TAÑADA vs TUVERA G.R. No.

L-63915 April 24, 1985

FACTS:

 Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in
the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
 PETITIONER ARGUMENTS
 That they have the right to be informed on the matters of public concern as recognized in Section 6, Article IV
of the 1973 Philippine Constitution.
 Also, with accordance to Article 2 of the Civil Code, laws must be published in the Official Gazette before it to
be valid or effectively promulgated.

 RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS THROUGH OSG

 Contends that the petitioner has no legal standing to file this case because the petitioner was not directly and
adversely affected or was not the aggrieved party of the said PD and others invoking Section 3, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use a enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and
to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

 Also, Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement
for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.
It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date, they are
to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored
on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

Respondent averred that, In a long line of decisions, this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is
necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not
when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect,

PROCEDURAL ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not the petitioner has the legal standing to file this instant case?

RULING ON PROCEDURAL ISSUES:

YES, because it is clear that the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by
no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be
difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer
generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.

As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of
mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be
subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and

"it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79
M.e., 469],
 " nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a
public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted
need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such
interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not the publication is indispensable requirement before a law takes effect?

2.) Whether or not the publication is not required if the date of effectivity is specifically provided?

RULING ON SUBSTANTIAL ISSUE :

Publication is indispensable requirement before a law, statute, presidential decree or any others alike which has
general application and public in nature takes into effect even with the presence of the specific date of application. In
short, if the law or the above mentioned laws and orders, is not published in the official gazette and in the newspaper of
general circulation, (Article 2, Civil Code) then the law shall have no binding force and effect.

REASON:

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette
1. All important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines;
2. all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability;
3. decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published;
4. such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and
5. such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from
time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be
published. ...

The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That
duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public
concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published
in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever
as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.

HENCE, with that it is undisputed that PUBLICATION in the official gazette and in the
newspaper of general circulation is INDISPENSABLE requirement before a law takes effect.

LOGICAL REASON OF THE DECISION:

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would
be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice
to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one.

Meaning before the presumption that the general public is well informed of the law, a publication
must first be established.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances
which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.
TAÑADA vs TUVERA G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
FACTS:
 The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that decision in the
previous case of TAÑADA vs TUVERA G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985 Specifically, they ask the following
questions:
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
 PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS:
 Petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those
which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be made
forthwith in the Official Gazette.
 RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS THROUGH OSG:
 That the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication
required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in
the Official Gazette;
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the clause “unless otherwise provided” meant that the publication required therein was not
always imperative?
RULINGS:

No. The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make
the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.

REASON:

"ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication."

 Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-
day period shall be shortened or extended.
 The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly.
 All statutes, including those of local application and private laws.
 Presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
 Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.
 Charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and
directly affects only the inhabitants of that place.
 Circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in
the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

 The following does not need to be published.

 Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.
 So-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
 Instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for
adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of
his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms.
 Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.
 LOGICAL REASON OF THE DECISION:

The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of
the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become
effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short
period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they
would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence.
Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal
measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they
can begin to operate.

Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern,"

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon
thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their
publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.

NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., vs MILITARY SHRINE

SERVICES, G.R. No. 187587, 05 June 2013

FACTS:
 Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision
promulgated on 29 April 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97925
 BACKGROUND TO THE CASE:
 Proclamation No. 423, (12 July 1957) by then President Carlos P. Garcia
– reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and
Pasay City for a military reservation (Fort Bonifacio).
 Proclamation No. 208, (28 May 1967), by then President Ferdinand Marcos (amended Proc. No. 423)
– which excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national shrine. The excluded area is now
known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under the administration of herein respondent Military Shrine
Services – Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).

 Proclamation No. 2476, (7 January 1986) by then President Marcos (further amending Proc. No. 423)
– which excluded barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of Proclamation
No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under the provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.
(PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE)
– At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum, which
reads "P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan (NOT PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE)

 Proclamation No. 172, (16 October 1987) by then President Corazon C. Aquino
– which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but this time excluded Lots 1 and
2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared the said lots open
For disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.
 On 27 August 1999, herein petitioner, filed a Petition with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP), where it was docketed as COSLAP Case No. 99-434. The Petition prayed for the following:
1. the reclassification of the areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of Western Bicutan, from
public land to alienable and disposable land pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476;
2. the subdivision of the subject lot by the Director of Lands; and
3. the Land Management Bureau’s facilitation of the distribution and sale of the subject lot to its bona fide
occupants.
– COSLAP granted the petitioner’s petition, they ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an
integral part of Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the President could not
be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others.
– Further, considering that Proclamation No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative
powers, it could not be amended, repealed or superseded, by a mere executive enactment. Thus, Proclamation No.
172 could not have superseded much less displaced Proclamation No. 2476, as the latter was issued on October 16,
1987 when President Aquino’s legislative power had ceased.
  Consequently, herein respondent filed a Motion for reconsideration which denied by COSLAP but was subsequently
granted by the Court of Appeals rendering the ASSAILED decision in this instant case.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the written addendum be considered as part of the Proclamation No. 2476 even though it was not
included in the publication?

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
WAS NOT DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE BY VIRTUE OF PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 BECAUSE THE
HANDWRITTEN ADDENDUM OF PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS INCLUDING WESTERN BICUTAN IN
PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PUBLICATION

RULING:
No. The written addendum by then President Marcos cannot be considered part of the Proclamation No. 2476
considering that the same was not included in the publication, hence it cannot be enforced and given effect of a law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides:

Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

REASON:

1. The issue of the requirement of publication was already settled in the landmark case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera, in
which we had the occasion to rule thus:
 Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended.

o We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is
to inform the public of the contents of the laws.
o the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts
(e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the
Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance.
xxxx
o Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized
as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended
to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
 WHEREFORE, applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten
note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the note never had
any legal force and effect.

2. Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the publication of any law,
resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority."

 Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but
speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from
the words appearing in the law. This Court cannot rule that a word appears in the law when, evidently, there
is none.

In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano, we ruled that "under Article 8 of the Civil Code”,
“judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines.'
This does not mean, however, that courts can create law. The courts exist for interpreting the law, not for
enacting it. To allow otherwise would be violative of the principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as the
sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret the laws, particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or
where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto itself the task of legislating." The remedy
sought in these Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but another legislation that would amend the law ‘to
include petitioners' lots in the reclassification.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April 2009 is AFFIRMED in toto. Accordingly, this Court's status
quo order dated 17 June 2009 is hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all pending motions to cite respondent in contempt is DENIED,
having been rendered moot. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, INC vs EUGENIO PEÑAFIEL G.R. No.
173976, 27 February 2009

FACTS:
 Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 29, 2005 and Resolution
dated July 31, 2006. The assailed decision nullified the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of respondents’ properties
because the notice of sale was published in a newspaper not of general circulation in the place where the
properties were located.

 BACKGROUND TO THE CASE

 Respondent Erlinda Peñafiel and the late Romeo Peñafiel are the registered owners of two parcels of land,
both issued by the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City.
 On August 1, 1991, the Peñafiel spouses mortgaged their properties in favor of petitioner Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Company, Inc. The mortgage deed was amended on various dates as the amount of the loan
covered by said deed was increased to which spouses defaulted in the payment of their loan.
 Consequently, on July 14, 1999, petitioner instituted an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding under Act No.
3135 through Diego A. Alleña, Jr., a notary public.

Respondent Erlinda Peñafiel received the Notice of Sale, stating that the public auction was to be held
on September 7, 1999 at ten o’clock in the morning, at the main entrance of the City Hall of
Mandaluyong City.
The Notice of Sale was published in Maharlika Pilipinas on August 5, 12 and 19, 1999, as attested to
by its publisher in his Affidavit of Publication. Copies of the said notice were also posted in three
conspicuous places in Mandaluyong City.

 At the auction sale, petitioner emerged as the sole and highest bidder. The subject lots were sold to petitioner
for ₱6,144,000.00. A certificate of sale was subsequently issued in its favor.
 On August 8, 2000, respondent Erlinda Peñafiel, through her attorney-in-fact, Eugenio Peñafiel, filed a
Complaint praying that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties be declared null and void. They
likewise sought
(a) to enjoin petitioner and the Register of Deeds from consolidating ownership,
(b) to enjoin petitioner from taking possession of the properties, and
(c) to be paid attorney’s fees.
 On June 30, 2003, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered judgment in favor of herein petitioner that the
said foreclose of properties was VALID.
 Respondents appealed to the CA, raising, among others, the issue of whether petitioner complied with the
publication requirement for an extrajudicial foreclosure sale under Act No. 3135, to which the CA agreed
with respondents.
The CA noted that the law requires that publication be made in a newspaper of general
circulation in the municipality or city where the property is situated. Based on the testimony of
the publisher of Maharlika Pilipinas, it concluded that petitioner did not comply with this requirement,
since the newspaper was not circulated in Mandaluyong City where the subject properties were
located. Thus, in its Decision dated July 29, 2005, the CA reversed the RTC Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby
entered declaring the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the properties NULL and VOID.
  PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS:
 Petitioner contends that Maharlika Pilipinas is a newspaper of general circulation Petitioner insists that
Maharlika Pilipinas is a newspaper of general circulation since it is published for the dissemination of local
news and general information, it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers, and it is
published at regular intervals. It asserts that the publisher’s Affidavit of Publication attesting that Maharlika
Pilipinas is a newspaper of general circulation is sufficient evidence of such fact. Further, the absence of
subscribers in Mandaluyong City does not necessarily mean that Maharlika Pilipinas is not circulated therein.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner complied with the publication requirement under Section 3, Act No. 3135?; or
2. Whether or not the foreclosure sale of properties was published in a newspaper of general circulation?

RULING:
No. The court ruled that the publication of notices of foreclosure sale of properties does not complied with the
requirements with regards to proper or valid publication because the Maharlika Pilipinas according to this court was
not a newspaper of general circulation, hence, the same cannot be given an effect.

Section 3, Act No. 3135, which provides:

SECTION 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty days in at least three public
places of the municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred
pesos, such notice shall also be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in the municipality or city.

 The court ruled that Maharlika Pilipinas was not a newspaper of general circulation for the following reason:

1. Petitioner correctly points out that neither the publisher’s statement that Maharlika Pilipinas is being circulated in
Rizal and Cavite, nor his admission that there are no subscribers in Mandaluyong City proves that said
newspaper is not circulated in Mandaluyong City.
2. Nonetheless, the publisher’s testimony that they "do not just offer [Maharlika Pilipinas] to anybody" implies that
the newspaper is not available to the public in general. This statement, taken in conjunction with the fact that
there are no subscribers in Mandaluyong City, convinces us that Maharlika Pilipinas is, in fact, not a newspaper of
general circulation in Mandaluyong City.

To which is a manifestation of non-compliance to the Section 3 of Act No. 3135 that required a notice to published
in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city.

