kind of property
telecommunication or telephone service on or about
G.R. No. 155076 January 13, 2009
LUIS MARCOS P. LAUREL, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ZEUS C. ABROGAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES & PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
COMPANY Respondents.
On February 27, 2006, this Court’s First Division rendered
judgment in this case as follows:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED.
The assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court and the
Decision of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is directed to issue an order
granting the motion of the petitioner to quash the Amended
Information.
SO ORDERED.1
By way of brief background, petitioner is one of the accused
in Criminal Case No. 99-2425, filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 150. The Amended Information
charged the accused with theft under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
On or about September 10-19, 1999, or prior thereto in
Makati City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, conspiring and confederating together
and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another,
with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent
of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone (PLDT), did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
use the international long distance calls belonging to PLDT
by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR), which is a
method of routing and completing international long
distance calls using lines, cables, antenae, and/or air wave
frequency which connect directly to the local or domestic
exchange facilities of the country where the call is destined,
effectively stealing this business from PLDT while using its
facilities in the estimated amount of P20,370,651.92 to the
damage and prejudice of PLDT, in the said amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash (with Motion to Defer
Arraignment)," on the ground that the factual allegations in
the Amended Information do not constitute the felony of
theft. The trial court denied the Motion to Quash the
Amended Information, as well petitioner’s subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari was dismissed by
the Court of Appeals. Thus, petitioner filed the instant
petition for review with this Court.
In the above-quoted Decision, this Court held that the
Amended Information does not contain material allegations
charging petitioner with theft of personal property since
international long distance calls and the business of
providing telecommunication or telephone services are not
personal properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT) filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to
Refer the Case to the Supreme Court En Banc. It maintains
that the Amended Information charging petitioner with
theft is valid and sufficient; that it states the names of all the
accused who were specifically charged with the crime of
theft of PLDT’s international calls and business of providing
September 10 to 19, 1999 in Makati City by conducting ISR or
International Simple Resale; that it identifies the
international calls and business of providing
telecommunication or telephone service of PLDT as the
personal properties which were unlawfully taken by the
accused; and that it satisfies the test of sufficiency as it
enabled a person of common understanding to know the
charge against him and the court to render judgment
properly.
PLDT further insists that the Revised Penal Code should be
interpreted in the context of the Civil Code’s definition of
real and personal property. The enumeration of real
properties in Article 415 of the Civil Code is exclusive such
that all those not included therein are personal properties.
Since Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code used the words
"personal property" without qualification, it follows that all
"personal properties" as understood in the context of the
Civil Code, may be the subject of theft under Article 308 of
the Revised Penal Code. PLDT alleges that the international
calls and business of providing telecommunication or
telephone service are personal properties capable of
appropriation and can be objects of theft.
PLDT also argues that "taking" in relation to theft under the
Revised Penal Code does not require "asportation," the sole
requisite being that the object should be capable of
"appropriation." The element of "taking" referred to in
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code means the act of
depriving another of the possession and dominion of a
movable coupled with the intention, at the time of the
"taking," of withholding it with the character of
permanency. There must be intent to appropriate, which
means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing. Thus, the
term "personal properties" under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code is not limited to only personal properties which
are "susceptible of being severed from a mass or larger
quantity and of being transported from place to place."
PLDT likewise alleges that as early as the 1930s, international
telephone calls were in existence; hence, there is no basis for
this Court’s finding that the Legislature could not have
contemplated the theft of international telephone calls and
the unlawful transmission and routing of electronic voice
signals or impulses emanating from such calls by unlawfully
tampering with the telephone device as within the coverage
of the Revised Penal Code.
According to respondent, the "international phone calls"
which are "electric currents or sets of electric impulses
transmitted through a medium, and carry a pattern
representing the human voice to a receiver," are personal
properties which may be subject of theft. Article 416(3) of
the Civil Code deems "forces of nature" (which includes
electricity) which are brought under the control by science,
are personal property.
In his Comment to PLDT’s motion for reconsideration,
petitioner Laurel claims that a telephone call is a
conversation on the phone or a communication carried out
using the telephone. It is not synonymous to electric current
or impulses. Hence, it may not be considered as personal
property susceptible of appropriation. Petitioner claims that
the analogy between generated electricity and telephone
calls is misplaced. PLDT does not produce or generate
telephone calls. It only provides the facilities or services for
the transmission and switching of the calls. He also insists
that "business" is not personal property. It is not the
"business" that is protected but the "right to carry on a
business." This right is what is considered as property. Since
the services of PLDT cannot be considered as "property," the
same may not be subject of theft.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agrees with
respondent PLDT that "international phone calls and the
business or service of providing international phone calls"
are subsumed in the enumeration and definition of personal
property under the Civil Code hence, may be proper subjects
of theft. It noted that the cases of United States v. Genato,3
United States v. Carlos4 and United States v. Tambunting,5
which recognized intangible properties like gas and
electricity as personal properties, are deemed incorporated
in our penal laws. Moreover, the theft provision in the
Revised Penal Code was deliberately couched in broad terms
precisely to be all-encompassing and embracing even such
scenario that could not have been easily anticipated.
According to the OSG, prosecution under Republic Act (RA)
No. 8484 or the Access Device Regulations Act of 1998 and
RA 8792 or the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 does not
preclude prosecution under the Revised Penal Code for the
crime of theft. The latter embraces unauthorized
appropriation or use of PLDT’s international calls, service
and business, for personal profit or gain, to the prejudice of
PLDT as owner thereof. On the other hand, the special laws
punish the surreptitious and advanced technical means
employed to illegally obtain the subject service and business.
Even assuming that the correct indictment should have been
under RA 8484, the quashal of the information would still
not be proper. The charge of theft as alleged in the
Information should be taken in relation to RA 8484 because
it is the elements, and not the designation of the crime, that
control.
Considering the gravity and complexity of the novel
questions of law involved in this case, the Special First
Division resolved to refer the same to the Banc.
We resolve to grant the Motion for Reconsideration but
remand the case to the trial court for proper clarification of
the Amended Information.
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. – Theft is committed by any
person who, with intent to gain but without violence
against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things,
shall take personal property of another without the latter’s
consent.
The elements of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code are as follows: (1) that there be taking of personal
property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that
the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be
done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the
taking be accomplished without the use of violence against
or intimidation of persons or force upon things.
Prior to the passage of the Revised Penal Code on December
8, 1930, the definition of the term "personal property" in the
penal code provision on theft had been established in
Philippine jurisprudence. This Court, in United States v.
Genato, United States v. Carlos, and United States v.
Tambunting, consistently ruled that any personal property,
tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, capable of
appropriation can be the object of theft.
Moreover, since the passage of the Revised Penal Code on
December 8, 1930, the term "personal property" has had a
generally accepted definition in civil law. In Article 335 of the
Civil Code of Spain, "personal property" is defined as
"anything susceptible of appropriation and not included in
the foregoing chapter (not real property)." Thus, the term
"personal property" in the Revised Penal Code should be
interpreted in the context of the Civil Code provisions in
accordance with the rule on statutory construction that
where words have been long used in a technical sense and
have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning,
and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain
meaning prior to a particular statute, in which they are used,
the words used in such statute should be construed
according to the sense in which they have been previously
used.6 In fact, this Court used the Civil Code definition of
"personal property" in interpreting the theft provision of the
penal code in United States v. Carlos.
Cognizant of the definition given by jurisprudence and the
Civil Code of Spain to the term "personal property" at the
time the old Penal Code was being revised, still the
legislature did not limit or qualify the definition of "personal
property" in the Revised Penal Code. Neither did it provide a
restrictive definition or an exclusive enumeration of
"personal property" in the Revised Penal Code, thereby
showing its intent to retain for the term an extensive and
unqualified interpretation.1avvphi1.zw+ Consequently, any
property which is not included in the enumeration of real
properties under the Civil Code and capable of appropriation
can be the subject of theft under the Revised Penal Code.
The only requirement for a personal property to be the
object of theft under the penal code is that it be capable of
appropriation. It need not be capable of "asportation,"
which is defined as "carrying away."7 Jurisprudence is
settled that to "take" under the theft provision of the penal
code does not require asportation or carrying away.8
To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the
thing.9 The word "take" in the Revised Penal Code includes
any act intended to transfer possession which, as held in the
assailed Decision, may be committed through the use of the
offenders’ own hands, as well as any mechanical device, such
as an access device or card as in the instant case. This
includes controlling the destination of the property stolen to
deprive the owner of the property, such as the use of a
meter tampering, as held in Natividad v. Court of Appeals,10
use of a device to fraudulently obtain gas, as held in United
States v. Tambunting, and the use of a jumper to divert
electricity, as held in the cases of United States v. Genato,
United States v. Carlos, and United States v. Menagas.11
As illustrated in the above cases, appropriation of forces of
nature which are brought under control by science such as
electrical energy can be achieved by tampering with any
apparatus used for generating or measuring such forces of
nature, wrongfully redirecting such forces of nature from
such apparatus, or using any device to fraudulently obtain
such forces of nature. In the instant case, petitioner was
charged with engaging in International Simple Resale (ISR)
or the unauthorized routing and completing of international
long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air
wave frequency and connecting these calls directly to the
local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where
destined.
As early as 1910, the Court declared in Genato that ownership
over electricity (which an international long distance call
consists of), as well as telephone service, is protected by the
provisions on theft of the Penal Code. The pertinent
provision of the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila,
which was involved in the said case, reads as follows:
Injury to electric apparatus; Tapping current; Evidence. – No
person shall destroy, mutilate, deface, or otherwise injure or
tamper with any wire, meter, or other apparatus installed or
used for generating, containing, conducting, or measuring
electricity, telegraph or telephone service, nor tap or
otherwise wrongfully deflect or take any electric current
from such wire, meter, or other apparatus.
No person shall, for any purpose whatsoever, use or enjoy
the benefits of any device by means of which he may
fraudulently obtain any current of electricity or any
telegraph or telephone service; and the existence in any
building premises of any such device shall, in the absence of
satisfactory explanation, be deemed sufficient evidence of
such use by the persons benefiting thereby.
It was further ruled that even without the above ordinance
the acts of subtraction punished therein are covered by the
provisions on theft of the Penal Code then in force, thus:
Even without them (ordinance), the right of the ownership
of electric current is secured by articles 517 and 518 of the
Penal Code; the application of these articles in cases of
subtraction of gas, a fluid used for lighting, and in some
respects resembling electricity, is confirmed by the rule laid
down in the decisions of the supreme court of Spain of
January 20, 1887, and April 1, 1897, construing and enforcing
the provisions of articles 530 and 531 of the Penal Code of
that country, articles 517 and 518 of the code in force in these
islands.
The acts of "subtraction" include: (a) tampering with any
wire, meter, or other apparatus installed or used for
generating, containing, conducting, or measuring electricity,
telegraph or telephone service; (b) tapping or otherwise
wrongfully deflecting or taking any electric current from
such wire, meter, or other apparatus; and (c) using or
enjoying the benefits of any device by means of which one
may fraudulently obtain any current of electricity or any
telegraph or telephone service.
In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by
illegally connecting various equipment or apparatus to
private respondent PLDT’s telephone system, through
which petitioner is able to resell or re-route international
long distance calls using respondent PLDT’s facilities
constitutes all three acts of subtraction mentioned above.
The business of providing telecommunication or telephone
service is likewise personal property which can be the object
of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.
Business may be appropriated under Section 2 of Act No.
3952 (Bulk Sales Law), hence, could be object of theft:
Section 2. Any sale, transfer, mortgage, or assignment of a
stock of goods, wares, merchandise, provisions, or materials
otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade and the
regular prosecution of the business of the vendor,
mortgagor, transferor, or assignor, or any sale, transfer,
mortgage, or assignment of all, or substantially all, of the
business or trade theretofore conducted by the vendor,
mortgagor, transferor or assignor, or all, or substantially all,
of the fixtures and equipment used in and about the
business of the vendor, mortgagor, transferor, or assignor,
shall be deemed to be a sale and transfer in bulk, in
contemplation of the Act. x x x.
In Strochecker v. Ramirez,12 this Court stated:
With regard to the nature of the property thus mortgaged
which is one-half interest in the business above described,
such interest is a personal property capable of appropriation
and not included in the enumeration of real properties in
article 335 of the Civil Code, and may be the subject of
mortgage.
Interest in business was not specifically enumerated as
personal property in the Civil Code in force at the time the
above decision was rendered. Yet, interest in business was
declared to be personal property since it is capable of
appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real
properties. Article 414 of the Civil Code provides that all
things which are or may be the object of appropriation are
considered either real property or personal property.
Business is likewise not enumerated as personal property
under the Civil Code. Just like interest in business, however,
it may be appropriated. Following the ruling in Strochecker
v. Ramirez, business should also be classified as personal
property. Since it is not included in the exclusive
enumeration of real properties under Article 415, it is
therefore personal property.13
As can be clearly gleaned from the above disquisitions,
petitioner’s acts constitute theft of respondent PLDT’s
business and service, committed by means of the unlawful
use of the latter’s facilities. In this regard, the Amended
Information inaccurately describes the offense by making it
appear that what petitioner took were the international long
distance telephone calls, rather than respondent PLDT’s
business.
A perusal of the records of this case readily reveals that
petitioner and respondent PLDT extensively discussed the
issue of ownership of telephone calls. The prosecution has
taken the position that said telephone calls belong to
respondent PLDT. This is evident from its Comment where it
defined the issue of this case as whether or not "the
unauthorized use or appropriation of PLDT international
telephone calls, service and facilities, for the purpose of
generating personal profit or gain that should have
otherwise belonged to PLDT, constitutes theft."14
In discussing the issue of ownership, petitioner and
respondent PLDT gave their respective explanations on how
a telephone call is generated.15 For its part, respondent
PLDT explains the process of generating a telephone call as
follows:
38. The role of telecommunication companies is not limited
to merely providing the medium (i.e. the electric current)
through which the human voice/voice signal of the caller is
transmitted. Before the human voice/voice signal can be so
transmitted, a telecommunication company, using its
facilities, must first break down or decode the human
voice/voice signal into electronic impulses and subject the
same to further augmentation and enhancements. Only
after such process of conversion will the resulting electronic
impulses be transmitted by a telecommunication company,
again, through the use of its facilities. Upon reaching the
destination of the call, the telecommunication company will
again break down or decode the electronic impulses back to
human voice/voice signal before the called party receives the
same. In other words, a telecommunication company both
converts/reconverts the human voice/voice signal and
provides the medium for transmitting the same.
39. Moreover, in the case of an international telephone call,
once the electronic impulses originating from a foreign
telecommunication company country (i.e. Japan) reaches
the Philippines through a local telecommunication company
(i.e. private respondent PLDT), it is the latter which decodes,
augments and enhances the electronic impulses back to the
human voice/voice signal and provides the medium (i.e.
electric current) to enable the called party to receive the call.
Thus, it is not true that the foreign telecommunication
company provides (1) the electric current which transmits
the human voice/voice signal of the caller and (2) the electric
current for the called party to receive said human voice/voice DIRECTED to amend the Amended Information to show that
signal. the property subject of the theft were services and business
of the private offended party.
40. Thus, contrary to petitioner Laurel’s assertion, once the
electronic impulses or electric current originating from a SO ORDERED.
foreign telecommunication company (i.e. Japan) reaches
private respondent PLDT’s network, it is private respondent presumption on possession
PLDT which decodes, augments and enhances the electronic
G.R. No. 158385 February 12, 2010
impulses back to the human voice/voice signal and provides
the medium (i.e. electric current) to enable the called party MODESTO PALALI, Petitioner,
to receive the call. Without private respondent PLDT’s
network, the human voice/voice signal of the calling party vs.
will never reach the called party.16
JULIET AWISAN, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact
In the assailed Decision, it was conceded that in making the GREGORIO AWISAN, Respondent.
international phone calls, the human voice is converted into
A person occupying a parcel of land, by himself and through
electrical impulses or electric current which are transmitted
his predecessors-in-interest, enjoys the presumption of
to the party called. A telephone call, therefore, is electrical
ownership. Anyone who desires to remove him from the
energy. It was also held in the assailed Decision that
property must overcome such presumption by relying solely
intangible property such as electrical energy is capable of
on the strength of his claims rather than on the weakness of
appropriation because it may be taken and carried away.
the defense.
