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Oil Storage

Related terms:

Crude Oil, Corrosion, Floating Production Storage and Offloading, Wellheads

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C
Richard P. Pohanish, in Sittig's Handbook of Toxic and Hazardous Chemicals and
Carcinogens (Seventh Edition), 2017

Storage: Oil: Color code—Red: Flammability Hazard: Store in a flammable (liquid or


solid materials) storage area or approved cabinet away from sources if ignition. Color
code—Yellow Stripe (strong reducing agent): Reactivity Hazard; Store separately in an
area isolated from flammables, combustibles, or other yellow coded materials. Prior
to working with carbon black all handlers should be trained on its proper handling
and storage. Carbon black must be stored to avoid contact with chlorates, bromates,
and nitrates, since violent reactions occur. Sources of ignition, such as smoking
and open flames are prohibited where carbon black is used, handled, or stored in a
manner that could create a potential fire or explosion hazard. If carbon black contains
more than 0.1% PAHs it should be used, handled, and stored in a regulated area as
a carcinogen. A regulated, marked area should be established where this chemical
is handled, used, or stored in compliance with OSHA Standard 1910.1045.

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Oil and Gas Industry Network


Sankara Papavinasam, in Corrosion Control in the Oil and Gas Industry, 2014

2.30 Oil storage tanks


Oil storage tanks may be present in many locations for different reasons. They
function as staging areas to collect crude oils from various production fields and
to deliver them into pipelines or tankers (see section 2.18). Oil storage tanks may be
present at locations close to refineries. They collect crude oils from the transportation
sectors (e.g., oil transmission pipelines, tankers, rail cars, and trucks). Storage tanks
are also present immediately after the refinery to store different refined products.
The functionality and operating principles of all oil storage tanks are similar.

Tanks are built in groups – commonly known as tank farms. They can be as high as
46 feet (14 m) and as wide as 328 feet (100 m). The tank size depends on batch
arrival, demand for refined products, cycle-time, safety-stock, tank-bottom, and
safe-fill allowance. Batch arrival is the frequency at which particular crude arrives.
Demand for refined products varies seasonally; for example, gasoline demand is
typically higher in the summer, whereas heating fuel demand is typically higher in
the winter. Cycle-time is the time between delivery of batches of a particular product.
Tank-bottom is the volume of oil in the bottom of the tank that cannot be accessed.
Safe-fill allowance is the safety factor to keep the tank from overflowing.

The roofs of the tanks may be fixed or floating. Fixed roof tanks can be pressurized.
Floating roof tanks are operated at atmospheric pressure. Floating roofs provide
minimum void between the surface of oil and the roof and are designed to provide
a good seal between the periphery of the floating roof and the tank shell. This
arrangement minimizes oxygen contamination. In certain designs, a combination
of fixed roof with internal floating-roof is used, e.g., in areas of heavy snowfall or
rain to prevent the accumulation of snow or water on the floating roof.

Most storage tanks are fabricated using carbon steel. Table 2.19 presents typical
materials of construction of oil storage tanks, and standards providing guidelines
for constructing the tanks.44 Special attention is paid to constructing and operating
tanks used for storing sour crudes. These include inspection of locations for potential
iron sulfide deposition; closing of all openings to prevent H2S gas leaks; and
installation of gauges at the bottom of the tanks to collect samples for analysis.
Aluminum tanks may be used to store sour crude.

Table 2.19. Materials for Constructing Oil Storage Tanks44

Tank Type Construction Ma- Specification Size (Typical) Other Character-


terial istics
Bolted steel tank Steel API 12B 100 to 10,000 bbl •Easily
with•Painting•-
dismountable•-
Galvanized
Construction is
coating•Poly-
easy
meric coating
Welded steel tank Heavier steel API 12FBS 2654 90 to 500 bbl •Pressure up to
16 oz
Flat-sided tanks API 620
•Atmospheric
pressure
operation•Use-
ful when space
is
limited•-
Flat-sided tanks
Field – welded Heavy gauge steel API 12D 500 to 10,000 bbl •Provides large
storage capaci-
ties in a single
unit
Field – welded Heavy gauge steel API 650 150,000 bbl •Standard tank
for large stor-
age of oil
and petroleum
products

Figure 2.20 presents types of corrosion occurring in above ground tanks.45 More


than 65% of tank failures are associated with corrosion. In general, the incidences of
external corrosion are higher than those of internal corrosion. The most susceptible
part of the external surface is the bottom of the tank. Most external tank surfaces
are coated. External coating protects the surface from corrosion and, in the above
ground areas, provides an aesthetic look. The areas below ground may further be
protected with CP.
FIGURE 2.20. Types of Internal and External Corrosion Occurring in an Aboveground
Tank.45