LOGICAL REASON :

The object of a notice of sale is to inform the public of the nature and condition of the property to be sold,
and of the time, place and terms of the sale. Notices are given for the purpose of securing bidders and to
prevent a sacrifice of the property. The goal of the notice requirement is to achieve a "reasonably wide
publicity" of the auction sale. This is why publication in a newspaper of general circulation is required

 True, to be a newspaper of general circulation, it is enough that it is published for the dissemination of local news and
general information, that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers, and that it is published at regular
intervals. Over and above all these, the newspaper must be available to the public in general, and not just to a
select few chosen by the publisher.
 Also, what is important is that a paper should be in general circulation in the place where the properties to be foreclosed
are located in order that publication may serve the purpose for which it was intended.
 Therefore, The key element in this cases is that the general circulation of the newspaper shall be at the place where
the property is located.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated July 29, 2005 and
Resolution dated July 31, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 79862 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 ________________________________________
SPOUSES DACUDAO V. GONZALES, G.R. No. 188056, 688 SCRA 109, 8 January 2013
“Exception to the prospective application of laws”

FACTS:

 Petitioners, residents of Bacaca Road, Davao City were among the investors whom Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and
his associates in the Legacy Group of Companies (Legacy Group) allegedly defrauded through its company “buy
back agreement” that earned them check payments that were dishonored.
 After writing demand for the return of the investment of petitioners went unheeded, they initiated a number of
charges for “syndicated estafa” against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City
on February 6, 2009. Three of the cases were docketed as NPS Docket No. XI-020INV-09-A-00356, Docket No. XI-
020INV-09-C-00752 and Docket No. XI-02-INV-09-C-00753.
 On March 18, 2009, Secretary of Justice issued DOJ Order No. 182, directing all Regional State Prosecutors,
Provincial Prosecutors and City Prosecutors to forward all cases filed against Delos Angeles to the Secretariat of
the DOJ Special Panel in Manila to take action.
 All cases already filed against Delos Angeles should be forwarded to the Secretariat of the Special Panel Room 149
at DOJ Office with the “exemption” of the cases filed in Cagayan de Oro City under Memorandum dated March 2,
2009 for proper disposition.
 Pursuant to DO No. 182, complaints of petitioners were forwarded by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao
City to the Secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ.
 Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners directly come to the Court via petition of Certiorari, Prohibition and
mandamus against the Secretary of Justice of grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182. They claim that DO
No. 182 violated their right to due process, equal protection of the laws, speedy disposition of cases. Also DO No.
182 was an obstruction of justice and a violation of the rule against enactment of laws with retroactive effect.
 Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the issuance of DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 exempting
from the coverage of DO No. 182 all the cases for “syndicated estafa” filed and pending in the Cagayan de Oro
and it was violative to their right to equal protection under constitution.
 The OSG maintains the validity of DO No. 182 and Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 and prays that petition be
dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUE/s:

1. whether or not petitioners properly bring their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus directly to the
court
2. whether or not Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182
3. whether or not DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 violate petitioners’ constitutional rights
4. whether or not DO No. 182 violates the prohibition against passing laws with rectroactive effect

RULING:

1. NO, Petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to the court without tendering
therein any special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the petition. Concurrence of
Jurisdiction among different courts to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus do not give unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum. This court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of Certiorari and others not
exclusive. It is shared by different courts. Hierarchy of the courts is determinative of the venue of appeals. As a
rule, the court is a court of last resort, not a court of first instance. Issuance of extraordinary writs of first level
(inferior) courts should be filed with the RTC and those against the latter with the Court of Appeals. Sec. 4 of Rule
65, Rules of Court states that “when and where petition filed- not later than 60 days from notice of the judgement,
order or resolution”. Hence, the strictness of the policy is designed to shield the court (SC) to deal with causes
 within the competence of the lower courts. Thus, leaving ample time to the court to do more fundamental and
essential tasks that the constitution assigned. Strict adherence to the policy of hierarchy of courts is amplified.
2. NO, petition did not show that the Secretary of Justice acted grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners merely alleged
that the Secretary of Justice had acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction and failed to give requisites for
certiorari.
3. NO, DO No. 182 was issued pursuant to Department Order No. 84 that the Secretary of Justice had promulgated
to govern the performance of the mandate of the DOJ to “administer the criminal justice system in accordance
with the accepted process thereof” as expressed in Republic Act No. 10071 or Prosecution Service Act of 2010 and
Sec. 3, Chapter I, Title III and Sec. 1 Chapter I Title III of Book IV of Executive Order 292 (Administrative Code of
1987). Thus, DO No. 182 did not exceeded the bounds of the latter.
4. NO, as a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist, and one such exception
concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies
or modes of procedure does not create new rights or take away vested rights but only operates in furtherance of
the remedy or the confirmation of already existing rights. A statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts
will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage. All procedural
laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive application is not violative of any right of a
person who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no vested right generally attaches to or arises from procedural
laws.

________________________________________
FRIVALDO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTION, G.R. No. 120295 and 123755, 257 SCRA 727, 28 June 1996
“Exception to the prospective application of laws”

FACTS:

 This is a petition to annul three Resolutions made by the COMELEC; 1. Resolution of the Second Division on 1 May
1995, disqualifying Frivaldo from running for Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 election on the ground of
his citizenship; 2. Resolution of the COMELEC en banc promulgated on 11 May 1995; and 3. Resolution of the
COMELEC en banc promulgated on 11 May 1995, suspending the proclamation of Frivaldo.
 Frivaldo asserts that the aforementioned Resolutions on different grounds contravene Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
 Petitioner stated that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction to issue Resolutions because they were not rendered
“within the period allowed by law”.
 Petitioner contends that the failure of the COMELEC to act on the petition for disqualification within the period of
fifteen (15) days prior to the election as provided by law is a jurisdictional defect which renders the said
Resolutions null and void.