Electricity is personal property under Article 416 (3) of the
Civil Code, which enumerates "forces of nature which are This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
brought under control by science."17 Rules of Court assails the September 27, 2002 Decision2 and
the April 25, 2003 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Indeed, while it may be conceded that "international long
in CA-G.R. CV No. 52942. The challenged Decision disposed as
distance calls," the matter alleged to be stolen in the instant
follows:
case, take the form of electrical energy, it cannot be said that
such international long distance calls were personal WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of
properties belonging to PLDT since the latter could not have the trial court dated May 24, 1996 is hereby REVERSED AND
acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, SET ASIDE and a new one is entered:
augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using
its complex communications infrastructure and facilities. 1. Awarding the subject land in favor of the [respondent]
PLDT not being the owner of said telephone calls, then it with the exclusion of the area where the residential house of
could not validly claim that such telephone calls were taken the [petitioner] is erected.
without its consent. It is the use of these communications
2. Ordering the [petitioner] to vacate the rootcrop land and
facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the
surrender its possession in favor of the [respondent], and
crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone
enjoining the [petitioner] to refrain from doing any act
services and business.
disturbing the [respondent’s] peaceful possession and
Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication and enjoyment of the same.
the telephone service are personal property under Article
3. Cancelling Tax Declaration No. 31297 of the [petitioner]
308 of the Revised Penal Code, and the act of engaging in
insofar as the rootcrop land of .0648 hectares is concerned,
ISR is an act of "subtraction" penalized under said article.
with the exclusion of his residential land. All other reliefs and
However, the Amended Information describes the thing
remedies prayed for are DENIED, there being no sufficient
taken as, "international long distance calls," and only later
evidence to warrant granting them.
mentions "stealing the business from PLDT" as the manner
by which the gain was derived by the accused. In order to SO ORDERED.4
correct this inaccuracy of description, this case must be
remanded to the trial court and the prosecution directed to Factual Antecedents
amend the Amended Information, to clearly state that the
Respondent Juliet Awisan claimed to be the owner5 of a
property subject of the theft are the services and business of
parcel of land in Sitio Camambaey, Tapapan, Bauko,
respondent PLDT. Parenthetically, this amendment is not
Mountain Province, allegedly consisting of 6.6698 hectares6
necessitated by a mistake in charging the proper offense,
and covered by Tax Declaration No. 147 in her name.7 On
which would have called for the dismissal of the information
March 7, 1994, she filed an action for quieting of title against
under Rule 110, Section 14 and Rule 119, Section 19 of the
petitioner Modesto Palali, alleging that the latter occupied
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. To be sure, the crime
and encroached on the northern portion of her property and
is properly designated as one of theft. The purpose of the
surreptitiously declared it in his name for tax purposes.8 We
amendment is simply to ensure that the accused is fully and
shall refer to this land occupied by petitioner, which
sufficiently apprised of the nature and cause of the charge
allegedly encroached on the northern portion of
against him, and thus guaranteed of his rights under the
respondent’s 6.6698-hectare land, as the "subject
Constitution.
property". Respondent prayed to be declared the rightful
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. owner of the northern portion, for the cancellation of
The assailed Decision dated February 27, 2006 is petitioner’s tax declaration, and for the removal of
RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of petitioner and his improvements from the property.9
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68841 affirming the Order issued
Respondent’s (Plaintiff’s) Allegations
by Judge Zeus C. Abrogar of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 150, which denied the Motion to Quash According to respondent, the 6.6698 hectare land was
(With Motion to Defer Arraignment) in Criminal Case No. 99- originally owned by her father, Cresencio Cadwising. The
2425 for theft, is AFFIRMED. The case is remanded to the trial latter testified that he and his wife were able to consolidate
court and the Public Prosecutor of Makati City is hereby ownership over the land by declaring them from public land
as well as by purchasing from adjoining landowners. He
admitted including in his tax declaration a communal sacred
lot (patpatayan) even if he did not acquire free patent title
over the same. As for the properties he bought, these were
generally purchased without any documentation, save for
two.10
Cadwising also claimed having introduced improvements on
the subject property as early as the 1960s.11 The 6.6698
hectare land was mortgaged to the Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP), which acquired it in the foreclosure
sale. DBP then sold the land to one Tico Tibong, who
eventually donated the same to respondent.
Petitioner’s (Defendant’s) Allegations
In his defense, petitioner denied the encroachment and
asserted ownership over the subject property. He
maintained that he and his ancestors or predecessors-in-
interest have openly and continuously possessed the subject
land since time immemorial. He and his siblings were born on
that land and, at that time, the area around the house was
already planted with bananas, alnos, and coffee.12 When his
mother died, he buried her in the lot beside the house in
1975; while his father was buried near the same plot in
1993.13 His own home had been standing on the property for
the past 20 years. Petitioner insisted that during this entire
time, no one disturbed his ownership and possession
thereof.14
Sometime in 1974, petitioner declared the said land in his
name for taxation purposes.15 The said Tax Declaration
indicates that the property consists of 200 square meters of
residential lot and 648 square meters of rootcrop land (or a
total of 848 square meters).
Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court
It is worth mentioning that both the complaint16 and the
pre-trial brief17 of respondent alleged encroachment only on
the northern portion of her 6.6698-hectare land. During trial,
however, respondent’s attorney-in-fact, Gregorio Awisan,18
and respondent’s predecessor-in-interest, Cresencio
Cadwising,19 both alleged that there was an encroachment
in the southern portion also. This was done without
amending the allegations of the complaint.
Confronted with this new allegation of encroachment on the
southern portion, petitioner tried to introduce his tax
declaration over the same (in the name of his deceased
father), but was objected to by respondent on the ground of
immateriality.20 After such objection, however, respondent
surprisingly and inconsistently insisted that the ownership of
the southern portion was included in the complaint and was
an issue in the case. The ensuing confusion over the subject
of the case is revealed in the following exchange between
the parties’ lawyers:21
Atty. Awisan: Where is the land in question located?
Palali: In Tapapan, Bauko, sir.
Atty. Awisan: Where is that situated in relation to your
house?
Palali: It is near my house which is enclosed with fence.
Atty. Awisan: How about the land in question situated in the
southern portion, do you know that?
Palali: That is the land our parents gave to us as inheritance.
There are terraces there.
Atty. Awisan: So, the land in question [is] located below your
house and on the southern portion?
Atty. Bayogan: As far as the southern portion is concerned,
it is not included in the complaint.
Atty. Awisan: It is included.
Atty. Bayogan: The southern portion refer[s] to Lot 3 and it
is not included in the complaint. In fact when I started asking
question regarding this land, the counsel objected.
Atty. Awisan: This land indicated as Lot 3 is the southern
portion.
The trial court, apparently relying on the allegations of the
complaint, ruled on the northern portion as the subject
property of the case.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After due trial, the Regional Trial Court of Bontoc, Mountain
Province, Branch 35, dismissed22 the complaint. It based its
decision on respondent’s failure to prove her allegation of
physical possession of the land. Going by the results of its
ocular inspection23 of the land in question, the trial court
noted that Cadwising (respondent’s predecessor-in-
interest) could not pinpoint and the court did not see any of
the improvements that Cadwising had allegedly introduced
to the land.24 Thus, the trial court held that respondent’s
claim of ownership was supported solely by her tax
declarations and tax payment receipts which, by themselves,
are not conclusive proof of ownership.25
In contrast, the trial court duly verified during the ocular
inspection the existence of the improvements introduced by
petitioner and his predecessors on the subject property.26
Moreover, the trial court observed that the witnesses for the
petitioner all lived continuously since their births within or
near Sitio Camambaey in Tapapan and that they knew the
land very well. They knew petitioner and his predecessors, as
well as the improvements introduced by them to the land.
Thus, the trial court found that the petitioner presented
overwhelming proof of actual, open, continuous and
physical possession of the property since time immemorial.
Petitioner’s possession, coupled with his tax declarations, is
strong evidence of ownership which convinced the court of
his better right to the property.27
For purposes of clarity, we cite the dispositive portion of the
trial court’s Decision thus:
Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the defendant Modesto Palali and
against the plaintiff Juliet C. Awisan, represented by her
Attorney-in-Fact, Gregorio B. Awisan, as follows:
a) Ordering the dismissal of the complaint and costs against
the plaintiff;
b) Adjudging the defendant Modesto Palali as the owner and
lawful possessor of the subject property; and
c) The court cannot however grant the counterclaim of
defendant for lack of evidence to prove the same.
SO ORDERED.28
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Respondent appealed the trial court’s decision to the CA,
which reversed the same. The CA found that petitioner failed
to prove actual possession of the entire 6.6698 hectare land,
which the CA believed to be the subject of the case.
According to the appellate court, petitioner was only able to
prove actual occupation of the portion where his house was
located and the area below where he had planted fruit-
bearing plants.29
The CA also ruled that based on the ocular inspection report
of the trial
court, petitioner’s possession did not extend to the entire
6.6698 hectares. In its own words:
Likewise, the report on the ocular inspection of the land in
question divulges that the alleged possession of the land by
[petitioner] Modesto Palali does not extend to the entire
6.6698 hectares of the subject land. Not even in the sketch
plan of the land does it illustrate that the possession of the
[petitioner] refers to the entire subject land. Instead, the
possession of [petitioner] merely points to certain portions
of the subject land as drawn and prepared by the tax
mappers.
From the foregoing testimony, no sufficient indicia could be
inferred that the possession of the [petitioner] refers to the
entire portion of the land.30
The appellate court also refused to give credence to
petitioner’s tax declaration. The CA held that petitioner’s Tax
Declaration No. 31793, which covers only an 848-square
meter property, is incongruous with his purported claim of
ownership over the entire 6.6698-hectare land.
Proceeding from this premise, the CA gave greater weight to
the documentary and testimonial evidence of respondent.
The presumption of regularity was given to the public
documents from which respondent traced her title to the
subject property.
Thus, the CA awarded the entire 6.6698-hectare property to
respondent and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s tax
declaration (except for the 200-square meter residential lot
thereof which was not being claimed by respondent).31
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the unfavorable
Decision, but his motion was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
Preliminary Matter
The CA Decision is based on a mistaken understanding of the
subject property
It is apparent that the CA Decision proceeded from an
erroneous understanding of what the subject property
actually is and what the trial court actually ruled upon. The
CA was under the mistaken impression that the subject
property was the entire 6.6698 hectares of land allegedly
owned by respondent under her Tax Declaration No. 147.
Because of this, the CA ruled against petitioner on the
ground that he failed to prove possession of the entire
6.6698 hectares. The CA also disregarded petitioner’s Tax
Declaration No. 31793 (despite being coupled with actual
possession) because the said tax declaration covered only an
848-square meter property and did not cover the entire
6.6698 hectare property. This is clear from the following text
lifted from the CA Decision:
The trial court’s finding that the defendant-appellee had
acquired the subject land by virtue of acquisitive prescription
cannot be countenanced. At the outset, the subject land
being claimed by the plaintiff-appellant as described in the
complaint is the 6.6698 hectares land [boundaries omitted].
The said description is with the exclusion of the portion of
land where the residential house of the defendant-appellee
is erected. However, the adverse and exclusive possession
offered by the defendant-appellee, which includes his tax
receipt, does not refer to the entire land consisting of 6.6698
hectares being claimed by the plaintiff-appellant. x x x The
witnesses for the defendant-appellee testified that indeed
Modesto Palali’s predecessors-in-interest have once built a
house in Camambaey, Tapapan, Bauko, Mt. Province, but
whether or not the defendant-appellee or his predecessor-
in-interest have actually, exclusively, notoriously, and
adversely possessed the entire 6.6698 hectares of land
could not be deduced from their testimonies. It could be
gleaned from the testimony of Consigno Saligen, that what
the defendant-appellee actually possessed and claim as their
own is merely that portion where the house is erected and
that portion of land below the house where Modesto Palali
planted fruit-bearing plants. x x x
Likewise, the report on ocular inspection of the land in
question divulges that the alleged possession of the land by
defendant-appellee Modesto Palali does not extend to the
entire 6.6698 hectares of the subject land. Not even in the
sketch plan of the land does it illustrate that the possession
of the defendant-appellee refers to the entire subject land.
Instead, the possession of the defendant-appellee merely
points to certain portions of the subject land as drawn and
prepared by the "tax mappers".
From the foregoing testimony, no sufficient indicia could be
inferred that the possession of the defendant-appellee
refers to the entire portion of the land.32
This was perhaps not entirely the appellate court’s fault,
because a reading of the issues presented by respondent to
the CA gives the wrong impression that the subject property
is the entire 6.6698 hectares:
x x x [T]he plaintiff-appellant elevated the matter on appeal
assigning the following errors committed by the trial court:
I
The trial court erred in failing to consider the overwhelming
superior documentary and oral evidence of the plaintiff
Juliet C. Awisan showing her ownership on (sic) the land in
question consisting of 6.6698 hectares described in her
complaint
II
The trial court erred in adjudicating the land in question to
the defendant Modesto Palali who is a squatter on the land
whose tax declaration merely overlapped or duplicated that
of the plaintiff and which covered only a small portion of 200
square meters of residential portion [sic] and 648 square
meter of rootcrop land.
x x x x33
The foregoing formulation of the issues presented by
respondent before the CA erroneously described "the land
in question" as "consisting of 6.6698 hectares" and
erroneously stated that the trial court "adjudicated the land
in question to [petitioner]". Said formulation is very
misleading because the case before the trial court did not
involve the ownership of the entire 6.6698 hectares, but
merely the northern portion thereof – the property actually
occupied by petitioner and much smaller than 6.6698
hectares. Even if we go back to the respondent’s complaint,
we would find there that respondent is claiming
encroachment merely of the "northern portion" of her
6.6698-hectare property, and not of the entire 6.6698
property.34
Neither did the trial court adjudicate to petitioner the entire
6.6698-hectare land; it simply upheld petitioner’s right to
the property he is actually occupying. It only declared
petitioner as the lawful owner and possessor of the "subject
property", which is the property to the north of the 6.6698-
hectare land and occupied by petitioner. This is evident from
the trial court’s summary of the facts established by the
respondent and her witnesses, to wit:
During the hearing of the case, plaintiff and her witnesses
established and disclosed: x x x that only a portion of the
entire 6.6 hectares in its northern portion located below and
above the residential house of the defendant Modesto Palali
is now the land in question as properly shown in the sketch
of the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 147 in the name
of Juliet Awisan x x x.35
Proceeding from a wrong premise as to what is the subject
property, the CA utterly failed to appreciate the evidence as
they relate to the parties’ claims. Thus, while the general rule
is that this Court is not a trier of facts, and that in a petition
for review under Rule 45, only questions of law may be
raised, the Court is behooved to admit the instant case as an
exception.36
Issue
The issue in this case is who between the parties has the
better right to the subject property.
Our Ruling
Having gone over the parties’ evidence before the trial court,
we find adequate support for the trial court’s ruling in favor
of petitioner. The CA erred in reversing the trial court’s
findings, particularly because, as discussed above, such
reversal was premised on the CA’s erroneous understanding
of the subject property.
As found by the trial court, petitioner was able to prove his
and his predecessors’ actual, open, continuous and physical
possession of the subject property dating at least to the pre-
war era (aside from petitioner’s tax declaration over the
subject property). Petitioner’s witnesses were long time
residents of Sitio Camambaey. They lived on the land, knew
their neighbors and were familiar with the terrain. They were
witnesses to the introduction of improvements made by
petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest.
From their consistent, unwavering, and candid testimonies,
we find that petitioner’s grandfather Mocnangan occupied
the land during the pre-war era. He planted camote on the
property because this was the staple food at that time. He
then gave the subject property to his daughter Tammam,
while he gave a separate one to his son Pacolan Mocnangan.
In the 1960s, Tammam and her husband Palalag cultivated
the land, built a cogon home, and started a family there.
Palalag introduced terraces and, together with his sons, built
earth fences around the property. Palalag’s family initially
planted bananas, coffee, and oranges; they later added
avocadoes, persimmons, and pineapples. When Tammam
and Palalag died, their son, petitioner herein, buried them in
the subject property and continued cultivating the land. He
also constructed a new home.
On the other hand, respondent relied merely on her tax
declaration, but failed to prove actual possession insofar as
the subject property is concerned. To be sure, respondent
attempted to prove possession of the subject property. Her
predecessor-in-interest, Cadwising, had allegedly introduced
improvements like a piggery, poultry, terracing, plantings,
and a barbed wire fence. However, not one of these alleged
improvements was found during the ocular inspection
conducted by the trial court. The absence of all his alleged
improvements on the property is suspicious in light of his
assertion that he has a caretaker living near the subject
property for 20 years. Cadwising did not even bother to
explain the absence of the improvements. The trial court’s
rejection of Cadwising’s assertions regarding the
introduction of improvements is therefore not
baseless.1avvphi1
Thus, respondent having failed to prove possession, her
claim rests solely on her tax declaration. But tax
declarations, by themselves, are not conclusive evidence of
ownership of real property. In the absence of actual, public,
and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax
purposes does not prove ownership.37 Respondent’s tax
declaration, therefore, cannot serve as basis to oust
petitioner who has been in possession (by himself and his
predecessors) of the subject property since before the war.
Neither can respondent rely on the public instruments
dealing with the 6.6698-hectare property covered by her tax
declaration. Such public documents merely show the
successive transfers of the property covered by said
documents. They do not conclusively prove that the
transferor actually owns the property purportedly being
transferred, especially as far as third parties are concerned.
For it may very well be that the transferor does not actually
own the property he has transferred, in which case he
transfers no better right to his transferee. No one can give
what he does not have – nemo dat quod non habet.38 Thus,
since respondent’s predecessor-in-interest Cadwising
appeared not to have any right to the subject property, he
transferred no better right to his transferees, including
respondent.
All told, we hold that as between the petitioner and the
respondent, it is the petitioner who has the better claim or
title to the subject property. While the respondent merely
relied on her tax declaration, petitioner was able to prove
actual possession of the subject property coupled with his
tax declaration. We have ruled in several cases that
possession, when coupled with a tax declaration, is a
weighty evidence of ownership.39 It certainly is more
weighty and preponderant than a tax declaration alone.
The preponderance of evidence is therefore clearly in favor
of petitioner, particularly considering that, as the actual
possessor under claim of ownership, he enjoys the
presumption of ownership.40 Moreover, settled is the
principle that a party seeking to recover real property must
rely on the strength of her case rather than on the weakness
of the defense.41 The burden of proof rests on the party who
asserts the affirmative of an issue. For he who relies upon
the existence of a fact should be called upon to prove that
fact. Having failed to discharge her burden to prove her
affirmative allegations, we find that the trial court rightfully
dismissed respondent’s complaint.
