(US vs Tan Teng, G.R. No.
7081, gonorrhea, cannot be used as evidence
September 7, 1912)
Facts: The sister of Oliva Pacomio (7-year
old girl) discovered that the latter was
suffering from a venereal disease known as
gonorrhea. Oliva related to her sister that in
the morning of the 15th of September 1910,
after she took a bath, Chinaman Tan Teng
followed her into her room and asked her for
some face powder, which she gave him; that
after using some of the face powder upon
his private parts he threw her upon the floor,
placing his private parts upon hers, and
remained in that position for some little time.
The sister at once put on foot an
investigation to find the Chinaman. A
number of Chinamen were collected
together. Oliva was called upon to identify
the one who had abused her. Tan Teng was
not present at first. Later he arrived and
Oliva identified him at once as the one who
had attempted to violate her.
Upon this information Tan Teng was
arrested and taken to the police station and
stripped of his clothing and examined. The
policeman who examined the defendant
swore that his body bore every sign of the
fact that he was suffering from the venereal
disease known as gonorrhea. The
policeman took a portion of the substance
emitting from the body of the defendant and
turned it over to the Bureau of Science for
the purpose of having a scientific analysis
made of the same. The result of the
examination showed that the defendant was
suffering from gonorrhea.
During the trial, the defendant contended
that the result of the scientific examination
made by the Bureau of Science of the
substance taken from his body, at or about
the time he was arrested, was not
admissible in evidence as proof of the fact
that he was suffering from gonorrhea. That
to admit such evidence was to compel the
defendant to testify against himself.
The trial court found Tan Teng guilty of the
crime of rape.
Issue: Whether the substance taken from
Tan Teng, which indicates that he has
against Tan Teng on the ground that it is
violative of the constitutional injunction
against self-incrimination.
Held: The prohibition contained in section 5
of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not
be compelled to be a witness against
himself, is simply a prohibition against legal
process to extract from the defendant's own
lips, against his will, an admission of his
guilt. The main purpose of the provision of
the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory
oral examination of prisoners before trial, or
upon trial, for the purpose of extorting
unwilling confessions or declarations
implicating them in the commission of a
crime.
The doctrine contended for by appellant
would prohibit courts from looking at the fact
of a defendant even, for the purpose of
disclosing his identity. Such an application of
the prohibition under discussion certainly
could not be permitted. Such an inspection
of the bodily features by the court or by
witnesses, can not violate the privilege
granted under the Philippine Bill, because it
does not call upon the accused as a witness
— it does not call upon the defendant for his
testimonial responsibility. The evidence
obtained in this way from the accused, is not
testimony but his body itself.
The accused was not compelled to make
any admission or answer any questions, and
the mere fact that an object found upon his
body was examined seems no more to
infringe the rule invoked than would the
introduction of stolen property taken from
the person of a thief.
(Villaflor vs. Summers, G.R. No. 16444,
September 8, 1920)
Facts: Petitioner Villaflor was charged with
the crime of adultery. The trial court, upon
motion of the assistant fiscal, ordered her to
submit to physical examination to determine
if she was pregnant or not. Villaflor refused
to obey the order on the ground that such
examination of her person was a violation of
the constitutional provision relating to self-
incrimination. Thereupon she was found in
contempt of court and was ordered to be
committed to Bilibid Prison until she should
permit the medical examination required by
the court.
Issue: Whether the compelling of a woman
to permit her body to be examined by
physicians to determine if she is pregnant,
violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of
Rights and that portion of our Code of
Criminal Procedure providing that no person
shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself.
Held: No. The constitutional guaranty that no
person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself is
limited to a prohibition against compulsory
testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary
to the proposition is that, an ocular
inspection of the body of the accused is
permissible.
Perhaps the best way to test the correctness
of our position is to go back once more to
elements and ponder on what is the prime
purpose of a criminal trial. As we view it, the
object of having criminal laws is to purge the
community of persons who violate the laws
to the great prejudice of their fellow men.
Criminal procedure, the rules of evidence,
and constitutional provisions, are then
provided, not to protect the guilty but to
protect the innocent. No rule is intended to
be so rigid as to embarrass the
administration of justice in its endeavor to
ascertain the truth. No accused person
should be afraid of the use of any method
which will tend to establish the truth. For
instance, under the facts before us, to use
torture to make the defendant admit her guilt
might only result in including her to tell a
falsehood. But no evidence of physical facts
can for any substantial reason be held to be
detrimental to the accused except in so far
as the truth is to be avoided in order to
acquit a guilty person.
