PIMENTEL V.

COMELEC
GR No. 161658 Nov. 3, 2008

The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by
unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.

FACTS:
 Section 36 (g) of RA 9165 provided that: “(g) All candidates for public office . . . both in the national or
local government in the May 10, 2004 elections shall undergo a mandatory drug test.”
 Pursuant to its rulemaking authority, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and
regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office.
 Petitioner Senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr and a candidate for the said election filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 to nullify Sec 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution on
Dec 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that it imposes a qualification for candidates for senators in
addition to those already provided in the Constitution. Legal basis is Art VI Sec 3 of Constitution

ISSUE:
 WON Section 36 (g) of RA 9165 & Resolution No. 6486 are unconstitutional

RULING:
 They are unconstitutional.
 A candidate for senator only needs to meet the qualifications provided under the Constitution.
 The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot
disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
 Legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional
limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of
legislation. The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights and other
provisions such as Art VI Sec 3 for senators.
 For violating the Constitution, such provision is null and void.
 In the same way, COMELEC cannot promulgate rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36 (g) of RA
9165. If the Congress can’t, all the more does the COMELEC not have the authority to do so.
 Valid if it what optional.

VETERANS FEDERAL PARTY V. COMELEC

342 SCRA 244

The 20% allocation in Congress for party list representatives provided by the Constitution is only
a ceiling, and the Congress has the authority to define the mechanics that is consistent with the
essence of representation.

To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and Republic Act (RA) No.
7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:

First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty
percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.

Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid
votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is
entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats.

Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed
"in proportion to their total number of votes."
FACTS:

Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of government -- the party-list
method of representation. Under this system, any national, regional or sectoral party or organization registered
with the Commission on Elections may participate in the election of party-list representatives who, upon their
election and proclamation, shall sit in the House of Representatives as regular members. 4 In effect, a voter is
given two (2) votes for the House -- one for a district congressman and another for a party-list representative.

Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the "selection or election" of party-list representatives,
Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995.

For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not
be entitled to participate in the party-list system.

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on
the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.

On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the national
elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On June
26, 1998, the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve (12) parties and
organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-list
system. Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the
votes.

After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25, 1998, the Comelec en banc
further determined that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters’ Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-list
seat for having garnered 186,388 votes, which were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total votes cast for the
party-list system. Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S. Calderon, was proclaimed on September 8, 1998 as the
14th party-list representative.7

On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People’s Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards
Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number
of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent
membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution,
was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of the two percent vote requirement and the three-
seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared
winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House.

Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations8 filed their respective Motions for Intervention, seeking the same
relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASA’s Petition was joined
by other party-list organizations in a Manifestation they filed on August 28, 1998. These organizations were
COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN,
OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans
Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.

On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed Resolution granting
PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14
already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of
congressional9 seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives and twenty (20%)
percent party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote requirement
prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list system,"
which should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up." First, "the system was conceived to
enable the marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives."
Second, "the system should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it should
encourage [the] multi-party system." (Boldface in the original.) Considering these elements, but ignoring the
two percent threshold requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 x x x
should have at least one representative." It thus disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881),
Republic Act No. 7941 and other election laws, the Commission (Second Division) hereby resolves to GRANT
the instant petition and motions for intervention, to include those similarly situated.

The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit of inconsistency and flip-flopping. In its Resolution No. 2847
dated June 25, 1996, the Comelec en banc had unanimously promulgated a set of "Rules and Regulations
Governing the Election of x x x Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System." Under these Rules
and Regulations, one additional seat shall be given for every two percent of the vote, a formula the Comelec
illustrated in its Annex "A." It apparently relied on this method when it proclaimed the 14 incumbent party-list
solons (two for APEC and one each for the 12 other qualified parties). However, for inexplicable reasons, it
abandoned said unanimous Resolution and proclaimed, based on its three "elements," the "Group of 38"
private respondents.10

The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners on the basis of having
obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system, objected to the proclamation of the 38
parties and filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. They contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA
7941, only parties, organizations or coalitions garnering at least two percent of the votes for the party-list
system were entitled to seats in the House of Representatives; and (2) additional seats, not exceeding two for
each, should be allocated to those which had garnered the two percent threshold in proportion to the number of
votes cast for the winning parties, as provided by said Section 11.

