B.M. No.

712 July 13, 1995 xxx xxx xxx4

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING
OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law
Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW
RESOLUTION 710:

FELICIANO, J.: It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere
greater temptations to deviate from the straight and
narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional
that arise in the practice of profession. For these
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along
reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for
with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in
admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard
connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991.
therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of
The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe
bar examiners as an arm of the court, is required to
physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of
cause a minute examination to be made of the moral
university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then
standard of each candidate for admission to practice.
entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such
. . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive
bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through
at the conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny
reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a
must be exercised as to the moral character of a
judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused
candidate who presents himself for admission to the
individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging
bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its
from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has
once been admitted, and has pursued his profession,
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application and has established himself therein, a far more
for probation with the lower court. The application for probation was difficult situation is presented to the court when
granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the
Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, recalling and annulment of his license.
counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer
assigned to supervise him.
In Re Keenan:6

Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent
Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he
rights of every citizen, as in the right to carry on an
disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status.
ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege
He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En
granted and continued only to those who demonstrate
Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.1 He passed the Bar Examination.
special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral
He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal
basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him has been set up to test applicants by standards fair to
to take the attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those
averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession,
by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation and only those who maintain the standards are
period did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the allowed to remain in it.
Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since
then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his
Re Rouss:7
Petition for Admission to the Bar.

Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with

The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be
conditions, and a fair private and professional
granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege
character is one of them; to refuse admission to an
limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational
unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.2 The essentiality of good
offense: an examination into character, like the
moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following
examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.
excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as having
persuasive effect:
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8
In Re Farmer: 3

Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and

ability, so that they may not only protect the rights
xxx xxx xxx
and interests of their clients, but be able to assist
court in the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as clients or assistance to courts could such agents give?
a condition precedent to the applicant's right to They are required to be of good moral character, so
receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, that the agents and officers of the court, which they
and of which he must, in addition to other requisites, are, may not bring discredit upon the due
satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary administration of the law, and it is of the highest
to make up such a character. It is something more possible consequence that both those who have not
than an absence of bad character. It is the good name such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having
which the applicant has acquired, or should have had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be
acquired, through association with his fellows. It permitted to appear in courts to aid in the
means that he must have conducted himself as a man administration of justice.
of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or
does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is,
nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite
in fact, of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper
often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is
administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal
right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it
learning:
is wrong. . . .

. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C.

xxx xxx xxx
1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):

And we may pause to say that this requirement of the

The public policy of our state
statute is eminently proper. Consider for a moment
has always been to admit no
the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and
person to the practice of the law
his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every
unless he covered an upright
man's fireside. Vast interests are committed to his
moral character. The possession
care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
of this by the attorney is more
confidence; he deals with is client's
important, if anything, to the
property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law
public and to the proper
is a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as
administration of justice than
such, is to aid the administration of justice. . . .
 legal learning. Legal learning Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by
may be acquired in after years, appropriate written manifestation, of the names and addresses of the
but if the applicant passes the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul
threshold of the bar with a bad Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this
moral character the chances are Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of
that his character will remain Raul Camaligan.
bad, and that he will become a
disgrace instead of an ornament
to his great calling — a curse
instead of a benefit to his
community — a Quirk, a
Gammon or a Snap, instead of a
Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin.9

All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect
of those seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed,
said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for
disbarment:

Re Stepsay: 10

The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney

in a proceeding for his admission to practice
is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.

Re Wells: 11

. . . that an applicant's contention that upon

application for admission to the California Bar the
court cannot reject him for want of good moral
character unless it appears that he has been guilty of
acts which would be cause for his disbarment or
suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is
broader in its scope than that in a disbarment
proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence
which tends to show the applicant's character as
respects honesty, integrity, and general
morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon
proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the
acts declared to be causes for disbarment.

The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who

would seek admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than
the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public. There
is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal
profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The
growth of such a perception would signal the progressive destruction of
our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we
know it.12

Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly

fell far short of the required standard of good moral character. The
deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of
severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the
unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on
the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-
accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and
well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity
involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least,
he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus,
participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted
upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and
was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that
the participant was then possessed of good moral character.

Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has
expired, the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether
applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in
moral character referred to above. We stress that good moral character is
a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the
time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also,
and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar
and to take the attorney's oath of office.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and
consideration, evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with
the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking
admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn
certifications from responsible members of the community who have a
good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for
a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction
was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has
tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family
of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must,
in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different
person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient
and learned profession of the law.
THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. NO. 5499 : August 16, 2005]
WILSON PO CHAM, Complainant, v. ATTY. EDILBERTO D.
PIZARRO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Before this Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by
Wilson Po Cham (complainant) against Atty. Edilberto D. Pizarro
(respondent) for commission of falsehood and misrepresentations in
violation of a lawyer's oath.
Complainant gives the following account of the facts that spawned the
filing of the present administrative complaint.
Sometime in July 1995, Emelita Cañete (Cañete), Elenita Alipio (Alipio),
and now deceased Mario Navarro (Navarro) who was then the Municipal
Assessor of Morong, Bataan, offered for sale to him a parcel of land with an
area of approximately forty (40) hectares, identified as Lot 1683 of Cad.
Case No. 262, situated at Sitio Gatao, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan (the
property).
He having expressed interest in the offer, Cañete and Navarro arranged a
meeting between him and respondent at the latter's residence in Balanga,
Bataan1 where respondent categorically represented to him that the
property being offered for sale was alienable and disposable. 2 Respondent
in fact presented to him 1) Real Property Tax Order of Payment3 dated July
10, 1995 covering the property signed by Edna P. Pizarro as Municipal
Treasurer and Navarro as Municipal Assessor; 2) a Deed of Absolute
Sale4 dated July 25, 1995 purportedly executed by the alleged previous
actual occupant of the property, one Jose R. Monzon (Monzon),
transferring all his rights, interest and possession thereover in favor of
Virgilio Banzon (Banzon), Rolando B. Zabala (Zabala) and respondent for
an agreed consideration of P500,000.00; and 3) Special Power of
Attorney5 dated July 25, 1995 executed by Banzon and Zabala authorizing
him (respondent) to:
1. x x x offer to sell [their] rights over a certain parcel of land, which is more
particularly described as follows:
AREA: 40 has. more or less
situated at Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan covered by Tax
Declaration No. 6066 PIN #108-08-044-05-126
2. x x x negotiate and enter into a contract for the consumation (sic) of sale
of the subject property; and to sign the same.
3. x x x receive proceeds thereof with obligation to distribute the
corresponding share of each co-owner;
x x x6 (Underscoring supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
On July 25, 1995, he as buyer and respondent as seller executed an Option
to Buy,7 the pertinent portions of which provide:
WHEREAS, the SELLER is the owner and Attorney-In-Fact of his co-owners
of rights with planted trees (improvements) containing an area of FORTY
THREE (43) hectares, situated in Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong, Morong,
Bataan; (Portion of Lot 1683, Cad. 262, Morong Cadastre), covered by Tax
Declaration 6066.
WHEREAS, the BUYER is interested to buy the same for a total price of
THREE MILLION AND SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P3,700,000.00) payable in two (2) gives (sic), as follows:
a) Earnest money of P10,000.00 upon signing of this contract and the
balance of full payment within three (3) weeks from date hereof which
offer the SELLER accepts;
NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and
the terms and conditions hereunder specified the parties have agreed on
the following:
1) That the Buyer shall give an option money and earnest (sic)
of P10,000.00 upon signing of this contract, which shall form part of the
contract price if and when the buyer comply (sic) with his obligation to pay
in full within three (3) weeks from date hereof, otherwise should the
BUYER fails (sic) to comply with his obligation to pay in full on the
scheduled period the P10,000.00 earnest money shall be forfeited in favor
of the SELLER and the Option to Buy is automatically cancelled.
2) That the SELLER upon full payment of the price shall execute a final
Deed of Sale and shall surrender all documents, plans and paper relative to
the properties subject of sale;
3) That the SELLER shall warrants (sic) their rights and claims over the
above stated properties including the trees planted on it as against the
rights of third party except that of the government. 8 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
In accordance with the terms of the Option to Buy, he paid respondent the
amount of P10,000.00 for which respondent issued the corresponding
Receipt9 reading:
Received the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) from MR.
WILSON CHAM, representing earnest/option money for Lot 1683 of Cad.
Case No. 262 situated at Boundaries:
NORTH : Right of Catalino Agujo
SOUTH : National Road-Bagac-Morong
WEST : Right of Nicasio Canta
EAST : Sapang Batang Panao
including the trees and improvement situated thereon.
Full payment shall be paid within three (3) weeks from date
hereof.10 (Underscoring supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
On August 21, 1995, respondent executed a Deed of Absolute Sale11 over
the property in his favor, the pertinent portions of which read as follows:
For and in consideration of the sum of THREE MILLION THREE HUNDRED
SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
(P3,372,533.00), Philippine Currency, the receipt whereof is hereby
acknowledged from the BUYER to the entire satisfaction of the SELLERS,
the said SELLERS do by these presents SELL, TRANSFER and CONVEY, in
manner absolute and irrevocable, in favor of the said BUYER, his heirs and
assigns, all their rights, interest and participation over that certain real
estate destined for, and in actual use as fruit land, situated at Pook
Batangas, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan and more particularly described
as follows:
Location : Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan
Area : That portion of Lot 1683, Cad. 262, Morong Cadastre, containing an
area of 392,155 square meters more or less.
Boundaries : North : Right of Catalino Agujo
South : National Road, Bagac-Morong
West : Right of Nicasio Canta
East : Sapang Batang Panao
The SELLERS do hereby declare that the boundaries of the foregoing land
are visible by means of monuments, creeks and trees; that the land
including the permanent improvements existing thereon consist of fruit-
bearing trees assessed for the current year at TWO HUNDRED SIXTY TWO
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED P262,400.00 as per Tax Declaration No.
5010; and that the property is presently in the possession of the SELLERS.
The SELLERS hereby agree with the BUYER that they are the absolute
owners of the rights over the said property; that they have the perfect right
to convey the same; that they acquired their rights over the said property
by absolute deed of sale from Jose R. Monzon who acquired his rights over
the property from Marianito Holgado; that Marianito Holgado acquired his
right from Pedro de Leon who, in turn, acquired his right from Julian Agujo
who was the original owner who cleared the land and who was in
possession of the same immediately after the Second World War.
The SELLERS warrant their rights and claims over the aforedescribed real
estate including the trees planted thereon and they undertake to defend
the same unto said Vendee, his heirs and assigns against the claims of any
third person whomsoever.12 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
Respondent thereafter furnished him with a copy of Tax Declaration No.
501013 with Property Index No. 018-08-004-05-126 issued in his
(respondent's) name and his alleged co-owners, and Real Property Tax
Receipt No. 02520114 dated August 17, 1995 issued in his (respondent's)
name.
He thus gave respondent two checks dated August 21, 1995 representing
the purchase price of the rights over the property, Asian Bank Corporation
Check No. GA06321015 in the amount of P168,627.00 payable to
respondent, and Asian Bank Manager's Check No. 004639GA 16 in the
amount of P3,193,906.00 payable to respondent, Banzon and Zabala.
He subsequently took possession of the property and installed a barbed
wire fence at its front portion. Soon after, however, a forest guard
approached him and informed him that the property could not be fenced
as it was part of the Bataan National Park.17
Upon investigation, he discovered that the property is not an alienable or
disposable land susceptible of private ownership. He thus secured a
Certification18 from the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENR) in Bagac, Bataan of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) dated July 2, 1998, signed by CENR Officer
Laurino D. Macadangdang, reading:
This pertains to your request for a certification as to the status of land
claimed by spouses Perfecto and Purificacion, Jose Monson, et. al, Virgilio
Banzon and Edilberto Pizarro, all located at Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan.
Please be informed that per verification conducted by the personnel of this
Office, said lands fall within the Bataan Natural Park per L.C. Map/N.P. Map
No. 34 as certified on December 1, 1945. Under the Public Land Law, lands
within this category are not subject for disposition. 19 (Underscoring
supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
He also obtained a Letter-directive20 dated August 31, 1995 issued by
Officer-in-Charge Ricardo R. Alarcon of the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENR) of Balanga, Bataan to the Municipal
Assessor, the pertinent portions of which read:
Please be informed that it comes to our attention that there are some
forest occupants that are securing land tax declarations from your
office in (sic) the pretext that the area they
occupied (sic) were (sic) within alienable and disposable lands.
Presently, this tax declaration is being used in the illegal selling of
right [of] possession within the Bataan Natural Park which is
prohibited under our laws.
xxx
In this regard, I would like to request for your assistance by way of
informing us and in controlling this land rush and massive selling and
buying of rights of possession within prohibited areas as stated
above.21 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
Upon his request, the PENR issued a Certification22 dated March 14, 1996
stating that those named by respondent as prior owners of rights over the
property from whom respondent and his alleged co-owners acquired their
alleged rights were not among those inventoried as occupants per the
PENR's 1978 to 1994 Forest Occupancy Census (IFO) Survey.
Despite repeated demands, respondent refused to return the purchase
price of the rights over the property.23
In his present complaint24 dated September 10, 2001, complainant charges
respondent to have violated his oath as a member of the Bar in committing
manifest falsehood and evident misrepresentation by employing
fraudulent means to lure him into buying rights over the property which
property he represented to be disposable and alienable. 25
In his Comment26 dated January 12, 2002, respondent denied having
employed deceit or having pretended to co-own rights over the property
or having represented that it was alienable and disposable. He claimed that
complainant, being engaged in speculation in the purchase of property,
knew exactly the character and nature of the object of his purchase;27 and
that despite complainant's awareness that he was merely "buying rights to
forest land," he just the same voluntarily entered into the transaction
because of the property's proximity to the Subic Bay Economic Zone.
Respondent surmised that complainant bought the rights over the
property in the hope that lands belonging to the public domain in Morong
"would be eventually declared alienable and disposable to meet the rising
demand for economic zones."28
By Resolution29 of February 6, 2002, this Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation or decision within ninety (90) days from notice.
On May 6, 2002, complainant filed before the IBP his Reply 30 to
respondent's Comment, maintaining that the sale of rights over the
property was attended with deceit as respondent deliberately did not
disclose that the property was within the confines of the Bataan National
Park.31 And he denied being engaged in speculation, he claiming that with
his purchase of the property, he would venture into low-cost housing for
the employees of the nearby Subic Bay area.32
To complainant's Reply, respondent filed his Rejoinder on June 21, 2002.33
Complainant later filed his Affidavit34 and Position Paper35 on June 21,
2002 and September 17, 2001, respectively, reiterating his assertions in
his previous pleadings.
The record shows that complainant filed a criminal complaint for estafa
against respondent, Banzon, Zabala, Cañete, Alipio and Navarro in
199936 arising from the questioned sale of rights. The complaint was twice
