A.C. No.
5900, April 10, 2019 any resentment or showed any sign of humiliation as she even laughed at the joke and continued to sit in front of
RE: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST ATTY. CRESENCIO P. CO UNTIAN, JR.
RESOLUTION
J. REYES, JR., J.:
Subject of this Resolution is an Anonymous Complaint1 dated May 14, 2002 against Atty. Cresencio P. Co Untian, Jr.
(respondent) for his alleged sexual harassment of students of Xavier University, Cagayan de Oro City (Xavier).
The May 14, 2002 Complaint requested the Court to investigate the alleged sexual harassments that respondent
had committed against students of Xavier, particularly Antoinette Toyco (Toyco), Christina Sagarbarria (Sagarbarria)
and Lea Dal (Dal). The complaint was written in the local dialect and made by an individual identifying himself or
herself only as "law practitioner." In a September 26, 2002 Letter,2 the "law practitioner" sent copies of the complaint-
affidavits3 of the victims of sexual harassment and the Resolution of the Committee on Decorum and Investigation
(Committee on Decorum).
Toyco claimed that respondent initially expressed amorous interest when he sent her flowers anonymously through
another law student. She stated that thereafter, respondent would often text her through the phone of another law
student. Toyco noted eventually that respondent texted her through his own phone where he would send romantic
messages, poems, love notes and sweet nothings. She said that respondent also invited her to go to Camiguin with
another law student but she turned it down. Toyco explained that while she was never sexually assaulted,
respondent's unwelcome advances made her feel degraded as she could not easily ignore respondent for fear of
reprisal.
On the other hand, Sagarbarria narrated that respondent showed her a photograph revealing only the face of a
woman and asked her if she knew who the woman in the picture was. After she realized that the woman in the
picture looked like her, respondent revealed the entire photograph revealing a naked woman and teased her
within hearing distance of other law students. Sagarbarria denied that she was the woman because she had a
distinctive mark on her back for the past six years. She averred that the incident caused her depression, fearing
what other law students may think of her. Sagarbarria highlighted that she was unable to participate in a scheduled
moot court competition because she broke down in the middle of practice and cried uncontrollably.
Meanwhile, Dal recounted that in one of her recitations during respondent's class, she clarified a question
propounded to her saying "Sir, come again?" Respondent retorted "What? You want me to come again? I have not
come the first time and don't you know that it took me five minutes to come, and you want me to come again?"
She later learned that respondent would narrate the said incident to almost all of his classes. Dal felt offended that
she was subjected to such sexually charged language and the fact that her embarrassment was retold in other
classes.
In its September 5, 2002 Resolution,4 the Committee on Decorum recommended that respondent's teaching
contract not be renewed on account of the accusations of sexual harassment against him. It explained that
respondent was guilty of violating Xavier's anti-sexual harassment guidelines. The Committee on Decorum noted
that respondent's unwanted sexual advances or innuendos caused distress to the complaining students as it
created a hostile or offensive environment.
Respondent's Position
Respondent lamented that the complaints for sexual harassment was made by disgruntled students who failed their
classes for the 2001-2002 school year as manifested by the fact that the incidents happened years apart but the
complaints were made all at the same time.
Respondent denied sending flowers and text messages with romantic undertones to Toyco. He highlighted that it
was in fact her who gave him gifts during Valentine's Day in 2002. Respondent added that he texting "luv u" and
"miss u" are friendly text messages sent without malice especially considering that they were misspelled.
As to Sagarbarria's allegations, respondent countered that he confiscated the photograph from another student
and jokingly showed it to her in the spirit of their open and uninhibited relationship. He noted that Sagarbarria is his
niece and they were previously close as they would oftentimes exchange discussions on sensitive and mature
matters as adults without any malice. Respondent claimed that she was never humiliated when he showed her the
photograph because she even gamely lowered down her pants to prove that it was not her in the photograph
because unlike her, the naked woman did not have any tattoo.
On the other hand, respondent explained that Dal answered disrespectfully when she was called for recitation
uttering "Come again?" He posited that to inject humor during class, he responded "Never use slang language in my
class because you might be misinterpreted. What do you mean by 'come again?' It takes me several minutes
before I come again." Respondent expounded that the joke was directed at himself and that Dal never showed
the class.
IBP Proceedings
In his Report and Recommendation5 dated January 19, 2009, Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag (Commissioner
Hababag) recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years. He observed that
respondent was given all the opportunity to explain his side in the investigation that Xavier had conducted.
Commissioner Hababag reminded that lawyers must be of good moral character and must continue to possess it so
long as he is part of the legal profession.
In its Resolution No. XIX-2010-2896 dated April 16, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Board of Governors (IBP-
BOG) affirmed with modification the recommendation of Commissioner Hababag. It resolved to disbar respondent
on the ground of gross immoral conduct.
Respondent moved for reconsideration. In its Resolution No. XXII-2017-8047 dated January 27, 2017, the IBP-BOG
partially granted his motion for reconsideration. It reduced the penalty to two years suspension and directed the
Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline to prepare an extended resolution explaining its actions.
In his June 9, 2017 Extended Resolution,8 Director Ramon S. Esguerra (Director Esguerra) explained that respondent
was not guilty of sexual harassment as defined under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7877 or the "Anti-Sexual Harassment
Law of 1995." He noted that there was no evidence to show that respondent demanded or requested sexual favors
from Toyco, Sagarbarria and Dal. Nevertheless, Director Esguerra expounded that while respondent's actions do not
constitute sexual harassment as defined by law, the way he interacted with his students were unbecoming of a
member of the legal profession. He stressed that being a law professor, respondent should be worthy of emulation
and should not have used his position and stature to make offensive sexual insults on his students. Director Esguerra
postulated that the penalty of two years suspension is a sufficient sanction to protect the public and the legal
profession.
The Court's Ruling
The Court modifies the recommended penalty of the IBP-BOG.
In the case at bench, some of respondent's students accused him of sexual harassment claiming that his actions
were sexual in nature and had offended or humiliated them.
R.A. No. 7877 defines education related sexual harassment as sexual harassment committed by a teacher,
instructor, professor, coach, trainer or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over
another in an education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other,
regardless of whether the same is accepted by the object of the act.9 In particular, it is committed:
1. Against one who is under the care, custody or supervision of the offender;
2. Against one whose education, training, apprenticeship or tutorship is entrusted to the offender;
3. When the sexual favor is made a condition to the giving of a passing grade, or the granting of honors and
scholarships or the payment of a stipend, allowance or other benefits, privileges or considerations; or
4. When the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the student, trainee or
apprentice.10
The IBP-BOG opined that respondent was not guilty of violating R.A. No. 7877 because there was no evidence to
show that he demanded or requested sexual favors from the complainants. Nevertheless, it found respondent's
action unacceptable and conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession.
R.A. No. 7877 does not require that the victim had acceded to the sexual desires of the abuser. Further, it is not
necessary that a demand or request for sexual favor is articulated in a categorical manner as it may be discerned
from the acts of the offender.11 In addition, sexual harassment is also committed in an educational environment
when the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment.12 In short, it is not necessary
that there was an offer for sex for there to be sexual harassment as a superior's conduct with sexual underpinnings,
which offends the victim or creates a hostile environment would suffice.
In Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,13 the Court explained
that the essence of sexual harassment is not the violation of the victim's sexuality but the abuse of power by the
offender. In other words, what the law aims to punish is the undue exercise of power and authority manifested
through sexually charged conduct or one filled with sexual undertones. In Domingo v. Rayala,14, the Court clarified
that R.A. No. 7877 speaks of the criminal infraction of sexual harassment and without prejudice to any administrative
charge which may be filed against one who sexually harasses another.
The Civil Service Commission (CSC) in CSC Resolution No. 01-0940 defined the administrative offense of sexual
harassment in an educational environment as existing when:
SEC. 3 x x x
(b) x x x
(1) submission to or rejection of the act or series of acts is used as a basis for any decision affecting the
complainant, including, but not limited to, the giving of a grade the granting of honors or a scholarship, the
payment of a stipend or allowance, or the giving of any benefit, privilege or consideration.
(2) the act or series of acts have the purpose or effect of interfering with the performance, or creating an
intimidating, hostile or offensive academic environment of the complainant; or
(3) the act or series of acts might reasonably be expected to cause discrimination, insecurity, discomfort, offense
or humiliation to a complainant who may be a trainee, apprentice, intern, tutee or ward of the person
complained of.15
In addition, CSC Resolution No. 01-0940 provides examples of sexual harassment, to wit:
SEC. 5. The following are illustrative forms of sexual harassment:
(a) Physical
i. Malicious Touching
ii. Overt sexual advances
iii. Gestures with lewd insinuation
(b) Verbal, such as but not limited to, requests or demands for sexual favors, and lurid remarks
(c) Use of objects, pictures or graphics, letters or [written] notes with sexual underpinnings
(d) Other forms analogous to the [foregoing].16
Respondent's actions towards the students concerned definitely constitute sexual harassment as defined by R.A.
No. 7877 and the pertinent rules and regulation.
A reading of respondent's Answer would show that he substantially admitted the accusations against him, although
providing a justification for them. He stated that he showed a picture of a naked woman to Sagarbarria only as a
joke and after he had confiscated it from another student to prevent further circulation in the school. Respondent
narrated that he would text Toyco with "luv u" and "miss u" but claimed that it was a common everyday text devoid
of any romantic overtones as evidenced by its informality. Meanwhile, he clarified that the statement he made to
Dal was meant to inject humor in the classroom and to teach her not to use slang language in class. Respondent
assailed that these accusations were due to them failing in his class and that none of the purported victims
exhibited embarrassment or discomfort during the incidents in question.
Respondent's conduct towards Sagarbarria, Dal and Toyco created a hostile and offensive environment which has
no place in a learning institution. He publicly showed a lewd picture to Sagarbarria in the presence of other
students. The incident deeply distressed her to the extent that she was unable to continue with her Moot Court
practice because she became emotional and cried uncontrollably. The fact that Sagarbarria was bothered and
humiliated was even supported by one of respondent's witnesses who stated that respondent demanded that the
photograph be surrendered to him because Sagarbarria was disturbed by it.
In addition, respondent's action was reprehensible regardless of Sagarbarria's reaction. He had the audacity to
show lewd images to one of his students in the hallway where other students were present. Respondent's alleged
close relationship with Sagarbarria is not an excuse as it does not detract from the fact that he exhibited the
indecent picture in a public place. It would have been different had he shown the photograph privately to
Sagarbarria especially since he claims that as uncle and niece, they could talk about mature and sensitive topics
without malice. Respondent could have saved Sagarbarria from embarrassment in having to identify the naked
woman as herself in public.
On the other hand, respondent should not brush aside his text messages to Toyco and his joke to Dal as innocent
remarks devoid of any impropriety. He readily admits that he would text "luv u" and "miss u" but explains that these
are sweet nothings and used in everyday ordinary text messages. These are not harmless text messages especially
since it appears that these were unwelcome flirtations which made Toyco uncomfortable. In addition, they cast a
cloud of impropriety considering that respondent was Toyco's teacher when he sent them.
Meanwhile, respondent's statement to Dal during her recitation in class cannot be categorized as an innocent joke
only meant to lighten the mood of the class. When she was unable to comprehend the question propounded to
her, she asked him "to come again." In response, respondent said, "Never use slang language in my class because
you might be misinterpreted. What do you mean by 'come again'? It takes me several minutes before I come
again."
It is readily apparent that the remark is tasteless, vulgar and crude and has no place in any academic setting. It is
not a clever word play or a mere statement with sexual innuendos as its intended meaning is obviously discernable.
Respondent's attempt at humor miserably fails as his words clearly refer to him needing five minutes to ejaculate
again. Respondent's statements made Dal uncomfortable and embarrassed in front of her classmates as it went
beyond an innocent joke and was instead a gross, graphic and an insensitive remark.
Clearly, respondent abused the power and authority he possessed over the complainants. His sexually laced
conduct had created a hostile and offensive environment which deeply prejudiced his students. In what was
supposed to be a safe place for them to learn and develop, they were instead subjected to unwarranted sexual
advances.
What makes respondent's act of sexual harassment even more reprehensible is the fact that he is both a professor
and a member of the legal profession.
Lawyers carry the burden of living up to the ethical standards of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility because public confidence in law and in lawyers may be tainted by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of members of the Bar.17 Those privileged to practice the legal profession are expected to
maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality considering that they are always under
the watchful public eye scrutinizing them both in their public and private lives. 18
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) provides that a lawyer shall not engage in an unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. On the other hand, Canon 7 mandates that lawyers shall, at all times,
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Further, Rule 7.03 of the CPR commands lawyers not to
engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, or behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession. In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,19 the Court emphasized on the primacy of maintaining a
high sense of morality and decorum among lawyers, to wit:
As this Court often reminds members of the bar, the requirement of good moral character is of much greater import,
as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character is not only a
condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one's
good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad
character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do
the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because "vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient
of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his client's property, reputation, his life, his all."
xxxx
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. A
member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping
a mistress but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the impression that he is
flouting those moral standards. (Emphases supplied)
Much is expected of lawyers in that it does not suffice that they are persons of integrity and values, but must also
appear to be so in the eyes of the people, and of God. Notwithstanding the relativity of morality, lawyers, as
keepers of public faith, are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility — they must handle their personal
affairs with greater caution.20 In other words, members of the bar are measured in a more demanding light because
their actions or inactions not only affect themselves, but also the legal profession and the public's trust and respect
for the law. As such, any errant behavior on the part of the lawyer, whether in a public or private capacity, which
tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension
or disbarment.21
It must be remembered that lawyers are both preachers and stewards of law, justice, morals and fairness in that
they are duty-bound to propagate observance and deference thereto. It is not enough that they know right from
wrong, just from unjust, moral or immoral, because they must not only speak of such ideals, but must also live by
them. Lawyers, aside from being competent and adept in dealing with the intricacies of the law, must also be
individuals of honor and virtue. Legal knowledge and ability, without the guidance of morals and justice, is a
dangerous tool, which may harm, instead of uplift others.
Respondent's responsibilities and expectations are even more heightened because he is a law professor. He should
be a beacon of righteous and conscientious conduct. Respondent, as a molder of minds of soon-to-be lawyers,
should guide his students to behave and act in a manner consistent with the lofty standards of the legal profession.
Instead, he abused his position of authority creating an offensive and uncomfortable atmosphere in school. Again,
what should be a place of learning and growth had become a place of fear and distrust for the affected students.