 Section 5 (2), Art. VI of the Constitution states that "the party-list representatives shall constitute twenty
per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list."
 Also, RA 7941 prescribed the requirements for a party list representative seat.
 In the 1998 election, COMELEC proclaimed party list representatives who garnered at least 2% of the
number of votes.
 38 party list reps, who obtained less than 2% of the votes, were then proclaimed on the ground that the
Constitution provides that at least 20% of the seats in Congress should be filled up by party list reps.

ISSUE/S:
 WON twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution is mandatory (meaning it should be filled up all the time, which is what COMELEC did here
by proclaiming those other party list reps) or a ceiling
 WON the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA
7941 are constitutional
RULING:
 The 20% is merely a ceiling, and Section 11(b) is constitutional.
 If there is no sufficient number of participating parties or groups which can fill up the 20%, then such
allocation cannot be filled up completely. Comelec cannot be faulted for “incompleteness” because it is
the voters who determine who and how many should represent them.
 Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list
system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total
membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.
 Congress deemed it necessary to require at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list
system to ensure that only those who have sufficient constituents will then be represented in Congress.
(If you want to represent, you should have the mandate of a sufficient number of people.)
 The three seat limit, on the other hand, was meant to ensure that Congress will not be dominated by a
specific sector or group of people no matter how large their number is (like if they can block EDSA,
joke).
 Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38) herein respondent parties,
organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two
requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and proportional representation.

BANAT v COMELEC GR No. 179271 July 8, 2009

BAYAN v COMELEC GR No. 179295 April 21, 2009

FACTS:
 The COMELEC, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in
May 2007. In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the
following rules:

1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20%
shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least
2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is
entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case
of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes
cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).

 Petitioner BANAT partylist, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula(2% threshold) being
used. Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional
seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the
Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list
seat prescribed by the Constitution.
 BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with
the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20%
share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be
discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest).
 Petitioner BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section
11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.

ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the “2% threshold to qualify” for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated? (process was questioned by banat)
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.

HELD: by issue
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts,
there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. 1:4 ratio or one partylist representative for
every 4 district representative.
Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20
rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However,
the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as
in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the
May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1
ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.

This is the formula:

(Current Number of Legislative District Representatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to
Party-List Representatives

(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55 party-list representatives

II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-list
representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However,
it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.

III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only
party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less
than 2% are disqualified.

Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment.
The Supreme Court explained (example sa supreme court why the calculation is wrong):

It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”

Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a
seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
III.

SC laid down the following rules for the distribution:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have
already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for
allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941
allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-
lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat
each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available
seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats
available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer below for tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in
determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the
party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation
for party-list representatives by getting the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it
against the remaining number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional
number of seats allotted for the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.

Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total
votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional
seat

Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79

Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter
which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so
happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule
prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.

Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still
unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in
the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.

V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of
UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections. Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio)
did point out that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major
political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word “party” was not qualified and that
even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to
participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the
marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices,
explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it
is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the will of the people is that only the
marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political
parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-
list system.

BORJA v COMELEC
GR No. 133495 Sept. 3, 1998

FACTS:

Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term
ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the
incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which
ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years ending June
30, 1998.1

On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to
the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought
Capco's disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive
terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.
On April 30, 1998, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared
private respondent Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros. However, on motion of
private respondent the COMELEC en banc, voting 5-2, reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to
run for mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections.

Accordingly, private respondent was voted for in the elections. He received 16,558 votes against petitioner's
7,773 votes and was proclaimed elected by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.

This is a petition for certiorari brought to set aside the resolution, dated My 7, 1998, of the COMELEC and to
seek a declaration that private respondent is disqualified to serve another term as mayor of Pateros, Metro
Manila.

Petitioner contends that private respondent Capco's service as mayor from September 2, 1989 to June 30,
1992 should be considered as service for one full term, and since he thereafter served from 1992 to 1998 two
more terms as mayor, he should be considered to have served three consecutive terms within the
contemplation of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution and §43(b) of the Local Government Code. Petitioner stresses
the fact that, upon the death of Mayor Cesar Borja on September 2, 1989, private respondent became the
mayor and thereafter served the remainder of the term. Petitioner argues that it is irrelevant that private
respondent became mayor by succession because the purpose of the constitutional provision in limiting the
number of terms elective local officials may serve is to prevent a monopolization of political power.