A final note. Like the trial court, we make no ruling regarding
the southern portion of the property (or Lot 3, as referred to
by the parties), because this property was not included in
respondent’s complaint. Although the Rules of Court
provide that "when issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, they
shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in
the pleadings,"42 such rule does not apply here. Respondent
objected43 when petitioner tried to prove his ownership of
Lot 3 on the ground of immateriality, arguing that ownership
of Lot 3 was not an issue. Respondent cannot now insist
otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 27,
2002 Decision as well as the April 25, 2003 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52942 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The May 24, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Bontoc, Mountain Province, Branch 35 is
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.
kind of possession and effects
[G.R. NO. 177384 : December 8, 2009]
JOSEPHINE WEE, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
In land registration cases, the applicant has the burden to
show that he or she is the real and absolute owner in fee
simple of the land sought to be registered.1 It is also
important to bear in mind that one who seeks registration of
title must prove his or her claim with "well-nigh
incontrovertible" evidence.2 In this case, petitioner
miserably failed to show that she is the real and absolute
owner in fee simple of the land sought to be registered.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari3 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court are the April 28, 2006 Decision4 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) and its subsequent Resolution5
dated April 3, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 76519. Said Decision and
Resolution reversed and set aside the April 2, 2002
Judgment6 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay
City, Branch 18 and held that petitioner was not entitled to
the requested registration of title.
Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court
On December 22, 1994, petitioner filed an Application for
Registration of Title7 over a 4,870-square meter parcel of
land situated in Barangay Puting Kahoy, Silang, Cavite,
designated as Lot No. 8349 (Cadastral Lot. No. 452-D).
In brief, petitioner alleged in her application that she is the
owner in fee simple of the subject property by virtue of a
Deed of Absolute Sale8 dated February 1, 1993 executed by
Julian Gonzales in her favor. Petitioner claimed the benefits
of the Property Registration Decree9 or, should said Decree
be inapplicable, the benefits of Chapter VIII of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (1936),10 because she and her
predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
public, peaceful and adverse possession of the land since
time immemorial.
On March 15, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its
Opposition11 alleging that neither the petitioner nor her
predecessor-in-interest has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of Lot
No. 8349 since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. The OSG
likewise averred that the muniments of title and tax
payment receipts submitted by the petitioner do not
constitute competent or sufficient evidence of a bona fide
acquisition of the subject lot, or of the petitioner's open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation thereof in the concept of owner since June 12,
1945 or prior thereto. It asserted that Lot No. 8349 is part of
the public domain and consequently prayed for the dismissal
of the application for registration.
Petitioner presented the following pieces of documentary
evidence before the trial court:
1) Deed of Absolute Sale between Josephine Wee and Julian
Gonzales dated February 1, 1993;12
2) Tax Declarations in the name of Julian Gonzales for the
years 1957, 1961, 1967, 1980, and 1985;13
3) Tax Declarations in the name of Josephine Wee from 1993
onwards;14
4) Receipts for tax payments made by Josephine Wee from
1993-1999;15
5) Affidavit of Seller-Transferor executed by Julian Gonzales
on February 10, 1993;16
6) Affidavit of Ownership, Aggregate Land Holding and Non-
Tenancy executed by Julian Gonzales on February 10, 1993;17
7) Affidavit of Non-Tenancy executed by Julian Gonzales on
February 10, 1993;18
8) Salaysay executed by Juana Macatangay Gonzales, Erlinda
Gonzales Batingal and Remedios Gonzales Bayan;19
9) Certification dated March 2, 2000 by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) stating that Lot
No. 8349 was shown to be within the Alienable or Disposable
Land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under
FAO-4-1656 on March 15, 1982;20
10) Survey Plan of Lot No. 8349;21 and
11) Surveyor's Certificate, Technical Description and Tracing
Cloth.22
She also presented the testimonies of the following
witnesses who were all cross-examined by the Republic
through the public prosecutor:
1) Josephine Wee, who testified that she purchased Lot No.
8349 from Julian Gonzales through a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated February 1, 1993 and immediately took possession
thereof after the sale; that she did not cultivate it because it
is planted with coffee; that she paid for all the real property
taxes subsequent to the sale; that she caused the
preparation of a survey plan; that the property is not part of
the public domain or any river or military reservation; that
there are no adverse claimants and no cases were filed
against her after the sale involving said lot and that she is not
doing anything with the property because it is not
"productive".23
2) Juana Gonzales, the 75-year old widow of Julian Gonzales,
who declared that she and her husband sold Lot No. 8349 to
the petitioner and identified her husband's signature and her
own thumbmark. She testified that she and her late husband
had been in possession of Lot No. 8349 prior to the sale to
Josephine Wee; that her husband inherited the property
from his parents "a long time ago"; that her husband already
had the property when they got married and that she and
Julian Gonzales began living together in 1946. She also
identified and affirmed the due execution and authenticity
of her Salaysay, as well as the documents signed by her
husband.24
3) Remedios Gonzales Bayan, the 39-year old daughter of
Julian and Juana Gonzales, who testified that she witnessed
the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale between her
father whose signature she identified and the applicant in
February 1993. She also identified and affirmed the due
execution and authenticity of her Salaysay.25
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On April 2, 2002, the RTC promulgated in favor of the
petitioner a Judgment,26 pertinent portions of which read:
Culled from the evidence on record, both testimonial and
documentary, are facts which satisfactorily establish
applicant's ownership in fee simple of the parcel of land,
subject matter of the instant proceedings, to wit: that by
means of an appropriate deed of sale, the applicant has
acquired said property by purchase from Julian Gonzales on
February 1, 1993; that the same parcel was declared for
taxation purposes; that all the realty taxes due thereon have
been duly paid. Likewise, this Court could well-discern from
the survey plan covering the same property and other
documents presented, more particularly the tracing cloth
plan which was presented as additional evidence in support
of the application, that the land sought to be registered is
agricultural and not within any forest zone or the public
domain; that the land is not covered by any public land
application/patent, and that there is no other adverse
claimant thereof; and further, that tacking her predecessors-
in-interest's possession to applicant's, the latter appears to
be in continuous and public possession thereof for more
than thirty (30) years.
On the basis of the foregoing facts and considering that
applicant is a Filipino citizen not otherwise disqualified from
owning real property, this Court finds that she has satisfied
all the conditions essential to the grant of her application
pursuant to the provisions of the Land Registration Law, as
amended.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for
registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141,
Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property
Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Ap-04-010262,
Lot 8349 and containing an area of Four Thousand Eight
Hundred Seventy (4,870) Square Meters as supported by its
technical description now forming part of the record of this
case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of
JOSEPHINE WEE, who is of legal age, single and with
residence at 1345 Claro M. Recto Avenue, Sta, Cruz, Manila.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the
corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
Unsatisfied, the Republic, through the OSG, filed its Notice
of Appeal on April 26, 2002, alleging that the RTC erred in
granting the application for registration considering that
petitioner failed to comply with all the legal requirements for
judicial confirmation of her alleged title. In particular, the
OSG claimed that Lot No. 8349 was classified as alienable
and disposable land only on March 15, 1982, as per
Certification issued by the DENR. Thus, petitioner and her
predecessor-in-interest could not have been in possession of
the property since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The OSG also
pointed out that the tax declarations presented by
petitioner are fairly recent and do not show petitioner and
her predecessor-in-interest's nature of possession.
Furthermore, the original tracing cloth plan was not
presented in evidence.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA reversed the RTC Judgment. It held that petitioner
failed to prove that she and her predecessor-in-interest have
been in possession and occupation of the subject lot under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945. Thus:
In granting the application for registration of title, the court
a quo merely relied on the deed of sale executed by Julian
Gonzales, in favor of applicant-appellee on February 1, 1993,
the tax declarations and tax receipts. It is interesting to note
that Juana Gonzales, widow of Julian Gonzales, after
identifying the deed of sale executed by her deceased
husband in favor of applicant-appellee, merely stated that
the lot subject thereof was inherited by Julian from his
parents a long time ago and that Julian was in possession of
the lot since 1946 when they started living together. For her
part, applicant-appellee testified that she immediately took
possession of the subject lot, which was planted with coffee,
after acquiring the same and that she is not doing anything
on the lot because it is not productive. As pointed out by the
Republic, applicant-appellee and Juana Gonzales failed to
specify what acts of development, cultivation, and
maintenance were done by them on the subject lot. x x x
xxx
In the case at bar, applicant-appellee merely claimed that the
subject lot is planted with coffee. However, no evidence was
presented by her as to who planted the coffee trees thereon.
In fact, applicant-appellee admitted that she is not doing
anything on the subject lot because it is not productive,
thereby implying that she is not taking care of the coffee
trees thereon. Moreover, tax declarations and tax receipts
are not conclusive evidence of ownership but are merely
indicia of a claim of ownership, aside from the fact that the
same are of recent vintage.27
Hence, this petition.
Issues
Petitioner's arguments
1) The testimony of Juana Gonzales proves that petitioner's
predecessor-in-interest, Julian Gonzales, occupied Lot No.
8349 even prior to 1946;
2) The fact that the property is planted with coffee, a fruit
bearing tree, reveals that the lot is planted, cultivated and
cared for. Thus, there was not only effective and active
possession and occupation but actual cultivation and
tending of the coffee plantation; andcralawlibrary
3) The fact that the land was declared for tax purposes as
early as 1957 shows that the land was actively possessed and
occupied by petitioner and her predecessor-in-interest.
Respondent's arguments:
1) Since Lot No. 8349 became part of the alienable and
disposable land only on March 15, 1982, petitioner could not
have been considered as having been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership;
andcralawlibrary
2) There is no proof that petitioner or Julian Gonzales
undertook any clear act of dominion or ownership over Lot
No. 8349, since there are no structures, improvements, or
plantings on the property.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioner failed to prove open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the subject property.
In Director, Land Management Bureau v. Court of Appeals,28
we explained that -
x x x The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public,
peaceful and in concept of owner," by which characteristics
private respondent describes his possession and that of his
parents, are mere conclusions of law requiring evidentiary
support and substantiation. The burden of proof is on the
private respondent, as applicant, to prove by clear, positive
and convincing evidence that the alleged possession of his
parents was of the nature and duration required by law. His
bare allegations without more, do not amount to
preponderant evidence that would shift the burden of proof
to the oppositor.
Here, we find that petitioner's possession of the lot has not
been of the character and length of time required by law.
The relevant provision of the Property Registration Decree
relied upon by petitioner reads'
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws. x x x
Unfortunately, petitioner failed to prove that she and her
predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945.
First, there is nothing in the records which would
substantiate her claim that Julian Gonzales was in
possession of Lot No. 8349 since 1945, other than the bare
allegations of Juana Gonzales.29 Certainly, these
unsubstantiated statements do not meet the required
quantum of evidence in land registration cases. In fact,
contrary to her testimony that her late husband inherited the
property from his parents "a long time ago", or even prior to
1945, the earliest tax declaration that was presented in this
case is one declared by Julian Gonzales only in 1957 - long
after June 1945.
It bears stressing that petitioner presented only five tax
declarations (for the years 1957, 1961, 1967, 1980 and 1985)
for a claimed possession and occupation of more than 45
years (1945-1993). This type of intermittent and sporadic
assertion of alleged ownership does not prove open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation. In any event, in the absence of other competent
evidence, tax declarations do not conclusively establish
either possession or declarant's right to registration of
title.30
Petitioner failed to prove possession in the concept of an
owner.
Second, and more importantly, we agree with the CA that
petitioner was unable to demonstrate that the alleged
possession was in the concept of an owner, since she could
not point to any acts of occupation, development,
cultivation or maintenance over the property. Petitioner
claims that because the property is planted with coffee, a
fruit-bearing tree, it automatically follows that the lot is
cultivated, showing actual possession and occupation.
However, petitioner failed to explain who planted the
coffee, whether these plants are maintained or harvested or
if any other acts were undertaken by petitioner or her
predecessor-in-interest to cultivate the property.
Even if we were to assume that the coffee was planted by
petitioner's predecessor-in-interest, "mere casual
cultivation" of the land does not amount to exclusive and
notorious possession that would give rise to ownership.31
The presence of an unspecified number of coffee plants,
without proof that petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest
actually and deliberately cultivated them is not sufficient to
support a claim of title. In fact, the five tax declarations in
the name of Julian Gonzales described the lot as "unirrigated
riceland". No improvements or plantings were declared or
noted in any of these tax declarations. It was only in
petitioner's 1993 tax declaration that the land was described
as planted with coffee. We are, therefore, constrained to
conclude that the mere existence of an unspecified number
of coffee plants, sans any evidence as to who planted them,
when they were planted, whether cultivation or harvesting
was made or what other acts of occupation and ownership
were undertaken, is not sufficient to demonstrate
petitioner's right to the registration of title in her favor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals'
April 28, 2006 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 76519 and its
Resolution dated April 3, 2007 denying petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration are both AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Easement
[G.R. No. L-14652. June 30, 1960.]
JUAN GARGANTOS, Petitioner, v. TAN YANON and THE
COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
EASEMENT OF LIGHT AND VIEW; TWO ADJOINING ESTATES
FORMERLY OWNED BY ONE PERSON; WHEN EXISTENCE OF
DOORS AND WINDOWS IS EQUIVALENT TO A TITLE. —
Where two adjoining estates were formerly owned by just
one person who introduced improvements on both such
that the wall of the house constructed on the first estate
extends to the wall of the camarin on the second estate; and
at the time of the sale of the first estate, there existed on the
aforementioned wall of the house, doors and windows
which serve as passages for light and view, there being no
provision in the deed of sale that the easement of light and
view will not be established, the same is covered by Article
624, New Civil code, which provides that the existence of an
apparent sign of easement between two estates established
by the proprietor of both, shall be considered, if one of them
is alienated, as a title so that easement will continue actively
and passively, unless at the time the ownership of the estate
is divided, the contrary is stated in the deed of alienation of
either of them, or the sign is made to disappear before the
instrument is executed. The existence of doors and windows
on the aforesaid wall of the house is equivalent to a title, for
the visible and permanent sign of an easement is the title
that characterizes its existence. But while the law declares
that the easement is to "continue", the easement actually
arises for the first time only upon alienation of either estate,
inasmuch as before that time there is no easement to speak
of, there being but one owner of both estates (Article 613,
N.C.C.) .
Juan Gargantos appeals by certiorari from the decision of the
Court of Appeals reversing the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Romblon.
The record discloses that the late Francisco Sanz was the
former owner of a parcel of land containing 888 square
meters, with the buildings and improvements thereon,
situated in the poblacion of Romblon. He subdivided the lot
into three and then sold each portion to different persons.
One portion was purchased by Guillermo Tengtio who
subsequently sold it to Vicente Uy Veza. Another portion,
with the house of strong materials thereon, was sold in 1927
to Tan Yanon, respondent herein. This house has on its
northeastern side, doors and windows overlooking the third
portion, which, together with the camarin and small building
thereon, after passing through several hands, was finally
acquired by Juan Gargantos, petitioner herein.
On April 23, 1955, Gargantos applied to the Municipal Mayor
of Romblon for a permit to demolish the roofing of the old
camarin. The permit having been granted, Gargantos tore
down the roof of the camarin. On May 11, 1955, Gargantos
asked the Municipal Council of Romblon for another permit,
this time in order to construct a combined residential house
and warehouse on his lot. Tan Yanon opposed approval of
this application.
Because both the provincial fiscal and district engineer of
Romblon recommended granting of the building permit to
Gargantos, Tan Yanon filed against Gargantos an action to
restrain him from constructing a building that would prevent
plaintiff from receiving light and enjoying the view through
the windows of his house, unless such building is erected at
a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary
line between the lots of plaintiff and defendant, and to
enjoin the members of the Municipal Council of Romblon
from issuing the corresponding building permit to
defendants. The case as against the members of the
Municipal Council was subsequently dismissed with
concurrence of plaintiff’s council. After trial, the Court of
First Instance of Romblon rendered judgment dismissing the
complaint and ordering plaintiff to pay defendant the sum of
P12,500.00 by way of compensatory, exemplary, moral and
moderate damages.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Romblon and enjoined defendant
from constructing his building unless "he erects the same at
a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary
line of his property, in conformity with Article 673 of the New
Civil Code."cralaw virtua1aw library
So Juan Gargantos filed this petition for review of the
appellate Court’s decision. The focal issue herein is whether
the property of respondent Tan Yanon has an easement of
light and view against the property of petitioner Gargantos.
The kernel of petitioner’s argument is that respondent never
acquired any easement either by title or by prescription.
Assuredly, there is no deed establishing an easement.
Likewise, neither petitioner nor his predecessors-in-interest
have ever executed any deed whereby they recognized the
existence of the easement, nor has there been final
judgment to that effect. Invoking our decision in Cortes v.
Yu-Tibo (2 Phil., 24), petitioner maintains that respondent
has not acquired an easement by prescription because he
has never formally forbidden petitioner from performing any
act which would be lawful without the easement, hence the
prescriptive period never started.