BELTRAN VS. SAMSON [53 PHIL 570;
G.R. NO. 32025; 23 SEPT 1929]
Facts: Beltran, as a defendant for the crime
of Falsification, refused to write a sample of
his handwriting as ordered by the
respondent Judge. The petitioner in this
case contended that such order would be a
violation of his constitutional right against
self-incrimination because such examination
would give the prosecution evidence against
him, which the latter should have gotten in
the first place. He also argued that such an
act will make him furnish evidence against
himself.
Issue: Whether or not the writing from the
fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the
purpose of comparing the latter's
handwriting and determining whether he
wrote certain documents supposed to be
falsified, constitutes evidence against
himself within the scope and meaning of the
constitutional provision under examination.
Held: The court ordered the respondents
and those under their orders desist and
abstain absolutely and forever from
compelling the petitioner to take down
dictation in his handwriting for the purpose
of submitting the latter for comparison.
Writing is something more than moving the
body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is
not a purely mechanical act, because it
requires the application of intelligence and
attention; and in the case at bar writing
means that the petitioner herein is to furnish
a means to determine whether or not he is
the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent
fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more
serious, we believe the present case is
similar to that of producing documents or
chattels in one's possession. We say that,
for the purposes of the constitutional
privilege, there is a similarity between one
who is compelled to produce a document,
and one who is compelled to furnish a
specimen of his handwriting, for in both
cases, the witness is required to furnish
evidence against himself. It cannot be
contended in the present case that if
permission to obtain a specimen of the
petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the
crime would go unpunished. Considering the
circumstance that the petitioner is a
municipal treasurer, it should not be a
difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained
genuine specimens of his handwriting. But
even supposing it is impossible to obtain
specimen or specimens without resorting to
the means complained herein, that is no
reason for trampling upon a personal right
guaranteed by the constitution. It might be
true that in some cases criminals may
succeed in evading the hand of justice, but
such cases are accidental and do not
constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege.
This constitutional privilege exists for the
protection of innocent persons.
CHAVEZ VS. CA
FACTS: Petitioner herein was charged of
qualified theft of a motor vehicle,one
Thunderbird car, with accessories
amounting to P22,000.
That this theft was committed when the
petitioner with the help of one, Asistio have
completed a deed of sale of Thunderbird
which belongs to Johnson Lee. Chavesz
telephoned Lee and made an appointment
for the sale of Thunderbird with Sumilang as
a introduced buyer.
As payment was made to Eugene’s
restaurant in Quezon City, all of them then
drove to the place. Chavez and Sumilang,
pretending to get the money for the
perfection of sale of the Thunderbird car, left
the two Chinese alone, Johnson Lee and his
brother.
When the two Chinese went outside to look
for Chavez and Sumilang, they could no
longer locate the former and the
Thunderbird car was also from the parking
lot.
Nevertheless the Thunderbird was
impounded however, it was already been
repainted.
During the trial, the Fiscal Grecia presented
Chavez as a witness. And despite of
Chavez’s objection being aware that the
latter would be self-incriminated, the Court
sustained the stand of the Fiscal saying.
“What he will testify to does not necessarily
incriminate him, counsel.”
“And there is the right of the prosecution to
ask anybody to act as witness on the
witness stand including the accused.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s
statement against himself can be used to
convict him.
HELD: No. It is in the context that we sat
that the constitutional guarantee may not be
treated with unconcern. To repeat, it is
mandatory: it secures to every defendant a
valuable and substantive right.
The court may not extract from a
defendant’s own lips and against his will an
admission of his guilt.
In reality, the purpose calling an accused as
a witness for the People would be to
incriminate him.
In the case at bar, the petitioner did not
volunteer to take the witness stand in his
own defence; he did not offer himself as a
witness; on the contrary, he claimed the
right upon being called to testify.
There is not even a valid waiver of the
privilege. To be valid and effective, a waiver
must be certain and unequivocal, and
intelligently, understandably and willingly
made.
Wherefore the accused is acquitted.
PEOPLE VS. GALLARDE
Facts: In the evening of 26 May 1997, at the
house of spouses Eduardo and Elena Talan
in Brgy. Trenchera, Tayug, Pangasinan,
their neighbors converged. Among them
were Radel Gallarde, Francisco, Renato,
Edwin, all surnamed Fernandez, Romel
Hernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente,
Jon Talen, Noel Arellaga and Ramil Bargon.