ISSUE/s:

1. whether or not repatriation of Frivaldo is valid and legal

2. whether or not Frivaldo’s “judicially declared” disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to
his eligibility to run, to be elected or hold office of governorship of Sorsogon
3. whether or not the COMELEC have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317 considering that the
said petition is not “a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or quo warranto case
4. whether or not the proclamation of Lee valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence
5. whether or not COMELEC exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed Resolutions and violative under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
6. whether or not Frivaldo’s repatriation is in line with the retroactive application of law prior to the election
RULING:

1. YES, under Philippine law, citizenship may be acquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by
repatriation. Petitioner reacquired his citizenship under P.D. No. 725.
2. NO, The record shows that the Supreme Court had decided that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and only
disqualified for the purpose of 1988 and 1992 elections. However, there is no record of “final judgement” of
disqualification for the 1995 election. Thus, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot
govern a person’s future status because the person may subsequently reacquired citizenship as stated in P.D.
No. 725.
3. YES, COMELEC have given powers by the Constitution to “exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective officials”. COMELEC is merely exercising
Constitutional prerogative with regards to this petition.
4. NO, Lee’s proclamation is deemed null and void because he was not legally entitled to be proclaimed and it
should be the Vice-Governor to assume office. Thus, the fact remains that he was not the choice of sovereign
will.
5. YES, Resolution of the COMELEC dated 1 May 1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution dated 11 May 1995
were rendered beyond fifteen- (15) day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Resolutions are deemed superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the COMELEC (First Division) dated 19
December 1995 and affirmed en banc on February 23, 1996. Thus, Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code is
merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, authorizes the Commision to try and decide petitions for
disqualification eve after the election.
6. YES, It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE
or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS. A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it
creates a new right, also provides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its
preamble, P.D. 725 expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) avail of
repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status" and who could
neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino woman who marries an alien
to retain her Philippine citizenship . . ." because "such provision of the new Constitution does not apply to
Filipino women who had married aliens before said constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new
right to these women -- the right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture, which
right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also provided a new remedy and a new
right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have
had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they
could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation. Hence,
Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal aberrations and thus its provisions
are considered essentially remedial and curative.
 ________________________________________
NUNGA V. NUNGA, G.R. No. 178306, 18 December 2008
“Exception to the prospective application of laws”

FACTS:

 The petition is about the review in certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision made by
Court of Appeals dated 4 June 2007. The appellate court reversed the decision dated 25 October 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 42 in Commercia Case No. 018, which ordered the
registration of the transfer of ownership of the shares of stock in the Rural Bank of Apalit, Inc. (RBA) in favor of
the petitoners.
 On 30 January 1996, RBA conducted its Annual Stockholders’ Meeting at San Vicente, Apalit, Pampanga.
Stockholders representing 28,150 out of 35,956 total outstanding shares of stock was attended.
 Stockholders proceeded with the election of the RBA Board of Directors for the Fiscal year 19996. Francisco III
was voted Chairman of the Board. In the same meeting, stockholder Jesus Gonzales informed the members of
is intention to sell his stocks.
 On 19 February 1996, Gonzales executed a Contract of Sale in favor of Francisco Jr. through Victor, son of
Francisco Jr.
 On 27 February 1996, a day before Francisco Jr. could pay the balance, Gonzales entered into another contract
involving the very same shares with Francisco III.
 On 14 March 1996, Victor filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against Francisco
III and Firme which was docketed as SEC Case No. 03-565288, to declare Stockholders Meeting held on 30
January 1996 null and void. On the same day, Francisco III filed a complaint against Gonzales, Francisco Jr., and
Victor before the SEC which was docketed as SEC Case No. 03-96-5292, sought the Termporary Restraining Order
(TRO) against Francisco Jr. and Victor conspiring to oust him.
 On 21 November 2000, cases before SEC were turned over to the RTC in pursuant to Administrative Circular AM
No. 00-11-0323. SEC cases No. 03-96-5288 and No, 03-96-5292 were docketed as Commercial Cases No. 001 and
No. 018.
 Francisco III filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration but was denied by the RTC in an order dated 31 January
2003. Thus, Francisco III filed with the RTC a Notice of Appeal before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 78424.
 On 31 January 2007, Court of Appeals rendered its assailed decision favoring Francisco III and reversing the
decision made by the RTC.

ISSUE/s:

1. whether or not the Court of Appeals erred sale of the shares of stock of Gonzales to Francisco Jr. null and void
under the basis of R.A. No. 7353
2. whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred that Francisco III has a vested right to the shares of stock of
Gonzales, which would be impaired by the Retroactive Application of R.A. No. 8179

RULING:

1. NO, The Deed of Assignement between Francisco III and Gonzales did not confer upon Francisco III a vested
interest that could be impaired by the retroactive application of R.A. No. 8179. Also, Section 4 of R.A. No. 7353
explicitly provides that the capital stocks of any rural bank shall be fully owned and held directly or indirectly by
 citizens of the Philippines…. Thus, argument made and uttered by Francisco Jr. and Victor are both erroneous and
unfounded pertaining R.A. No 7353.
2. NO, The Court upholds the finding of the Court of Appeals that R.A. No. 8179 cannot be applied retroactively to
the present case because it would prejudice the vested rights of Francisco III, who is undeniably a citizen of the
Philippines. It would not matter that Gonzales executed Contract of Sell in favor of Francisco Jr. prior to the Deed
of Assignment in favor of Francisco III because the Contract of Sell was held null and without force for being
contrary to the law. Hence, it intended to effect a transfer, which was prohibited by R.A. No 7353.

