78. People vs.

Peralta
Facts:
About the month of October, 1919, and for sometime previously Cecilio Toledo held the
position of president of the "Philippine Marine Union," and in such capacity, he had the
privilege of occupying, as his dwelling, a room of house No. 507 of Jaboneros Street of
this city, which was rented to said association. About the middle of said month of
October, Toledo was discharged from the position of president and was succeeded by
Olimpio de Peralta. The latter, for the purpose of looking for a desk glass which he
believed was the property of the union, entered the room in question in the morning of
the 16th of the same month. This gave rise to the information for trespass to dwelling
against Peralta, in which it is alleged that he entered the room of Toledo against the will
of the occupant.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant is guilty of trespass to dwelling
Held:
No, After a careful study of the testimony given in the case, The court are of the opinion
that the accused, after calling at or near the door, pushed it and without the permission
of the occupants entered the room with the object of taking away the desk glass. There
is no evidence that Toledo had expressed his will in the sense of prohibiting the
accused Peralta from entering his room, and the mere fact that the latter entered it,
without the permission of the occupant, does not constitute the offense of trespass to
dwelling provided for and penalized in article 491 of the Penal Code. In order that this
crime may exist it is necessary that the entrance should be against the express or
presumed prohibition of the occupant, and the lack of permission should not be
confused with prohibition. In the decisions of the courts of Spain, as well as in those of
this jurisdiction, it has been held uniformly that this crime is committed when a person
enters another's dwelling against the will of the occupant, but not when the entrance is
effected without his knowledge or opposition.
79. US vs. Silvano
Facts:
It was duly proven at the trial that Francisca Fabian and her husband lived at No. 739
Calle T. Alonso, in a house which belonged to Simon de los Reyes; that they occupied a
room therein next to the sala, which latter room was rented and occupied by Joaquin
Silvano, in company with two married couples; that early in the morning of July 8, 1913,
while the woman Fabian, an old lady named Marciana de los Santos and a little girl
named Eusebia Juan were asleep in the said room, Fabian’s husband having left for
Cebu on the previous day, Joaquin Silvano, taking advantage of this circumstance,
entered the room by cutting a ribbon with which the door latch was fastened; that
Francisca Fabian was awakened by the noise made by defendant’s entry and turned up
the light of a lamp which stood on a table, whereupon she saw and recognized the
defendant, who was already inside the room; that the defendant said to her: "If you’re
not willing, I’ll kill you," to which she replied by asking him why he had entered her room;
that defendant was carrying a pocket knife in his hand; that she became afraid and took
refuge beside the old lady Marciana de los Santos; and that at this moment defendant
put out the light and precipitately left the room. It was afterwards discovered that the
ribbon with which the girl Eusebia Juan had fastened the room door had been cut in
two, and this ribbon was presented in evidence as Exhibit A.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant is guilty of Forcible entry of dwelling
Held:
Yes, The facts aforestated, duly proven in the present cause, classify the crime as
forcible entry of a dwelling, inasmuch as it was committed by means of violence upon
the door of the dwelling room of the offended party, and by intimidation, since
defendant, who was carrying a pocket knife, threatened the prosecuting witness with
death. This crime is provided for and punished by article 491, paragraph 2, of the Penal
Code. It cannot be doubted that Joaquin Silvano had no authority to enter the said room
without the permission and consent of its inmates. Notwithstanding this, early in the
morning of the affair, taking advantage of the absence of Francisca Fabian’s husband
and of Francisca’s being asleep with her companions, he cut the ribbon which fastened
the door and, on being discovered, threatened her with death. All these details
aggravate and qualify the forcible entry. The circumstance of defendant’s being a
boarder in the same house does not alter the nature of the crime nor the responsibility
of the perpetrator thereof. Neither can the circumstance of the door being fastened by a
weak and inadequate ribbon support the claim that there was no breaking in, since
before going to sleep the prosecuting witness closed and fastened her door, thereby
giving it to be understood that she did not wish anyone to enter without her express
consent.
80. PEDRO GABRIEL v. PEOPLE +

Facts:

Sherman Jones and his wife, Josefina Jones, were occupying the house No. 9-B, M. H.
del Pilar St., Malabon, Rizal, having as neighbor their comadre Mariquita Beltran. The
electric meter of the premises was installed on a wall in the balcony, and visible from
the porch of the house (Exhibit 1). At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of April 19, 1949,
accused Pedro Gabriel, Avelino Natividad and Miguel Evangelista arrived at the house,
presented themselves as Meralco light inspectors to Mrs. Jones who was then on the
stairs of the house with Mariquita and inquired from the ladies for Sherman Jones. Mrs.
Jones told them to wait on the porch; she entered the living room, closed the door
behind her and went to the family bedroom where Sherman was then in the act of
changing his clothes. While Mrs. Jones was inside the bedroom and informing her
husband of the presence of the Meralco inspectors, accused Gabriel inspected the
electric meter and then shouted to his co-accused Natividad: "Naty, atras ang
contador." Natividad rushed into the living room and then entered the bedroom where
Sherman and his wife were talking. Natividad pushed the door of the bedroom with such
force that the said door brushed aside Mrs. Jones who was then leaving behind it.
Accused Gabriel followed Natividad to the bedroom and, with the help of flashlights,
both searched for a gadget which they suspected Sherman used in order to steal
electric fluid. Notwithstanding Sherman's protest of their intrusion, the two accused
continued their search. Finding that Sherman meant business, the intruders left the
bedroom hastily, boarded their jeep and went away with the other accused Evangelista
to Sangandaan Street where they met policeman Pablo Malosido of Caloocan. The trio
requested the policeman accompany them to Sherman's house in order to explain to
him that they had. no intention to do him any harm. The policeman accompanied them,
but upon noticing the presence of several Americans in the house, they left. They
noticed later that a truck commonly known as 6x6 started from Sherman's house and
followed them. They were able to hide and later went to the municipal building of
Caloocan, at which Sherman and his companions subsequently arrived to complain.
Sherman's complaint, however, was referred to the police authorities of Malabon who
had jurisdiction over the case."
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant is guilty of trespass to dwelling
Held:
No, counsel contend that appellants are exempt from criminal liability under the third
paragraph of article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, because "they rendered a service
to justice" when, as Meralco line inspectors, they "followed Mrs. Sherman Jones to the
bedroom" and there found her husband "hiding a transformer in an 'aparador' " Here
again, counsel assume something which was not believed by the Court of Appeals, that
is, that appellants saw Jones in the act of hiding a transformer used by him "in stealing
electricity," this claim being characterized by the court as nothing but a "vain effort on
the part of the appellants to fit the facts of the case to the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code to the effect that a person who enters a dwelling for the purpose of
rendering service to justice, is not guilty of trespass." In other words, the Court of
Appeals believed that appellants merely suspected that there was a transformer in the
house. That alone did not give them the right to enter the house against the will of its
owner, unarmed as they were with a search warrant.
81. US vs De La Cruz
Facts:
Sofronio de la Cruz threatened Dolores Coronel in a letter with death or the burning of
her house unless she gave him P500, which she must deposit in the place indicated to
her in the letter. This letter was found by Rafaela Goronel, who was living with Dolores,
in the fence around her house, and as she was then on her way to church she turned it
over to her neighbor Agustin, Coronel, who read its contents to Dolores Coronel, an old
woman of 70 years, who became nervous and uneasy upon seeing herself thus
threatened. Tito Coronel reported the matter to the municipal president of Guagua,
Pampanga, who went to Dolores’ house and adopted some precautionary measures.
Upon returning to the town hall he found a man held under arrest by the Constabulary.
He had him searched to see whether he was carrying any prohibited thing and there
was found upon him an envelope inside a pocketbook, and upon the envelope was
written the name of Dolores Coronel. The man under arrest was Sofronio de la Cruz.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant is guilty of threats
Held:
Yes, defendant is guilty of threats. One of the methods of proving the authenticity of a
writing is collation, the comparison the court can make with other writings proven to its
satisfaction to be authentic. The trial court held to be proven to its satisfaction as
authentic the writing by the defendant (Exhibit B) that was found inside the pocketbook.
The defendant tried to ascribe the writing to another — to Tito Coronel — and his
counsel tested Tito Coronel by having him write in the court room what he dictated to
him. He directed him to write the name of a person and of a place as the address of a
letter, and it plainly appears that neither the free handwriting of the letter nor the
firmness of the strokes of the writing is at all like the somewhat rough and uncertain
form, as of a beginner, of the writing and strokes in Exhibit B and the anonymous
Exhibits A and C.
82. Santiago Paera Vs. People of the Philippines

FACTS:

As punong barangay, Santiago allocated his constituent’s use of communal water

coming from a communal tank by limiting distribution to the residents of his contituents.
Despite Santiago’s scheme, Indalecio continued drawing water from the tank. Santiago
reminded Indalecio of the water distribution scheme and cut Indalecios access.
The following day, Santiago inspected the tank after constituents complained of water
supply interruption. Santiago discovered a tap from the main line which he promptly
disconnected. To stem the flow of water from the ensuing leak, Santiago, using a
borrowed bolo, fashioned a wooden plug. It was at this point
when Indalecio arrived. Santiago then, without any warning, picked-up his bolo and
charged towards Indalecio, shouting Patyon tikaw! (I will kill you!). Indalecio ran for
safety, passing along the way, Diosetea. Upon seeing Santiago, Diosetea inquired
what the matter was. Instead of replying, Santiago shouted
“Wala koy gipili, bisag babaye ka, patyon tikaw!” (I dont spare anyone, even if you are a
woman, I will kill you!). Diosetea similarly scampered and sought refuge in the nearby
house of a relative. Unable to pursue Diosetea, Santiago turned his attention back to
Indalecio. As Santiago chased Indalecio, he passed Vicente, and, recognizing the latter,
repeatedly thrust his bolo towards him, shouting “Bisag gulang ka, buk-
on nako imo ulo!” (Even if you are old, I will crack open your skull!).
Santiago was charged for three (3) counts of Grave Threats.

Santiago claimed that he can only be charged for a single count of the continued
complex crime of Grave Threats. He argued that there is a single crime committed
through series of acts arising from one criminal intent.

ISSUE: Whether Santiago is guilty of three counts of Grave Threats.

RULING:

Santiago is liable for three counts of Grave Threats.

Article 282 of the RPC holds liable for Grave Threats any person who shall threaten
another with the infliction upon the person x x x of the latter or his family of any wrong
amounting to a crime. This felony is consummated as soon as the threats come to the
knowledge of the person threatened.

Applying these parameters, it is clear that Santiago’s threat to kill Indalecio and
Diosetea and crack open Vicentes skull are wrongs on the person amounting to (at the
very least) homicide and serious physical injuries as penalized under the RPC. These
threats were consummated as soon as Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente heard Santiago
utter his threatening remarks. Having spoken the threats at different points in time to
these three individuals, albeit in rapid succession, Santiago incurred three separate
criminal liabilities.
Santiago’s theory fusing his liability to one count of Grave Threats because he only had
a single mental resolution, a single impulse, and single intent to threaten
Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente assumes a vital fact: that he had foreknowledge
of Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicentes presence near the water tank. The facts, however,
belie this assumption. Thus, in the case of Indalecio, Santiago was as much surprised
to see Indalecio as the latter was in seeing Santiago when they chanced upon each
other near the water tank. Similarly, Santiago came across Diosetea as he was
chasing Indalecio who had scampered for safety. Lastly, Santiago crossed paths with
Vicente while running after Indalecio. Indeed, Santiago went to the water tank not to
execute his single intent to threaten Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente but to investigate
a suspected water tap. Not having known in advance of Indalecio, Diosetea, and
Vicente’s presence near the water tank at the time in question, Santiago could not have
formed any intent to threaten any of them until shortly before he inadvertently came
across each of them.
Santiago’s intent to threaten Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente with bodily harm arose
only when he chanced upon each of his victims.

Indeed, Santiagos theory holds water only if the facts are altered that is, he
threatened Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente at the same place and at the same
time. Had this been true, then Santiagos liability for one count of Grave Threats.
83. RONNIE CALUAG, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts:

In the afternoon of March 19, 2000, around 4 o’clock8 in the afternoon, Nestor learned
that two of his guests from an earlier drinking spree were mauled. At that time, Caluag
and Sentillas were drinking at the store owned by the son of Sentillas. When Nestor
inquired from several people including his own son Raymond what happened, Caluag
butted in and replied, "Bakit kasama ka ba roon?," and immediately boxed him without
warning. Nestor retaliated but he was overpowered by Caluag and Sentillas. Julia saw
Caluag and Sentillas box her husband. Although she tried to pacify them, they did not
listen to her. To avoid his assailants, Nestor ran to his house. Julia followed him. At
around 6:00 p.m., Nestor told his wife to report the boxing incident to the barangay
authorities.9

Later, at around 7:30 in the evening, when Julia and her son Rotsen were on their way
to their barangay hall, she encountered Caluag, who blocked her way at the alley near
her house. Caluag confronted Julia with a gun, poked it at her forehead, and said "Saan
ka pupunta, gusto mo ito?"10 Despite this fearful encounter, she was still able to
proceed to the barangay hall where she reported the gun-poking incident to the
barangay authorities.