Internal corrosion occurs due to the contaminants in the crude oil settling at the
bottom of the tank where water also accumulates. Some tanks have cone-bottoms to
drain water, in order to prevent corrosion. Some metallic tanks are internally coated,
typically with coal tar, epoxy resin, rubber lining, or they are galvanized (zinc coating).
The internal coating protects the surface of the tank from corrosion and protects the
oil from contamination. Coatings that are immersed in liquids are often backed with
CP.

Vapor phase corrosion may occur in aboveground tanks in the areas above the stored
product. Depending on the temperature gradient and on materials of construction
and storage, general, crevice, and pitting corrosion may occur. The interface between
liquid and vapor phases is susceptible to accelerated corrosion due to the oxygen or
moisture concentration gradient.

Non-metallic tanks are frequently used to store smaller amounts of crude oil,
typically up to 5.7 m3 (15,000 gal). The non-metallic materials most commonly used
include molded polymers reinforced with fiberglass and high-density polyethylene
(HDPE). HDPE can be used up to 122°F (50°C) and fiberglass reinforced polymer
(vinyl ester or epoxy) tanks can be used between 50 and 200°C. At temperatures
above 392°F (200°C) non-metallic tanks cannot be used. Non-metallic storage tanks
may undergo cracking or may develop pinholes. Before non-metallic tanks are
chosen to store crude oil, their compatibility to the ingredients should be evaluated.
For example, fiberglass tanks are not suitable for storing crude oil with methanol or
ethanol.

Standards providing guidelines for constructing and operating tanks include:

• API 12B, ‘Specification for Bolted Tanks for Storage of Production Liquids’

• API 2000, ‘Venting Atmospheric and Low Pressure Storage Tanks’

• API 12D, ‘Specification for Field-Welded Tanks for Storage of Production Liq-
uids’
• API 620, ‘Recommended Rules for Design and Construction of Large, Welded
Low Pressure Storage Tanks’
• API 650, ‘Welded Steel Tanks for Crude Storage’

• API 2610, ‘Design, Construction, Operation, and Maintenance of Terminal and


Tank Facilities’
• API 2003, ‘Protection against Ignitions Arising out of Static, Lightning, and
Stray Currents’
• API 2015, ‘Safe Entry and Cleaning Petroleum Storage Tanks’
• API 653, ‘Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration, and Reconstruction’

• BS 2654, ‘Welded Steel Welded Storage Tanks for the Petroleum Industry’

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Civil engineering and building works


British Electricity International, in Station Planning and Design (Third Edition), 1991

7.6 Oil tank compounds


Oil storage tanks, which may vary in size from 6 m to 45 m in diameter and by 3
m to 15 m high, are of welded construction. The intensity of loading is due mainly
to the weight of the contained oil and is thus moderate for the lower tanks which
will generally be founded on a thick reinforced concrete raft, or on a bed of crushed
stone hardcore, with a thick layer of sand topped off by a sand/bitumen mix. For
the larger and taller tanks piling is frequently required, as such tanks are frequently
sited on poor ground close to a water's edge.

As a precaution against the risk of spread of fire, and against considerable leakage
of oil from a damaged tank, tanks are contained within earth retaining walls (called
bunds) or within reinforced concrete enclosures; these must be sufficiently vo-
luminous to contain the full oil capacity of the tanks. There is no record of fire or
collapse of tanks causing a large leakage at any CEGB power station. However, small
spillages do occur and these are retained within the bunds.

In general, the larger tanks hold heavy fuel oil and these are enclosed within large
unsurfaced earth bunds. Rain falling within these bunded areas either drains into
the ground or evaporates, whereas fuel oil solidifies at normal temperature and can
be removed or left to decompose. Smaller tanks normally hold light oils and these
need to be enclosed within surface impervious bunds which fall to a blind sump
within the bunded area. The light oils separate from the rainwater and the water is
pumped from the bottom of the blind sump over the bund wall and into the surface
water system.

All major tankage installations need to be most carefully considered with respect to
the oil and petroleum storage regulations and perhaps the Reservoirs Act [13].