dismissed by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. On Petition for Review ,
however, the Department of Justice, through then Secretary Hernando B.
Perez, by Resolution37 of March 6, 2002, reversed the dismissal of the
complaint as it found probable cause to indict respondent et al. in court. An
information for estafa was thereupon filed against respondent et al. before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, docketed as Criminal Case
No. Q-00-94232.
By Report and Recommendation of April 20, 2004, the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro, finding
respondent to have violated his oath as a member of the Bar to do no
falsehood and misrepresentations, recommended his suspension from the
practice of law for three (3) months, subject to the approval of the
members of the Board of Governors. Pertinent portions of the Report and
Recommendation read:
. . . [I]t is evident that as early as of (sic) 1992, the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of NIPAS ACT38 prohibited the illegal selling of rights or
possession of the areas occupied within the Bataan Natural Park, the
subject property not excluded as per letter of OIC CENRO Laurino D.
Mapadanig [illegible], Bagac, Bataan per L.C. map/N.P. Map No. 34 to the
Municipal Assessor therein and certified on December 1, 1945 that subject
property which is within this category was not subject for disposition; a
fact supposed to be known by the respondent being a resident of Balanga,
Bataan and was in the practice of his profession also in said area.
Aside from the fact that the alleged original owner Monzon was not among
those inventoried occupants as per Forest Occupancy (IFO) Survey since
1978 up to the latest census in 1994 from whom respondent allegedly
bought the subject property; the Absolute Deed of Sale executed between
the complainant Wilson Po Cham and the respondent relative to the same
subject property was not notarized which partook the nature of a private
and not official document.
Although respondent furnished complainant the foregoing documents to
prove their rights, interest and possession to the subject
property, respondent and his co-owners failed to show a permit from the
government conferring upon them rights or concessions over the subject
property, which formed part of the Bataan Natural Park classified as public
and not subject to disposition, therefore respondent and his co-owners
have no rights and interests whatsoever over the subject property and
their representations to complainant were simply not true but a falsehood.
Respondent being extensively conversant and knowledgeable about the
law took advantage of his versatility in the practice of law and committed
misrepresentations that he and his co-owners have irrevocable rights,
interests and possession over the subject property which convinced
complainant into purchasing subject property unmindful that the same is
not alienable or disposable being a portion of the public domain;
whereby respondent violated his solemn oath as member of the Philippine
Bar for having committed such falsehood and misrepresentations to the
complainant.39 (Underscoring supplied).
By CBD Resolution No. XVI-2004-407 of October 7, 2004, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the April 20, 2004 Committee Report
and Recommendation.
The case was forwarded to this Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-
B of the Rules of Court.40
The IBP findings are well-taken.
The Bar is enjoined to maintain a high standard of not only legal
proficiency but of honesty and fair dealing.41 Thus, a member should
refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence
and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the
legal profession.42
The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity and good demeanor to thus render him unworthy of the privileges
which his license and the law confer upon him, may be sanctioned with
disbarment or suspension.43
Thus, under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member
of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney on
the following grounds: 1) deceit; 2) malpractice or other gross misconduct
in office; 3) grossly immoral conduct; 4) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; 5) violation of the lawyer's oath; 6) willful disobedience
to any lawful order of a superior court; and 7) willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party without authority.
And he may be faulted under Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates a member of the Bar to obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for the law. Rule 1.01 of the Code specifically
enjoins him not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. "Conduct," as used in this rule, is not limited to conduct exhibited
in connection with the performance of professional duties.44
In the case at bar, as reflected above, complainant presented certifications
from the DENR that the property is part of the public domain and not
disposable as it is within the Bataan National Park. Indeed, by virtue of
Proclamation No. 2445 issued on December 1, 1945, all properties of the
public domain therein designated as part of the Bataan National Park were
withdrawn from sale, settlement or other disposition, subject to private
rights.
On the other hand, respondent has utterly failed to substantiate his
documented claim of having irrevocable rights and interests over the
property which he could have conveyed to complainant. E.g., he could have
presented any document issued by the government conferring upon him
and his alleged co-owners, or even upon his alleged predecessors-in-
interest, with any such right or interest, but he presented none. He merely
presented a Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly executed by a certain Jose
R. Monzon in his, Banzon's and Zabala's favor on July 25, 1995, a month shy
of the execution on August 21, 1995 of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor
of complainant.
The tax declaration and receipt which respondent presented do not help
his cause any as neither tax receipts nor realty tax declarations are
sufficient evidence of the right of possession over realty unless supported
by other effective proof.46 The presentation of a tax declaration must
indeed have been a "pretext," as observed by the PENR in its earlier-quoted
portion of its letter-directive to the Balanga Municipal Assessor "that the
area occupied . . . [is] within alienable and disposable land."
Respondent must thus be faulted for fraudulently inducing complainant to
purchase, for P3,372,533.00, non-existent "irrevocable rights, interest and
participation" over an inalienable property.
In Lizaso v. Amante47 where therein respondent lawyer enticed the therein
complainant to invest in the casino business with the proposition that her
investment would yield her substantial profit, but therein respondent not
only failed to deliver the promised return on the investment but also the
principal thereof, this Court took occasion to expound on sanctioning
