ASEAN-centric, East Asia Summit, ADMM Plus • Trilateral, Quad Conclusion
• Build Australia’s Defence Capability
defence industry cooperation with the U.S. Maintain capability edge • Engage with China • Our interests are not always aligned • China engages in counter-productive behaviour Final Takeaway • 2c iv Prevention of incidents • Confidence Building Measures • 2. Consistent with their obligations under this Code and international instruments, the Parties shall adopt, at the appropriate levels of government, processes, guidelines and notification protocols to operationalise the Parties’ obligation to exercise self-restraint in the South China Sea, and mechanisms at the appropriate levels to ensure their implementation. [PH = Philippines] Final Takeaway • Assist ASEAN members in drafting processes, guidelines and protocols as Appendices to final South China Sea Code of Conduct • Military-to-military cooperation – exercises, hot lines etc. • Cooperation between maritime law enforcement agencies • Prevention of incidents at sea • Management of incidents at sea • Resolving incidents at sea • Accession to COC by Third Parties who have direct interests in the security of the South China Sea Sharing Maritime Security Perspectives in the South China Sea: An Australian Perspective Emeritus Professor Carlyle A. Thayer, Presentation Session 2 to Workshop on Maritime Security in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean Region: Exploring Convergent Views co-sponsored by National Maritime Foundation and Embassy of Japan Jacaranda Hall, India Habitat Centre, New Delhi, India January 30, 2020