2004 Rules on Notarial Practice

Spouses Santuyo v. Hidalgo 448 SCRA 282 (2005)

Sicat v. Ariola 456 SCRA 93 (2005)
Baysac v. Aty. Aceron-Papa, A.C. No. 10231, 10 August
2016
Almario v. Llera-Agno, AC No. 10689, 8 January 2018
Spouses Elmer and Mila Soriano Vs. Atty. Gervacio B.
Ortiz, Jr. and Atty. Roberto B. Arca, A.C. No. 10540.
November 28, 2019

No Unlawful, Dishonest, Immoral, Deceitful Conduct

– Rule 1.01

Ui v. Bonifacio, Adm. Case No. 3319, June 8, 2000

Figueroa v. Barranco, SBC Case No. 519 276 SCRA
445 (1997)
Barrios v. Martines, AC No. 4585 442 SCRA 324 (2004)
Yupangco-Nakpil v. Atty. Roberto Uy, AC No. 9115, 14
September 2014
Emma Dantes vs. Atty. Crispin Dantes, A.C. No. 6488,
September 22, 2004
Barrientos vs. Daarol, 218 SCRA 30
Toledo vs. Toledo, 7 SCRA 757
Obusan vs. Obusan, 128 SCRA 485
Terre vs. Terre, A.M. No. 2349, July 3, 1992
Santos vs. Tan, A.M. No. 2697, April 19, 1991

No dichotomy of standards

Tan, Jr. v. Gumba, A.C. No. 9000, October 5, 2011, 658

SCRA 527
Campugan, et al. vs. Tolentino, A.C. No. 8261, March
11, 2015

No Counseling to Defy Law – Rule 1.02

Donton v. Dr. Tansingco, AC No. 6057, June 27,
2006
In re Terell 2 Phil 266 (1903)
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan 416 SCRA 465 (2003)