It is obvious, however, that Article 538, O.C.C. (now Article
621, N.C.C.) and the doctrine in the Yu-Tibo case are not
applicable herein because the two estates, that now owned
by petitioner, and that owned by respondent, were formerly
owned by just one person, Francisco Sanz. It was Sanz who
introduced improvements on both properties. On that
portion presently belonging to respondent, he constructed
a house in such a way that the northeastern side thereof
extends to the wall of the camarin on the portion now
belonging to petitioner. On said northeastern side of the
house, there are windows and doors which serve as
passages for light and view. These windows and doors were
in existence when respondent purchased the house and lot
from Sanz. The deed of sale did not provide that the
easement of light and view would not be established. This
then is precisely the case covered by Article 541, O.C.C. (now
Article 624, N.C.C.) which provides that the existence of an
apparent sign of easement between two estates,
established by the proprietor of both, shall be considered, if
one of them is alienated, as a title so that the easement will
continue actively and passively, unless at the time the
ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary is
stated in the deed of alienation of either of them, or the sign
is made to disappear before the instrument is executed. The
existence of the doors and windows on the northeastern
side of the aforementioned house, is equivalent to a title, for
the visible and permanent sign of an easement is the title
that characterizes its existence (Amor v. Florentino, 74 Phil.,
403). It should be noted, however, that while the law
declares that the easement is to "continue" the easement
actually arises for the first time only upon alienation of either
estate, inasmuch as before that time there is no easement to
speak of, there being but one owner of both estates (Article
530, O.C.C., now Article 613, N.C.C.) .
We find that respondent Tan Yanon’s property has an
easement of light and view against petitioner’s property. By
reason of this easement, petitioner cannot construct on his
land any building unless he erects it at a distance of not less
than three meters from the boundary line separating the
two estates.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed with
costs against petitioner.
Donation
G.R. No. 188666
SPOUSES JUAN and ANTONINA CANO, ROLANDO CANO and
JOSEPHINE "JOSIE" CANOAQUINO, Petitioners
vs.
SPOUSES ARTURO and EMERENCIANA CANO, Respondents
These consolidated Petitions for Review involve a dispute
over possession and ownership of a parcel of land located in
the Barrio of Palaming, City of San Carlos, Pangasinan.
Petitioners Juan and Antonina Cano anchor their claim upon
a donation propternuptias allegedly made by Feliza1 Baun in
their favor in 1962. Respondents Arturo and Emerenciana
Cano, on the other hand, claim that they purchased the land
from Feliza in 1982 and caused the annotation of the Deed of
Absolute Sale on the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
62276 covering the property.
The Petition in G.R. No. 188666 assails the Decision2 and the
Resolution3 of the Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 104200, which affirmed the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Resolution4 ordering petitioners to vacate
the property and surrender possession thereof to
respondents. Meanwhile, the Petition in G.R. No. 190750
questions the CA Decision5 and the Resolution,6 which
affirmed the RTC Decision7 confirming respondents'
ownership of the property. The factual background and the
proceedings held in each case will be discussed in turn.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
G.R. No. 188666
(Ejectment Case)
On 16 November 1999, respondents filed a Complaint for
Ejectment with Prayer for Injunction8 against petitioners on
the basis of a Deed of Absolute Sale9 executed in the
former's favor by Feliza, the registered owner of the
property. Immediately after the sale, respondents allegedly
(1) took possession of the land;10 (2) employed a relative to
act as caretaker thereof;11 and (3) received the fruit of the
mango trees planted thereon.12
Respondents also asserted that they benevolently allowed
petitioners to take actual possession of the property after
the sale because the parties were all blood relatives.13 This
peaceful arrangement continued until 3 October 1999, the
day petitioners allegedly harassed and threw stones at the
individuals hired by respondents to spray the mango trees
with chemical fruit inducers.14 This act of ingratitude
supposedly prompted respondents to send petitioners a
demand letter to vacate the property.15
Because the demand to vacate went unheeded,
respondents filed an ejectment complaint before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of San Carlos City,
Pangasinan.16 They prayed for (a) an order directing
petitioners to vacate the property and pay moral damages
and attorney’s fees to the former;17 and (b) an injunction to
restrain petitioners from performing acts that would disturb
or harass respondents or the latter's agents in violation of
their right of ownership and possession over the property.18
In an Answer with Affirmative and/or Special Defenses and
Counterclaim,19 petitioners denied the allegations in the
Complaint. They claimed ownership of the property on the
basis of (l) a donation propternuptias20 executed in their
favor by Feliza on 30 May 1962; and (2) their continuous
possession of the land since they were born, or for more
than 63 years at the time of the filing of the suit for
ejectment.21 They also asserted that the Deed of Absolute
Sale cited by respondents was a falsified instrument.22
The MTCC Ruling
In a Decision23 dated 21 February 2000, the MTCC dismissed
the Complaint for lack of merit. Citing an Ocular Inspection
Report submitted by the sheriff who investigated the
disputed property, the court noted that three semi-concrete
houses owned by petitioners, as well as several mango trees,
were standing on the land. These improvements were
considered as evidence of laches on the part of respondents
and justified the dismissal of the Complaint:
Plaintiffs[’] failure to raise a restraining arm to the
defendants’ introduction of several improvements on the
disputed property in a span of almost eighteen (18) years is
simply contrary to their claim of ownership.
Thus, the plaintiffs[’] long inaction or passivity in asserting
their alleged rights over the disputed property will preclude
them from recovering the same under the equitable
principle of laches.
xxxx
If, indeed the plaintiffs are very assertive of their claim of
ownership over the disputed property, they should have
filed a judicial action for recovery of possession or ejectment
before or at the time of the construction of two (2)
additional houses of defendant Juan Cano's children, namely
defendants Rolando Cano and Josie Aquino, and NOT merely
paying realty taxes and securing Tax Declarations, only on
December 22, 1999 considering that tax receipts and tax
declarations are only prima facie evidence of ownership and
possession (Heirs of Leopoldo Vencilao, Sr., et al. vs. CA, April
1, 1998).24
As to the issue of ownership, the MTCC ruled in favor of
petitioners. It upheld the validity of the donation propter
nuptias in view of the absence of a declaration by a proper
forum that the instrument was null and void25 and the lack
of evidence that Feliza was indeed incapable of signing her
name on the instrument of donation.26
The following circumstances were likewise deemed
consistent with the claim of ownership by petitioners: (a)
their payment of realty taxes on the property; (b) the
continued registration of the title to the property in the
name of their mother, Feliza; and (c) the execution of the
donation propter nuptiasprior to the Deed of Sale.27
The RTC Ruling
While the RTC initially affirmed the MTCC Decision and
considered the claim of respondents barred by laches,28 it
subsequently reversed its own ruling. In a Resolution dated
27 May 2008,29 the RTC declared respondents as the true
owners of the property on account of the registered Deed of
Absolute Sale in their favor. This instrument was considered
as evidence of a preferred right as against petitioners' claim
based on an unregistered donation propternuptias:
The Court notes that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed in
favor of plaintiffs-appellants over the portion pertaining to
Felisa Baun is registered on the title itself. This registration is
proof of their ownership over the land, the purpose of which
is to quiet title to land and to put a stop forever to any
question of the legality of the title. Not only that, the
annotation on the said title says that that portion pertaining
to the share of Felisa Baun is tenanted by plaintiff-
appellant[,] Arturo Cano. Clearly, plaintiff-appellant, before
and at the time he was ousted by the defendantsappellees,
was in possession of the property, first as a tenant prior to
1982 and as the owner thereof from 1982 onwards.
Indeed, as provided under Section 51, 2nd paragraph, P.D.
1529, "the act of registration shall be the operative act to
convey or affect the [l]and insofar as third parties are
concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the
registration shall be made in the office of the Registrar of
Deeds for the province or city where the land lies." As
between the two transactions, the donation and the sale,
respectively, concerning the subject parcel of land in the
name of Felisa Baun, plaintiffs-appellants who have
registered the sale in their favor [have] a preferred right over
the defendants-appellees who have not registered their
title.30
The CA Ruling
On appeal,31 the CA upheld the RTC ruling and declared that
the registered transaction should prevail over the earlier
unregistered right:32
It is not contested that the property in question is a
registered land with Original Certificate of Title No. 62276. It
is also uncontested that the sale in favor of respondents
herein have been annotated on the title. On the other hand,
the purported Donation PropterNuptias in favor of
petitioners herein has not been annotated in the Title of the
property subject of this case.
xxxx
annotated in the title and the donation in favor of
petitioners, the effective and binding transfer is that covered
by the Deed of Sale.33
The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioners,34 prompting them to file the Petition for Review
in G.R. No 188666.35
Proceedings before the Court
Before this Court, petitioners contend that the non-
registration of the donation propternuptias in their favor
does not make their claim inferior to that of respondents.36
Citing Article 749 of the Civil Code, the petitioners argue that
donations of immovable property are considered valid so
long as these are made in a public document.37 They also
claim that registration does not vest ownership over any
particular property, but is merely an evidence of title
thereto.38 Moreover, registration was supposedly
unnecessary in this case, because respondents were
"manifestly aware of the petitioners' existing interest in the
property, albeit not registered,"39 as petitioners were in
possession of the property at the time it was allegedly
purchased.40
Petitioners also emphasize that the donation propternuptias
was executed by Feliza 20 years before the alleged
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale.41 Assuming that she
had agreed to the sale, this second transaction conveyed
nothing to respondents.42 Finally, petitioners assert that
even if the donation propternuptias is assumed to be invalid,
they still have a better right over the property as they have
already established their ownership by virtue of acquisitive
prescription.43
In their Comment,44 respondents deny the allegation that
they were aware of petitioners' claim over the property at
the time they purchased it.45 They also assert that after they
had purchased the lot, they had the Tax Declarations
transferred to their names, and that they henceforth paid
the realty taxes thereon up to the present.46 Respondents
likewise pray for the dismissal of the Petition for raising
factual issues that have already been resolved by the lower
courts.47
During the pendency of G.R. No. 188666, a second Petition
docketed as G.R. No. 190750 was filed before this Court. As
will be discussed, the second case involves the same
property and the same parties, but pertains specifically to
the issue of ownership.
G.R. No. 190750
(Quieting of Title Case)
The dispute in G.R. No. 190750 stemmed from a Complaint
for Quieting of Title, Declaration of Nullity of Document,
Ownership and Damages48 filed by petitioners with the RTC
of San Carlos City, Pangasinan.49 The suit was instituted
while the ejectment case in G.R. No. 188666 was pending.
In the Complaint, petitioners claimed absolute ownership
over the subject property citing the donation propternuptias
executed in their favor,50 as well as their possession of the
land since 1962. They further alleged that the quieting of title
was necessary, because respondents were claiming
ownership of the same lot on the basis of a spurious and
simulated deed of sale.
In their Sworn Answer,51 respondents sought the dismissal
of the Complaint on the following grounds: (1) failure to
comply with a condition precedent, i.e., the conduct of
barangay conciliation proceedings; (2) forum shopping; (3)
laches; (4) prescription; and (5) failure to state a cause of
action.52 They also asserted that the signature of Feliza on
the instrument of donation was spurious, considering that
she did not know how to write and could only affix her
thumbmark to legal documents.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision53 dated 27 May 2008, the RTC declared
respondents the rightful owners of the property.54 While
affirming the validity of both the donation propternuptias
made in favor of petitioners and the Deed of Absolute Sale
presented by respondents, the trial court declared that the
sale prevailed over the donation because of the operative
fact of registration.55 The RTC explained:
The formalities required by law having been established on
the two (2) documents (Donation Propter Nuptias for the
plaintiffs and Deed of Absolute Sale for the defendants), We
now proceed to determine which between these documents
prevails over the other. The Court finds the right of the
defendants superior over that of the plaintiffs.
Section 51, 2nd paragraph, P.D. 1529 provides, "the act of
registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the
land insofar as third persons are concerned and in all cases
under this Decree, the registration shal1 be made in the
office of the Registrar of Deeds for the province or city
where the land lies.
It is settled in this jurisdiction that the maxim "Prior est in
tempore. Potior est injure." (He who is first in time is
preferred in right) is observed in land registration matters.
As between the two transactions, the donation and the sale,
respectively, concerning the subject parcel of land in the
name of Felisa Baun, the defendants who have registered
the sale in their favor have a preferred right over the
plaintiffs have not registered their title, even if the latter are
in actual possession of the property involved.56
The RTC also noted that respondents presented sufficient
evidence to prove their possession of the property since
1982, while petitioners failed to submit proof in support of
the latter's claim of ownership and occupancy:
Moreover, as established by evidence, the house on which
plaintiffs stay was once the ancestral house of the family of
Felissa Baun. It was likewise the only house standing on the
land in question until the dispute between the parties arose
in 1999. The annotation on TCT no. 62276 in 1982 that
defendant Arturo Cano is the tenant of the subject parcel of
land would show that indeed it was defendant Arturo Cano
who possessed and took care of the land prior to the said
year until he purchased the same in 1982. Defendants, after
the sale[,] had declared the subject property for taxation
purposes in their names. Likewise, from 1982 up to 2005,
defendants religiously paid the realty tax due from (sic) the
subject property. Their possession however was disturbed in
1999, the year he was disallowed entry by the plaintiffs.
Aside from defendants' registered ownership over the
parcel of land in question, the tax declaration and annual tax
payments bolster the fact of their ownership of the subject
lot.
Plaintiffs on the other hand failed to present evidence that
indeed they are the legitimate owners of the subject parcel
of land. Except for their present possession of the subject
property, they and their children failed to present evidence
that the subject land and the improvements, particularly the
houses standing thereon, are declared in their names. They
also failed to present any documentary evidence to prove
payment of taxes due from the property.5
On the basis of its determination that respondents were the
rightful owners of the property, the RTC declared that they
had the right to possess it.58 Moreover, since petitioners
were staying on the property by the mere tolerance of the
real owners, the trial court ruled that it was incumbent upon
them to vacate the land59 and to pay respondents for actual
damages caused by the dispossession.60
The CA Ruling
Petitioners sought the reversal of the RTC Decision, but the
CA dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.61 The appellate
court agreed with the trial court's ruling that respondents
were the rightful owners of the property, albeit on a
different ground; that is, the invalidity of the donation
propternuptias executed by Feliza in their favor:
The document captioned as Donation Property Nuptias does
not show that plaintiffs-appellants, as the donees, accepted
the subject parcel of land as a gift from the donor. Neither
have the plaintiffs-appellants presented any other document
that would evidence such acceptance and notification to the
donor. Hence, it is our considered view that the ownership
over the subject parcel of land did not pass to plaintiffs-
appellants by reason of their failure to accept the donation
as required by law. And, by necessary consequence,
considering that Felisa retained the ownership over the
subject parcel of land, she can validly sell the same, as she
did in 1982, in favor of defendants-appellees.62 (Emphases
omitted)
The CA also emphasized that respondents were purchasers
in good faith, as there was nothing in OCT No. 62276 itself or
in the circumstances of the sale that could have warned
them that the property was being claimed by others
[E]very person dealing with registered land may safely rely
on the correctness of its certificate of title and the law will
not oblige him to go beyond what appears on the face
thereof to determine the condition of the property. This rule
applies to defendants-appellees who are purchasers in good
faith of the subject parcel of land. There was nothing in TCT
No. 62276 or the circumstances surrounding the subject
parcel of land that could have warned or made them
suspicious that other persons have a claim over the land. At
the time they purchased the subject parcel of land in 1982,
the same remains covered by TCT No. 62276 in the name of
Felisa, and her co-owners, and the donation of the land by
Felisa to plaintiffs-appellants does not appear in said TCT.
Likewise, as the trial court found based on the evidence on
record, only the ancestral house of Felisa was standing on
the subject parcel of land at the time the latter sold it to
defendants-appellees. In view thereof, the reliance of
defendants-appellees on TCT No. 62276 when they
purchased the subject parcel of land is supported by law. We
also find no defect in the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Felisa and defendants-appellees, which effected the transfer
of ownership of the subject parcel of land from the fonner
to the latter.63
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Decision, but the
CA denied the motion in its Resolution dated 14 December
2009.6
Proceedings before this Court
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review before this Court65
seeking the reversal of the above CA Decision and
Resolution. They contend that the CA erred in declaring the
donation propternuptias invalid on the ground of lack of
acceptance by the donee. It allegedly made that declaration
even if the applicable provisions of the Civil Code did not
impose that requirement.66 They assert that since the
donation had been validly made, Feliza sold nothing to
respondents in 1982, as she had already divested herself of
ownership over that same property in 1962.67
The Comment68 filed by respondents on the Petition in G.R.
No. 190750 raises substantially the same arguments as those
found in their Comment in G.R. No. 188666
Consolidation of Case
Considering that the two Petitions involved identical parties
litigating over the same property, the two cases were
consolidated by the Court in a Resolution69 dated 17 March
2010. Petitioners were thereafter ordered to file a
consolidated reply to the Comments filed in both
petitions.70
In their Consolidated Reply,71 petitioners point out that the
two cases involve not only the issue of possession, but also
of ownership.72 Consequently, they argue that the findings
of the lower courts on possession were not controlling in
this case.73 They also reiterate their arguments on the
validity of the donation in their favor.74
ISSUES
The consolidated Petitions present the following issues for
resolution
(1) Whether the CA erred in nullifying the donation
propternuptias executed by Feliza in favor of petitioners
because of the absence of an express acceptance by the
donee
(2) Whether the CA erred in declaring that respondents are
the rightful owners of the property
(3) Whether the CA erred in awarding the possession of the
property to reepondents
OUR RULING
We DENY the Petitions.