ISSUE

 Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of the Mayor by operation of law and
serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term for the purpose of the
three-term limit

HELD:

Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The first is
the notion of service of term, derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of a
prolonged stay in office. The second is the idea of election, derived from the concern that the right of the people
to choose those whom they wish to govern them be preserved.It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term
limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by
reason of election.

Indeed a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people should be allowed to choose those
whom they please to govern them. To bar the election of a local official because he has already served three
terms, although the first as a result of succession by operation of law rather than election, would therefore be to
violate this principle.

Textual analysis as well supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, §8 contemplates service by local
officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of "the term of office
of elective local officials" and bars "such official[s]" from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The
second sentence, in explaining when an elective local official may be deemed to have served his full term of
office, states that "voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected." The term served must
therefore be one "for which [the official concerned] was elected." The purpose of this provision is to prevent a
circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective local official may serve. Conversely, if he is
not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he
succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term notwithstanding his voluntary
renunciation of office prior to its expiration.

Under the Local Government Code, he is the presiding officer of the sanggunian and he appoints all officials
and employees of such local assembly. He has distinct powers and functions, succession to mayorship in the
event of vacancy therein being only one of
them. It cannot be said of him, as much as of the Vice-President in the event of a vacancy in the Presidency,
that, in running for vice-mayor, he also seeks the mayorship. His assumption of the mayorship in the event of
vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in
the application of any term limit.

To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well
as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual
has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office; he must also have been elected to the same
position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

LATASA v COMELEC
GR No. 154829 Dec. 10, 2003

FACTS:
 The Petitioner was disqualified by the Comelec to hold office upon winning the election. Petitioner held
3 consecutve offices as mayor, and on his third term, the Municipality of Digos was made into the City
of Digos wherein all officials continued their previous elected positions as mandated by the constitution.
 Private respondent filed petition to deny due course, cancel COC and Disqualification, for falsely
representing his COC regarding his legibility to run as Mayor of City of Digos. COMELEC cancelled his
COC.

ISSUES:
 Whether or not petitioner Latasa is eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-
created City of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the
Municipality of Digos.

HELD:
 No, As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose those who
will govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it limits the
range of choice of the people. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
 An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local government post,
unless two conditions concur:
1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government
post, and
2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the present case, petitioner states that a city and a
municipality have separate and distinct personalities. Thus they cannot be treated as a single entity and
must be accorded different treatment consistent with specific provisions of the Local Government Code.
He does not deny the fact that he has already served for three consecutive terms as municipal mayor.
However, he asserts that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a different
juridical personality. Therefore, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor, he cannot be
construed as vying for the same local government post.
 Substantial differences do exist between a municipality and a city. For one, there is a material change
in the political and economic rights of the local government unit when it is converted from a municipality
to a city and undoubtedly, these changes affect the people as well. It is precisely for this reason why
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution mandates that no province, city, municipality, or barangay may
be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, without the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
 As may be gleaned from the Local Government Code, the creation or conversion of a local government
unit is done mainly to help assure its economic viability. Such creation or conversion is based on
verified indicators: Section 7. Creation and Conversion. --- As a general rule, the creation of a local
government unit or its conversion from one level to another shall be based on verifiable indicators or
viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:
 (a) Income. --- It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential
government facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its
population, as expected of the local government unit concerned;
(b) Population. --- It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial
jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and
(c) Land Area. --- It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and
bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to
meet the requirements of its populace.
 Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance (DOF), the
National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).[17]On the other hand, Section 2 of the Charter of the City
of Digos provides:
Section 2. The City of Digos --- The Municipality of Digos shall be converted into a component city
to be known as the City of Digos, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the
present territory of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur Province. The territorial jurisdiction of
the City shall be within the present metes and bounds of the Municipality of Digos. x x x
Moreover, Section 53 of the said Charter further states:
Section 53. Officials of the City of Digos. --- The present elective officials of the Municipality of
Digos shall continue to exercise their powers and functions until such a time that a new election is
held and the duly-elected officials shall have already qualified and assumed their offices. x x x. As
seen in the aforementioned provisions (Section 450 (Requisites for Creation), Sec 7 (Creation and
Conversion) of the Local Government Code and Sections 2 and 53 of the Charter of the City of
Digos), the Court noted that the delineation of the metes and bounds of the City of Digos did not
change even by an inch the land area previously covered by the Municipality of Digos.
 The elective officials of the Municipality of Digos continued to exercise their powers and functions until
elections were held for the new city officials. Although, the new city acquired a new corporate existence
separate and distinct from that of the municipality. It does not mean, that for the purpose of applying the
subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different
local government post as that of the office of the city mayor.
 The territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the
inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group
of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These
are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine
year.
 The law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from office and
ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular
local government unit.
 The framers of the Constitution included an exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will
govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a
particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner to
vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor
would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception.
 Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would
then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants
for a total of eighteen consecutive years.