AGUJETAS and BIJIS vs Court of Appeals and the People of the Philippines
G.R. no. 106560, 23 August 1996

FACTS:
✓ Petitioners Florezil Agujetas and Salvador Bijis, former Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively of the Provincial
Board of Canvassers for the Province of Davao Oriental assail the decision of the public respondent Court of Appeals
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mati, Davao Oriental finding them guilty as charged for failure
to proclaim a winning elected candidate.
✓ On January 21, 1988, the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the Province of Davao Oriental, composed of 1.) the
Provincial Election Supervisor Florezil Agujetas, as Chairman, 2.) Provincial Prosecutor Salvador Bijis, as Vice
Chairman, and 3.) Division Superintendent of Public Schools in said province, Benjamin Miano, 2 as member,
proclaimed the winners for Governor, Vice-Governor, and Provincial Board Members for Davao Oriental in the January
18, 1988 election. Among other proclaimed candidates were:
▪ For Provincial Board Members
o 1. Cirilo R. Valles 42,394 votes
o 2. Ma. Elena Palma Gil 41,557 votes
o 3. Antonio Alcantara 39,104 votes
o 4. Dr. Capistrano Roflo 37,301 votes
o 5. Orlando Rodriguez 34,914 votes
o 6. Alfredo Abayon 34,191 votes
o 7. Justina Yu 32,360 votes
o 8. Pedro Pena 30,679 votes

The eighth board member proclaimed, Pedro Pena, garnered 30,679 votes when another candidate for the Board, Erlinda
Irigo, got 31,129 or 450 more votes than Pena. Before the proclamation was made, when the certificate of canvass and
proclamation statements of winning candidates were finished, a verbal protest was lodged by Mrs. Maribeth Irigo Batitang,
daughter of candidate Irigo and her designated representative during the canvassing proceedings, addressed to the
Tabulation Committee. Considering, however, that the protest was verbal and not officially brought to the attention of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers during official session, the same was not given appropriate official recognition.
On January 23, 1988, Board Member Candidate Erlinda V. Irigo filed her written protest 3 with the Board of Canvassers.
Meanwhile, Francisco Rabat, a losing gubernatorial candidate in Davao Oriental filed with the COMELEC a complaint
against the three board members for violation of BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code) and RA 6646 (The Electoral Reform Law
of 1987). After a preliminary investigation was conducted by the COMELEC, criminal charges were filed against the Board
members. The pertinent portions of the information in Criminal Case No. 1886 for Violation of 2nd Paragraph of Section 231
in Relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code read:
That on or about January 21, 1988, in the Municipality of Mati, Province of Davao Oriental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused as Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Third Member,
respectively, of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Davao Oriental in the January 18, 1988 elections, conspiring with,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully fail to proclaim Erlinda
Irigo as elected Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member candidate who obtained 31,129 votes, the eighth highest number of
votes cast in said province but instead proclaimed candidate Pedro Pena who obtained only 30,699 votes.
✓ After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision, which reads
In Criminal Cases No. 1886, the Court finds the accused Florezil Agujetas, Salvador Bijis and Benjamin Miano GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as principals for violation of Section 231, second paragraph, of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as
amended, otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines"
✓ The three accused appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the decision assailed in this petition.
✓ PETITIONER ARGUMENTS
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of conviction because:
a.It is the failure to make a proclamation on the basis of the Certificate of Canvass, and not mere
erroneous proclamations, which is punishable under Sec. 262 in relation to Sec. 231 (2) of the Omnibus
Election Code.

b.A protest made to the verification/tabulation committee does not constitute a protest to the Board of
Canvassers itself.
c.The functus oficio rule is applicable to the present case.
d.Credence should not have been given to hearsay testimony to establish the alleged protest to the Board
of Canvassers.
The Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages to a person who is not a party to the case.
✓ After the People's counsel has filed respondents' comment, petitioners filed their Reply wherein they raised for the
first time (not even in their Petition), the issue that the crime under which petitioners were convicted no longer exists
because Republic Act Nos. 6646 (the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987) and 7166 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1991) were
subsequently approved on January 5, 1988 and November 26, 1991, respectively; that these two laws amended the
Omnibus Election Code by deleting certain provisions thereof or adding new ones; and that among those amended
was Section 231, which was modified by Section 28 of RA No. 7166 by removing the specific manner by which the
proclamation of winning candidates by the Board of Canvassers should be made and thereby, in effect, repealing the
second paragraph of Sec. 231 of the old Omnibus Election Code under which Petitioners had been convicted.

ISSUES: On Political Law Context:

Whether or not, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of conviction:
a. On the basis of Section 262 in relation to Section 231 (2) of Omnibus Election Code.
b. Because a protest made to verification/tabulation committee does not constitute a protest to the
Board of Canvassers itself.
c. Because the functus oficio rule is applicable to the present case.
d. Because credence should not have been given to hearsay testimony to establish the alleged
protest to the Board of Canvassers.
Whether or not, the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages to a person who is not a party to the case.
On Civil Law Context:
Whether or not, Section 231 of the Omnibus Election Code is repealed by implication by Section 28 of RA
7166.

RULING:
On Political Law Context:
No. The petition is denied for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed in toto.

On Civil Law Context:

No. There is insufficient fact to prove that Section 231 of the Omnibus Election Code is
repealed by implication by Section 28 of RA 7166
REASONING:

On Political Law Context:

a. The second paragraph of Section 231 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:

The respective board of canvassers shall prepare a certificate of canvass duly signed and affixed with the imprint
of the thumb of the right hand of each member, supported by a statement of the votes and received by each
candidate in each polling place and, on the basis thereof, shall proclaim as elected the candidates who obtained
the highest number of votes cast in the province, city, municipality or barangay. Failure to comply with this
requirement shall constitute an election offense.
The issue hinges on the question of what is being penalized by the pertinent provision of the Omnibus Election
Code. Petitioners argue that they are not liable under the said law because they complied with all the
requirements of Sec. 231 of the Omnibus Election Code. According to them, the Omnibus Election Code does
not punish the preparation of an incorrect certificate of canvass, nor an erroneous proclamation made by the
Board; what it does punish is that, having thus prepared the corresponding certificate, the board for some reason
fails to make the corresponding proclamation on the basis thereof.
However, the Court agreed with the respondent’s stand that petitioner's challenges on this particular issue is a
question of semantics, a mere play of words; for while the prosecution maintains that there was a failure to
proclaim the winning candidate, petitioners on the other hand, counter that there was merely an erroneous
proclamation of the losing candidate; that petitioners forget that in proclaiming an erroneous winner they actually
failed to proclaim the winning candidate, in this case, Erlinda Irigo. Respondents further argue that the situation
presented by petitioners would not exculpate them from criminal responsibility for, whichever way the matter
may be looked into, whether as erroneous proclamation of a losing candidate or failure to proclaim the winning
candidate, the result is the same — the winning candidate was not proclaimed, and hence, injustice is the end
result.
b. The Court find the above contentions untenable. As aptly stated by Director Borra in his aforementioned
resolution:
The timely verbal protest of the daughter-watcher of Mrs. Erlinda Irigo did not trigger on the part of the PBC
(Provincial Board of Canvassers) the responsible action of verifying the basis of the protest. The 3 Members of
the PBC could not attribute to the Committee on Tabulation the blame for their errors as the PBC members
themselves were the ones who certified under oath the said Certificate of Proclamation and the Tabulation
Committee members were totally under their direct supervision and control.
c. As to this issue, suffice it to state that whether or not "the Board of Canvassers became functus oficio" after it
proclaimed the winning candidates, is beside the point. What matters is whether or not petitioners committed an
election offense. Besides, as stated earlier, Mrs. Irigo's watcher made a timely verbal protest to the Tabulation
Committee.
d. The Court is not persuaded on the petitioners argument that even if they tentatively grant that Mrs. Irigo's
testimony is hearsay evidence, there is still ample evidence which proves that the Board was deemed to have
been informed of the verbal protest and that the members thereof were liable for having failed to act on the basis
thereof.
• According to the petitioners, the present case was filed by Francisco Rabat, the losing gubernatorial candidate
in the Province of Davao Oriental. Mrs. Irigo never joined the Complaint as a party-plaintiff at any stage of the
proceedings and she was merely presented as a witness; and thus, for the court to have awarded damages to
Mrs. Irigo was a patent error. The Court find petitioners' allegations untenable. Except where the law specifically
provides the contrary, a complaint that a public crime has been committed may be laid by any competent
person. The Omnibus Election Code does not specifically provide that a particular person must file the
complaint and hence, the complaint filed by Francisco Rabat is valid. It was pointed out that even an offended
party not mentioned in the Information, may claim the civil liability during the trial if he has not waived it. In the
case at bar, Erlinda Irigo clearly, was the party offended or the person whose rights were trampled upon, by
the indecent haste with which petitioners proclaimed Teodoro Pena (sic) as the winner of the 8th seat of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the persistence of Erlinda Irigo's lawyers to participate, as in fact they
participated, in the proceedings a quo as private prosecutors over the vehement objections of petitioners'
counsel clearly indicates that Erlinda Irigo intended to claim damages from petitioners.
On Civil Law Context:
Sec. 231 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) was not expressly repealed by R.A. 7166
because said Sec. 231 is not among the provisions repealed by Sec. 39 of R.A. 7166 which we quote:

Sec. 39. Amending and Repealing Clause. — Sections 107, 108 and 245 of the Omnibus Election
Code are hereby repealed. Likewise, the inclusion in Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code of the
violations of Sections 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111 and 112 as among election offenses is also hereby
repealed. This repeal shall have retroactive effect.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, Republic Act No. 6646, Executive Order Nos. 144 and 157 and all other
laws, orders, decrees, rules and regulations or other issuances, or any part thereof, inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby amended or repealed accordingly.
The statement "All laws or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly." certainly is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts
that are intended to be repealed. If repeal of particular or specific law or laws is intended, the proper step is to
so express it.
Neither is there an implied repeal of Sec. 231 by the subsequent enactment of RA 6646 and RA 7166. While
Sec. 28 of RA 7166, like Sec. 231 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) pertains to the Canvassing by the
Boards of Canvassers, this fact of itself is not sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act.
Sec. 231.Canvass by the board. — The board of canvassers shall meet not later than six o'clock in the
afternoon of election day at the place designated by the Commission to receive the election returns and to
immediately canvass those that may have already been received. It shall meet continuously from day to day
until the canvass is completed, and may adjourn but only for the purpose of awaiting the other election returns
from other polling places within its jurisdiction. Each time the board adjourns, it shall make a total of all the
votes canvassed so far for each candidate for each office, furnishing the Commission in Manila by the fastest
means of communication a certified copy thereof, and making available the data contained therein to the mass
media and other interested parties. As soon as the other election returns are delivered, the board shall
immediately resume canvassing until all the returns have been canvassed.
The respective board of canvassers shall prepare a certificate of canvass duly signed and affixed with
the imprint of the thumb of the right hand of each member, supported by a statement of the votes and received
by each candidate in each polling place and, on the basis thereof, shall proclaim as elected the candidates
who obtained the highest number of votes cast in the province, city, municipality or barangay. Failure to
comply with this requirement shall constitute an election offense.
Subject to reasonable exceptions, the board of canvassers must complete their canvass within thirty-
six hours in municipalities, forty-eight hours in cities and seventy-two hours in provinces. Violation hereof shall
be an election offense punishable under Section 264 hereof.
With respect to the election for President and Vice-President, the provincial and city boards of
canvassers shall prepare in quintuplicate a certificate of canvass supported by a statement of votes received
by each candidate in each polling place and transmit the first copy thereof to the Speaker of the Batasang
Pambansa. The second copy shall be transmitted to the Commission, the third copy shall be kept by the
provincial election supervisor or city election registrar; the fourth and the fifth copies to each of the two
accredited political parties. (Sec. 169, 1978 EC)