Further, it is even more disappointing that respondent fails to acknowledge the consequences of his actions and
disregard the hurt Sagarbarria, Toyco and Dal may have felt. He generally claimed that they did not express any
distress, embarrassment, or humiliation during the incidents complained of. It must be stressed that as their law
professor, respondent exercised moral ascendancy over them. Thus, it is within reason that the concerned students
could not have readily expressed disgust or annoyance over a person in authority. It takes courage and strength to
stand up and speak against any form of sexual harassment. This is especially true considering that in most cases, the
offender wields power, authority, or influence over the victim.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Cresencio P. Co Untian, Jr. is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five (5) years and
ten (10) years from teaching law in any school effective upon the finality of this Resolution, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be reflected on the records of
respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. NO. 146053 : April 30, 2008]
DIOSCORO F. BACSIN, Petitioner, v. EDUARDO O. WAHIMAN, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner Dioscoro F. Bacsin questions the Decision1 dated August 23, 2000 of
the First Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 51900, which affirmed Resolution No. 98-0521 dated
March 11, 1998 and Resolution No. 99-0273 dated January 28, 1999, both issued by the Civil Service Commission
(CSC), dismissing petitioner from the service for Grave Misconduct.
Facts of the Case
Petitioner is a public school teacher of Pandan Elementary School, Pandan, Mambajao, Camiguin Province.
Respondent Eduardo O. Wahiman
is the father of AAA, an elementary school student of the petitioner.
AAA claimed that on August 16, 1995, petitioner asked her to be at his office to do an errand.2 Once inside, she saw
him get a folder from one of the cartons on the floor near his table, and place it on his table. He then asked her to
come closer, and when she did, held her hand, then touched and fondled her breast. She stated that he fondled
her breast five times, and that she felt afraid.3 A classmate of hers, one Vincent B. Sorrabas, claiming to have
witnessed the incident, testified that the fondling incident did happen just as AAA related it.4
Petitioner was charged with Misconduct in a Formal Charge dated February 12, 1996 by Regional Director Vivencio
N. Muego, Jr. of the CSC.5
In his defense, petitioner claimed that the touching incident happened by accident, just as he was handing AAA a
lesson book.6 He further stated that the incident happened in about two or three seconds, and that the girl left his
office without any complaint.7
Resolution of the CSC
In Resolution No. 98-0521 dated March 11, 1998, the CSC found petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct (Acts of
Sexual Harassment), and dismissed him from the service.8 Specifically, the CSC found the petitioner to have
committed an act constituting sexual harassment, as defined in Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7877, the Anti-
Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in Resolution No. 99-0273 dated January 28,
1999.
Decision of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner then brought the matter to the CA under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the recourse
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51900.
Petitioner raised the following issues before the CA:
1. Whether or not there were efforts by [AAA], her parents and the Honorable Civil Service Commission to magnify
the accidental touching incident on August 16, 1995;
2. Whether or not the guilt of the petitioner was supported by the evidence on record; and
3. Whether or not there was irregularity in the imposition of the penalty of removal.9
In resolving the case, the CA determined that the issue revolved around petitioner's right to due process, and based
on its finding that petitioner had the opportunity to be heard, found that there was no violation of that right. The CA
ruled that, even if petitioner was formally charged with "disgraceful and immoral conduct and misconduct," the
CSC found that the allegations and evidence sufficiently proved petitioner's guilt of grave misconduct, punishable
by dismissal from the service.
The Issues Before Us
The petitioner now raises the following issues in the present petition:
1. Whether or not the petitioner could be guilty of acts of sexual harassment, grave misconduct, which was different
from or an offense not alleged in the formal charge filed against him at the inception of the administrative case.
2. Assuming petitioner was guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct and misconduct as charged by complainant,
whether or not the penalty of dismissal from the service imposed by the Civil Service Commission and affirmed by
the Court of Appeals is in accord with Rule XIV, Section (23) of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and applicable
rulings.
3. Whether or not the charge of Misconduct, a lesser offense, includes the offense of Grave Misconduct; a greater
offense.
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner argues that the CSC cannot validly adjudge him guilty of an offense, such as "Grave Misconduct (Acts of
Sexual Harassment)," different from that specified in the formal charge which was "Misconduct." He further argues
that the offense of "Misconduct" does not include the graver offense of "Grave Misconduct."
This argument is unavailing.
As Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission teaches:
The charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an
information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge against him;
what is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of the offense.10
It is clear that petitioner was sufficiently informed of the basis of the charge against him, which was his act of
improperly touching one of his students. Thus informed, he defended himself from such charge. The failure to
designate the offense specifically and with precision is of no moment in this administrative case.
The formal charge, while not specifically mentioning RA 7877, The Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, imputes on
the petitioner acts covered and penalized by said law. Contrary to the argument of petitioner, the demand of a
sexual favor need not be explicit or stated. In Domingo v. Rayala,11 it was held, "It is true that this provision calls for a
'demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor.' But it is not necessary that the demand, request, or requirement
of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude,
from the acts of the offender." The CSC found, as did the CA, that even without an explicit demand from petitioner
his act of mashing the breast of AAA was sufficient to constitute sexual harassment. Moreover, under Section 3 (b)
(4) of RA 7877, sexual harassment in an education or training environment is committed "(w)hen the sexual
advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the student, trainee or apprentice." AAA even
testified that she felt fear at the time petitioner touched her.12 It cannot then be said that the CSC lacked basis for
its ruling, when it had both the facts and the law. The CSC found the evidence presented by the complainant
sufficient to support a finding of grave misconduct. It is basic that factual findings of administrative agencies, when
supported by substantial evidence, are binding upon the Court.
Leaving aside the discrepancy of the designation of the offense in the formal charge, it must be discussed whether
or not petitioner is indeed guilty, as found by the CA and CSC, of "Grave Misconduct," as distinguished from "Simple
Misconduct." From the findings of fact of the CSC, it is clear that there is misconduct on the part of petitioner. The
term "misconduct" denotes intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior.13
We agree with the rulings of the CSC and the CA.
In grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established
rule must be manifest.14 The act of petitioner of fondling one of his students is against a law, RA 7877, and is
doubtless inexcusable. The particular act of petitioner cannot in any way be construed as a case of simple
misconduct. Sexually molesting a child is, by any norm, a revolting act that it cannot but be categorized as a grave
offense. Parents entrust the care and molding of their children to teachers, and expect them to be their guardians
while in school. Petitioner has violated that trust. The charge of grave misconduct proven against petitioner
demonstrates his unfitness to remain as a teacher and continue to discharge the functions of his office.
Petitioner's second argument need not be discussed further, as he was rightly found guilty of grave misconduct.
Under Rule IV, Section 52 of the CSC Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases, "Grave Misconduct" carries with it the
penalty of dismissal for the first offense. Thus, the penalty imposed on petitioner is in accordance with the Rules.
Petitioner was not denied due process of law, contrary to his claims. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.15 These elements are present in this
case, where petitioner was properly informed of the charge and had a chance to refute it, but failed.
A teacher who perverts his position by sexually harassing a student should not be allowed, under any circumstance,
to practice this noble profession. So it must be here.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
51900 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 A.M. No. P-17-3772 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3999-P), January 10, 2018
JOVITA B. LAMSIS, Complainant, v. JUDE F. SALES, SR., PROCESS SERVER, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 10, LA
TRINIDAD, BENGUET, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
For resolution is a complaint1 filed by Jovita B. Lamsis (Jovita) against respondent Jude F. Sales, Sr., Process Server,
Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10 (RTC) for Sexual Harassment under Republic Act No. (RA)
7877,2 which was forwarded3 to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by Executive Judge Danilo P.
Camacho (Judge Camacho).
The Facts
In an undated Complaint,4 Jovita narrated that she is an employee of Sparrow Integrated Services, Inc. (Sparrow),
assigned as a janitress in the Hall of Justice, Benguet (HOJ) from 2004 up to the present. On October 6, 2012, she
arrived at the RTC for her Saturday duty. While she was removing the garbage from the trash bin located at the
second floor of the HOJ, someone approached her from behind, calling her name. When she turned around, she
saw respondent walking towards her, holding his private organ and showing it to her. Shocked, she called
respondent "bastos" and nervously ran to the first floor to seek help. She claimed that it took her two days to muster
the courage to disclose her ordeal to her co-worker and later to the Vice Executive Judge.5 She asserted that
respondent's indecent act towards her constitutes sexual harassment under RA 7877 and prayed for his preventive
suspension pending investigation.6
In his Comment7 dated January 25, 2013, respondent pointed out that the allegations in the Complaint were
essentially lifted from the October 24, 2012 Affidavit-Complaint8 for sexual harassment filed by Jovita against him
before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet, docketed as NPS Docket No. 1-05-INV-12J-
1446.9 Respondent admitted reporting for Saturday duty on October 6, 2012 but denied showing his organ or
committing any act amounting to sexual harassment against Jovita on said date. He maintained that he was
actually busy on that date inside the staff room of the RTC, which fact can be corroborated by his officemates.10 He
also asserted that Jovita filed the present administrative complaint after he filed a complaint against her for Oral
Defamation, Slander by Deed and Intriguing against Honor before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Barangay Poblacion, La Trinidad, Benguet,11 adding that she violated the rule against forum
shopping by filing the Complaint after she had filed the Affidavit-Complaint before the Prosecutor - now subject of
an Information12 for Unjust Vexation before the Municipal Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet - based on the same
facts.13 Finally, he contended that the administrative complaint before the OCA is premature for non-compliance
with the procedures laid down in A.M. 03-03-13-SC Resolution dated December 14, 2004 (Re: Rule on Administrative
Procedure in Sexual Harassment Cases and Guidelines on Proper Work Decorum in the Judiciary).14
On May 6, 2014,15 the OCA recommended that the administrative complaint against respondent for sexual
harassment be dismissed for being premature and that the entire records of the complaint be referred to the
Committee on Decorum and Investigation (CODI) for its corresponding action in accordance with A.M. 03-03-13-
SC.16
In a Resolution17 dated July 9, 2014, the Court adopted the OCA's recommendation. Hence, in a
Memorandum18 dated September 30, 2014, the OCA referred the administrative complaint to Judge Camacho,
who was also the Chairperson of the CODI, for corresponding action as recommended.
On March 14, 2016, the OCA received the Report and Recommendation19 of the CODI dated December 17, 2015
recommending the dismissal of the complaint for sexual harassment against respondent, without prejudice to him
being charged of disgraceful and immoral conduct.20 The CODI found Jovita's allegations as true, noting that
respondent had been convicted of Unjust Vexation for the same act, but ruled that respondent cannot be held
liable for sexual harassment under RA 7877 due to the lack of the element of moral ascendancy over Jovita. This
notwithstanding, it found that respondent's actuation was reprehensible and constituted disgraceful and immoral
conduct in violation of the Civil Service Rules.21
In a Resolution22 dated October 10, 2016, the Court referred the administrative matter to the OCA for evaluation,
report, and recommendation.
The OCA's Report and Recommendation
In a Memorandum23 dated September 29, 2017, the OCA recommended that: (a) the administrative complaint
against respondent be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; and (b) respondent be found guilty of
disgraceful and immoral conduct, this being his second offense of the same nature; that he be dismissed from the
service, with forfeiture of his retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, if any, and perpetual disqualification
from reemployment in the government service.24
The OCA agreed that respondent, a Process Server of the RTC, cannot be said to have moral ascendancy over
Jovita, a critical element of sexual harassment under RA 7877, as Jovita is a contractual employee of independent
contractor Sparrow. This notwithstanding, respondent's act constitutes disgraceful and immoral conduct which is
classified as a grave offense and punishable by suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the
first offense and dismissal for the second offense in accordance with the Civil Service Rules. Considering that, per
the records, respondent had been previously found guilty of immoral and disgraceful conduct - an offense of the
same nature - in A.M. No. P-14-3267,25 the OCA concluded that respondent should be meted the "severe penalty of
dismissal from the service without any mitigating circumstance to be considered in his favor."26
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent is guilty of disgraceful and immoral
conduct.
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA that respondent is guilty of disgraceful and
immoral conduct and, considering that this is his second infraction of the same nature, should thus be dismissed
from the service.
Immoral conduct has been defined as conduct that is willful, flagrant or shameless, showing moral indifference to
the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community,27 and includes conduct inconsistent with
rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness.28 Section 1 of the Civil Service
Commission Memorandum Circular No. 15, Series of 201029 particularly defines disgraceful and immoral conduct as
a willful act that violates the basic norm of decency, morality and decorum abhorred and condemned by the
society.
In this case, the OCA's findings that respondent deliberately exposed his private organ to Jovita and exhibited "gross
sexual innuendo" are well supported by the records. In this relation, the Court notes that respondent was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Unjust Vexation for the same acts by the Municipal Trial Court of La Trinidad,
Benguet in a Decision30dated May 14, 2014, which conviction was subsequently affirmed, on appeal, by the
Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63 on December 23, 2014.31 It should be emphasized that in
administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required.32 All things considered, this standard of
substantial evidence has been satisfied in this case.
What made matters worse for respondent is the fact that this is his second offense of the same nature. As correctly
noted by the OCA, respondent had been found guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct and was sanctioned
with "six (6) months suspension without pay with a warning that a repetition of the same act in the future will be
dealt with more severely"33 in a Resolution34 dated October 15, 2014 in A.M. No. P-14-3267 entitled Jennylyn L.
Colingan, Court Interpreter III v. Jude F. Sales, Sr., Process Server, both of Branch 10, Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad,
Benguet. Clearly, respondent has not learned his lesson, thus, calling for the harsh penalty of dismissal from the
service pursuant to Section 46 (B) (3),35 Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service36 (RRACCS), in relation to Section 46 (b) (5),37 Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. (EO)
292,38 otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987." Under Section 52 (a),39 Rule 10 of the RRACCS, in
relation to Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other
Pertinent Civil Service Laws, the penalty of dismissal carries with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification for holding public office.40
A final word. "It cannot be overstressed that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and
otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel."41 Court employees
should be circumspect on how they conduct themselves in their professional and private affairs in order to preserve
the good name and integrity of courts of justice.42 Respondent's actuation in this case is reprehensible and has no
place in any decent society, more so in the premises of the HOJ that deserves respect from its employees even
during unofficial hours. This is a clearly offensive and indecent behavior which the Court cannot countenance.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Jude F. Sales, Sr., Process Server of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,
Benguet, Branch 10 GUILTY of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct. Accordingly, he is DISMISSED from the service
effective immediately, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to
re employment in any branch or agency of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, without prejudice to his criminal liabilities.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 175433, March 11, 2015
ATTY. JACINTO C. GONZALES, Petitioner, v. MAILA CLEMEN F. SERRANO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Atty. Jacinto C.