Not to Encourage Lawsuit or Proceedings – Rule

1.03

Saburnido v. Madrono, AC No. 4497, 366 SCRA 1

(2001)
Linsangan v. Atty. Tolentino, AC No. 6672, September
4, 2009

Encourage Client to Avoid Controversy – Rule 1.04

Ysasi III vs NLRC, GR No. 104599, March 11, 1994
Castañeda v. Ago, G.R. No. L-28546, 65 SCRA 505
(1975)
SICAT v ARIOLA
Facts:
§ Arturo Sicat, Board Member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Rizal charged Atty. Gregorio E.
Ariola of committing fraud, deceit, and falsehood in
notarizing a Special Power of Attorney (SPA).
§ Said SPA was purportedly executed by Juanito
Benitez, of the JC Benitez Architect and Technical
Management. Said company had a contract with the
Municipality of Cainta for the construction of low cost
houses.
§ What is fraudulent about it is the fact that the SPA was
notarized more than 2 months after the death of Benitez,
the person who supposedly executed it.
§ P3,700T was paid to JC Benitez Architect and
Technical Management for services not rendered (as
consultants).
§ Ariola claims that the document he notarized was
superfluous and unnecessary, and prejudiced no one,
and therefore he should be exonerated – the document
was cancelled the same day he notarized it, hence
legally there was no public document that existed.
Issue:
§ W/N Ariola can be held liable.
Held:
§ Yes.
§ Notaries public should not authenticate documents
unless the persons who signed them are the very same
persons who executed them an personally appeared
before the, to attest to the contents and truth of what are
stated therein.
§ His assertion of falsehood in a public document
contravened one of the most cherished tenets of the
legal profession and potentially cast suspicion on the
truthfulness of every notarial act.
§ Ariola is disbarred, and not merely suspended for a
year.
OSCAR M. BAYSAC v ATTY. ELOISA M. ACERON-
PAPA, A.C. No. 10231
Promulgated: August 10, 2016
FACTS:
Complainant Oscar M. Baysac (complainant)
owns a property was mortgaged by complainant to
Spouses Emmanuel and Rizalina Cruz (Spouses Cruz)
on December 20, 2000.
In February 2003, complainant went to the
Registry of Deeds ofTrece Martires City to get a certified
true copy of the certificate of title of the property because
the property had a prospective buyer. However,
complainant was surprised to find out that the certificate
had already been cancelled, and a new certificate was
issued in favor of Spouses Cruz.
After further investigation, complainant found out
that the property was transferred in the name of
Spouses Cruz pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale
which was allegedly executed on January 13, 2003 for
the consideration of Pl 00,000.00. The Deed of Absolute
Sale which was allegedly signed by complainant, as the
owner of the property, was notarized by respondent on
January 13, 2003. Complainant, however, vehemently
denied having ever signed the Deed of Absolute Sale
and having ever appeared before a notary public on
January 13, 2003 to acknowledge the same.
Complainant further stated that the Deed of Absolute
Sale showed that what he allegedly presented to the
notary public when he acknowledged having executed
the document was his Community Tax Certificate (CTC)
issued on May 26, 2000 or three years prior to the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale.
Complainant filed a Complaint for Disbarment
dated April 14, 2009 with the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline for violation of Section 1, Rule II of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice.
Based on the documents submitted,
Investigating Commissioner Atty. Salvador B. Hababag
(Atty. Hababag) of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline found respondent administratively liable for
notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. He
recommended that respondent be suspended for two
years as notary public.
On February 13, 2013, the IBP Board of
Governors issued which adopted the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner but modified the
recommended penalty. Instead of suspension for two
years as notary public, the IBP Board of Governors
recommended the disqualification of respondent from
being commissioned as notary public for three years with
a stem warning to be more circumspect in her notarial
dealings and that repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent violated the
Notarial Law and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly Canon 1.01.
HELD:
The court affirmed the resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors finding respondent administratively
liable, but modified the penalty imposed. The court note
that the complainant and the IBP Board of Governors
cited Section 1, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice as basis for the complained acts of respondent.
However, the court find Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103,
otherwise known as the Notarial Law, to be the
applicable law at the time the complained acts took
place. Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a
notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the
country to take acknowledgments of instruments or
documents in the place where the act is done. The
notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment
shall certify that the person acknowledging the
instrument or document is known to him and that he is
the same person who executed it, and acknowledged
that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate
shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law
required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so
state. (Emphasis added.)
 The court emphasized that among the functions
of a notary public is to guard against any illegal or
immoral arrangements. By affixing her notarial seal on
the instrument, she converted the Deed of Absolute
Sale, from a private document into a public document.
As a consequence, respondent, in effect, proclaimed to
the world that: (1) all the parties therein personally
appeared before her; (2) they are all personally known to
her; (3) they were the same persons who executed the
instrument; (4) she inquired into the voluntariness of
execution of the instrument; and (5) they acknowledged
personally before her that they voluntarily and freely
executed the same.
Her act of certifying under oath an irregular
Deed of Absolute Sale without ascertaining the identities
of the persons executing the same constitutes gross
negligence in the performance of duty as a notary public.
Respondent breached Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly Canon 1.01. By
notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale, she engaged in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
The Court finds Atty. Eloisa M. Aceron-Papa
GUILTY of violating the Notarial Law and the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court
REVOKED her incumbent commission, PROHIBITED
her from being commissioned as a notary public for two
(2) years; and SUSPENDED her from the practice of law
for one (1) year, effective immediately. She is further
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense
shall be dealt with more severely.
Romeo A. Almario vs. Atty. Dominica Llera-Agno (A.C.
No. 10689 January 8, 2018)
PONENTE: Del Castillo, J.:
SUBJECT:
1. 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice: Acknowledgment– Purpose of
personal appearance of affiant.
2.
FACTS: Atty. Dominica L. Agno notarized and
acknowledged a SPA. This was questioned by
complainant Romeo Almario contending that the said
SPA was falsified because one of the affiants therein,
Francisca A. Mallari, could not possibly have executed
the same because she was in Japan at the time the SPA
was executed, as certified to by the Bureau of
Immigration. Hence, he filed a case of disbarment.
In her Answer, Atty. Agno admitted her infraction but
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and offered the
following arguments (1) this is her first offense since she
was first commissioned as a notary public in 1973; (2)
the case involved only one document; (3) the
notarization was done in good faith; (4) the civil case
wherein the questioned SP A was used ended in a
Compromise Agreement; and finally (5) she is already
71 years old and is truly sorry for what she had done,
and promises to be more circumspect in the
performance of her duties as a notary public.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended the penalty
of six (6) months suspension as a Notary Public.
In her Petition for Review, Atty. Agno prayed that the
penalty recommended by the IBP be lowered.
ISSUE:
1. What is/are the importance of affiant’s personal
appearance when a document is notarized?
2. What is the appropriate penalty to be meted out
against Atty. Agno?
RULING:
1. The importance of the affiant’s personal appearance
when a document is notarized is underscored by Section
1, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice which
states:
SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. – ‘Acknowledgment’
refers to an act in which an individual on a single
occasion:
a) appears in person before the notary public and
presents an integrally complete instrument or document;
b)is attested to be personally known to the notary public
or identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on
the instrument or document was voluntarily affixed by
him for the purposes stated in the instrument or
document, declares that he has executed the instrument
or document as his free and voluntary act and deed,
and, if he acts in a particular representative capacity,
that he has the authority to sign in that capacity.
Furthermore, Section 2(b), Rule 1V of the same Rules
provides that:
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person
involved as signatory to the instrument or document –
(1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time
of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or
otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules.
These provisions mandate the notary public to require
the physical or personal presence of the person/s who
executed a document, before notarizing the same. In
other words, a document should not be notarized
unless the person/s who is/are executing it is/are
personally or physically present before the notary
public. The personal and physical presence of the
parties to the deed is necessary to enable the notary
public to verify the genuineness of the signature/s of the
affiant/s therein and the due execution of the document.
The purpose of this requirement is to enable the
notary public to verify the genuineness of the
signature of the acknowledging party and to
ascertain that the document is the party’s free and
voluntary act and deed.
2. The Court opts to suspend Atty. Agno as a notary
public for two months, instead of six months as the IBP
had recommended. We are impelled by the following
reasons for taking this course of action: first, the
apparent absence of bad faith in her notarizing the SP A
in question; second, the civil case wherein the flawed SP
A was used ended up in a judicial Compromise
Agreement; and finally, this is her first administrative
case since she was commissioned as a Notary Public in
1973. In addition, Atty. Agno invites our attention to the
fact that she is already in the twilight years of her life.
————————————————-
THINGS DECIDED:
A) ‘Acknowledgment’ refers to an act in which an
individual on a single occasion (a) appears in person
before the notary public and presents an integrally
complete instrument or document; (b) is attested to be
personally known to the notary public or identified by the
notary public through competent evidence of identity as
defined by these Rules; and (c) represents to the notary
public that the signature on the instrument or document
was voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in
the instrument or document, declares that he has
executed the instrument or document as his free and
voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular
representative capacity, that he has the authority to sign
in that capacity.
B) A document should not be notarized unless the
person/s who is/are executing it is/are personally or
physically present before the notary public.
C) The purpose in requiring the appearance of the
affiant is to enable the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party
and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free
and voluntary act and deed.
‘ 1971, Figueroa learned Barranco married another
Ui vs. Bonifacio
Adm. Case No. 3319, June 8, 2000
Facts:
Complainant Lesli Ui found out that her husband Carlos
Ui was carrying out an illicit relationship with respondent
Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot two children.
Hence, a complaint for disbarment was filed by
complainant against respondent before the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for
carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainant’s
husband. It is respondent’s contention that her
relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were
married abroad and that after June 1988, when
respondent discovered Carlos Ui’s true civil status, she
cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that
Carlos Ui never lived with her.
Issue:
Whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral
manner for which she deserves to be barred from the
practice of law.
Held:
The complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty.
Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, was dismissed.
All the facts taken together leads to the inescapable
conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing
her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her
relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what
respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be
considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct
that shows indifference to the moral norms of society
and the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant
disciplinary action, the same must be “grossly immoral,”
that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to
a high degree
FIGUEROA V BARRANCO, JR. v ROMERO; July 31,
1997
FACTS
In 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that Simeon
Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal
profession. Barranco passed the 1970 bar
exams on the fourth attempt.
Figueroa avers that she and Barranco had been
sweethearts, that a child was born to them out of
wedlock and that respondent did not fulfill
his repeated promises to marry her.
Figueroa and Barranco were townmates in Janiuay,
Iloilo and were steadies since 1953. Figueroa first