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Principles and Case Histories of Deep
Vibro Techniques
C.F. Leung, ... K.W. Leong, in Ground Improvement Case Histories, 2015

11.3.1 Proposed development


An independent oil storage terminal (Fig. 11.10) was constructed on Singapore’s
Jurong Island. The island is a human-made, formed by reclamation over several
small islands. At the completion of the terminal, it was one of the world’s largest
and Asia’s biggest independent oil storage facility. It initially consisted of 73 tanks
with diameters ranging from 13.6–78.6 m and height from 15–22.3 m. A total of 34
tanks were built with floating roofs, while the remainder were built with fixed roofs.
After about five years of operation, the facility was expanded with an additional tank
farm consisting of 5 tanks with diameter of 18–25 m and height of 31.3 m.

Figure 11.10. Aerial photo of oil storage terminal.

(Source: From http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/companies-markets/universal-ter-


minal-postpones-up-to-s1b-ipo).

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Application of Cathodic Protection


Alireza Bahadori Ph.D., in Cathodic Corrosion Protection Systems, 2014

2.11.7 Oil Storage Tank Bottoms


Large oil storage tanks are often erected on earth foundation mounds. The top of the
foundation mound may be provided with a bit-sand carpet, or some form of coating
may be applied to the underside of the tank bottom. During operation, the bottom
of the tank is subject to flexure and settlement. The bit-sand carpet is therefore liable
to be damaged, and this thus allows parts of the tank bottom to come into contact
with the soil of the foundation mound. Any coating applied to the tank bottom plates
is also likely to be partially destroyed by the heat of welding of the lap joints, with
the same result.

Hence, if the environment is corrosive, cathodic protection may be applied to


supplement the protection provided by carpeting or tank bottom coating. The above
general considerations also apply to similarly constructed tankage for use with
liquids other than with petroleum or its products.

2.11.7.1 Structure Preparation


The tank foundation mound should as far as possible be constructed so that it will
distribute protection current uniformly to the whole of the underside of the tank.
This means that the use of rubble, rock fill, etc., should be avoided and the mound
should consist of fine-grained and well-compacted material.

Oil storage tank bottoms are constructed by lap welding individual plates and
are therefore electrically continuous. Where groups of tanks are to be cathodically
protected, provision will need to be made for bounding between individual tanks.
If it is desired to confine the protection current to the tanks, isolating joints will
be required in all pipelines connected to the tanks. If flammable liquids are being
stored, such joints should be located outside the tank bund.

2.11.7.2 Application to Oil Storage Tank Bottom


Current density figures of the order of 10 mA/m2 are normally required for uncoated
tank bottoms resting on bit-sand carpets and, owing to the large areas involved,
impressed current is usually preferred. Galvanic anodes may, however, be worth
considering for small isolated tanks on soil with low resistivity.

Ground beds should, as far as possible, be symmetrically arranged around the tank
or group of tanks, and a distance of not less than one tank diameter from the
tank periphery is desirable. Ground beds should not be located inside tank bunds if
flammable liquids are being stored. Where space is restricted, consideration may be
given to installing anodes at considerable depths.

2.11.7.3 Particular Considerations


Structure soil potentials vary across the underside of a cathodically protected tank
bottom and rim potentials usually need to be more negative than −0.85 V to ensure
protection at the center. The main factors concerned are the insulation provided by
the tank bottom coating in relation to soil resistivity, and variations in soil resistivity
with depths at the tank site.

On new constructions, it may be possible to install two or three permanent reference


electrodes in the foundation mound prior to tank erection so that the least negative
rim potential necessary to secure full protection of the tank bottom can be assessed
and suitable mechanical protection will be required.

Where measurement is impracticable, an arbitrary value of the rim potential has


to be adopted. Potentials in the range of −1.10 to −1.20 V (copper/copper) sulfate
reference electrode have been found to be satisfactory. Tanks that remain empty
for prolonged periods are therefore unlikely to receive complete protection because
upward flexure of the tank bottom when the tank is emptied leads to a loss of contact
with the foundation.

Cases may arise where an old tank on a granular bed, for example, granite chips, is
lifted for rebottoming and the subsequent application of cathodic protection. Under
these circumstances, the spaces between the granite chippings should be filled with
suitable fine-grained material to enable protection current to flow to the whole of
the underside surface of the new bottom.

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Process Safety
Arnab Chakrabarty, ... Tahir Cagin, in Multiscale Modeling for Process Safety Appli-
cations, 2016

2.5.3.10 Buncefield disaster


The Buncefield oil storage depot in Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire, UK, saw an
explosion in December 2005. Like many other previous incidents, the disaster was
caused by the unexpected discharge of liquid gasoline. The explosion was so huge
that it caused massive fires, which injured more than 40 people. Apart from plant
personnel, the explosion damaged property in a 10-km radius. This was one of the
largest peace time explosions in Europe for 50–60 years.