Gonzales,2 assailing the Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated August 16, 2006, and its Resolution4 dated
October 4, 2006, in CA G.R. SP No. 76959. The CA reversed and set aside the Memorandum-Order dated January 3,
2003 and the Order dated February 11, 2003 approved by then Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio
Jr. in OMB-ADM-0-01-0162, and reinstated the Decision dated March 19, 2002 of the Ombudsman Administrative
Adjudication Bureau approved by then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto in OMB-ADM-01-0162 (RAS-2001-0156).
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
This case arose from an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Maila Clemen F. Serrano (respondent) against her
direct superior, Atty. Jacinto C. Gonzales (petitioner), Chief, Legal Division of the Philippine Racing Commission
(PHILRACOM), for grave misconduct, sexual harassment and acts of lasciviousness.
In her Complaint-Affidavit5 dated January 12, 2001, respondent alleged that on November 23, 2000, petitioner
invited her, along with her officemates, Administrative Officer V Eva Bataller, Atty. III Eugene Juanson, and
Stenographer II Roman Vidal, to eat lunch at Buddy's Restaurant, at J.P. Rizal St., Makati City. While seated at the
table waiting for their food to be served, petitioner suddenly took hold of respondent's face and forcefully kissed her
lips in the presence of Eva, Eugene, Roman and other customers. Respondent tried to ward off petitioner by pulling
her head away from him, but he persisted on kissing her against her will. She was so shocked, terrified, and
humiliated that she could hardly talk and move. She wanted to cry, but held her tears for fear of further
embarrassment. After releasing her, petitioner said: “Ang sarap pala ng labi ni Maila...” Then, he held her hand and
said “Maila sige na...” But, she took away her hand from him. Thereafter, she immediately reported the incident to
PHILRACOM Executive Director Juan Lozano.
Respondent also alleged that prior to that “kissing” incident, petitioner had already degraded her person on four (4)
separate occasions, namely: (1) on the very first day she met him in the office, he offered to purchase her a cell
phone so that he can text her, which offer she straightforwardly refused; (2) on that same day, he wanted her to
join him in his car in going home, which she likewise refused; (3) a week later, he asked her to eat out for lunch;
again, she refused; and (4) on August 23, 2000, after her sick leave from office, petitioner called her in his office and
scolded her and uttered the following unsavory remarks:
Eh ayoko na sa iyo. Hindi mo sinabi sa akin na may anak ka! Nasaan na ang tatay ng anak mo? Wala na? Ano
pang hindi mo sinasabi sa akin, may boyfriend ka? Akala ko pa naman ok ka, kaya nga sinabihan kita dati na
sumabay ka sa akin! Ang daming nagrereklamo sa iyo dito. Hindi ka marunong makisama. Makisama ka naman!
Paano na kung alisin ka dito, makakabalik ka pa ba sa dati mong opisina? Eh ayoko talaga sa iyo dito. Ano? Do
you have a choice? Alam mo ba na ako ang nagrekomenda kay Eva diyan sa Admin. kay Chairman. Kaya ka
nakapasok dito dahil pakiusap ka lang [ni] Eva sa akin. Alam mo bang nakasalalay dito and posisyon mo dito?
Alam mo bang kung ano mo ako dito? Ha? Ano mo ako dito? xxx Ano ngayon ang gagawin natin eh ayoko nga
sa iyo? Anong gagawin natin ngayon?
Respondent further alleged that she was constrained to elevate her complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman because the PHILRACOM Grievance Committee had not taken any concrete action on her
administrative case which had been pending for over a month, and also because of petitioner's relatively high
position in the office.
To support her complaint-affidavit and to corroborate her account, respondent submitted the Joint Affidavit6 of her
officemates Eva, Eugene and Roman, who witnessed the entire “kissing” incident on November 23, 2000.
In his Counter-Affidavit/Answer dated March 22, 2001, petitioner alleged that at the prodding of his staff, he agreed
to treat them for lunch, as it was respondent's birthday, and she had no money for a “blowout”.7 While their group
were talking in the restaurant, he greeted respondent and planted an innocent birthday greeting kiss on her left
cheek, near her lips. He also alleged that he first met respondent when she applied for Attorney III; that on July 1,
2000, he summoned her to explain the complaints forwarded by the Personnel and Administrative Division as to her
frequent absence and tardiness; and that his act of reviewing her official functions was in accordance with his
duties and responsibilities as a legal counsel of PHILRACOM.
In her Reply-Affidavit,8 respondent stated that she never solicited any favor from petitioner, let alone obliged him to
spend money for her birthday “blowout”; that his birthday lunch treat was part of a premeditated evil plan to have
her submit to his sexual desire; that she never allowed him to kiss her on the cheek, much less on the lips; that in the
course of her employment with petitioner as her supervisor, he had often made sexual advances and gestures
towards her, but she still tried to keep their relationship on a strictly professional level; that the alleged work-related
incidents of tardiness, inefficiency and laziness were all intended to harass her; and that because of the
administrative case she filed against him, she lost her job.
Meanwhile, records show that in an Order of Termination dated January 18, 2001, Executive Director Lozano
ordered the termination of respondent at the close of business hours of January 19, 2001.9 Records also show that
the Commission on Human Rights issued a Resolution dated May 8, 2001 in CHR Case No. 2001-037 which found
petitioner to have committed acts of sexual harassment, abuse of authority, and illegal dismissal against
respondent.10cralawred
In an Order dated June 27, 2001, the parties were directed to appear for the preliminary conference of the
administrative case. Both parties appeared as directed and agreed to submit the case for decision based on the
evidence on record and pleadings filed.
A Resolution dated July 17, 2001 was approved by then Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr.
(Overall Deputy Ombudsman) in OMB-0-01-0039, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office finds sufficient evidence that supports the conclusion that the crime of
violation of Section 3(a), Republic Act No. 7877, otherwise known as “An Act Declaring Sexual Harassment Unlawful
in the Employment, Education, or Training Environment, and for other purposes,” was committed probably by the
herein respondent. Let therefore, the appropriate information be filed against Jacinto C. Gonzales before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City.
SO RESOLVED.11
On March 19, 2002, the Office of the Ombudsman Administrative Adjudication Bureau, through Graft Investigation
Officer Marlon T. Molina, issued a Decision finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct. Approved by Ombudsman
Aniano A. Desierto, among other officers, the Decision has the following dispositive portion:
FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds substantial evidence that respondent JACINTO G. GONZALES is
guilty of Grave Misconduct.
Accordingly, the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service is hereby imposed upon him pursuant to Section 52 (A), par.
3, Rule IV of Resolution No. 991936 otherwise known as the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
The Honorable Chairman of the Philippine Racing Commission, Electra House Building, Esteban Street, Legaspi
Village, Makati City is hereby directed to implement this Decision in accordance with law and promptly report to
this Office compliance thereof.
SO ORDERED.12cralawlawlibrary
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Ombudsman Administrative Adjudication Bureau denied in the
Order dated September 9, 2002.13cralawred
However, on January 3, 2003, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman approved the Memorandum issued by Graft
Investigation Officer II Julita M. Calderon, with a decretal portion that states:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, we most respectfully recommend that the herein ORDER dated
September 9, 2002 prepared by GIO Molina be MODIFIED insofar as the infraction and the penalty to be imposed
upon the herein respondent is concerned, i.e., from GRAVE MISCONDUCT to SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and
from DISMISSAL from the Service to a mere ONE (1) MONTH SUSPENSION, without pay, pursuant to Section 52B (2) of
Rule IV of the “Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.14cralawlawlibrary
Aggrieved, respondent brought the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
attributing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Overall Deputy
Ombudsman. On August 16, 2006, the CA sustained respondent and rendered the herein assailed decision. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The memorandum-order dated 03 January 2003
and the Order dated 11 February 2003 approved by then Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. in
OMB-ADM-0-01-0162 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 19 March 2002 approved by then
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto in OMB-ADM-0-01-0162 (RAS-2001-0156) is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against private
respondent.
SO ORDERED.15cralawlawlibrary
Thereafter, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration,16 but the CA
denied it in a Resolution17 dated October 4, 2006 for being a prohibited motion.
Hence, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review.
Petitioner raises the following issues:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN SETTING ASIDE THE MEMORANDUM-ORDER
DATED 03 JANUARY 2003 AND THE ORDER DATED 11 FEBRUARY 2003 APPROVED BY THE THEN OVERALL DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR. IN OMB-ADM-0-01-0162, IT APPEARING THAT THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN,
IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS ONLY SIMPLE MISCONDUCT, HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO HAVE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK, OR IN EXCESS OF DISCRETION [sic], UPON WHICH THE INSTANT PETITION IS
BASED, IN GROSS CONTRAVENTION OF THE RULES AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE GROSSLY ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S URGENT MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, THE GROUNDS INVOKED THEREIN NOT BEING APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR AND MOREOVER,
THE DENIAL THEREOF HAS SACRIF[I]CED THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY TO TECHNICALITIES OF
PROCEDURE.18cralawlawlibrary
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that it is only in an appealed case, not in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
that the CA has authority to substitute its own findings and conclusions with that of the disciplining authority. He
points out that what is claimed as “grave abuse of discretion” on the part of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman was
his alleged erroneous approval of the Memorandum-Order dated January 3, 2003 which modified the infraction
and the penalty from grave misconduct to simple misconduct, and from dismissal to a mere one (1) month
suspension without pay. But, he argues that such was merely an error in the exercise of judgment or discretion which
is not correctible by a writ of certiorari. He also argues that the mere fact that the Overall Deputy Ombudsman
made findings and conclusions contrary to or inconsistent with those of the Ombudsman Administrative
Adjudication Bureau cannot, by itself, be considered grave abuse of discretion, as the findings of the disciplining
authority is always subject to amendment, corrections or reconsideration. He concedes that the Overall Deputy
Ombudsman found him to have committed misconduct amounting to sexual harassment. However, he points out
that such finding of simple misconduct, instead of grave misconduct, is supported by facts and circumstances, and
such finding is within sole discretion of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman over which the courts have no authority to
interfere. At any rate, he submits that his misconduct was not motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional
purpose; hence, the extreme penalty of dismissal is not warranted. Finally, he maintains that the issue of sexual
harassment is better addressed and resolved in the criminal case for violation of Section 3(a) of R.A. No.
787719 (docketed as Crim. Case No. 311165) pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Branch 64, for to
do so in an administrative proceedings would be unfair, unjust and extremely unreasonable.
On the second issue, petitioner contends that the CA grossly erred in applying the two prohibitions laid down
in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. et al. v. Court of Appeals,20 which was reiterated in Ma. Imelda Argel, et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al.,21i.e., the doctrine that the 15-day period for filing an appeal is non-extendible, and the prohibition
against the filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration in all courts, except the
Supreme Court. He insists that the denial of such motion for extension should be based on the court's assessment of
the grounds relied upon and not on purely procedural technicality. He seeks to justify his urgent motion for extension
on the fact that, as Presiding Judge and Pairing Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Olongapo City, he was
beset with pressures of work attending to numerous court trials, preparation of court orders and decisions, and large
volume of case load. He prays for a liberal construction of procedural rules in order to assist the parties in obtaining
a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding.
There is no merit in the petition
The Court shall first delve on the procedural issue of the case. In Imperial v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court ruled:
In a long line of cases starting with Habaluyas Enterprises v. Japzon, we have laid down the following guideline:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial
Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases
pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the
extension requested.
Thus, the general rule is that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration is allowed. This rule is
consistent with the rule in the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals that unless an appeal or a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is filed within the 15-day reglementary period, the CA’s decision becomes final. Thus, a
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration does not stop the running of the 15-day period for
the computation of a decision’s finality. At the end of the period, a CA judgment becomes final, immutable and
beyond our power to review.23cralawlawlibrary
This rule, however, admits of exceptions based on a liberal reading of the rule,24 so long as the petitioner is able to
prove the existence of cogent reasons to excuse its non-observance.25 No such reasons were shown to obtain in this
case. Petitioner's reasons of pressures of work attending to numerous court trials, preparation of court orders and
decisions, and large volume of case load, are foreseeable and perennial problems of most trial court judges. Such
reasons are inexcusable, as ordinary prudence should have prompted him to secure the services of an
independent counsel to defend his administrative case.
While the CA was correct in denying his Urgent Motion for Extension to File Motion for Reconsideration for being a
prohibited motion, the Court, in the interest of justice, looked into the merits of the case, and opted to suspend the
prohibition against such motion for extension after it found that a modification of the CA Decision is warranted by
the law and the jurisprudence on administrative cases involving sexual harassment. The emerging trend of
jurisprudence, after all, is more inclined to the liberal and flexible application of procedural rules.26 Rules of
procedure exist to ensure the orderly, just and speedy dispensation of cases; to this end, inflexibility or liberality must
be weighed. Thus, the relaxation or suspension of procedural rules, or exemption of a case from their operation is
warranted only by compelling reasons or when the purpose of justice requires it.27cralawred
The Court shall now delve on the substantive issue of whether the CA gravely erred in reversing the Memorandum-
Order of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman which downgraded petitioner's infraction from grave misconduct to
simple misconduct, and the penalty imposed on him from dismissal to a mere one (1) month suspension without
pay.
In Office of the Ombudsman v. Amalio A. Mallari,28 the Court explained the difference between simple and grave
misconduct, as follows:
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is considered as grave if it involves additional elements such as
corruption or willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proven by substantial
evidence; otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the
act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some
benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. In other words, in grave
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule
must be evident.
