1political and International Law PDF

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COVEREDCASESAND
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PERLAS-
BERNABE
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Micah Regina A. Gonzales Ma. Lourdes M. Santos
Zennia S. Turrecha
Nestor J. Porlucas, Jr.
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SUBJECT HEADS
Constitutional Law I CHRISTIAN S. TADURAN
Constitutional Law II PATRICK RAY B. BALISI
Administrative Law and LEONORE MAE P. DEGOLLADO
Law on Public Corporation
Election Law and Law on Public Officers FRANCIS ARTHUR A. CORPUZ
Public International Law GERANI D. MALIJAN
SUBJECT MEMBERS
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Atty. ANTONIO EDUARDO S. NACHURA, JR.
PREFACE
The COVERED CASES AND J. PERLAS-BERNABE CASE DOCTRINES was
crafted as an apt response for the need to provide a comprehensive compilation of
jurisprudence, promulgated by the Supreme Court, covered for this year’s Bar
Examinations. This complement significantly the other bar review materials in the
repository of the San Beda Centralized Bar Operations.
On this year’s edition, the COVERED CASES is in two forms: a printed copy of
the Covered Cases: Case Doctrines, and a digital copy of the Covered Cases: Case
Digests which include the Supreme Court decisions released from July 1, 2017 to June
30, 2018; while the J. PERLAS-BERNABE CASE DOCTRINES includes the
summary of the rulings pronounced by the 2019 Bar Examination Chairperson, the
Honorable Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, from September 16, 2011 to December
31, 2018.
In addition to that, the cases herein are categorized and arranged based on the
2019 Supreme Court Bar Exam Syllabus in order to guide its readers in their
appreciation and understanding of the court decisions.
With this material, the San Beda Centralized Bar Operations seeks to uphold
its legacy of service and excellence in helping the examinees achieve their goal of
becoming worthy members of the legal profession.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Page
Number
Leonardia vs. Phuture Visions Co., Inc. …………………………………………..…….… 1

G.R. No. 190289; January 17, 2018
Lagman vs. Pimentel III ………………………………………………………………………. 2

G.R. Nos. 235935, 236061, 236145 & 236155; February 6, 2018
Baguilat, Jr. vs. Alvarez ……………………………………………………………………… 4
G.R. No. 227757; July 25, 2017
Trillanes IV vs. Hon. Castillo Marigomen …………………………………………………. 5

GR. No. 223451; March 14, 2018
Dela Cruz vs. Ochoa, Jr. ……………………………………………………………………... 6

G.R. No. 219683; January 23, 2018.
Confederation of Coconut Farmers Organizations of the Philippines, Inc. ………… 7
vs. Aquino III
G.R. No. 217965; August 8, 2017
Career Executive Service Board, Represented by its Executive Director, …………. 8
Maria Anthonette Velasco-Allones vs. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 212348; June 19, 2018
Lagman vs. Medialdea ………………………………………………………………….……. 9

G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774 (Resolution); December 5, 2017
Padilla vs. Congress of the Philippines …………………………………………..………. 14
G.R. Nos. 231671 & 231694; July 25, 2017
Heirs of Zoleta vs. Land Bank of the Philippines ……………………………………..… 15
G.R. No. 205128; September 8, 2017
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Fastech Synergy Philippines, Inc. ………….….… 16
G.R. No. 206150; September 8, 2017
Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators vs. …….…. 17
Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 223505; October 3, 2017
Philippine International Trading Corp. vs. Commission on Audit …………………… 18
G.R. No. 205837; November 21, 2017
Republic vs. N. Dela Merced & Sons, Inc. ………………………………………………... 19
G.R. Nos. 201501 & 201658; January 22, 2018
Padilla vs. Congress of the Philippines ……………………………………………….….. 20
G.R. Nos. 231671 & 231694; July 25, 2017
Umali vs. Judicial and Bar Council ………………………………………………………... 21
G.R. No. 228628, July 25, 2017
Ocampo vs. Enriquez ………………………………………………………………………… 22
G.R. No. 225973; August 8, 2017
Umali vs. Judicial and Bar Council ………………………………………………………... 23

G.R. No. 228628; July 25, 2017
Republic vs. Sereno ………………………………………………………………………….. 24

GR No. 237428; May 11, 2018
Cerilles vs. Civil Service Commission ……………………………………………………. 25

G.R. No. 180845; November 22, 2017
Small Business Corporation vs. Commission on Audit ……………………………….. 26
G.R. No. 230628; October 3, 2017
Feliciano vs. Department of National Defense …………………………………………... 27
G.R. Nos. 199232 & 201577 (Resolution); November 8, 2017
Nayong Pilipino Foundation, Inc. vs. Tan ………………………………………………... 28
G.R. No. 213200; September 19, 2017
Marmeto vs. Comelec ………………………………………………………………………… 29
G.R. No. 213953; September 26, 2017
Pasok, Jr. vs. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao ……………………………………. 30

G.R. No. 218413; June 6, 2018
Samahan ng Progresibong Kabataan vs. Quezon City ………………………………… 31
G.R. No. 225442; August 8, 2017
Aparente vs. People …………………………………………………..……………………… 32

G.R. No. 205695; September 27, 2017
People vs. Saluday …………………………………………………………………………… 33
G.R. No. 215305; April 3, 2018
Valmores vs. Achacoso ……………………………………………………………………… 34

G.R. No. 217453; July 19, 2017
Genuino vs. De Lima …………………………………………………………………………. 35

G.R. Nos. 197930, 199034 & 199046; April 17, 2018
Evergreen Manufacturing Corp. vs. Republic …………………………………………… 36

G.R. Nos. 218628 & 218631; September 6, 2017
Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Galle ………………………………………………... 37
G.R. No. 171836 & 195213; October 2, 2017
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Omengan ……………………………………………… 38
G.R. No. 196412; July 19, 2017
Republic vs. Larrazabal ……………………………………………………………………… 39
G.R. No. 204530; July 26, 2017
National Transmission Corp. vs. Oroville Development Corp. ………………………. 40
G.R. No. 223366; August 1, 2017
People vs. Cabanada …………………………………………………………………………. 41

G.R. No. 221424; July 19, 2017
People vs. Fernandez ………………………………………………………………………… 42
G.R. No. 218310; February 14, 2018
Kim Liong vs. People ………………………………………………………………………… 43

G.R. No. 200630, June 4, 2018
People vs. Sandiganbayan ………………………………………………………………..… 44

G.R. Nos. 232197-232198; April 16, 2018
People vs. Domingo ………………………………………………………………………..… 45
G.R. No. 204895; March 21, 2018
Magno vs. People …………………………………………………………………………..… 46
G.R. No. 230657; March 14, 2018
People vs. Alejandro …………………………………………………………………………. 47

G.R. No. 223099; January 11, 2018
Callo vs. Morente ……………………………………………………………………………… 48
G.R. No. 230324; September 19, 2017
Gadian vs. Ibrado …………………………………………………………………………...… 49
G.R. No. 188163 & 188195; October 3, 2017
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the ……………………………………...… 50
Director/Head of the CIDG, PNP vs. Cayanan and Pascua
G.R. No. 181796; November 7, 2017
Republic vs. Go Hei Pung …………………………………………………………………… 51

G.R. No. 212785; April 4, 2018
Mahtani vs. Republic …………………………………………………………………………. 52
G.R. No. 211118; March 21, 2018
Tan vs. Crisologo ……………………………………………………………………………... 53

G.R. No. 193993; November 8, 2017
Re: Fake Certificates of Civil Service Eligibility of Marivic B. Ragel, ……………….. 54

Evelyn C. Ragel, Emelyn B. Campos, And Jovilyn B. Dawang
A.M. No. 14-10-314-RTC; November 28, 2017
Castilla vs. Duncano …………………………………………………………………………. 55
A.M. No. P-17-3771; January 24, 2018
Balloguing vs. Dagan 56
A.M. No. P-17-3645; January 30, 2018
Office of the Ombudsman vs. Regalado 57
G.R. Nos. 208481-82; February 7, 2018
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) vs. Commission on Audit ………………………. 58

G.R. No. 213424, July 11, 2017
Paduga vs. Dimson …………………………………………………………………………… 59

A.M. No. P-18-3833 (Resolution), April 16, 2018
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Viesca …………………………………………….. 60
A.M. No. P-12-3092; October 10, 2017
Fernando vs. Commission on Audit (En Banc) ………………………………………….. 61
G.R. No. 214910; February 13, 2018
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Bravo ……………………………………………… 62
A.M. No. P-17-3710; March 13, 2018
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit ……………………… 63
G.R. No. 221706; March 13, 2018
Abubakar vs. People …………………………………………………………………………. 64
G.R. No. 202408, 202409, 202412; June 27, 2018
Re: Dropping from the Rolls of Mr. Florante Sumangil ………………………………… 65
A.M. No. 18-04-79-RTC; June 20, 2018
Re: Dropping from the Rolls of Mr. Arno D. Del Rosario ………………………………. 66
A.M. No. 17-12-135-MeTC; April 16, 2018
Re: Report of Judge Peras, RTC Cebu Branch 10, ……………………………………… 67
on the Acts of Insubordination of Camaso
A.M. No. 15-02-47-RTC, March 21, 2018
Field Investigation Office vs. Piano ……………………………………………………….. 68

G.R. No. 215042; November 20, 2017
Purisima vs. Carpio-Morales ………………………………………………………………... 69
G.R. No. 219501; July 26, 2017
Tan vs. Valeriano ……………………………………………………………………………… 70
G.R. No. 185559; August 2, 2017
Recto-Sambajon vs. Public Attorney’s Office …………………………………………… 71
G.R. No. 197745; September 6, 2017
GMA Network, Inc vs. National Telecommunication Commission …………………… 72
G.R. No. 192128 & 192135-36; September 13, 2017
Lim vs. Fuentes ………………………………………………………………...……………… 73
G.R. No. 223210; November 6, 2017
Field Investigation Unit-Office of The Deputy Ombudsman …………...……………… 74
for Luzon vs. De Castro
G.R. No. 232666. June 20, 2018
Joson III vs. Commission on Audit …………………………………...…………………… 75
G.R. No. 223762; November 7, 2017
Miralles vs. Commission on Audit …………………………………...…………………….. 76
G.R. No. 210571; September 19, 2017
De Guzman vs. Ombudsman …………………………………...…………………………… 77
G.R. No. 229256; November 22, 2017
Office of the Ombudsman vs. Vergara …………………………………...……………….. 78
G.R. No. 216871; December 6, 2017
Frades vs. Gabriel …………………………………...………………………………………... 79
A. M. No. P-16-3527; November 21, 2017
Fajardo vs. Corral …………………………………...………………………………………… 80
G.R. No. 212641, July 5, 2017
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon vs. Dionisio …………...………………... 81
G.R. No. 220700, July 10, 2017
Hon. Zarate-Fernandez vs. Lovendino …………...……………….…………...………….. 82
A.M. No. P-16-3530; March 6, 2018
Office of the Ombudsman vs. De Guzman …………...…………………………………... 83
G.R. No. 197886, October 4, 2017
Sabio v. Field Investigation Office …………...…………………………………………….. 84
G.R. No. 229882; February 13, 2018
National Transmission Corporation vs. Commission on Audit …………...…………. 85
G.R. No. 227796; February 20, 2018
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Dalawis …………...……………………………… 86
A.M. No. P-17-3638; March 13, 2018
Ifurung vs. Hon Carpio-Morales …………...……………………………………………….. 87
G.R. No. 232131; April 24, 2018
Espaldon, et al vs. Buban …………...………………………………………………………. 88
G.R. No. 202784, April 18, 2018
Canlas vs. Bongolan, et.al. …………...…………………………………………………….. 89
G.R. No. 199625, June 6, 2018
Disciplinary Board, Land Transportation Office vs. Gutierrez …………...…………… 90
G.R. No. 224395; July 3, 2017
Iglesias vs. Office of the Ombudsman …………...……………………………………….. 91
G.R. No. 180745; August 30, 2017
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas vs Commission on Audit …………...……………………. 92
G.R. No. 213581; September 19, 2017
Saunar vs. Ermita …………...………………………………………………………………… 93
G.R. No. 186502; December 13, 2017
Lanao Del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. …………...……………………………… 94

Provincial Government of Lanao G.R. No. 185420; August 29, 2017
Department of Public Works and Highways vs. …………...……………………………. 95
CMC/Monark/Pacific/Hi-Tri Joint Venture
G.R. No. 179732; September 13, 2017
Lefebre vs. A. Brown Company, Inc. …………...…………………………………………. 96
G.R. No. 224973; September 19, 2017
Salvador vs. COMELEC ...………………………………....…………………………………. 97

G.R. No. 230744, September 26, 2017
Francisco vs. COMELEC ...…………………………………...……………………………… 98

G.R. No. 230249; April 24, 2018
Evasco, Jr. v. Montañez ...…………………………………....……………………………… 99

G.R. No. 199172; February 21, 2018
City of Pasig vs. Manila Electric Co. ...…………………………………………………….. 100
G.R. No. 181710; March 7, 2018
Civil Service Commission vs. Unda .………………….…………………………………… 101
G.R. No. 213237 & 213331, July 11, 2017
Lao, Jr. vs. LGU of Cagayan De Oro City ………….……………………………………… 102
G.R. No. 187869; September 13, 2017
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region vs. Muñoz ……………... 103
G.R. No. 207342; November 7, 2017
Summit One Condominium Corporation vs. Pollution Adjudication Board ……….. 104
and Environmental Management Bureau – NCR
G.R. No. 215029, July 5, 2017
COVERED CASES (JULY 01, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
STATE CANNOT BE SUED WITHOUT ITS CONSENT
Leonardia vs. Phuture Visions Co., Inc.

G.R. No. 190289; January 17, 2018
Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS:
Petitioners, City of Bacolod, Hon. Mayor Evelio R. Leonardia, Atty. Allan L. Zamora and
Arch. Lemuel D. Reynaldo filed this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the CA,
reversing the dismissal of respondent Phuture Visions Co., Inc.’s Petition for Mandamus and
Damages by the RTC.
Phuture Vision has operation of lotto betting stations and/or other gaming outlets as one
of its secondary purposes under its Articles of Incorpration. Phuture learned that its bingo outlet
was padlocked by agents of the Office of the City Legal Officer and that a copy of a Closure Order
was posted at the entrance of the bingo outlet, leading to a complaint case filed before the RTC.
The RTC dismissed the action and the suit of damages. CA concluded that Phuture was denied
its proprietary right without due process of law and ordered the case to be reinstated and remanded
to the RTC to determine if damages should be awarded.
According to petitioners, hearing on the action for damages effectively violates the City's
immunity from suit since respondent had not yet obtained the consent of the City Government of
Bacolod to be included in the claim for damages. The City Mayor and other officials impleaded,
are similarly immune from suit since the acts they performed were within their lawful duty and
functions. Moreover, petitioners maintain that they were merely performing governmental or
sovereign acts and exercised their legal rights and duties to implement the provisions of the City
Ordinance.
ISSUE:
Can the city as a government instrumentality be sued without their consent?
RULING:
No, the State may not be sued without its consent.
The principle of immunity from suit is embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987
Philippine Constitution which states that "The State cannot be sued without its consent." The
purpose behind this principle is to prevent the loss of governmental efficiency as a result of the
time and energy it would require to defend itself against lawsuits. The State and its political
subdivisions are open to suit only when they consent to it. Consent may be express or implied,
such as when the government exercises its proprietary functions, or where such is embodied in a
general or special law.
Phuture sued petitioners for the latter's refusal to issue a mayor's permit for bingo
operations and for closing its business on account of the lack of such permit. No consent to be
sued and be liable for damages can thus be implied from the mere conferment and exercise of the
power to issue business permits and licenses.
Thus, while the authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits
is granted by the Local Government Code (LGC), which also vests local government units with
corporate powers, one of which is the power to sue and be sued, this Court has held that the power
to issue or grant licenses and business permits is not an exercise of the government's proprietary
function. Instead, it is in an exercise of the police power of the State, ergo a governmental act.
|1
CONGRESS HAS THE POWER TO EXTEND AND DETERMINE THE PERIOD OF

MARTIAL LAW
Lagman vs. Pimentel III

G.R. Nos. 235935, 236061, 236145 & 236155; February 6, 2018
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the extension of the
proclamation of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for
one year from January 1 to December 31, 2018.
The President requested the Congress to extend the effectively of Proc. No. 216. In a
Special Joint Session, the Congress adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 2 extending Proc.
No. 216 until Dec. 31, 2017. Acting on said recommendations, the President asked both the Senate
and the House of Representatives to further extend the proclamation of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from
Jan. 1, 2018 to Dec. 31, 2018, or for such period as the Congress may determine.
The Senate and the House of Representatives, in a joint session, adopted Resolution of
Both Houses No. 4 further extending the period of martial law and suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year.
The petitioners contend that the Constitution allows only a one-time extension of martial
law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, not a series of extensions
amounting to perpetuity.
ISSUE:
Does the Congress have the power to further extend and determine the period of martial
law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?
RULING:
Yes, the Congress has the power to extend the martial law declaration.
Sec. 18, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution is indisputably silent as to how many times the
Congress, upon the initiative of the President, may extend the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus. The limitations to the exercise of the congressional
authority to extend such proclamation or suspension are (1) that the extension should be upon the
President’s initiative; (2) that it should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or rebellion
and the demands of public safety; and (3) that it is subject to the Court’s review of the sufficiency
of its factual basis upon the petition of any citizen. Sec. 18, Art. VII did not also fix the period of the
extension of the proclamation and suspension. However, it clearly gave the Congress the authority
to decide on its duration; thus, the provision states that that the extension shall be “for a period to
be determined by the Congress.”
The framers of the Constitution evidently gave enough flexibility on the part of the
Congress to determine the duration of the extension. Plain textual reading of Sec. 18, Art. VII and
the records of the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission buttress the view that as regards
the frequency and duration of the extension, the determinative factor is as long as “the invasion or
rebellion persists, and public safety requires” such extension. Hence, the Congress has the power
to extend the martial law declaration.
2|
CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO PROMULGATE RULES IS GENERALLY NOT SUBJECT TO

JUDICIAL REVIEW
Lagman vs. Pimentel III

G.R. Nos. 235935, 236061, 236145 & 236155; February 6, 2018
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the extension of the
proclamation of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for
one year from January 1 to December 31, 2018.
The President requested the Congress to extend the effectively of Proclamation No. 216.
In a Special Joint Session, the Congress adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 2 extending
Proclamation No. 216 until December 31, 2017.
The President again asked both the Senate and the House of Representatives to further
extend the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from Jan 1, 2018 to Dec 31, 2018, or for such period
as the Congress may determine. The Senate and the House of Representatives, in a joint session,
adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 further extending the period of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year.
Petitioners question the manner that the Congress approved the extension of martial law
in Mindanao. Petitioners premised their argument on the fact that the Joint Rules adopted by both
Houses provided for an inordinately short period for interpellation of resource persons and for
explanation by each Member after the voting is concluded.
ISSUE:
Are the Congressional rules on the extension of the martial law subject to judicial review?
RULING:
No, the Court ruled that they cannot review the rules promulgated by Congress in the
absence of any constitutional violation.
No less than the Constitution, under Section 16 of Article VI, grants the Congress the
right to promulgate its own rules to govern its proceedings—a right granted with full discretionary
authority to each House of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules.
As such, the exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference,
except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a
denial of due process. The limitation of this unrestricted power deals only with the imperatives of
quorum, voting and publication. It should be added that there must be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought
to be attained.
In the instant case, the rules in question did not pertain to quorum, voting or publication.
Furthermore, deliberations on extending martial law certainly cannot be equated to the
consideration of regular or ordinary legislation. The Congress may consider such matter as urgent
as to necessitate swift action, or it may take its time investigating the factual situation. Thus,
Congressional rules on the extension of the martial law is not subject to judicial review in the
absence of any constitutional violation.
|3
LEGISLATIVE RULES ARE NOT PERMANENT; THEY ARE SUBJECT TO REVOCATION,

MODIFICATION OR WAIVER
Baguilat, Jr. vs. Alvarez

G.R. No. 227757; July 25, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners, all members of the House of
Representatives, essentially praying that respondents, also members of the House of
Representatives, be compelled to recognize: (a) Rep. Baguilat as the Minority Leader of the 17th
Congress of the House of Representatives; and (b) petitioners as the legitimate members of the
Minority.
Prior to the election of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, then-Acting Floor
Leader Rep. Farinas and Rep. Jose Atienza had an interchange before the Plenary, wherein the
latter elicited the following from the former: (a) all those who vote for the winning Speaker shall
belong to the Majority and those who vote for the other candidates shall belong to the Minority; (b)
those who abstain from voting shall likewise be considered part of the Minority; and (c) the Minority
Leader shall be elected by the members of the Minority.
Thereafter, the Elections for the Speakership were held, with 252 Members voting for
Speaker Alvarez, 8 voting for Rep. Baguilat, 7 voting for Rep. Suarez, 21 abstaining and 1
registering a “no vote.” Thus, resulting in Speaker Alvarez being the duly elected Speaker of the
House of Representatives of the 17th Congress. Later, Rep. Harlin Neil Abayon manifested before
the Plenary that those who did not vote for Speaker Alvarez convened and elected Rep. Suarez
as the Minority Leader.
Petitioners filed this petition insisting that Rep. Baguilat should be recognized as the
Minority Leader in light of the "long-standing tradition" in the House where the candidate who
garnered the second-highest number of votes for Speakership automatically becomes the Minority
Leader.
ISSUE:
May the House of Representatives of the 17th Congress waive the application of such
“long-standing tradition” where the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes
for speakership automatically becomes minority leader?
RULING:
Yes, the House of Representatives may waive its application.
Under Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, the Senate shall elect its President
and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members.
Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. As such, the method of
choosing who will be such other must be prescribed by the House of Representatives itself, not by
the Court. Corollary thereto, Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution vests in the House of
Representatives the sole authority to, inter alia, “determine the rules of its proceedings.” These
“legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness
during their effectivity. In fact, they ‘are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure
of the body adopting them.
Being merely matters of procedure, their observance is of no concern to the courts, for
said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a
majority of the House of Representatives.” Hence, the House of Representatives of the 17th
Congress may waive the application of such “long-standing tradition”.
4|
PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY DOES NOT COVER MEDIA INTERVIEWS
Trillanes IV vs. Hon. Castillo-Marigomen

GR. No. 223451; March 14, 2018
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
Trillanes IV, a Senator, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 over the respondent
judge’s orders which denied the former’s motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration in a civil
case entitled “Antionio Tiu v. Antionio Trillanes IV,” instituted by respondent Tiu.
During the senate hearing regarding the overpriced Makati City Hall II Parking Building,
some references were made on a 350-hectare estate in Batangas also referred to as Hacienda
Binay, supposedly owned by Tiu. During media interviews in between the hearings and in response
to media’s request for him to comment on the matter, Trillanes IV expressed his opinion that Tiu
appears to be a “nominee” or “front” or acting as “dummy” of the actual beneficial owner, former
Vice President Binay.
Tiu sued for damages against Trillanes IV’s defamatory and libelous statements. The
latter invoked parliamentary immunity, claiming that his statements were part of public debate on
the matter. Hon. Castillo-Marigonem denied the motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration
of Trillanes IV because said immunity is subject to special circumstance which must be established
to full blown trial.
ISSUE:
Are the statements made in media interviews covered by parliamentary immunity?
RULING:
No, the statements made in media interviews were not covered by the parliamentary
immunity.
The privilege of speech or debate under Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution covers
speech delivered in Senate or any of its committees, spoken in the course of any debate in said
fora, or made in the official discharge or performance of duties as a Senator. The statement must
be part of or integral to legislative process. They are not so in this case.
The statements were made during the breaks and gaps of the hearing, not delivered in
Senate committees not spoken during a debate therein. They were also not made in the official
discharge of duties as a Senator. To participate in or respond to media interviews is not demanded
by his sworn duty nor is it a component of the process of enacting laws. Indeed, a lawmaker may
well be able to discharge his duties and legislate without having to communicate with the press. A
lawmaker's participation in media interviews is not a legislative act, but is "political in nature,"
outside the ambit of the immunity conferred under the Speech or Debate Clause in the Constitution.
The privilege arises not because the statement is made by a lawmaker, but because it is uttered
in furtherance of legislation.
Trillanes IV, therefore, cannot invoke parliamentary immunity to cause the dismissal of
Tiu's Complaint.
|5
AN APPROPRIATION IS SPECIFIC IN PURPOSE EVEN IF BROKENN DOWN INTO

DIFFERENT SUB-CATEGORIES OF THE SAME NATURE
Dela Cruz vs. Ochoa, Jr.

G.R. No. 219683; January 23, 2018
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
The case is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition which assails the
implementation of LTO’s Motor Vehicle License Plate Standardization Program (MVPSP) in view
of its use of funds appropriated under General Appropriations Act of 2014 (2014 GAA).
LTO is one of the line agencies of DOTC which is tasked, among others, to register motor
vehicles and regulate their operation. Pursuant to its mandate, LTO is required to issue vehicle
license plates. The same recently formulated the MVPSP to supply new license plates for both old
and new vehicle registrants. The program, however, did not appear as an item in the 2014 GAA.
The increased appropriation of Php4,843,753,000.00 was allocated under the item Motor Vehicle
Registration and Driver’s Licensing Regulatory Services (MFO2).
Petitioners who are members of the House of Representatives argued that since MVPSP
did not appear as an item in the 2014 GAA, the use of its funds allocated for the MFO2 amounted
to an unconstitutional transfer of appropriations prohibited by Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution
which provides that “No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriation.”
ISSUE:
Was the implementation of MVPSP properly funded under the appropriation for MFO2
despite the fact that it did not appear as an item in the 2014 GAA?
RULING:
Yes, the implementation of MVPSP was properly funded under the appropriation for
MFO2 in the 2014 GAA.
To be valid, an appropriation must indicate a specific amount and a specific purpose.

However, the purpose may be specific even if it is broken down into different related sub-categories
of the same nature. For example, the purpose can be to "conduct elections," which even if not
expressly spelled out covers regular, special, or recall elections. The purpose of the appropriation
is still specific — to fund elections, which naturally and logically include, even if not expressly
stated, not only regular but also special or recall elections.
In the case, the appropriation for motor vehicle registration naturally and logically
included plate-making inasmuch as plate-making was an integral component of the registration
process. Considering that the final amount for MFO2 under the 2014 GAA aggregated to
Php4,843,753,000.00 (inclusive of the requested increase of Php2,489,600,100.00), it is evident
that the funding of the MVPSP was intended.
Thus, since the 2014 GAA itself contained the direct appropriation necessary to
implement the MVPSP, there was no unconstitutional transfer of funds.
6|
REVENUE COLLECTED FOR A SPECIAL PURPOSE SHALL BE TREATED AS A SPECIAL

FUND TO BE USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE STATED PURPOSE
Confederation of Coconut Farmers Organizations of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Aquino III
G.R. No. 217965; August 8, 2017
Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition challenging the constitutionality of EO Nos. 179 and 180
filed by Confederation of Coconut Farmers Organizations of the Philippines, Inc. (CCFOP).
Pres. Benigno Aquino III issued EO Nos. 179 and 180. E.O. No. 179 calls for the inventory
and privatization of all coco levy assets. EO No. 180 mandates the reconveyance and utilization
of these assets for the benefit of coconut farmers and the development of the coconut industry.
CCFOP believes the presidential issuances violated Secs. 29 (1) and (3), Article VI of the
Constitution. CCFOP explains that the executive orders were made without authority of law
because they were based on PD No. 1234, which had mandated coconut levy funds as special
public funds and part of the general funds of the government. PD No. 1234, however, had ceased
to exist upon the passage of PD No. 1468, which mandates coconut levy funds as private funds
which are owned by the coconut farmers in their private capacities.
The respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General counters that the Court,
in COCOFED v. Republic, struck down P.D. No. 1468, consequently, P.D. No. 1234 should be
considered the operative law and that "coconut levies are special funds to be remitted to the
Treasury in the General Fund of the State but treated as Special Accounts" (SAGF).
ISSUE:
May the President issue an order appropriating the coco levy funds for particular purpose
other than for the benefit of the coconut farmers or the development of the coconut industry?
RULING:
No, the President may not issue an order appropriating the coco levy funds for particular
purpose other than for the benefit of the coconut farmers or the development of the coconut
industry.
The power of the purse lies with Congress. Art. VI, Sec. 29 of the Constitution provides for
two classification of appropriation measures — general and special appropriation. A general
appropriation law is one passed annually to provide for the financial operations of the entire
government during one fiscal period, whereas a special appropriation is designed for a specific
purpose. The revenue collected for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund to be used
exclusively for the stated purpose. The coconut levy funds are special funds allocated for a specific
purpose and can never be used for purposes other than for the benefit of the coconut farmers or
the development of the coconut industry. Any attempt to appropriate the said funds for another
reason, no matter how noble or beneficial, would be struck down as unconstitutional.
The assailed issuances, however, did not create a new special fund. They were issued
pursuant to previous laws and jurisprudence which declared coconut levy funds such as the CCSF
and the CIDF as public funds for a special purpose. For this reason, Secs. 6, 7, 8, and 9 of EO No.
180 are declared void because they are not in conformity with the law. Through these sections,
the President went beyond the authority delegated by law in the disbursement of the coconut levy
funds.
|7
NO MONEY SHALL BE PAID OUT OF THE TREASURY EXCEPT IN PURSUANCE OF AN

APPROPRIATION MADE BY LAW
Career Executive Service Board, Represented by its Executive Director, Maria Anthonette
Velasco-Allones vs. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 212348; June 19, 2018
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
By petition for certiorari and prohibition, petitioner Career Executive Service Board (CESB)
assails Commission on Audit (COA) Decision affirming the Notice of Disallowance (ND) issued by
the Audit Team Leader (ATL) vis-a-vis the payment of the monetary benefits for Calendar Years
(CY) 2002 and 2003 to its covered officials and employees out of the CESB's savings. The CESB
asserts herein that COA Decision No. 2010-121 was null and void for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
CESB granted to its officials and employees various monetary benefits in CY 2002 and CY
2003 pursuant to the Collective Negotiation Agreement (CNA) it had entered into with the Samahan
ng Kawaning Nagkakaisa sa Diwa, Gawa at Nilalayon (SANDIGAN), a duly accredited organization
of its employees. Upon post-audit, Audit Team Leader (ATL) issued a Memorandum disallowing
the grant of monetary benefits like Birthday Bonus, Fringe Benefits, Christmas Grocery and
Retirement Pay in the total amount of P2,386,000.00 to its rank and file employees, on the ground
that it has no legal support.
The Commission on Audit (COA) reiterates that the disallowance has no legal support and
that it only discharged and adhered to its duty and responsibility to exercise its general audit power
under the 1987 Constitution.
CESB argues that it granted the monetary benefits pursuant to Section 2, Article V of the
CNA; that it needed no new appropriation inasmuch as its agency savings were utilized; and that
the use of the savings was authorized by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) under
National Budget Circular No. 487 (NBC) issued to enforce R.A. No. 9206 (General Appropriations
Act of 2003).
ISSUE:
Does the CESB have a legal authority to use its savings for the payment of benefits?
RULING:
No, the CESB had no legal authority to use its savings for the payment of monetary
benefits.
Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution ordains that: "No money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." The only exception is found
in Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, by which the President of the Philippines, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Philippines, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions are authorized to transfer
appropriations to augment any item in the GAA for their respective offices from the savings in other
items of their respective appropriations.
In this case, the CESB, although intended to be an autonomous entity, is administratively

attached to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), and does not wield the power to authorize the
augmentation of items of its appropriations from savings in other items of its appropriations. With
the CSC being the office vested with fiscal autonomy by the 1987 Constitution, the CESB's use of
its savings to cover the CNA benefits for its employees had no legal basis.
Hence, CESB had no legal authority under the Constitution to augment any item in the
GAA from the savings in other items in the appropriation, to pay for the monetary benefits to
employees.
8|
THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES MERE SUFFICIENCY, AND NOT ACCURACY, OF

FACTUAL BASIS, FOR THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW
Lagman vs. Medialdea

G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774 (Resolution); December 5, 2017
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration on whether there is sufficiency of the factual bases of
Proclamation No. 216 and the parameters used in determining the sufficiency of the factual bases.
Proclamation No. 216 was the President's declaration of martial law and/or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao which is effective for 60 days. It
was issued on May 23, 2017 and expired on July 23, 2017.
The petitioners contend that the President had no sufficient factual basis for the issuance
of Proclamation No. 216 because, among others, acts of terrorism in Mindanao do not constitute
rebellion since there is no proof that its purpose is to remove Mindanao or any part thereof from
allegiance to the Philippines, its laws, or its territory, and that the President's Report contained
"false, inaccurate, contrived and hyperbolic accounts."
ISSUE:
Does the Constitution require accuracy of the factual basis to declare martial law and/or
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus?
RULING:
No, the constitution requires sufficiency of factual basis, not accuracy.
The parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: 1) actual
rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and 3)
there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion." The
phrase “sufficiency of factual basis” in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution should be
understood as the only test for judicial review of the President's power to declare martial law and
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus." Requiring the Court to determine the accuracy
of the factual basis of the President contravenes the Constitution as Section 18, Article VII only
requires the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis. Accuracy is not the same as
sufficiency as the former requires a higher degree of standard.
Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the
proclamation and in the written Report as the President could not be expected to verify the
accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To require
precision in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and therefore impede
the process of his decision-making. Such a requirement will practically necessitate the President
to be on the ground to confirm the correctness of the reports submitted to him within a period that
only the circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate. Such a scenario, of course, would not
only place the President in peril but would also defeat the very purpose of the grant of emergency
powers upon him. Possibly, by the time the President is satisfied with the correctness of the facts
in his possession, it would be too late in the day as the invasion or rebellion could have already
escalated to a level that is hard, if not impossible, to curtail.
Thus, the Constitution requires sufficiency of factual basis, not accuracy.
|9
PRESIDENT HAS DISCRETION WHICH MILITARY POWER TO USE DEPENDING ON