Buncefield oil storage facility is a major transfer point for petroleum derivatives in
the UK. On December 10, 2005, about 8400 m3 of unleaded gasoline was brought
to the site. It was decided that a part of the oil would be transferred to one of the
tank (912). According to the attached pressure gauge, the tank was two-thirds full
and had about 4971 m3 of empty volume (Mannan, 2011).
On the morning of the 11th, tank 912 was filled with gasoline. From 3 a.m. in
the morning, the tank gauge remained static showing that the tank was two-thirds
full. As the gasoline filled the tank, its temperature increased. At about 5:35 a.m.,
tank 912 began overflowing. The installed CCTV cameras showed images of mist
engulfing the facility site. After the incident, when the people in the vicinity were
interrogated, they confirmed this fact. It was further revealed that a distinctive odor
of gasoline swamped the surroundings in the early hours of December 10. Until
6 a.m. in the morning, about 300 metric tons of gasoline was released from the tank.
The flammable vapor cloud ignited at 6 a.m. and there was a major explosion. This
explosion was succeeded by other explosions, which led to fires causing damage to
people and property. Figure 2.28(a) shows a picture of the first day of the fire.

Figure 2.28. Disasters in industries. (a) Buncefield facility on the first day of the fire.
(b) Smoke from Naples (Hailwood et al., 2009).

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Oil firing
In The Efficient Use of Energy (Second Edition), 1982

Storage and Handling Equipment.


A clear diagram of the oil storage and handling system, protected from dirt and
moisture, should be prominently displayed. Operating instructions for pumps,
heaters etc. and a record of routine maintenance should also be available for study
and inspection. For every system an individual maintenance schedule should be
developed which should include the checking of the following essential items.

1. Cleanliness of the delivery point and the use of dust caps on filling-pipe ends.

2. Tank identification and oil-grade labels.


3. Drainage of water from the oil storage tanks.

4. Security of the bunded area.

5. Securely locked and blanked off tank drain valves.

6. Condition of the tank vent pipes, to ensure that they are clear, especially after
an overfill has occurred.
7. Correctness of tank contents’ gauges, by comparison with dipstick readings,
to prevent overfilling.
8. Correct functioning of fire valves.

9. Condition of filters. Cleaning them and draining off any water.

10. Condition of all tracing and lagging, making good any defects.

11. Condition of steam traps.

12. Operation of oil heaters, ensuring that they are properly vented and that
controls are functioning correctly.
13. Leakage from any part of the system. Making good any defects.

14. Condition of oil interceptors fitted to surface water drains.

Repairs to oil storage tanks and oil lines involving hot working should only be
undertaken with special precautions (see Delivery and Storage – Safety)

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Risk Assessment Applied to Offshore


Structures
Yong Bai, Wei-Liang Jin, in Marine Structural Design (Second Edition), 2016

Marine System Risk


Only cargo tank systems for oil storage are considered herein. The cargo tanks are
provided with inert gas systems and crude oil washing systems. Explosions and fires
may occur in cargo tanks, although there is a lack of incident data for the frequency
quantification. A cargo tank explosion may cause structural damage and damage to
the process plant. This would more than likely result in a hydrocarbon leak from
the process system and a possible subsequent fire in the process area. Immediate
fatalities are mainly due to the effect of the explosion in the process area. Smoke
may be a treat to personnel safety. The potential risk reduction measures are:
• Improving procedures for tank intervention

• Improving reliability of the inert gas system

• Installing thrusters to allow the vessel to change heading (to avoid fire engulf-
ing the accommodation)
• Improving the fire/blast protection of the front wall of the accommodation
(Nesje et al., 1999)

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Explosions
Trevor Kletz, in What Went Wrong? (Fifth Edition), 2009

30.13.1 Buncefield
In December 2005, at the Buncefield Oil Storage Depot in Hertfordshire, United
Kingdom, a large storage tank containing gasoline overflowed through the vent at
the top as the level measuring equipment and high-level alarm on the tank, which
at the time was receiving liquid, were out of order.