In this case, the Court finds the element of corruption present. As correctly pointed out by the CA, petitioner used his
position and authority as Head of the Legal Division of PHILRACOM, as well as his moral ascendancy, to elicit sexual
favors and to indulge in sexually malicious acts from his respondent, his female subordinate.29 As to petitioner's sole
defense that he merely gave respondent an innocent birthday greeting kiss, the Court is unconvinced in view of the
Joint Affidavit of their officemates attesting that he forcibly kissed her on the lips and said: “Ang sarap pala ng labi
ni Maila. x x x”
In Narvasa v. Sanchez, Jr.,30 the Court found the respondent public officer, who merely attempted to forcibly kiss the
complainant, guilty of grave misconduct through sexual harassment, thus:
Respondent’s acts of grabbing petitioner and attempting to kiss her were, no doubt, intentional. Worse, the incident
occurred months after he had made similar but subtler overtures to [complainant] De la Cruz, who made it clear
that his sexual advances were not welcome. Considering that the acts respondent committed against petitioner
were much more aggressive, it was impossible that the offensive nature of his actions could have escaped him. It
does not appear that petitioner and respondent were carrying on an amorous relationship that might have justified conditions or assignments, a passing grade, the granting of honors or scholarship, or the grant of benefits or
his attempt to kiss petitioner while they were separated from their companions. Worse, as petitioner and respondent payment of a stipend or allowance, and
were both married (to other persons), respondent not only took his marital status lightly, he also ignored petitioner’s 5. other analogous cases.
married state, and good character and reputation.
B. Less Grave Offenses shall include, but are not limited to:
We disagree with the CA that neither corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an established 1. unwanted touching or brushing against a victim’s body;
rule attended the incident in question. RA 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, took effect on March 5, 2. pinching not falling under grave offenses;
1995. Respondent was charged with knowledge of the existence of this law and its contents, more so because he 3. derogatory or degrading remarks or innuendoes directed toward the members of one sex, or one’s sexual
was a public servant. His act of grabbing petitioner and attempting to kiss her without her consent was an orientation or used to describe a person;
unmistakable manifestation of his intention to violate laws that specifically prohibited sexual harassment in the work 4. verbal abuse with sexual overtones; and
environment. Assuming arguendo that respondent never intended to violate RA 7877, his attempt to kiss petitioner 5. other analogous cases.
was a flagrant disregard of a customary rule that had existed since time immemorial – that intimate physical
contact between individuals must be consensual. Respondent’s defiance of custom and lack of respect for the C. The following shall be considered Light Offenses;
opposite sex were more appalling because he was a married man. Respondent’s act showed a low regard for 1. surreptitiously looking or staring a look of a person’s private part or worn undergarments;
women and disrespect for petitioner’s honor and dignity.31 (Emphasis added) 2. telling sexist/smutty jokes or sending these through text, electronic mail or other similar means, causing
embarrassment or offense and carried out after the offender has been advised that they are offensive or
However, it bears emphasis that in Narvasa v. Sanchez, Jr.,32 the Court ordered the respondent public officer's embarrassing or, even without such advise, when they are by their nature clearly embarrassing, offensive or vulgar;
dismissal from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or 3. malicious leering or ogling;
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations, because it was the 4. the display of sexually offensive pictures, materials or graffiti;
third time that he was penalized for acts of sexual harassment. In determining such penalty, moreover, the Court 5. unwelcome inquiries or comments about a person’s sex life;
considered the length of his service as an aggravating circumstance. 6. unwelcome sexual flirtation, advances, propositions;
7. making offensive hand or body gestures at an employee;
Apropos to this case is Civil Service Commission v. Nierras33 where the Court upheld the CA's decision finding the 8. persistent unwanted attention with sexual overtones;
respondent public officer guilty of grave misconduct through sexual harassment with a reduced sentence of six (6) 9. unwelcome phone calls with sexual overtones causing discomfort, embarrassment, offense or insult to the
months suspension without pay, thus: receiver; and
10. other analogous cases.
Petitioner alleged that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the case of Veloso v. Caminade in imposing the
proper penalty on Nierras since the facts of the case are different. Indeed, it should be noted that in the instant RULE XI
case, Oña and Nierras are not co-employees while in the Caminade case, the complainants were the subordinates ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITIES
of the offender. Also, in the Caminade case, there were several incidents of sexual harassment by a judge from xxx xxx xxx
whom the expected standard of morality was more exacting. But here, there was only one incident of sexual Section 55. Any person who is found guilty of sexual harassment shall, after the investigation, be meted the penalty
harassment. If a six-month suspension can be meted to a judge from whom the expected standard of morality is corresponding to the gravity and seriousness of the offense.
more exacting, a fortiori, the same or lesser penalty should be meted to Nierras. Moreover, in the Caminade case,
the offender actually forcefully kissed and grabbed the complainants. However, in this case, Oña was able to flee Section 56. The penalties for light, less grave, and grave offenses are as follows:
from the arms of Nierras even before he could cause more harm to her. Under the circumstances of the present A. For light offenses:
case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that suspension of the offender for a period of six (6) months without pay 1st offense – Reprimand 2nd offense – Fine or suspension not exceeding thirty (30) days 3rd offense – Dismissal
is sufficient penalty.34 B. For less grave offenses:
1st offense – Fine or suspension of not less than thirty (30) days and not exceeding six (6) months 2nd offense –
Guided by the foregoing jurisprudence, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioner should be held liable for grave Dismissal
misconduct, but holds that a reduction of the penalty from dismissal from service to a mere suspension of six (6) C. For grave offenses: Dismissal” (Emphasis added)
months without pay, is in order. Like in Veloso v. Caminade,35 there is only one incident of sexual harassment in this
case where petitioner forcibly kissed respondent who was his subordinate. If a six (6)-month suspension can be
meted to a judge from whom the expected standard of morality is more exacting, it is logical that a similar penalty Applying the foregoing provisions, the Court finds that the sexual harassment offense petitioner committed falls
should be meted to petitioner. under less grave offenses which is analogous to “unwanted touching or brushing against a victim’s body”, and to
“derogatory or degrading remarks or innuendoes directed toward the members of one sex”, with the
Moreover, the Court's reduced penalty of six (6)-months suspension without pay is in conformity with Civil Service corresponding maximum penalty of six (6) months suspension without pay.36cralawred
Commission Resolution (CSC) No. 01-0940 entitled the Administrative Disciplinary Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases.
Section 53, Rule X thereof classifies acts of sexual harassment as grave, less grave and light offenses, while Sections Section 53 of CSC Resolution No. 99-1936, or the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
55 and 56, Rule XI provides the corresponding penalties therefor, to wit: (URACCS),37 states that in the determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating and
alternative circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense shall be considered. The following
“RULE X circumstances shall be appreciated:

CLASSIFICATION OF ACTS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT a. Physical Illness

b. Good faith
c. Taking undue advantage of official position
Section 53. Sexual harassment is classified as grave, less grave and light offenses. d. Taking undue advantage of subordinate
e. Undue disclosure of confidential information
A. Grave Offenses shall include, but are not limited to: f. Use of government property in the commission of the offense
1. unwanted touching of private parts of the body (genitalia, buttocks and breast); g. Habituality
2. sexual assault; h. Offense is committed during office hours and within the premises of the office or building;
3. malicious touching; i. Employment of fraudulent means to commit or conceal the offense
4. requesting for sexual favor in exchange for employment, promotion, local or foreign travels, favorable working j. Length of service in the government
k. Education service record. The OCA is hereby DIRECTED to investigate, report and recommend the necessary action on
l. Other analogous circumstances. whether petitioner declared in his application for appointment his pending administrative and criminal cases.

Nevertheless, in the appreciation thereof, the same must be invoked or pleaded by the proper party, otherwise, SO ORDERED.
said circumstances shall not be considered in the imposition of proper penalty. The Commission, however, in the
interest of substantial justice may take and consider these circumstances.

The Court notes that the Deputy Overall Ombudsman was correct in appreciating the following mitigating
circumstances in determining the imposable penalty, to wit: (1) petitioner's weak physical condition and (2)
commission of the offense in a public place and in the presence of their office mates. However, the said
Ombudsman gravely erred in failing to consider the following aggravating circumstances: (1) taking undue
advantage of official position; (2) taking undue advantage of subordinate; and (3) education. As the Head of the
Legal Department of PHILRACOM and the direct superior of respondent, petitioner's act of forcibly kissing her lips
and saying “Ang sarap pala ng labi ni Maila x x x” in front of their office mates, smacks of bad faith, abuse of official
position, flagrant disregard of the anti-sexual harassment law,38 and willful violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.39 Under Section 54 (d) of the URACCS,40 where more aggravating circumstances are present than
mitigating ones, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. Hence, the Court imposes the penalty of suspension of six
(6) months without pay.
Given that the Ombudsman is vested with plenary and unqualified power41 to investigate any malfeasance,
misfeasance and non-feasance by a public officer or employee of the government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof,42 the settled rule is that courts will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of its
investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reason to indicate otherwise.43 As discussed
above, the Court finds such good and compelling reasons based on law and jurisprudence as would warrant the
modification of the CA decision, as well as the Memorandum-Order of Overall Deputy Office of the Ombudsman.
Meanwhile, the Court disagrees on petitioner's contention that the issue of sexual harassment is better addressed in
the pending criminal case for sexual harassment before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, for to do so in an
administrative proceedings would be unfair, unjust and extremely unreasonable. It bears to stress that administrative
and criminal charges filed before the Office of the Ombudsman and the trial court, respectively, are separate and
distinct from each other even if they arise from the same act or omission. This is because the quantum of proof
required in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt, while in administrative cases, only substantial
evidence is required. Moreover, the purpose of the administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public
service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of
the criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime.44 Thus, even the dismissal of a criminal case does not
necessarily foreclose the administrative action against the respondent.45cralawred
Finally, considering that the Court is reducing the penalty imposed on him from dismissal from service to a mere 6-
month suspension without pay, and that he is no longer connected with PHILRACOM, petitioner should refund the
salaries and all other monetary benefits he had received equivalent to six (6) months with legal interest of six
percent (6%) per annum (p.a.) from finality of this Decision until fully paid. 46 His earned leave credits for the duration
of such suspension are likewise deemed forfeited.47 The Court stresses that his appointment48 as a trial court judge
should not be viewed as a sort of exoneration from such suspension that he should have served while he was then
PHILRACOM's Legal Department Head. Thus, in addition to the refund of salaries and benefits, and forfeiture of
earned leave credits during such suspension, the Court sternly warns petitioner not to commit similar acts, otherwise,
his conduct may be construed as tainted with impropriety which shall merit the penalty of dismissal from the service.

Moreover, in view of Section 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council which disqualifies from being
nominated for appointment to any judicial post those with pending criminal or regular administrative cases, the
Court finds it necessary to investigate whether petitioner declared in his application for appointment his pending
administrative case for grave misconduct and criminal cases for sexual harassment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 16, 2006, and its Resolution
dated October 4, 2006, in CA G.R. SP No. 76959, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, reducing the penalty for grave
misconduct through sexual harassment from dismissal from service to suspension of six (6) months without pay, and
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same offense shall be punished with dismissal from the service.
Considering, however, that petitioner Atty. Jacinto C. Gonzales is no longer connected with Philippine Racing
Commission, he is ORDERED to REFUND the salaries and other monetary benefits he could have received during the
period of such suspension with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully
paid. Further, his earned leave credits during such period of suspension are also deemed FORFEITED.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to form part of petitioner’s
 A.M. No. RTJ-13-2363 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4149-RTJ), February 25, 2015
SAMAHAN NG MGA BABAE SA HUDIKATURA (SAMABAHU), Complainant, v. JUDGE CESAR O. UNTALAN, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 149, MAKATI CITY, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
The present administrative case stemmed from an unsigned letter received by the Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ)
on April 18, 2013, purportedly written by a group of female court employees styled as “Samahan ng mga Babae sa
Hudikatura” (SAMABAHU).
The aforesaid letter charging respondent with sexual harassment reads:
April 5, 2013
Hon. Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno
Chief Justice
Supreme Court of the Philippines
P. Faura St., Manila
Ma’am,
Tulong po, marami po kaming kasamahang babae dito sa RTC, Makati na binabastos at hinihipuan sa SUSO, PUWET
at harapang bahagi ng katawan ni Judge Cezar Untalan, [J]udge ng RTC, 149, at naging Acting Judge ng RTC Br.
145.
Isa siyang MANYAKIS na nagtatago sa Bible pero kurap at salbahe sa empleyado. Kawawa po ang mga kasama
kong sina:
1) Sarah - court aide ng Br. 149, tuwing pinapapasok siya ni Judge Untalan sa kuwarto niya ay hinihipuan ito umiiyak
na lang.
2) Tess Rol - Stenographer ng Br. 65 at kamag-anak ni Sarah, pinuntahan niya si Sarah sa Br. 149 para tanungin sa
tsismis, pero siya rin ay hinipuan sa PUWET ni Judge Untalan kaya minura niya ito.
3) Weng - Clerk III, RTC 145 mas madalas siyang hipuan sa puwet kahit galit na galit siya noong Acting Judge sa Br.
145 si Judge Manyakis.
4) Marissa - Stenographer, Br. 145 hinipuan din sa suso.
5) Ana San Pedro - Process Server, Br. 145 HINALIKAN sa nguso habang hinihimas ang SUSO.
6) Sarah - Interpreter, Br. 145. Hinalikan din at hinimas ang suso.
May nakakita po sa kanila. Ang 2 nasa huli (Ana & Sarah) ay pumayag na pagsamantalahan dahil lahat sila ay
takot sa banta ni Judge na ibabagsak ang performance rating noon.
7) Aurora - Legal Researcher, Br. 149. Dinukot din ni Judge Untalan ang gilid ng suso.
NATATAKOT PO SILA para daw pong BALIW si Judge, ipapsychological test po siya.
SAKLOLO ipatawag po niyo sila upang malaman ang totoo.
SUSPENDEHIN MUNA si manyakis habang iniimb[e]stigahan o ilipat sa ibang Br. sa Metro Manila ‘wag sa Makati.
Alam po ito ng Judge ng 145 na si Judge Calpatura, at marami pang Huwes. Pati ba sila ay takot kay Judge
Untalan?
Mayabang siya at bastos, pag binati mo siya ng “Good morning Judge” ang isasagot parati sa iyo ay “What is
good in the morning?.
Corrupt siya at yumaman nang maging Judge ng “Commercial Court.” We challenge you your Honor, gawin
niyong “Drugs Court” siya para di siya kumita. Tingnan niyo ang Administrative cases niya NAPAKARAMI. Malakas
daw siya sa inyo at kay DCA Delorino at Vice-President Binay. (Bakit matagal idecide mga administrative case
niya?)
Noong isang Linggo sinigawan niya at hiniya si Atty. Jamora Br. Clerk of Court at Process Server ng RTC Br. 56 dahil
sa agawan ng parking ng kotse niya at Judge Pascua ng Br. 56. Nilamukos at ibinato sa mukha ng Process Server
ang papel na katunayan na kay Judge Pascua ang parking space sabay mura kay Atty. Jamora at Process Server.