THE PREVAILING CIRCUMSTANCES/ SET OF CONDITIONS

G.R. No. 231658, 231771 & 231774; July 4, 2017
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
All three petitions beseech the cognizance of the Court based on the third paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to determine sufficiency of the factual bases of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus which is effective for 60 days. It was issued on May 23,
2017 and expired on July 23, 2017.
The Mohamad Petition posits that martial law is a measure of last resort and should be
invoked by the President only after exhaustion of less severe remedies. It contends that the
extraordinary powers of the President should be dispensed sequentially, i.e., first, the power to call
out the armed forces; second, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and
finally, the power to declare martial law. It maintains that the President has no discretion to choose
which extraordinary power to use.
ISSUE:
Does the President have the discretion to choose which extraordinary power to use?
RULING:
Yes, the President has discretion to choose which extraordinary power to use. It cannot be
overemphasized that time is paramount in situations necessitating the proclamation of martial law
or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Indeed, the 1987 Constitution gives the “President, as Commander-in-Chief, a 'sequence'

of 'graduated powers'. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law.”
It must be stressed, however, that the graduation refers only to hierarchy based on scope and
effect. It does not in any manner refer to a sequence, arrangement, or order which the Commander-
in-Chief must follow. This so-called "graduation of powers" does not dictate or restrict the manner
by which the President decides which power to choose.
The power to choose, initially, which among these extraordinary powers to wield in a given
set of conditions is a judgment call on the part of the President. As Commander-in-Chief, his
powers are broad enough to include his prerogative to address exigencies or threats that endanger
the government, and the very integrity of the State.
It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the
President's decision pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or
conditions.
10 |
ONLY FACTS KNOWN TO THE PRESIDENT AT THE TIME OF DECLARATION OF

MARTIAL LAW SHALL BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING SUFFICIENCY OF
FACTUAL BASIS

G.R. No. 231658, 231771 & 231774; July 4, 2017
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
The Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual
basis because the President's Report contained “false, inaccurate, contrived and hyperbolic
accounts.”
The OSG posits that the sufficiency of the factual basis must be assessed from the
trajectory or point of view of the President and base on the facts available to him at the time the
decision was made. It argues that the sufficiency of the factual basis should be examined not
based on the facts discovered after the President had made his decision to declare martial law.
ISSUE:
May the Court examine the facts discovered after the President has made the decision to
declare martial law?
RULING:
No, those facts cannot be considered in determining sufficiency of factual bases.
Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the President, the determination
of this Court must be based only on facts or information known by or available to the President at
the time he made the declaration or suspension, which facts or information are found in the
proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress.
In determining the sufficiency of the factual bases of the declaration and/or the suspension,
the Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or
individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the
proclamation and in the written Report as the President could not be expected to verify the
accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To require
precision in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and therefore impede
the process of his decision-making.
In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to convince himself that
there is probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than not a rebellion was committed
or is being committed. To require him to satisfy a higher standard of proof would restrict the
exercise of his emergency powers.
| 11
PRESIDENT MAY PUT THE ENTIRE PHILIPPINES OR ONLY A PART THEREOF UNDER
MARTIAL LAW

G.R. No. 231658, 231771 & 231774; July 4, 2017
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao which is effective for 60 days. It
was issued on May 23, 2017 and expired on July 23, 2017.
The Cullamat Petition avers that the supposed rebellion described in Proclamation No. 216
relates to events happening in Marawi City only and not in the entire region of Mindanao. It
concludes that Proclamation No 216 "failed to show any factual basis for the imposition of martial
law in the entire Mindanao."
ISSUE:
Is there factual basis for the imposition of martial law in the entire Mindanao?
RULING:
Yes, there is factual basis for the imposition of martial law in the entire Mindanao.
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states that “In case of invasion or rebellion, when
the public safety requires it, [the President] may x x x suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus
or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.” Clearly, the Constitution grants to
the President the discretion to determine the territorial coverage of martial law and the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. He may put the entire Philippines or only a part thereof
under martial law.
This is both an acknowledgement and a recognition that it is the Executive Department,

particularly the President as Commander-in-Chief, who is the repository of vital, classified, and live
information necessary for and relevant in calibrating the territorial application of martial law and
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It, too, is a concession that the
President has the tactical and military support, and thus has a more informed understanding of
what is happening on the ground.
Thus, the Constitution imposed a limitation on the period of application, which is 60 days,
unless sooner nullified, revoked or extended, but not on the territorial scope or area of coverage;
it merely stated "the Philippines or any part thereof," depending on the assessment of the
President.
12 |
COURT’S POWER TO REVIEW IS INDEPENDENT FROM CONGRESS’ POWER TO

REVOKE THE PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW

G.R. No. 231658, 231771 & 231774; July 4, 2017
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
During the oral argument, the OSG urged the Court to give deference to the actions of the
two co-equal branches of the Government: on the part of the President as Commander-in-Chief,
in resorting to his extraordinary powers to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus; and on the part of Congress, in giving its imprimatur to Proclamation No. 216
and not revoking the same.
ISSUE:
Is the power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus independent of the
actions taken by Congress?
RULING:
Yes, the power of the Court is independent of the actions taken by Congress.
The power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally
different but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same
trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. For instance, in reviewing the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only the
information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration; it is not
allowed to “undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings.” On the other hand,
Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to but likewise events
supervening the declaration.
As culled from the deliberations of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, the intent was to
vest the Court and Congress with veto powers independently from each other. Therefore, the Court
can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and independently from, the power to revoke
by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or default on the part of Congress does not deprive
or deny the Court of its power to review.
| 13
CONGRESS IS NOT MANDATED TO CONVENE IN JOINT SESSION TO DELIBERATE

MARTIAL LAW PROCLAMATION
Padilla vs. Congress of the Philippines

G.R. Nos. 231671 & 231694; July 25, 2017
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions for Mandamus and Certiorari under consideration
essentially assail the failure and/or refusal of respondent the Congress, to convene in joint session
and therein deliberate on Proclamation No. 216 issued on May 23, 2017 by President Rodrigo Roa
Duterte.
President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao on the grounds of rebellion and
necessity of public safety pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution. The Senate
and the House of Representative independently deliberated on the proclamation which secured
majority vote. They also deliberated for a joint session of the Congress to vote upon the
proclamation which was rejected.
Congress asserts firmly that there is no mandatory duty on their part to "vote jointly," except
in cases of revocation or extension of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The group of petitioners claim that a plain reading of Article
VII, Section 18 of the Constitution shows that the Congress is required to convene in joint session
to review Proclamation No. 216 and vote as a single deliberative body. The performance of the
constitutional obligation is allegedly mandatory, not discretionary.
ISSUE:
Is there a mandatory duty for the Congress to convene jointly upon the President's
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution?
RULING:
No, the Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session except to
vote jointly to revoke the President's declaration or suspension.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission reveal the framers’ specific
intentions to (a) remove the requirement of prior concurrence of the Congress for the effectivity of
the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus; and (b) grant to the Congress the discretionary power to revoke the President's
proclamation and/or suspension by a vote of at least a majority of its Members, voting jointly. As
seen in the deliberations the underlying reason for the requirement that the two Houses of the
Congress will vote jointly is to avoid the possibility of a deadlock and to facilitate the process of
revocation of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.
Hence, the plain language of the subject constitutional provision does not support the
petitioners’ argument that it is obligatory for the Congress to convene in joint session following the
President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, under all circumstances.
14 |
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES CANNOT ISSUE WRITS OF CERTIORARI
Heirs of Zoleta vs. Land Bank of the Philippines

G.R. No. 205128; September 8, 2017
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Eliza Zoleta (Zoleta) filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 praying
that judgment be rendered directing respondent Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) to dismiss the petition for certiorari filed before it by respondent Land Bank of the
Philippines.
Zoleta voluntarily offered for sale her land to the government under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Unsatisfied with Landbank’s valuation, the case was
transferred to the Office of Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) which conducted a
summary administrative proceeding. Zoleta filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment before the
RARAD, which was granted and a writ of execution was issued.
Landbank filed before DARAB a petition for certiorari on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of RARAD. The DARAB granted
Land Bank's petition for certiorari and "annulled" the Writ of Execution.
Zoleta, appealed to the CA alleging that DARAB exceeded its authority when it granted
Landbank's petition. The CA held that DARAB's actions were granted by its general "supervisory
authority" and appellate jurisdiction over rulings of RARAD.
ISSUE:
Can administrative agencies, like DARAB, issue a writs of certiorari?
RULING:
No, jurisprudence has settled that DARAB possesses no power to issue writs of certiorari.
Administrative agencies are part of the executive branch of the government. Due to their
highly specialized nature, they are not only vested executive powers but also with quasi-legislative
and quasi-judicial powers.
However, the basic nature of the certiorari power as an incident of judicial review—an
exercise which must be limited to judicial questions that are beyond the competence of
administrative agencies—necessarily means that administrative agencies have no certiorari
powers. Determining whether an act of an officer or state organ exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
powers was made without or in excess of jurisdiction demands an examination of the law delimiting
that officer's or organ's jurisdiction. It is an exercise in legal interpretation. It is an exercise that only
courts, and not administrative agencies, are competent to engage.
As an administrative agency exercising quasi-judicial but not consummate judicial power,

DARAB is inherently incapable of issuing writs of certiorari.
| 15
THE COURT WILL NOT RENDER A DECISION UPON MOOT AND ACADEMIC CASES
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Fastech Synergy Philippines, Inc.

G.R. No. 206150; September 8, 2017
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, praying that the CA Resolution
approving the Rehabilitation Plan of the respondent Fastech Corporations be modified to consider
the concerns raised by petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (Landbank).
Fastech Synergy Philippines, Inc., Fastech Microassembly & Test, Inc., Fastech
Electronique, Inc., and Fastech Properties, Inc. (collectively, Fastech Corporations), submitted
their Rehabilitation Petition before the Rehabilitation Court. After several hearings, Rehabilitation
Court dismissed the petition. The CA, upon appeal, approved the rehabilitation plan, finding that
rehabilitation was feasible.
Landbank, one of the creditors, filed a petition for review before the SC, assailing the CA’s
decision. Meanwhile, another creditor, Planters Bank and its successor-in-interest, Philippine
Asset Growth Two, Inc. (PAGTI), filed a separate petition for review before the SC. The second
case was docketed as G.R. No. 206528. On the second case, the SC found that rehabilitation was
not feasible.
In the present case, Planters Bank and PAGTI filed their Manifestation, stating that SC
already issued a Decision in G.R. No. 206528, resolving the issue of whether the CA erred in
approving the Rehabilitation Plan, which had already become final and executory.
ISSUE:
Was the petition of Landbank moot and academic?
RULING:
Yes, with the promulgation of the June 28, 2016 Decision in Philippine Asset Growth Two,
Inc. v. Fastech Synergy Philippines, Inc., the present case has been rendered moot and academic.
The Court is generally constrained to rule upon moot and academic cases since “our power
of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies” under Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution. An actual case or controversy exists "when the case presents conflicting or opposite
legal rights that may be resolved by the court in a judicial proceeding." Courts will not decide a
case unless there is "a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief."
Thus, courts will not render judgment on a moot and academic case unless any of the
following circumstances exists: "(1) grave constitutional violations; (2) exceptional character of the
case; (3) paramount public interest; (4) the case presents an opportunity to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; or (5) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review."
The decision in G.R. No. 206528 is comprehensive enough that to rule on the issue raised
by petitioner will be futile and is a waste of this Court's time and resources. Moreover, petitioner
did not advance any other issue that could have been resolved by this Court.
16 |
COURT WILL DECIDE ON A MOOT AND ACADEMIC CASE IF THE ISSUE IS CAPABLE
OF REPITITION YET EVADING REVIEW
Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 223505; October 3, 2017
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the validity of Section 2(e), Rule III
of COMELEC Resolution No. 10015 filed by petitioner Philippine Association of Detective and
Protective Agency Operators (PADPAO), which is an association of licensed security agencies
and company security forces under RA 5487 or the Private Security Agency Law.
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 10015 which provided for the rules and regulations
on the ban on bearing, carrying or transporting of firearms and other deadly weapons and the
employment, availment or engagement of the services of security personnel or bodyguards during
the election period for the May 2016 National and Local Elections, more commonly referred to as
the "Gun Ban."
PADPAO assails the validity of Section 2(e), Rule III of Resolution No. 10015 insofar as its
application to private security agencies (PSA) is concerned. However, the OSG contends that the
petition had become moot and academic as Resolution No. 10015 is no longer in effect, since the
election period already expired on June 8, 2016.
ISSUE:
Is the case moot given that the May 2016 elections have already taken place?
RULING:
No, the case is not moot and academic.
An action is considered “moot” when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy

because the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has
already been resolved. However, this court has taken cognizance of moot and academic cases
when: (1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a situation of
exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the issues raised required the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) the case
was capable of repetition yet evading review.
This case falls under the fourth exemption: the case was capable of repetition yet evading
review. For this exception to apply, the following factors must be present: (1) the challenged action
is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; and (2) there is a
reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action.
Here, the election period in 2016 was a total of only 150 days. There was thus not enough
time for the resolution of the controversy. Moreover, the COMELEC has consistently issued rules
and regulations on the Gun Ban for previous elections in accordance with RA 7166: Resolution
No. 871420 for the 2010 elections, Resolution No. 9561-A21 for the 2013 elections, and the
assailed Resolution No. 10015 for the 2016 elections. Thus, the COMELEC is expected to
promulgate similar rules in the next elections. Prudence accordingly dictates that the Court
exercise its power of judicial review to finally settle this controversy.
| 17
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION RETROACTS TO THE DATE OF EFFECTIVITY OF THE

LAW
Philippine International Trading Corp. vs. Commission on Audit

G.R. No. 205837; November 21, 2017
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari filed by Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC),
which seeks to annul and set aside the decision of Commission on Audit (COA), denying PITC's
request for the amendment of the 2010 Annual Audit Report (AAR), relating to the payment and
accrual of liability for retirement benefits under Section 6 of EO No. 756.
The Court clarified in the decision in Philippine International Trading Corporation v.

Commission on Audit, that the provision of gratuities equivalent to "one month pay for every year
of service computed at highest salary received including all allowances" was meant as an incentive
for employees who retire, resign or are separated from service during or as a consequence of the
reorganization and not a permanent retirement law for its employees that PITC characterizes it to
be.
PITC averred that the Decision in Philippine International Trading Corporation v.

Commission on Audit must be applied prospectively, such that all qualified PITC employees should
be allowed to claim their vested rights to the benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756
upon retirement or resignation until the date when the Decision became final.
COA provides that when the Court renders a decision that merely interprets a particular
provision of law - one that neither establishes a new doctrine nor supplants an old doctrine - the
interpretation takes effect and becomes part of the law as of the date when the law was originally
passed. The Decision in Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit did
not overrule an old doctrine nor adopt a new one.
ISSUE:
Should the Decision in Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit
be applied prospectively upon its finality?
RULING:
No, the decision should not be applied prospectively.
Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law but consists merely of
a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one. It is consequently clear that a judicial
interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, subject only
to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted,
and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively
and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith.
The Court merely construed therein the meaning and application of Section 6 of EO 756
by taking into consideration the rationale behind the provision, its interplay with pre-existing
retirement laws, and the subsequent enactments and statutes that eventually repealed the same.
Prior to the Decision in Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit, there
was no other ruling from this Court that explained the nature of the retirement benefits under
Section 6 of EO 756.
Thus, the Court's interpretation of the aforesaid provision embodied in the Decision in
Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit retroacts to the date when
Executive Order No. 756 was enacted. Hence, the Decision in Philippine International Trading
Corporation v. Commission on Audit retroacts to the date of the effectivity of E.O. No. 756.
18 |
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LAW CANNOT BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED
Republic vs. N. Dela Merced & Sons, Inc.

G.R. Nos. 201501 & 201658; January 22, 2018
Sereno, C.J.
FACTS:
This is consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing CA decision,
upholding the Order of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Pollution
Adjudication Board (DENR-PAB) to fine N. Dela Merced & Sons, Inc. (Dela Merced & Sons), for
violation of Section 28 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9275 (The Clean Water Act of 2004). The
appellate court, however, reduced the fine from ₱3.98 million to ₱2.63 million.
DENR Secretary issued a cease and desist order (CDO) to Dela Merced & Sons for
violation of R.A. No. 9275 and the IRR thereof. In the same Order, the company was informed that
no temporary lifting order (TLO) shall be issued in its favor, unless it would submit the documents
required under the law. Dela Merced & Sons assailed the DENR-PAB Orders imposing the fine
amounting to P3.98 million. Dela Merced & Sons claimed that it was exempt from the requirements
of R.A. No. 9275 by virtue of the Certificate of Non-Coverage CNC pursuant to Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1586 (Philippine Environmental Impact Statement System).
The main contention of Dela Merced & Sons is that Sec. 28 of R.A. No. 9275 violates Sec.
19(1), Article III of the Constitution, because the former provides for the imposition of excessive
fines. It also argued that the imposition of the fine was unconstitutional for being excessive.
ISSUE:
Was the constitutionality of Sec. 28 of R.A. No. 9275 properly questioned?
RULING:
No, constitutionality of Sec. 28 of RA 9275 was not properly questioned.
The Court notes at the outset that Dela Merced & Sons' attempt to assail the
constitutionality of Sec. 28 of R.A. No. 9275 constitutes a collateral attack. This is contrary to the
rule that issues of constitutionality must be pleaded directly. Unless a law is annulled in a direct
proceeding, the legal presumption of the law's validity remains.
Assuming arguendo that the issue of constitutionality was properly presented, Dela Merced
& Sons still failed to satisfy the fourth requisite for this Court to undertake a judicial
review. Specifically, the issue of constitutionality of Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 is not the lis mota of this
case. The lis mota requirement means that the petitioner who questions the constitutionality of a
law must show that the case cannot be resolved unless the disposition of the constitutional
question is unavoidable. Consequently, if there is some other ground (i.e. a statute or law) upon
which the court may rest its judgment, that course should be adopted and the question of
constitutionality avoided.
In this case, Dela Merced & Sons failed to show that the case cannot be legally resolved
unless the constitutional issue it has raised is resolved. Hence, the presumption of constitutionality
of Sec. 28 of R.A. No. 9275 stands.
| 19
CITIZENS HAVE A PUBLIC RIGHT TO CHALLENGE ILLEGAL OR

UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACTS
Padilla v. Congress of the Philippines

G.R. Nos. 231671 & 231694; July 25, 2017
FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions for Mandamus and Certiorari to assail the failure and/or
refusal of respondent the Congress to convene in joint session and therein deliberate on
Proclamation No. 216 issued on May 23, 2017 by President Rodrigo Roa Duterte.
President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao on the grounds of rebellion and
necessity of public safety pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution. The Senate
and the House of Representative independently deliberated on the proclamation which secured
majority vote. They also deliberated for a joint session of the Congress to vote upon the
proclamation which was rejected.
Congress claims that the petitioners’ suing as “citizens and taxpayers” is inadequate to
clothe them with locus standi. The group of petitioners claim to have legal standing to sue as
citizens and taxpayers in their assertion of public right. Nonetheless, they submit that the present
case calls for the Court's liberality in the appreciation of their locus standi given the fact that their
petition presents "a question of first impression—one of paramount importance to the future of our
democracy - as well as the extraordinary nature of Martial Law itself.”
ISSUE:
Do petitioners, suing as citizens and taxpayers, have legal standing to challenge a
supposed illegal/unconstitutional act?
RULING:
Yes, the petitioners do. Locus standi is a personal and substantial interest in a case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental
act. The question is whether the challenging party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy so as to assure the existence of concrete adverseness that would sharpen the
presentation of issues and illuminate the court in ruling on the constitutional question posed.
The Court has recognized that every citizen has the right, if not the duty to interfere and
see that a public offense be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be
remedied. When a citizen exercises this "public right" and challenges a supposedly illegal or
unconstitutional executive or legislative action, he represents the public at large, thus, clothing him
with the requisite locus standi. He may not sustain an injury as direct and adverse as compared to
others but it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that he is entitled to
protection or relief from the Court in the vindication of a public right.
The present petitions have been filed by individuals asserting that the Senate and the
House of Representatives have breached an allegedly constitutional duty to convene in joint
session to deliberate on Presidential Proclamation No. 216. Therefore, the citizen-petitioners'
challenge of a purportedly unconstitutional act in violation of a public right, done in behalf of the
general public, gives them legal standing.
20 |
ESTABLISHED JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS SHOULD BE ADHERED TO
Umali vs. Judicial and Bar Council

G.R. No. 228628; July 25, 2017
Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition under Rule 65 filed with the Supreme Court (SC) by petitioner Rep.
Reynaldo Umali, current Chair of the House of Representatives (HoR) Committee on Justice,
impugns the present-day practice of 6-month rotational representation of Congress in the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC) for it unfairly deprives both Houses of Congress of their full participation in
the said body. The said practice was adopted by the JBC in light of the ruling in Chavez v. Judicial
and Bar Council.
The Court in the Chavez Case declared the said practice of having two representatives
from Congress with one vote each in the JBC unconstitutional. This Court enunciated that the use
of the singular letter "a" preceding "representative of the Congress" in Sec. 8(1), Art. VIII of the
Constitution is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction or interpretation. The
same is indicative of the Framers' intent that Congress may designate only one representative to
the JBC. As a result, the Congress agreed upon a 6-month rotational representation in the JBC
wherein the HoR would represent the department from January to June and the Senate would
represent the department from July to Dec. By this reason, Rep. Umali’s votes for the selection of
nominees for the vacancies of then retiring SC Assoc. Justices Jose Perez and Arturo Brion were
not counted by the JBC.
The OSG wants this Court to revisit Chavez holding that it is only proper for both Houses
of Congress to be given equal representation in the JBC as neither House can bind the other. The
JBC, on the other hand, insists that it was the intent of the Framers of the Constitution for the JBC
to have only seven members. The reason for that was laid down in Chavez, that is, to provide a
solution should there be a stalemate in the voting.
ISSUE:
Should the Court’s ruling in Chavez, which declared unconstitutional the practice of having
two representatives from Congress with one vote each in the JBC, be overthrown?
RULING:
No, the Court’s ruling in Chavez should not be overthrown.
The doctrine stare decisis et non quieta movere means to adhere to precedents and not to
unsettle things which are established. The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents and
requires courts in a country to follow the rule established in a decision of the SC. It is based on the
principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled
and closed to further argument. The court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial
practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts,
it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the
same. The SC has ruled that "abandonment thereof [of the doctrine] must be based only on strong
and compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability which is expected from
this Court would be immeasurably affected and the public's confidence in the stability of the solemn
pronouncements diminished.”
Here, the facts are exactly the same as in Chavez, where this Court has already settled
the issue of interpretation of Sec. 8(1), Art. VIII of the Constitution. Truly, such ruling may not be
unanimous, but it is undoubtedly a reflection of the wisdom of the majority of members of this Court
on that matter. Chavez cannot simply be regarded as an erroneous application of the questioned
constitutional provision for it merely applies the clear mandate of the law, that is, Congress is
entitled to only one representative in the JBC in the same way that its co-equal branches are.
| 21
THE COURT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO CHECK AND OVERRIDE AN ACT ENTRUSTED

TO THE JUDGMENT OF ANOTHER BRANCH ABSENT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Ocampo vs. Enriquez

G.R. No. 225973; August 8, 2017
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, assailing decision of the
Court, which dismissed the petitions challenging the intended burial of the mortal remains of
Ferdinand Marcos, former President of the Republic of the Philippines, at the Libingan ng mga
Bayani (LNMB).
The Court dismissed the petitions challenging the intended burial of the mortal remains of
Marcos at the LNMB. Marcos was finally laid to rest at the LNMB around noontime of Nov 18,
2016. Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not be allowed because it
has the effect of not just rewriting history as to the Filipino people's act of revolting against an
authoritarian ruler but also condoning the abuses committed during the Martial Law, thereby
violating the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution, which is a "post-dictatorship charter" and a
"human rights constitution."
ISSUE:
Does the Court have authority to check and override the President’s decision to bury Mrcos
at the LNMB?
RULING:
No, Court has no authority to check and override the President’s decision to bury Mrcos
at the LNMB.
In the November 8, 2016 Decision of the Court, it ruled that the President's decision to bury
Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence. Consistent
with President Duterte's mandate under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution, the burial of Marcos
at the LNMB does not contravene R.A. No. 289, R.A. No. 10368, and the international human
rights laws. R.A. No. 289 authorized the construction of a National Pantheon as the burial place of
the mortal remains of all the Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes and patriots. R.A. No.
10368 recognizes the heroism and sacrifices of all Filipinos who were victims of summary
execution, torture, enforced or involuntary disappearance, and other gross human rights violations
committed from Sep 21, 1972 to Feb 25, 1986.
Judicial power covers only the recognition, review or reversal of the policy crafted by the
political departments if and when a case is brought before it on the ground of illegality,
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion (i.e., blatant abuse of power or capricious exercise
thereof). The determination of the wisdom, fairness, soundness, justice, equitableness or
expediency of a statute or what "ought to be" as a matter of policy is within the realm of and should
be addressed to the legislature. If existing laws are inadequate, the policy-determining branches
of the government, specifically the duly elected representatives who carry the mandate of the
popular will, may be exhorted peacefully by the citizenry to effect positive changes. True to its
constitutional mandate, the Court cannot craft and tailor statutory provisions in order to
accommodate all of situations no matter how ideal or reasonable the proposal may sound. No
matter how well-meaning, we can only air Our views in the hope that Congress would take notice.
Hence, Court has no authority to check and override the President’s decision to bury Mrcos
at the LNMB. The Court denied with finality these motion for reconsiderations.
22 |
THE SIX-MONTH ROTATIONAL REPRESENTATION OF CONGRESS IN THE JUDICIAL

AND BAR COUNCIL IS CONSTITUTIONAL
Umali vs. Judicial and Bar Council

G.R. No. 228628; July 25, 2017
Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 filed by petitioner Rep.
Reynaldo V. Umali, current Chair of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice,
impugning the present-day practice of six-month rotational representation of Congress in the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) for it unfairly deprives both Houses of Congress of their full
participation in the said body. The aforementioned practice was adopted by the JBC in light of the
ruling in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council.
The Court in the Chavez Case declared the said practice of having two representatives
from Congress with one vote each in the JBC unconstitutional. This Court enunciated that the use
of the singular letter "a" preceding "representative of the Congress" in Section 8(1), Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction or
interpretation. The same is indicative of the Framers' intent that Congress may designate only one
representative to the JBC. As a result, the Congress agreed upon a 6-month rotational
representation in the JBC wherein the House of Representatives would represent the department
from January to June and the Senate would represent the department from July to December. By
this reason, Rep. Umali’s votes on December were not counted by JBC.
ISSUE:
Is the present practice of the JBC in allowing only one member of Congress to represent
the department during deliberations constitutional?
RULING:
Yes, the present practice is constitutional.
The JBC is merely following the provisions stipulated in Section 8, Article VIII of the1987
Constitution and the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Chavez case. As provided in the Chavez case,
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution is clear, categorical and unambiguous. Thus, it
needs no further construction or interpretation.
The wordings of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution are to be considered as
indicative of the final intent of its Framers, which is for Congress as a whole to only have one
representative to sit in the JBC. The Court, cannot simply make an assumption that the Framers
merely by oversight failed to take into account the bicameral nature of Congress in drafting the
same. Also, the framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional representation
in the JBC as it was not in the exercise of its primary function, which is to legislate. The JBC was
created to support the executive power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was merely
assigned a contributory non-legislative function. No parallelism can be drawn between the
representative of Congress in the JBC and the exercise by Congress of its legislative powers under
Article VI and constituent powers under Article XVII of the Constitution.
Thus, the adoption of the rotational scheme will not deprive Congress of its full participation
in the JBC for such an arrangement is also in line with that constitutional mandate.
| 23
COMPLIANCE WITH SALN REQUIREMENT INDUBITABLY REFLECTS ON PERSON’S

INTEGRITY
Republic vs. Sereno

GR No. 237428; May 11 2018
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a special civil action under Rule 66 for the
issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare as void respondent Maria Lourdes P.
A. Sereno’s appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
The position of Chief Justice was declared vacant in 2012. The Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) required applicants to submit, among others, all of their Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and
Net worth (SALNs) up to December 30, 2011. Respondent, then Associate Justice of the Court,
applied for the position. It appears, however, that respondent’s SALNs were incomplete. In 2017,
an impeachment complaint was filed against the respondent due in part to failure to file her SALNs.
The Republic, represented by the OSG, claims that quo warranto was the proper remedy
to question the validity of respondent’s appointment as it questions the qualification and eligibility
of the respondent, contradistinguished from impeachment which is concerned with culpable
violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office. The OSG contends that
respondent’s failure to submit her SALNs as required by the JBC disqualifies her from the outset
for failing to show that she is a person of proven integrity.
The respondent contends that the phrase “may be removed from office” of the does not
signify that impeachable officers may be removed through other modes other than impeachment.
She also contends that failure to file SALN has no bearing on one’s integrity and the issue of
proven integrity is a political question for the JBC.
ISSUES:
Is the respondent ineligible as Candidate and Nominee to be Chief Justice for her failure
to file SALNs?
RULING:
Yes, respondent’s failure to file SALN’s renders her ineligible as Candidate and Nominee
to be Chief Justice.
Compliance with SALN requirement indubitably reflects on person’s integrity because it is

a Constitutional (Sec. 17, Art. XI) and statutory (Sec. 8 and 11 of RA No. 6713, Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees; Sec. 9 of RA 3019, Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act) requirement for public officers. To recapitulate, Section 7, Article VIII of the
Constitution requires that a member of the Judiciary must be of proven integrity. To be of proven
integrity means that the applicant must have established a steadfast adherence to moral and
ethical principles. Primarily the JBC should see to it that the candidates possess the minimum
qualifications including integrity: a prerequisite and continuing requirement for a Member of the
Court. Thus, the filing of SALN forms part of mandatory conduct expected of a judge.
Respondent filed only 11 of the 20 required SALNs during her employment in UP Law. On
the other hand, none during her employment in PIATCO cases. Absent the same, the JBC should
not have interviewed the respondent, much less considered her for nomination. The respondent’s
integrity, therefore, was not established at the time of her application. This voids her application
and nomination to be Chief Justice as a matter of course. Respondent was given a color of title
due to her ineligibility, which makes her a de facto officer. As such, she never attained the status
of an impeachable official and her removal from office, other than impeachment, is justified. Hence,
respondent is not eligible as Candidate and Nominee to be Chief Justice.
24 |
APPOINTMENT MADE BY THE APPOINTING AUTHORITY MAY BE INVALIDATED BY

THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION WHEN THE REMOVAL OF EMPLOYEE WAS DONE
IN BAD FAITH
Cerilles vs. Civil Service Commission

G.R. No. 180845; November 22, 2017
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
The case is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 assailing CA’s Decision which affirmed
CSC’s Resolution invalidating the 96 appointments made by petitioner Governor Aurora Cerilles
(Cerilles) while sitting as Provincial Governor or Zamboanga del Sur.
Anita Jangad-Chua, et al. (private respondents) are permanent employees of the provincial
government of Zamboanga del Sur who were among those terminated by Cerilles in view of the
reorganization pursuant to RA 8973 which created the province of Zamboanga Sibugay from the
province of Zamboanga del Sur. New employees as well as those previously holding lower
positions are appointed and replaced private respondents.
Private respondents brought the matter to CSC’s Regional Office No. IX which invalidated
the 96 appointments because it violated RA 6656. It provides that officers and employees holding
permanent appointments shall be given preference for appointment to the new positions and that
no new employees shall be taken in until all permanent officers and employees have been
appointed.
ISSUE:
Can CSC invalidate the appointments made by Governor Cerilles?
RULING:
Yes, CSC can invalidate the appointments made by Governor Cerilles.
R.A. No. 6656 was enacted to implement the State's policy of protecting the security of
tenure of officers and employees in the civil service during the reorganization of government
agencies. Appointment, by its very nature, is a highly discretionary act. In certain occasions,
however, the selection of the appointing authority is subject to review by respondent CSC. The
Court has ruled that the only function of the CSC is merely to ascertain whether the appointee
possesses the minimum requirements under the law; if it is so, then the CSC has no choice but to
attest to such appointment. However, in light of the circumstances unique to a government
reorganization, such pronouncements must be reconciled with the provisions of R.A. No. 6656.
There is no encroachment on the discretion of the appointing authority when the CSC revokes an
appointment on the ground that the removal of the employee was done in bad faith. In such
instance, the CSC is not actually directing the appointment of another but simply ordering the
reinstatement of the illegally removed employee.
In the case, private respondents were able to prove bad faith in the reorganization of the
province of Zamboanga del Sur in view of the substantial number of appointments which is a strong
indication of the intent to circumvent the security of tenure of affected employees. Also, there is a
showing of bad faith pursuant to Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6656 considering that new employees or those
holding lower positions in the old staffing pattern replaced private respondents. Thus, there being
bad faith on the removal of private respondents, the CSC can revoke the appointments made by
Cerilles.
| 25
CSC CANNOT OVERTURN THE POLICY ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF
Small Business Corporation vs. Commission on Audit