lawyers for committing fraud, deceit or falsehood in their private dealings:
It is true, of course, that there was no attorney-client relationship between
respondent Amante and complainant Cuyugan-Lizaso. The transaction
that complainant entered into with respondent did not require respondent
to perform professional legal services for complainant nor did that
transaction relate to the rendition of professional services by respondent
to any other person.
As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez the
principle that it can exercise its power to discipline lawyers for causes
which do not involve the relationship of an attorney and client. x x x
"x x x [A]s a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline
one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been committed in his
private capacity. But this is a general rule with many exceptions. The courts
sometimes stress the point that the attorney has shown, through
misconduct outside of his professional dealings, a want of such professional
honesty as render him unworthy of public confidence, and an unfit and unsafe
person to manage the legal business of others. The reason why such a
distinction can be drawn is because it is the court which admits an attorney
to the bar, and the court requires for such admission the possession of a
good moral character.
x x x"
The rationale of the rule that misconduct, indicative of moral unfitness,
whether relating to professional or non-professional matters, justifies
suspension or disbarment, was expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Prentice
in In Re Disbarment of Peck, with eloquence and restraint:
"As important as it is that an attorney be competent to deal with the
oftentimes intricate matters which may be intrusted to him, it is infinitely
more so that he be upright and trustworthy. Unfortunately, it is not easy to
limit membership in the profession to those who satisfy the standard of
test of fitness. But scant progress in that direction can be hoped for if, in
the determination of the qualification of professional fitness, non-
professional dishonor and dishonesty in whatsoever path of life is to be
ignored. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the
accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. x x
x misconduct, indicative of moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be
professional or non-professional, justifies dismission as well as exclusion
from the bar."
The rule in this jurisdiction was stated by Mr. Justice Malcolm in Piatt v.
Abordo x xx:
"The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same time the
profession is not compelled to harbor all persons whatever their character,
who are fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As good character is an
essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the
attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and
unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the
power to discipline him."48 (Italics in the original)
This Lizaso ruling was reiterated in Co v. Bernardino49 and Lao v. Medel.50
To be sure, complainant is not entirely blameless. Had he exhibited a
modicum of prudence before entering into the transaction with
respondent, he would have spared himself from respondent's sham.
It is jurisprudentially established though that in a disbarment proceeding,
it is immaterial that the complainant is not blameless or is in pari delicto as
this is not a proceeding to grant relief to the complainant, but one to purge
the law profession of unworthy members to protect the public and the
courts.51
The record does not disclose the status of the estafa case against
respondent. His conviction or acquittal is not, however, essential insofar as
the present administrative case against him is concerned.52
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They
are distinct from and they may proceed independently of x x x criminal
cases.
The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for
disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all that is
required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial
question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the
administrative proceedings.
It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not
necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case.
Conversely, respondent's acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him
administratively.53 (Emphasis supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
It is not thus sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal
case before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise,
this Court will be rendered helpless from vigorously applying the rules on
admission to and continuing membership in the legal profession during the
whole period that the criminal case is pending final disposition when the
objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate. 54
While the facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant the
imposition of so severe a penalty as disbarment, the inherent power of this
Court to discipline an errant member of the Bar must, nonetheless, be
exercised as it cannot be denied that respondent violated his solemn oath
as a lawyer not to engage in unlawful, dishonest or deceitful conduct. 55
The penalty of suspension for three (3) months recommended by the IBP
is not, however, commensurate to the gravity of the wrong committed by
respondent. This Court finds that respondent's suspension from the
practice of law for One (1) Year is warranted.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Edilberto D. Pizarro, is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for One (1) Year and STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will merit a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of respondent
as a member of the Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts of the country.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 1928. August 3, 1978.]
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.
MARCIAL A. EDILLON (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD - 1).
SYNOPSIS
For respondent’s stubborn refusal to pay his memebership dues to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines since the latter’s constitution,
notwithstanding due notice, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines unanimously adopted and submitted to the Supreme
Court a resolution recommending the removal of respondent’s name from
its Roll of Attorneys, pursuant to Par. 2, Sec. 24, Art. III of the By-Laws of
the IBP.
Respondent, although conceding the propriety and necessity of the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines, questions the all-encompassing,
all-inclusive scope of membership therein and the obligation to pay
membership dues arguing that the provisions therein (Section 1 and 9 of
the Court Rule 139-A) constitute an invasion of his constitutional right in
the sense that he is being compelled, as a precondition to maintaining his
status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay
the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and
property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Respondent likewise
questions the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike his name from the
Roll of Attorneys, contending that this matter is not among the justiciable
cases triable by the Court but is of an administrative nature pertaining to
an administrative body.
The Supreme Court unanimously held that all legislation directing the
integration of the Bar are valid exercise of the police power over an
important profession; that to compel a lawyer to be a member of the IBP is
not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate; that the
requirement to pay membership fees is imposed as a regulatory measure
designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of
integration; that the penalty provisions for non-payment are not void as
unreasonable or arbitrary; that the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction and
power to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys is expressly
provided by Art.X, Section 5(5) of the Constitution and held as an inherent
judicial function by a host of decided cases; and that the provisions of Rules
of Court 139-A ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines and
the IBP By-Laws complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
Respondent disbarred and his name ordered stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys.
SYLLABUS
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in
the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for
short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in
Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
"stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter’s
constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri,
submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval,
pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP,
which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . . Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29,
the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued
delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including
a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent
member’s name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall
be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the
Chapter concerned."cralaw virtua1aw library
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the
resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on
February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due
from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board
of Governors to reply to Edillon’s comment: on March 24, 1976, they
submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing,
the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their
oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent’s pleadings
would show that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar
of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however,
objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred
to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the
Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24,
Article III of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme
Court the removal of a delinquent member’s name from the Roll of
Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws
(supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for
is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of
Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six
months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of
the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is
stated in these words of the Court Rule:chanrobles law library
"SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national
body to be known as the ‘Integrated Bar of the Philippines,’ composed of
all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the
Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court."cralaw virtua1aw library
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words
of the Court Rule:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay
such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the
approval of the Supreme Court. . . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The core of the respondent’s arguments is that the above provisions
constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is
being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer
in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding
dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the
said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is
being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by
the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of
the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and
effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike
his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not
among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to
constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the
surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define
the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the
exercise of the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a
previous case before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In
the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
Roman Ozaeta, Et Al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all
these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the
Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there
made the unanimous pronouncement that it was.
". . . . fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the
arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials
and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar
is ‘perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable’ . . ."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must
belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual
lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the
Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded
an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as
well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or
under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national
body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore,
subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including
the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of
professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which
constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper
cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the
offending member. 2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding
considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as
more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that
integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience
of individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the
integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a
valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The
practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover
clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not
only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts,
and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of
the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the Court. 4 The
practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this
privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the
extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through
Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public
interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power"
(Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing
the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the
exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act’s avowal is to
"raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectivity." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in
ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on
January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the
constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree
No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations
of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of
pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and
regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property
may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for,
as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare
is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights
of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is
a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because
then society will fall into anarchy (Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is
an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all
freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and
validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal
grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X
of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
x x x but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory
"(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the
Bar . . .",
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme
Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine
Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards
of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling
Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the
provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes
indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court
with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision
of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his
practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the
society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to
require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the
proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering
with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such
reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the
public with an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely
deal with them seriatim.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without
power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it
impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is
not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the
Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an
official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. 8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is
free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or
vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion
to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court,
in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program — the lawyers. 9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer
to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the state. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the
Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing
in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power
and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of
law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the
1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from
requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a
reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the
profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out
the objectives and purposes of integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty
provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due process
and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the
practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles
the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to
consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and
under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its
existence, the respondent’s right to practice law before the courts of this
country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if
the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right
power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer s public
responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is
sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment
and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have
been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the
Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed
and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of
Kentucky, said: The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its
officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a
power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed
necessary, to the proper administration of justice . . . the argument that this
is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting
from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has
limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task
to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where,
as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed
only with a determination to uphold the ideals and traditions of an
honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and
fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will
not be misused or prostituted. . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Court’s jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution
when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice . . . and the admission to the practice of law
and the integration of the Bar . . ." (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass
upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal
profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A
and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of
are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court