Issue:

Whether or not the defendant is guilty of threats

Held:

Yes, It noted that Nestor did not deny that he was drunk at the time of the incident while
Caluag admitted that he got annoyed by Nestor’s attitude. The court concluded that
Caluag and Sentillas lost control of their tempers due to Nestor’s unruly behavior. On
the other hand, the court noted that Julia did not waste time reporting the gun-poking
incident to the barangay. While she had intended to report the mauling of her husband,
as he instructed her, what she reported instead was what happened to her. With such
straightforward and seemingly natural course of events, the MeTC was convinced that
the negative assertions of Caluag and Sentillas cannot prevail over the positive
testimonies of Nestor and Julia.
84. US vs Mena
Facts:
On or about the 21st day of December, 1907, three carabaos, the property of the
defendant, trespassed upon the rice paddies of the complaining witness, Ceferino Flora,
doing considerable damage thereto. Flora took possession of the animals and refused
to return them to the defendant without compensation for the damage done. The
defendant did to deny Flora's right to compensation, but said that he was unable to
make payment in kind, because at the time he did not own any rice; and there would
appear to have been some question also as to the amount damage done by the
animals.. Between 10 and 11 o'clock on the following morning, Flora and his son set out
to take the carabaos to the justice of the peace, for the purpose of depositing them in
his care until the question of damages could be settled in his court. On the road to the
justice of the peace, they met the defendant in company with some of the party who
were with the defendant, Flora said that he was bringing the animals to the justice of
peace, and refused to surrender them to the defendant or his friends. Thereupon, the
defendant drew his bolo, rushed at Flora's don (who was in advance of Flora himself,
mounted on one of the carabaos, and leading another with a mecate), cut
the mecate by which the son was leading the carabao, and with threats of bodily injury,
compelled him to turn the other loose; and then with further threats of bodily injury,
compelled Flora himself to turn loose the carabao which he was riding.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant is liable for grave coercion
Held:
Yes,The acts committed by the defendant clearly fall within the foregoing definition of
the crime of coaccion. With violence he compelled the complaining witness to do that
which he did not desire to do - that is to say, to turn over the possession of the carabaos
- and it matters not whether it was "just or unjust" that they should thus have been
turned over to the defendant; whether it was or was not the duty of the complaining
witness to turn them over on demand, the defendant was guilty of the crime
of coaccion unless he was lawfully authorized to enforce his demand when the
complaining witness refused compliance therewith.
85. MARCIAL PUNZALAN v. PEOPLE

Facts:
on or about the 14th day of November, 1951, in the Municipality of Tiaong, Province of
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Hon. Court, the said accused,
being the Municipal Mayor of said municipality, taking advantage of his official position
as such, without any justifiable motive, and with evident purpose of extorting confession
from one Moises Escueta did then itnd there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously illtreat
the latter, by then and there assaulting, beating and striking the abdomen, face, breast
and arms with an Automatic Pistol, caliber .45 and his fist, while said Moises Escueta
was kept in the Camp of the Phil. Ground Force (PGF) located in the said municipality,
thereby causing injuries in the different parts of his body which required medical
attendance for a period of seven (7) days, and incapacitated the said offended party
from performing his customary labor for the same period of time
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant is liable for grave coercion
Held:
Yes, The fact that an individual was maltreated for the purpose of compelling to confess
a crime which was attributed to him, constitute the crime of consummated coercion,
even if the agents of the authorities who carried out the maltreatment did not
accomplish their purpose to draw from him a confession, which it was their intention to
obtain by the employment of such means
86. US vs Albao
Facts:
That on or about the 25th day of June, 1913, Vicente Lizarraga was in the possession of
202 "latas de opio," which were of the value of about P14,000.. That on the day in
question, after repeated efforts to sell the said opium, Vicente Lizarraga met Ciriaco
Singson together with others, in the house of one Francisco Jurado, for the purpose of
consummating the sale of the 202 "latas de opio." That on the night in question (25th of
June, 1913), while Vicente Lizarraga and Ciriaco Singson, in the house of Francisco
Jurado, were negotiating for the sale of said opium, the defendant Alejandro Albao,
together with others unknown, appeared at the house of Francisco Jurado and
demanded that the opium be turned over to him, by means of threats and violence,
using a revolver and pointing the same at Vicente Lizarraga. That by reason of said
threats, intimidation and demands, by using his revolver, the defendant, Alejandro
Albao, took possession of said 202 "latas de opio," against the will and consent of
Vicente Lizarraga. That after the said opium had been delivered in the manner above
indicated to Alejandro Albao, he promised to return the same upon the payment to him
and his unknown associates of the sum of P6,000. That the defendant, Alejandro Albao,
had been and was a policeman in the city of Cebu at the time; that he makes no
pretense or claim that he was acting in his capacity as a policeman at the time he took
forcible possession of the opium in question. That the opium in question was never
returned to Vicente Lizarraga, nor to any public authority.cha
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant is guilty of robbery
Held:

Yes, during the trial of the cause there was an effort made to show that Vicente
Lizarraga was not the owner of the opium and that said opium was contraband goods,
and that, therefore the crime of robbery could not have been committed with reference
to said property. In the commission of the crime of robbery, it is not necessary that the
person from whom the property is taken, by means of threats and violence, shall be the
owner. It is sufficient if the property is taken from him by means of threats and
violence, for the purpose of gain, on the part of the person appropriating it. The
possession of the property is sufficient. Ownership is not necessary. Robbery may be
committed from a bailee or from a person who himself has stolen it and it has even
been held that the taking of clothing from the body of a dead person constitutes robbery,
as the property of the executor. Even the owner of property may be guilty of robbery
when, for instance, he takes it from the possession of a bailee, with the intent to charge
the bailee with its value.
87. US v. PEDRO LAHOYLAHOY

Facts:
It appears that in the year 1912 some ten or a dozen people were living on the small
island of Sicogon, in the jurisdiction of the municipality of Balasan, Province of Iloilo. Two
of these were an aged couple named Francisco Seran and his wife Juana. Two others
were Roman Estriba and his wife Rosa. The latter couple had two children Miguela and
Bartolome, aged at that time respectively about 14 and 9 years. Upon the night of the
commission of the crime charged in the complaint the two children were staying with
Juana, their grandmother, in a house some distance removed from that occupied by
Roman and Rosa and located farther back from the shore. The grandfather, Francisco,
had gone to the beach as was his custom to watch for turtles. After the grandmother and
the children had gone to rest on a mat where they slept together, and probably only a
short while after it had become dark, the two accused appeared and demanded money
of Juana. She gave them P100 in money in response to this demand, and the accused
then required the three to leave the house and go in the direction of the sea. When the
party had arrived at or near the beach, a further demand was made upon the old woman
for money, which demand she was unable to comply with. Lahoylahoy then struck her
with a bolo just below her breast, killing her instantly. The two children were at the time
close to their grandmother, and being greatly frightened, they ran away separately for
some distance and remained hidden during the night in the bushes.
The next morning the children made their way to the house where the old couple had
lived, which was vacant; but they there found each other and proceeded together to the
house of their parents. Going in that direction they stopped at the house of their sister,
the wife of the defendant Madanlog. When they went a little later to the house where their
parents had lived, the fact was revealed that Francisco, Roman, and Rosa had also been
killed. All the bodies were collected and buried early in the morning by the two accused,
assisted by Eugenio Tenedero, son-in-law of Lahoylahoy. The two children Miguela and
Bartolome say that they were threatened with death if they should make complaint.
Nevertheless their lives were spared, and for sometime they stayed with their sister in the
home of Madanlog; and after staying for a long time on the island; they were afterwards
taken to the home of another sister, named Dionisia Estriba, at Escalante, on the Island
of Panay. They here revealed the facts above narrated. This sister, Dionisia, afterwards
filed the complaint in this case. Pedro Lahoylahoy was arrested first; and when he was
examined before the justice of the peace, he made a confession in which he stated that
the four deceased persons had been killed by Madanlog, with his assistance.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of robbery
Held:
No, In the light of what has been said it is evident that, by reason of the lack of conformity
between the allegation and the proof respecting the ownership of the property, it is
impossible to convict the two accused of the offense of robbery committed by them in this
case; and therefore they cannot be convicted of the complex offense of robbery with
homicide, penalized in subsection (1) of article 503 of the Penal Code. No such difficulty
exists, however, with respect to the quadruple homicide committed upon the persons
named in the complaint; and in conformity with the provisions of article 87 of the Penal
Code, the penalties corresponding to all these crimes must be severely imposed. This
court has already held in United States vs. Balaba (37 Phil. Rep., 260), that where more
than one offense (not complex offenses) are charged in the complaint, and the accused
fails to demur or ask for a severance, the penalties corresponding to all of the offenses
which are charged and proved may be imposed. The doctrine announced in that case
applies with even greater propriety to a case like that now before us, because here the
statute expressly authorizes the joining of the different offenses in one complaint.