G.R. No. 230628; October 3, 2017
Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Small Business Corporation (SB
Corp.) assailing the Decision of the COA En Banc which sustained the validity of Notice of
Disallowance disallowing the payment of merit increase to five officers of petitioner, amounting to
a total of P759,042.41.
SB Corp. Issued Board Resolution (BR) No. 1610 approving its Revised Organizational
Structure, Staffing Pattern, Qualification Standards and Salary Structure pursuant to R.A. No.
6977. The Issued BR No. 1610 was approved by the CSC. Meanwhile, E.O. No. 7 was passed
which provides a moratorium on increases in salaries, allowances, and other benefits of GOCC
officers and employees, subject to exceptions unless specifically authorized by the President.
Shortly after E.O. No. 7 was enacted, Governance Commission for GOCC (GCG) was created
which is the central advisory, monitoring, and oversight body with the authority to formulate,
implement, and coordinate policies concerning GOCCs. Later, SB Corp. granted and paid merit
increases to five officers and requested GCG’s confirmation to proceed with the grant. GCG denied
the request with finality citing that the moratorium provided in Section 9 of E.O. No. 7 which
provides for the imposition of moratorium on increases in the rates of salaries, and grant of new
increases in the rates of allowances, incentives and other benefits, is still in effect. Thus, the State
Auditor disallowed the merit increase given to the five officers of SB Corp.
Petitioner argues that the granted increase bears the imprimatur of the President when the
CSC approved its BR No. 1610.
ISSUE:
Does CSC’s approval of BR No. 1610 take precedence over the moratorium imposed by
E.O. No. 7?
RULING:
No, CSC’s approval of BR No. 1610 does not take precedence over the moratorium
imposed by E.O. No. 7.
The CSC has no authority to carve out an exception to E.O. No. 7, when the EO itself does
not provide for it. Neither is the CSC empowered to alter, modify, or contravene the express
mandate of E.O. No. 7. The Court emphasized the value of construction given by an administrative
agency charged with the interpretation of a statute.
In the case, however, CSC is not empowered to interpret E.O. No. 7, precisely because
the words of EO itself and the prohibition it imposed is clear. The CSC cannot overturn this policy
established by the President himself. Petitioner would have the Court rule that the approval of the
CSC, knowing that the moratorium was already in place, can overturn the express mandate of the
President of the Philippines to prohibit the grant of salary increases. That, the Court cannot do.
Therefore, the President not having Issued any further issuance to lift the moratorium imposed
under Section 9 of E.O. No. 7, the moratorium under such provision is still in effect.
26 |
CSC IS THE CENTRAL PERSONNEL AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT HAVING THE

POWER TO HEAR AND DECIDE ADMINISTRATIVE CASES ON ALL PERSONNEL AND
CIVIL SERVICE MATTERS
Feliciano vs. Department of National Defense

G.R. Nos. 199232 & 201577 (Resolution); November 8, 2017
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal to undo the termination of the petitioners Feliciano and Gonzalez’s
service by the Department of National Defense (DND) on the basis that they did not enjoy security
of tenure for failing to complete the four stages of qualification for the Career Executive Service
Eligibility (CESE).
Roberto Emmanuel Feliciano possessed a Career Service Executive Eligibles (CSEE) and
served as Assistant Secretary of the DND; while Horacio S. Gonzalez, who also had a CSEE, held
the position of Chief of the Administrative Service Office of the DND.
Then DND Sec. Voltaire T. Gazmin issued DO 154, terminating 11 officials of the DND,
including Gonzalez, on account of their lack of the CSEE; and to re-designate Feliciano as
Assistant Secretary for Strategic Assessment of the DND. However, subsequently thereafter,
Feliciano received DO 163 terminating his designation and services as Assistant Secretary for
Strategic Assessment.
Respective parties appealed before the CSC on the ground of illegal termination. Upon
appeal, the CA 14th Division held that the CSC had no jurisdiction over the case of Feliciano
because the Career Executive Service Board was the governing body for the Career Executive
Service (CES) pursuant to PD 1 issued by President Arroyo. For its part, CA Special 11th Division
pronounced that the CSC did not err in taking cognizance of the case of Gonzalez considering that
the CSC, by express provision of Executive Order No. 292, had the power and function to render
opinions and rulings on all personnel and other Civil Service matters, as the sole central personnel
agency of the Government vested with adjudicatory powers.
ISSUE:
Does CSC have jurisdiction over the case of illegal termination of DND personnel holding
CES position?
RULING:
Yes, CSC has jurisdiction over the cases of the petitioners.
The CSC is one of the three independent Constitutional Commissions invested with
adjudicative powers to render final arbitration on disputes and personnel actions involving matters
relating to the Civil Service. On the other hand, the CESB was established pursuant to the
Integrated Reorganization Plan (IRP) to serve as the governing body of the CES. although the
CESB is expressly empowered to promulgate rules, standards and procedures on the selection,
classification, compensation and career development of the members of the CES, the power and
function to hear and decide administrative cases on all personnel and civil service matters
remained to be duty and function of the CSC as the central personnel agency of the Government.
The mere fact that the positions involved in these cases were CES positions does not divest the
CSC of its constitutional power to hear and decide the cases.
Thus, the mere fact that the positions involved in these cases were CES positions does
not divest the CSC of its constitutional power to hear and decide the cases.
| 27
COA HAS THE POWER TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER PUBLIC FUNDS WERE UTILIZED
FOR THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THEY HAD BEEN INTENDED BY LAW
Nayong Pilipino Foundation, Inc. vs Chairperson Pulido Tan et al.

G.R. No. 213200; September 19, 2017
Reyes, Jr., J.
FACTS:
This a petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Nayong Pilipino Foundation, Inc. (NPFI),
seeking to annul respondent COA’s Decision and Resolution sustaining the Notice of Disallowance
relating to the payments of Anniversary Bonus and Extra Cash Gift to NPFI's officers and
employees and excess honoraria to the members of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) and
Technical Working Group (TWG).
NPFI Board of Trustees Issued Board Resolutions granting anniversary bonuses and cash
gifts to its qualified employees in connection with its 30th and 35th Founding Anniversary in the
years 2000 and 2004, respectively. COA Issued Audit Observation Memorandums finding that the
grant thereof has no legal basis nor approval of the President. It likewise states that the NPFI did
not submit the required exemption from the DBM when it granted for the payment of honoraria to
its BAC and TWG members.
NPFI claims that the allowance is supported by DBM Budget circular which was approved
by then President Arroyo. The same also points out that COA should not have disallowed the grant
as it is still subject of a Motion for Reconsideration pending before the Office of the President
through the DBM.
ISSUE:
Did COA, in disallowing NPFI’s payment of the benefits, gravely abuse its discretion?
RULING:
No, COA did not gravely abuse its discretion when it disallowed NPFI’s payment of
benefits.
The COA, by mandate of the 1987 Constitution, is the guardian of public funds, vested of
broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses
of public funds and property, including the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
examination, to establish the techniques and methods for such review, and to promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations. COA is given a wide latitude of discretion "to
determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures of government funds" and has the power to ascertain whether public
funds were utilized for the purpose for which they had been intended by law. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough. The abuse of discretion must be grave in that there is a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
In the case, considering that the grant specifically covers government entities and
commemorates their creation as such, for the purpose of determining entitlement to Anniversary
Bonus, NPFI’s milestone year should be reckoned from the date it was incorporated as a public
corporation. It follows then that NPFI is entitled to such bonus on 2002 and 2007, not 2000 and
2004. Nevertheless, it was evident that NPFI granted the Anniversary Bonus and the recipients
received the same in good faith. Disallowance of benefits and allowances of government
employees, recipients or payees need not refund these disallowed amounts in the absence of proof
to rebut the presumption that they received the same in good faith.
Thus, there is no grave abuse of discretion when COA disallowed the benefits granted by
NPFI.
28 |
COMELEC MAY NOT DENY INITIATIVE PETITION FOR LACK OF FUNDS

COMELEC MAY DETERMINE WHETHER AN INITIATIVE PROPOSAL IS ULTRA VIRES
Marmeto vs. COMELEC

GR No. 213953; September 26, 2017
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
In a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed under Rule 65, petitioner Engr. Oscar A.
Marmeto (Marmeto) seeks to annul the resolution of respondent COMELEC. The resolution denied
Marmeto’s petition for initiative creating a Sectoral Council composed of 12 sectoral
representatives which would act as people’s representative, and appropriation of Php200 million
for livelihood programs. The proposal was first introduced to the Sangguniang Panglunsod of
Muntinlupa (SLM).
In 2013, Comelec denied the initiative petition because the propositions would create a
new legislative body and is beyond the powers of Sangguniang Panglunsod (SL). In 2014,
Marmeto filed a second initiative petition on the same proposal which was denied due to lack of
budgetary allocation for fiscal year (FY) 2014.
Marmeto argues that Comelec only has ministerial duty to conduct initiative proceedings,
hence could not determine if the proposal is ultra vires for the (SL). He also asserts that Comelec
evaded its mandated duty by citing unavailability of public funds as ground to dismiss his petition.
ISSUES:
(1) Can the COMELEC deny an initiative proposal based on lack of budgetary allocation?
and;
(2) Does the COMELEC only have ministerial functions in case of initiative petitions.
RULING:
(1) No, the COMELEC cannot deny an initiative proposal based on lack of budgetary
allocation.
Similar to the case of Goh v. Hon. Bayron, the COMELEC was provided line item budget
for “Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes, and plebiscites,” and
“Management and supervision of elections and other electoral exercises.” Accordingly, the term
“election” is comprehensive enough to include other kinds of electoral exercises, including initiative
elections. Thus, COMELEC cannot deny the initiative proposal of Marmeto based on lack of
budgetary allocation.
(2) No. The Comelec may determine whether the proposition is within the power of the
concerned SL.
Section 127 of Local Government Code gives the courts the authority to nullify propositions
for being ultra vires on the Sanggunian only when they proposition is already approved. It begs the
question: which tribunal can review the sufficiency of the petition? In Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority v. COMELEC, the Court ruled that the COMELEC has the power to adjudicate and pass
upon such proposals in the exercise of their quasi-judicial and administrative power. Such power
is also implied from Section 12 of R.A. No. 6735 which gives the Court appellate power to review
Comelec’s “findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative and referendum.”
Thus, the power and duty of COMELEC is not merely ministerial.
| 29
THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IS NOT VIOLATED BY THE MERE FAILURE TO FURNISH
FINDINGS OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO THE ACCUSED
Pasok, Jr. vs. Office of The Ombudsman-Mindanao

G.R. No. 218413; June 6, 2018
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Order of the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao finding probable cause against petitioner Pasok for Malversation and violation of Sec. 3
of R.A. No. 3019, without furnishing Pasok a copy of its Order, in violation of Pasok’s right to due
process.
Pasok was the Municipal Agriculturist of Tandag, Surigao del Sur. Private respondent Rex
Dua, who was Agricultural Technician in the Office of the Municipal Agriculturist, found irregularities
in Pasok’s implementation of the animal dispersal program and other agricultural programs,
leading him to file a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and violation of Sec. 3 of R.A. No.
3019. The Ombudsman found Pasok guilty of grave misconduct and found probable cause for the
violation of R.A. No. 3019. The Ombudsman later issued two separate Orders, one initially setting
aside the finding of probable cause, and the other subsequently finding probable cause again,
upon reviewing Special Audit Reports from the Commission on Audit.
Pasok argues that there was a violation of his right to due process when the Ombudsman
found probable cause for a second time without furnishing Pasok a copy of the Order or requiring
him to comment thereon. The respondent argues that there was no such violation because Pasok
was able to argue his case and explain the merits of his defense.
ISSUE:
Did the Ombudsman violate Pasok’s right to due process when it issued an Order finding
probable cause for his violation of R.A. No. 3019 without furnishing a copy to him?
RULING:
No, Ombudsman did not violate Pasok’s right to due process when it issued an Order
finding probable cause for his violation of R.A. No. 3019 without furnishing him a copy of the Order.
Sec. 3, Art. XI of the Constitution provides that the Office of the Ombudsman may
investigate illegal acts or omission by public officials and request any government agency for
assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if
necessary, pertinent records and documents.
When the Ombudsman conducted a preliminary investigation based on the complaint filed,
Dua and Pasok were each given a chance to submit their pleadings, certifications and affidavits
from different witnesses and offices, and relevant records and documents to prove and disprove
their claims. Pasok was given the opportunity to address all the allegations that presented in the
complaint filed with the Ombudsman. Pasok cannot now assert that he has been deprived of his
right to due process when he was given every opportunity to do so during the preliminary
investigation. Even the subsequent directive of the Ombudsman to the COA to conduct an
investigation, and once again find probable cause based on the COA investigation was still within
the constitutional powers of the Ombudsman.
Thus, Pasok’s right to due process was not violated when Ombudsman issued an Order
finding probable cause for his violation of R.A. No. 3019 without furnishing a copy to him.
30 |
RESTRICTIONS ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS SHOULD ONLY BE TO THE EXTENT

NECESSARY TO PROTECT A COMPELLING STATE INTEREST
Samahan Ng Progresibong Kabataan vs. Quezon City

G.R. No. 25442; August 8, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
The petitioner Samahan ng Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK), an association of young
adults and minors filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition directly before the Supreme Court,
assailing the constitutionality of several local ordinances imposing curfews on minors.
Following President Duterte’s campaign to implement a nationwide curfew for minors and
the enactment of R.A. No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act, the local governments of
Navotas, Manila, and Quezon City implemented curfew ordinances penalizing the parents and
guardians of minors who were caught violating the curfew hours. SPARK argues that R.A. No.
9344 is unconstitutional for failing to pass the strict scrutiny test, being narrowly tailored and
employing means that bear no reasonable relation to their purpose.
ISSUE:
Do the curfew ordinances pass the strict scrutiny test considering their interference on the
right to travel?
RULING:
No, with the exception of the Quezon City ordinance.
Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the
reasonableness of classifications. The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i)
interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under
the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes. The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a
classification does not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, but requires heightened
scrutiny, such as in classifications based on gender and legitimacy. Lastly, the rational basis test
applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests. Considering that the right to travel is
a fundamental right in our legal system guaranteed no less by our Constitution, the strict scrutiny
test is the applicable test.
The government has the burden of proving that the classification (i) is necessary to achieve
a compelling State interest, and (ii) is the least restrictive means to protect such interest or the
means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest. In this case, respondents have
sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to keep
unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce — if
not totally eliminate — their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against criminal
pressure and influences which may even include themselves. As such, a compelling State interest
exists for the enactment and enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances.
However, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down since
their exceptions, which are essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew
regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection of the above-mentioned fundamental rights. As
compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the Quezon City Ordinance
is more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of
religion, travel, to peaceably assemble, and of free expression. Hence, the Manila and Navotas
ordinances did not pass the strict scrutiny test considering their interference on the right to travel.
| 31
A WARRANTLESS SEARCH MAY PRECEDE A WARRANTLESS ARREST IF THERE IS

PROBABLE CAUSE TO MAKE AN ARREST AT THE OUTSET OF THE SEARCH
Aparente vs. People

G.R. No. 205695; September 27, 2017
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
In a petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner Jesus Aparante (Aparente) assailed the
CA decision dismissing his appeal from an RTC decision finding him guilty of violating R.A. No.
9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).
An Information was filed against Aparante charging him of the unlawful possession of 0.01g
of methamphetamine hydrocholoride (shabu), in violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165.
According to the prosecution, police officers spotted Aparente in an alley with a small plastic
sachet, flicking it against nearby light sources. The officers approached Aparente and took the
sachet from him, where the crime laboratory stated the contents to be positive for shabu.
Aparente argues that he was in his house when officers forcibly entered, his house was
searched, shabu was allegedly found, and he was then arrested. Thus, the search preceding the
arrest. Violates his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Additionally, there was no
inventory and photographing at the place of Aparente’s arrest or at the nearest police station.
ISSUE:
Was the warrantless arrest valid despite it being preceded by a warrantless search?
RULING:
Yes, the warrantless arrest was valid.
While it is true that in People v. Tudtud this Court noted that, generally, a warrantless arrest
must precede a warrantless search, nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with
an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset
of the search. Thus, where a warrantless search preceded a warrantless arrest but was
substantially contemporaneous with it, what must be resolved is whether or not the police had
probable cause for the arrest when the search was made. Further, probable cause may be in the
form of overt acts which show that a crime had been, was being, or was about to be committed.
Thus, a warrantless arrest that precedes a warrantless search may be valid, as long as these two
(2) acts were substantially contemporaneous, and there was probable cause.
In this case, the arrest and the search were substantially contemporaneous. Thus, what
must be evaluated is whether or not the arresting officers had probable cause for petitioner's arrest
when they made the search. Here, the arresting officers saw a man hand petitioner a small plastic
sachet, which petitioner then inspected by flicking it against the light of a lamp post in an alley.
Upon the officers' approach, these two (2) men fled. These overt acts and circumstances were
observed personally by the arresting officers and, taken together, constitute reasonable suspicion
that these two (2) men were violating R.A. No. 9165. Thus, that the search preceded the arrest
does not render invalid the search and arrest of petitioner.
32 |
THE CONSTITUTION PROTECTS ONLY AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND

SEIZURES
Saluday vs. People

G.R. No. 215305; April 3, 2018
Carpio, Acting C.J.
FACTS:
In a petition for review on certiorari, Marcelo Saluday (Saluday) assails the CA Decision
and Resolution affirming the RTC ruling finding him guilty of illegal possession of high-powered
firearm, ammunition, and explosive under P.D. 1866.
The Task Force Davao of the Philippine Army flagged down a bus to check for contraband,
illegal firearms, explosives, and suspicious individuals. A member of the force located a small
heavy bag and ordered Saluday (who kept suspiciously looking at the soldier and at the bag and
allegedly admitted to owning the bag), to open it, revealing a rifle with ammunition, a hand grenade,
and a hunting knife. When Saluday was unable to produce authority to carry these items, he was
immediately arrested and informed of his rights. He was later charged with illegal possession of
firearm, ammunition, and explosive.
Saluday’s defense was that he did not own the bag, his brother did (who was dead at the
time the case went to the RTC), and that it was the bus conductor who pointed to him as the owner.
He contested the legality of the search because it was conducted without a warrant, and he argued
that his mere failure to object to the search cannot be construed as an implied waiver.
ISSUES:
(1) Was the search illegal for being conducted without a warrant? And;
(2) May Saluday’s failure to object to the search be construed as an implied waiver?
RULING:
(1) No, the search was not illegal.
The prohibition against searches and seizures applies to unreasonable searches and
seizures. The Court referred to its prior rulings where it held that warrantless searches are
reasonable where they are conducted for safety purposes in a place with no expectation of privacy
(as with airport and seaport searches), or in public transportation.
In this case, the warrantless search was held reasonable because it was conducted at a
military checkpoint and in a vehicle of public transportation, where there is a reduced expectation
of privacy. Further, the soldier merely lifted the bag. It was Saluday who opened it. Therefore, the
search itself is reasonable and it is not illegal by the mere fact that there was no search warrant.
(2) Yes, the failure to object is an implied waiver.
Even assuming the search is unreasonable, the immunity against unreasonable searches
and seizures may be waived voluntarily. In this case, the Court ruled that petitioner’s words “Yes,
just open it” based on his own testimony is clear consent.
Thus, the Court ruled that the search conducted was valid.
| 33
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION MAY BE REGULATED BY

THE STATE
Valmores vs. Dr. Achacoso

G.R. No. 217453; July 19, 2017
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
This is a Reply reiterating Denmark Valmores’ (Valmores) prayer for the issuance of a writ
of mandamus against Dr. Cristina Achacoso (Achacoso) as Dean of the Mindanao State University
(MSU)-College of Medicine and Dr. Giovanni Cabildo (Calbido).
Valmores is a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church whose religion is in strict

observance of the Sabbath day every Saturday. Valmores was enrolled as a first-year student at
the MSU-College of Medicine. Some of his classes and examinations were moved from weekdays
to Saturdays. Hence, petitioner failed to take his Histo-Pathology laboratory examination and
received a failing grade despite prior requests to excuse him. He elevated the matter before the
CHED and in turn, MSU President enjoined Achacoso to enforce the CHED Memorandum which
ensures that all higher education institutions render proper respect and compliance to Sec. 5 of
the Bill of Rights at the same time acknowledging the exercise of academic freedom. It excuses,
among others, the students from attending school activities scheduled on days which would conflict
with the exercise of religious freedom. However, no action was still given.
Petitioners brings this case before the Court based on his constitutional guarantee of
freedom of religion. Respondents, on the other hand, based their defense on the fact that MSU
had other students who were able to graduate despite being members of said religion.
ISSUE:
Are respondents duty bound by law to enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum which
ensures that all higher education institutions render proper respect and compliance to Sec. 5 of
the Bill of Rights?
RULING:
Yes, they are bound to enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum in case of Valmores.
The Constitution respects and recognizes the collective spirituality of the Filipino under
Sec. 5, Art. III of the Constitution. The Constitution guarantees the freedom to believe absolutely,
while the freedom to act based on belief is subject to regulation by the State when necessary to
protect the rights of others and in interest of public welfare. In 2010, the CHED laid down guidelines
for the exemption of teachers, personnel, and students from participating in school or related
activities due to compliance with religious obligations. Once the required certification or proof is
submitted, the concerned higher education institutions (HEIs) is enjoined to exempt the affected
student from attending or participating in school-related activities if such activities are in conflict
with their religious obligations.
As to whether HEIs will require remedial work or not, the Court finds the same to be already
within their discretion, so long as the remedial work required is within the bounds of school rules
and regulations and that the same will not affect the grades of the concerned students. As
representatives of the State, educational institutions are bound to safeguard the religious freedom
of their students.
Thus, to such end, our schools carry the responsibility to restrict its own academic liberties,
should they collide with constitutionally preferred rights. Hence, respondents were bound to
enforce the Memorandum.
34 |
THE DOJ HAS NO AUTHORITY TO RESTRICT THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO

TRAVEL WITHOUT LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS EMPOWERING IT TO DO SO
Genuino vs. De Lima

G.R. Nos. 197930, 199034 & 199046; April 17, 2018
Reyes Jr., J.
FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality
of DOJ Circular No. 41, series of 2010, otherwise known as the "Consolidated Rules and
Regulations Governing Issuance and Implementation of Hold Departure Orders, Watchlist Orders
and Allow Departure Orders," on the ground that it violates the constitutional right to travel.
After the expiration of GMA’s term as President, criminal complaints against her were filed.
In view of the complaints, then-DOJ Secretary De Lima issued multiple watchlist orders. GMA
subsequently requested for the issuance of an ADO so that she may seek medical attention
abroad, undertaking to return to the Philippines once her treatment is complete. Her application
was denied, but the SC issued a TRO against DOJ Cir. 41 and the WLOs subject to conditions, all
of which GMA complied with. Despite this, the Bureau of Immigration refused to process her travel
documents. De Lima argues that DOJ Cir. No. 41 is a limitation on the right to travel, which was
issued to keep individuals under preliminary investigation within the jurisdiction of the Philippines
justice system. GMA argued that the TRO issued by the SC was immediately executory and its
open defiance is tantamount to gross disobedience and resistance to a lawful order by the Court.
ISSUE:
Is DOJ Cir. No. 41 a valid limitation on the constitutional right to travel?
RULING:
No, the DOJ Cir. No. 41 is not a valid limitation on the constitutional right to travel.
Sec. 6, Art. III of the Constitution provides that the right to travel may be impaired only in
the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law. The
liberty of abode may only be impaired by a lawful order of the court and, on the one hand, the right
to travel may only be impaired by a law that concerns national security, public safety or public
health. Therefore, when the exigencies of times call for a limitation on the right to travel, the
Congress must respond to the need by explicitly providing for the restriction in a law.
Here, there is no law particularly providing for the authority of the secretary of justice to
curtail the exercise of the right to travel, in the interest of national security, public safety or public
health. To be clear, DOJ Cir. No. 41 is not a law. It is a mere administrative issuance apparently
designed to carry out the provisions of an enabling law. Sec. 3, Book IV, Title III, Ch. 1 of E.O. No.
292 does not authorize the DOJ to issue WLOs and HDOs to restrict the constitutional right to
travel. There is even no mention of the exigencies stated in the Constitution that will justify the
impairment. The provision simply grants the DOJ the power to investigate the commission of
crimes and prosecute offenders, which are basically the functions of the agency. The DOJ's
reliance on the police power of the state cannot also be countenanced. On its own, the DOJ cannot
wield police power since the authority pertains to Congress. Even if it claims to be exercising the
same as the alter ego of the President, it must first establish the presence of a definite legislative
enactment evidencing the delegation of power from its principal. In this case, DOJ Cir. No. 41 does
not fall under any of the grants of power to the DOJ. The respondents likewise cannot claim that it
is necessary for preliminary investigation because the presence of the accused is not necessary
for the prosecutor to discharge his investigatory duties. The power to issue Hold-Departure Orders
remains with the Court.
Thus, the Court declared DOJ Cir. No. 41 unconstitutional.
| 35
JUST COMPENSATION REQUIRES PAYMENT OF INTEREST IF FULL PAYMENT

THEREOF HAS NOT BEEN MADE
Evergreen Manufacturing Corp. vs. Republic

G.R. Nos. 218628 & 218631; September 6, 2017
Carpio, Acting C.J.
FACTS:
This is a consolidated petition challenging the CA’s decision fixing the amount of just
compensation.
The DPWH expropriated a portion of land (1428 sqm.) owned by Evergreen for a public
purpose: the construction of the Marikina Bridge and Access Road. The subject property is valued
at P6,000.00 per square meter based on BIR assessments. When the DPWH offered to purchase
the property, Evergreen declined, leading the DPWH to file a complaint for expropriation, and
depositing an amount equivalent to 100% of the property’s value based in BIR valuation. The RTC
fixed the amount of just compensation at P25,000.00/sqm. Both parties appealed the ruling. The
CA increased the amount of just compensation to P35,000.00/sqm but denied Evergreen’s claim
of consequential damages or interest.
Evergreen argues that consequential damages should also be paid, as a result of lost
income with its billboard lessee, decrease in the property’s value, and legal interest.
ISSUE:
Should interest be due on the payment of just compensation?
RULING:
Yes. Just compensation envisions a payment in full of the expropriated property. Absent
full payment, interest on the balance would necessarily be due on the unpaid amount.; otherwise,
the property owner suffers the immediate deprivation of both his land and its fruits or income.
In this case, there was still an unpaid balance due to Evergreen at the time the case was
pending before the Supreme Court, which is the difference between the amount already deposited
and the amount fixed by the court, as provided in Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 8974. The DPWH has only
paid the first payment, which is 100% of the property’s value based on BIR assessments; it has
not yet paid the second payment, which is the difference between the BIR valuation and the amount
fixed by the Supreme Court. Finally, the Court disagreed with the DPWH’s contention that interest
is not proper because it had already paid the initial deposit required; there is still an unpaid balance
from which interest accrues.
Thus, the Court ordered the payment of interest based on the difference between the
amount already paid and the amount fixed by the Supreme Court, computed from the time the
DPWH took possession of the property until the time of finality of the SC’s decision.
36 |
THE ULTIMATE DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION IN EXPROPRIATION

PROCEEDINGS REMAINS A JUDICIAL PREROGATIVE
Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Galle

G.R. No. 171836 & G.R. No. 195213; August 11, 2014
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
This is a Review of the consolidated Petitions assailing the dispositions of the CA on just
compensation of certain parcels of land.
Respondent Susie Irene Galle (Galle) owned Patalon Coconut Estate. Petitioner Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) valued 356.3357 hectares of the estate at Php6,083,545.26, which
valuation was rejected by Galle. On November 17, 1993, the Zamboanga City Registry cancelled
Galle’s titles and transferred the estate to the Republic of the Philippines-DAR. On May 13, it
appears that as to Galle, a total of 3.3929 hectares were taken from her by the government without
just compensation. Galle instituted a case for “Determination and Payment of Just Compensation”
with the RTC. DAR moved to dismiss the case claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction since it
was not designated Special Agrarian Court (SAC). Moreover, DAR alleged that the SAC and CA
failed to observe the proper formula in fixing just compensation as provided in DAR AO 6.
Galle filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, arguing among others that the courts
have the power to review the Decision of the DAR, which is merely preliminary and not final; that
a landowner may file a case with the SA without waiting for DAR’s determination on just
compensation; and the valuation of property in eminent domain cases is essentially a judicial
function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies.
ISSUE:
Who determines the just compensation?
RULING:
The RTC-SAC is vested with the exclusive and original jurisdiction of determining just
compensation.
In the exercise of the Court’s essentially judicial function of determining just compensation,
the RTC-SACs are not granted unlimited discretion and must consider and apply the R.A. No.
6657-enumerated factors and the DAR formula that reflect these factors. These factors and
formula provide the uniform framework or structure for the computation of the just compensation
for a property subject to agrarian reform. This uniform system will ensure that they do not arbitrarily
fix an amount that is absurd, baseless and even contradictory to the objectives of our agrarian
reform laws as just compensation. This system will likewise ensure that the just compensation
fixed represents, at the very least, a close approximation of the full and real value of the property
taken that is fair and equitable for both the farmer-beneficiaries and the landowner.
After considering these factors and formula, it is revealed that the RTC-SAC completely
disregarded them and simply relied on the valuation of Branch 36. The RTC-SAC did not point to
any specific evidence or cite the values and amounts it used in arriving at the P200.00 per square
meter valuation.
| 37
DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION IS ESSENTIALLY A JUDICIAL FUNCTION
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Omengan

G.R. No. 196412; July 19, 2017
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review filed by the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) regarding
valuation of just compensation.
Miguel Omengan (Omengan) was the registered owner of land. He received a notice from
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) subjecting his property under the CARP. The property
was initially valued at Php 219,524.98. DAR, through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
(PARO), requested the Office of Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) for Kalinga for
preliminary determination of just compensation.
The PARAD noted that since the property was taken in 2000, the unit market value (UMV)
for the year 2000 which is Php 18,940/ha as certified by the Municipal Assessor of Tabuk, Kalinga
should have been applied instead of the 1994 Schedule of Base UMV of Php 15,780/ha used by
petitioner.
However, on motion for reconsideration, the PARAD adopted petitioner's valuation of Php
264,458.74. This prompted petitioner to file a petition for judicial determination of just
compensation before the RTC-SAC. Petitioner imputes error on the part of the CA when it affirmed
the valuation made by the RTC-SAC despite the latter's alleged failure to strictly adhere to the
mandatory formula prescribed under DAR A.O. No. 5-98. Petitioner advances the view that just
compensation in the implementation of agrarian reform is absolutely different from ordinary
expropriation proceedings.
ISSUE:
Was the formula for determining just compensation under DAR A.O. No. 5-98 and Sec. 17
of RA 6657 complied with?
RULING:
No, the formula determining just compensation under the law was not complied with.
It is settled that the valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent

domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts and not with
administrative agencies. By law, the RTC-SAC enjoys original and exclusive jurisdiction in
determining just compensation for lands acquired for purposes of agrarian reform. Nevertheless,
in the exercise of its judicial function to determine just compensation, the RTC-SAC takes into
consideration the factors enumerated under Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657. DAR, on the other hand,
is empowered under R.A. No. 6657 to promulgate rules for its implementation. Hence, pursuant to
its rule-making power, DAR issued A.O. No. 5-98 which translated the factors listed under R.A.
No. 6657 into a basic and alternative formulae. However, RTC-SAC is not mandated to strictly
follow the formula. When the RTC-SAC, in the exercise of an essentially judicial function and
discretion, can deviate therefrom subject to the jurisprudential limitation that the factual situation
calls for it and that the RTC-SAC clearly explains the reason for such deviation.
However, the RTC-SAC incompletely applied the basic formula provided under the law and
disregarded NIR and capitalization rate factors, and that the reason for deviation was not clearly
explained, thus, it was not properly complied with.
38 |
AS A GENERAL RULE, JUST COMPENSATION SHOULD BE DETERMINED AS OF THE

TIME OF TAKING
Republic vs. Larrazabal

G.R. No. 204530; July 26, 2017
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of CA affirming the RTC Decision fixing the just
compensation for the lot of respondent Potenciano Larrazabal (Potenciano) at Php 10,000/sqm,
and for the lots of Victoria Larrazabal (Victoria) and Betty Larrazabal (Betty) at Php 4,000/sqm.
On Sep 15, 1999, the petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC for expropriations of portions
of three parcels of land owned by respondents Potenciano, Victoria, and Betty. After the filing of
the Complaint, petitioner was allowed to enter the properties, and demolish the improvements
thereon. On Feb 18, 2000, the RTC formed a Commission assigned with the evaluation and
recommendation of the amount of just compensation for the properties and found that the fair
market value of Potenciano’s property was Php10,000/sqm and Php4,000/sqm for Betty’s property
based from the recent sale of a real estate of William Gothong Aboitiz which nearly reflects the
average FMV of commercial lots in Ormoc. However, the petitioner claimed that the appraisal value
stated in Resolution No. 9-98 should be applied instead of the just compensation determined by
the Commission. The RTC approved the value of the properties as fixed by the Commissioners in
their Report which Decision was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Should the determination of just compensation be reckoned as of the time of the filing of
the Complaint?
RULING:
No. As a general rule, just compensation should be determined as of the time of the taking.
Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of the filing of the Complaint.
Since the Complaint in this case was filed on Sep 15, 1999, with petitioner being allowed
entry to the property thereafter, the just compensation should therefore be reckoned as of the time
of the filing of the Complaint. The sale relied by RTC, however, was made two years prior to the
filing of the Complaint, hence, this could not have been the proper bases for determining the just
compensation for the properties. Moreover, the records reveal that several factors such as
acquisition cost, current market value of like properties, tax value, size, shape, and location were
not considered by the Commission. The Commission even failed to explain as to how they arrived
at such amounts.
In view of the foregoing, the Court is left with no option except to reverse and set aside the
CA Decision and Resolution that affirmed the RTC Decision.
| 39
JUST COMPENSATION MUST BE RECKONED FROM THE TIME OF ACTUAL TAKING
National Transmission Corp. vs. Oroville Development Corp.