While we disagree with certain pronouncements of the CA in
respect of the validity of donations propternuptias, we
affirm its ultimate conclusion that respondents are the
rightful owners of the property and are consequently
entitled to possession thereof.
Written acceptance and notification to
the donor are not required for
donations propter nuptias executed
under the Civil Code
Disposing of a preliminary matter, we clarify our position
with respect to the pronouncement of the CA in G.R. No.
190750 that the donation propternuptias executed in favor
of petitioners was invalid.
In the CA Decision affirming the RTC ruling in the action for
quieting of title, the appellate court invalidated the donation
propter nuptias because of petitioners' failure to comply
with the formal requirement of acceptance. The CA
explained
When applied to a donation of an immovable property, the
law further requires that the donation be made in a public
document and that the acceptance thereof be made in the
same deed or in a separate public instrument; in cases where
the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, it is
mandated that the donor be notified thereof in an authentic
form, to be noted in both instruments. The acceptance of
the donation by the donee is indispensable. Where the deed
of donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the
formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate
instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted
in the deed of donation and in the separate acceptance, the
donation is null and void.
The document captioned as Donation Propter Nuptias does
not show that plaintiffs-appellants, as the donees, accepted
the subject parcel of land as a gift from the donor. Neither
have plaintiffs-appellants presented any other document
that would evidence such acceptance and notification to the
donor. Hence, it is our considered view that the ownership
over the subject parcel of land did not pass to plaintiffs-
appellants by reason of their failure to accept the donation
as required by law. And, by necessary consequence,
considering that Felisa retained the ownership over the
subject parcel of land, she can validly sell the same, as she
did in 1982, in favor of defendants-appellees.75 (Emphases in
the original)
We note that petitioners do not deny that they never
accepted the donation in their favor. They insist, though,
that acceptance of the gift was not required, since the
donation propternuptias was executed on 30 May 1962, or
while the Civil Code was still in effect.76 Thus, they contend
that the CA erred in applying the ordinary rules of donation
to the instrument herein,77 when the applicable provisions
were in fact Articles 126 to 134 of the Civil Code
We agree with petitioners on this point.
It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the
execution of a contract are applicable thereto.78 The
donation propternuptias in this case was executed on 30
May 1962,79 while the provisions on such donations under
the Civil Code were still in force and before the Family Code
took effect on 3 August 1988.. The formal requisites for the
validity of the donation should therefore be determined in
accordance with the following provisions of the Civil Code:
ARTICLE 126. Donations by reason of marriage are those
which are made before its celebration, in consideration of
the same and in favor of one or both of the future spouses.
ARTICLE 127. These donations are governed by the rules on
ordinary donations established in Title III of Book III, except
as to their form which shall be regulated by the Statute of
Frauds; and insofar as they are not modified by the following
articles.
ARTICLE 129. Express acceptance is not necessary for the
validity of these donations.
In Valencia v. Locquiao,80 we explained the effect of these
Civil Code provisions on the formal requirements for
donations propternuptias
Unlike ordinary donations, donations propternuptias or
donations by reason of marriage are those "made before its
celebration, in consideration of the same and in favor of one
or both of the future spouses." The distinction is crucial
because the two classes of donations are not governed by
exactly the same rules, especially as regards the formal
essential requisites.
xxxx
Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article 127
thereof provides that the form of donations propternuptias
are [sic] regulated by the Statute of Frauds. Article 1403,
paragraph 2, which contains the Statute of Frauds requires
that the contracts mentioned thereunder need be in writing
only to be enforceable. However, as provided in Article 129,
express acceptance "is not necessary for the validity of these
donations." Thus, implied acceptance is sufficient.81
(Emphases supplied)
Given that this old rule governs this case, it is evident that
the CA erroneously invalidated the donation propternuptias
in favor of petitioners. The absence of proof that the gift was
accepted in a public instrument is not controlling, since
implied acceptance - such as the celebration of marriage and
the annotation of this fact in the OCT82 - must be deemed
sufficient.
We must clarify that the foregoing rule applies only to
donations propternuptias made prior to the Family Code (as
in this case). At the time, Article 129 of the Civil Code allowed
acceptance of those donations to be made impliedly. Since
that provision is no longer part of the current Family Code,
donations propternuptias made thereafter are now subject
to the rules on ordinary donations83 including those on the
formal requisites for validity. As a result, donations of
immovables under the Family Code, including those made by
reason of marriage, must now be expressly accepted by the
donee in a public instrument.84
The CA correctly ruled that
respondents are the rightful owners
of the property.
The validity of the donation propternuptias executed by
Feliza in favor of petitioners, however, does not detract from
our ultimate conclusion that respondents are the rightful
owners of the property. On this point, we agree with the CA
that the prior unregistered donation does not bind
respondents, who are innocent purchasers for value. Hence,
it correctly declared them the rightful owners of the subject
property.
The unregistered donation propter
nuptias does not bind third persons.
Pursuant to Article 709 of the Civil Code, all rights over
immovable property must be duly inscribed or annotated on
the Registry of Deeds before they can affect the rights of
third persons. The provision states:
Art. 709. The titles of ownership, or other rights over
immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or
annotated in the Registry of Property shall not prejudice
third persons.
The same rule is enunciated in Presidential Decree No. (P.D.)
1529, or the Property Registration Decree, specifically
Sections 51 and 52 thereof, which provide:
SECTION 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered
owner - x x x But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other
voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or
affect registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or
bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between
the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of
Deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey
or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, x x
x
SECTION 52. Constructive notice upon registration. Every
conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order,
judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land
shall, if registered, filed or entered in the office of the
Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to
which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons
from the time of such registering, filing or entering.
In Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, we explained the
significance of the foregoing provisions to unregistered
donations as follows:85
From the foregoing provisions, it may be inferred that as
between the parties to a donation of an i1nmovabk property,
all that is required is for said donation to be contained in a
public document. Registration is not necessary for it to be
considered valid and effective. However, in order to bind
third persons, the donation must be registered in the
Registry of Property (now Registry of Land Titles and
Deeds). Although the non-registration of a deed of donation
shall not affect its validity, the necessity of registration
comes into play when the rights of third persons are
affected, as in the case at bar.
xxxx
It is undisputed in this case that the donation executed by
Ignacio Gonzales in favor of his grandchildren, although in
writing and duly notarized, has not been registered in
accordance with law. For this reason, it shall not be binding
upon private respondents who did not participate in said
deed or had no actual knowledge thereof. Hence, while the
deed of donation is valid between the donor and the donees,
such deed, however, did not bind the tenants-farmers who
were not parties to the donation. As previously enunciated
by this Court, non-registration of a deed of donation does
not bind other parties ignorant of a previous transaction
(Sales vs. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 858 [1992)).86
(Emphases supplied)
In this case, petitioners do not deny that the donation
propternuptias was never registered. Applying the rule laid
down in Gonzales, the conveyance of the property in their
favor is not considered binding on third persons, who had no
participation in the deed or any actual knowledge thereof.87
The Court is convinced that respondents fall within the
scope of this rule.
The records of both the cases for ejectment and the quieting
of title are bereft of evidence of respondents' participation
in or actual knowledge of the deed. In fact, petitioners never
made that assertion in any of their submissions before the
courts. Instead, they focused on their claim that
respondents were aware of the former’s possession of the
property.88
We emphasize, however, that in order for prior unregistered
interest to affect third persons despite the absence of
registration, the law requires actual knowledge of that
interest. Nothing less would suffice. As we explained in
Pineda v. Arcalas,89 mere possession of the property is not
enough
True, that notwithstanding the preference given to a
registered lien, this Court has made an exception in a case
where a party has actual knowledge of the claimant’s actual,
open, and notorious possession of the disputed property at
the time the levy or attachment was registered. In such
situations, the actual notice and knowledge of a prior
unregistered interest, not the mere possession of the
disputed property, was held to be equivalent to registration.
Lamentably, in this case, Pineda did not even allege, much
less prove, that Arcalas had actual knowledge of her claim of
ownership and possession of the property at the time the
levy was registered. The records fail to show that Arcalas
knew of Pineda's claim of ownership and possession prior to
Pineda’s filing of her third party claim before the Quezon City
RTC. Hence, the mere possession of the subject property by
Pineda, absent any proof that Arcalas had knowledge of her
possession and adverse claim of ownership of the subject
property, cannot be considered as equivalent to
registration.90
In the absence of proof that respondents participated in the
transaction, or had knowledge of petitioners' interest over
the land at the time the property was purchased in 1982, this
Court must rule that they are not bound by the unregistered
donation.91 Hence, the conveyance had no effect as to
respondents.
Respondents are innocent
purchasers for value.
The acquisition of the property by respondents must
likewise be respected because they were innocent
purchasers for value. They had every right to rely on OCT No.
62276 insofar as it indicated that (1) one-fourth of the
property was owned by Feliza; and (2) the land was subject
only to the encumbrances annotated on the title, which did
not include the donation propternuptias in favor of
petitioners.
Our ruling is rooted in the general principle that persons
dealing with registered land have the right to completely rely
on the Torrens title issued over the property.92 Buyers are
not required to go beyond what the certificate of title
indicates on its face,93 provided the acquisition of the land
is made in good faith, that is, without notice that some other
person has a right to, or interest in, the property
Nevertheless, the protection granted by law to innocent
purchasers for value is not absolute. In Lausa v. Quilaton,94
the Court explained:
Jurisprudence has established exceptions to the protection
granted to an innocent purchaser for value, such as when
the purchaser has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would compel a reasonably cautious man
to inquire into the status of the lot; or of a defect or the lack
of title in his vendor; or of sufficient facts to induce a
reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title
of the property in litigation.
The presence of anything that excites or arouses suspicion
should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the
certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing
on the face of the certificate. One who falls within the
exception can neither be denominated as innocent
purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith, and hence
does not merit the protection of the law.
In particular, the Court has consistently held that that a
buyer of a piece of land that is in the actual possession of
persons other than the seller must be wary and should
investigate the rights of those in possession. Without such
inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good
faith.95
Here, petitioners maintain that they had prior physical
possession of the land, and that they built permanent
structures thereon even before respondents' acquisition of
the property from Feliza. Citing the findings of the MTC
during the ocular inspection conducted in G.R. No. 188666,
petitioners argue that the permanent structures and the
trees found on the disputed f property prove their
possession thereof over a considerable period of time.96
They insist that respondents cannot feign ignorance of these
facts; hence, the latter cannot claim to be innocent
purchasers for value.97
We are not persuaded.
The Court notes that petitioners have failed to sufficiently
establish their assertion. Notably, the RTC in both the cases
for ejectment and quieting of title declared that it was
respondent Arturo Cano who was in possession of the
property as a tenant prior to and at the time of the sale in
1982, based on the annotation on the title to the property
(OCT No. 62276).
In its Decision dated 27 May 2008, the RTC in G.R. No. 190750
dismissed the case filed by petitioners for quieting of title on
the basis of the following findings of fact:
x x x The annotation on TCT no. 62276 in 1982 that defendant
Arturo Cano is the tenant of the subject parcel of land would
show that indeed it was defendant Arturo Cano who
possessed and took care of the land prim· to the said year
until he purchased the same in 1982.
Defendants, after the sale[,] had declared the subject
property for taxation purposes in their names. Likewise,
from 1982 up to 2005, defendants religiously paid the realty
tax due from (sic) the subject property. Their possession
however was disturbed in 1999, the year he was disallowed
entry by the plaintiffs. Aside from defendants' registered
ownership over the parcel of land in question, the tax
declaration and annual tax payments bolster the fact of their
ownership of the subject lot.
xxxx
x x x The Court further notes that prior to defendants'
purchase of the land, they were the ones tilling the subject
land as tenants.1âwphi1 Clearly, therefore, prior to 1982 and
thereafter, defendants were in possession of the subject
land as tenants and thereafter as registered owners. Their
possession, however, was disturbed in 1999 when plaintiffs,
who as established are staying on the subject lot upon the
tolerance of the defendants were disallowed entry by the
former.98 (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, the RTC in G.R. No. 188666 ordered the
ejectment of petitioners from the property, upon a finding
that respondents had been in continuous possession of the
land even prior to their purchase thereof in 1982:
Not only that, theannotation on the said title says that that
portion pertaining to the appellant, before and at the time
he was ousted by the defendants-appellees, was in
possession of the property, first as a tenant prior to 1982 and
as the owner thereof from 1982 onwards.
xxxx
x x x Likewise, from 1982 up to 2005, plaintiffs-appellants
religiously paid the realty tax due from the subject property.
The plaintiffs-appellants have explained on the observation
of this Court that prior to the purchase plaintiffs-appellants
were already in possession at that time, being the tenants
thereof. Their possession however was disturbed in October
3, 1999, the day plaintiff-appellant Arturo was disallowed
entry by the defendants-appellees. Aside from plaintiffs-
appellants' registered ownership over the parcel of land in
question, the tax declaration and tax payments bolster the
fact of their ownership of the subject lot.99 (Emphases
supplied)
In their petition, petitioners allude to three semi-concrete
houses and several trees currently standing on the land as
evidence of their possession thereof. However, they have
failed to prove that these structures were already in place at
the time of the sale in 1982. In fact, the RTC and the CA in the
case for quieting of title declared that the only house
standing on the property was the ancestral house of the
seller, Feliza, when the Deed of Sale was executed. The RTC
declared:
Moreover, as established by evidence. the house on which
plaintiffs stay was once the ancestral house of the family of
Felissa Baun. It was likewise the only house standing on the
land in question until the dispute between the parties arose
in 1999.100 x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
This finding was affirmed by the CA in its Decision dated 30
September 2009:
At the time they purchased the subject parcel of land in 1982,
the same remains covered by TCT No. 62276 in the name of
Felisa, and her co-owners, and the donation of the land by
Felisa to plaintiffs-appellants does not appear in said TCT.
Likewise, as the trial court found based on the evidence on
record, only the ancestral house of Felisa was standing on
the subject parcel of land at the time the latter sold it to
defendants-appellees. 101 (Emphasis supplied)
We find no reason to overturn the foregoing factual findings.
It must be emphasized that the Petitions before us were filed
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As such, our mandate is
limited to only a review of errors of law.102 It is not our place
to analyze the factual findings of the lower courts and weigh
the evidence all over again. 103 At most, our inquiry should
only pertain to whether these findings are sufficiently
supported by evidence.
In this case, the determinations made by the CA and the RTC
as to the party in possession of the property, and the
structures standing on the land at a specific point of time,
are entitled to deference. These factual determinations are
supported by the annotation on OCT No. 62276, the tax
declarations submitted by petitioners and other pieces of
evidence that show that only the ancestral house of the
seller was standing on the land.
Considering that the factual findings of the lower courts are
consistent with the evidence on record, we affirm their
conclusion that respondents are innocent purchasers for
value who had no reason to investigate further or to go
beyond what was stated in the OCT. Having acquired the
land in good faith, respondents' claim of ownership must be
upheld.
Acquisitive prescription does
not apply to registered land.
The assertion of petitioners that they acquired ownership of
the property by virtue of their open, continuous, adverse
and exclusive possession thereof for more than 60 years104
is likewise untenable.
As early as 1902, when Act No. 496 created the Torrens
system of registration, the law already declared that
registered land cannot be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.105 This principle is currently found in
Section 47 of P.D. 1529:
Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. No
title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered
owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession.
Respondents are entitled to
possession of the property.
In view of our ruling in favor of respondents on the issue of
ownership, we likewise conclude that they are entitled to
possession of the land in question. They have the right to
enjoy and dispose of it without limitations other than those
imposed by law.106
Our ruling on ownership also renders immaterial the issue of
tolerance raised by petitioners. Since their supposed title
over the land - based on the donation propter nuptias and on
their claim of acquisitive prescription - has been defeated by
the registered Deed of Absolute Sale, petitioners clearly
have no right to remain on the property. Regardless of
whether or not their prior possession of the property had
been tolerated by respondents, it is evident that petitioners
must now vacate the land
Accordingly, we rule that the CA committed no reversible
error in declaring respondents as the rightful owners of the
land in the action for the quieting of title; and in ordering
petitioners to vacate the property in the ejectment case.
As a final point, the Court is aware that our ruling will affect
the structures currently standing on the property, which
petitioners claim to own. Our decision may then engender
certain issues of accession, particularly the right to
reimbursement of expenses and payment of damages.
Unfortunately, these matters were not raised by any of the
parties before this Court or any of the lower courts. The
dearth of evidence on this point likewise prevents us from
making any pronouncement on the matter. These questions
must perforce be dealt with in another proceeding.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Court of
Appeals Decision and Resolution dated 29 April 2009 and 3
July 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 104200, and the
Decision and Resolution dated 30 September 2009 and 14
December 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 91587 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Easement
G.R. No. 183719 February 2, 2011
MARGARITA F. CASTRO, Petitioner,
vs.
NAPOLEON A. MONSOD, Respondent.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1 dated
May 25, 2007 and the Resolution2 dated July 14, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 83973.
The antecedents of the case are as follows:
Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land located
on Garnet Street, Manuela Homes, Pamplona, Las Piñas City,
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
36071, with an area of one hundred thirty (130) square
meters (sq.m.). Respondent, on the other hand, is the owner
of the property adjoining the lot of petitioner, located on
Lyra Street, Moonwalk Village, Phase 2, Las Piñas City. There
is a concrete fence, more or less two (2) meters high,
dividing Manuela Homes from Moonwalk Village.3
On February 29, 2000, respondent caused the annotation of
an adverse claim against sixty-five (65) sq.m. of the property
of petitioner covered by TCT No. T-36071. The adverse claim
was filed without any claim of ownership over the property.