Sec. 28.Canvassing by Provincial, City, District and Municipal Boards of Canvassers. — (a) The city or
municipal board of canvassers shall canvass the election returns for President, Vice-President, Senators and
members of the House of Representatives and/or elective provincial and city or municipal officials. Upon
completion of the canvass, it shall prepare the certificate of canvass for President, Vice-President, Senators
and Members of the House of Representatives and elective provincial officials and thereafter, proclaim the
elected city or municipal officials, as the case may be.
(b)The city board of canvassers of cities comprising one or more legislative districts shall canvass the
election returns for President, Vice-President, Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and
elective city officials. Upon completion of the canvass, the board shall prepare the certificate of canvass for
President, Vice-President, and Senators and thereafter, proclaim the elected Members of House of
Representatives and city officials.
(c) (1) In the Metro Manila Area, each municipality comprising a legislative district shall have a district
board of canvassers which shall canvass the election returns for President, Vice- President, Senators,
Members of the House of representatives and elective municipal officials. Upon completion of the canvass, it
shall prepare the certificate of canvass for President, Vice-President, and Senators and thereafter, proclaim the
elected Members of the House of Representatives and municipal officials.
(2)Each component municipality in a legislative district in the Metro Manila Area shall have a
municipal board of canvassers which shall canvass the election returns for President, Vice-
President, Senators, . . .
(3)The district board of canvassers of each legislative district comprising two (2)
municipalities in the Metro Manila Area shall canvass the certificates of canvass for
President, Vice-President, . . .
(d)The provincial board of canvassers shall canvass the certificates of canvass for President, Vice-
President, Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and elective provincial officials as well as
plebiscite results, if any plebiscite is conducted simultaneously with the same election, as submitted by the
board of canvassers of municipalities and component cities. Upon completion of the canvass, it shall prepare
the certificate of canvass for President, Vice-President and Senators and thereafter, proclaim the elected
Members of the House of Representatives and provincial officials as well as the plebiscite results, if any.
While the two provisions differ in terms, neither is this fact sufficient to create repugnance. In order to effect a
repeal by implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the existing
law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together. The clearest case possible must be made
before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn, for inconsistency is never presumed. "It is necessarily,
says the court in a case, before such repeal is deemed to exist that it be shown that the statutes or statutory
provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. There must be
a showing of repugnance clear and convincing in character. The language used in the later statute must be
such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that
standard does not suffice." For it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by
implication are not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency or repugnance and, accordingly, against
implied repeal. For the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have
enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.
In the case at bar, the needed manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal is not present. Neither is
there any inconsistency between the two subject provisions.

TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE vs LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT

G.R. no. 166471, 22 MARCH 2011
FACTS:
✓ This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petition challenges the 1 October
2004 Judgment and 6 November 2004 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region 1, Branch 62, La
Trinidad, Benguet, in Civil Case No. 03-CV-1878.
✓ Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a cooperative, registered with the Cooperative Development Authority,
and organized to provide domestic water services in Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet. On the other hand, La
Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a local water utility created under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 198, as amended. It
is authorized to supply water for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes within the municipality of La Trinidad,
Benguet.
✓ On 9 October 2000, TMPC filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an application for a certificate of
public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Barangay Tawang. LTWD opposed
TMPC’s application. LTWD claimed that, under Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its franchise is exclusive.
o Sec. 47. Exclusive Franchise. No franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency for domestic,
industrial or commercial water service within the district or any portion thereof unless and except to the extent
 that the board of directors of said district consents thereto by resolution duly adopted, such resolution,
however, shall be subject to review by the Administration.
✓ In Resolution No. 04-0702 dated 23 July 2002, the NWRB approved TMPC’s application for a CPC. In its 15 August
2002 Decision, the NWRB held that LTWD’s franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive franchises are
unconstitutional and found that TMPC is legally and financially qualified to operate and maintain a waterworks system.
LTWD filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 18 November 2002 Resolution,6 the NWRB denied the motion. LTWD
appealed to the RTC.
✓ In its 1 October 2004 Judgment, the RTC set aside the NWRB’s 23 July 2002 Resolution and 15 August 2002 Decision
and cancelled TMPC’s CPC. The RTC held that Section 47 is valid.
✓ TMPC filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 6 November 2004 Order, the RTC denied the motion. Hence, the
present petition.

ISSUES:
• Whether or not, the Regional Trial Court erred in holding that Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, is valid
and not in violation of the constitution.

RULING:
Yes. The court ruled that Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, is unconstitutional.
Therefore, the petition is granted.

REASONING:
What cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. This rule is basic and, to a reasonable mind,
does not need explanation.
The President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises for the operation of a public utility that
are exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly prohibit the creation of
franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 8, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution states that:
No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted
except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under the laws of the
Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor shall such
franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years.
Section 5, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution states that:
No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted
except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines
at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years.
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that:
No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted
except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines,
at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years.
Plain words do not require explanation. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions are clear — franchises for the
operation of a public utility cannot be exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly
and clearly state that, "nor shall such franchise x x x be exclusive in character." There is no exception. When the
law is clear, there is nothing for the courts to do but to apply it. The duty of the Court is to apply the law the way
it is worded.
DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY:
Indeed, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises that are exclusive in character.
What the President, Congress and the Court cannot legally do directly they cannot do indirectly. Thus, the
President, Congress and the Court cannot create indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing
the Board of Directors (BOD) of a water district and the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) to create
franchises that are exclusive in character.

In PD No. 198, as amended, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) created indirectly
franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the BOD of LTWD and the LWUA to create directly
franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, allows the BOD and the
LWUA to create directly franchises that are exclusive in character.
In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always prevails because the
Constitution is the basic law to which all other laws must conform to. The duty of the Court is to uphold
the Constitution and to declare void all laws that do not conform to it.

GARVIDA vs SALES, JR.