G.R. No. 223366; August 1, 2017
Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the CA Decision
affirming the RTC Decision in an expropriation case.
In 1983, National Transmission Corporation (TransCo) constructed a power transmission

line on the properties belonging to Alfredo Reyes (Reyes) and Grace Calingasan (Calingasan).
Reys sold his land to Navarette, who later sold the same to respondent Oroville, who became the
registered owner of these properties. On November 17, 2006, TransCo offered to buy these
properties from Oroville to be used for the construction of the Abaga-Kirahon transmission line in
Mindanao. TransCo manifested their intent to file expropriation proceedings against Oroville. The
parties agreed to have the subject properties surveyed to determine the just compensation. The
trial court appointed three Commissioners to fix the just compensation.
The RTC set aside the Commissioners’ report and fixed the just compensation at the rate
of Php1,520/sqm reckoned from April 20, 2007, the date of filing of the Complaint. TransCo, on
the other hand, claimed that the determination of just compensation should be based on its fair
market value at the time of the taking.
Oroville averred that to sustain the argument of TransCo that the basis of the payment for
just compensation is the value of the property at the time of taking would sow immeasurable
injustice. TransCo contended that this case is not an exception to the settled rule that just
compensation should be based on the property's value at the time of its taking; that the value and
classification of the subject property at the time of its taking in 1983 should be the basis for the
computation of just compensation.
ISSUE:
Should the computation of the just compensation be computed at the time of the taking of
the property.
RULING:
Yes, the computation of just compensation shall be reckoned from the date of actual taking.
It has been uniformly ruled that just compensation is the value of the property at the time
of taking is controlling for the purposes of compensation and not the date of the filing of the
proceedings. The determination of just compensation should be reckoned from the time the
property owners initiated inverse condemnation proceedings notwithstanding that the taking of the
properties occurred earlier is just an exception to the general rule mentioned. This exception is
applied when property owners came to know the taking of the property later because of
employment of stealth or gross unfairness on the part of the one who expropriates.
Since TransCo commenced the construction of transmission lines on 1983, the just
compensation must be ascertained as of that year. Just compensation is therefore fixed at
Php78.65/sqm. The exception to the general rule, however, cannot be applied because the
transmission lines are visible, such that Oroville could not deny knowledge of its construction in
1983.
40 |
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION COMMENCES WHEN A PERSON IS SINGLED OUT AS A

SUSPECT IN THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME
People vs. Cabanada

G.R. No. 221424; July 19, 2017
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
This is a review on the CA Decision affirming the RTC Decision finding Robelyn Cabanada
y Rosauro (Cabanada) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft.
In the course of the interview at the Victoria's residence, Cabanada admitted to PO2
Maximo Cotoner, Jr. (PO2 Cotoner) that she took the money. She led them to her room and took
a pouch (white envelope) containing ₱16,000 cash. She also showed a white leather wallet
containing the missing master key of Victor's vehicle. Thereafter, Cabanada was brought at the
Criminal Investigation Unit (CIU) for further investigation. Cabanada apologized to Catherine
Victoria (Catherine), and admitted that she still had some of the missing jewelry in her house at
Panatag Compound, Welfareville, Mandaluyong City. The police went to her house and recovered
the Technomarine, Pierre Cardin, Relic and Santa Barbara watches and a pair of earrings with
diamonds placed in a tool box.
The RTC found Cabanada guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft to
which Decision was affirmed by the CA claiming that Cabanada's admissions were not obtained
under custodial investigation as it was established that she was not yet arrested at that time. The
"uncounseled admissions" were given freely and spontaneously during a routine inquiry. On the
other hand, Cabanada alleges that her confessions were made through police questioning; that
she was treated as a suspect when she was being interviewed at Victoria’s residence. Thus, her
uncounseled admissions are inadmissible without a valid waiver.
ISSUE:
Was Cabanada’s admissions obtained under custodial investigation?
RULING:
No, Cabanada’s confession with regard to her crime is not obtained under custodial
investigation.
The "investigation" in Sec 12, par. 1 of the Bill of Rights pertains to "custodial investigation."
Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a
suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask
questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission.
Applying the foregoing, Cabanada was not under custodial investigation when she made
the confession, without counsel, to PO2 Cotoner that she took the missing ₱20,000. The
prosecution established that the confession was elicited during the initial interview of the police
after Catherine called to report the missing money and personal effects. The investigation was still
a general inquiry of the crime and has not focused on a particular suspect. Also, she admitted to
the crime while at the residence of her employer, thus, she was not yet taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of her freedom.
Therefore, the confession made by Cabanada during the general inquiry is admissible and
can be used against her.
| 41
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION IS INADMISSIBLE IF NOT MADE WITH THE

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT ALL TIMES
People vs. Fernandez

G.R. No. 218310; February 14, 2018
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal by the accused who was found guilty of special complex crime of robbery
with homicide
An Information was filed alleging that Fernandez and Paris, in conspiracy with each other,
unlawfully entered the office of the Anna Leizel Construction Supply building, took jewelry and cash
owned by Anna Abagat, and stabbed Reymark Salvador, a stay-in worker, causing his
instantaneous death. The prosecution argued that Fernandez voluntarily confessed with the
assistance of a certain Atty. Francisco, fully aware of the consequences. The prosecution alleged
that while at the police station, Colonel Samson, the Chief of Police, informed Senior Police Officer
I Jose Ysit (SPO1 Ysit) of Fernandez's intention to confess. At that time, Fernandez's mother was
also present. SPO1 Ysit asked Fernandez whether he wanted a counsel [to] which the latter
answered in the affirmative. Several police officers found Atty. Franco C. Francisco (Atty.
Francisco) and informed him that a person in the police station needs a lawyer. Fernandez,
Mercedes, and Atty. Francisco together with SPO1 Ysit went to the investigator and made his
Extra-Judicial Confession. Atty. Francisco translated and explained every question to Fernandez.
Fernandez alleges that his extrajudicial confession cannot be used against him because
he did it out of fear of physical harm, and that his counsel’s assistance during the confession was
inadequate, Atty. Francisco having arrived after interrogation started, having explained the
extrajudicial confession only after it was printed out, and not explaining the part where he admitted
joining the culprits and the possibility of him being charged together with Paris.
ISSUE:
Is the extrajudicial confession admissible despite the counsel’s absence at the start of the
questioning?
RULING:
No, the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible. The Court referred to People v. Penaflor,
where it ruled that for an extrajudicial confession to be valid, it must be (a) voluntary, (b) made with
the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, (c) express, and (d) in writing. In addition,
Art. III of the Constitution provides for the accused’s right to have competent and independent
counsel, and any confession obtained in violation of this right shall be inadmissible in evidence.
R.A. No. 7438 likewise requires that any person under custodial investigation shall at all times
assisted by counsel. Custodial investigation begins at the moment the interrogator starts
interrogating or extracting a confession.
Atty. Francisco assisted Fernandez only at the time he executed his confession, but he
was not there when Fernandez was arrested and questioned about the robbery with homicide. In
addition, Atty. Francisco was a legal consultant for the Office of the Mayor of Binmaley since his
duty to the mayor was in direct conflict with his duty to protect the rights of Fernandez.
Thus, the Court ruled that the extrajudicial confession was inadmissible considering that
Fernandez was not assisted by counsel at all times, and the counsel he had was not independent
and was not vigilant in protecting his rights.
42 |
THE RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE IS WAIVED BY DELAYS IMPUTABLE TO

DEFENDANT
Kim Liong vs. People

G.R. No. 200630; June 04, 2018
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to reverse the decision of the CA which
affirmed the ruling of the RTC finding Liong to have repeatedly delayed cross-examination of the
witness.
Liong was charged with estafa for allegedly failing to return to Equitable PCI Bank, despite
demand, a total of US $50,955.70, which was erroneously deposited in his dollar account. The
records show that the first witness for the prosecution is Antonio dela Rama. Because of the
lengthy testimony of the witness on direct examination, the cross examination was deferred and
reset to March 15, 2007. The cross examination was reset several times upon motion of the
accused who engaged the services of a new counsel. On March 15, 2007, Atty. Danilo Banares
appeared as collaborating counsel of Atty. Jovit Ponon, Liong's counsel of record. Atty. Banares
then moved for the resetting of the hearing to April 19, 2007. The hearing was again reset on the
instance of Liong because Atty. Ponon was allegedly a fraternity brother of the private prosecutor,
Atty. Pacheco. Thus, Liong terminated the services of Atty. Ponon and the hearing was reset. On
February 5, 2009, accused's counsel, Atty. Banares, failed to appear. Again, on August 27, 2009,
counsel for the accused failed to appear.
The court declared accused to have waived his right to cross examine the witness Antonio
dela Rama. Liong blamed his former counsel, Atty. Banares, for being grossly negligent for
repeatedly failing to attend his hearings. The Court of Appeals found that Liong repeatedly delayed
his cross-examination of Dela Rama specifically on March 15, 2007, April 19, 2007, February 5,
2009, and August 27, 2009.
ISSUE:
Should Liong be excused from delay because of his negligent counsel?
RULING:
No, Liong should not be excused from delay of his negligent counsel.
The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses is a basic, fundamental human right
vested inalienably to an accused. However, this right does not exist in isolation. The State also has
the right to due process. This means that the prosecution must not be denied unreasonably of its
ability to be able to prove its case through machinations by the accused. When the accused abuses
its option to choose his counsel as in this case, he can be deemed to have waived his right to
confrontation and cross-examination.
Here, Liong is partly to blame for frequently changing counsels. Petitioner was given more
than enough opportunity to cross-examine witness Dela Rama. Contrary to his allegation, five (5)
of the cancellations are attributable to him. The March 2007 hearing was cancelled on petitioner's
motion. The next hearing set on April 19, 2007 was again cancelled because petitioner terminated
the services of Atty. Ponon. On April 2008, petitioner was allegedly indisposed and did not attend
the hearing. On February 5, 2009, petitioner had no counsel. Finally, on August 27, 2009, petitioner
again had no counsel. Thus, the petitioner is deemed to have waived his right to confrontation and
cross-examination.
| 43
THE VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES CANNOT BE

CONCLUDED BY THE MERE DELAY FROM THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT TO THE
INSTITUTION OF THE INFORMATION
People vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. Nos. 232197-232198; April 16, 2018
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Sandiganbayan’s decision to
dismiss two Informations against former Sorsogon Mayor Alejandro Gamos, Municipal Accountant
Rosalyn Gile, and Municipal Treasurer Virginia Laco for malversation of public funds on the ground
of delay.
In February 2008, Sangguniang Bayan members Jocelyn Gallanosa and Joselito Robillos
filed the first Complaint against Gamos, Gile, and Laco for violation of Art. 217 of the Revised
Penal Code, alleging that they made illegal cash advances in conspiracy with one another. The
Ombudsman filed the first complaint. In December 2009, Gallanosa who was then elected as
mayor, filed a second Complaint against them for another conspired malversation of public funds.
Over the court of several years, multiple motions for reconsideration and extensions of time were
filed and it was only in 2013 that the Ombudsman found probable cause, and it was only in 2015
that the case was filed before the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan then dismissed the cases on the ground of delay, ruling that the right
of respondents-accused to a speedy disposition of their cases was violated.
ISSUE:
Did the 7-year gap from the filing of the complaint to the filing of the Information constitute
a violation on the respondents’ right to a speedy disposition of cases?
RULING:
No, the 7-year gap from the filing of the complaint to the filing of the Information does not
violation the respondents’ right to a speedy disposition of cases.
In determining whether such right has been violated, the following factors must be
considered: (1) length of delay; (2) reasons/s for the delay; (3) the accused’s assertion of or failure
to assert the right to a speedy disposition of the case/s; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
In addition, the respondents never asserted their right to a speedy disposition during the
Ombudsman proceedings when the delay allegedly occurred; they only asserted it when the
Informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan. No prejudice was also caused to the
respondents since they never underwent investigative proceedings. Likewise, there is neither
allegation nor proof that respondents were persecuted, oppressed, or made to undergo any
vexatious process during investigation period before the filing of the Informations.
The Court looked into the circumstances surrounding the case and found that the
Ombudsman already acted upon the case as early as March 2008, and the case involved multiple
exchanges of pleadings, consecutive resignations of Deputy Ombudsmen, and the multitude of
cases before the Ombudsman. Thus, the delay in itself was not unreasonable.
44 |
TO DETERMINE VIOLATION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL,

FOUR FACTORS MUST BE CONSIDERED: (A) LENGTH OF DELAY; (B) THE REASON FOR
THE DELAY; (C) THE DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION OF HIS RIGHT; AND (D) PREJUDICE
TO THE DEFENDANT
People vs. Domingo

G.R. No. 204895; March 21, 2018
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal of the accused-appellant Joel Domingo of the CA Decision finding him
guilty of two counts of Murder and one count of Attempted Murder, setting aside the dismissal of
cases transgressing the appellant’s constitutional right of speedy trial and against double jeopardy.
Accused-appellant was arrested on Mar 3, 2005. With the assistance of counsel, the
accused Roel and Joel Domingo were arraigned before Branch 15 and pleaded not guilty to each
charge. The accused filed a Motion to re-raffle the cases because of the delay on the setting of the
pre-trial conference. The judge granted the motion and the case was raffled to RTC Branch 14.
Accused-appellant had in fact moved for the re-raffle of the case on Aug 10, 2006 because of the
delay in the setting of the pre-trial conference which was finally granted by the judge. The pre-trial
conference was then conducted on Dec 12, 2006. The prosecution was given four settings to
present its evidence and witnesses. The copy of Order was received by Provincial Police and by
Tomas Dalere, however, they failed to appear and present without any justification. Thus, the RTC
dismissed the cases on Feb 7, 2007 and directed the release of the two accused.
The prosecution admitted that it failed to present any evidence on the four settings,
however, it argued that the failure was because the private complainants left their places of
residence because of persistent threats to their lives, thus they failed to receive the subpoenas
sent to them. The private prosecutor also argued that "a perusal of the reasons posited by
private complainants of their failure to appear on the scheduled hearings will therefore show
that the same were not vexatious, capricious, and oppressive as in fact they were justified
because of the persistent and imminent dangers on their lives.
ISSUE:
Was the right of the accused to speedy trial violated?
RULING:
Yes, right of the accused to speedy trial was violated.
Under Sec. 14, Art. III of the Constitution, the accused is granted a right to a speedy trial.
To determine whether accused-appellant's right to speedy trial was violated, "four factors must be
considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of his
right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant."
Prejudice to the accused is determined through its effect on three interests of the accused
that the right to a speedy trial is designed to protect, which are: "(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial
incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility
that the defense will be impaired." Accused-appellant was arrested on Mar 3, 2005. Thus, at the
time of the first setting for the prosecution's presentation of evidence, he had already been
incarcerated for almost two years. Accused-appellant had in fact moved for the re-raffle of the case
on Aug 10, 2006 because of the delay in the setting of the pre-trial conference which was finally
granted by the judge. Accused-appellant was therefore prejudiced when the prosecution failed to
present its evidence during all the settings that were given to it. Every day spent in jail is
oppressive, more so when the reason for the prolongation of incarceration is the prosecution's
unreasonable motions for postponement.
Thus, the Court is of the considered belief that accused- appellant had indeed asserted his
right to a speedy trial. The RTC's dismissal of the cases in its February Order was justified.
| 45
THE VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL IS DETERMINED BY THE LENGTH,

REASONS, AND PREJUDICE CAUSED BY DELAY AS WELL AS THE ASSERTION OF THE
RIGHT BY THE ACCUSED
Magno vs. People

G.R. No. 230657; March 14, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari appealing the decision of the SB which found that
petitioner's right to speedy trial was not violated.
An Information was filed on May 14, 2003 before the RTC charging petitioner with Multiple
Frustrated Murder and Double Attempted Murder. After arraignment, petitioner objected to the
formal appearance of one Atty. Sitoy, who intended to act as a private prosecutor in behalf of the
Ombudsman. The RTC did not allow Atty. Sitoy to participate in the trial. The order was assailed
by the People all the way to the Supreme Court (Private Prosecutor Case).
While the Private Prosecutor Case was still pending, the CA enjoined the RTC from
implementing its orders to exclude Atty Sitoy. However, it clarified that its injunctive writs do not
operate to enjoin the proceedings in criminal aspect of the case, provided that it is conducted in
the presence of the private prosecutor. Thus, trial commenced until it was again halted when the
prosecution challenged an order of the RTC excluding a piece of evidence as inadmissible. The
“Objection Case” delayed proceedings so petitioner filed on a Motion resume trial invoking his right
to speedy trial, which was granted. The prosecution’s presentation was again halted due to the
handling prosecutor’s illness in 2007. It appears that no further hearings were conducted until April
2010 when the petitioner had to move again for the continuation of the trial. Still, trial was reset 3
times until September 2010 so petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of violation of his
right to speedy trial. He pointed out the various postponements and cancellations of hearings by
the prosecution from the filing of the information until 2007, and the hibernation of the case from
2007 until his Motion to Set Case for Hearing filed in April 2010.
The RTC granted petitioner's motion to dismiss. The Sandiganbayan however reversed on
appeal ruling that since both parties contributed to the delays in the case, the petitioner-accused
cannot invoke his right to speedy trial.
ISSUE:
Was petitioner's right to speedy trial violated when the case was decided more than a
decade after its filing?
RULING:
Yes, his right to speedy trial was violated.
An accused's right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is guaranteed by the
Constitution. In the determination of whether the defendant has been denied such right, the
following factors may be considered and balanced: (a) the length of delay; (b) the reasons for the
delay; (c) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (d) the prejudice caused
by the delay.
More than a decade has elapsed from the time the Information was filed on May 14, 2003,
until the RTC promulgated its Orders dated September 30, 2013 and November 28, 2014
dismissing the case on the ground of violation of petitioner's right to speedy trial. The long delay
from 2007 to 2010 largely remains unjustified. Crucially, petitioner was not remiss in asserting his
right to speedy trial. Thus, the facts of this case clearly show a violation of the right to speedy trial.
46 |
DOUBLE JEOPARDY ATTACHES WHEN THE JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IS

WITHDRAWN
People vs. Alejandro

G.R. No. 223099; January 11, 2018
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the CA Decision affirming a Decision rendered by the RTC of
Cauayan City, Isabela finding accused-appellant Lino Alejandro y Pimentel guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of rape.
Alejandro was charged with 2 counts of rape of AAA, a 12-year old minor. During trial,
accused-appellant, through his counsel, manifested in open court that he would no longer present
any evidence for the defense and submitted the case for decision. The RTC promulgated a
decision acquitting the accused-appellant. On the same day, however, the RTC recalled the said
decision upon a manifestation by the prosecution, admitting that it erroneously declared that private
complainant AAA did not testify in Court, when in truth and in fact said private complainant took
the witness stand. The mistake was due to a mix-up with another case involving Alejandro and
another victim, XXX.
Accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that a judgment of acquittal

is immediately final and executory and can neither be withdrawn nor modified, because to do so
would place an accused-appellant in double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
May the order of acquittal be recalled?
RULING:
No, the order of acquittal may not be recalled since it would place the accused twice in
jeopardy.
For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: (1) a valid information
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court of
competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused
was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.
Here, all the elements were present. There was a valid information for two counts of rape
over which the RTC had jurisdiction and to which the accused-appellant entered a plea of not
guilty. After the trial, a judgment of acquittal was thereafter rendered and promulgated. What is
peculiar in this case is that a judgment of acquittal was rendered based on the mistaken notion
that the private complainant failed to testify; allegedly because of the mix-up of orders with a
different case involving the same accused-appellant. This, however, does not change the fact that
a judgment of acquittal had already been promulgated. Indeed, a judgment of acquittal, whether
ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon
its promulgation.
Thus, the order of acquittal may not be recalled since it would place the accused twice in
jeopardy.
| 47
A PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO MAY BE FILED ONLY IN CASES OF

EXTRALEGAL KILLINGS, ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES, OR THREATS THEREOF
Callo vs. Morente

G.R. No. 230234; September 14, 2017
Carpio, Acting C.J.
FACTS:
In a petition for the writ of amparo before the Supreme Court, the petitioner Lorie Marie
Callo (Callo) sought the immediate release of Danielle Tan Parker (Parker) from an immigration
detention facility, following the CA’s and RTC’s denial of her prior petitions for the writ of habeas
corpus. The respondent Jaime Morente was the Commissioner for the Bureau of Immigration.
Parker is a Philippine passport holder who was charged with deportation, after an
allegation that she was fugitive from justice of the USA with an outstanding arrest warrant. She
was later arrested and detained. She filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, but both the CA
and RTA denied her petitions, finding her detention to be legal. The CA found that Parker failed to
prove her Philippine citizenship to warrant judicial intervention through habeas corpus.
Thus, Callo filed a petition for the writ of amparo, arguing that Parker is a natural-born
Filipino citizen, and thus there is no reason for her detention. She also argued that Parker’s life is
in danger due to her continued detention.
ISSUE:
Is the writ of amparo a proper remedy in a detention case?
RULING:
No, the writ of amparo is not a proper remedy in a detention case.
The writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to expeditiously provide relief to violations of a

person's constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, and more specifically, to address the
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats of such.
Parker’s situation lacks a crucial element of enforced disappearance: that the deprivation
of liberty was followed by the State’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the
whereabouts of the person. There is no threat of extralegal killing or enforced disappearance in
this case, and the Bureau of Immigration even produced the body of Parker in a habeas corpus
case she previously filed. Parker has not disappeared, and the Bureau of Immigration has
sufficiently justified her detention, given the nature of the cases against her.
Additionally, Sec. 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for a successive and
exclusive order of filing of the petition, and it requires family members to first file before any
concerned citizen may do so. In this case, Callo was the first and only petitioner for Parker.
Thus, the Court denied Callo’s petition for the writ of amparo for not meeting the required
conditions of threat of extralegal killings and enforced disappearance, and for being filed in violation
of the order of petitioners required.
48 |
ACCREDITATION NOT ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR PROTECTION OF THE

GRANTEE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO
Gadian vs. Ibrado

G.R. Nos. 188163 & 188195; October 3, 2017
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari assailing the CA decision finding
Nadina Gadian-Diamante, alleging herself to be the sister of Lt. SG Mary Gadian (Gadian),
petitioned before the Supreme Court for a writ of amparo in behalf of her sister, impleading various
AFP officers as respondents, which included AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Ibrado. Gadian was the
officer-in-charge of the PH-US Balikatan Exercises, thus forming the Balikatan CMO Task Group
(Group) and requested P4,000,000.00 to support the Group’s requirements. The whole budget
request was approved, but Gadian received only P1.3 Million. Conflicts arose regarding the
distribution of funds, and Gadian was charged with lavish spending, misuse of funds, and willful
disobedience.
Gadian subsequently resigned and went into hiding and has been receiving messages that
her house was being surveyed and that there was a verbal shoot-to-kill order for her. There have
also been two attempts to kidnap her, prompting her to seek the writ of amparo. Additionally, she
requests that the Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines (AMRSP) be allowed
to continue providing protection to her, as they have already been doing.
Gadian argues that although the Department of National Defense (DND) was civilian in
character, the protection could only be extended to her through DND's military personnel. Hence,
she asks that the AMRSP be instead allowed to continue providing protection and sanctuary to
her; and that the Court provides all means necessary to AMRSP, specifically the accreditation of
it as a private institution or person capable of keeping and securing the aggrieved party under
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The CA granted the petition for the writ of amparo, but it noted
that Gadian failed to establish the authors of the threats against her, and therefore the Secretary
of Defense should be deemed the appropriate person to extend protection, not the AMRSP.
ISSUE:
May a religious association, despite lack of accreditation, provide protection to the grantee
of a writ of amparo?
RULING:
Yes, a religious association, despite lack of accreditation, may provide protection to the
grantee of a writ of amparo.
Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the persons or agencies who may provide protection
to the aggrieved parties and any member of the immediate family are limited to government
agencies, and accredited persons or private institutions capable of keeping and securing their
safety, but in respect of the latter, they should be accredited in accordance with guidelines still to
be issued.
In this case, the viability of any private or religious organization to protect the grantee of a
writ of amparo should not be dismissed solely because of the lack of accreditation. Lack of
accreditation is a lesser concern than the protection of the petitioner’s life and liberty.
Thus, a religious association, despite lack of accreditation, may provide protection to the
grantee of a writ of amparo.
| 49
THE PROCEEDINGS TAKEN UNDER THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO ARE NOT
AKIN OR SIMILAR TO THOSE IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director/Head of the CIDG, PNP vs. Cayanan
and Pascua
G.R. No. 181796; November 7, 2017
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
The Government, represented by the Director/Head of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group of the Philippine National Police, appeals the resolution issued by the RTC
maintaining the writ of amparo; ordering the CIDG to continue its investigation into the
disappearance of Pablo Cayanan.
Regina Cayanan filed a petition for habeas corpus in the RTC, which she subsequently
amended to a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo, alleging that Pablo, her husband, was
being illegally detained by the CIDG, led by SPO1 Pascua. RTC granted the petition.
CIDG and Pascua now argues that the writ of amparo was erroneously issued, there being
no sufficient evidence to support the same and that it discharged its functions as required in its
mandate and exhausted all remedies available under the law.
ISSUE:
Did the issuance of the writ of amparo by the RTC impair Pascua's right to the presumption
of his innocence?
RULING:
No, the issuance of the writ of amparo by the RTC does not impair Pascua's right to the
presumption of his innocence.
The proceedings taken under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo are not akin or similar to
those in criminal prosecutions. In the former, the guilt or innocence of the respondents is not
determined, and no penal sanctions are meted. The proceedings only endeavor to give the
aggrieved parties immediate remedies against imminent or actual threats to life, liberty or security.
The presumption of innocence is never an issue. In the latter, the prosecution of the accused with
due process of law is the object of the proceedings. The presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused is always the starting point. Hence, the need for the State to adduce proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.
50 |
STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH ALL DOCUMENTARY REQUIREMENTS IS NECESSARY

FOR NATURALIZATION
Republic vs. Go Pei Hung

G.R. No. 212785; April 4, 2018
Del Castillo, C.J.
FACTS:
In a petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner (Republic of the Philippines) assails the
decision of the CA and RTC granting respondent’s (Hung) Petition for Naturalization. Hung is a
British subject and Hong Kong resident seeking Philippine citizenship.
The Republic argues that the petition should not have been granted because Hung did not
file his declaration of intention with the OSG and did not submit a Certificate of Arrival in the
Philippines, is not engaged in a lucrative profession, trade, or occupation, and failed to present
qualified character witnesses during the hearing, all contrary to the requirements for naturalization
under Sec. 5 of CA 473 or the Revised Naturalization Law.
Hung’s sole defense is that he is exempt from filing a Declaration of Intention because he
has been a resident of the Philippines for more than 30 years. Additionally, he argues that a
Certificate of Arrival is a mere component of the Declaration of Intention and thus, his exemption
from filing a Declaration of Intention extends to his submission of a Certificate of Arrival.
ISSUE:
Is Hung exempt from filing a Declaration of Intention and Certificate of Arrival by virtue of
his residency?
RULING:
No, Hung is not exempt from filing a Declaration of Intention and Certificate of Arrival by
virtue of his residency.
Sec. 7 of CA 473 obliges petitioners for naturalization to attach their Declaration of Intention
and Certificate of Arrival and Declaration of Intention to such petition. The purpose of the Certificate
of Arrival is proving that the person seeking naturalization entered the country legally, and failure
to attach this Certificate to the Petition for Naturalization renders the Petition incomplete and must
be denied outright. Likewise, the Declaration and the Certificate are two different documents; the
latter is not a mere component of the former.
In this case, Hung failed to submit both documents. Strict compliance with all statutory
requirements is necessary before an applicant may acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization.
The absence of even a single requirement is fatal to an application for naturalization.
Hence, Hung is not exempt from filing a Declaration of Intention and Certificate of Arrival
by virtue of his residency.
| 51
THE CONCEPT OF LUCRATIVE TRADE, PROFESSION, OR LAWFUL OCCUPATION IN

THE CONTEMPLATION OF LAW SPEAKS OF ADEQUACY AND SUSTAINABILITY
Mahtani vs. Republic

G.R. No. 211118; March 21, 2018
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition of Manish Mahtani (Mahtani) in her Naturalization case assailing the
requirement of lucrative trade.
On January 2, 2007, Mahtani, a citizen of the Republic of India, filed a Declaration of Intent
to become a citizen of the Philippines with the OSG. On April 18, 2008, Mahtani filed a petition for
Naturalization. He stated among others that he is engaged in a lawful lucrative occupation and is
currently the Vice-President for Operations of Sprint International, Inc., which is the importer,
manufacturer, and exclusive distributor of Speedo swimwear and athletic gear in the country. The
RTC granted the petition appearing that Mahtani has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications required under the law to become a naturalized Filipino citizen. The Republic,
through the OSG, appealed and faulted the ruling of the RTC for granting the petition despite that
he has failed to prove that he has a lucrative occupation. He failed to submit documentary evidence
and present credible persons as character witnesses.
On the other hand, Mahtani averred that the word “lucrative” shall refer only to “trade” and
not to “profession” or “lawful occupation”. It only means that “his income permits him and the
members of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard
of living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our civilization.” which
he proved by his place of residence, daughter’s education, memberships in civic organization,
social interactions, Alien Employment Permit, and Special Resident Retiree's Visa. The CA
reversed the RTC ruling and denied his Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Was petitioner engaged in lucrative trade or lawful occupation?
RULING:
No, Mahtani failed to prove that the requirement under Sec. 2(4) of CA 473 was complied
with.
“Some lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation” may be shown that the
employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his
expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness,
or disability to work and thus avoid ones becoming the object of charity or a public charge.
In the case, Mahtani did not provide any documentary evidence nor did present anything
to apprise the courts a quo of his income or financial status. At most, the evidence presented
merely proved that he and his family live in comfort, above that of an average person or family.
There is no sufficient proof that it is enough to create an appreciable margin of income over
expenses. Moreover, doing business and socializing with prominent personalities do not satisfy
the requirement of the law.
Hence, the concept of a lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation speaks of

adequacy and sustainability which was not present in the case.
52 |
REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP DOES NOT HAVE RETROACTIVE

