Yap Tua case

We find a very interesting case reported in 131 Pennsylvania State, 220 (6 L. R. A., 353), and
cited by the appellees, which was known as "Knox's Appeal." In this case one Harriett S.
Knox died very suddenly on the 17th of October, 1888, at the residence of her father. After
her death a paper was found in her room, wholly in her handwriting, written with a lead
pencil, upon three sides of an ordinary folded sheet of note paper and bearing the signature
simply of "Harriett." In this paper the deceased attempted to make certain disposition of
her property. The will was presented for probate. The probation was opposed upon the
ground that the same did not contain the signature of the deceased. That was the only
question presented to the court, whether the signature, in the form above indicated, was a
sufficient signature to constitute said paper the last will and testament of Harriett S. Knox.
It was admitted that the entire paper was in the handwriting of the deceased.

The man who cannot write and who is obliged to make his mark simply therefor, upon the
will, is held to "sign" as effectually as if he had written his initials or his full name. It would
seem to be sufficient, under the law requiring a signature by the person making a will, to
make his mark, to place his initials or all or any part of his name thereon. In the present case
we think the proof shows, by a large preponderance, that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, if she
did not sign her full name, did at least sign her given name "Tomasa," and that is sufficient to
satisfy the statute.

“Tomasa” – valid

Two wills – old or new? New.

Jaboneta

The fact that he was in the act of leaving, and that his back was turned while a portion of the
name of the witness was being written, is of no importance. He, with the other witnesses and
the testator, had assembled for the purpose of executing the testament, and were together in
the same room for that purpose, and at the moment when the witness Javellana signed the
document he was actually and physically present and in such position with relation to
Javellana that he could see everything which took place by merely casting his eyes in the
proper direction, and without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so, therefore we
are of opinion that the document was in fact signed before he finally left the room.
true test of vision is not whether the testator actually saw the witness sign, but whether he
might have seen him sign, considering his mental and physical condition and position at the
time of the subscription.

Nera case

The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they
actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have been seen each other sign, had they
chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical condition and position with relation to each
other at the moment of inscription of each signature.

What was the thing that was placed across? Curtain

Calde case

Ballpen
autoptic preference

There are indeed genuine cases of inference by the tribunal from things perceived to other
things unperceived — as, for example, from a person’s size, complexion, and features, to his
age; these cases of a real use of inference can be later more fully distinguished . . . But we
are here concerned with nothing more than matters directly perceived — for example, that a
person is of small height or is of dark complexion; as to such matters, the perception by the
tribunal that the person is small or large, or that he has a dark or light complexion, is a mode
of acquiring belief which is independent of inference from either testimonial or circumstantial
evidence. It is the tribunal’s self-perception, or autopsy, of the thing itself.

From the point of view of the litigant party furnishing this source of belief, it may be termed Autoptic Proference.

Abangan case

Two sheets:

Is it necessary that the sheets should be paged? Should have marginal signatures?

Javellana case

No presumption that the testator knew the Spanish language

Remand!
In some cases, it is true, this lack of evidence was considered cured by presumptioin of knowledge of the
language or dialect used in the will, as where the will is executed in a certain province or locality, in the dialect
currently used in such provimnce or locality in which the testator is a native or resident, the presumption arises
that the testator knew the dialect so used, in the absence of evidence to the contrary; 3 or where the will is in
Spanish, the fact that the testratrix was a "mestiza española", was married to a Spaniard, made several trips to
Spain, and some of her letters in her own handwriting submitted as evidence by the oppositor, are in Spanish,
give rise to the presumption that she knew the language in which the will was written, in the absence of proof to
the contrary.4

In the case before us, no such or similar circumstances exist. On the contrary, there is evidence that the
testator is a Visayan although residing in San Juan, Rizal at the time of his death. The will was executed in the
City of Manila. Undoubtedly, it cannot be said, and there is no evidence, that Spaniards is the language
currently used either in San Juan, Rizal, or Manila. It follows, therefore, that no presumption can rise that the
testator knew the Spanish Language.

Andalis case

the execution of a will is supposed to be one act and cannot be

legally effective if the various participants sign on various days and
in various combinations of those present.

Arcenas - disallowed

“John Doe, by the testator, Richard Roe.”

By the testator, John Doe, Richard Roe.”

Ondevilla - valid

For Pascuala Olaguer, Fructuoso Llenaresa

Barut - valid