Idling by was Editha, 10 year old daughter of
spouses Talan. After a while, Roger stood
up and invited Jaime and Gallarde to dine in
the kitchen. As they partook of the meal,
Gallarde suddenly left. Jaime, too, stepped
out of the kitchen to urinate. Outside the
house, he chanced upon Gallarde and
Editha talking to each other. Jaime whistled
at Gallarde but instead of minding him, the
latter sprinted towards the road leading to
his house. Thereafter, Editha entered the
kitchen and took hold of a kerosene lamp.
Jaime followed her and asked where she
was going. Editha answered that she would
look for Gallarde. Soon Editha left enroute to
where Gallarde fled. By 10:00 p.m., the
drinking buddies had dispersed but Jaime,
Francisco, Edwin and Rose regrouped at
Renato's place where they talked and
relaxed. Moments later, Roger arrived and
informed them that Editha was missing.
Roger asked the group to help look for her.
Elena Talan informed his uncle, Barangay
Ex-kagawad Mario Fernandez, about her
daughter's disappearance. The latter,
together with his son Edwin, wife Virginia
and nephew Freddie Cortez wasted no time
in joining their neighbors search the houses,
dikes and fields to look for the missing child.
When Jaime mentioned that Gallarde was
the last person he sawtalking to Editha, the
searchers went back to the house of
Gallarde. The searchers found Gallarde
squatting with his short pants at the toilet
about 6 meters away from Gallarde's house;
his hands and knees covered with soil.
Asked where Editha was, Gallarde replied: "I
do not know, I did not do anything to her."
To the question, "where did you come from
since a while ago you were not yet in this
toilet?" Gallarde answered "I was with Kiko, I
was asleep in their house. One of the
searchers Mario Bado, got angry and
countered that Gallarde's statement was
impossible because Kiko was with him
drinking. After the confrontation at the toilet,
Ex-kagawad Fernandez brought Gallarde to
Brgy. Captain Felicisimo Mendoza,
informing the latter that Gallarde was the
last person seen talking with the missing
child. Fernandez then rejoined the
searchers. Back in the field, Virginia
Fernandez tripped on a wet ground. The
searchers, thereafter, noticed disheveled
grasses, and a wide hole among the
disheveled grass. When Ex-kagawad
Fernandez forthwith scratched some earth
aside and then Editha's hand pitted out.
Fernandez screamed in terror. Meantime,
Barangay Captain Mendoza heardshouts
saying: "She is here, she is now here
already dead!" Mindful of Gallarde's safety,
Brgy. Captain Mendoza decided to bring
Gallarde to the municipal building. On their
way though, they met policemen on board a
vehicle. He flagged them down and turned
over the person of Gallarde, saying: "Here is
the suspect in the disappearance of the little
girl. Since you are already here, I am giving
him to you." The policemen together with
Gallarde proceeded to where the people
found Editha. One of the policemen shoved
more soil aside. The lifeless Editha was
completely naked when she was recovered.
A picture of Gallarde was taken without any
counsel present.
Gallarde was charged with the special
complex crime of rape with homicide. The
trial court rendered a decision convicting
Gallarde of the crime of murder only, not of
the complex crime of rape with homicide
because of the lack of proof of carnal
knowledge, and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of the late Editha Talan
in the negotiated sum of P70,000.00. The
trial court rejected the photographs (Exhibits
"I," "J" and "K") taken of Gallarde
immediately after the incident on the ground
that "the same were taken while he was
already under the mercy of the police."
Gallarde appealed his conviction to the SC.
Issue: Whether The taking of pictures of an
accused violates of his constitutional right
against self-incrimination.
Held: The taking of pictures of an accused
even without the assistance of counsel,
being a purely mechanical act, is not a
violation of his constitutional right against
self-incrimination.
The constitutional right of an accused
against self-incrimination proscribes the use
of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from the accused and not
the inclusion of his body in evidence when it
may be material. Purely mechanical acts are
not included in the prohibition as the
accused does not thereby speak his guilt,
hence the assistance and guiding hand of
counsel is not required. The essence of the
right against self-incrimination is testimonial
compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence
against himself through a testimonial act.
Hence, it has been held that a woman
charged with adultery may be compelled to
submit to physical examination to determine
her pregnancy; and an accused may be
compelled to submit to physical examination
and to have a substance taken from his
body for medical determination as to
whether he was suffering from gonorrhea
which was contracted by his victim; to expel
morphine from his mouth; to have the outline
of his foot traced to determine its identity
with bloody footprints; and to be
photographed or measured, or his garments
or shoes removed or replaced, or to move
his body to enable the foregoing things to be
done.