EFFECT
Tan vs. Crisologo

G.R. No. 193993; November 8, 2017
Martires, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filled by petitioner Vivenne K. Tan assailing the
Decision of the CA which found that the RTC exercised grave abuse of discretion when it reversed
the decision of the MeTC to exclude Tan from the voter's list.
On 19 Jan 1993, Tan, born to Filipino parents, became a naturalized US citizen. On 26 Oct
2009, Tan applied to be registered as a voter which was approved by the Election Registration
Board (ERB). On 30 Nov 2009, Tan took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
On 1 Dec 2009, she filed a petition before the Bureau of Immigration (BI) for the reacquisition of
her Philippine (PH) citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. The BI confirmed her reacquisition of PH
citizenship. On the same day, Tan filed her Certificate of Candidacy to run as congresswoman.
Respondent Vincent Crisologo filed a petition seeking the exclusion of Tan from the voter's
list because she was not a Filipino citizen when she registered as a voter. Tan countered that,
although she became a naturalized American citizen on 19 January 1993, since 1996 she had
effectively renounced her American citizenship as she had been continuously residing in the
Philippines.
ISSUE:
Did reacquisition of PH citizenship through R.A. No. 9225 have a retroactive effect as to
make Tan a Filipino citizen prior to such reacquisition, particularly, during her registration as voter?
RULING:
No, reacquisition of PH citizenship through R.A. No. 9225 does not have a retroactive
effect which can cure any and all defects attendant during registration as a voter.
Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9225 states, “Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their PH citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed hereby to have reacquired PH
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic... x x x Natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain
their PH citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.” R.A. No. 9225 makes a distinction between
Filipino citizens who lost their PH citizenship prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 9225 and reacquired
their citizenship under the same law from those who lost their PH citizenship after R.A. No. 9225
was enacted and retained their citizenship. Given the distinction between citizens who have
"reacquired" from those who "retained" PH citizenship, Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 9225 cannot be used as
basis for giving a retroactive application of the law. Correlating Secs. 2 and 3 of the law would
readily reveal that only those falling under the 2nd par. of R.A. No. 9225, i.e., natural-born citizens
who became naturalized citizens of a foreign country after the effectivity of the said law, shall be
considered as not to have lost their PH citizenship. To consider that the reacquisition of PH
citizenship retroacts to the date it was lost would result in an absurd scenario where a Filipino
would still be considered a PH citizen when in fact he had already renounced his citizenship.
Tan took an Oath of Allegiance to the USA on 19 Jan 1993, prior to the enactment of R.A.
No. 9225 on 29 Aug 2003. If the Court were to effect as retroactive Tan's PH citizenship to the
date, she lost her PH citizenship, then the different use of the words "reacquire" and "retain" in
R.A. No. 9225 would effectively be futile. Hence, reacquisition of PH citizenship through R.A. No.
9225 does not have a retroactive effect which can cure any and all defects attendant during
registration as a voter.
| 53
AN EMPLOYEE OF THE JUDICIARY IS A PUBLIC SERVANT AND MUST ACT WITH

INTEGRITY TO PRESERVE THE IMAGE OF A COURT OF JUSTICE
Re: Fake Certificates of Civil Service Eligibility of Marivic B. Ragel, Evelyn C. Ragel, Emelyn B.
Campos, And Jovilyn B. Dawang
A.M. No. 14-10-314-RTC; November 28, 2017.
Per Curiam
FACTS:
For the consideration of the Court is the Administrative Matter for Agenda dated July 4,
20171 prepared by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) with a recommendation that Evelyn
Corpus Ragel, Stenographer I, Municipal Trial Court, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, and Emelyn
Borillo Campos, Stenographer III, Branch 31, Regional Trial Court, Guimba, Nueva Ecija, be
dismissed from the service with forefeiture of all retirement benefits except their accrued leave
credits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government,
including government-owned and controlled corporations.
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted an investigation regarding the civil
service eligibility of four stenographers, namely: Marivic Ragel (Marivic), Evelyn Ragel (Evelyn),
Campos, and Dawang. When Civic Service Commission submitted a photo in the Picture-Seat
Plans of the examiners, it was found out that Evelyn, Campos and Dawang were not the ones who
took the civil service examinations. They denied the allegations without submitting any evidence
on their behalf. OCA recommended the penalties of dismissal and forfeiture of all retirement
benefits except their accrued leave credits. The complaint against Marivic was dismissed. Dawang
was dismissed from service on an earlier decision.
ISSUE:
Are the penalties recommended by OCA just?
RULING:
Yes, the penalties recommended are just.
Evelyn and Campos are guilty of dishonesty. Dishonesty has been defined as intentionally
making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception
or fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment or promotion. It was clearly
established that the persons who took the Civil Service Examinations were not Evelyn and
Campos. The Court ruled in another case that such act of letting another person take the
examination for him “must have only been with must have only been with the permission and
knowledge of respondent that the other person was able to use her name for the examinations”.
It must be stressed that every employee of the judiciary should be an example of integrity,
uprightness, and honesty. The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and
otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel. By their
act of dishonesty, Evelyn Ragel and Campos failed to meet the stringent standards set for a judicial
employee. Premises considered, the penalties recommended are just.
54 |
OFFICE IS A PUBLIC TRUST AND PUBLIC SERVANTS ARE ACCOUNTABLE TO THE

PEOPLE AT ALL TIMES
Castilla v. Duncano
A.M. No. P-17-3771; January 24, 2018.
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint for Conduct Unbecoming of a Court Employee,
Dishonesty, Gross Negligence, and Violation of Section 7 (d) of Republic Act (RA) No. 6713, 1
against Maria Luz A. Duncano (Mrs. Duncano), Clerk of Court IV of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Butuan City, Agusan del Norte.
Clerk of Court Duncano, personally and privately but under the pretext of performing her
official duties, demanded and collected from Anita and Anniesel Lamoste the amount of Php7,000
for the provisional release of Nathaniel Lamoste who, at that time, was still undergoing inquest
proceeding for Resistance and Disobedience. It was later found out that no bail was required.
Duncano only returned the money after several demands from Lamoste’s. She denied that she
received the money. Duncano also deliberately caused or allowed the loss of a Supreme Court
EPSON printer. She presented a receipt showing that it was brought to a repair shop but the receipt
is in fact for computer CPU. She later stated that she found the missing printer within th premises
of MTCC Butuan City and was declared unserviceable. The Investigating Judge recommended
that she be meted the penalty of suspension for two months.
ISSUE:
Is Duncano liable and should be punished of two-month suspension?
RULING:
Yes, Duncano is liable and should be punished of two-month suspension.
Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees are at all times accountable to
the people; must serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency; and must
lead modest lives. Furthermore, the position of a clerk of court is an essential and ranking officer
of our judicial system who performs delicate administrative functions vital to the prompt and proper
administration of justice. Sec. 7 (d) of R.A. No. 6713 provides that public officials and employees
shall not solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or
anything of monetary value from any person in the course of their official duties or in connection
with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions
of their office.
It is illogical to believe that Duncano did not receive the cash bail bond, and yet, she was
the one who returned the same. In practice, the proper procedure in the handling bail bond is for
the clerk of court to immediately deposit it with the persons with whom a cash bail bond may be
deposited namely: the collector of internal revenue, or the provincial, city or municipal treasurer,
after being directed by the court to receive it. With respect to the printer, instead of explaining the
whereabouts of it, she blamed Sheriff Demata saying that the latter twisted the fact. Duncano was
not able to account for it.
Thus, Duncano is liable and should be punished of two-month suspension.
| 55
PUBLIC OFFICERS MUST PERFORM THEIR DUTIES STRICTLY AND REGULARLY
Balloguing vs. Dagan

A.M. No. P-17-3645; January 30, 2018.
Per Curiam
FACTS:
This resolves the administrative complaint filed by Presiding Judge Marita B. Balloguing
(Judge Balloguing) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Vigan City, Ilocos Sur, Branch 20 against
Cresente B. Dagan (Dagan), Utility Worker I of the same court 1) for habitual absenteeism and
abandonment of work; and 2) for taking records and evidence in the RTC.
Judge Balloguing alleged that Dagan, a utility worker of RTC in Vigan City, incurred
absences at work for September, October and November 2014 and completely abandoned his
work in December 2014. Petitioner also claimed that the rifle submitted as evidence in a civil case
pending in the RTC went missing and Dagan was the only possible culprit since only he has the
key in the stockroom which used to be his sleeping quarter. Later, he was caught surreptitiously
returning the rifle to the court. Dagan failed to comment even after receiving two orders from OCA
to comment. OCA recommended that the administrative case be re-docketed, that Dagan be
dismissed from service and all his benefits, except accrued leave benefits, be forfeited.
ISSUE:
Is Dagan liable for habitual absenteeism, abandonment, and responsible for taking the
rifle?
RULING:
Yes, Dagan is liable for habitual absenteeism, abandonment, and responsible for taking
the rifle.
Citing Administrative Circular No. 14-2002 and Office of the Court Administrator v.
Sarceno, a civil servant is considered habitually absent when "he or she incurs 'unauthorized
absences exceeding the allowable 2.5 days monthly leave credit under the law for at least three
(3) months in a semester or at least three (3) consecutive months during the year.'" Habitual
absenteeism constitutes gross misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. It also emphasized the constitutional precept that public office is a public trust. Since public
officers are accountable to the people, they must perform their duties strictly. It further held that, it
condemns such act or omission that would diminish the people's faith in the Judiciary; hence, all
its officers and employees must conduct themselves in a manner that is beyond suspicion.
Even though Dagan was able to file leave of absence in September, October and
November, he, nonetheless, went AWOL in December 2014. Dagan is guilty of habitual
absenteeism and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Such act must be
condemned as it diminishes the people’s faith in the Judiciary. His disservice to the Judiciary gives
the Court sufficient reason to dismiss him and declare him ineligible for public service hereafter.
Due to Dagan’s inexcusable refusal to comment despite ample opportunity to do so, he

had waived his right to defend himself, and had shown appalling disrespect of the Court's authority
as well as its rules and regulations. The OCA's directives, and those of its deputies are issued
pursuant to the administrative supervision of the Court. They are not mere requests but are
directives that must be timely and fully complied with. As such, the indifference to and disregard of
such orders constitute insubordination.
Thus, Dagan is liable for habitual absenteeism, abandonment, and responsible for taking
the rifle.
56 |
ONE MUST PRESERVE THE TRUST REPOSED UPON HIM BY THE PEOPLE TO REMAIN
IN PUBLIC SERVICE
Office of the Ombudsman vs. Regalado

G.R. Nos. 208481-82; February 7, 2018
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari praying for the reversal of the Decision of the CA
ruling that respondent Maria Rowena Regalado (Regalado) was liable for Grave Misconduct but
reduced her penalty to suspension from office without pay for one (1) year.
Carmelita Doromal (Doromal), owner of St. Martha’s Day Care Center and Tutorial Center,
inquired in the Davao Office of the Bureau of Immigration about its letter requiring her school to
obtain an accreditation to admit foreign students. Regalado, an Immigration Officer, told her that
she has to pay Php50,000 as “processing fee” and that the amount may be reduced. If Doromal
does not pay it, the inspection fee could soar as high as Php100,000. After her several offers were
denied, respondent called Doromal saying that the amount was reduced to Php10,000. Doromal
agreed but Regalado demanded for an “honorarium” which she will give to her boss. The
representative of Doromal delivered the “honorarium” directly to respondent in the amount of
Php1,500. Upon opening the envelope, Regalado blurted out saying that it should be at least
Php30,000. Regalado even admitted that the transaction is under the table.
The Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao found Regalado guilty of Grave Misconduct
and violation of Sec. 7(d) of R.A. 6713 and imposed the penalty of dismissal from the service,
which shall carry with it the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits, and perpetual disqualification [from] reemployment in the government service. The CA
lowered the penalty to suspension for 1 year without pay considering that it was the first time of
Regalado to be found administratively liable.
ISSUE:
Is the CA correct in lowering the penalty to 1-year suspension considering it was the first
administrative liability of respondent?
RULING:
No, the CA erred in lowering the penalty of respondent to 1-year suspension.
The 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (2017 RACCS) and the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which were in effect during
respondent's commission of the acts charged against her imposes the penalty of dismissal from
service with the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, perpetual disqualification from
public office, bar from taking civil service examinations, and forfeiture of retirement benefits.
Furthermore, Sec. 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713, in addition to Sec. 3(c) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act) carries the same accessory penalty. Also, the Court already ruled in the
case of Duque v. Veloso that the clear language of Sec. 52, Rule IV does not consider a first-time
offender as a mitigating circumstance. One can continue to hold public office only for as long as
he or she proves worthy of public trust. The fundamental notion that one's tenure in government
springs exclusively from the trust reposed by the public means that continuance in office is
contingent upon the extent to which one is able to maintain that trust.
Respondent violated Sec. 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713. The modus operandi of [Regalado] is to
present to applicants for accreditation a fake copy of Office Mem. Order No. RBR 00-57 providing
an accreditation fee of P50,000 to be able to charge the said amount, when the actual fee required
is only P10,000. If the applicant cannot afford to pay she will reduce the accreditation fee to
P10,000.
Hence, Regalado is ordered to suffer the penalty of dismissal from service, along with its
accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual
disqualification from employment in government.
| 57
A REFRESHER COURSE CONDUCTED TO GOVERNMENT OFFICERS ARE

CONSIDERED NECESSARY AND REASONABLE EXPENDITURES
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Commission on Audit

G.R. No. 213424; July 11, 2017
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Decision of the Commission on Audit (COA)
which disallowed (1) payments made by Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to MSA Academic
Advancement Institute (MSA) representing refresher course and examination review fees, and (2)
travel expenses incurred by bank officers in connection with the said refresher course.
LBP engaged MSA Academic Advance Institute (MSA) for the conduct of the Professional
Advancement Refresher Course (PARC), a 5-day refresher program designed to provide LBP
officers nationwide with Pay Grade 9 and up with managerial, verbal, and analytical skills.
Furthermore, LBP sought to prepare its officers, holding temporary appointments for the Career
Service Executive Eligibility/Management Aptitude Test Battery (CSEE/MATB) examination.
The refresher course was done in two batches. 51 out of the 192 officers who attended the
second refresher course in July 2005 failed in the CSEE/MATB examination given on Nov 2004.
Hence, they were given the privilege to review for the second time in July 2005, as part of the
second batch. During the Audit Observations, the LBP Auditor classified the expenses for the
second review of the 51 officers as unnecessary/excessive expenses, and recommended the
refund of such.
However, the COA Legal and Adjudication Office issued a Notice of Disallowance for lack
of legal basis, not only the review fees and expenses of the 51 officers, but ALL the review fees
and expenses paid by LBP to MSA. The travel expenses claimed by the LBP officers who
participated in the MSA refresher courses in Metro Manila, Cebu City, and Davao City were also
disallowed.
ISSUE:
Did the expenses disburse by the LBP for the refresher course of its officers have legal
basis?
RULING:
Yes, the expenses disbursed by the LBP for the refresher course of its officers have legal
basis.
The aim of the refresher course is to provide updated information on the enhancement of
managerial and verbal skills, and on the analysis and interpretation of data which can assist the
officers concerned in (1) effectively carrying out their respective duties and responsibilities, and (2)
enhancing LBP's delivery of service to its clients. These objectives of LBP in securing MSA's
service to conduct a professional advancement refresher course are clearly in line with its mandate
to provide a continuing program for career development of its personnel as laid down in the civil
service rules.
The refresher course was conducted not solely to aid the bank's officers to pass the
eligibility examination but also to strengthen the bank's upper management group who supervises
LBP's more than 300 branches and field offices nationwide while performing highly technical or
specialized core banking functions.
Truly, the refresher course was a necessary and reasonable expenditure for the bank
under the circumstances.
58 |
DISHONESTY IS THE CONCEALMENT OR DISTORTION OF TRUTH, WHICH SHOWS

LACK OF INTEGRITY OR A DISPOSITION TO DEFRAUD, CHEAT, DECEIVE, OR
BETRAY, OR INTENT TO VIOLATE THE TRUTH
Paduga vs. Dimson
A.M. No. P-18-3833 (Resolution); April 16, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
A letter-complaint was filed before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by Paduga
against Roberto Dimson, Sheriff IV of the RTC-Valenzuela Branch 171, accusing the latter of
usurpation and abuse of authority.
Paduga alleged that respondent personally attended to the execution proceedings in

connection with a decision rendered by the RTC of QC Branch 221 despite not having been
deputized by said court to do so. He also claimed that respondent is a Sheriff of an entirely different
court which is RTC Valenzuela Branch 171. Respondent personally went with the sheriff of RTC-
QC Branch 221 to complainant's address for the purpose of enforcing the RTC-QC Branch 221
RULING. Dimson personally supervised the execution of the RTC-QC Branch 221 RULING and
even handed financial assistance to those who voluntarily vacated the property subject of litigation.
Dimson denied the charges, explaining that as brother-in-law of one of the counsels in the
case ruled by RTC-QC Branch 221, he only assisted in the implementation of such ruling, and
claimed he never introduced himself as a sheriff of another court. Dimson explains that he acted
in his personal capacity. The OCA found respondent guilty of usurpation of authority and abuse of
authority which constitute Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. The OCA ruled
that Dimson is also guilty of Less Serious Dishonesty and Simple Neglect of Duty.
ISSUE:
Should the respondent be held administratively liable for acts complained of?
RULING:
Yes, Dimson is administratively liable.
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service involves the demeanor of a public
officer which tends to tarnish the image and integrity of his public office. On the other hand,
Dishonesty is the concealment or distortion of truth, which shows lack of integrity or a disposition
to defraud, cheat, deceive, or betray, or intent to violate the truth. Under CSC Resolution No. 06-
0538, dishonesty may be classified as serious, less serious or simple. Sec 4 of said Resolution
states that Less Serious Dishonesty necessarily entails the presence of any one of the following
circumstances: (a) the dishonest act caused damage and prejudice to the government which is not
so serious as to qualify under Serious Dishonesty; (b) the respondent did not take advantage of
his/her position in committing the dishonest act; and (c) other analogous circumstances. Finally,
Simple Neglect of Duty means the failure of an employee or official to give proper attention to a
task expected of him or her, signifying a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or
indifference.
Respondent is guilty of all three (3) of these offenses, considering that: (a) as a Sheriff in
RTC-Valenzuela Branch 171, he encroached on the authority, duties, and functions of the Sheriff
of RTC-QC Branch 221 when he personally appeared at the property subject of a ruling in said
court, without being deputized to do so; and (b) in attending to such matter extraneous to his duties
as Sheriff of RTC-Valenzuela Branch 171, he neglected his own duties and functions in the same
court.
| 59
THE COURT HAS THE DISCRETION TO MITIGATE THE PENALTY CONSIDERING THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Viesca

A.M. No. P-12-3092; October 10, 2017.
Per Curiam
FACTS:
For resolution is the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent Remedios R. Viesca
(Viesca) of the Court's Decision dated April 14, 2015.
The Supreme Court imposed on respondent Viesca, Clerk of Court of MTC of San Antonio,
Nueva Ecija who was found guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty, Grave Misconduct, and Serious
Dishonesty, the penalties of (i) dismissal from service; (ii) forfeiture of all her retirement benefits,
except accrued leave benefits; (iii) perpetual disqualification from re-employment in any
government-owned and controlled corporation or government financial institution; (iv) cancellation
of her civil service eligibility; and (v) disqualification from taking the civil service examination for
failure to remit the whole amount of judicial collections coupled with misappropriation.
Respondent prays for the Court to mitigate her penalties based on the following grounds:
her full restitution of the total amount of shortage, her thirty-four (34) years of government service,
the lack of irregularities in the receipts she submitted, that she is already sixty-eight years of age
and the fact that this is her first administrative case.
ISSUE:
May the Court mitigate the penalties imposed in an administrative case against a clerk of
court?
RULING:
Yes. The Court notes several mitigating circumstances that may reasonably justify the
reduction of the penalty imposable on Viesca.
Records reveal that she fully restituted the shortages in judicial collections after the
meeting with the audit team. Moreover, the interests that could have been earned had she timely
deposited the amounts have already been deducted from her withheld salaries, leaving no
outstanding accountabilities. The Court also notes that she fully cooperated with the audit team
during the investigation of her infractions and soon thereafter, submitted the financial records
without any irregularities, tampering, or falsifications. To the Court's mind, these acts amount to
taking full responsibility for the infractions committed, and thus, may be duly appreciated in
imposing the penalty.
Furthermore, the Court considers Viesca's advanced age, her more than three (3) decades
of service to the Judiciary, and the fact that this is her first administrative offense. Considering the
circumstances of this case in light of the above-stated jurisprudential pronouncements, the Court
partially reconsiders the penalty of dismissal initially meted against Viesca and instead, imposes a
fine of P50,000.00, deductible from her retirement benefits.
60 |
THE EXPENDITURES OF GOVERNMENT FUNDS OR USES OF GOVERNMENT

PROPERTY IN VIOLATION OF LAW OR REGULATION SHALL BE PERSONAL
LIABILITY OF THE OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE FOUND TO BE DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE
THEREFOR
Fernando vs. Commission on Audit (En Banc)

G.R. No. 214910; February 13, 2018.
Jardaleza, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 64 assailing the Decision of the
Commission on Audit (COA) which disapproved the COA-National Government Sector (NGS)
Cluster-B Decision and effectively denied the appeal of the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA) with modifications.
MMDA and William L. Tan Construction (WLTC) executed a Contract whereby the latter
agreed to design and construct 14 steel pedestrian bridges in Metro Manila to be completed within
120 calendar days. During the construction, WLTC executed Deeds of Assignment for parts of the
project to third-party contractors. The MMDA issued three suspension orders (SOs) to WLTC
because of such assignment. The MMDA did not pay WLTC the balance under their service
contract, since it was the computed liquidated damages for the 120-calendar day delay in the
completion of the project. The COA State Auditor issued Notice of Disallowance (ND) for the
suspended transactions. The COA-NGS Cluster-B lifted the disallowance, except for liquidated
damages. The COA Proper disapproved the decision of the COA-NGS Cluster-B and denied the
appeal of the MMDA with modifications. It reduced the original disallowance consisting of the
liquidated damages and contract cost variance. COA Proper named WLTC and the responsible
officials of the MMDA liable for the disallowance.
Petitioners argue that WLTC bears the sole liability because the delay in the project and
the additional costs incurred to expedite its completion were the entire fault of WLTC.
ISSUE:
Can MMDA and/or its concerned officers be held liable for the liquidated damages and/or
contract cost variance?
RULING:
Yes. The COA Proper is correct in holding WLTC and the above MMDA officials solidarily
liable for the disallowance.
Under the Administrative Code, every expenditure or obligation authorized or incurred in

violation of the provisions of this Code or of the general and special provisions contained in the
annual General or other Appropriations Act shall be void. Every payment made in violation of said
provisions shall be illegal and every official or employee authorizing or making such payment, or
taking part therein, and every person receiving such payment shall be jointly and severally liable
to the Government for the full amount so paid or received." Sec 103 of P.D. No. 1445 provides that
expenditures of government funds or uses of government property in violation of law or regulations
shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found to be directly responsible therefor.
The SO should have only suspended the operation and nothing more. The SO, in fact,
expressly directed WLTC to suspend all construction operation and did not contain anything about
revising or moving the effectivity of the contract. Petitioners allowed and approved the
disbursement of funds for the payment to WLTC, without withholding or deducting the correct
amount of liquidated damages and contract cost variance. Thus, WLTC and the said MMDA
officials are solidarily liable for the disallowance.
| 61
ABSENCES BECOME HABITUAL ONLY WHEN AN OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE IN THE

CIVIL SERVICE EXCEEDS THE ALLOWABLE MONTHLY LEAVE CREDIT, WHICH IS 2.5
DAYS WITHIN THE GIVEN TIME FRAME
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Vladimir Bravo

A.M. No. P-17-3710; March 13, 2018.
Per Curiam
FACTS:
These consolidated administrative cases discuss the habitual absenteeism of Vladimir A.
Bravo (Bravo), Court Interpreter II, of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Manila, Branch 24.
Teodora Balboa, Branch Clerk of Court of MeTC Br. 24 Manila, wrote to OCA requesting
the latter that Bravo be considered Absent without Official Leave (AWOL), in view of Bravo's
continuous absence without filing any leave of absence. OCA issued Indorsements directing Bravo
to Comment on the two (2) counts of habitual absenteeism. However, instead of filing his
Comment, he tendered his resignation.
OCA aptly observed that Bravo's refusal to comment can be interpreted as an admission
of the charges against him. OCA recommended that for the two (2) counts of habitual absenteeism,
for the periods September 2012 to February 2013, and March 2013 to May 2013, be meted the
penalty of dismissal from the service, but considering that he has already resigned from the service,
that Bravo be meted with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued leave
credits, if any, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
ISSUE:
Is Bravo guilty of habitual absenteeism such that he must be meted the penalty of being
barred from entering public service?
RULING:
Yes, Bravo is guilty of habitual absenteeism.
Under Memorandum Circular No. 4, Series of 1991, of the Civil Service Commission
(CSC), an officer or employee in the civil service shall be considered habitually absent if he or she
incurs unauthorized absences exceeding the allowable 2.5 days monthly leave credit under the
leave law for at least three (3) months in a semester; or at least three (3) consecutive months
during the year. To stress, mere failure to file leave of absence does not by itself result in any
administrative liability. However, unauthorized absence is punishable if the same becomes
frequent or habitual. Absences become habitual only when an officer or employee in the civil
service exceeds the allowable monthly leave credit, which is 2.5 days within the given time frame.
Bravo is considered to have incurred unauthorized absences exceeding the allowable period by
law. Bravo incurred 72.5 absences in the year 2012, while in 2013, he incurred 61 unauthorized
absences. In sum, Bravo incurred a total of 133.5 unauthorized absences.
There is no applicable mitigating circumstance that can be considered in Bravo's favor.

Aside from being habitually absent, he blatantly ignored the communications sent to him. Such act
is a manifestation of Bravo's lack of interest to the impending consequence of being barred from
entering the judiciary again which he tried to circumvent by submitting his resignation early on.
He is hereby dismissed from the service with prejudice to re-employment in any

government agency, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and with forfeiture of
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits. Hence, Bravo is guilty of habitual absenteeism.
62 |
DBP MEMBERS ARE NOT SALARIED OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT THUS NOT
ENTITLED TO BENEFITS UNLESS SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED BY LAW
Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Commission on Audit

G.R. No. 221706; March 13, 2018.
Gesmundo, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the Decision of the Commission on Audit
(COA) which affirmed the Notice of Disallowance (ND) relative to the compensation and other
benefits received by the Board of Directors (Board) of petitioner Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP).
In 2006, DBP issued a resolution approving, among others, entitlement of the DBP
Chairman and Board P1,000.00 per diem for every Board/ExCom meeting attended and
reimbursement of reasonable actual transportation and representation expenses. The DBP Board
passed another Resolution No. 0037 approving the guidelines in determining the entitlement to per
diems and other benefits of the Board. This was approved by the President of the Philippines. DBP
paid its Board members benefits which were accounted as Representation and Entertainment-
Others. It likewise paid the Board members rice subsidy and anniversary bonuses.
Supervising Auditor from the COA issued a Notice of Disallowance(ND) against the DBP,
which stated: that pursuant to the DBP Charter, the Board members are only entitled to per diems;
that the approval of the President under Section 8 of DBP Charter only refers to the increase of
the per diem for each meeting attended; and that COA Decision No. 2001-026 dated January 25,
2001, provided that granting additional compensation to the Board members other than those
prescribed requires legislative action and that it cannot be substituted by administrative
authorization.
ISSUE:
Are the DBP Board members entitled to benefits other than per diems?
RULING:
No. DBP Board members are not salaried officials of the government, hence, they are not
entitled to benefits unless specifically provided by law.
Sec. 8 of the DBP Chapter only mentions per diems as the compensation of the Board
members. It does not expressly provide the grant of other benefits to the said members.
Nevertheless, considering that the Board cannot grant additional benefits to its members, other
than per diems, then the President's approval of the DBP Memorandum is immaterial.
Lastly, even assuming that the additional benefits of the Board are disallowed, the
responsible officers cited under the ND should not be held liable by reason of good faith. Good
faith may be appreciated in favor of the responsible officers under the ND provided they comply
with the following requisites: (1) that they acted in good faith believing that they could disburse the
disallowed amounts based on the provisions of the law; and (2) that they lacked knowledge of facts
or circumstances which would render the disbursements illegal, such when there is no similar ruling
by this Court prohibiting a particular disbursement or when there is no clear and unequivocal law
or administrative order barring the same.
Here, the DBP believed in good faith that they could grant additional benefits to the Board
members based on Sec. 8 of the DBP Charter. The DBP claimed that the additional benefits had
the imprimatur of President Arroyo. Also, at the time of the issuance of the said DBP resolutions,
there was still no existing jurisprudence or administrative order or regulation expressly prohibiting
the disbursement of benefits and compensation to the DBP Board members aside from per diems.
DBP Board members are not salaried officials of the government, hence, they are not
entitled to benefits unless specifically provided by law.
| 63
THE ARIAS DOCTRINE APPLIES ONLY WHEN A PUBLIC OFFICIAL HAS NO

FOREKNOWLEDGE OF ANY FACT OR CIRCUMSTANCE THAT WOULD PROMPT HIM
OR HER TO INVESTIGATE THE ACTS OR OMISSIONS OF HIS OR HER SUBORDINATES
Abubakar vs. People

G.R. No. 202408, 202409, 202412; June 27, 2018
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
The case involves several Petitions for Review on Certiorari concerning alleged anomalies
in the implementation of infrastructure projects within the ARMM. The petitioners question the
Decisions and Resolution of the Sandiganbayan finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
Petitioners were officials of the DPWH-ARMM when the offenses were allegedly
committed. After the creation of the ARMM, the national government earmarked P615,000,000 for
the implementation of regional and provincial infrastructure projects. In 1991, the funds were
transferred to the office of the ARMM Regional Governor before a portion was transferred to the
DPWH-ARMM. When the Office of the President received reports of irregularities with respect to
these funds, the Commission on Audit was directed to conduct an investigation. Based on the
report submitted by the Commission on Audit, the Office of the Ombudsman conducted a
preliminary investigation and found probable cause to indict the regional officials of DPWH-ARMM
for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On July
31, 1998, 21 separate Informations were filed against petitioners and other officials of DPWH-
ARMM. The Sandiganbayan found the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
In their motions for reconsideration, Accused Guiani and Baraguir invoked the application
of the Arias Doctrine.
ISSUE:
Can the Arias Doctrine apply to exonerate Guiani and Baraguir?
RULING:
No. The Arias Doctrine cannot exonerate Guiano and Baraguir.
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 punishes a public officer who causes "any undue injury to
any party, including the Government" or gives "any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence."
Arias laid down the doctrine that heads of offices may, in good faith, rely to a certain extent
on the acts of their subordinates "who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations."
However, the application of the doctrine is subject to the qualification that the public official has no
foreknowledge of any facts or circumstances that would prompt him or her to investigate or
exercise a greater degree of care. In a number of cases, this Court refused to apply the Arias
doctrine considering that there were circumstances that should have prompted the government
official to inquire further.
In this case, the Court finds that petitioners gave unwarranted benefits and advantage to
several contractors by allowing them to deploy their equipment ahead of the scheduled public
bidding. The Arias doctrine cannot exonerate petitioners from criminal liability. There were
circumstances that should have prompted them to make further inquiries on the transactions
subject of this case.
64 |
DROPPING EMPLOYEES FROM THE ROLL WHO HAVE BEEN CONTINUOUSLY ABSENT
WITHOUT OFFICIAL LEAVE FOR AT LEAST 30 WORKING DAYS, WITHOUT PRIOR
NOTICE, IS VALID
Re: Florante B. Sumangil

A.M. No. 18-04-79-RTC; June 20, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative matter stemmed from a Letter informing the Court that Mr.
Florante Sumangil (Sumangil) has been on absence without official leave (AWOL) since December
2017.
The records of the Employees' Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services (OAS),
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), show that Sumangil has not submitted his Daily Time
Record (DTR) since December 27, 2017 up to the present2 or filed any application for leave. Thus,
he has been on AWOL since December 1, 2017. Atty. Maria Bernadette Opeda (Atty. Opeda)
reported that she was informed by Sumangil's housemate that the latter left for Mindanao last
December 31, 2017. On the other hand, Sumangil's daughter, Dyna Sumangil, told her that none
of her relatives had seen her father and that the latter visited his own mother but had not returned.
Atty. Opeda also inquired from his friends but no one knew his whereabouts. Accordingly, his
salaries and benefits were withheld.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that Sumangil's name be
dropped from the rolls effective December 1, 2017 for having been absent without official leave.
ISSUE:
Was OCA’s recommendation to drop petitioner from the roll proper?
RULING:
Yes, the recommendation made by OCA to drop petitioner from the roll was proper.
Section 107 (a) (1), Rule 20 of the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(2017 RACCS) authorizes the dropping from the rolls of employees who have been continuously
absent without official leave for at least thirty (30) working days, without the need for prior notice.
Sumangil's prolonged unauthorized absences caused inefficiency in the public service as

it disrupted the normal functions of the court, and in this regard, contravened his duty as a public
servant to serve with the utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. The Court
stresses that a court personnel's conduct is laden with the heavy responsibility of upholding public
accountability and maintaining the people's faith in the Judiciary. By failing to report for work since
December 2017, Sumangil grossly disregarded and neglected the duties of his office. Undeniably,
he failed to adhere to the high standards of public accountability imposed on all those in the
government service.
Nevertheless, as the OCA correctly pointed out, dropping from the rolls is non-disciplinary
in nature, and thus, Sumangil's separation from the service shall neither result in the forfeiture of
his benefits nor disqualification from reemployment in the government.
| 65
PROLONGED UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCES IS PREJUDICIAL TO PUBLIC SERVICE
Re: Dropping from The Rolls of Mr. Arno D. Del Rosario