The liquid splashed down the side of the tank and formed a large cloud. It ignited,
and an explosion was followed by a large fire. As a result, 45 people were injured and
there was extensive damage not only to the depot but to a neighboring industrial
estate, where the ignition probably occurred. The premises of 20 businesses em-
ploying 5,000 people were destroyed, and those of 60 businesses employing 3,500
people were damaged and made temporarily unusable. The explosion, said to have
been the largest in peacetime Europe, occurred at 6 a.m. on a Saturday If it had
occurred during a working day, the injuries would have been much greater. (The
explosion may well have damaged a larger area than earlier ones, but it was not the
largest in its results. In 1921, the explosion of a mixture of ammonium nitrate and
sulfate at Oppau in Germany killed 500 to 600 people.)

The industrial estate had been sited near the depot and allowed to expand as all those
concerned were unaware of the Newark explosion and believed that cold oil could
not explode in the open air. The defense of the group of oil companies that owned
the depot was that such an event had never been known to have occurred. In fact, as
well as the Newark explosion, a number of similar events had occurred and reports
on them had been published, for example, at Naples, Italy, in 1995 [19] and at St.
Herblain, France, in 1991 [20]. Other examples can be found by searching Google
for “Gasoline spills resulting in vapor cloud explosions.” Damage at Buncefield was,
however, more extensive than at Newark and elsewhere.
Section 5.1 describes other cases of overfilling, and reference 21 describes the
various types of level measurement equipment that are available.

The Buncefield Investigation Board has published a report on the disaster [30]. In
Appendix 4, page 87, it says, “The violent explosion at Buncefield was deemed to
be unprecedented at the time, although a review of the literature revealed that this
was not strictly correct.” This is an understatement. The published evidence, quoted
above, shows that that similar events had happened before, but most of those who
ought to have known this never learned it or had forgotten it.

> Read full chapter

Explosions
Trevor Kletz, Paul Amyotte, in What Went Wrong? (Sixth Edition), 2019

23.13.2 Buncefield
In December 2005, at the Buncefield Oil Storage Depot in Hertfordshire, UK, a
large storage tank containing gasoline overflowed through the vent at the top as
the level measuring equipment and high-level alarm on the tank, which at the time
was receiving liquid, were out of order.

The liquid splashed down the side of the tank and formed a large cloud. It ignited,
and an explosion was followed by a large fire. As a result, 45 people were injured and
there was extensive damage not only to the depot but to a neighboring industrial
estate, where the ignition probably occurred. The premises of 20 businesses em-
ploying 5000 people were destroyed, and those of 60 businesses employing 3500
people were damaged and made temporarily unusable. The explosion, said to have
been the largest in peacetime Europe, occurred at 6 a.m. on a Saturday. If it had
occurred during a working day, the injuries would have been much greater. (The
explosion may well have damaged a larger area than earlier ones, but it was not the
largest in its results. In 1921, the explosion of a mixture of ammonium nitrate and
sulfate at Oppau in Germany killed 500–600 people.)

The industrial estate had been sited near the depot and allowed to expand as all
those concerned were unaware of the Newark explosion and believed that cold oil
could not explode in the open air. The defense of the group of oil companies that
owned the depot was that such an event had never been known to have occurred. In
fact, as well as the Newark explosion, a number of similar events had occurred and
reports on them had been published, for example, at Naples, Italy, in 1995 [33] and
at St. Herblain, France, in 1991 [34]. Other examples can be found by conducting an
internet search for gasoline spills resulting in vapor cloud explosions.

I (PA) conducted such a search in May 2018; some of the results are as follows:

● Overflow of gasoline from an aboveground storage tank and subsequent VCE


in 2009; Caribbean Petroleum Corporation (CAPECO), Puerto Rico, US (see
Section 11.1).
● Leak of gasoline from a tank outlet valve and subsequent VCE in 2009; Indian
Oil Corporation, Jaipur, India (see, for example, Refs. [35, 36]).
● Ongoing discussion of Buncefield including flame acceleration via tree-lined
laneways, high-speed deflagrations and quasi-detonations [37], and the
lessons to be learned from this incident [38].

The extensive damage at Buncefield merits a review of Section 11.1 in the current
book on overfilling of storage tanks. Ref. [39] describes the various types of level
measurement equipment that are available.

The Buncefield Investigation Board has published a report on the disaster [40]. In
Appendix D, page 87, it says: The violent explosion at Buncefield was deemed to be
unprecedented at the time, although a review of the literature revealed that this was not
strictly correct. This is an understatement. The published evidence, quoted above,
shows that similar events had happened before (and have happened since), but most
of those who ought to have known this never learned it or had forgotten it.

> Read full chapter

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