G.R. no. 124893, 18 APRIL 1997
FACTS:
✓ Petitioner Lynette G. Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the order dated May 2, 1996 of respondent Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) en banc suspending her proclamation as the duly elected Chairman of the Sangguniang
Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
✓ The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections nationwide was scheduled to be held on May 6, 1996. On March 16, 1996,
petitioner applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo,
Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Board of Election Tellers, however, denied her application on the ground that petitioner,
who was then twenty-one years and ten (10) months old, exceeded the age limit for membership in the Katipunan ng
Kabataan as laid down in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824.
✓ On April 2, 1996, petitioner filed a "Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and Voter" with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bangui-Pagudpud-Adams-Damalneg, Ilocos Norte. In a decision dated April 18, 1996,
the said court found petitioner qualified and ordered her registration as member and voter in the Katipunan ng
Kabataan. The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. 2 The presiding
judge of the Regional Trial Court, however, inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close association
with petitioner.
✓ On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan,
Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte. In a letter dated April 23, 1996, respondent
Election Officer Dionisio F. Rios, per advice of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, disapproved petitioner's
certificate of candidacy again due to her age. Petitioner, however, appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Filemon
A. Asperin who set aside the order of respondents and allowed petitioner to run.
✓ On May 2, 1996, respondent Rios issued a memorandum to petitioner informing her of her ineligibility and giving her
24 hours to explain why her certificate of candidacy should not be disapproved. Earlier and without the knowledge of
the COMELEC officials, private respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman of the Sangguniang
Kabataan, filed with the COMELEC en banc a "Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy"
against petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in her certificate of candidacy. The petition was
sent by facsimile and registered mail on April 29, 1996 to the Commission on Elections National Office, Manila.
✓ On May 2, 1996, the same day respondent Rios issued the memorandum to petitioner, the COMELEC en banc issued
an order directing the Board of Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the
proclamation of petitioner in the event she won in the election.
✓ On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private respondent's votes of 76. 10 In
accordance with the May 2, 1996 order of the COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election Tellers did not proclaim
petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996. On June 2, 1996, however,
the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed petitioner the winner for the position of SK chairman, Barangay San Lorenzo,
Bangui, Ilocos Norte. 11 The proclamation was "without prejudice to any further action by the Commission on Elections
or any other interested party."
ISSUES:
• Whether or not, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the Comelec en banc.
• Whether or not, petitioner is eligible to file a certificate of candidacy to be an elected official of Sangguniang
Kabataan on the grounds of the age qualification for candidacy.

RULING:
• No.The jurisdiction lies with COMELEC sitting in Division.
• No. The Court declared the petitioner ineligible for being over the age of qualification for candidacy in the
May 6, 1996 elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan. Hence, the petition is dismissed.

REASONING:
Membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan is subject to specific qualifications laid down by the Local Government
Code of 1991, viz:

Sec. 424. Katipunan ng Kabataan. — The katipunan ng kabataan shall be composed of all citizens of the
Philippines actually residing in the barangay for at least six (6) months, who are fifteen (15) but not more than
twenty-one (21) years of age, and who are duly registered in the list of the sangguniang kabataan or in the official
barangay list in the custody of the barangay secretary.

A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may become a candidate for the Sangguniang Kabataan if he
possesses the following qualifications:

Sec. 428. Qualifications. — An elective official of the sangguniang kabataan must be a citizen of the
Philippines, a qualified voter of the katipunan ng kabataan, a resident of the barangay for at least one (1) year
immediately prior to election, at least fifteen (15) years but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on the
day of his election, able to read and write Filipino, English, or the local dialect, and must not have been convicted
of any crime involving moral turpitude.

For the May 6, 1996 SK elections, the COMELEC interpreted Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 in Resolution No. 2824 and defined how a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan becomes a
qualified voter and an elective official. Thus:

Sec. 3. Qualifications of a voter. — To be qualified to register as a voter in the SK elections, a person must be:

a) a citizen of the Philippines;

b) fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day that is, he must have been
born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and

c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year and actually residing in the barangay wherein he
proposes to vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the elections.

Sec. 6. Qualifications of elective members. — An elective official of the SK must be:

a) a qualified voter;

b) a resident in the barangay for at least one (1) year immediately prior to the elections; and

c) able to read and write Filipino or any Philippine language or dialect or English.

Cases involving the eligibility or qualification of candidates shall be decided by the city/municipal Election Officer
(EO) whose decision shall be final.
The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election
is very clear. The Local Government Code speaks of years, not months nor days. When the law speaks of years,
it is understood that years are of 365 days each. One born on the first day of the year is consequently deemed
to be one year old on the 365th day after his birth — the last day of the year. In computing years, the first year
is reached after completing the first 365 days. After the first 365th day, the first day of the second 365-day cycle
begins. On the 365th day of the second cycle, the person turns two years old. This cycle goes on and on in a
lifetime. A person turns 21 years old on the 365th day of his 21st 365-day cycle. This means on his 21st birthday,
he has completed the entire span of 21 365-day cycles. After this birthday, the 365-day cycle for his 22nd year
begins. The day after the 365th day is the first day of the next 365-day cycle and he turns 22 years old on the
365th day.

The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It means 21 365-
day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a year because that would be more
than 21 365-day cycles. "Not more than 21 years old" is not equivalent to "less than 22 years old," contrary to
petitioner's claims. The law does not state that the candidate be less than 22 years on election day.
In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On March 16, 1996, the day she registered as voter for
the May 6, 1996 SK elections, petitioner was twenty-one (21) years and nine (9) months old. On the day of the
elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and 5 days old. When she assumed office on June 1, 1996, she was 21
years, 11 months and 20 days old and was merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years old. Petitioner may
have qualified as a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan but definitely, petitioner was over the age limit for
elective SK officials set by Section 428 of the Local Government Code and Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec
Resolution No. 2824. Therefore, she was ineligible to run as candidate for the May 6, 1996 Sangguniang
Kabataan elections.