A.M. No. 17-12-135-MeTC; April 16, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
This administrative matter stemmed from a letter dated September 6, 2017 requesting that
Mr. Arno Del Rosario (Del Rosario), Court Stenographer II of the MeTC Branch 41 be dropped
from the rolls due to his absences without official leave.
The records show that Del Rosario has not submitted either his daily time record from
February 3, 2017 to the present or any application for leave covering such period, thus making him
absent without approved leave since said date. In view of the foregoing, Del Rosario's name was
excluded from the payroll starting April 2017. This notwithstanding, the Personnel Division stated
that he is still in the plantilla of personnel and is therefore considered in active service.
Thus, Presiding Judge Analie B. Oga- Brual requested to drop Del Rosario from the rolls
or declare his position vacant considering his absences without official leave.
ISSUE:
Should Del Rosario’s prolonged unauthorized absences warrant his removal from the rolls?
RULING:
Yes, Del Rosario’s prolonged unauthorized absences warrant his removal from the rolls.
Section 107, Rule 20 of the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
authorizes and provides the procedure for the dropping from the rolls of employees who, inter alia,
are absent without approved leave for an extended period of time.
This provision is in consonance with Section 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave,
as amended by Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 13, Series of 2007, which
states that an official or employee who is continuously absent without approved leave for at least
30 working days shall be considered on absence without official leave and shall be separated from
the service or dropped from the rolls without prior notice.
In this case, it is undisputed that Del Rosario had been absent without official leave since
February 3, 2017. Verily, his prolonged unauthorized absences caused inefficiency in the public
service as it disrupted the normal functions of the court. It contravened the duty of a public servant
to serve with the utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. It should be
reiterated and stressed that a court personnel's conduct is circumscribed with the heavy
responsibility of upholding public accountability and maintaining the people's faith in the judiciary.
By failing to report for work since February 3, 2017 up to the present, Del Rosario grossly
disregarded and neglected the duties of his office. Undeniably, he failed to adhere to the high
standards of public accountability imposed on all those in the government service.
66 |
A COURT EMPLOYEE MAY BE REMOVED FROM EMPLOYMENT DUE TO HIS

DELUSIONAL DISORDER CONDITION
Re: Report of Judge Peras, RTC Cebu Br 10, on the Acts of Insubordination of Camaso
A.M. No. 15-02-47-RTC, March 21, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
This administrative matter stemmed from a Complaint for Gross Insubordination (With a
Request for Psychiatric Evaluation) filed before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by
Executive Judge Soliver C. Peras (Judge Peras) of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC),
Branch 10, against Catalina Z. Camaso (Camaso), Utility Worker I, Office of the Clerk of Court,
RTC.
Judge Peras issued a Memorandum temporarily detailing Camaso to Branch 10 to assist

in the filing, delivery, and mailing of letters in the said court. Camaso failed to comply, thus
prompting Judge Peras to send her two (2) subsequent memoranda directing her to explain in
writing such non-compliance; however, Camaso ignored such directives. Further, Judge Peras
averred that Camaso has been acting and behaving "strangely and abnormally," as exhibited by
the latter's following acts: (a) claiming that she will not retire upon reaching the age of 65, citing
that she is a "national employee;" and (b) sitting on top of the backrest of a chair and resting her
feet on the seat of the same chair, placing herself in danger of falling.
Dr. Banzon of the Court’s Medical Services stated that the examinations done on Camaso
indicate that she is suffering from Delusional Disorder and that in the absence of psychiatric
management, she will be unable to maintain good inter-personal relationships with her co-workers.
Camaso averred that she was just following a certain administrative order which provides that
employees of the lower court are not required to be assigned to any office outside of their job
description. She further maintained that Judge Peras's imputation of gross insubordination has no
basis, contending that Judge Peras has no jurisdiction over her as she is assigned to the RTC
Library, which is under the supervision of the OCA.
ISSUE:
May a court employee be dropped from the rolls due to his condition of Delusional
Disorder?
RULING:
Yes, a court employee be dropped from the rolls due to his condition of Delusional
Disorder.
Section 93 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service authorizes
and provides the procedure for the dropping from the rolls of employees who, inter alia, are no
longer fit to perform his or her duties. It states, among others, that “an officer or employee who is
behaving abnormally and manifests continuing mental disorder and incapacity to work as reported
by his/her co-workers or immediate supervisor and confirmed by a competent physician, may be
dropped from the rolls.”
After conducting such tests, the psychologist found that there are already: (a) deterioration
in almost all facets of Camaso's mental functioning; and (b) distortion in her perception of things,
making a limited grasp of reality. In view of the foregoing, the Court is constrained to drop Camaso
from the rolls. At this point, the Court deems it worthy to stress that the instant case is non-
disciplinary in nature. Thus, Camaso's separation from the service shall neither result in the
forfeiture of any benefits which have accrued in her favor, nor in her disqualification from re-
employment in the government service.
| 67
PUBLIC OFFICE IS A PUBLIC TRUST, AND THAT PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
MUST, AT ALL TIMES, BE ACCOUNTABLE TO THE PEOPLE
Field Investigation Office vs. Piano

G.R. No. 215042; November 20, 2017
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
The case is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the
Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA).
P/Dir. George Piano (respondent), Chairman of the PNP Inspection and Acceptance
Committee (IAC), is among several respondents in the complaint filed by the Field Investigation
Office (petitioner) before the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioner alleged that the PNP purchased
from Manila Aerospace Products Trading Corporation (MAPTRA) three helicopters. The
agreement of the parties required that all three helicopters be brand new and air-conditioned.
Notwithstanding the noncompliance to such requirements, respondent Issued Resolution No. IAC-
09-045 (Resolution stating that the helicopters conformed to the specifications and, thus, allowed
MAPTRA to deliver only one brand new unit and two pre-owned units, not air-conditioned.
Respondent averred that his participation in the procurement of the helicopters was limited
only in the determination of its delivery in the correct quantity and its conformity to the specification
based on the report of his inspection team. He merely relied upon a team of inspectors who
conducted the technical and meticulous examination of the two helicopters that were delivered.
ISSUE:
Is respondent, in issuing the Resolution, guilty of serious dishonesty and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service?
RULING:
Yes, respondent, in issuing the Resolution, is guilty of serious dishonesty and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The Constitution underscores that public office is a public trust, and that public officers and
employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people. This imposes upon the Court the
responsibility of holding public officers accountable for their blatant disregard of the high standard
of ethics, competence, and accountability demanded of them. As an administrative offense,
dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one's
office or connected with the performance of his duties. On the other hand, conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of service deals with a demeanor of a public officer which "tarnished the image
and integrity of his public office.
The report made by the inspectors showed the non-conformity with the required
specifications. Despite the non-conformity, respondent still did not make further inquiries or
validation on such lack of compliance and deviation from the requirements. In issuing the said
Resolution which contained untruthful statements, respondent is indeed guilty of act of serious
dishonesty in the exercise of his public functions. The affixing of signatures by the committee
members are not mere ceremonial acts but proofs of authenticity and marks of regularity. On a
final note, the 1987 Constitution itself underscores that public office is a public trust, and that public
officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people. Those in public service,
such as herein respondent P/Director Piano, are thus, cautioned to act in full accordance with this
constitutional standard, for this Court will not shirk from its duty of upholding administrative
sanctions against erring public servants. Hence, in issuing the Resolution, respondent is guilty of
serious dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
68 |
ISSUANCE OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE COUNTER-

AFFIDAVIT OF RESPONDENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF DUE
PROCESS
Purisima vs. Carpio-Morales

G.R. No. 219501; July 26, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner, former Police
Director General Alan La Madrid Purisima (Purisima), assailing the CA Decision which affirmed
the Order Issued by respondent Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as the Ombudsman,
preventively suspending Purisima during the pendency of the consolidated cases against him
before the Office of the Ombudsman.
When Purisima was appointed as PNP Chief, a memorandum was addressed to him
recommending the mandatory delivery of firearm licenses through courier service. Purisima
approved this memorandum on February 17, 2013 and WER FAST was accredited as courier
service provider without any public bidding.
Complaints against Purisima were filed assailing the validity of the aforementioned
accreditation. Purisima requested for additional time to file his counter-affidavit and was granted a
non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of the Order. However, without waiting for
Purisima's counter-affidavit, the Ombudsman Issued the assailed Order, which preventively
suspended Purisima and other PNP officers, for six (6) months without pay. Purisima now contends
that the Ombudsman violate his right to due process.
ISSUE:
Does the Ombudsman’s issuance of the preventive suspension without Purisima’s counter-
affidavit constitute a violation of his right to due process?
RULING:
No, Ombudsman’s issuance of the preventive suspension without Purisima’s counter-
affidavit did not constitute a violation of his right to due process.
Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an

administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from
using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or
tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If after such
investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts
warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. Being a
preventive measure, the preventive suspension is essentially meant to ensure the proper course
of an ongoing investigation.
In the case, the Ombudsman found that the evidence of guilt against Purisima was strong
enough to place him under preventive suspension. The Ombudsman, therefore, may ISSUE a
preventive suspension order prior to the filing of an answer or counter-affidavit, considering that
the same is but a preventive measure. Prior notice and hearing is not required, such suspension
not being a penalty but only a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. Furthermore, the
issuance of a preventive suspension order does not amount to a prejudgment of the merits of the
case. There is therefore no violation of Purisima’s right to due process when a preventive
suspension order was issued.
| 69
PUBLIC OFFICERS ARE PROHIBITED FROM ENGAGING IN CERTAIN FORMS OF

POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
Tan vs. Valeriano

G.R. No. 185559; August 2, 2017
Martires, J.
FACTS:
For resolution is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the CA Decision which
reversed the trial court’s ruling, holding that petitioners Jose G. Tan and Orencio C. Luzuriaga’s
act of filing their complaint with the CSC, notwithstanding the pendency of the administrative case
with the Ombudsman(OMB), shows bad faith.
The present case arose from a damages suit for malicious prosecution filed by
respondent Romeo H. Valeriano (Valeriano) against petitioners. Valeriano is an incumbent auditor
of COA and is also the president of the Holy Name Society of Bulan, Sorsogon (Holy Name
Society), a religious organization which held a multi-sectoral consultative conference at the Bulan
Parish Compound. During the conference, Valeriano lambasted certain local officials of Bulan,
Sorsogon when he delivered his welcome address. The following day, petitioners filed with the
CSC an administrative complaint against Valeriano. Prior to petitioner’s withdrawal of their
administrative complaint with the CSC, they also charged him before the Office of the Ombudsman
(OMB) with acts of electioneering and engaging in partisan politics. The complaint with the OMB
was dismissed for want of evidence.
Valeriano filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against petitioners. RTC ruled that
the act of filing of numerous cases against Valeriano by petitioners, Gilana, and Gonzales was
attended by malice, vindictiveness, and bad faith. The RTC noted that the fact that Valeriano was
singled out by petitioners, Gilana, and Gonzales, although his participation was only to deliver the
Welcome Address, is indicative of malice. Also, the RTC held that the act of filing numerous cases
before the CSC, COA, and the Ombudsman, which cases were subsequently found to be
unsubstantiated, is reflective of ill will or the desire for revenge.
ISSUE:
Did the petitioners act with malice or bad faith in filing the administrative complaints against
Valeriano with the CSC and OMB?
RULING:
No, petitioners did not act with malice or bad faith when they filed the administrative
complaints against Valeriano.
Section 2(4), Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides that no officer or employee in civil
service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.
Section 55 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 also provides that “no officer or employee
in the Civil Service including members of the Armed Forces, shall engage directly or indirectly in
any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote nor shall he use his official
authority or influence to coerce the political activity of any other person or body…”
Here, the conference was held at a time so close to the holding of the 2001 elections. In
the case, considering that Valeriano had a vital participation in the multi-sectoral conference that
was held wherein certain local officials were the subject of criticisms, it cannot be said that
petitioners acted with malice or bad faith in instituting the complaints.
Thus, given the law's prohibition on public officers and employees, such as Valeriano, from
engaging in certain forms of political activities, it could reasonably be said that those who had filed
the complaints against Valeriano before the CSC and OMB had done so as they had reason to
believe that Valeriano was violating the prohibition.
70 |
DISCIPLINING AUTHORITY MAY APPEAL THE DECISION WHICH REDUCED THE

ORIGINAL PENALTY IMPOSED
Recto-Sambajon vs. Public Attorney's Office

G.R. No. 197745; September 6, 2017
Martires, J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the CA
Decision and Resolution which reversed the CSC Resolutions and finding petitioner Atty. Melita S.
Recto-Sambajon (Atty. Recto-Sambajon) guilty of Grave Misconduct and of Being Notoriously
Undesirable.
Chief Public Attorney Persida V. Rueda-Acosta (Chief Acosta) summoned Atty. Recto-
Sambajon due to the latter's reaction to her reassignment. Initially, Atty. Recto-Sambajon denied
reports that she had cried over her supposed reassignment. However, her outburst was witnessed
by several PAO personnel present at that time. The same also made threats saying that "whoever
will feed any wrong information to the Chief, I will shoot them conjoined through the eyes."
Thereafter, Deputy Chief Public Attorney Silvestre A. Mosing (Atty. Mosing) ordered Atty. Recto-
Sambajon to explain why she should not be administratively charged with Grave Misconduct and
for being Notoriously Undesirable. After explaining, Atty. Recto-Samabajon was found guilty of the
offenses charged against her and accordingly dismissed her from the service.
Aggrieved, Atty. Recto-Sambajon appealed before the CSC. The latter modified the
decision of PAO form Grave to Simple misconduct. PAO, after having denied reconsideration by
the CSC, appealed before the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the CSC and reinstated the
decision of PAO. Atty. Recto-Sambajon now argues that the CSC resolution cannot be appealed
by PAO.
ISSUE:
May PAO, the disciplining authority in this case, appeal the decision that reduced the
original penalty imposed?
RULING:
Yes, the disciplining authority may appeal the decision that reduced the original penalty
imposed.
Under Section 4(k) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(RRACCS), CSC modified the definition of a "party adversely affected" for purposes of appeal.
“Party adversely affected” refers to the respondent against whom a decision in an administrative
case has been rendered or to the disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision reversing or
modifying the original decision”. Honesty and integrity are important traits required of those in
public service. If all decisions by quasi-judicial bodies modifying the penalty of dismissal were
allowed to become final and unappealable, it would, in effect, show tolerance to conduct
unbecoming of a public servant. The quality of civil service would erode, and the citizens would
end up suffering for it.
Thus, PAO has a legal standing to appeal the decision reinstating Atty. Recto-Sambajon
whom it previously found unfit to continue as a public attorney. If it were otherwise, the government
would be deprived of its right to weed out undeserving public servants.
| 71
THE 60-DAY PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD FIXED BY SECTION 28 OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE

LAW IS AVAILABLE ONLY IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS FILED UNDER CHAPTER IV
THEREOF
GMA Network, Inc. vs. National Telecommunications Commission

G.R. No. 192128 & 192135-36, September 13, 2017
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA Decision which denied the
petitions filed by petitioner GMA Network, Inc. (GMA) against the assailed Orders Issued by the
respondent National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) ordering it to pay fines for operating
with an expired provisional authority.
GMA filed before the NTC three (3) applications for Certificate of Public Convenience
respectively in order to Install, Operate and Maintain a VHF-TV station and Radio station. Pending
the resolution of these applications, NTC granted GMA three Provisional Authorities (PA). Upon
the lapse of their respective expiration dates, the PAs were not renewed and it took 4-5 years
before GMA was able to file Ex-Parte Motions for Renewal of Provisional Authority.
Eventually, the NTC Issued orders imposing fines on GMA for the aforementioned
violations. GMA alleged that it can no longer be sanctioned for the late filing of the Motions because
its violation already prescribed pursuant to Sec. 28, Chapter IV of Commonwealth Act No. 146 or
the Public Service Act (PSA) which states that violations of the terms and conditions of any
certificate Issued by the NTC shall prescribe after sixty (60) days.
ISSUE:
Is the 60-day prescription applicable to administrative proceedings for violations of orders,
decisions and regulations of NTC as well as violations of the terms and conditions of the certificate
issued by it?
RULING:
No, the 60-day prescription period does not apply.
The Court has previously held that the 60-day prescriptive period under Section 28 of the
PSA can be availed of as a defense only in criminal proceedings filed under Chapter IV thereof
and not in proceedings pertaining to the regulatory or administrative powers of the NTC over a
public service utility's observance of the terms and conditions of its Provisional Authority.
Proceedings of this kind are held primarily to ensure adequate and efficient service as well as to
protect the public against the operator's malfeasances or abuses; they are not penal in character.
The Court has held that NTC, being the government agency entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under its special and technical forte, and possessing the necessary rule-making
power to implement its objectives, is in the best position to interpret its own rules, regulations and
guidelines.
Consequently, the Public Service Commission is not barred from receiving evidence of the
prescribed violations for the purpose of determining whether an operator has or has not faithfully
kept the conditions of his certificate of permit, whether he failed or not to render the services he is
required to furnish to the customers, and whether or not the infractions are sufficient cause to
cancel or modify the certificate. Thus, GMA, having operated on an expired provisional authority,
violated the PSA and is liable for the corresponding fines.
72 |
A PUBLIC OFFICER IS HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR GRAVE MISCONDUCT WHEN

THERE IS BLATANT DISREGARD OF THE RULES
Lim vs. Fuentes

G.R. No. 223210; November 6, 2017
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision of
the CA which affirmed the Joint Order and Order of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO) which in turn, reversed its previous Decision.
Petitioners Wilson Lim (Lim) and Rex Lazo (Lazo) were engaged in the business of buying
and selling second-hand motor vehicles in Iloilo City under the business name "Wheels To Go."
They transacted with a car agent named Raquim Salvo (Salvo) upon the latter’s assurances that
his units were properly documented and cleared by the Iligan Traffic Management Group (TMG).
Respondent PNP Police Senior Inspector Eustiquio Fuentes (Respondent), head of the office of
TMG Iligan City, Issued PNP Motor Vehicle Clearance Certificates (MVCC), which is one of the
LTO requirements for the transfer of ownership over motor vehicles from the seller to the buyer. It
was later found out that some of the units were stolen/carnapped and are considered as “hot cars”.
The TMG of Iloilo City filed criminal complaints against Lim and Lazo but the complaints
were dismissed having found that Lim and Lazo acted in good faith. Aggrieved, Lim and Lazo filed,
among others, an administrative complaint against Respondent for Grave Misconduct before the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO for the issuance of MVCC.
Fuentes said that he should not be faulted for the issuance of the MVCC is purely a
ministerial function.
ISSUE:
Does the act of respondent in issuing the MVCCs constitute grave misconduct?
RULING:
Yes, the act of respondent in issuing the MVCCs constitutes grave misconduct.
To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with

the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as
distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or
flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest.
In the case, Memorandum Circular No. 2002-012 provides that motor vehicles applying for
MVCC shall undergo physical examination jointly conducted by the TMG personnel and crime
laboratory technicians. Respondent, as clearance officer, is responsible for the effective
implementation of the motor vehicle clearance system, necessarily calling for his cautious exercise
of discretion. Respondent was bound by law to ensure that MVCCs may only be Issued after
careful determination that the vehicle covered thereby was acquired by legal means. If a vehicle
that is Issued an MVCC turns out to be a stolen unit, the clearance officer, must be held
accountable for his blatant disregard as it means that the system was not faithfully implemented,
in contravention with the mandate of the circular.
Thus, there is grave misconduct considering that the rules necessarily call for the cautious
exercise of discretion.
| 73
REPEATED AND DELIBERATE VIOLATION OF LAW CONSTITUTES GRAVE

MISCONDUCT
Field Investigation Unit-Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon vs. Raquel A. De Castro
G.R. No. 232666; June 20, 2018
Reyes Jr., J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 appealing Decision and Resolution of the CA
finding respondent Raquel A. De Castro (De Castro) guilty of only simple misconduct and providing
for her reinstatement.
De Castro worked as a Municipal Accountant for the Municipality of Bongabong, Oriental

Mindoro. Her functions included reviewing supporting documents before preparation of vouchers
to determine completeness of requirements. During the respondent's employment from 2006 to
2010, the Municipality of Bongabong transacted with several business registered in the name of
respondent’s husband and daughter. Thus, respondent was charged of Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service and Grave Misconduct because the Local Government Code prohibits
local government officials from engaging, directly or indirectly, in any business transaction with the
local government unit in which he is an official whereby money is to be paid, directly or indirectly,
out of the resources of the local government unit to such person or firm.
De Castro asserts that she neither intervened nor participated directly or indirectly in the
process and consummation of the subject transactions. She maintained that her signature
appearing on the disbursement vouchers only mean that she had certified that the documents
supporting the transactions were complete. Respondent was exonerated from the charge of
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service but found guilty of Grave Misconduct. On
appeal, the CA further reduced her liability to simple misconduct and ordered her reinstatement to
her former position.
ISSUE:
Did De Castro’s acts or omissions constitute grave misconduct?
RULING:
Yes, respondent is guilty of not only simple misconduct but of grave misconduct.
Misconduct is defined as an intentional wrongdoing or a deliberate violation of a rule of law

or standard of behavior, especially by a government official. A misconduct is grave where the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule are
present.
The records show that the respondent, on more than one occasion, knowingly certified and
approved disbursement vouchers covering transactions between the Municipality of Bongabong,
and businesses owned or operated by her immediate family members. She repeatedly certified
many such illegal transactions notwithstanding the fact that she clearly had pecuniary interests,
albeit indirect, therein. As held in the case of Imperial, Jr. v. Government Service Insurance
System, an employee's propensity to ignore the rules as clearly manifested by his or her actions
constitutes flagrant disregard of rules.
74 |
MERE SIGNATURE OF A PUBLIC OFFICER IN THE AWARD OF THE CONTRACT

ITSELF WITHOUT ANYTHING MORE CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS A PRESUMPTION
OF LIABILITY
Joson III vs. Commission on Audit

G.R. No. 223762; November 7, 2017
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari challenging the Decision of COA which denied the petition
for exclusion for liability filed by petitioner Tomas Joson III (Joson).
The Provincial Government of Nueva Ecija, with Joson as its governor, awarded the
construction of the Nueva Ecija Friendship Hotel (now named as Sierra Madre Suites) to AVT
Construction (AVT). The COA found the award to be irregular for the said contractor is ineligible.
A Notice of Disallowance was thereafter Issued by the COA disallowing the payments made to
AVT. Petitioner was held solidarily liable for entering into the contract with AVT and for approving
the payment vouchers to the latter. Petitioner’s appeal of the disallowance and petition for
exclusion from liability, as well as the subsequent MR were all denied.
Joson alleged that the COA gravely abused its discretion in holding him personally liable
for the disallowed amount. He claimed that the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) has the
responsibility to check and determine the eligibility of the prospective bidders. Joson also claims
that he had to rely to a reasonable extent on the good faith of his subordinates in the regular
performance of their duties. COA, on the other hand, argued that Joson failed to exercise the
necessary due diligence in the performance of his duty relative to the award of the contract. Being
the signatory in the contracts, Joson had every opportunity to examine the supporting documents
and hence, presumed to have prior knowledge that the bidding process was tainted with irregularity
due to non-compliance with the eligibility requirements.
ISSUE:
May the officer who signed his name in the award of the contract, without any further
involvement in the same, be made liable for any disallowed amounts thereon?
RULING:
No, the officer who signed his name in the award of the contract, without any further
involvement in the same, is not liable for any disallowed amounts thereof.
An official or employee shall be personally liable for unauthorized expenditures if the

following requisites are present, to wit: (a) there must be an expenditure of government funds or
use of government property; (b) the expenditure is in violation of law or regulation; and (c) the
official is found directly responsible therefor. By his signature in the award of the contract to AVT
and the contract itself, the COA held that petitioner is presumed to have prior knowledge that the
bidding process was tainted with irregularity due to the ineligibility of AVT. However, mere
signature does not result to a liability of the official involved without any showing of irregularity on
the document's face such that a detailed examination would be warranted. Liability depends upon
the wrong committed and not solely by reason of being the head of a government agency.
In the landmark case of Arias v. Sandiganbayan, this Court held that the head of the office
or agency can rely to a reasonable extent on the good faith of their subordinates. The fact that
petitioner is the head of the procuring entity and the governor of Nueva Ecija does not automatically
make him the party ultimately liable for the disallowed amount.
Thus, he cannot be held liable simply because he was the final approving authority of the
transaction in question and that the employees/officers who processed the same were under his
supervision.
| 75
A PUBLIC OFFICER IS PRESUMED TO HAVE ACTED IN THE REGULAR

PERFORMANCE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTY
Miralles vs Commission on Audit

G.R. No. 210571; September 19, 2017
J. Bersamin
FACTS:
In this review by petition for certiorari, Orestes Miralles (Miralles) seeks to nullify and set
aside a Decision of the COA holding him personally liable under two notices of disallowance for
having approved the loan applications of borrowers of Quedan and Rural Credit Guarantee
Corporation (QUEDANCOR) who later turned delinquent.
COA Issued a Notice of Disallowance (ND) for an amount representing the uncollected
loan amounts granted to several loan applicants and held the Miralles personally liable for having
approved the loan transactions, and other officers for having failed to verify the veracity of the
financial documents submitted by the loan applicants.
Miralles consistently invoked the Arias doctrine wherein heads of offices could rely to a
reasonable extent on the findings and recommendations of their subordinates provided there was
no reason for them to go beyond such recommendations. On the other hand, COA argued that
the Arias doctrine was not applicable because there were peculiar circumstances that should have
prompted the petitioner to exercise a higher degree of circumspection.
ISSUE:
Is the Arias Doctrine applicable in this case?
RULING:
Yes, Miralles’ invocation of the Arias doctrine is appropriate. The circumstances of his case
came within the ambit of the pronouncement made in Arias v. Sandiganbayan wherein all heads
of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those
who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations.
Section 2, Part D (Commission on Audit), of Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly

provides the power, authority and duty of the COA to examine, audit, and settle all accounts
pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned
or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities.
Accordingly, the COA's power and authority to disallow upon audit can only be exercised
over transactions deemed as irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, illegal or
unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and property. Otherwise put, NDs
should issue only for these kinds of transactions. Miralles should have been presumed to have
acted in the regular performance of his official duty because no evidence had been presented to
show his having acted in bad faith and with gross negligence. COA could not justly execute its
constitutional function of disallowing expenditures unless it accurately but fairly identified the
persons liable for the disallowances.
76 |
MISCONDUCT IS GRAVE IF IT INVOLVES A WILLFUL INTENT TO VIOLATE THE

LAW
De Guzman vs. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. No. 229256; November 22, 2017
Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse and set aside CA Decision
which affirmed the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) finding petitioner
Marietta Maglaya De Guzman (De Guzman), Chairperson of the National Printing Office Bids &
Awards Committee (NPO-BAC), guilty of grave misconduct and dismissing her from government
service.
Bestforms, Inc. (BFI) and Readyform, Inc. (RFI) secured the awards in the public biddings
conducted by the NPO-BAC for, among others, the printing of accountable forms of LTO. However,
the NPO Accreditation Committee revoked BFI’s accreditation as a private security printer of NPO.
Resultantly, BFI was disqualified to participate in any bidding conducted by the NPO and its
ongoing printing transactions were likewise cancelled. Resultantly, the contracts initially awarded
to BFI were subjected to a re-bidding where RFI won and subsequently secured two Notices of
Award for the contracts. Aside from these two awards, the NPO similarly awarded to RFI, through
negotiated procurement, the supply of LTO forms. Subsequently, BFI instituted an administrative
complaint against the NPO officer-in-charge, Felipe Evardone, and the members of the NPO-BAC
before the OMB, alleging that the NPO officers and RFI are guilty of grave misconduct.
The complaint was based on the failure of NPO-BAC to observe the procedures laid down
in RA 9184 or the “Government Procurement Reform Act” for the biddings it conducted and in
entering into a negotiated procurement with RFI.
ISSUE:
Should De Guzman be held liable for grave misconduct for the failure of NPO-BAC to
comply with the requirements under RA 9184 with respect to bidding and negotiated procurement?
RULING:
Yes, De Guzman should be held liable for grave misconduct for failure of NPO-BAC to
comply with the requirements under RA 9184 with respect to bidding and negotiated procurement.
Section 10, Article IV, in relation to Section 5, pars. (n) and (o), Article I, of RA 9184
mandates that all acquisition of goods, consulting services, and the contracting for infrastructure
projects by any branch, department, office, agency, or instrumentality of the government, including
state universities and colleges, GOCCs, government financial institutions, and LGUs shall be done
through competitive bidding. A competitive public bidding aims to protect the public interest by
giving the public the best possible advantages thru open competition. Another self-evident purpose
of public bidding is to avoid or preclude suspicion of favoritism and anomalies in the execution of
public contracts.
Here, De Guzman, along with the other members of the NPO-BAC, committed grave
misconduct when they conducted the bid process of and awarded the subject contracts without
compliance with the other requirements for limited source bidding and negotiated procurement.
The lack of official documents proving compliance with the bidding requirements constitutes the
substantial evidence that sufficiently establishes De Guzman's liability for grave misconduct.
Thus, De Guzman should be held liable for grave misconduct for failure of NPO-BAC to
comply with the requirements under RA 9184 with respect to bidding and negotiated procurement.
| 77
THE DOCTRINE OF CONDONATION IS APPLICABLE IN CASES THAT TRANSPIRED

PRIOR TO THE RULING OF THE COURT IN CARPIO-MORALES V. CA AND BINAY, JR.
Office of the Ombudsman vs. Vergara

G.R. No. 216871; December 6, 2017
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
The case is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to reverse and
set aside CA’s decision in rendering as inapplicable the penalty imposed by the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB) on respondent Cabanatuan City Mayor Julius Cesar Vergara (Mayor Vergara)
due to the doctrine of condonation.
A complaint was filed against Mayor Vergara alleging that during his third term (2004-
2007), the same maintained an open burning dumpsite which exposed the residents of
Cabanatuan to toxic solid wastes. The complaint also alleged that Mayor Vergara ignored the
complaints from local residents as well as from the authorities of DENR. Later, Mayor Vergara was
found guilty by OMB for violation of Section 5(a) of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees) and consequently imposed the penalty of
suspension from government service for six months.
Mayor Vergara appealed the OMB decision contending that the suspension cannot be
implemented as it runs counter to the doctrine of condonation considering that he was re-elected
in the same position in the May 2010 elections. Petitioner OMB, on the other hand, maintains that
the doctrine of condonation only applies to cases where the public officials were elected to the
same position in the immediately succeeding election.
ISSUE:
Is Mayor Vergara entitled to the doctrine of condonation?
RULING:
Yes, Mayor Vergara is entitled to the doctrine of condonation.
Section 66(b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the penalty suspension beyond the
unexpired portion of the elective official’s prior term, and likewise still allows said official to still run
for re-election. The same provision, however, does not state that the elective local official’s
administrative liability is extinguished by the fact of re-election. The concept of public office is a
public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated
under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's
administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact
that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode
of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in
our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of
any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction,
liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned by the President in light of Section
19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos to apply to
administrative offenses.
The doctrine of condonation was recently abandoned but such abandonment was
prospective in application. Hence, the doctrine is still applicable in cases that transpired prior to
the November 10, 2015 RULING of the SC in Carpio-Morales vs. CA and Jejomar Binay, Jr.
Thus, considering that the case was instituted prior to the said case, the doctrine of
condonation may still be applied.
78 |
A SIMPLE MISFEASANCE OR NONFEASANCE OF ITS OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES MAY

HAVE DISASTROUS REPERCUSSIONS ON THE IMAGE OF THE JUDICIARY
Frades vs. Gabriel

A.M. No. P-16-3527 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3987-P); November 21, 2017
Per Curiam
FACTS:
This is a complaint filed by Atty. Renato E. Frades (Frades), Clerk of Court VI, in the Office
of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Gapan City, Nueva Ecija, against Ms. Josephine A.
Gabriel (Gabriel), Clerk III, in the same court, for grave misconduct, dishonesty, gross
insubordination, abandonment of work and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Frades, who is the superior of Gabriel, alleges that the following were transgressions of
the latter:
1. Failure to remit payments made to the Sheriff’s Trust Fund;

2. Exclusion of her daily time records from those transmitted to the OCA in order to
manipulate her absences, made without the appropriate application for leave;
3. Falsification of the identification card of one Lea De Guzman in order to use the latter’s
plane ticket in order to attend an event held in Puerto Princesa, Palawan;
4. Distribution of the checks for the salaries and allowances of court personnel in violation
of OCA Circular No. 15-1997-A and Memorandum Circular on Administrative
Supervision of Courts;
5. Practice of money-lending akin to a”5-6” set up and withholding checks belonging to
employees who borrow money from her;
6. Having an attitude problem and inability to work harmoniously with her co-employees;
7. She was usually not in the office to perform her duty to docket criminal cases as she
was always at RTC-Branch 87 and at the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Gapan City, Nueva Ecija, for no valid reason, and without even asking permission from
Frades; and
8. Possession of a tape recorder which was hidden on her table in their office for the
purpose of recording the communication of her co-employees while she was away, in
violation of Republic Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wire Tapping Act.
ISSUE:
Do Gabriel’s transgressions warrant his dismissal from service?
RULING:
Yes, the transgressions of Gabriel warrant his dismissal from service.
A clerk of court's office is the hub of activities, and he or she is expected to be assiduous
in performing official duties and in supervising and managing the court's dockets, records and
exhibits. Dishonesty has been defined as "intentionally making a false statement on any material
fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination,
appointment, or registration." Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service deals with a
demeanor of a public officer which "tarnished the image and integrity of his/her public office."
Proceeding from the said definition, the Court held Gabriel guilty of serious dishonesty for
deliberately impersonating De Guzman in order to use the latter's roundtrip ticket between Manila
and Puerto Princesa. After considering the records and the investigations conducted on the matter,
it is undisputed that Gabriel failed to meet the requirement expected of her as Clerk III. Gabriel
was accordingly dismissed from service.
| 79
FAILURE TO ACCOUNT FOR THE SHORTAGE OF THE CASH ITEMS IN HER CUSTODY
CONSTITUTES GRAVE MISCONDUCT
Fajardo vs. Corral