MONTEBON v COMELEC
G.R. No. 180444 April 8, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioners Montebon and Ondy and respondent Potencioso, Jr. were candidates for municipal councilor of the
Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu for the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections. On April 30,
2007, petitioners and other candidates4 for municipal councilor filed a petition for disqualification against
respondent with the COMELEC alleging that respondent had been elected and served three consecutive terms
as municipal councilor in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. Thus, he is proscribed from running for the
same position in the 2007 elections as it would be his fourth consecutive term.

In his answer, respondent admitted that he had been elected for three consecutive terms as municipal
councilor. However, he claimed that the service of his second term in 2001-2004 was interrupted on January
12, 2004 when he succeeded as vice mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Petronilo L.
Mendoza. Consequently, he is not disqualified from vying for the position of municipal councilor in the 2007
elections. In the hearing of May 10, 2007, the parties were directed to file their respective memoranda.

In petitioners’ memorandum, they maintained that respondent’s assumption of office as vice-mayor in January
2004 should not be considered an interruption in the service of his second term since it was a voluntary
renunciation of his office as municipal councilor. They argued that, according to the law, voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the official concerned was elected.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that a local elective official is not disqualified from running for the fourth
consecutive time to the same office if there was an interruption in one of the previous three terms.

On June 2, 2007, the COMELEC First Division denied the petition for disqualification ruling that respondent’s
assumption of office as vice-mayor should be considered an interruption in the continuity of his service. His
second term having been involuntarily interrupted, respondent should thus not be disqualified to seek reelection
as municipal councillor. And on appeal, upheld ruling of First Division and dismissed MR.

Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on the ground that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that respondent’s assumption of office as vice-
mayor in January 2004 interrupted his 2001-2004 term as municipal councilor

ISSUE:
 Whether or not respondent is deemed to have fully served his second term in view of his assumption of
office as vice-mayor of Tuburan on January 2004

RULING:
 No
 Succession in local government offices is by operation of law.
 In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice mayor due to the retirement of Vice
Mayor Mendoza. Respondent, being the highest ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in
accordance with law as provided under Sec 44 of the Local Government Code. It is clear that his
assumption can in no way be considered a voluntary renunciation as counsilor. Assumption of office
was an involuntary severance resulting to an interruption of service of his 2001-2004 term.
 The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether to accept the vacated post or not.
Section 44 of the Local Government Code makes no exception. Only if the highest-ranking councilor is
permanently unable to succeed to the post does the law speak of alternate succession. Under no
circumstances can simple refusal of the official concerned be considered as permanent inability within
the contemplation of law. Essentially therefore, the successor cannot refuse to assume the office that
he is mandated to occupy by virtue of succession. He can only do so if for some reason he is
permanently unable to succeed and occupy the post vacated.
 Succession by law to a vacated government office is involuntary since it involves performance of a
public duty, non-performance of which exposes said official to possible administrative and criminal
charges of dereliction of duty and neglect in the performance of public functions. It is therefore more
compulsory and obligatory rather than voluntary.
ALDOVINO v COMELEC
G.R. No. 184836 December 23, 2009