BALIW NA PO SI JUDGE UNTALAN, SAKLOLO. Babae ka rin po.
SAMAHAN NG MGA BABAE SA HUDIKATURA1
The anonymous letter was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) which dispatched a team of four
(4) lawyers tasked to conduct a “discreet investigation” and submit a report. The team verified the identities of the
alleged victims named in the letter thru telephone calls. They eventually met with two female employees of Makati
City RTC, namely Mrs. Rowena “Weng” P. Ripdos (Ripdos), Clerk III at Branch 145, and Ms. Marissa Fe B. Herradura
(Herradura).
On June 17, 2013, Ripdos and Herradura executed their respective affidavit-complaints2 before the City Prosecutor
of Makati.
In her Affidavit-Complaint,3 Ripdos alleged that on April 22, 2011, she and Herradura remained at Branch 145 while
their office mates went out for lunch. Respondent suddenly arrived and shouted for her to come inside the
chambers. She was made to sit infront of respondent’s table while respondent looked angrily at her. She then asked
“Bakit po, Judge?” and respondent inquired if her husband was around. When she replied that her husband, who is
an employee of the Makati City Hall detailed at Branch 145, was not there, respondent quickly stood up saying
“pahalik” while holding her cheeks. She hurriedly rose from her seat and told respondent she was going out but he
also stood up, saying “sandali! pahalik ulit.” Respondent embraced her and kissed her on the neck and chest while
rubbing his body against hers. She tried to push him away but respondent knelt down with one hand clasping her
waist while the other was on her breast. Respondent’s face was slumped on her womb while her hand was on her
breast; his body seemed to be “nanggigigil.” When respondent stopped and released her, she quickly went out of
the chambers and ran towards Herradura. She narrated to Herradura what respondent did to her and Herradura
exclaimed “Putang-inang Judge, iyan pati ako pinisil ang aking suso” at the same time demonstrating how
respondent pinched her breast.
After the alleged incident, Ripdos claimed that respondent threatened her with a low performance rating and
transfer to the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC). Since then, she tried to avoid the respondent but when the time
for accomplishing the employees’ performance ratings came, respondent summoned her and her husband.
Respondent declared that he intended to write this Court to request for her removal and attach her performance
rating with “Satisfactory” grade. When she retorted that she will just respond to such charge, he got mad and told
her she is hard-headed and that he will talk to the judge who will replace him at Branch 145 to give her a low rating.
At this point, she told respondent that he knows what he did to her. Upon hearing this, respondent changed his
mood and calmly told them that he actually went to church where St. Andrew pleaded to him because if she is
dismissed from her job, she and her husband would be pitiful and they would have no means to send their children
to school, and respondent would see them living on the streets while his car passes by them. Respondent then
warned her not to complain to the administration because no one will believe her, she is just an employee and her
enemy is a Judge and he can have her removed.
Herradura corroborated the statement of Ripdos that she divulged to her what respondent did to her. She narrated
her own experience with respondent whom she claimed pinched her breast twice while she was working infront of
the computer and respondent was standing behind her. When she asked respondent why, the latter did not answer
and just left. She felt shaken and later told everybody in Branch 146 and her office, and also Atty. Danilo Lacson,
what happened to her. Sometime thereafter, respondent called her to his chambers and told him that her office
mates have many stories about her. She repeatedly denied it but respondent kept on saying she was lying.
Respondent also asked her to report to him what Anna, Sarah and “Tatang” (retired clerk) have been saying about
him, which confused her because these were his loyal employees and thus she refused. Respondent then said the
reason he called for her was to tell her he will give her a low performance rating if she will not apologize right away,
but she told him she does not know what she has to apologize for. After this, respondent said her office mates dislike
her because she does not talk to them. She dared him to call all her office mates to confront them but respondent
said “Never mind, no need.” Respondent then reiterated he was going to give her a low performance rating, and
when she asked why respondent said “I don’t have to tell you, you know.” He even made her read each criterion in
the performance rating sheet, saying she would fail. Again, he insinuated at another employee (“Tatang”) who
supposedly complained that she does not talk to him, and she denied having dealt negatively with said employee.
She told respondent that she and her office mates have been together for 20 years already and have not
quarreled until now, which respondent did not take well as it alluded to him as the reason for the rift. When
respondent insisted he will still give her a low rating, she replied that she will just fight it and told him he was being
unfair and unjust. Realizing that she will not apologize to him, he asked how the matter was going to end and she
told him it was him who is more broad-minded.4cralawlawlibrary
In their Report5 dated October 1, 2013, the investigating team submitted the foregoing affidavits and stated that
they have gathered information that the following staff members serve
as the “eyes and ears” of respondent: Myrna Dizon and Roberto Guilang
(locally funded employees) and Eugyne del Rosario (Clerk III, Branch 149, RTC Makati City). The team said it is
necessary to place respondent under suspension “to literally clear the air and ensure an unhampered
investigation”6 as they believed once respondent is suspended, “more victims will come out or it will be easier for
the Team to reach out and solicit more information/evidence.”7 It was further recommended that Dizon and
Guilang be recalled to their mother unit while del Rosario in the meantime should be detailed to the OCC-RTC
Makati City.
After evaluation, the OCA concluded that the allegations in the anonymous complaint are far from being figments
of the imagination as the complainants described in detail their experience with respondent. It thus recommended
that the case be docketed as a regular administrative matter and referred to the Court of Appeals (CA) Presiding
Justice to be raffled off among their Justices for investigation, report and recommendation. Respondent was
placed under preventive suspension and directed to file his comment to be submitted to the CA Investigating
Justice. Further, the OCA ordered that del Rosario be detailed to the OCC-RTC Makati City, and that Dizon and
Guilang return to the City Government of Makati.
In his Comment,8 respondent denied all the allegations of improper conduct imputed to him and submitted the
supporting affidavits of his three female employees (Atty. Grace C. Tang-Togado, Branch Clerk of Branch 149; Shara
Joy Brillo, Branch 149 Court Aide; and Aurora T. Usero-Jackson, Legal Researcher II at Branch 149). He argued that
the standard of substantial evidence is not met in this case considering that the alleged date mentioned by Ripdos
in her affidavit, April 22, 2011, was in fact an official holiday as it was Good Friday. The manner in which the “discreet
investigation” was conducted was likewise assailed by respondent, pointing out that the OCA team’s findings were
apparently based on hearsay from unnamed sources. Respondent also lamented the fate of Dizon, Guilang and
del Rosario who were unjustly labeled as “moles” by anonymous, unevaluated sources. He stressed that the team
itself admitted the flaws in their investigation, as they had to resort to measures in order for them to reach out and
“solicit more information/evidence.” As to the charge of corruption, respondent asserted there was no evidence on
record except for the allegation in the anonymous letter. Accordingly, he prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
The case was assigned to CA Justice Danton Q. Bueser who conducted hearings where the following witnesses
testified: Atty. Analiza T. Parra (OCA), Ripdos, Herradura, Herman Manigbas, respondent Judge Untalan, Shara Joy
Brillo, Rosanna San Pedro and Ma. Aurora Usero-Jackson.
In his Final Report and Recommendation, Justice Bueser found respondent guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
sexual harassment as he exercised moral ascendancy over the complaining female court employees. He found the
testimonies given by Ripdos and Herradura credible and that their silence for two years before filing the present
complaint can be explained by their fear of losing their jobs. On respondent’s denial, Justice Bueser declared that it
cannot prevail over the witnesses’ credible testimony. He thus recommended that respondent be meted the
penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits.
After thorough evaluation of the records, we are unable to concur with the findings and conclusions of the
Investigating Justice.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in his complaint with
substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to justify a conclusion.9 Further, it is settled that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a function primarily
lodged in the Investigating Justice.10 The findings of investigating magistrates are generally given great weight by
the Court by reason of the unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified.11 The
rule which concedes due respect, and even finality, to the assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial judges in
civil and criminal cases applies a fortiori to administrative cases.12 However, there are some exceptions to the rule
according finality to the trial judge’s assessment of a witness’ testimony, such as when his evaluation was reached
arbitrarily or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
and substance which would affect the result of the case.13cralawlawlibrary
In this case, the OCA and the Investigating Justice found credible the allegation of Ripdos that respondent made
sexual advances on her despite respondent’s assertion that such incident could not have happened considering
that the date stated in her Affidavit (dated June 17, 2013) - April 22, 2011- was Good Friday, a regular holiday and
hence all government offices including courts are closed. Notably, it was only during the investigation proper at the
CA that Ripdos corrected herself in her Judicial Affidavit14 dated June 2, 2014, after respondent had raised the issue
in his Comment, thus:
88. QUESTION: Sinasabi ni Judge Untalan sa kanyang Motion for Reconsideration at Comment na ang date na April
22, 2011, kung kelan nangyari umano ang pangmo-molestiya sa iyo, ay Biyernes Santo o Good Friday. Nabasa mo
ba ito?
ANSWER: Opo.
89. QUESTION: So kung Good Friday ang April 22, 2011, bakit mo nasabi na ikaw at si Marissa Herradura ay nasa
opisina nuong araw na ito?
ANSWER: Maari po na ako ay nagkamali sa pagsabing April 22, 2011, pero sigurado po ako na naganap sa araw
ng Biyernes sa petsang April 2011 yung pangmo-molestiya sa akin ni Judge Untalan.
90. QUESTION: Paano ka nakaka-siguro na araw ng Biyernes, April 2011, nangyari ang insidente?
ANSWER: Kasi po wash day po kami kapag Biyernes, hindi po kami required mag[-]uniform.
91. QUESTION: Sabi mo wash day kayo nuong Biyernes na iyon, natatandaan mo ba kung ano ang suot mo nuong
araw na iyon?
ANSWER: Opo, sir.
92. QUESTION: Ano ang suot mo nuong araw na iyon?
ANSWER: Ako po ay naka-jacket na maong, pulang blouse at maong na pantalon.
93. QUESTION: Bakit mo naa-alala ang suot mo nuong araw na iyon samantalang 3 taon na ang nakakalipas?
ANSWER: Hindi ko po makakalimutan ang aking suot nuong Biyernes na iyon dahil may ginawa sa akin si Judge
Untalan na hindi maganda at hindi mawala sa aking memorya.15 (Italics supplied)
It may be recalled that as early as June 13, 2013, the OCA team gave Ripdos a copy of her Affidavit so she can
read and review the same. When the team returned on June 17, 2013, Ripdos when queried on the contents of her
affidavit said that she was satisfied with it and did not make any correction on the date of the alleged incident
stated therein.16 Her claim that it was pure oversight on her part is thus difficult to believe, and so with her silence for
two years when, except for Herradura, she had not complained to the proper authorities about respondent’s
improper act.
Respondent vehemently denied the charge of sexual harassment. On Ripdos’ claim, he presented the following
documentary evidence to prove that on all Fridays of April 2011, except April 22, he conducted hearings on his own
court (Branch 149)17:
1. Certification dated July 9, 2014 issued by Branch Clerk Atty. Danilo C. Lacson stating that hearings of cases
presided by Judge Cesar O. Untalan at Branch 145 were regularly scheduled at 2:00 p.m. on Mondays,
Tuesdays and Wednesdays, except for some instances when Judicial Dispute Resolutions were at times held on
Thursdays in the afternoon, and that for the month of April 2011, these were held at 2:00 p.m.;
2. Court Calendar, Journal entries of scheduled hearings and Minutes of hearings, as well as Orders issued by
Judge Cesar O. Untalan at Branch 149 on the Fridays of April 2011, except April 22, the court sessions starting at
8:30 a.m., and hearing of motions at 2:00 p.m.

The OCA contends that these pieces of evidence are irrelevant because as narrated by Ripdos, the incident took
place during lunch break and it lasted for only a few minutes. It points out that while Atty. Tang-Togado testified that
she normally sees respondent taking his lunch at the canteen, she admitted that she does not know his
whereabouts after that. However, the OCA failed to consider the fact that since respondent had no scheduled
hearing at Branch 145, where he was merely a Pairing Judge, and with his hands full of hearings morning and
afternoon at Branch 149, it was unlikely that on one Friday of April, respondent would momentarily escape to
Branch 145 at lunch break to commit the act of sexual harassment imputed to him by Ripdos. Meanwhile, Atty.
Tang-Togado clarified that while she leaves the canteen after buying her lunch, with respondent there still eating,
the latter usually returns to their office (Branch 149) after eating his lunch, then takes a nap, comes out at 1:00 to
1:30 p.m. to ask about his scheduled hearings for the day, and conducts hearing again at 2:00 p.m.
Under Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-03-13-SC (Re: Rule on Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment Cases and
Guidelines on Proper Work Decorum in the Judiciary), work-related sexual harassment is committed by an official or
employee in the Judiciary who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work
environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the
demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the latter. It is committed when “the sexual favor is
made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued employment of said
individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the
refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would
discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said
employee.”18cralawlawlibrary
In this case, while respondent exercised moral ascendancy over Ripdos and Herradura, his subordinates at Branch
145 where he had temporarily presided as Pairing Judge at the time, the alleged sexual advances by respondent
were not proven with moral certainty. We find that the totality of evidence failed to convince that respondent
committed the acts imputed against him.
For one, SAMABAHU appears to be a non-existent group as Ripdos and Herradura, and the other female court
employees who testified for respondent, all declared they had not known nor heard about such organization. This
Court has stressed that an anonymous complaint is always received with great caution, originating as it does from
an unknown author. But such nature of the complaint does not always justify its outright dismissal for being baseless
or unfounded, as it may easily be verified and may, without much difficulty, be substantiated by other competent
evidence.19 While the herein letter-complaint may be treated as an anonymous complaint, the Court must still
prudently examine it in the light of all evidence presented.
The letter-complaint not only raised serious allegations of improper conduct against respondent, it also listed no less
than seven female employees in Makati City RTC who were allegedly victims of sexual harassment perpetrated by
respondent. The OCA team’s “discreet investigation” resulted in the affidavits of Ripdos and Herradura procured
through coordination with Makati RTC Clerk of Court, Atty. Engracio M. Escasinas, Jr.. Accusing some staff members
of Branch 149 as “moles”, the OCA team had them transferred and respondent placed under preventive
suspension because supposedly such measure will pave the way for more victims to come out or it will be easier for
the team “to reach out and solicit more information/evidence”. But on the contrary, even with the suspension of
respondent and removal of his purported “eyes and ears” in his court, the team never got to obtain any
information/evidence, other than those claims of Ripdos and Herradura, to support the charges against him, and
the team also did not investigate further in the Office of the Executive Judge. In defense of respondent, his Branch
Clerk together with three of his female subordinates and another employee assigned at Branch 145, who were listed
in the letter-complaint as “victims” of respondent, submitted their respective affidavits and testified on his good
character, categorically denying having been sexually harassed at any time by respondent.