G.R. No. 212641; July 5, 2017
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Rules of Court, which seeks to annul
and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 121180.
Fajardo was designated as OIC, Division Chief III, Prize Payment (Teller) Division of the
Treasury Department of the PCSO. She was authorized to draw cash advance of PhP 3M for
payment of sweepstakes. For such accountability, Fajardo was bonded with the Bureau of
Treasury for PhP 1.5 Million. In line with her duties, she was issued a vault which she only has
access since she only has the key and knew the combination to open it and to store the money.
PCSO Internal Audit Department (IAD) conducted a surprise audit of Fajardo’s cash items
and discovered that she had a shortage. After such audit, Fajardo did not report for work, so they
sealed her vault and her steel cabinet. Corral issued a letter to Fajardo, which ordered her to
immediately produce the missing funds and to explain such shortage, but Fajardo failed to do so.
In a letter, she admitted her mistake and offered to settle her accountability by waiving all her rights
to bonuses and monetary benefits and did not question the regularity of the conduct of spot audits.
However, in her Counter-Affidavit, she now denies that the spot audits were conducted, and if so,
such were conducted contrary to established rules.
ISSUE:
Is failure to account for the shortage and for the cash items in her custody grave
misconduct?
RULING:
Yes, failure to account for the shortage and for the cash items in her custody constitute
grave misconduct.
Grave misconduct is defined as the transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer coupled with the
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules. Corruption,
as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the official or employee's act of unlawfully or
wrongfully using his position to gain benefit for one's self. Lastly, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of service deals with a demeanor of a public officer which "tarnished the image and integrity
of his/her public office".
Clearly, Fajardo's acts constitute serious dishonesty for her dishonest act deals with money
on her account; and that her failure to account for the shortage showed an intent to commit material
gain, graft and corruption. Grave misconduct was committed when Fajardo failed to keep and
account for cash and cash items in her custody. It must be noted that she was issued a vault by
the PCSO and was bonded by the Bureau of Treasury for her to effectively carry out her duties
and responsibilities. Yet, investigation conducted by the PCSO reveals that she failed to perform
such duties when such funds on her account were reported missing. Her corrupt intention was
evident on her failure to explain such missing funds despite reasonable opportunity to do the same.
Thus, failure to account for the shortage and for the cash items in her custody constitute
grave misconduct.
80 |
MISCONDUCT MUST BE GRAVE AND SERIOUS TO WARRANT DISMISSAL FROM

SERVICE
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon vs. Dionisio

G.R. No. 220700; July 10, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon (Ombudsman) are the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals
(CA) finding respondents Eufrocina Carlos Dionisio (Dionisio) and Winifredo Salcedo Molina
(Molina; collectively, respondents) guilty of Simple Misconduct only.
Editha and Eduardo Ponce (Spouses Ponce) are the owners of Sariling Atin Drug Store,
while Dionisio was the School Principal of Barasoain Memorial Elementary School (BMES).
Spouses Ponce inquired with Dionisio if they could lease a portion of the school grounds to open
a drug store thereon. Upon Dionisio's advice, Spouses Ponce submitted a letter offering a monthly
rent, but Dionisio promised she will personally handle the lease for a much lower rent provided that
such should be without the knowledge of the Teacher's Association, the PTA, or the Barangay
Council. Subsequently, Spouses Ponce made several other payments and donations according to
Dionisio’s requests.
Spouses Ponce met with the DepEd officials in Bulacan where they were informed that the
MOA executed between them and Dionisio was illegal. Thus, Spouses Ponce filed a complaint
before the Ombudsman accusing respondent and her 6 co-teachers of violating Sec 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019. The Ombudsman found them guilty of Simple Misconduct.
ISSUE:
Do Dionisio’s acts only constitute simple misconduct?
RULING:
No, Dionisio’s acts do not only constitute simple misconduct.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more

particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from
the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not
trifling. In order to differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest
in the former.
The following acts, taken together, manifest gross misconduct on the part of Dionisio: first,
she had no authority to lease out a portion of the school premises, it being owned by the Provincial
Government of Bulacan. Second, she claims that the money received from the Spouses Ponce in
connection with the lease were spent for public purposes, but she failed to submit official receipts
and other documents that would support her claim. Third, assuming arguendo that the money
received by Dionisio was used for the construction of the school canteen and the procurement of
educational equipment, she nonetheless failed to comply with the requirements of RA 9184 which
mandates that all government procurement must be done through competitive bidding.
While respondents' intentions may be noble and may have indeed benefited the school,
the Court cannot turn a blind eye on respondents' blatant disregard of existing rules and regulations
lest the Court sets a dangerous precedent. In this case, compliance with the applicable rules and
regulations gains even more importance considering that what is involved is the accountability of
public officers.
Thus, respondents Dionisio and Molina are found guilty of Grave Misconduct, and are
dismissed from government service.
| 81
TO WARRANT DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE, THE MISCONDUCT MUST BE GRAVE,

SERIOUS, IMPORTANT, WEIGHTY, MOMENTOUS, AND NOT TRIFLING
Hon. Zarate-Fernandez vs. Lovendino

A.M. No. P-16-3530; March 6, 2018
Per Curiam
FACTS:
This is a Letter-Complaint filed by petitioner Judge of RTC San Mateo against respondent
Rainier M. Lovendino (Lovendino), a Court Aide of the same court, for the unlawful taking of drug
specimens stored in the court's vault.
Complainant alleged that during a hearing for the presentation of the prosecution’s
evidence for the reopening of a certain Criminal case, it ordered for several drug specimens
(consisting of shabu and marijuana) be brought out for identification of the prosecution’s witness.
The Clerk in Charge for Criminal Cases and court appointed evidence custodian could not find the
said specimens in its vault where the criminal cases were stored. Complainant convinced that
Lovendino was responsible for the unlawful taking of the illegal drugs stored in the vault. She
explained that Lovendino, as court aide, cleans the area of the RTC and was the only one who
fixes the court records stored at the bodega. Complainant added that Lovendino had a key to her
chambers where he could access the courtroom and the vault of the court. OCA found that there
exists a strong prima facie case for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service against Lovendino. It held that the loss of the court exhibits
consisting of shabu and marijuana had been properly documented through the inventory list of
missing pieces of evidence and that the letter-complaint stated that Lovendino had access to these
exhibits.
The OCA also highlighted that respondent had involvement in illegal drugs and was caught
in possession of a firearm that was stolen from the RTC, along with live ammunition and white
crystalline substance suspected to be shabu.
ISSUE:
Is Lovendino administratively guilty for which dismissal from service is proper?
RULING:
Yes, Lovendino is administratively guilty for which dismissal from service is proper.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more

particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from
the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not
trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment.
The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful
intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial
evidence. Respondent committed grave misconduct because theft of the exhibits in the court's
vault and the illegal sale of the pilfered firearm are clear transgressions of the law. There is also
an element of corruption because he unlawfully and wrongfully used his position to procure some
benefit for himself and to the detriment of the Judiciary. Respondent is likewise guilty of dishonesty
because his misappropriation of the court's evidence demonstrates his disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, defraud, or betray.
As front liners in the administration of justice, court personnel should live up to the strictest
standards of honesty and integrity in the public service, and in this light, are always expected to
act in a manner free from reproach. Any conduct, act, or omission that may diminish the people's
faith in the Judiciary should not be tolerated. For tarnishing the image and integrity of the bench,
respondent's name should be perpetually stripped from the rolls of the men and women of the
Judiciary.
82 |
AN OFFICER ACTING WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS IS

ONLY LIABLE FOR GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY, NOT GRAVE MISCONDUCT
Office of the Ombudsman vs. De Guzman

G.R. No. 197886; October 4, 2017
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the CA which annulled
and set aside the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman). The Ombudsman found
respondent Antonio Z. De Guzman (De Guzman) guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty for
entering into a contract with a private entity for mail delivery in Luzon despite not having prior
approval from the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) Board of Directors.
PPC entered into a contract with Aboitiz Air Transport Corporation (Aboitiz Air) for the
carriage of mail. After the expiry of its contract with Aboitiz Air, PPC purchased 40 vehicles for mail
deliveries in Luzon and hired 25 drivers for these vehicles on a contractual basis. The Central Mail
Exchange Center of the PPC found that the expenses for the salaries and maintenance of its
vehicles were higher than its previous system of outsourcing deliveries to Aboitiz Air, and
recommended that PPC would save costs if deliveries were outsourced for a certain fee. De
Guzman, the OIC Postmaster General of PPC, endorsed for approval the recommendation to
outsource mail delivery in Luzon. Aboitiz Air accepted the proposal. Subsequently, Postmaster
General Villanueva approved payments made to Aboitiz Air for services rendered.
Atty. Mata filed an administrative complaint with the Ombudsman against De Guzman
alleging that the Aboitiz Air contract renewal was done without public bidding and that the rate per
kilogram was unilaterally increased without the Philippine Postal Corporation Board of Directors'
approval. The Ombudsman found De Guzman guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty.
ISSUE:
Is De Guzman liable for grave misconduct?
RULING:
No, De Guzman is not liable for grave misconduct.
Grave misconduct is not mere failure to comply with the law. Failure to comply must be
deliberate and must be done in order to secure benefits for the offender or for some other person.
In Office of the Ombudsman v. PS/Supt. Espina, gross neglect of duty is defined as "negligence
characterized by want of even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there
is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the
consequences, insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care that even
inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to give to their own property." In contrast, simple neglect
of duty is the failure of an employee or official to give proper attention to a task expected of him or
her, signifying a "disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference."
In this instance, Ombudsman has not presented evidence to show that De Guzman
benefited from the lack of public bidding in the procurement of Aboitiz Air’s services. While there
was a transgression of the established rules on public bidding, there must be evidence,
independent from this transgression, which would show that respondent or some other person on
his behalf benefited from the Aboitiz Air contract. De Guzman, as the acting Postmaster General,
had the duty to first secure the Board of Directors' approval before entering into contract with
Aboitiz Air. The Board of Directors did not actually give its approval since it required him to first
fulfil certain conditions. Instead of complying, he went ahead and executed the contract with Aboitiz
Air without ensuring that the procurement of its services by the PPC would be done through the
proper procedures and at the most advantageous price. Accordingly, he is found guilty of gross
neglect of duty.
| 83
AN ACQUITTAL IN A CRIMINAL CASE DOES NOT BAR ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEEDING
Sabio v. Field Investigation Office

G.R. No. 229882; February 13, 2018
Per Curiam
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the CA which adjudged
petitioner Camilo L. Sabio (petitioner) guilty of the administrative offenses of Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and thereby, imposed
upon him the penalty of forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and privileges, except accrued leave
credits, if any, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Former Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Chairman Sabio was

charged with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service for the following acts: (1) excess monthly charges in the official use of PCGG-issued
cellular phone in violation of the P10,000 cap under Office Order No. CLS-001-2005 for 7 of 12
billing periods; (2) failure to deposit the aggregate amount of P10,350,000.00 consisting of the
cash advances and partial remittances from sequestered corporations; and, (3) failure to liquidate
despite demand the amount of P1,555,862.03 out of the total cash advances that he used in his
travels and litigation of foreign cases. Sabio averred that he used the cash remittances in financing
PCGG’ operations in liue of the unreleased Confidential Intelligence Fund and that he had to
engage the service of foreign lawyers in litigation of foreign cases.
Ombudsman found substantial evidence against petitioner and adjudged him guilty of the
charges. Sabio invoked his acquittal in the allied criminal cases for Violation of Se. 3(e) of RA 3019
and Malversation of Public Funds on the ground of insufficiency of evidence which engendered
reasonable doubt.
ISSUE:
May Sabio be held administratively liable even after his acquittal in a related criminal case?
RULING:
Yes. A public officer shall be liable for grave misconduct only when the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule are manifest.
Sabio's flagrant disregard of the rule imposing a P10,000.00 cap is readily apparent from
his repeated incurrence of irregular, excessive, and/or extravagant cellular phone charges over
and above said cap. He also failed to show any law authorizing him to utilize the remittances from
sequestrated corporations to be channeled for any other purpose than that provided under Section
63 of RA 6657. Furthermore, he was not able to show that the PCGG had no other funds which
may be utilized to serve the purposes for which such cash advances were applied.
Lastly, an administrative case is, as a rule, independent from criminal proceedings. As

such, the dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence or the acquittal of
an accused who is also a respondent in an administrative case does not necessarily preclude the
administrative proceeding nor carry with it relief from administrative liability. This is because the
quantum of proof required in administrative proceedings is merely substantial evidence, unlike in
criminal cases which require proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Thus, Sabio may be held administratively liable even after his acquittal in a related criminal
case.
84 |
CONTRACTUAL EMPLOYEES ARE ENTITLED TO SEPARATION BENEFITS ONLY IF

THEIR APPOINTMENTS HAVE BEEN APPROVED BY CSC
National Transmission Corporation vs. Commission on Audit

G.R. No. 227796; February 20, 2018
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
This Petition for Certiorari assails the Decision of Commission on Audit (COA) Commission
Proper (CP), which disallowed the payment of separation benefits to Mr. Alfredo V. Agulto, Jr.
Petitioner National Transmission Corporation (TransCo) is a government instrumentality

created under R.A. No. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA Law). It
operates and manages the power transmission system that links power plants to electric
distribution utilities Nationwide. Mr. Agulto Jr., who was a regular employee of TransCo with the
position Principal Engineer B from Mar 2003 to Jun 2009, received the amount of P656,597.50 as
separation benefits pursuant to TransCo's Resolution implementing the Early Separation Program.
During post-audit, the Supervising Auditor (SA) issued Notice of Disallowance (ND) disallowing
the amount of P22,965.81 from Agulto's separation benefits as said amount pertained to the period
March 1 to 15, 2004 during which Agulto's employment status was still contractual. The SA noted
that the Service Agreement of Agulto during the said period specially provided that "the service to
be rendered is not considered and will not be credited as government service. SA found the Board
of Directors, and Agulto Jr. liable.
TransCo appealed to COA arguing that the payment of separation benefits to contractual
employees was lawful as it was in accordance with the EPIRA Law, Corpration Code, and its
Resolution. COA Director partially granted the appeal by exempting Agulto from liability since he
received his separation benefits in good faith. Commission on Audit Commission Proper(COA-CP)
disapproved the Decision of the COA Director maintaining that separation benets is allowed only
if their appointments were approved or attested to by the Civil Service Commission (CSC). In this
case, since there was no proof that Agulto's appointment was duly approved or attested to by the
CSC, the payment of the amount of P22,965.81 was correctly disallowed. The members of
TransCo's Board of Directors who approved the Resolutions implementing the Early Separation
Program, as well as Agulto, were liable to return the said amount.
ISSUE:
Did the COA-CP commit grave abuse of discretion in disallowing a portion of Agulto's
separation benefits and in finding him and the members of petitioner TransCo's Board of Directors
solidarily liable?
RULING:
No. COA-CP is correct in disallowing a portion of Agulto's separation benefits and in finding
him and the members of TransCo's Board of Directors solidarily liable.
Under the EPIRA Law, contractual employees are entitled to separation benefits only if
their appointments have been approved or attested to by the CSC. In this case, since there was
no proof that Agulto's appointment was duly approved or attested to by the CSC, the disallowance
of the amount of P22,965.81 was valid and proper.
Thus, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent COA-CP is
sustaining the disallowance. The disallowed amount, however, need not be refunded by the
members of TransCo's Board of Directors as well as by Agulto, following the ruling of the Court in
National Transmission Corporation v. COA that passive recipients of the disallowed
disbursements, who acted in good faith, are absolved from refunding the same.
| 85
CLERKS OF COURT ARE PRIMARILY ACCOUNTABLE FOR ALL FUNDS COLLECTED

FOR THE COURT
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Dalawis

A.M. No. P-17-3638; March 13, 2018
Per Curiam
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint against Ms. Ruby M. Dalawis (Dalawis), Clerk of Court
(COC) II, Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Monkayo-Montevista, Compostela Valley, which
stemmed from the financial audit on the books of accounts of the Monkayo-Montevista MCTC
conducted by the Financial Audit Team (Audit Team) of the Fiscal Monitoring Division, Court
Management Office of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).
Audit Team conducted a financial audit in the MCTC of Monkayo-Montevista, Compostela

Valley, covering the accountabilities including that of respondent Dalawis, a Clerk of Court. Audit
Team found that there are cash shortages in Fiduciary Fund (FF) and Sheriff's Trust Fund (STF),
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and General Fund-New. Dalawis admitted that she could
personally withdraw the same from the Land Bank of the Philippines, even though the savings
account of the court needed the signature of the presiding judge. In addition, Dalawis herself had
admitted in her letter dated March 11, 2016 that she had appropriated her judiciary collections for
her personal use. The Audit Team explained to Dalawis that her computed shortages were the
result of her failure to remit or deposit her judiciary collections from April 2015 to December 2015,
as well as her unauthorized withdrawals. It recommended that Dalawis be relieved of her duties
as financial officer of the court to prevent further loss of the judiciary funds. In a letter, Dalawis
promised to pay 100% interest for the whole amount to be restituted. However, she still failed to
settle her financial accountabilities despite the time given to her to restitute the shortages she
incurred.
ISSUE:
Is Dalawis administratively liable for the cash shortages and for the failure to restitute the
same?
RULING:
Yes, Dalawis is administratively liable for the cash shortages and for the failure to restitute
the same.
As frontliners in the administration of justice, court personnel should live up to the strictest
standards of honesty and integrity in the public service. Being the custodian of court funds and
revenues, clerks of court are primarily accountable for all funds that are collected for the court,
whether personally received by them, or by a duly-appointed cashier who is under their supervision
and Control. Citing OCA v. Dequito, the Court has held that it will not countenance any conduct,
act or omission on the part of those involved in the administration of justice which violates the norm
of public accountability and diminishes the faith of the people in the Judiciary.
Dalawis’ acts are evident manifestations of her inability to efficiently and conscientiously
discharge her duties as the administrative officer of the court. Such actions constitute gross neglect
of duty and grave misconduct. Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct are classified as grave
offenses under Section 50 (a) of Rule 10 of the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service. The penalty for each of these offenses is dismissal even for the first offense. Thus,
Dalawis, Clerk of Court II, MCTC of Monkayo-Montevista, Compostela Valley, is found guilty of
Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct.
86 |
OMBUDSMAN’S TERM IS FOR 7 YEARS REGARDLESS OF THE CAUSE OF VACANCY
Ifurung vs. Hon Carpio-Morales

GR No. 232131; April 24, 2018
Martires, J.
FACTS:
In a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Ifurung in propria persona seeks the
declaration that Sec. 8(3) in relation to Sec. 7 of RA 6770 (the Ombudsman Act) in unconstitutional
for transgressing Sec. 11, in relation to Sec. 8 and 10 of Art. XI of the Constitution, and that
respondents are de facto Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman who must vacate their positions.
Petitioner avers Sec. 8(3) of the Ombudsman act which provides that in case of vacancy
due to death, resignation, removal, or permanent disability, the succeeding Ombudsman and his
deputies should serve for a full term of seven (7) years. According to Ifurung, the successors should
only serve for the unexpired portion of the term, consistent with other constitutionally created
positions and that the intent of the framers of the Constitution is to put the Ombudsman on the
same status as Constitutional Commissioners.
Respondents contend that verba legis, Sec. 11 of Art. XI of the Constitution provides that
the Ombudsman should serve for full term of 7 years without distinguishing if the predecessor
completed his term or vacated it due to causes under the Ombudsman Act. The rotational system
does not apply to it and that there are also constitutionally created positions which do not serve for
the unexpired portion of its predecessor such as the JBC, HRET, and SET.
ISSUE:
Should the Ombudsman serve only for the unexpired portion of the term in case of death,
resignation, removal, or permanent disability?
RULING:
No, the Ombudsman should serve the full term of 7 years.
First, the Ombudsman is not a Constitutional Commission, unlike the CSC, COA and
COMELEC. The Ombudsman was primarily tasked with receiving complaints from persons
aggrieved by administrative action or inaction, conducting investigation thereon, and making
recommendations to the appropriate administrative agency based on his findings. It is not a
collegial body that decides by majority vote of all its members a case or matter brought before it
but are rather confined within the sphere of their respective jurisdiction.
Second, when Sec. 10, Art XI of the Constitution provided that the Ombudsman should
have the same “rank” and “salary” as that of a Constitutional Commissioner, but it does not include
term of office. Reviewing the deliberations of the framers, Commissioner Romullo commented the
comparison with Constitutional Commissioners is only for the purposes of referencing the rank and
salary that an Ombudsman may receive. It does not involve term of office.
Third, the rotational scheme also does not apply because serving for the unexpired term
was not provided for on the provision of the Constitution with respect to the Ombudsman, unlike in
COA, CSC, and COMELEC. The Court also took notice of the cases of JBC, HRET, SET, and
others regarding the distinction as to the unexpired portion. Thus, the Ombudsman Act remains
consistent with the Sec. 11, Art. XI of the Constitution.
| 87
OMBUDSMAN’S DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT IS DISCRETIONARY IN

ADMINISTRATIVE CASE, NOT IN CRIMINAL CASE
Espaldon, et al vs. Buban

G.R. No. 202784; April 18, 2018
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
In this petition under Rule 65, petitioner Jonnel D. Espaldon (Espaldon) seeks to nullify the
Order of the respondent Office of the Ombudsman in the criminal complaint, and thereafter, to
compel the Ombudsman to take cognizance of Espaldon's complaint against respondents Buban.
Atty. Garbo III of the NBI received information that Ferrotech Steel Corporation and/or its
President, Benito Keh employed schemes to evade payment of taxes by failing to issue sales
invoices and falsifying sales invoices, in violation of NIRC. By virtue of this, Atty. Garbo applied for
the issuance of search warrants to search the premises occupied by said corporation. The search
warrants were served by NBI agents. Espaldon, the Corporate Secretary of Metal Exponents, Inc.,
and the counsel of Ferrotech Steel Corporation and Metalex International Inc., alleged that several
irregularities attended the implementation of the search warrants.
Consequently, Espaldon filed a criminal complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman against

respondents due to the irregularities. Later, he filed a supplemental complaint-affidavit praying for
the preventive suspension of respondents. The administrative complaint and the criminal complaint
were dismissed by the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman averred that, the dismissal of both the administrative and the criminal
complaints were grounded on Section 20(1) of R.A. No. 6770, which provides that: “The Office of
the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission
complained of if it believes that the complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or
quasi-judicial body”.
ISSUE:
Should the Ombudsman conduct investigation on the criminal complaints?
RULING:
Yes, the Ombudsman should conduct investigation on the criminal complaints.
Jurisprudence has settled that dismissal based on the grounds provided under Section 20
of R.A. 6770 is discretionary on the part of the evaluating Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman
evaluating an administrative complaint. Its invocation in the present criminal case is therefore
misplaced.
Contrariwise, the procedure in criminal cases requires that the Ombudsman evaluate the
complaint and after evaluation, to make its recommendations. Thus, the only instance when an
outright dismissal of a criminal complaint is warranted is when such complaint is palpably devoid
of merit. The assailed Orders are empty except for the citation of Section 20 as basis for outright
dismissal. It is thus inaccurate and misleading for the Ombudsman to profess that the criminal
complaint was dismissed only after the conduct of a preliminary investigation, when the complaint
never reached that stage to begin with.
Hence, the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when it evaluated and
consequently dismissed a criminal complaint based on grounds peculiar to administrative cases
and in an unexplained deviation from its own rules of procedure.
88 |
THE EXONERATION OF PUBLIC OFFICERS BY THE OMBUDSMAN IN A CHARGE

ALLEGING GRAVE MISCONDUCT IS GENERALLY UNAPPEALABLE
Canlas vs. Bongolan et al.

G.R. No. 199625; June 6, 2018
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner appeals the CA decision,
which affirms the Ombudsman’s decision to dismiss the administrative complaint for grave
misconduct and violation of Sec.3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 against the officers of Home Guaranty.
National Housing Authority and R-II entered into a joint venture agreement for the Smokey
Mountain Development and Reclamation Project, for which they engaged Home Guaranty to
guaranty the former’s obligations to investors. The entire asset pool of the Project was assigned
to Home Guaranty in case it should be called to pay the secured obligations. Upon maturity of
obligations, Home Guaranty was compelled to pay and consequently, so after two publications in
newspapers of general circulation, and due consultation with the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel, Home Guarantee sold two parcels of land included in the asset pool of the
project.
Petitioner Jerome R. Canlas (Canlas), in his personal capacity, filed an administrative and
criminal complaint with the Ombudsman against the officers of Home Guaranty, alleging that the
price of the sale was grossly inadequate per fair market value. The Ombudsman dismissed both
complaints for lack of proof that the transaction was disadvantageous to the government. The CA
affirmed the dismissal.
Petitioner insists that the respondents should be held guilty for misconduct for entering into
a contract grossly disadvantageous to the government. The respondents however question the
propriety of the appeal. The respondents assert that Canlas has no standing to file the petition,
and that the decision of the Ombudsman complaint is unappealable.
ISSUE:
Does Canlas have the right to appeal the decision of the Ombudsman dismissing his
complaint?
RULING:
No. in administrative cases filed before the Ombudsman, Rule III of A.O. No. 07 provides
that where the respondent is absolved of the charge, or in cases of conviction where the penalty
imposed is merely public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine
equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory, and unappealable.
Also, while Ombudsman may entertain complaints from any person, even from those
without substantial interest in the matter, appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman are governed
by the Rules of Court, which require that an appealing party by a real party in interest. Moreover,
in administrative cases filed under the Civil Service Law, an allowed appeal may only be brought
by the party adversely affected by the decision.
In this case, the appeal was filed in petitioner’s’ personal capacity. Even assuming that
Canlas has legal standing, A.O. No. 7 is clear in that where the decision of the Ombudsman is
absolution, such is final and unappealable. The only remedy against unappealable decisions or
orders is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the proper court, if the Ombudsman acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
| 89
NO DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS WHERE ONE IS

ACCORDED THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, EITHER THROUGH ORAL
ARGUMENTS OR PLEADINGS
Disciplinary Board, Land Transportation Office vs. Gutierrez

G.R. No. 224395; July 3, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
The case is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA Decision which set aside
CSC Decision and, accordingly, remanded the case to petitioner Land Transportation Office (LTO)
for its Disciplinary Board to conduct a preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of
respondent Mercedita E. Gutierrez (Gutierrez).
Gutierrez, Chief of LTO Registration Section, was instructed to temporarily relocate her
Section's equipment for renovations of the workstations pursuant to the "Do-It-Yourself" Program
of LTO. Because of the instruction to relocate, Gutierrez raised concerns about the safety and
integrity of the records kept at her office during the transfer. This prompted the LTO to issue a
Memorandum directing Gutierrez to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against
her for non-compliance with the relocation directive. In response, Gutierrez sent a letter-reply,
reiterating her concerns and communicated that the Registration Section is ready and willing to
comply with the relocation directive and that their equipment is ready for pick-up whenever the
LTO may see fit.
Thereafter, LTO issued a Formal Charge against Gutierrez after finding a prima facie case
against her for Gross Insubordination, Refusal to Perform Official Duties, and Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service. Gutierrez filed her Answer contesting the validity of the Formal
Charge against her on the ground of lack of due process as it was issued without the requisite
preliminary investigation
ISSUE:
Was Gutierrez deprived of her right to procedural due process in connection with the
Formal Charge issued against her without conducting a preliminary investigation?
RULING:
No, Gutierrez was not deprived of her right to procedural due process.
In administrative proceedings, due process simply means the opportunity to explain one's
side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. “To be heard”
does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may also be heard thru pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial
of procedural due process. In the case, the Formal Charge against Gutierrez was issued after LTO
issued a Show Cause Memorandum. Gutierrez was also allowed to file an Answer to refute the
charges against her.
Therefore, Gutierrez was amply accorded her rights to procedural due process and, thus,
there is no more need to conduct another preliminary investigation on her administrative case.
90 |
INCLUSION OF NEW FINDINGS WHICH WERE NOT IN THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT

VIOLATES THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS
Iglesias vs. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. No. 180745; August 30, 2017
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
The case is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to nullify
and set aside the CA Decision which affirmed the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in
dismissing petitioner form service.
A complaint was filed by the Department of Finance (DOF) with the Ombudsman against
petitioner Iglesias who was employed as Acting District Collector by the Bureau of Customs. The
complaint alleged that Iglesias failed to file her Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth
(SALNs) prior to the year 2000 and made false entries for years 2000, 2001, 2002. Thereafter,
OMB held that the acts of Iglesias constitute dishonesty and grave misconduct, punishable by
dismissal from service under Rule IV, Section 52(A) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service.
Petitioner argues that she was not given an opportunity to refute the new accusations and
charges against her because such were not stated in the Complaint-Affidavit filed by the DOF,
particularly the irregularities found in her 1989 to 1999 SALNs. Thus, petitioner claims that her right
to be informed of the accusations against her and to be afforded with due process of law has been
violated.
ISSUE:
Was petitioner, in claiming that she was not informed of the charges against her, denied of
administrative due process?
RULING:
Yes, petitioner was partly denied of administrative due process.
Administrative due process demands that the party being charged is given an opportunity
to be heard. Due process is complied with "if the party who is properly notified of allegations against
him or her is given an opportunity to defend himself or herself against those allegations, and such
defense was considered by the tribunal in arriving at its own independent conclusions.
Here, there was a violation of due process with respect to the other charges which were
not in the original complaint. OMB cannot add new findings which were not part of the original
complaint because doing so would violate the right of the accused to due process. Nevertheless,
there were charges in the original complaint in which petitioner should be held liable. OMB
Resolution reveals that petitioners were not solely dismissed from service because of the
irregularities in her 1989 to 1999 SALNs but also because of the anomalies found in her 2000 to
2001 SALNs. The discrepancies in her 2000-2002 SALNs were stated in the Complaint-Affidavit
to which petitioner gave clarifications in her Counter-Affidavit and Position Paper.
Thus, even if the findings in petitioner’s 1989 to 1999 SALNs were disregarded, she should
still be liable for the discrepancies stated in the complaint filed against her.
| 91
DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS REQUIRES THAT A PARTY IS

DULY NOTIFIED OF THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST HIM
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas vs Commission on Audit

G.R. No. 213581; September 19, 2017
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
This petition seeks to review the Decision and Resolution of the Commission on Audit
(COA) finding Bank Officer II Evelyn Yap (Yap), Manager Perry Dequita (Dequita) and other
officers of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas of the Cotabato Branch jointly and solidarily liable for a
cash shortage in the amount of P32,701,600.
Acting Bank Officer III Verlina Silo (Silo), in her affidavits, disclosed that she repeatedly
stole cash from her accountabilities for a period of about five years and that she admits sole
responsibility for the cash shortage that resulted therefrom. COA filed administrative charges of
dishonesty and grave misconduct, and criminal charges of malversation and violation of Section
3(E) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) against Silo, Dequita, and Yap before
the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB). Silo was made solely liable for dishonesty and grave
misconduct while Yap and Dequita were absolved. The Ombudsman found probable cause in the
criminal case against Silo, but none against Dequita and Yap. In both administrative and criminal
cases, COA sought for reconsideration of Yap and Dequita’s liability but were denied. The COA
no longer appealed the denial. When the BSP asked for an opinion regarding Yap's liability, in
relation to the dismissal of the administrative charges against the latter, COA, instead of providing
an opinion, had Issued a Decision denying the request to extinguish Yap's liability in the cash
shortage and holding her liable for it.
Petitioner insists that COA erred in treating its request for opinion as a complaint against
Yap and Dequita. Respondents, on the other hand, asserts it followed the requirements of due
process because it studied the records and evidence submitted in the proceedings.
ISSUE:
Was there a denial of due process with respect to Yap et al. when the respondent COA
rendered a Decision against them?
RULING:
Yes, there was a denial of due process when COA rendered a decision against Yap, et al.
Due process in administrative proceedings does not require the submission of pleadings
or a trial-type of hearing. However, due process requires that a party is duly notified of the
allegations against him or her and is given a chance to present his or her defense.
The request for opinion was meant to seek guidance from COA, with regard to the proper
booking of the Accounts Receivable by Yap, in relation to the Ombudsman's dismissal of the
administrative case against her. It is beyond dispute that Yap, Dequita, and the other bank officials
were denied due process with the issuance of the assailed Decision. The request for opinion was
filed by petitioner alone, yet the assailed Decision found Yap, Dequita, and other bank officers of
the Cotabato Branch jointly and solidarily liable, even if they were never parties to the request for
opinion or request for relief from accountability.
Thus, the assailed Decision violated the basic tenets of due process and must be annulled
and set aside.
92 |
ABSENCE OF FORMAL HEARING IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS IS