acceded to sexual congress in 1960. A son, Rafael
Barranco, was born on Dec 11, 1964. Barranco
promised to marry Figueroa after he passes the bar
exams. Their relationship continued, with more than 20
or 30 promises of marriage. Barranco
gave only P10 for the child on Rafael‘s birthdays. In
woman. From 1972 to 1988, several motions to
dismiss and comments were filed. On Sept 29, 1988,
the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for
failure of complainant to prosecute the case for an
unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon
Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyer‘s oath.
-Nov 17, 1988, the Court, in response to Figueroa‘s
opposition, resolved to cancel Barranco‘s scheduled
oathtaking.
-
June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the IBP. On
May 17, 1997, IBP recommended the dismissal of the
case and that respondent be allowed to take the lawyer
‘s oath
ISSUE
WON the facts constitute gross immorality warranting
the permanent exclusion of Barranco from the legal
profession
HELD
No. To justify suspension or disbarment, the act
complained of must not
only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral
act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree. It is a willful,
flagrant, or shameless acts which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of respectable members of
the community. Barranco‘s engaging in premarital sexual
relations with Figueroa and promises to marry suggest
a doubtful moral character on his part but it does not
constitute grossly immoral conduct. Barranco and
Figueroa were sweethearts whose sexual relations were
evidently consensual.
BARRIOS V MARTINEZ
PER CURIAM; November 12, 2004
FACTS
- Atty. Martinez was convicted of a violation of BP 22
- Complainant submitted Resolution dated March 13,
1996, and the Entry of judgment dated March 20, 1996
in an action for disbarment against Martinez
- July 3, 1996 – the Court required respondent to
comment on said petition within 10 days from notice
- February 17, 1997 – a second resolution was issued
requiring respondent to show cause why no disciplinary
action should be imposed on him for failure to comply
with the earlier Resolution and to submit Comment
- July 7, 1997 – the Court imposed a fine of P1000 for
respondent’s failure to comply with previous resolution
within 10 days
- April 27, 1998 – the Court fined the respondent an
additional P2000 and required him to comply with the
resolution under pain of imprisonment and arrest for a
period of 5 days or until his compliance
- February 3, 1999 – the Court declared respondent
Martinez guilty of Contempt under Rule 71, Sec 3(b) of
the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure and ordered his
imprisonment until he complied with the aforesaid
resolution
- April 5, 1999 – NBI reported that respondent was
arrested in Tacloban City on March 26, 1999 but was
subsequently released after having shown proof of
compliance with the resolutions of February 17, 1997
and April 27, 1998 by remitting the amount of P2000 and
submitting his overdue Comment:
1. He failed to respond to the Resolution dated
February 17, 1997 as he was at that time
undergoing medical treatment at Camp
Ruperto Kangleon in Palo, Leyte
2. Complainant passed away sometime in
June 1997
3. Said administrative complaint is an offshoot
of a civil case which was decided in
respondent’s favor. Respondent avers that
as a result of his moving for the execution of
judgment in his favor and the eviction of the
family of complainant, the latter filed the
present administrative case
- September 11, 1997 – Robert Visbal of the Provincial
Prosecution Office of Tacloban City submitted a letter to
the First Division Clerk of Court alleging that respondent
Martinez also stood charged in another estafa case
before the RTC of Tacloban City, as well as a civil case
involving the victims of the Dona Paz tragedy in 1987 for
which the RTC of Basey, Samar rendered a decision
against him, his appeal thereto having been dismissed
by the CA.
- June 16, 1999 – the Court referred the present case to
the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation
- The report of IBP stated:
1. Respondent filed a motion for the dismissal
of the case on the ground that the
complainant died and that dismissal is
warranted because the case filed by him
does not survive due to his demise as a
matter of fact, it is extinguished upon his
death. The IBP disagrees, pursuant to
Section 1 Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules
of Court, the SC or the IBP may initiate the
proceedings when they perceive acts of
lawyers which deserve sanctions or when
their attention is called by any one and a
probable cause exists that an act has been
perpetrated by a lawyer which requires
disciplinary sanctions.
2. Propensity to disregard orders of the SC, as
shown by respondent, is an utter lack of
good moral character
3. Respondent’s conviction of a crime of moral
turpitude clearly shows his unfitness to
protect the administration of justice and
therefore justifies the imposition of sanctions
against him
4. It is recommended that respondent be
disbarred and his name stricken out from the
Roll of Attorneys immediately
- September 27, 2003 – the IBP Board of Governors
passed a Resolution adopting and approving the report
and recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner
- December 3, 2003 – Atty. Martinez filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation
- January 14, 2004 – the Court required the complainant
to file a comment within 10 days
- February 16, 2004 – complainant’s daughter sent a
Manifestation and Motion alleging they have not been
furnished with a copy of respondent’s Motion
ISSUE
WON the crime respondent was convicted of is one
involving moral turpitude
HELD
Yes. Moral turpitude includes everything which is done
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It
involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and
woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.
- The argument of respondent that to disbar him now is
tantamount to a deprivation of property without due
process of law is also untenable. The practice of law is
a privilege. The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment
is to protect the administration of justice by requiring
that those who exercise this important function shall be
competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom courts
and clients may repose confidence.
- Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and
afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare,
and for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from
the official ministrations of persons unfit to practice them.
- The court is also disinclined to take respondent’s old
age and the fact that he served in the judiciary in various
capacities in his favor. If at all, the respondent was held
to a higher standard for it, for a judge should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence, and his conduct should be above
reproach.
- The Court based the determination of the penalty from
previously decided cases, holding that disbarment is the
appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a
crime of moral turpitude.
Disposition Respondent was disbarred and his name
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.