Atty. Grace C. Tang-Togado, Branch Clerk at Branch 149, affirmed the contents of her affidavit and identified the
documents relative to the hearings for the month of April 2011. She worked for respondent for almost ten years and
attested to his dedication to his duties and responsibilities and his adherence to the laws and rule in performing their
functions; his being a devout Catholic who starts his day with reading the Bible; he would leave often during lunch
break, telling her he was going to attend Mass. Upon learning that respondent was charged with sexual
harassment, she was shocked because she had known him as a person of morals and integrity.20 On the work habits
of respondent, she recounted that before and after a hearing, respondent is usually at his chambers reading the
cases to be heard, reviewing the pleadings filed each day and signing/annotating Orders he issued. On Fridays, she
sees respondent eating his lunch at the canteen, then proceed to his chambers to take a nap, after which he
comes out asking for the cases scheduled to be heard, and thereafter conduct hearings again in the afternoon at
2:00 p.m. Respondent usually reports for work at 8:00 a.m. and leaves the court at 5:00 p.m., and he is not fond of
going out of his sala as he seldom socializes with other people. She normally sees respondent eating his lunch at the
canteen and usually goes back to their office after having his lunch.21cralawlawlibrary
Ma. Aurora Usero-Jackson, Legal Researcher at Branch 149, was the “Aurora” mentioned in the letter-complaint.
She testified that she felt bad upon being shown said letter because it contains false allegations. Despite her
inclusion in the list of alleged victims, she was never contacted by anyone to verify such allegation.22 She confirmed
her statements in her Affidavit where she described respondent as a diligent, dedicated and hardworking Judge
who imparted to his staff his high standards of work ethics, as well as his moral and religious principles, always
showing concern for the welfare of his staff, and inspires them to become better individuals. She vehemently denied
that respondent committed any sexual misconduct on her person and neither has she experienced anything
offensive in the workplace, and likewise not heard of the existence of SAMABAHU nor have knowledge of the
alleged sexual complaints against the respondent.23cralawlawlibrary
Shara Joy Brillo, Court Aide at Branch 149, testified she was the “Sarah” mentioned (No. 1) in the letter-complaint,
and learned about the case filed against respondent sometime in October 2013. She told respondent that she had
nothing to do with the complaint as no association or person even approached her. She voluntarily executed her
affidavit as she could not believe respondent can do such things. She knows another Sarah, court interpreter at
Branch 145 whom she asked if respondent had done anything bad to her but she replied in the negative. The latter
also confided to her that there was some misunderstanding among her office mates at the time and Sarah feared
that the other staff of Branch 145 were against her because she had wanted to testify for
respondent.24cralawlawlibrary
Rosanna San Pedro, former Process Server of Branch 145 and now Barangay Captain of Napindan, affirmed that
she was the “Ana San Pedro” mentioned in the letter-complaint. She testified that the alleged lewd act of
respondent against her never happened. As to SAMABAHU, it was only at the hearing of the case that she heard
about such group. She denied the claim of Herradura that she was also present when Herradura was being
molested by respondent.25cralawlawlibrary
Sarah Cuares, Court Interpreter of Branch 145 testified that she is the “Sarah” mentioned (No. 6) in the letter-
complaint and denied that respondent sexually harassed her, nor that anyone else had witnessed that respondent
was molesting her and another female staff. While she admitted that Ripdos is her office mate, she had no idea that
Ripdos has executed an affidavit against respondent. As to Herradura, she recalled that she had been telling stories
that she (Herradura) was pinched by respondent at her back. Since she was busy working at the time, she did not
pay attention to such story.26cralawlawlibrary
The foregoing testimonies of witnesses who have worked more closely with respondent on a daily basis, testifying as
they did in a candid, spontaneous and straightforward manner, and there being no reason to believe they had any
other motive in testifying except to tell the truth, put serious doubts on the veracity of the allegations of Ripdos and
Herradura.
To refute the declarations of respondent’s witnesses, counsel for complainants (Atty. James Navarrete) presented
their rebuttal witness, Herman L. Manigbas, an employee of the City Government of Makati who is detailed at the
office of Atty. Escasinas (OCC) as Court Aide at Branch 149, and had been office mates with Shara Brillo from 1988
to 2007. Manigbas made a sketch showing their respective desks at the office. On the alleged sexual advances
committed by respondent against Brillo, he had seen this many times from 2005 to 2006. About ten times, he saw
respondent holding Brillo at the side of her breast. On Brillo’s denial that these happened, he said that Brillo was just
afraid to tell the truth because she might lose her job. Although they always talked, he never asked her about it
especially since respondent did it jokingly. As to Aurora Usero-Jackson, he claimed that he also witnessed about
three times respondent holding the side of her breast but did not complain and simply goes to Atty. Tang-Togado.
He worked at Branch 149 only until 2007 when respondent had him transferred and it was Atty. Escasinas who
accepted him at the OCC as casual employee.27cralawlawlibrary
We are not persuaded by this bare claim of Manigbas who could not even state the date, time and factual
circumstances when he allegedly witnessed respondent’s improper behavior. Moreover, giving weight to his
testimony aimed at disproving the alleged victims’ categorical declarations in court, is an affront to the dignity and
reputation of these women who have categorically and publicly denied they were sexually molested by
respondent.
In sum, the Court finds that Ripdos and Herradura failed to substantiate their charges against respondent by the
required quantum of proof. While it is true that their affidavits were replete with details describing the alleged sexual
advances, such detailed narration by itself will not suffice and will not automatically result in a guilty verdict. Ripdos
never reported the alleged lascivious acts by respondent to the proper authorities until two years later when the
OCA team went to their branch. This seeming lack of urgency on her part in taking concrete administrative action
against a wayward judge bears heavily on her case.

The same thing can be said of Herradura, who appeared to have told everybody at Branch 149 and Branch 145 her
story about respondent pinching the side of her breast, and yet failing to complain before the proper authorities
considering that the alleged infraction took place within the court premises. Rosanna San Pedro even denied
Herradura’s claim that she was also present when the aforesaid incident allegedly took place. In contrast,
respondent presented credible testimonial and documentary evidence leading to a reasonable conclusion that he
could not have committed the alleged sexual advances.

Based on the foregoing findings, there is no sufficient evidence to create a moral certainty that Judge Cesar O.
Untalan committed the acts complained of.

Administrative complaints against members of the judiciary are viewed by this Court with utmost care, for
proceedings of this nature affect not only the reputation of the respondents concerned, but the integrity of the
entire judiciary as well.28 Considering that the complainants failed to present substantial evidence to prove the
alleged sexual advances committed against them by respondent, elementary justice dictates that he be
exonerated from the said charge.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Cesar O. Untalan is hereby EXONERATED of the charges against him. The present
administrative complaint is accordingly DISMISSED for lack of sufficient factual basis.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. NO. 155831 : February 18, 2008]
MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO, Petitioner, v. ROGELIO I. RAYALA, Respondent.
[G.R. NO. 155840 : February 18, 2008]
ROGELIO I. RAYALA, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; RONALDO V. ZAMORA, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary; ROY V. SENERES, in his capacity as Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission (in lieu of RAUL
T. AQUINO, in his capacity as Acting Chairman of the National labor Relations Commission); and MA. LOURDES T.
DOMINGO, Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 158700 : February 18, 2008]
The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; and ALBERTO G. ROMULO, in his
capacity as Executive Secretary, Petitioners, v. ROGELIO I. RAYALA, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced "superiority" which is enough to dampen an employee's spirit and
her capacity for advancement. It affects her sense of judgment; it changes her life.1
Before this Court are three Petitions for Review on Certiorari assailing the October 18, 2002 Resolution of the CA's
Former Ninth Division2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026. The Resolution modified the December 14, 2001 Decision3 of the
Court of Appeals' Eleventh Division, which had affirmed the Decision of the Office of the President (OP) dismissing
from the service then National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Chairman Rogelio I. Rayala (Rayala) for
disgraceful and immoral conduct.
All three petitions stem from the same factual antecedents.
On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a
Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE).
To support the Complaint, Domingo executed an Affidavit narrating the incidences of sexual harassment
complained of, thus:
xxx
4. Sa simula ay pabulong na sinasabihan lang ako ni Chairman Rayala ng mga salitang "Lot, gumaganda ka yata?"
5. Sa ibang mga pagkakataon nilalapitan na ako ni Chairman at hahawakan ang aking balikat sabay pisil sa mga
ito habang ako ay nagta-type at habang nagbibigay siya ng diktasyon. Sa mga pagkakataong ito, kinakabahan
ako. Natatakot na baka mangyari sa akin ang mga napapabalitang insidente na nangyari na noon tungkol sa
mga sekretarya niyang nagbitiw gawa ng mga mahahalay na panghihipo ni Chairman.
6. Noong ika-10 ng Setyembre, 1998, nang ako ay nasa 8th Floor, may nagsabi sa akin na kailangan akong bumaba
sa 7th Floor kung nasaan ang aming opisina dahil sa may koreksyon daw na gagawin sa mga papel na tinayp ko.
Bumaba naman ako para gawin ito. Habang ginagawa ko ito, lumabas si Chairman Rayala sa silid ni Mr. Alex
Lopez. Inutusan ako ni Chairman na sumunod sa kaniyang silid. Nang nasa silid na kami, sinabi niya sa akin:
Chairman: Lot, I like you a lot. Naiiba ka sa lahat.
At pagkatapos ako ay kaniyang inusisa tungkol sa mga personal na bagay sa aking buhay. Ang ilan dito ay tungkol
sa aking mga magulang, kapatid, pag-aaral at kung may boyfriend na raw ba ako.
Chairman: May boyfriend ka na ba?cralawred
Lourdes: Dati nagkaroon po.
Chairman: Nasaan na siya?cralawred
Lourdes: Nag-asawa na ho.
Chairman: Bakit hindi kayo nagkatuluyan?cralawred
Lourdes: Nainip po.
Chairman: Pagkatapos mo ng kurso mo ay kumuha ka ng Law at ako ang bahala sa iyo, hanggang ako pa ang
Chairman dito.
Pagkatapos ay kumuha siya ng pera sa kaniyang amerikana at inaabot sa akin.
Chairman: Kuhanin mo ito.
Lourdes: Huwag na ho hindi ko kailangan.
Chairman: Hindi sige, kuhanin mo. Ayusin mo ang dapat ayusin.
Tinanggap ko po ang pera ng may pag-aalinlangan. Natatakot at kinakabahan na kapag hindi ko tinanggap ang
pera ay baka siya magagalit kasabay na rito ang pagtapon sa akin kung saan-saan opisina o kaya ay tanggalin
ako sa posisyon.
Chairman: Paglabas mo itago mo ang pera. Ayaw ko ng may makaka-alam nito. Just the two of us.
Lourdes: Bakit naman, Sir?cralawred
Chairman: Basta. Maraming tsismosa diyan sa labas. But I don't give them a damn. Hindi ako mamatay sa kanila.
Tumayo na ako at lumabas. Pumanhik na ako ng 8th Floor at pumunta ako sa officemate ko na si Agnes Magdaet.
Ikinwento ko ang nangyari sa akin sa opisina ni Chairman. Habang kinikwento ko ito kay Agnes ay binilang namin
ang pera na nagkakahalaga ng tatlong libong piso (PHP 3,000). Sinabi ni Agnes na isauli ko raw ang pera, pero ang
sabi ko ay natatakot ako baka magalit si Sir. Nagsabi agad kami kay EC Perlita Velasco at sinalaysay ko ang
nangyari. Sinabi niya na isauli ko ang pera at noong araw ding iyon ay nagpasiya akong isauli na nga ito ngunit
hindi ako nagkaroon ng pagkakataon dahil marami siyang naging bisita. Isinauli ko nga ang pera noong Lunes,
Setyembre 14, 1998.
7. Noong huling linggo ng Setyembre, 1998, ay may tinanong din sa akin si Chairman Rayala na hindi ko masikmura,
at sa aking palagay at tahasang pambabastos sa akin.
Chairman: Lot, may ka live-in ka ba?cralawred
Lourdes: Sir, wala po.
Chairman: Bakit malaki ang balakang mo?cralawred
Lourdes: Kayo, Sir ha! Masama sa amin ang may ka live-in.
Chairman: Bakit, ano ba ang relihiyon ninyo?cralawred
Lourdes: Catholic, Sir. Kailangan ikasal muna.
Chairman: Bakit ako, hindi kasal.
Lourdes: Sir, di magpakasal kayo.
Chairman: Huh. Ibahin na nga natin ang usapan.
8. Noong Oktubre 29, 1998, ako ay pumasok sa kwarto ni Chairman Rayala. Ito ay sa kadahilanang ang fax
machine ay nasa loob ng kaniyang kwarto. Ang nag-aasikaso nito, si Riza Ocampo, ay naka-leave kaya ako ang
nag-asikaso nito noong araw na iyon. Nang mabigyan ko na ng fax tone yung kausap ko, pagharap ko sa kanan
ay nakaharang sa dadaanan ko si Chairman Rayala. Tinitingnan ako sa mata at ang titig niya ay umuusad mula
ulo hanggang dibdib tapos ay ngumiti na may mahalay na pakahulugan.
9. Noong hapon naman ng pareho pa ring petsa, may nag-aapply na sekretarya sa opisina, sinabi ko ito kay
Chairman Rayala:
Lourdes: Sir, si Pinky po yung applicant, mag-papainterview po yata sa inyo.
Chairman: Sabihin mo magpa-pap smear muna siya
Chairman: O sige, i-refer mo kay Alex. (Alex Lopez, Chief of Staff).
10. Noong Nobyembre 9, 1998, ako ay tinawag ni Chairman Rayala sa kaniyang opisina upang kuhanin ko ang
diktasyon niya para kay ELA Oscar Uy. Hindi pa kami nakakatapos ng unang talata, may pumasok na bisita si
Chairman, si Baby Pangilinan na sinamahan ni Riza Ocampo. Pinalabas muna ako ni Chairman. Nang maka-alis na
si Ms. Pangilinan, pinapasok na niya ako ulit. Umupo ako. Lumapit sa likuran ko si Chairman, hinawakan ang
kaliwang balikat ko na pinipisil ng kanang kamay niya at sinabi:
Chairman: Saan na ba tayo natapos?