ACCEPTABLE ONLY WHEN THE PARTY DOES NOT INVOKE IT OR WAIVES THE SAME
Saunar vs. Ermita

G.R. No. 186502; December 13, 2017
Martires, J.
FACTS:
The case is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside the CA
Decision which affirmed the dismissal of petitioner Carlos R. Saunar (Saunar) from government
service by the Office of the President (OP).
When Saunar was the NBI Chief of Anti-Graft Division, an official investigation regarding
the alleged corruption relative to the tobacco excises taxes was conducted and was found to have
involved former President Estrada. Later, Saunar received a subpoena from the Sandiganbayan
requiring him to testify in the plunder case against President Estrada. After giving his testimony,
he was relieved of his duties as regional director and was not assigned with any duties. He was
only advised to be available at any time whenever he would be needed.
Later, Saunar received an order from the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PACG)
which required him to answer the allegations against him for gross neglect of duty in view of his
failure to report for work without approved leave of absence for four months. Thereafter, OP found
Saunar guilty of gross neglect of duty and consequently dismissed the same from service. Saunar
claims that he was denied due process asserting that no real hearing was ever conducted and he
was only notified of the charges against him after PAGC had formally charged him. CA, however,
held that absence of formal hearings in administrative proceedings is not anathema to due process.
ISSUE:
Was Saunar denied due process because of the absence of formal hearing?
RULING:
Yes, Saunar was denied due process by the PAGC.
Section 3, Rule III of PAGC’s New Rules of Procedure provides that while the conduct of
clarificatory hearings is discretionary, in the event that the conduct of one is necessary, the
following rules shall be followed: (1) the parties are to be notified of the clarificatory hearings; and
(2) the parties shall be afforded the opportunity to be present in the hearings without the right to
examine witnesses. The due process requirement before administrative bodies are not as strict
compared to judicial tribunals in that it suffices that a party is given a reasonable opportunity to be
heard. Nevertheless, such "reasonable opportunity" should not be confined to the mere submission
of position papers and/or affidavits and the parties must be given the opportunity to examine the
witnesses against them. The right to a hearing is a right which may be invoked by the parties to
thresh out substantial factual issues. It becomes even more imperative when the rules itself of the
administrative body provides for one. While the absence of a formal hearing does not necessarily
result in the deprivation of due process, it should be acceptable only when the party does not
invoke the said right or waives the same.
In the case, Saunar was not notified of the clarificatory hearings and thus, was deprived of
the opportunity to appear in such hearings. Consequently, he was denied of the chance to
propound questions against the opposing parties.
Thus, the violation of Saunar’s right to due process by PACG was apparent in the latter’s
disregard of its own rules of procedure.
| 93
CONCURRENCE OF JURISIDICTION OF THE SC, CA AND RTC FOR THE ISSUANCE OF

EXTRAORDINARY WRITS DOES NOT GRANT A PARTY THE FREEDOM TO CHOOSE
WHERE THE PETITION SHOULD BE FILED
Lanao Del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Provincial Government of Lanao
G.R. No. 185420; August 29, 2017
Velasco Jr., J.
FACTS:
Before this Court is a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, with prayer for injunctive relief to enjoin and prevent the respondent Provincial Government
of Lanao del Norte (PGLN) from levying and auctioning off all the assets, properties, and
equipment of petitioner Lanao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (LANECO) to satisfy its unpaid
real property taxes.
When Congress enacted RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991 (LGC), which conferred power to LGUs to impose taxes on real properties located within their
territories, LANECO received a letter from respondent Provincial Treasurer, demanding payment
for real property taxes. Aggrieved, LANECO questioned the validity of the real property tax
assessments and the Provincial Revenue Code in a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Preliminary
Prohibitory Injunction with the RTC of Lanao. The petition was dismissed, hence, LANECO filed
the present petition to raise the ISSUE on PGLN’s authority in enforcing the collection of unpaid
real property tax through administrative action, i.e., levy and auction of its assets, instead of
through judicial action. Respondent asserted that LANECO failed to exhaust available
administrative remedies when it directly resorted to filing the present petition before this Court
instead of filing the correct petition before the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC).
ISSUE:
Did LANECO, in filing the present petition for prohibition and mandamus with the Supreme
Court, fail to exhaust the available administrative remedies?
RULING:
Yes, LANECO failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies.
The Supreme Court, the CA and the RTC have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not grant
the party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file a petition in any court
of his choice. Accordingly, a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly
and specifically set out in the petition.
In the case, LANECO's proffered justifications for its direct resort to this Court is Section
78 of RA 9136 which vests the Supreme Court with authority to restrain or enjoin the
implementation of the provisions of the law. However, such does not necessarily mean that all
cases involving electric cooperatives should be filed thereat. The case does not involve questions
on the implementation of R.A. No. 9136 thus, Section 78 does not apply.
Therefore, LANECO should have first exhausted the available administrative remedies
before filing the present petition before the Court.
94 |
STRICT APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE

REMEDIES WILL BE SET ASIDE WHEN REQUIRING IT WOULD ONLY BE
UNREASONABLE
Department of Public Works and Highways vs. CMC/Monark/Pacific/Hi-Tri Joint Venture

G.R. No. 179732; September 13, 2017
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA Decision which affirmed the
Award of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC), an administrative agency
tasked with resolving issues pertaining to the construction industry.
A Contract Agreement for the Construction of certain road projects in Mindanao was
entered into between DPWH and respondent CMC/Monark/Pacific/Hi-Tri (Joint Venture). While the
project was ongoing, the Joint Venture's truck and equipment were set on fire. A few days after, a
bomb exploded at Joint Venture's hatching plant. It was found out that members of the MILF
caused the bombing incident. Joint Venture made several written demands for extension and
payment of the foreign component of the Contract. There were efforts between the parties to settle
the unpaid Payment Certificates but only the foreign component was up for negotiations subject to
further reduction of the amount on account of payments subsequently received by the Joint
Venture from DPWH. Later, Joint Venture filed a Complaint against DPWH before CIAC where the
latter ruled in favor of Joint Venture.
According to DPWH, the filing of the claim before CIAC was premature, since under CIAC
rules, there must be an exhaustion of administrative remedies first before government contracts
are brought to it for arbitration. Respondent, on the other hand, denies violating the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies. It claims that it sent at least 17 demand letters to petitioner,
four (4) of which were sent to the DPWH Secretary directly.
ISSUE:
Is the case prematurely filed due to the Joint Venture's non-compliance with the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies?
RULING:
No, the case is not prematurely filed.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the concerned administrative

agency must be given the opportunity to decide a matter within its jurisdiction before an action is
brought before the courts, otherwise, the action will be declared premature, subject to certain
exceptions.
In this case, CIAC found and correctly ruled that respondent had duly complied with the
contractual obligation to exhaust administrative remedies provided for in the Conditions of
Contract. Furthermore, a total of 17 demand letters were sent to petitioner to no avail. To require
respondent to wait for the DPWH Secretary's response while respondent continued to suffer
financially would be to condone petitioner's avoidance of its obligations to respondent. Even
assuming that the remedies provided for in the Conditions of Contract is not applicable, the case
still falls within the exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies since strict
application of the doctrine will be set aside when requiring it would only be unreasonable under
the circumstances.
Thus, the strict application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is set
aside.
| 95
APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE HLURB-BOC SHOULD BE MADE TO THE OFFICE

OF THE PRESIDENT PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Lefebre vs A. Brown Company, Inc.

G.R. No. 224973; September 27, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision and the Resolution of the
CA which set aside the Decision of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)-Board
of Commissioners (BOC).
Gina Lefebre (Lefebre) made a reservation to buy a residential lot in Xavier Estates
developed by A. Brown Company, Inc. (Company) in view of the latter’s representation that a
Manresa 18-Hole All Weather Championship Golf Course would be developed. However, the golf
course was not developed and the Contract to Sell they executed was eventually cancelled for
failure of Lefebre to pay the remaining balance of the agreed amount. Lefebre filed a Complaint
for Misleading and Deceptive Advertisement, Annulment of Rescission of Contract to Sell,
Damages and Other Relief against respondent before the HLURB. The HLU Arbiter ruled in favor
of the Company prompting Lefebre to file an appeal.
CA initially dismissed the petition on the ground that the Company failed to exhaust the
available administrative remedy However, on motion for reconsideration, CA reversed its decision
and held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not ironclad and may be
dispensed with when such requirement would be unreasonable and given that there were
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
ISSUE:
Does the case fall within the exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies?
RULING:
No, the case does not fall within any of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
As a general rule, the rules of procedure must be faithfully followed, except only when, for
persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his
failure to comply within the prescribed procedure. However, case law states that concomitant to a
liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking
liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules. The doctrine states that "where
strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the petition, the strict application of the
rules of procedure may be relaxed, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction."
In this case, Company failed to interpose an appeal before the Office of the President which
clearly violated the doctrine of exhaustion. As a general rule, therefore, "the rules of procedure
must be faithfully followed, except only when, for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to
relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply within the prescribed
procedure." Not only did the Company fail to adequately explain its failure to abide by the rules;
more significantly, there is also no palpable persuasive reason to relax the rules of procedure
considering that the HLURB-BOC actually rendered a correct ruling in the case.
96 |
THE CANDIDATE MUST BOTH BE WITHOUT A POLITICAL PARTY AND WITHOUT

SUPPORT FROM ANY POLITICAL PARTY FOR THE P5.00 EXPENDITURE CAP TO
APPLY
Salvador vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 230744; September 26, 2017
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
In this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64, petitioner Mario O. Salvador (Salvador)
challenges the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc which found
probable cause against him for violation of Sec. 100 in relation to Sec. 262 of Batasang Pambansa
Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines), as amended by Sec. 13 6 of R.A. No. 7166
or An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms,
Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes.
Salvador, a member of the political party Bagong Lakas ng Nueva Ecija, was a mayoralty
candidate in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija. Marivic, private respondent Belena’s wife, won over
Salvador in said mayoralty election. Belena filed a Complaint-Affidavit for overspending or violation
of Section 100 in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
According to Belena, Salvador exceeded the expenditure limit allowed by law for a
mayoralty candidate. Belena averred that according to Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166, a candidate,
other than for presidency and vice presidency, is allowed to spend an amount of P3.00 for every
voter in the constituency where he filed his COC. However, if he is without any political party and
without any support from any political party, he may be allowed to spend P5.00 for every such
voter. For his part, Salvador maintained that while he is a member of a political party, he argued
that he did not receive any support from any political party. Hence, the exception applies to him.
ISSUE:
Should an electoral candidate both be without a political party and without support from a
political party to qualify for the P5.00 expenditure cap?
RULING:
Yes, an electoral candidate should both be without a political party and without support
from a political party to qualify for the P5.00 expenditure cap.
The word "and" between "without political party" and "without support from any political
party" is conjunctive. It means in addition to. The word "and", whether it is used to connect words,
phrases or full sentences, must be accepted as binding together and as relating to one another.
Applying the foregoing to Section 13, the proper construction is that the allowable expenditure for
candidates without any political party and without support from any political party is P3.00.
After all, the word "support," which is explicitly provided by the law, is not solely limited to
financial aid. As aforementioned, political parties are designed to assist a candidate in his desire
to win the vote of the populace. Political parties use its machinery and its resources to achieve
such end. For example, political parties put up banners or give out leaflets containing the names
of its members for the public to consider. In doing so, these organizations effectively support each
candidate belonging to its unit. The law is clear — the candidate must both be without a political
party and without support from any political party for the P5.00 cap to apply. In the absence of one,
the exception does not apply. Thus, an electoral candidate should both be without a political party
and without support from a political party to qualify for the P5.00 expenditure cap.
| 97
PRIOR FINDING OF DISQUALIFICATION IS NOT NECESSARY BEFORE REMEDY

UNDER SEC. 68 OF OEC CAN BE HAD
Francisco vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 230249; April 24, 2018
Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS:
This treats of the petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 filed by Atty.
Pablo B. Francisco (Francisco), which seeks to nullify the Resolution of the public respondent
COMELEC En Banc which dismissed Francisco's Petition for Disqualification against private
respondent Atty. Johnielle Keith P. Nieto (Nieto).
Francisco filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification against Nieto, alleging
that respondent made financial contributions out of the government coffers for the asphalt-paving
of the road entrance along Imelda Avenue of Cainta Green Park Village. This, according to
petitioner, amounted to the expending of public funds within 45 days before the 2016 polls and to
illegal contributions for road repairs, respectively punishable under Secs. 261(v)(2) and 1043 of
the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). The COMELEC Second Division, anchoring its decision from
Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, dismissed the Petition for Disqualification against Nieto, ruling
that a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a
disqualification provided by law or the Constitution. COMELEC En Banc affirmed.
According to petitioner, the situation ushered in by the COMELEC ruling would render
toothless [the Petition for Disqualification] Sec. 68 of the OEC against election irregularities
because of the virtual impossibility of compliance with the prior ruling requirement.
ISSUE:
Is a prior finding that a candidate is suffering from a disqualification a condition sine qua
non before remedy under Sec. 68 of the OEC may be had?
RULING:
No, a prior court judgment is not required before the remedy under Sec. 68 of the OEC can
prosper.
This is highlighted by the provision itself, which contemplates of two scenarios: first, there
is a final decision by a competent court that the candidate is guilty of an election offense and
second, it is the Commission itself that found that the candidate committed any of the enumerated
prohibited acts.
The COMELEC's adjudicative function over election contests is quasi-judicial in character.

In adjudicating the rights of persons before it, the COMELEC is not just empowered but is in fact
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and
draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial
nature.
Contrary to Poe, the Court also categorically ruled that the COMELEC can be the proper
body to make the pronouncement against which the truth or falsity of a material representation in
a COC can be measured.
Therefore, a prior court judgment is not required before the remedy under Sec. 68 of the
OEC can prosper.
98 |
LGU HAS WIDE DISCRETION TO DETERMINE NOT ONLY WHAT THE INTERESTS OF
THE PUBLIC REQUIRE BUT ALSO WHAT MEASURES ARE NECESSARY FOR THE
PROTECTION OF SUCH INTERESTS
Evasco, Jr. vs. Montanez

G.R. No. 199172; February 21, 2018
Leonardo-DeCastro, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the CA Decision
declaring null and void Secs. 7, 8, 37 and 45 of the Davao City Ordinance No. 092, Series of 2000
(Ordinance 92-2000).
As early as 2003, the City Engineer of Davao City (City Engineer) started sending notices
of illegal construction to various outdoor advertising businesses, including Ad & Promo
Management (APM), owned by herein respondent Alex P. Montañez, that constructed the
billboards in different areas within the city. The City Engineer reminded the entities to secure a
sign permit or apply for a renewal for each billboard structure as required by Ordinance No. 092-
2000. Thereafter, the City Engineer Issued orders of demolition directing erring outdoor advertising
businesses, including APM, to "voluntarily dismantle" their billboards that violate Ordinance No.
092-2000 within three days from receipt of the order. Otherwise, the city government shall
summarily remove these structures without further notice.
Montañez filed a petition for injunction and declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 092-
2000, assailing it to be unconstitutional for being overbreadth in its application, vague, and
inconsistent with P.D. 1096 or the National Building Code of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Is the ordinance invalid for being inconsistent with P.D. 1096?
RULING:
No, the Ordinance is constitutional.
Ordinance No. 092-2000 is an exercise of police power. R.A. No. 4354 otherwise known
as the Revised Charter of the City of Davao vested the local Sangguniang Panlungsod with the
legislative power to regulate, prohibit, and fix license fees for the display, construction, and
maintenance of billboards and similar structures. Therefore, the city government may impose
stricter limitations because its police power to do so originates from its charter and not from the
National Building Code. An ordinance's validity shall be upheld if the following requisites are
present: First, the local government unit must possess the power to enact an ordinance covering
a particular subject matter and according to the procedure prescribed by law. Second, the
ordinance must not contravene the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or
must not be against public policy or must not be unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating
or in derogation of a common right.
The Court will not be quick at invalidating an ordinance as unreasonable unless the rules
imposed are so excessive as to be prohibitive, arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, or confiscatory.
It must be remembered that the local legislative authority has a wide discretion to determine not
only what the interests of the public require but also what measures are necessary for the
protection of such interests. High respect is accorded to the Sanggunian's issuance because the
local council is in the best position to determine the needs of its constituents.
For the foregoing reasons, the validity of Ordinance No. 092-2000 must be upheld.
| 99
A MUNICIPALITY HAS NO POWER TO IMPOSE FRANCHISE TAXES
City of Pasig vs. Manila Electric Co.

G.R. No. 181710; March 7, 2018
Martires, J.
FACTS:
At bar is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks a reversal
of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA).
The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Pasig [now Pasig City] enacted Ordinance
No. 25 which imposed a franchise tax on all business venture operations carried out through a
franchise within the municipality at the rate of 50% of 1% of its gross receipts derived from the
operation of the business in Pasig during the preceding calendar year. The Treasurer’s Office of
the Pasig City Government informed the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO), a grantee of a
legislative franchise, that it is liable to pay taxes for the period 1996 to 1999, pursuant to Municipal
Ordinance No. 25.
MERALCO protested the validity of the demand, arguing that Ordinance No. 25 is null and
void as municipalities are not empowered by law to impose and collect franchise tax pursuant to
Sec. 142 of the LGC. However, the City of Pasig argued that the conversion of the municipality of
Pasig into a city vested the latter with authority to levy franchise taxes.
ISSUE:
Does the City of Pasig have valid basis for imposing franchise taxes?
RULING:
No, the City of Pasig have no valid basis for imposing franchise taxes.
The power to impose franchise tax belongs to the province by virtue of Sec 137 of the Local
Government Code (LGC). On the other hand, under Sec. 142, the municipalities are prohibited
from levying the taxes specifically allocated to provinces. Meanwhile, Section 151 empowers the
cities to levy taxes, fees and charges allowed to both provinces and municipalities
The LGC further provides that the power to impose a tax, fee, or charge or to generate
revenue shall be exercised by the Sanggunian of the local government unit concerned through an
appropriate ordinance. The enactment of an ordinance is indispensable for it is the legal basis of
the imposition and collection of taxes upon covered taxpayers. Without the ordinance, there is
nothing to enforce by way of assessment and collection. Here, an ordinance must pass the test of
constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws. Otherwise, it shall be void.
It is not disputed that at the time the ordinance in question was enacted in 1992, the local
government of Pasig, then a municipality, had no authority to levy franchise tax. Article 5 of the
Civil Code explicitly provides, "acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory
laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizers their validity." Section 32 of Municipal
Ordinance No. 25 is, thus, void for being in direct contravention with Section 142 of the LGC. Being
void, it cannot be given any legal effect. An assessment and collection pursuant to the said
ordinance is, perforce, legally infirm.
The doctrinal rule on the matter still rings true to this day — that the conversion of the
municipality into a city does not remove the original infirmity of the subject ordinance. Thus, the
void ordinance herein cannot legally exist, it cannot have binding force and effect.
100 |
AN APPROPRIATION FOR THE COMPENSATION OF AN APPOINTED MUNICIPAL

OFFICER SHALL BE MADE IN AN ORDINANCE
AN APPOINTMENT TO A POSITION THAT IS OPTIONAL UNDER THE LOCAL

GOVERNMENT CODE (LGC) BUT WITHOUT THE CORRESPONDING APPROPRIATION
BY THE RELEVANT SANGGUNIAN IS INEFFECTUAL
Civil Service Commission vs. Unda

G.R. No. 213237 & 213331; July 11, 2017
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
The petitioners assail the decision of the CA which upheld the appointment of the
respondent as Municipal Environmental and Natural Resources Officer (MENRO) for the
Municipality of Masiu in the Province of Lanao Del Sur.
Outgoing Mayor Aminullah Arimao of the Municipality of Masiu, Lanao del Norte had
appointed respondent Samad M. Unda (Unda) as the MENRO for the Municipality of Masiu. After
the 2007 local elections, petitioner Nasser P. Pangandaman, Jr. assumed office as the newly-
elected Municipal Mayor of Masiu. He soon discovered that the LGU had not enacted any annual
budget for the years 2006 and 2007, and had operated on the basis of the re-enacted 2005 annual
budget; and that nine municipal employees, including the respondent, had been midnight
appointees whose appointments had been based on a non-existing budget. Inasmuch as said
appointees were not reporting to work, Mayor Pangandaman ordered their salaries withheld. Later
on, he filed a petition for the annulment of the appointments by the CSC Regional Office, which
soon upheld the appointments.
On appeal, CSC reversed the Regional Office’s decision. CA reversed the CSC decision
and reinstated the Regional Office’s ruling. The CA observed that the prohibition against midnight
appointments did not extend to the Unda because his appointment had been made 22 days prior
to the start of the election ban on Mar 30, 2007, and that the PSB had screened his application for
the position in compliance with CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40.
ISSUE:
Has respondent Unda been validly appointed as the MENRO of Municipality of Masiu?
RULING:
No, respondent Unda has not been validly appointed as the MENRO of Municipality of
Masiu.
There ought to be no question that the appointment of the respondent as the MENRO was
but optional on the part of the Municipality of Masiu, and that such appointment required the
concurrence of the Sangguniang Bayan, as well as the adoption of the appropriation ordinance to
fund the payment of his salaries and other emoluments.
Sec. 443 of the LGC expressly includes the position of the MENRO in the municipality.
Nonetheless, the provision subjects the appointment of the MENRO to several conditions, namely:
(1) the concurrence by the majority of the sangguniang bayan as provided in its paragraph (d); and
(2) the adoption of an ordinance setting the compensation, allowances and other emoluments
conformably with its paragraph (e). The requirement for the appropriation ordinance is consistent
with the fundamental principle of fiscal administration enunciated in Sec. 305 of the LGC that "[n]o
money shall be paid out of the local treasury except in pursuance of an appropriations ordinance
or law." An appropriation for his position shall be made in an ordinance, and not in a resolution. It
was undisputed that the appropriation for his MENRO position was only embodied in a resolution.
Hence, there is no valid appointment.
| 101
THE SANGGUNIAN MEMBERS HAVE STANDING IN MATTERS WHICH REQUIRE

THEIR AUTHORITY TO BIND THE CITY IN A CONTRACT
Lao Jr. vs. LGU of Cagayan de Oro

G.R. No. 187869; September 13, 2017
Leonen, J
FACTS:
This is a petition under Rule 45 questioning the Resolution of RTC denying petitioner
government official’s prayer for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and dismissing the
complaint for declaration of nullity of the contract for the redevelopment of Agora Market Terminal.
On March 19, 2007, the City Council of Cagayan De Oro (City Council) passed an
ordinance, for the redevelopment of Agora Complex which would be under a build-operate-transfer
scheme (BOT Contract), proposed by MEGA Integrated Agro Livestock Farm Corp (Mega Farm).
It deferred to authorize the old mayor (Emano) to conclude the contract with Mega Farm, and
referred it to committee on economic enterprise. In 2009, the newly-elected Mayor Jaraula
executed the BOT contract with MEGA Farm.
Petitioners, questioned the execution and the contents of BOT Contract, alleging that it
was issued in bad faith and with fraudulent maneuvers between Mega Farm and the City
Government of Cagayan De Oro. The Mayors allegedly were not authority to enter into such
contracts because the City Council has not issued any ordinance allowing them to do so.
Respondents claimed petitioners do not have the proper standing as they are not party to the
contract.
ISSUE:
Do petitioners have standing to file the suit?
RULING:
Yes, petitioners have the standing to file this suit.
The requirement of the sangguniang panlungsod's prior authority is a measure of check

and balance on the powers of the city mayor: The requirement was deliberately added as a
measure of check and balance, to temper the authority of the local chief executive, and in
recognition of the fact that the corporate powers of the local government unit are wielded as much
by its chief executive as by its council.
Petitioners are members of the City Council of Cagayan De Oro. They have alleged that
public respondent Mayor Jaraula entered into the Agora Complex BOT Contract without being
authorized by the City Council of Cagayan De Oro, in violation of the requirement in Title III,
Chapter III, Article I, Section 455(b)(l)(vi) of the Local Government Code. As they are part of the
very body in which authority is allegedly being undermined by the city mayor, they have the right
and duty to question the basis of the mayor's authority to sign a contract which binds the city.
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners regarding standing, and the case is remanded to
the RTC for further proceeding regarding the validity of the BOT Contract.
102 |
EXTRADITION TO HONGKONG MAY BE HAD IF DOUBLE CRIMINALITY IS PROVED

FOREIGN DECISIONS MUST BE PROVEN AS FACT
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region vs. Muñoz

G.R. No. 207342; November 7, 2017
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
For consideration and resolution is the petitioner's motion for reconsideration to seek the
review and reversal of the decision promulgated on August 16, 2016, whereby the Court affirmed
the amended decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on March 1, 2013 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 88610, and accordingly denied the petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) represented

by the Philippine Department of Justice (DoJ) filed motions for a reconsideration of a previous
decision by the Supreme Court regarding the extradition of respondent Juan Antonio Muñoz
(Muñoz). The Court, in the previous case, held that Muñoz can only be extradited for seven counts
of conspiracy to defraud but not for accepting an advantage as agent because such crime (bribery
in private capacity) does not exist in the Philippines. Petitioner now cites the case of B v. the
Commissioner of the Independent Commission against Corruption decided by the Court of Final
Appeal of Hong Kong to the effect that agent in Sec. 9 of HKSAR’s Prevention of Bribery Ordinance
(POBO) covered public servants in other jurisdictions, supposedly giving effect to the principle dual
criminality.
ISSUES:
(1) May a person who committed the crime of accepting an advantage as an agent be
extradited? and;
(2) May the Court take cognizance of a foreign Court’s decision?
RULING:
(1) No. Under the rule of specialty in international law, a Requested State shall surrender
to a Requesting State a person to be tried only for a criminal offense specified in their treaty of
extradition. Conformably with the dual criminality rule embodied in the extradition treaty between
the Philippines and the HKSAR, however, the Philippines as the Requested State is not bound to
extradite the respondent to the jurisdiction of the HKSAR as the Requesting State for the offense
of accepting an advantage as an agent considering that the extradition treaty is forthright in
providing that surrender shall only be granted for an offense coming within the descriptions of
offenses in its Article 2 insofar as the offenses are punishable by imprisonment or other form of
detention for more than one year, or by a more severe penalty according to the laws of both parties.
(2) No. To do so is to take judicial notice of the case of B v. the Commissioner of the
Independent Commission against Corruption which contravenes the Philippine rules on evidence
under which foreign judgment and laws are not considered as a matter of a public or notorious
nature that proved themselves. Foreign judgments have to be alleged and proved like any other
disputed fact. Further, the petitioner failed to raise the existence of the foreign case when it has
been decided during the pendency of this case before the CA. This delay is another proof of lack
of relevance and applicability of the foreign decision, neither were there any publication of the
ruling or a copy of it attested by the proper legal authority. The Court thus denies the petition.
| 103
THE POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD MAY IMPOSE A FINE FOR FAILURE TO

COMPLY WITH THE DENR'S RULES WITH RESPECT TO THE EFFLUENT STANDARDS
TESTS
Summit One Condominium Corporation vs. Pollution Adjudication Board and Environmental
Management Bureau - NCR
G.R. No. 215029; July 5, 2017
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
This a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) - National Capital Region (NCR)

conducted an inspection of the wastewater samples gathered from the sewage treatment facility
of Summit One Condominium Corporation (SOCC). The authorized inspection was through a "grab
sample" taken from SOCC's sewage treatment plant (STP) for the purpose of monitoring SOCC's
compliance with R.A. No. 9275 and as a necessary consequence of its application for wastewater
"Discharge Permit." The laboratory analysis yielded that the SOCC's wastewater failed to comply
with the DENR Effluent Standards set by the Revised Effluent Regulations of 1990.
Thereafter, the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) imposed a fine on SOCC in the amount
of Php2,790,000 for its initial failure to comply with the Effluent Standard. PAB denied SOCC’s
Motion for Reconsideration. Such Order was affirmed by the CA when the petitioner sought
recourse to the appellate court.
ISSUE:
Was the arbitrary fine amounting to Php2,790,000 imposed by PAB proper?
RULING:
Yes, the CA did not commit an error in affirming PAB’s Order.
Rule 27.5 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Clean Water Act of
2004 states that the continuation of the violation for which a daily fine shall be imposed shall not
be construed to be a continuation of the discharge or pollutive activity but the continuation of the
existence of the pollution.
Records clearly show that SOCC admitted its failure to comply with the DENR's rules with
respect to the Effluent Standards. In its petition, SOCC pleaded for the mitigation of fines by the
mere fact that it exerted its effort in good faith in complying with the Effluent Standards by hiring
Milestone to conduct the monthly examination. It even went further in informing this Court that "it
has an on-going project wherein it is currently in the process of installing a state-of-the-art sewage
treatment plant - the Hitachi STP-MBR", and would, among other things, "allow SOCC to recycle
80% of the water in effluent for use for drinking." Indeed, these statements indicate that SOCC
was aware that it failed to comply with the DENR Effluent Standards test during the March 11,
2010 inspection conducted by EMB-NCR. At that juncture, it was incumbent on PAB to impose a
penalty on SOCC, i.e., a fine in the amount of PhP 2,790,000.
Thus, the fine imposed by the PAB was affirmed.
104 |
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LAYOUT AND CONTENT EDITORS

SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW

CHARLOTTE VINA S. CASINILLO

UT IN OMNIBUS GLORIFICETUR DEUS!

THIS IS THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF THE

THE UNAUTHORIZED COPYING, REPRODUCTION,

Leonardia vs. Phuture Visions Co., Inc. …………………………………………..…….… 1

Lagman vs. Pimentel III ………………………………………………………………………. 2

Trillanes IV vs. Hon. Castillo Marigomen …………………………………………………. 5

Dela Cruz vs. Ochoa, Jr. ……………………………………………………………………... 6

Lagman vs. Medialdea ………………………………………………………………….……. 9

Umali vs. Judicial and Bar Council ………………………………………………………... 23

Republic vs. Sereno ………………………………………………………………………….. 24

Cerilles vs. Civil Service Commission ……………………………………………………. 25

Pasok, Jr. vs. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao ……………………………………. 30

Aparente vs. People …………………………………………………..……………………… 32

Valmores vs. Achacoso ……………………………………………………………………… 34

Genuino vs. De Lima …………………………………………………………………………. 35

Evergreen Manufacturing Corp. vs. Republic …………………………………………… 36

People vs. Cabanada …………………………………………………………………………. 41

Kim Liong vs. People ………………………………………………………………………… 43

People vs. Sandiganbayan ………………………………………………………………..… 44

People vs. Alejandro …………………………………………………………………………. 47

Republic vs. Go Hei Pung …………………………………………………………………… 51

Tan vs. Crisologo ……………………………………………………………………………... 53

Re: Fake Certificates of Civil Service Eligibility of Marivic B. Ragel, ……………….. 54

Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) vs. Commission on Audit ………………………. 58

Paduga vs. Dimson …………………………………………………………………………… 59

Field Investigation Office vs. Piano ……………………………………………………….. 68

Lanao Del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. …………...……………………………… 94

Salvador vs. COMELEC ...………………………………....…………………………………. 97

Francisco vs. COMELEC ...…………………………………...……………………………… 98

Evasco, Jr. v. Montañez ...…………………………………....……………………………… 99

STATE CANNOT BE SUED WITHOUT ITS CONSENT

Leonardia vs. Phuture Visions Co., Inc.

CONGRESS HAS THE POWER TO EXTEND AND DETERMINE THE PERIOD OF

Lagman vs. Pimentel III

CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO PROMULGATE RULES IS GENERALLY NOT SUBJECT TO

Lagman vs. Pimentel III

LEGISLATIVE RULES ARE NOT PERMANENT; THEY ARE SUBJECT TO REVOCATION,

Baguilat, Jr. vs. Alvarez

PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY DOES NOT COVER MEDIA INTERVIEWS

Trillanes IV vs. Hon. Castillo-Marigomen

AN APPROPRIATION IS SPECIFIC IN PURPOSE EVEN IF BROKENN DOWN INTO

Dela Cruz vs. Ochoa, Jr.

To be valid, an appropriation must indicate a specific amount and a specific purpose.

REVENUE COLLECTED FOR A SPECIAL PURPOSE SHALL BE TREATED AS A SPECIAL

NO MONEY SHALL BE PAID OUT OF THE TREASURY EXCEPT IN PURSUANCE OF AN

In this case, the CESB, although intended to be an autonomous entity, is administratively

THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES MERE SUFFICIENCY, AND NOT ACCURACY, OF

Lagman vs. Medialdea

Thus, the Constitution requires sufficiency of factual basis, not accuracy.

PRESIDENT HAS DISCRETION WHICH MILITARY POWER TO USE DEPENDING ON

Lagman vs. Medialdea

Indeed, the 1987 Constitution gives the “President, as Commander-in-Chief, a 'sequence'

ONLY FACTS KNOWN TO THE PRESIDENT AT THE TIME OF DECLARATION OF

Lagman vs. Medialdea

Lagman vs. Medialdea

This is both an acknowledgement and a recognition that it is the Executive Department,

COURT’S POWER TO REVIEW IS INDEPENDENT FROM CONGRESS’ POWER TO

Lagman vs. Medialdea

CONGRESS IS NOT MANDATED TO CONVENE IN JOINT SESSION TO DELIBERATE