Respondent was merely asserting the existing legal
easement of lateral and subjacent support at the rear
portion of his estate to prevent the property from
collapsing, since his property is located at an elevated
plateau of fifteen (15) feet, more or less, above the level of
petitioner’s property.4 Respondent also filed a complaint for
malicious mischief and malicious destruction before the
office of the barangay chairman.5
In defiance, petitioner filed a complaint for damages with
temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.
Petitioner also prayed that the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas
City be ordered to cancel the annotation of the adverse claim
on TCT No. T-36071.6
Prior to the filing of the case before the RTC, there were
deposits of soil and rocks about two (2) meters away from
the front door of the house of
petitioner. As such, petitioner was not able to park her
vehicle at the dead-end portion of Garnet Street. When
petitioner noticed a leak that caused the front portion of her
house to be slippery, she hired construction workers to see
where the leak was coming from. The workers had already
started digging when police officers sent by respondent
came and stopped the workers from finishing their job.7
Petitioner averred that when she bought the property from
Manuela Homes in 1994, there was no annotation or
existence of any easement over the property. Respondent
neither asked permission nor talked to her with regard to the
use of 65 sq.m. of her property as easement. Upon learning
of the adverse claim, she felt disturbed and experienced
sleepless nights for fear that she would not be able to sell
her property. Petitioner admitted that TCT No. 36071 does
not cover the open space at the dead-end portion of Garnet
Street.8
For his part, respondent claimed that he and his family had
been residing in Moonwalk Village since June 1984. Adjacent
to his property is the land of petitioner in Manuela Homes.
When he bought the property in 1983, the land elevation of
Moonwalk Village was almost on the same level as Manuela
Homes. However, sometime in 1985 and 1986, Pilar
Development Corporation, the developer of Manuela
Homes, bulldozed, excavated, and transferred portions of
the elevated land to the lower portions of Manuela Homes.
Thus, Manuela Homes became lower than Moonwalk
Village.9
Before the said excavation, respondent personally
complained to Pilar
Development Corporation and was assured that, as provided
by the National Building Code, an embankment will be
retained at the boundary of Manuela Homes and Moonwalk
Village, which is more or less fifteen (15) feet higher than
Manuela Homes.10
Manuela Homes retained the embankment consisting of soil
and rocks. Respondent had the open space riprapped with
stones as reinforcement against any potential soil erosion,
earthquake, and possible digging by any person.
Respondent asserted that the affidavit of adverse claim was
for the annotation of the lateral and subjacent easement of
his property over the property of petitioner, in view of the
latter’s manifest determination to remove the embankment
left by the developer of Manuela Homes.
On October 11, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision,11 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court hereby
renders judgment: (1) ordering the cancellation of
[respondent’s] adverse claim at the back of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-36071 at the expense of
[respondent] Napoleon Monsod; (2) ordering the said
[respondent] to pay the herein [petitioner] the amount of
Php50,000.00 as moral damages; and (3) dismissing
[petitioner’s] claim for actual damages, attorney’s fees,
litigation costs and costs of suit and [respondent’s]
compulsory counterclaim for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.12
The trial court ratiocinated that the adverse claim of
respondent was non-registrable considering that the basis of
his claim was an easement and not an interest adverse to the
registered owner, and neither did he contest the title of
petitioner. Furthermore, the adverse claim of respondent
failed to comply with the requisites provided under Section
70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.13
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court in
a Decision14 dated May 25, 2007, the fallo of which reads
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
198, Las Piñas City dated October 11, 2004 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Court hereby orders the retention of the
annotation at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
36071, not as an adverse claim, but a recognition of the
existence of a legal easement of subjacent and lateral
support constituted on the lengthwise or horizontal land
support/embankment area of sixty-five (65) square meters,
more or less, of the property of [petitioner] Margarita
Castro. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court
on April 18, 2006 is hereby made permanent. [Petitioner’s]
claim for damages is likewise DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.15
The CA ruled that while respondent’s adverse claim could
not be sanctioned because it did not fall under the requisites
for registering an adverse claim, the same might be duly
annotated in the title as recognition of the existence of a
legal easement of subjacent and lateral support. The
purpose of the annotation was to prevent petitioner from
making injurious excavations on the subject embankment as
to deprive the residential house and lot of respondent of its
natural support and cause it to collapse. Respondent only
asked that petitioner respect the legal easement already
existing thereon.16
On June 15, 2007, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. However, the CA denied the same in a
Resolution17 dated July 14, 2008.
Hence, this petition.
The issue in this case is whether the easement of lateral and
subjacent support exists on the subject adjacent properties
and, if it does, whether the same may be annotated at the
back of the title of the servient estate.
Article 437 of the Civil Code provides that the owner of a
parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything
under it, and he can construct thereon any works, or make
any plantations and excavations which he may deem proper.
However, such right of the owner is not absolute and is
subject to the following limitations: (1) servitudes or
easements,18 (2) special laws,19 (3) ordinances,20 (4)
reasonable requirements of aerial navigation,21 and (5)
rights of third persons.22
Respondent filed before the RTC an affidavit of adverse
claim, the pertinent portions of which read:
5. That our adverse claim consists of rights of legal or
compulsory easement of lateral and subjacent support
(under the Civil Code) over a portion of the above-described
property of owner Margarita F. Castro, that is, covering the
lengthwise or horizontal land support/embankment area of
sixty-five (65) square meters, more or less.
6. That said registered owner has attempted to destroy
and/or remove portions of the existing lateral/subjacent land
and cement supports adjoining the said two properties. In
fact, a portion of the easement was already
destroyed/removed, to the continuing prejudice of herein
adverse claimant, and that a formal complaint against said
registered owner was filed by the herein adverse claimant
before the Office of the Barangay Chairman of Talon V, Las
Piñas City and the same proved futile.23
Respondent’s assertion that he has an adverse claim over
the 65 sq.m. property of petitioner is misplaced since he
does not have a claim over the ownership of the land. The
annotation of an adverse claim over registered land under
Section 70 of Presidential Decree 152924 requires a claim on
the title of the disputed land. Annotation is done to apprise
third persons that there is a controversy over the ownership
of the land and to preserve and protect the right of the
adverse claimant during the pendency of the controversy. It
is a notice to third persons that any transaction regarding
the disputed land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.25
In reality, what respondent is claiming is a judicial
recognition of the existence of the easement of subjacent
and lateral support over the 65 sq. m. portion of petitioner’s
property covering the land support/embankment area. His
reason for the annotation is only to prevent petitioner from
removing the embankment or from digging on the property
for fear of soil erosion that might weaken the foundation of
the rear portion of his property which is adjacent to the
property of petitioner.
An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon
an immovable for the benefit of another immovable
belonging to a different owner.26 There are two kinds of
easements according to source. An easement is established
either by law or by will of the owners.27 The courts cannot
impose or constitute any servitude where none existed.
They can only declare its existence if in reality it exists by law
or by the will of the owners. There are therefore no judicial
easements.28
Article 684 of the Civil Code provides that no proprietor shall
make such excavations upon his land as to deprive any
adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent
support. An owner, by virtue of his surface right, may make
excavations on his land, but his right is subject to the
limitation that he shall not deprive any adjacent land or
building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. Between
two adjacent landowners, each has an absolute property
right to have his land laterally supported by the soil of his
neighbor, and if either, in excavating on his own premises,
he so disturbs the lateral support of his neighbor’s land as to
cause it, or, in its natural state, by the pressure of its own
weight, to fall away or slide from its position, the one so
excavating is liable.29
In the instant case, an easement of subjacent and lateral
support exists in favor of respondent.1avvphi1 It was
established that the properties of petitioner and respondent
adjoin each other. The residential house and lot of
respondent is located on an elevated plateau of fifteen (15)
feet above the level of petitioner’s property. The
embankment and the riprapped stones have been in
existence even before petitioner became the owner of the
property. It was proven that petitioner has been making
excavations and diggings on the subject embankment and,
unless restrained, the continued excavation of the
embankment could cause the foundation of the rear portion
of the house of respondent to collapse, resulting in the
destruction of a huge part of the family dwelling.30
We sustain the CA in declaring that a permanent injunction
on the part of petitioner from making injurious excavations
is necessary in order to protect the interest of respondent.
However, an annotation of the existence of the subjacent
and lateral support is no longer necessary. It exists whether
or not it is annotated or registered in the registry of
property. A judicial recognition of the same already binds the
property and the owner of the same, including her
successors-in-interest. Otherwise, every adjoining
landowner would come to court or have the easement of
subjacent and lateral support registered in order for it to be
recognized and respected.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated
May 25, 2007 and the Resolution dated July 14, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 83973 are hereby
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the annotation at the
back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-36071, recognizing
the existence of the legal easement of subjacent and lateral
support constituted on the lengthwise or horizontal land
support/embankment area of sixty-five (65) square meters,
more or less, of the property of petitioner Margarita F.
Castro, is hereby ordered removed.
SO ORDERED.
Donation
G.R. No. 172804 January 24, 2011
GONZALO VILLANUEVA, represented by his heirs,
Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES FROILAN and LEONILA BRANOCO, Respondents.
This resolves the petition for review1 of the ruling2 of the
Court of Appeals dismissing a suit to recover a realty.
The Facts
Petitioner Gonzalo Villanueva (petitioner), here represented
by his heirs,3 sued respondents, spouses Froilan and Leonila
Branoco (respondents), in the Regional Trial Court of Naval,
Biliran (trial court) to recover a 3,492 square-meter parcel of
land in Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte (Property) and collect
damages. Petitioner claimed ownership over the Property
through purchase in July 1971 from Casimiro Vere (Vere),
who, in turn, bought the Property from Alvegia Rodrigo
(Rodrigo) in August 1970. Petitioner declared the Property in
his name for tax purposes soon after acquiring it.
In their Answer, respondents similarly claimed ownership
over the Property through purchase in July 1983 from
Eufracia Rodriguez (Rodriguez) to whom Rodrigo donated
the Property in May 1965. The two-page deed of donation
(Deed), signed at the bottom by the parties and two
witnesses, reads in full:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, ALVEGIA RODRIGO, Filipino, of legal age, widow of
the late Juan Arcillas, a resident of Barrio Bool, municipality
of Culaba, subprovince of Biliran, Leyte del Norte,
Philippines, hereby depose and say:
That as we live[d] together as husband and wife with Juan
Arcillas, we begot children, namely: LUCIO, VICENTA,
SEGUNDINA, and ADELAIDA, all surnamed ARCILLAS, and by
reason of poverty which I suffered while our children were
still young; and because my husband Juan Arcillas aware as
he was with our destitution separated us [sic] and left for
Cebu; and from then on never cared what happened to his
family; and because of that one EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, one
of my nieces who also suffered with our poverty, obedient
as she was to all the works in our house, and because of the
love and affection which I feel [for] her, I have one parcel of
land located at Sitio Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte bearing Tax
Decl. No. 1878 declared in the name of Alvegia Rodrigo, I give
(devise) said land in favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, her
heirs, successors, and assigns together with all the
improvements existing thereon, which parcel of land is more
or less described and bounded as follows:
1. Bounded North by Amambajag River; East, Benito Picao;
South, Teofilo Uyvico; and West, by Public land; 2. It has an
area of 3,492 square meters more or less; 3. It is planted to
coconuts now bearing fruits; 4. Having an assessed value of
₱240.00; 5. It is now in the possession of EUFRACIA
RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962 in the concept of an owner,
but the Deed of Donation or that ownership be vested on
her upon my demise.
That I FURTHER DECLARE, and I reiterate that the land above
described, I already devise in favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ
since May 21, 1962, her heirs, assigns, and that if the herein
Donee predeceases me, the same land will not be reverted
to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of EUFRACIA
RODRIGUEZ;
That I EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, hereby accept the land above
described from Inay Alvegia Rodrigo and I am much grateful
to her and praying further for a longer life; however, I will
give one half (1/2) of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve
during her lifetime.4
Respondents entered the Property in 1983 and paid taxes
afterwards.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled for petitioner, declared him owner of
the Property, and ordered respondents to surrender
possession to petitioner, and to pay damages, the value of
the Property’s produce since 1982 until petitioner’s
repossession and the costs.5 The trial court rejected
respondents’ claim of ownership after treating the Deed as
a donation mortis causa which Rodrigo effectively cancelled
by selling the Property to Vere in 1970.6 Thus, by the time
Rodriguez sold the Property to respondents in 1983, she had
no title to transfer.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA),
imputing error in the trial court’s interpretation of the Deed
as a testamentary disposition instead of an inter vivos
donation, passing title to Rodriguez upon its execution.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA granted respondents’ appeal and set aside the trial
court’s ruling. While conceding that the "language of the
[Deed is] x x x confusing and which could admit of possible
different interpretations,"7 the CA found the following
factors pivotal to its reading of the Deed as donation inter
vivos: (1) Rodriguez had been in possession of the Property
as owner since 21 May 1962, subject to the delivery of part of
the produce to Apoy Alve; (2) the Deed’s consideration was
not Rodrigo’s death but her "love and affection" for
Rodriguez, considering the services the latter rendered; (3)
Rodrigo waived dominion over the Property in case
Rodriguez predeceases her, implying its inclusion in
Rodriguez’s estate; and (4) Rodriguez accepted the
donation in the Deed itself, an act necessary to effectuate
donations inter vivos, not devises.8 Accordingly, the CA
upheld the sale between Rodriguez and respondents, and,
conversely found the sale between Rodrigo and petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest, Vere, void for Rodrigo’s lack of title.
In this petition, petitioner seeks the reinstatement of the
trial court’s ruling. Alternatively, petitioner claims ownership
over the Property through acquisitive prescription, having
allegedly occupied it for more than 10 years.
Respondents see no reversible error in the CA’s ruling and
pray for its affirmance.
The Issue
The threshold question is whether petitioner’s title over the
Property is superior to respondents’. The resolution of this
issue rests, in turn, on whether the contract between the
parties’ predecessors-in-interest, Rodrigo and Rodriguez,
was a donation or a devise. If the former, respondents hold
superior title, having bought the Property from Rodriguez. If
the latter, petitioner prevails, having obtained title from
Rodrigo under a deed of sale the execution of which
impliedly revoked the earlier devise to Rodriguez.
The Ruling of the Court
We find respondents’ title superior, and thus, affirm the CA.
Naked Title Passed from Rodrigo to Rodriguez Under a
Perfected Donation
We examine the juridical nature of the Deed – whether it
passed title to Rodriguez upon its execution or is effective
only upon Rodrigo’s death – using principles distilled from
relevant jurisprudence. Post-mortem dispositions typically –
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the
death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing,
that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;
(2) That before the [donor’s] death, the transfer should be
revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a
reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties
conveyed;
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should
survive the transferee.10
Further –
[4] [T]he specification in a deed of the causes whereby the
act may be revoked by the donor indicates that the donation
is inter vivos, rather than a disposition mortis causa[;]
[5] That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or
a provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is "to
take effect at the death of the donor" are not controlling
criteria; such statements are to be construed together with
the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real
intent of the transferor[;] [and]
(6) That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed
donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to
avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property
subject of the deed.11
It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to
Rodriguez under a perfected donation inter vivos. First.
Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein Donee predeceases
me, the [Property] will not be reverted to the Donor, but will
be inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez," signaling the
irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguez’s estate,
waiving Rodrigo’s right to reclaim title. This transfer of title
was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez’s
acceptance of the disposition12 which, being reflected in the
Deed, took place on the day of its execution on 3 May 1965.
Rodrigo’s acceptance of the transfer underscores its
essence as a gift in presenti, not in futuro, as only donations
inter vivos need acceptance by the recipient.13 Indeed, had
Rodrigo wished to retain full title over the Property, she
could have easily stipulated, as the testator did in another
case, that "the donor, may transfer, sell, or encumber to any
person or entity the properties here donated x x x"14 or used
words to that effect. Instead, Rodrigo expressly waived title
over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her.
In a bid to diffuse the non-reversion stipulation’s damning
effect on his case, petitioner tries to profit from it,
contending it is a fideicommissary substitution clause.15
Petitioner assumes the fact he is laboring to prove. The
question of the Deed’s juridical nature, whether it is a will or
a donation, is the crux of the present controversy. By
treating the clause in question as mandating
fideicommissary substitution, a mode of testamentary
disposition by which the first heir instituted is entrusted with
the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir
the whole or part of the inheritance,16 petitioner assumes
that the Deed is a will. Neither the Deed’s text nor the import
of the contested clause supports petitioner’s theory.
Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the
beneficial title to the Property, evident from Rodriguez’s
undertaking to "give one [half] x x x of the produce of the
land to Apoy Alve during her lifetime."17 Thus, the Deed’s
stipulation that "the ownership shall be vested on
[Rodriguez] upon my demise," taking into account the non-
reversion clause, could only refer to Rodrigo’s beneficial
title. We arrived at the same conclusion in Balaqui v.