Palakad-lakad siya sa aking likuran habang nag-didikta. Huminto siya pagkatapos, at nilagay niya ang kanang
kamay niya sa aking kanang balikat at pinisil-pisil ito pagkatapos ay pinagapang niya ito sa kanang bahagi ng
aking leeg, at pinagapang hanggang kanang tenga at saka kiniliti. Dito ko inalis ang kaniyang kamay sa
pamamagitan ng aking kaliwang kamay. At saka ko sinabi:
Lourdes: Sir, yung kamay ninyo alisin niyo!
Natapos ko rin ang liham na pinagagawa niya pero halos hindi ko na maintindihan ang na-isulat ko dahil sa takot
at inis na nararamdaman ko.4
After the last incident narrated, Domingo filed for leave of absence and asked to be immediately transferred.
Thereafter, she filed the Complaint for sexual harassment on the basis of Administrative Order No. 250, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing RA 7877 in the Department of Labor and Employment.
Upon receipt of the Complaint, the DOLE Secretary referred the Complaint to the OP, Rayala being a presidential
appointee. The OP, through then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, ordered Secretary Laguesma to investigate
the allegations in the Complaint and create a committee for such purpose. On December 4, 1998, Secretary
Laguesma issued Administrative Order (AO) No. 280, Series of 1998,5 constituting a Committee on Decorum and
Investigation (Committee) in accordance with Republic Act (RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.6
The Committee heard the parties and received their respective evidence. On March 2, 2000, the Committee
submitted its report and recommendation to Secretary Laguesma. It found Rayala guilty of the offense charged
and recommended the imposition of the minimum penalty provided under AO 250, which it erroneously stated as
suspension for six (6) months.
The following day, Secretary Laguesma submitted a copy of the Committee Report and Recommendation to the
OP, but with the recommendation that the penalty should be suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day, in
accordance with AO 250.
On May 8, 2000, the OP, through Executive Secretary Zamora, issued AO 119,7 the pertinent portions of which read:
Upon a careful scrutiny of the evidence on record, I concur with the findings of the Committee as to the culpability
of the respondent [Rayala], the same having been established by clear and convincing evidence. However, I
disagree with the recommendation that respondent be meted only the penalty of suspension for six (6) months and
one (1) day considering the circumstances of the case.
What aggravates respondent's situation is the undeniable circumstance that he took advantage of his position as
the superior of the complainant. Respondent occupies the highest position in the NLRC, being its Chairman. As
head of said office, it was incumbent upon respondent to set an example to the others as to how they should
conduct themselves in public office, to see to it that his subordinates work efficiently in accordance with Civil
Service Rules and Regulations, and to provide them with healthy working atmosphere wherein co-workers treat
each other with respect, courtesy and cooperation, so that in the end the public interest will be benefited (City
Mayor of Zamboanga v. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 785 [1990]).
What is more, public service requires the utmost integrity and strictest discipline (Gano v. Leonen, 232 SCRA 99
[1994]). Thus, a public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity, and "utmost
devotion and dedication to duty" (Sec. 4 (g), RA 6713), respect the rights of others and shall refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, and good morals (Sec. 4(c)). No less than the Constitution sanctifies the principle that a public
office is a public trust, and enjoins all public officers and employees to serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency (Section 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution).
Given these established standards, I see respondent's acts not just [as] a failure to give due courtesy and respect to
his co-employees (subordinates) or to maintain good conduct and behavior but defiance of the basic norms or
virtues which a government official must at all times uphold, one that is contrary to law and "public sense of
morality." Otherwise stated, respondent - to whom stricter standards must apply being the highest official [of] the
NLRC - had shown an attitude, a frame of mind, a disgraceful conduct, which renders him unfit to remain in the
service.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Rogelio I. Rayala, Chairman, National Labor Relations Commission,
is found guilty of the grave offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct and is hereby DISMISSED from the service
effective upon receipt of this Order.
SO ORDER[ED].
Rayala filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the OP denied in a Resolution8 dated May 24, 2000. He then filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
on Civil Procedure before this Court on June 14, 2000.9 However, the same was dismissed in a Resolution dated June
26, 2000 for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.10 Rayala filed a Motion for
Reconsideration11 on August 15, 2000. In its Resolution12 dated September 4, 2000, the Court recalled its June 26
Resolution and referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) for appropriate action.
The CA rendered its Decision13 on December 14, 2001. It held that there was sufficient evidence on record to create
moral certainty that Rayala committed the acts he was charged with. It said:
The complainant narrated her story complete with details. Her straightforward and uninhibited testimony was not
emasculated by the declarations of Commissioner Rayala or his witnesses. x x x
Moreover, Commissioner Rayala has not proven any vicious motive for Domingo and her witnesses to invent their
stories. It is very unlikely that they would perjure themselves only to accommodate the alleged conspiracy to oust
petitioner from office. Save for his empty conjectures and speculations, Rayala failed to substantiate his contrived
conspiracy. It is a hornbook doctrine that conspiracy must be proved by positive and convincing evidence (People
v. Noroña, 329 SCRA 502 [2000]). Besides, it is improbable that the complainant would concoct a story of sexual
harassment against the highest official of the NLRC and thereby expose herself to the possibility of losing her job, or
be the subject of reprisal from her superiors and perhaps public ridicule if she was not telling the truth.
It also held that Rayala's dismissal was proper. The CA pointed out that Rayala was dismissed for disgraceful and
immoral conduct in violation of RA 6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees. It held that the OP was correct in concluding that Rayala's acts violated RA 6713:
Indeed, [Rayala] was a public official, holding the Chairmanship of the National Labor Relations Commission,
entrusted with the sacred duty of administering justice. Occupying as he does such an exalted position,
Commissioner Rayala must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him. He must comport himself at all times
in such a manner that the conduct of his everyday life should be beyond reproach and free from any impropriety.
That the acts complained of were committed within the sanctuary of [his] office compounded the objectionable
nature of his wrongdoing. By daring to violate the complainant within the solitude of his chambers, Commissioner
Rayala placed the integrity of his office in disrepute. His disgraceful and immoral conduct warrants his removal from
office.14
Thus, it dismissed the petition, to wit:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and Administrative Order No. 119 as well
[as] the Resolution of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 00-E-9118 dated May 24, 2000 are AFFIRMED IN
TOTO. No cost.
SO ORDERED.15
Rayala timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Justices Vasquez and Tolentino voted to affirm the December 14
Decision. However, Justice Reyes dissented mainly because AO 250 states that the penalty imposable is suspension
for six (6) months and one (1) day.16 Pursuant to the internal rules of the CA, a Special Division of Five was
constituted.17 In its October 18, 2002 Resolution, the CA modified its earlier Decision:
ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated December [14], 2001 is MODIFIED to the effect that the penalty of dismissal is
DELETED and instead the penalty of suspension from service for the maximum period of one (1) year is HEREBY
IMPOSED upon the petitioner. The rest of the challenged decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Domingo filed a Petition for Review18 before this Court, which we denied in our February 19, 2003 Resolution for
having a defective verification. She filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court granted; hence, the
petition was reinstated.
Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review19 with this Court essentially arguing that he is not guilty of any act of sexual
harassment.
Meanwhile, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA's October 18, 2002 Resolution. The CA denied
the same in its June 3, 2003 Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, by a majority vote, public respondents' Motion for Reconsideration, (sic) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic then filed its own Petition for Review.20
On June 28, 2004, the Court directed the consolidation of the three (3) petitions.
G.R. No. 155831
Domingo assails the CA's resolution modifying the penalty imposed by the Office of the President. She raises this
issue:
The Court of Appeals erred in modifying the penalty for the respondent from dismissal to suspension from service for
the maximum period of one year. The President has the prerogative to determine the proper penalty to be imposed
on an erring Presidential appointee. The President was well within his power when he fittingly used that prerogative
in deciding to dismiss the respondent from the service.21
She argues that the power to remove Rayala, a presidential appointee, is lodged with the President who has control
of the entire Executive Department, its bureaus and offices. The OP's decision was arrived at after affording Rayala
due process. Hence, his dismissal from the service is a prerogative that is entirely with the President.22
As to the applicability of AO No. 250, she argues that the same was not intended to cover cases against
presidential appointees. AO No. 250 refers only to the instances wherein the DOLE Secretary is the disciplining
authority, and thus, the AO does not circumscribe the power of the President to dismiss an erring presidential
appointee.
G.R. No. 155840
In his petition, Rayala raises the following issues:
I. CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE ACTS OF HEREIN PETITIONER DO NOT CONSTITUTE
SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS LAID DOWN BY THE En Banc RULING IN THE CASE OF AQUINO v. ACOSTA, ibid., AS WELL AS
IN THE APPLICATION OF EXISTING LAWS.
II. CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT IN A
CASE FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT IT IS AN OFFENSE THAT IS MALUM
PROHIBITUM.
III. THE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, AND NOW, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
HAS MISAPPLIED AND EXPANDED THE DEFINITION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE UNDER R.A. No. 7877,
BY APPLYING DOLE A.O. 250, WHICH RUNS COUNTER TO THE RECENT PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THIS HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT.23
Invoking Aquino v. Acosta,24 Rayala argues that the case is the definitive ruling on what constitutes sexual
harassment. Thus, he posits that for sexual harassment to exist under RA 7877, there must be: (a) demand, request, or
requirement of a sexual favor; (b) the same is made a pre-condition to hiring, re-employment, or continued
employment; or (c) the denial thereof results in discrimination against the employee.
Rayala asserts that Domingo has failed to allege and establish any sexual favor, demand, or request from petitioner
in exchange for her continued employment or for her promotion. According to Rayala, the acts imputed to him are
without malice or ulterior motive. It was merely Domingo's perception of malice in his alleged acts - a "product of
her own imagination"25 - that led her to file the sexual harassment complaint.
Likewise, Rayala assails the OP's interpretation, as upheld by the CA, that RA 7877 is malum prohibitum such that the
defense of absence of malice is unavailing. He argues that sexual harassment is considered an offense against a
particular person, not against society as a whole. Thus, he claims that intent is an essential element of the offense
because the law requires as a conditio sine qua non that a sexual favor be first sought by the offender in order to
achieve certain specific results. Sexual harassment is committed with the perpetrator's deliberate intent to commit
the offense.26
Rayala next argues that AO 250 expands the acts proscribed in RA 7877. In particular, he assails the definition of the
forms of sexual harassment:
Rule IV
FORMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Section 1. Forms of Sexual Harassment. ' Sexual harassment may be committed in any of the following forms:
a) Overt sexual advances;
b) Unwelcome or improper gestures of affection;
c) Request or demand for sexual favors including but not limited to going out on dates, outings or the like for the
same purpose;
d) Any other act or conduct of a sexual nature or for purposes of sexual gratification which is generally annoying,
disgusting or offensive to the victim.27
He posits that these acts alone without corresponding demand, request, or requirement do not constitute sexual
harassment as contemplated by the law.28 He alleges that the rule-making power granted to the employer in
Section 4(a) of RA 7877 is limited only to procedural matters. The law did not delegate to the employer the power to
promulgate rules which would provide other or additional forms of sexual harassment, or to come up with its own
definition of sexual harassment.29
G.R. No. 158700
The Republic raises this issue:
Whether or not the President of the Philippines may validly dismiss respondent Rayala as Chairman of the NLRC for
committing acts of sexual harassment.30
The Republic argues that Rayala's acts constitute sexual harassment under AO 250. His acts constitute unwelcome
or improper gestures of affection and are acts or conduct of a sexual nature, which are generally annoying or
offensive to the victim.31
It also contends that there is no legal basis for the CA's reduction of the penalty imposed by the OP. Rayala's
dismissal is valid and warranted under the circumstances. The power to remove the NLRC Chairman solely rests
upon the President, limited only by the requirements under the law and the due process clause.
The Republic further claims that, although AO 250 provides only a one (1) year suspension, it will not prevent the OP
from validly imposing the penalty of dismissal on Rayala. It argues that even though Rayala is a presidential
appointee, he is still subject to the Civil Service Law. Under the Civil Service Law, disgraceful and immoral conduct,
the acts imputed to Rayala, constitute grave misconduct punishable by dismissal from the service.32 The Republic
adds that Rayala's position is invested with public trust and his acts violated that trust; thus, he should be dismissed
from the service.
This argument, according to the Republic, is also supported by Article 215 of the Labor Code, which states that the
Chairman of the NLRC holds office until he reaches the age of 65 only during good behavior.33 Since Rayala's
security of tenure is conditioned upon his good behavior, he may be removed from office if it is proven that he has
failed to live up to this standard.
All the issues raised in these three cases can be summed up in two ultimate questions, namely:
(1) Did Rayala commit sexual harassment
(2) If he did, what is the applicable penalty?
Initially, however, we must resolve a procedural issue raised by Rayala. He accuses the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), as counsel for the Republic, of forum shopping because it filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026 and then filed a comment in G.R. No. 155840 before this Court.
We do not agree.
Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum,
of seeking and possibly securing a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action
for certiorari.34 It consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.35
There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1) identity of the parties or, at least, of the parties
who represent the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter
is founded on the same set of facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration or will constitute litis
pendentia.36
Reviewing the antecedents of these consolidated cases, we note that the CA rendered the assailed Resolution on
October 18, 2002. The Republic filed its Motion for Reconsideration on November 22, 2002. On the other hand,
Rayala filed his petition before this Court on November 21, 2002. While the Republic's Motion for Reconsideration
was pending resolution before the CA, on December 2, 2002, it was directed by this Court to file its Comment on
Rayala's petition, which it submitted on June 16, 2003.
When the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Republic filed its own Petition for Review with this Court on
July 3, 2003. It cited in its "Certification and Verification of a Non-Forum Shopping" (sic), that there was a case
involving the same facts pending before this Court denominated as G.R. No. 155840. With respect to Domingo's
petition, the same had already been dismissed on February 19, 2003. Domingo's petition was reinstated on June 16,
2003 but the resolution was received by the OSG only on July 25, 2003, or after it had filed its own petition.37
Based on the foregoing, it cannot be said that the OSG is guilty of forum shopping. We must point out that it was
Rayala who filed the petition in the CA, with the Republic as the adverse party. Rayala himself filed a motion for
reconsideration of the CA's December 21, 2001 Decision, which led to a more favorable ruling, i.e., the lowering of
the penalty from dismissal to one-year suspension. The parties adversely affected by this ruling (Domingo and the
Republic) had the right to question the same on motion for reconsideration. But Domingo directly filed a Petition for
Review with this Court, as did Rayala. When the Republic opted to file a motion for reconsideration, it was merely
exercising a right. That Rayala and Domingo had by then already filed cases before the SC did not take away this
right. Thus, when this Court directed the Republic to file its Comment on Rayala's petition, it had to comply, even if it
had an unresolved motion for reconsideration with the CA, lest it be cited for contempt.