PASCUAL VS. BOARD OF MEDICAL
EXAMINERS
Facts: Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta
Gatbonton filed an administrative case
against Arsenio Pascual Jr.
for alleged immorality. At the initial hearing
thereof, Gatbonton’s counsel announced
that he would present Pascual as his first
witness. Pascual objected, relying on the
constitutional right to be exempt from being
a witness against himself. The Board of
Examiners took note of such a plea but
scheduled Pascual to testify in the next
hearing unless in the meantime he could
secure a restraining order from a competent
authority. Pascual filed with the Court of
First Instance of Manila an action for
prohibition with prayer for preliminary
injunction against the Board of Medical
Examiners. The lower court ordered that a
writ of preliminary injunction issue against
the Board commanding it to refrain from
hearing or further proceeding with such an
administrative case and to await the judicial
disposition of the matter. Subsequently, a
decision was rendered by the lower court
finding the claim of Pascual to be well-
founded and prohibiting the Board "from
compelling the petitioner to act and testify as
a witness for the complainant in said
investigation without his consent and against
himself." Hence, the Board appealed.
Issue: Whether a medical practitioner
charged with malpractice in administrative
case can avail of the constitutional
guarantee not to be a witness against
himself.
Held: Yes. The case for malpractice and
cancellation of the license to practice
medicine while administrative in character
possesses a criminal or penal aspect. An
unfavorable decision would result in the
revocation of the license of the respondent
to practice medicine. Consequently, he can
refuse to take the witness stand.
The right against self-incrimination extends
not only to right to refuse to answer
questions put to the accused while on
witness stand, but also to forgo testimony, to
remain silent and refuse to take the witness
stand when called by as a witness by the
prosecution. The reason is that the right
against self incrimination, along with the
other rights granted to the accused, stands
for a belief that while a crime should not go
unpunished and that the truth must be
revealed, such desirable objective should
not be accomplished according to means
and methods offensive to the high sense of
respect accorded to the human personality.
MAPA, JR VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Petitioner herein was charged with violation
of Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices.However
he was granted an immunity from suit by the
PCGG related to the previous charges
against him, provided that he will testify as
witness against the Marcoses in criminal
proceedings in the United States Vs
Ferdinand Marcos, during the RICO, where
Ferdinand Marcos and his wife, Imelda
Marcos were being tried for charges of
corruption. All the expenses of Mapa were
shouldered by the PCCG when they flew to
New York to testify against the Marcoses.
During the trial, Ferdinand Marcos died and
La Bella, the American prosecutor
dispensed the testimony of Mapa and
thereby acquitted Imelda Marcos. Since
Mapa, was not able to testify, it was
contended that the immunity from suit of
Mapa took without force and effect.
However, the record shows that the
petitioners provided information to the
PCGG relating to the prosecution of the
RICO cases against the Marcoses in New
York. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the immunity given
by the PCGG to Mapa is still in effect and
force.
HELD: Yes. Under Sec. 5, EO 14, the
PCGG has the separate power to grant
immunity to any person from being
prosecuted provided they will meet the
conditions provided by the PCGG.

In the case at bar, Mapa was granted

immunity from the prosecution or criminal
case where he is being tried, and the PCGG
even shouldered all the expenses of Mapa
when they flew to New York to testify
implying that Mapa was able to meet the
conditions and the PCGG accepted the
information given by him (MAPA) to testify
against the Marcoses during the RICO trial.
Failure of the petitioner to testify on the
RICO can not nullify the immunity given to
him by the PCGG since the petitioner was
able to satisfy the requirements both of the
law and the parties’ implementing
agreements. Though the petitioners were
not able to testify against the Marcoses in
RICO, it can be said that it not their own
fault.

Wherefore, the petitioner must be acquitted

on the basis of the immunity granted by the
PCGG, which under the law has the power
to grant immunity.
TWO KINDS OF IMMUNITY CAN BE
GRANTED:
1. Transactional Immunity - is broader aint
he scope of its protection. By its grant the
witness can no longer be prosecuted for any
offence whatsoever arising out of the act or
transaction.
2. Used-and-derivative-use - a witnessed
is only assured that his or her particular
testimony and evidence derived from it will
not be used against him or her in a
subsequent prosecution.