FACTS:
 Respondent Wilfredo Asilo was elected councillor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms. 1998-
2007. In September 2005 during respondent’s third term Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him
which was subsequently lifted thus, he resumed the functions of his office and finished his term.
 Asilo filed his COC in the 2007 election for the same position. Petitioner sought to cancel respondent’s
certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three
terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under the Constitution
and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.
 COMELEC ruled that preventive suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the
suspended public official unable to provide complete service for the full term; thus, such term should not
be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
 The present petition seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUES:
1. Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term limit rule;
and
2. Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated in Section
43(b) of RA 7160

RULING:

Petition is meritorious.
1. No.
i) Preventive suspension does not involve an effective interruption of a term and should therefore not be
a reason to avoid the three-term limitation.
ii) A preventive suspension cannot be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to
stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within
the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office is the
absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy
exists.
iii) Preventive suspension does not have the element of voluntariness that voluntary renunciation
embodies. Neither does it contain the element of renunciation or loss of title to office as it merely
involves the temporary incapacity to perform the service that an elective office demands. Thus
viewed, preventive suspension is – by its very nature – the exact opposite of voluntary renunciation; it
is involuntary and temporary, and involves only the actual delivery of service, not the title to the office.
iv) Recognizing preventive suspension as an effective interruption of a term can serve as a
circumvention more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution expressly disallows
as an interruption.
2. Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats the constitutional provision, and any difference in wording
does not assume any significance in this case.
LONZANIDA v COMELEC
G.R. No. 135150 July 28, 1999

FACTS:
 Petitioner was duly elected and served two terms. He run for the same office on the third time and was
proclaimed the winner.
 Petitioner’s opponent filed an election protest which in a decision declared null a failure of election.
 In the next election petitioner run for the same position.
 Respondent timely filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that he had served three
consecutive terms in the same post. COMLEC disqualified petitioner.
 Petitioner challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions finding him disqualified to run for mayor.
He maintains that he was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his 3 rd assumption
shouldn’t be counted because he was not the duly elected mayor.

ISSUE:
 Whether petitioner assumption of office as mayor may be considered as service of one full term for the
purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials.

RULING:
 NO. Not duly elected and not holding office for the full term, his assumption of office cannot be counted
as a term for purposes of computing the three term limit.
 The requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent.
1. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the last election.
His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but
by reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation
subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume
office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner
who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest.
2. Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the term because he was ordered to vacate
his post before its expiration. The respondents contention that the petitioner should be deemed to
have served one full term because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to
support it; it disregards the second requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has
fully served three consecutive terms. The second sentence of the constitutional provision under
scrutiny states, Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected.
ONG v ALEGRE
GR No. 163295 Jan. 23, 2006

FACTS:
 A candidate was disqualified by the COMELEC en banc to run for mayor for he has served for three-
consecutive terms.
 During his second term, the opposing party filed a protest and the RTC declared the opposing party as
the duly elected mayor. However, such decision came out three years after and when the candidate
has already started his third term.
 Since the COMELEC disqualified the candidate, his political party nominated the brother of the
candidate as a substitute.
 The COMELEC denied due course the certificate of candidacy in the same mayoralty election as
substitute for his brother.
ISSUES:
 Whether or not the assumption of office as mayor from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be
considered as one full term service in the context of the consecutive three-term limit rule.
 Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied due course to the
certificate of candidacy in the same mayoralty election as substitute for his brother.
RULING:
 We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, "service for the full term", and should be counted
as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and
statutory provisions, supra, barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than
three consecutive term for the same position.
 For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must
concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the
same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
 A candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled or not given due course cannot be
substituted by another belonging to the same political party as that of the former.
 A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much the
same way as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any
stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all.
RIVERA v COMELEC
GR No. 167591 May 9, 2007

FACTS:
 A petition to cancel the candidate’s Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that he was elected and had
served three previous consecutive terms as mayor.
 He responded that he was not validly elected for the term 1998 to 2001 since the RTC, declared in its
Decision that his proclamation as mayor was void.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the term 1998 to 2001 should be counted when his proclamation as mayor was
declared void.

RULING:
Such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term. Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution can not be more clear and explicit —The term of the office of elected local officials . . . shall
be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms . . . .Upon the other
hand, Section 43 (b) of R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code) clearly provides: No local official
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position .