Accordingly, it cannot be said that the OSG "file[d] multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment."
We now proceed to discuss the substantive issues.
It is noteworthy that the five CA Justices who deliberated on the case were unanimous in upholding the findings of
the Committee and the OP. They found the assessment made by the Committee and the OP to be a "meticulous
and dispassionate analysis of the testimonies of the complainant (Domingo), the respondent (Rayala), and their
respective witnesses." 38 They differed only on the appropriate imposable penalty.
That Rayala committed the acts complained of - and was guilty of sexual harassment - is, therefore, the common
factual finding of not just one, but three independent bodies: the Committee, the OP and the CA. It should be
remembered that when supported by substantial evidence, factual findings made by quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies are accorded great respect and even finality by the courts.39 The principle, therefore, dictates
that such findings should bind us.40
Indeed, we find no reason to deviate from this rule. There appears no valid ground for this Court to review the
factual findings of the CA, the OP, and the Investigating Committee. These findings are now conclusive on the
Court. And quite significantly, Rayala himself admits to having committed some of the acts imputed to him.
He insists, however, that these acts do not constitute sexual harassment, because Domingo did not allege in her
complaint that there was a demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor as a condition for her continued
employment or for her promotion to a higher position.41 Rayala urges us to apply to his case our ruling in Aquino v.
Acosta.42
We find respondent's insistence unconvincing.
Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a
public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed
independently of the others.43 This rule applies with full force to sexual harassment.
The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3 thereof defines work-related sexual
harassment in this wise:
Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. - Work, education or training-related sexual
harassment is committed by an employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor,
professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in
a work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the
other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said
Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued
employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions,
or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which
in a way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said
employee;
(2) The above acts would impair the employee's rights or privileges under existing labor laws; or
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.
This section, in relation to Section 7 on penalties, defines the criminal aspect of the unlawful act of sexual
harassment. The same section, in relation to Section 6, authorizes the institution of an independent civil action for
damages and other affirmative relief.
Section 4, also in relation to Section 3, governs the procedure for administrative cases, viz.:
Sec. 4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a Work-related, Education or Training Environment. - It shall be the
duty of the employer or the head of the work-related, educational or training environment or institution, to prevent
or deter the commission of acts of sexual harassment and to provide the procedures for the resolution, settlement or
prosecution of acts of sexual harassment. Towards this end, the employer or head of office shall:
(a) Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations in consultation with and jointly approved by the employees or
students or trainees, through their duly designated representatives, prescribing the procedure for the investigation or
sexual harassment cases and the administrative sanctions therefor.
Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to prosecution in the proper courts for unlawful acts of sexual
harassment.
The said rules and regulations issued pursuant to this section (a) shall include, among others, guidelines on proper
decorum in the workplace and educational or training institutions.
(b) Create a committee on decorum and investigation of cases on sexual harassment. The committee shall
conduct meetings, as the case may be, with other officers and employees, teachers, instructors, professors,
coaches, trainors and students or trainees to increase understanding and prevent incidents of sexual harassment. It
shall also conduct the investigation of the alleged cases constituting sexual harassment.
In the case of a work-related environment, the committee shall be composed of at least one (1) representative
each from the management, the union, if any, the employees from the supervisory rank, and from the rank and file
employees.
In the case of the educational or training institution, the committee shall be composed of at least one (1)
representative from the administration, the trainors, teachers, instructors, professors or coaches and students or
trainees, as the case maybe.
The employer or head of office, educational or training institution shall disseminate or post a copy of this Act for the
information of all concerned.
The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayala's culpability is not to be determined solely on the basis of Section 3, RA
7877, because he is charged with the administrative offense, not the criminal infraction, of sexual harassment.44 It
should be enough that the CA, along with the Investigating Committee and the Office of the President, found
substantial evidence to support the administrative charge.
Yet, even if we were to test Rayala's acts strictly by the standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he would still be
administratively liable. It is true that this provision calls for a "demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor." But it
is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or
written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. Holding and squeezing
Domingo's shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations
with her, giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future privileges, and making statements
with unmistakable sexual overtones - all these acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request
for a sexual favor.
Likewise, contrary to Rayala's claim, it is not essential that the demand, request or requirement be made as a
condition for continued employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is enough that the respondent's acts
result in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the employee.45 That the acts of Rayala
generated an intimidating and hostile environment for Domingo is clearly shown by the common factual finding of
the Investigating Committee, the OP and the CA that Domingo reported the matter to an officemate and, after the
last incident, filed for a leave of absence and requested transfer to another unit.
Rayala's invocation of Aquino v. Acosta46 is misplaced, because the factual setting in that case is different from that
in the case at bench. In Aquino, Atty. Susan Aquino, Chief of the Legal and Technical Staff of the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA), charged then CTA Presiding Judge (now Presiding Justice) Ernesto Acosta of sexual harassment. She
complained of several incidents when Judge Acosta allegedly kissed her, embraced her, and put his arm around
her shoulder. The case was referred to CA Justice Josefina G. Salonga for investigation. In her report, Justice
Salonga found that "the complainant failed to show by convincing evidence that the acts of Judge Acosta in
greeting her with a kiss on the cheek, in a `beso-beso' fashion, were carried out with lustful and lascivious desires or
were motivated by malice or ill motive. It is clear from the circumstances that most of the kissing incidents were
done on festive and special occasions," and they "took place in the presence of other people and the same was
by reason of the exaltation or happiness of the moment." Thus, Justice Salonga concluded:
In all the incidents complained of, the respondent's pecks on the cheeks of the complainant should be understood
in the context of having been done on the occasion of some festivities, and not the assertion of the latter that she
was singled out by Judge Acosta in his kissing escapades. The busses on her cheeks were simply friendly and
innocent, bereft of malice and lewd design. The fact that respondent judge kisses other people on the cheeks in
the 'beso-beso' fashion, without malice, was corroborated by Atty. Florecita P. Flores, Ms. Josephine Adalem and
Ms. Ma. Fides Balili, who stated that they usually practice 'beso-beso' or kissing on the cheeks, as a form of greeting
on occasions when they meet each other, like birthdays, Christmas, New Year's Day and even Valentine's Day, and
it does not matter whether it is Judge Acosta's birthday or their birthdays. Theresa Cinco Bactat, a lawyer who
belongs to complainant's department, further attested that on occasions like birthdays, respondent judge would
likewise greet her with a peck on the cheek in a 'beso-beso' manner. Interestingly, in one of several festive
occasions, female employees of the CTA pecked respondent judge on the cheek where Atty. Aquino was one of
Judge Acosta's well wishers.
In sum, no sexual harassment had indeed transpired on those six occasions. Judge Acosta's acts of bussing Atty.
Aquino on her cheek were merely forms of greetings, casual and customary in nature. No evidence of intent to
sexually harass complainant was apparent, only that the innocent acts of 'beso-beso' were given malicious
connotations by the complainant. In fact, she did not even relate to anyone what happened to her. Undeniably,
there is no manifest sexual undertone in all those incidents.47
This Court agreed with Justice Salonga, and Judge Acosta was exonerated.
To repeat, this factual milieu in Aquino does not obtain in the case at bench. While in Aquino, the Court interpreted
the acts (of Judge Acosta) as casual gestures of friendship and camaraderie, done during festive or special
occasions and with other people present, in the instant case, Rayala's acts of holding and squeezing Domingo's
shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, and the inappropriate comments, were all made
in the confines of Rayala's office when no other members of his staff were around. More importantly, and a
circumstance absent in Aquino, Rayala's acts, as already adverted to above, produced a hostile work environment
for Domingo, as shown by her having reported the matter to an officemate and, after the last incident, filing for a
leave of absence and requesting transfer to another unit.
Rayala also argues that AO 250 does not apply to him. First, he argues that AO 250 does not cover the NLRC, which,
at the time of the incident, was under the DOLE only for purposes of program and policy coordination. Second, he
posits that even assuming AO 250 is applicable to the NLRC, he is not within its coverage because he is a
presidential appointee.
We find, however, that the question of whether or not AO 250 covers Rayala is of no real consequence. The events
of this case unmistakably show that the administrative charges against Rayala were for violation of RA 7877; that the
OP properly assumed jurisdiction over the administrative case; that the participation of the DOLE, through the
Committee created by the Secretary, was limited to initiating the investigation process, reception of evidence of
the parties, preparation of the investigation report, and recommending the appropriate action to be taken by the
OP. AO 250 had never really been applied to Rayala. If it was used at all, it was to serve merely as an auxiliary
procedural guide to aid the Committee in the orderly conduct of the investigation.
Next, Rayala alleges that the CA erred in holding that sexual harassment is an offense malum prohibitum. He argues
that intent is an essential element in sexual harassment, and since the acts imputed to him were done allegedly
without malice, he should be absolved of the charges against him.
We reiterate that what is before us is an administrative case for sexual harassment. Thus, whether the crime
of sexual harassment is malum in se or malum prohibitum is immaterial.
We also reject Rayala's allegations that the charges were filed because of a conspiracy to get him out of office and
thus constitute merely political harassment. A conspiracy must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. His
bare assertions cannot stand against the evidence presented by Domingo. As we have already ruled, the acts
imputed to Rayala have been proven as fact. Moreover, he has not proven any ill motive on the part of Domingo
and her witnesses which would be ample reason for her to conjure stories about him. On the contrary, ill motive is
belied by the fact that Domingo and her witnesses - all employees of the NLRC at that time - stood to lose their jobs
or suffer unpleasant consequences for coming forward and charging their boss with sexual harassment.
Furthermore, Rayala decries the alleged violation of his right to due process. He accuses the Committee on
Decorum of railroading his trial for violation of RA 7877. He also scored the OP's decision finding him guilty of
"disgraceful and immoral conduct" under the Revised Administrative Code and not for violation of RA 7877.
Considering that he was not tried for "disgraceful and immoral conduct," he argues that the verdict is a "sham and
total nullity."
We hold that Rayala was properly accorded due process. In previous cases, this Court held that:
[i]n administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or
constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real
opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's
favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a
person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said
tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in
the records or made known to the parties affected.48
The records of the case indicate that Rayala was afforded all these procedural due process safeguards. Although
in the beginning he questioned the authority of the Committee to try him,49 he appeared, personally and with
counsel, and participated in the proceedings.
On the other point raised, this Court has held that, even in criminal cases, the designation of the offense is not
controlling, thus:
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law
or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description
of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged
in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does
not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated
in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by
reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a
crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to
suitably prepare his defense.50
It is noteworthy that under AO 250, sexual harassment amounts to disgraceful and immoral conduct.51 Thus, any
finding of liability for sexual harassment may also be the basis of culpability for disgraceful and immoral conduct.
With the foregoing disquisitions affirming the finding that Rayala committed sexual harassment, we now determine
the proper penalty to be imposed.
Rayala attacks the penalty imposed by the OP. He alleges that under the pertinent Civil Service Rules, disgraceful
and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension for a period of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. He
also argues that since he is charged administratively, aggravating or mitigating circumstances cannot be
appreciated for purposes of imposing the penalty.
Under AO 250, the penalty for the first offense is suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year, while
the penalty for the second offense is dismissal.52 On the other hand, Section 22(o), Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 198753 and Section 52 A(15) of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service54 both provide that the first offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is
punishable by suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. A second offense is punishable by
dismissal.
Under the Labor Code, the Chairman of the NLRC shall hold office during good behavior until he or she reaches the
age of sixty-five, unless sooner removed for cause as provided by law or becomes incapacitated to discharge the
duties of the office.55
In this case, it is the President of the Philippines, as the proper disciplining authority, who would determine whether
there is a valid cause for the removal of Rayala as NLRC Chairman. This power, however, is qualified by the phrase
"for cause as provided by law." Thus, when the President found that Rayala was indeed guilty of disgraceful and
immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did not have unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other than the
penalty provided by law for such offense. As cited above, the imposable penalty for the first offense of either the
administrative offense of sexual harassment or for disgraceful and immoral conduct is suspension of six (6) months
and one (1) day to one (1) year. Accordingly, it was error for the Office of the President to impose upon Rayala the
penalty of dismissal from the service, a penalty which can only be imposed upon commission of a second offense.
Even if the OP properly considered the fact that Rayala took advantage of his high government position, it still
could not validly dismiss him from the service. Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service,56 taking undue advantage of a subordinate may be considered as an aggravating circumstance57 and
where only aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are present, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed.58 Hence, the maximum penalty that can be imposed on Rayala is suspension for one (1) year.
Rayala holds the exalted position of NLRC Chairman, with the rank equivalent to a CA Justice. Thus, it is not
unavailing that rigid standards of conduct may be demanded of him. In Talens-Dabon v. Judge Arceo,59 this Court,
in upholding the liability of therein respondent Judge, said:
The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that complainant is one of his subordinates over whom
he exercises control and supervision, he being the executive judge. He took advantage of his position and power in
order to carry out his lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of he being in loco parentis over his subordinate
employees, respondent was the one who preyed on them, taking advantage of his superior position.
In yet another case, this Court declared:
As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by more exacting work ethics. He failed to live up to his higher
standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his moral perversity. And when such moral perversity is
perpetrated against his subordinate, he provides a justifiable ground for his dismissal for lack of trust and
confidence. It is the right, nay, the duty of every employer to protect its employees from oversexed superiors.60
It is incumbent upon the head of office to set an example on how his employees should conduct themselves in
public office, so that they may work efficiently in a healthy working atmosphere. Courtesy demands that he should
set a good example.61
Rayala has thrown every argument in the book in a vain effort to effect his exoneration. He even puts Domingo's
character in question and casts doubt on the morality of the former President who ordered, albeit erroneously, his
dismissal from the service. Unfortunately for him, these are not significant factors in the disposition of the case. It is his
character that is in question here and sadly, the inquiry showed that he has been found wanting.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the October 18, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 61026 is AFFIRMED. Consequently, the petitions in G.R. NOS. 155831, 155840, and 158700 are DENIED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.