Dongso18 where, as here, the donor, while "b[inding] herself
to answer to the [donor] and her heirs x x x that none shall
question or disturb [the donee’s] right," also stipulated that
the donation "does not pass title to [the donee] during my
lifetime; but when I die, [the donee] shall be the true owner"
of the donated parcels of land. In finding the disposition as a
gift inter vivos, the Court reasoned:
Taking the deed x x x as a whole, x x x x it is noted that in the
same deed [the donor] guaranteed to [the donee] and her
heirs and successors, the right to said property thus
conferred. From the moment [the donor] guaranteed the
right granted by her to [the donee] to the two parcels of land
by virtue of the deed of gift, she surrendered such right;
otherwise there would be no need to guarantee said right.
Therefore, when [the donor] used the words upon which the
appellants base their contention that the gift in question is a
donation mortis causa [that the gift "does not pass title
during my lifetime; but when I die, she shall be the true
owner of the two aforementioned parcels"] the donor
meant nothing else than that she reserved of herself the
possession and usufruct of said two parcels of land until her
death, at which time the donee would be able to dispose of
them freely.19 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, if Rodrigo still retained full ownership over the
Property, it was unnecessary for her to reserve partial
usufructuary right over it.20
Third. The existence of consideration other than the donor’s
death, such as the donor’s love and affection to the donee
and the services the latter rendered, while also true of
devises, nevertheless "corroborates the express
irrevocability of x x x [inter vivos] transfers."21 Thus, the CA
committed no error in giving weight to Rodrigo’s statement
of "love and affection" for Rodriguez, her niece, as
consideration for the gift, to underscore its finding.
It will not do, therefore, for petitioner to cherry-pick
stipulations from the Deed tending to serve his cause (e.g.
"the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my
demise" and "devise"). Dispositions bearing contradictory
stipulations are interpreted wholistically, to give effect to
the donor’s intent. In no less than seven cases featuring
deeds of donations styled as "mortis causa" dispositions, the
Court, after going over the deeds, eventually considered the
transfers inter vivos,22 consistent with the principle that
"the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a
provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is ‘to
take effect at the death of the donor’ are not controlling
criteria [but] x x x are to be construed together with the rest
of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of
the transferor."23 Indeed, doubts on the nature of
dispositions are resolved to favor inter vivos transfers "to
avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property
subject of the deed."24
Nor can petitioner capitalize on Rodrigo’s post-donation
transfer of the Property to Vere as proof of her retention of
ownership. If such were the barometer in interpreting deeds
of donation, not only will great legal uncertainty be visited
on gratuitous dispositions, this will give license to rogue
property owners to set at naught perfected transfers of
titles, which, while founded on liberality, is a valid mode of
passing ownership. The interest of settled property
dispositions counsels against licensing such practice.25
Accordingly, having irrevocably transferred naked title over
the Property to Rodriguez in 1965, Rodrigo "cannot
afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said
property in favor of another."26 Thus, Rodrigo’s post-
donation sale of the Property vested no title to Vere. As
Vere’s successor-in-interest, petitioner acquired no better
right than him. On the other hand, respondents bought the
Property from Rodriguez, thus acquiring the latter’s title
which they may invoke against all adverse claimants,
including petitioner.
Petitioner Acquired No Title Over the Property
Alternatively, petitioner grounds his claim of ownership over
the Property through his and Vere’s combined possession of
the Property for more than ten years, counted from Vere’s
purchase of the Property from Rodrigo in 1970 until
petitioner initiated his suit in the trial court in February
1986.27 Petitioner anchors his contention on an unfounded
legal assumption. The ten year ordinary prescriptive period
to acquire title through possession of real property in the
concept of an owner requires uninterrupted possession
coupled with just title and good faith.28 There is just title
when the adverse claimant came into possession of the
property through one of the modes recognized by law for
the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the
grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.29
Good faith, on the other hand, consists in the reasonable
belief that the person from whom the possessor received
the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his
ownership.30
Although Vere and petitioner arguably had just title having
successively acquired the Property through sale, neither was
a good faith possessor. As Rodrigo herself disclosed in the
Deed, Rodriguez already occupied and possessed the
Property "in the concept of an owner" ("como tag-iya"31)
since 21 May 1962, nearly three years before Rodrigo’s
donation in 3 May 1965 and seven years before Vere bought
the Property from Rodrigo. This admission against interest
binds Rodrigo and all those tracing title to the Property
through her, including Vere and petitioner. Indeed,
petitioner’s insistent claim that Rodriguez occupied the
Property only in 1982, when she started paying taxes, finds
no basis in the records. In short, when Vere bought the
Property from Rodrigo in 1970, Rodriguez was in possession
of the Property, a fact that prevented Vere from being a
buyer in good faith.
Lacking good faith possession, petitioner’s only other
recourse to maintain his claim of ownership by prescription
is to show open, continuous and adverse possession of the
Property for 30 years.32 Undeniably, petitioner is unable to
meet this requirement.1avvphi
Ancillary Matters Petitioner Raises Irrelevant
Petitioner brings to the Court’s attention facts which,
according to him, support his theory that Rodrigo never
passed ownership over the Property to Rodriguez, namely,
that Rodriguez registered the Deed and paid taxes on the
Property only in 1982 and Rodriguez obtained from Vere in
1981 a waiver of the latter’s "right of ownership" over the
Property. None of these facts detract from our conclusion
that under the text of the Deed and based on the
contemporaneous acts of Rodrigo and Rodriguez, the latter,
already in possession of the Property since 1962 as Rodrigo
admitted, obtained naked title over it upon the Deed’s
execution in 1965. Neither registration nor tax payment is
required to perfect donations. On the relevance of the
waiver agreement, suffice it to say that Vere had nothing to
waive to Rodriguez, having obtained no title from Rodrigo.
Irrespective of Rodriguez’s motivation in obtaining the
waiver, that document, legally a scrap of paper, added
nothing to the title Rodriguez obtained from Rodrigo under
the Deed.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the
Decision dated 6 June 2005 and the Resolution dated 5 May
2006 of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
co-ownership and right of legal redemption
G.R. No. 122047 October 12, 2000
SPOUSES SERAFIN SI AND ANITA BONODE SI, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES JOSE ARMADA and
REMEDIOS ALMANZOR (deceased, and substituted by heirs:
Cynthia Armada, Danilo Armada and Vicente Armada)
respondents.
This petition for certiorari under Rule 45 assails the Decision1
dated March 25, 1994, of the Court of Appeals and its
Resolutions2 dated March 24, 1995 and September 6, 1995 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 30727. The Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 113,
and nullified the sale of the subject lot by the spouses
Crisostomo and Cresenciana Armada to spouses Serafin and
Anita Si. The dispositive portion of the respondent court's
decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision
appealed from is hereby REVERSED, and a new one is
rendered:
1) Annulling and declaring as invalid the registration of the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 27, 1979 executed by
Cresenciana V. Alejo in favor of Anita Bonode Si.
2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasay City to annul and
cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24751, issued in the
name of Anita Bonode Si, married to Serafin D. Si., Jose R.
Armada, married to Remedios Almanzor and Dr. Severo R.
Armada Jr., single.
3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasay City to
reconstitute and revive Transfer Certificate of Title No. 16007
in the names of Jose, Crisostomo and Severo, Jr.
4) That plaintiffs be allowed to repurchase or redeem the
share corresponding to the share of Crisostomo Armada
within thirty (30) days from notice in writing by Crisostomo
Armada.
5) The defendants-appellees are jointly and severally
ordered to pay the plaintiffs-appellants the sum of
P10,000.00 as moral damages.
6) The defendants-appellees are jointly and severally
ordered to pay the plaintiff-appellants the sum of
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses and
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED."3
The factual background of the case is as follows:
The 340 square meters of land, situated in San Jose District,
Pasay City, the property in dispute, originally belonged to
Escolastica, wife of Severo Armada, Sr. This was covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (17345) 2460. During
the lifetime of the spouses, the property was transferred to
their children and the Registry of Deeds, Pasay City, issued
TCT No. 16007 in the names of the three sons, as follows :
"DR. CRISOSTOMO R. ARMADA, married to Cresenciana V.
Alejo, 113.34 Square Meters; JOSE R. ARMADA, married to
Remedios Almanzor, 113.33 Square Meters; and DR. SEVERO
R. ARMADA, Jr., single, all of legal age, Filipinos."4
Annotated also in the title is the total cancellation of said
title "... by virtue of the Deed of Sale, (P.E. 77952/T-24751),
dated March 28, 1979, executed by CRESENCIANA V. ALEJO,
as attorney-in-fact of CRISOSTOMO R. ARMADA, conveying
113.34 square meters of the property herein, in favor of
ANITA BONODE SI, married to Serafin D. Si, for the sum of
P75,000.00, issuing in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 24751, Reg. Book T-102. (Doc. No. 17, Page No. 5,
Book No. 253 of Notary Public of Pasay City, Manila, Julian
Florentino)."5
On April 15, 1980, herein spouses Jose Armada and Remedios
Almanzor, filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Sale
and Reconveyance of Title with Damages, against herein
petitioners Anita and Serafin Si and Conrado Isada, brother-
in-law of Cresenciana. Isada brokered the sale.
The complaint alleged that Conrado Isada sold Crisostomo's
share by making it appear that Cresenciana, the attorney-in-
fact of her husband, is a Filipino citizen, residing with Isada
at No. 13-4th Camarilla Street, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.
By this time, Crisostomo and Cresenciana had migrated and
were already citizens of the United States of America. It also
stated that when petitioners registered the deed of absolute
sale they inserted the phrase "... and that the co-owners are
not interested in buying the same in spite of notice to
them.", and that petitioners knew of the misrepresentations
of Conrado. Further, the complaint alleged that the other
owners, Jose and Severo, Jr., had no written notice of the
sale; and that all upon learning of the sale to the spouses Si,
private respondents filed a complaint for annulment of sale
and reconveyance of title with damages, claiming they had a
right of redemption.
Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that on October 2,
1954, Escolastica, with the consent of her husband executed
three separate deeds of sale (Exhibits 1, 2, and 3)6 conveying
113.34 square meters of the property to Severo, and 113.33
square meters each to Crisostomo and Jose. The three deeds
of sale particularly described the portion conveyed to each
son in metes and bounds. Petitioners contend that since the
property was already three distinct parcels of land, there
was no longer co-ownership among the brothers. Hence,
Jose and Severo, Jr. had no right of redemption when
Crisostomo sold his share to the spouses Si. Petitioners point
out that it was only because the Armada brothers failed to
submit the necessary subdivision plan to the Office of the
Register of Deeds in Pasay City that separate titles were not
issued and TCT No. 16007 was issued and registered in the
names of Jose, Crisostomo, and Severo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the court ruled for petitioners:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the complaint is hereby
DISMISSED. With costs against the plaintiffs."7
Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On
March 25, 1994, the appellate court issued the decision now
assailed by petitioners. In reversing the decision of the trial
court and ruling for private respondents, the Court of
Appeals found that:
"A careful examination of TCT No. 16007 (Exh. 'A') shows
that the portion sold by virtue of the Deeds of Sale (Exh. 1, 2,
& 3) to the Armada brothers do not appear in the said title,
neither does it indicate the particular area sold. Moreover,
no evidence was presented to show that the Register of
Deeds issued TCT No. 16007 (Exh. 'A') on the basis of the said
deeds of Sale. In fact, TCT No. 16007 (Exh. 'A') shows that the
lot is co-owned by Jose, Crisostomo and Severo, Jr. in the
proportion of 113.33, 113.34 and 113.33 sq. m. respectively.
Furthermore, the evidence on record shows that the Deed
of Absolute Sale (Exh. 'B'), executed by Cresencia Armada in
favor of defendants Si, stated that the portion sold was the
'undivided one hundred thirteen & 34/100 (113.34) square
meters' of the parcel of land covered by TCT NO. 16007 of
the Registry of Deeds for Pasay City, which means that what
was sold to defendants are still undetermined and
unidentifiable, as the area sold remains a portion of the
whole.
Moreover, plaintiff Remedi[o]s Armada testified that on
March 27, 1979, Crisostomo Armada, thru his attorney-in-fact
and co-defendant, Cresenciana Alejo, sold his undivided
113.34 share to defendants, Sps. Si as evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale (Exh. 'B'), and presented for registration with
the Register of Deeds (Exh. 'B-1') without notifying plaintiffs
of the sale (TSN, pp. 6-8, December 20, 1988). Instead, it
appears that the phrase 'and that the co-owners are not
interested in buying the same inspite of notice to them', was
inserted in the Deed of Sale (Exh. 'B').
xx
Otherwise stated, the sale by a (sic) co-owner of his share in
the undivided property is not invalid, but shall not be
recorded in the Registry Property, unless accompanied by an
affidavit of the Vendor that he has given written notice
thereof to all possible redemptioners."8
On August 29, 1994, petitioners' counsel on record, Atty.
Roberto B. Yam received a copy of the CA decision. On
October 14, 1994, he filed a motion for reconsideration, but
it was denied by the Court of Appeals on November 21, 1994,
for being filed out of time.
On December 5, 1994, petitioners filed their motion for new
trial under Section 1, Rule 53 of the Revised Rules of Court.9
Petitioners presented new evidence, TCT No. (17345) 2460,
registered in the name of Escolastica de la Rosa, married to
Severo Armada, Sr., with annotation at the back stating that
the cancellation was by virtue of three deeds of sale in favor
of Escolastica's sons. On March 24, 1995, respondent court
denied the motion, reasoning that when the motion was
filed, the reglementary period had lapsed and the decision
had become final and executory. Petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of said resolution was denied.
Hence, the present petition, alleging that:
"1. Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error in ruling that a co-ownership still existed.
"2. Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error in denying the Motion for Reconsideration of its
Decision of 25 March 1994 on purely technical grounds.
"3. Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error in denying the Motion for New Trial.
"4. Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error in ordering petitioners to pay moral damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and the costs of the
suit."10
In essence, this Court is asked to resolve: (1) whether
respondent court erred in denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration and/or the Motion for New Trial; (2) whether
private respondents are co-owners who are legally entitled
to redeem the lot under Article 1623 of the Civil Code;11 and
(3) whether the award of moral damages, attorney's fees
and costs of suit is correct.
The pivotal issue is whether private respondents may claim
the right of redemption under Art. 1623 of the Civil Code. The
trial court found that the disputed land was not part of an
undivided estate. It held that the three deeds of absolute
sale12 technically described the portion sold to each son. The
portions belonging to the three sons were separately
declared for taxation purposes with the Assessor's Office of
Pasay City on September 21, 1970.13 Jose's testimony that
the land was undivided was contradicted by his wife when
she said they had been receiving rent from the property
specifically allotted to Jose.14 More significantly, on January
9, 1995, the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City cancelled TCT
24751 and issued three new titles as follows: (1) TCT 13459415
in favor of Severo Armada, Jr.; (2) TCT 13459516 under the
name of Anita Bonode Si, married to Serafin Si; and (3) TCT
13459617 owned by Jose Armada, married to Remedios
Almanzor. All these are on record.
However, the Court of Appeals' decision contradicted the
trial court's findings.18
In instances when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are at variance with those of the trial court, or when the
inference drawn by the Court of Appeals from the facts is
manifestly mistaken, this Court will not hesitate to review
the evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual
conclusion.19 This we have done in this case. It is our
considered view now, that the trial court is correct when it
found that:
"Rightfully, as early as October 2, 1954, the lot in question
had already been partitioned when their parents executed
three (3) deed of sales (sic) in favor of Jose, Crisostomo and
Severo, all surnamed Armada (Exh. 1, 2, & 3), which
documents purports to have been registered with the
Register of Deeds of Pasay City, on September 18, 1970, and
as a consequence TCT No. 16007 (Exh. A) was issued.
Notably, every portion conveyed and transferred to the
three sons was definitely described and segregated and with
the corresponding technical description (sic). In short, this is
what we call extrajudicial partition. Moreover, every portion
belonging to the three sons has been declared for taxation
purposes with the Assessor's Office of Pasay City on
September 21, 1970. These are the unblinkable facts that the
portion sold to defendant spouses Si by defendants
Crisostomo Armada and Cresenciana Armada was concretely
determined and identifiable. The fact that the three portions
are embraced in one certificate of title does not make said
portions less determinable or identifiable or distinguishable,
one from the other, nor that dominion over each portion less
exclusive, in their respective owners. Hence, no right of
redemption among co-owners exists."20 (citation omitted)
". . . [T]he herein plaintiffs cannot deny the fact that they did
not have knowledge about the impending sale of this
portion. The truth of the matter is that they were properly
notified. Reacting to such knowledge and notification they
wrote defendant Dr. Crisostomo Armada on February 22,
1979, a portion of said letter is revealing: 'Well you are the
king of yourselves, and you can sell your share of
Levereza."21 (emphasis omitted)
After the physical division of the lot among the brothers, the
community ownership terminated, and the right of
preemption or redemption for each brother was no longer
available.22
Under Art. 484 of the Civil Code,23 there is co-ownership
whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right
belongs to different persons. There is no co-ownership when
the different portions owned by different people are already
concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if
not yet technically described.24 This situation makes
inapplicable the provision on the right of redemption of a co-
owner in the Civil Code, as follows:
"Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall
not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in
writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the
case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the
Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of
the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all
possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of
adjoining owners."
Moreover, we note that private respondent Jose Armada
was well informed of the impending sale of Crisostomo's
share in the land. In a letter dated February 22, 1979, Jose
told his brother Crisostomo: "Well you are the king of
yourselves, and you can sell your share of Leveriza."25 Co-
owners with actual notice of the sale are not entitled to
written notice. A written notice is a formal requisite to make
certain that the co-owners have actual notice of the sale to
enable them to exercise their right of redemption within the
limited period of thirty days. But where the co-owners had
actual notice of the sale at the time thereof and/or
afterwards, a written notice of a fact already known to them,
would be superfluous. The statute does not demand what is
unnecessary.2
Considering that respondent Court of Appeals erred in
holding that herein private respondent could redeem the lot
bought by petitioners, the issue of whether the appellate
court erred in denying petitioners' motions for
reconsideration and new trial need not be delved
into.1âwphi1 The same is true with respect to the questioned
award of damages and attorney's fees. Petitioners filed their
complaint in good faith and as repeatedly held, we cannot
put a premium on the right to litigate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated March 25, 1994 and its Resolutions
dated March 24, 1995 and September 6, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 30727 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 8023-
P is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 113, promulgated on August
29, 1989, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
easement of road right of way
G.R. No. 188213
NATIVIDAD C. CRUZ and BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, Petitioners,
vs.
PANDACAN HIKER'S CLUB, INC., Represented by its
President, PRISCILA ILAO, Respondent.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to ahnul and set aside
the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated March 31, 2008 in CA-
G.R. SP. No. 104474. The appellate court reversed and set
aside the earlier decision of the Office of the Ombudsman
dismissing the complaint filed against petitioners.
Below are the facts of the case.
Petitioner Natividad C. Cruz (Cruz) was Punong Barangay or
Chairperson of Barangay 848, Zone 92, City of Manila.2 On
November 10, 2006, around five o'clock in the afternoon,
and along Central Street, Pandacan, Manila, within the
vicinity of her barangay, she allegedly confronted persons
playing basketball with the following statements:
Bakit nakabukas ang (basketball) court? Wala kayong
karapatang maglaro sa court na 'to, barangay namin ito! xxx
xxx xxx Wala kayong magagawa. Ako ang chairman dito.
Mga walanghiya kayo, patay gutom! Hindi ako natatakot!
Kaya kong panagutan lahat!3
Then, she allegedly gave an order to the other petitioner,
Barangay Tanod Benjamin dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), to destroy
the basketball ring by cutting it up with a hacksaw which
Dela Cruz promptly complied with, thus, rendering the said
basketball court unusable.4
The acts of petitioners prompted the filing of a Complaint
(for Malicious Mischief, Grave Misconduct, Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Abuse of
Authority)5 before the Prosecutor's Office and the Office of
the Ombudsman by the group that claims to be the
basketball court's owners, herein respondents Pandacan
Hiker's Club, Inc. (PHC) and its president Priscila Ilao (Ilao). In
the complaint, they alleged that PHC, a non-stock, non-profit
civic organization engaged in "health, infrastructure, sports
and other so-called poverty alleviation activities" in the
Pandacan area of Manila, is the group that had donated,
administered and operated the subject basketball court for
the Pandacan community until its alleged destruction by
petitioners.6
The complaint averred that the damage caused by
petitioners was in the amount of around P2,000.00. It was
supported by the affidavits of ten (10) members of PHC who
allegedly witnessed the destruction. Meanwhile, respondent
Ilao added that the acts of petitioner Cruz, the Barangay
Chairperson, of ordering the cutting up of the basketball ring
and uttering abusive language were "unwarranted and
unbecoming of a public official."7
In answer to the complaint, Cruz alleged that the basketball
court affected the peace in the barangay and was the subject
of many complaints from residents asking for its closure. She
alleged that the playing court blocked jeepneys from passing
through and was the site of rampant bettings and fights
involving persons from within and outside the barangays.
She claimed that innocent persons have been hurt and
property had been damaged by such armed confrontations,
which often involved the throwing of rocks and improvised
"molotov" bombs. She also averred that noise from the
games caused lack of sleep among some residents and that
the place's frequent visitors used the community's fences as
places to urinate. Cruz maintained that the court's users
never heeded the barangay officials' efforts to pacify them
and when the basketball ring was once padlocked, such was
just removed at will while members of the complainants'
club continued playing. When Cruz asked for the PHC to
return the steel bar and padlock, the request was simply
ignored, thus, prompting her to order Dela Cruz to destroy
the basketball ring. The destruction was allegedly also a
response to the ongoing clamor of residents to stop the
basketball games.8 Cruz denied allegations that she shouted
invectives at the PHC members. In support of her answer,
Cruz attached copies of the complaints, a "certification" and
letters of barangay residents asking for a solution to the
problems arising from the disruptive activities on the said
playing venue.9
After the parties' submission of their respective Position
Papers,10 the Office of the Ombudsman rendered its
Decision11 dated April 26, 2007dismissing the complaint filed
by Ilao, et al. The Ombudsman found that the act of
destroying the basketball ring was only motivated by Cruz
and Dela Cruz performing their sworn duty, as defined in the
Local Government Code.12 It found the act to be a mere
response to the clamor of constituents.13 The office found
that though the cutting of the ring was "drastic," it was done
by the barangay officials within their lawful duties, as the act
was only the result of the unauthorized removal of and
failure to return the steel bar and padlock that were earlier
placed thereon.14 Neither did the office give credence to the
allegation that Cruz uttered invectives against the
complainants' witnesses, noting that the said witnesses are
tainted by their personal animosity against the barangay
officials.15
After the Ombudsman's ruling dismissing the complaint filed
against Cruz and Dela Cruz, the complainants Ilao, et al. filed
a petition for review before the Court of Appeals praying for
the latter court to nullify the Ombudsman's decision.16 The
petition's thesis was that any actions in furtherance of the
community's welfare must be approved by ordinance and
that unless a thing is a nuisance per se, such a thing may not
be abated via an ordinance and extrajudicially.17
Commenting on the petition for review, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
averred that Section 389 of the Local Government Code,
which defines the powers, duties and functions of the
punong barangay, among which are the power to enforce all
laws and ordinances applicable within the barangay and the
power to maintain public order in the barangay and, in
pursuance thereof, to assist the city or municipal mayor and
the sanggunian members in the performance of their duties
and functions, does not require an ordinance for the said
official to perform said functions.18 The acts were also in
pursuance of the promotion of the general welfare of the
community, as mentioned in Section 16 of the Code.19
In its assailed Decision dated March 31, 2008, the Court of
Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the Office of
the Ombudsman. The appellate court found petitioner
Natividad C. Cruz liable for conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and penalized her with a suspension
of six (6) months and one (1) day, while it reprimanded the
other petitioner Benjamin dela Cruz, and also warned both
officials that a future repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.
The appellate court sustained the contentions of Ilao, et al.
that Cruz and Dela Cruz performed an abatement of what
they thought was a public nuisance but did the same without
following the proper legal procedure, thus making them
liable for said acts.20 It held Cruz to be without the power to
declare a thing a nuisance unless it is a nuisance per se.21 It
declared the subject basketball ring as not such a nuisance
and, thus, not subject to summary abatement. The court
added that even if the same was to be considered a nuisance
per accidens, the only way to establish it as such is after a
hearing conducted for that purpose.22
A motion for reconsideration filed by Cruz and Dela Cruz was
likewise denied by the appellate court.23 Hence, they filed
this petition.
Petitioners maintain that they acted merely with the
intention to regain free passage of people and vehicles over
the street and restore the peace, health and sanitation of
those affected by the basketball court. Cruz, in particular,
asserts that she merely abated a public nuisance which she
claimed was within her power as barangay chief executive to
perform and was part of her duty to maintain peace and
order.24
We deny the petition.
Under normal circumstances, this Court would not disturb
the findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman when
they are supported by substantial evidence.25 However, We
make an exception of the case at bar because the findings of
fact of the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals widely
differ.26
It is held that the administrative offense of conduct
prejudicial to the interest of the service is committed when
the questioned conduct tarnished the image and integrity of
the officer's public office; the conduct need not be related
or connected to the public officer's official functions for the
said officer to be meted the corresponding penalty.27 The
basis for such liability is Republic Act No. 6713, or the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, particularly Section 4 (c) thereof, which ordains
that public officials and employees shall at all times respect
the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts
contrary to public safety and public interest.28 In one case,
this Court also stated that the Machiavellian principle that
"the end justifies the means" has no place in government
service, which thrives on the rule of law, consistency and
stability.29
For these reasons, in the case at bar, We agree with the
appellate court that the petitioners’ actions, though well-
intentioned, were improper and done in excess of what was
required by the situation and fell short of the
aforementioned standards of behavior for public officials.
It is clear from the records that petitioners indeed cut or
sawed in half the subject basketball ring, which resulted in
the destruction of the said equipment and rendered it
completely unusable.30 Petitioners also moved
instantaneously and did not deliberate nor consult with the
Sangguniang Barangay prior to committing the subject acts;
neither did they involve any police or law enforcement agent
in their actions. They acted while tempers were running high
as petitioner Cruz, the Barangay Chairperson, became
incensed at the removal of the steel bar and padlock that
was earlier used to close access to the ring and at the
inability or refusal of respondents' group to return the said
steel bar and padlock to her as she had ordered.
The destructive acts of petitioners, however, find no legal
sanction. This Court has ruled time and again that no public
official is above the law.31 The Court of Appeals correctly
ruled that although petitioners claim to have merely
performed an abatement of a public nuisance, the same was
done summarily while failing to follow the proper procedure
therefor and for which, petitioners must be held
administratively liable.
Prevailing jurisprudence holds that unless a nuisance is a
nuisance per se, it may not be summarily abated.32
There is a nuisance when there is "any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property, or anything
else which: (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of
others; or (2) annoys or offends the senses; or (3) shocks,
defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4) obstructs or
interferes with the free passage of any public highway or
street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use
of property."33 But other than the statutory definition,
jurisprudence recognizes that the term "nuisance" is so
comprehensive that it has been applied to almost all ways
which have interfered with the rights of the citizens, either
in person, property, the enjoyment of his property, or his
comfort.34
A nuisance is classified in two ways: (1) according to the
object it affects; or (2) according to its susceptibility to
summary abatement.1âwphi1
As for a nuisance classified according to the object or objects
that it affects, a nuisance may either be: (a) a public
nuisance, i.e., one which "affects a community or
neighborhood or any considerable number of persons,
although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage
upon individuals may be unequal"; or (b) a private nuisance,
or one "that is not included in the foregoing definition"
which, in jurisprudence, is one which "violates only private
rights and produces damages to but one or a few
persons."35
A nuisance may also be classified as to whether it is
susceptible to a legal summary abatement, in which case, it
may either be: (a) a nuisance per se, when it affects the
immediate safety of persons and property, which may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity;36
or, (b) a nuisance per accidens, which "depends upon certain
conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a
question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing
thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a
thing does in law constitute a nuisance;"37 it may only be so
proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose and may not
be summarily abated without judicial intervention.38
In the case at bar, none of the tribunals below made a factual
finding that the basketball ring was a nuisance per se that is
susceptible to a summary abatement. And based on what
appears in the records, it can be held, at most, as a mere
nuisance per accidens, for it does not pose an immediate
effect upon the safety of persons and property, the
definition of a nuisance per se. Culling from examples cited
in jurisprudence, it is unlike a mad dog on the loose, which
may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it
poses to the safety and lives of the people; nor is it like
pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic
drugs which are inherently pernicious and which may be
summarily destroyed; nor is it similar to a filthy restaurant
which may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the
public health.39 A basketball ring, by itself, poses no
immediate harm or danger to anyone but is merely an object
of recreation. Neither is it, by its nature, injurious to rights of
property, of health or of comfort of the community and,
thus, it may not be abated as a nuisance without the benefit
of a judicial hearing.40
But even if it is assumed, ex gratia argumenti, that the
basketball ring was a nuisance per se, but without posing any
immediate harm or threat that required instantaneous
action, the destruction or abatement performed by
petitioners failed to observe the proper procedure for such
an action which puts the said act into legal question.
Under Article 700 of the Civil Code, the abatement, including
one without judicial proceedings, of a public nuisance is the
responsibility of the district health officer. Under Article 702
of the Code, the district health officer is also the official who
shall determine whether or not abatement, without judicial
proceedings, is the best remedy against a public nuisance.
The two articles do not mention that the chief executive of
the local government, like the Punong Barangay, is
authorized as the official who can determine the propriety
of a summary abatement.
Further, both petitioner Cruz, as Punong Barangay, and
petitioner Dela Cruz, as Barangay Tanod, claim to have acted
in their official capacities in the exercise of their powers
under the general welfare clause of the Local Government
Code. However, petitioners could cite no barangay nor city
ordinance that would have justified their summary
abatement through the exercise of police powers found in
the said clause. No barangay nor city ordinance was violated;
neither was there one which specifically declared the said
basketball ring as a nuisance per se that may be summarily
abated. Though it has been held that a nuisance per se may
be abated via an ordinance, without judicial proceedings,41
We add that, in the case at bar, petitioners were required to
justify their abatement via such an ordinance because the
power they claim to have exercised – the police power under
the general welfare clause – is a power exercised by the
government mainly through its legislative, and not the
executive, branch. The prevailing jurisprudence is that local
government units such as the provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays exercise police power through
their respective legislative bodies.42
The general welfare clause provides for the exercise of
police power for the attainment or maintenance of the
general welfare of the community. The power, however, is
exercised by the government through its legislative branch
by the enactment of laws regulating those and other
constitutional and civil rights.43 Jurisprudence defines
police power as the plenary power vested in the legislature
to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general
welfare of the people.44 The Latin maxim is salus populi est
suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme
law).45 Police power is vested primarily with the national
legislature, which may delegate the same to local
governments through the enactment of ordinances through
their legislative bodies (the sanggunians).46 The so-called
general welfare clause, provided for in Section 16 of the
Local Government Code, provides for such delegation of
police power, to wit:
Section 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit
shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion
of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and
support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance
the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of appropriate and self-reliant
scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice,
promote full employment among their residents, maintain
peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience
of their inhabitants.
Flowing from this delegated police power of local
governments, a local government unit like Barangay 848,
Zone 92 in which petitioners were public officials, exercises
police power through its legislative body, in this case, its
Sangguniang Barangay.47 Particularly, the ordinances
passed by the sanggunian partly relate to the general
welfare of the barangay, as also provided for by the Local
Government Code as follows:
Section 391. Powers, Duties, and Functions. –
(a) The sangguniang barangay, as the legislative body of the
barangay, shall:
(1) Enact ordinances as may be necessary to discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law or ordinance and to
promote the general welfare of the inhabitants therein;
(emphasis supplied)
Even the powers granted to the punong barangay consist
mainly of executing only those laws and ordinances already
enacted by the legislative bodies, including the said official's
own sangguniang barangay, to wit:
Section 389. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, and Functions.
–
(a) The punong barangay, as the chief executive of the
barangay government, shall exercise such powers and
perform such duties and functions, as provided by this Code
and other laws.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance, the
purpose of which is the general welfare of the barangay and
its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the
punong barangay shall:
(1) Enforce all laws and ordinances which are applicable
within the barangay;
xxxx
(3) Maintain public order in the barangay and, in pursuance
thereof, assist the city or municipal mayor and the
sanggunian members in the performance of their duties and
functions;
xxxx
(14) Promote the general welfare of the barangay;
(15) Exercise such other powers and perform such other
duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or
ordinance.48

Clearly, the complete destruction of the basketball ring by

the petitioners is justified neither by law or ordinance nor
even by equity or necessity, which makes the act illegal and
petitioners liable. And even as an action to maintain public
order, it was done excessively and was unjustified. Where a
less damaging action, such as the mere padlocking, removal
or confiscation of the ring would have sufficed, petitioners
resorted to the drastic measure of completely destroying
and rendering as unusable the said ring, which was a private
property, without due process. Such an act went beyond
what the law required and, in being so, it tarnished the image
and integrity of the offices held by petitioners and
diminished the public's confidence in the legal system.
Petitioners who were public officials should not have been
too earnest at what they believed was an act of restoring
peace and order in the community if in the process they
would end up disturbing it themselves. They cannot break
the law that they were duty-bound to enforce. Although the
Court bestows sympathy to the numerous constituents who
allegedly complained against the basketball court to
petitioners, it cannot legally agree with the methods
employed by the said officials. Their good intentions do not
justify the destruction of private property without a legal
warrant, because the promotion of the general welfare is
not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law.49
Unlike the examples cited earlier of a mad dog on the loose,
pornography on display or a filthy restaurant, which all pose
immediate danger to the public and, therefore, could be
addressed by anyone on sight, a basketball ring as a nuisance
poses no such urgency that could have prevented
petitioners from exercising any form of deliberation or
circumspection before acting on the same.

Petitioners do not claim to have acted in their private

capacities but in their capacities as public officials, thus, they
are held administratively liable for their acts. And even in
their capacities as private individuals who may have abated
a public nuisance, petitioners come up short of the legal
requirements. They do not claim to have complied with any
of the requisites laid down in Article 704 of the Civil Code, to
wit:

Art. 704. Any private person may abate a public nuisance

which is specially injurious to him by removing, or if
necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the
same, without committing a breach of the peace, or doing
unnecessary injury. But it is necessary:

(1) That demand be first made upon the owner or possessor

of the property to abate the nuisance;

(2) That such demand has been rejected;

(3) That the abatement be approved by the district health

officer and executed with the assistance of the local police;
and

(4) That the value of the destruction does not exceed three
thousand pesos.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.

The Court of Appeals Decision dated March 31, 2008 in CA-
G.R. SP. No. 104474 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.