that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred,
and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the
Court.
PCGG vs. SB, et al., G.R. No. 151809-12, April 12, 2005, J. Callejo,
dissenting opinion
DISSENTING OPINION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The Code of Professional Responsibility is not designed for Holmes’
proverbial "bad man" who wants to know just how many corners he may
cut, how close to the line he may play, without running into trouble with
the law. Rather, it is drawn for the "good man" as a beacon to assist him in
navigating an ethical course through the sometimes murky waters of
professional conduct.1
With due respect, I dissent from the majority opinion. I believe that the
present case behooves the Court to strictly apply the Code of Professional
Responsibility and provide an ethical compass to lawyers who, in the
pursuit of the profession, often find themselves in the unchartered sea of
conflicting ideas and interests. There is certainly, without exception, no
profession in which so many temptations beset the path to swerve from
the line of strict integrity; in which so many delicate and difficult questions
of duty are continually arising.2 The Code of Professional Responsibility
establishes the norms of conduct and ethical standards in the legal
profession and the Court must not shirk from its duty to ensure that all
lawyers live up to its provisions. Moreover, the Court must not tolerate any
departure from the "straight and narrow" path demanded by the ethics of
the legal profession and enjoin all lawyers to be like Caesar’s wife – to be
pure and appear to be so.3
Factual and Procedural Antecedents
On July 17, 1987, pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 14 of
then President Corazon C. Aquino, the PCGG, on behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion,
reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages" against respondents
Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos,
Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tanenglian,5 Estate of Benito Tan Kee
Hiong (represented by Tarciana C. Tan), Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C.
Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel
Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto
B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation, Allied
Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp.,
Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan
Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development
Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp.,
Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant,
Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo
Holdings and Development Corp. (collectively referred to herein as
respondents Tan, et al., for brevity), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
and Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and
Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the
Sandiganbayan (Second Division). In connection therewith, the PCGG
issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by
the above-named persons by means of taking advantage of their close
relationship and influence with former President Marcos.
Shortly thereafter, respondents Tan, et al. filed with this Court petitions
for certiorari, prohibition and injunction seeking to, among others, nullify
the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. After the filing of the
comments thereon, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan
(Fifth Division) for proper disposition, docketed therein as follows:
a. Civil Case No. 0096 – Lucio Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Allied Banking
Corp., Iris Holding and Development Corp., Virgo Holdings Development
Corp. and Jewel Holdings, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s
Order dated June 19, 1986 sequestering the shares of stock in Allied
Banking Corporation held by and/or in the name of respondents Lucio Tan,
Mariano Tanenglian, Iris Holding and Development Corp., Virgo Holdings
Development Corp. and Jewel Holdings, Inc.;
b. Civil Case No. 0097 – Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos,
Natividad Santos, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., and Foremost Farms, Inc. v.
PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order dated August 12, 1986
sequestering the shares of stock in Foremost Farms, Inc. held by and/or in
the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad
Santos and Florencio N. Santos, Jr.;
c. Civil Case No. 0098 – Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian,
Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Shareholdings,
Inc. and Fortune Tobacco Corp. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s
Order dated July 24, 1986 sequestering the shares of stock in Fortune
Tobacco Corp. held by and/or in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan,
Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos, Florencio N.
Santos, Jr., Shareholdings, Inc.; and
d. Civil Case No. 0099 – Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian,
Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos and Shareholdings, Inc. v. PCGG, which
seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order dated July 24, 1986 sequestering the
shares of stock in Shareholdings, Inc. held by and/or in the name of Lucio
Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos and
Natividad Santos.
In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. are represented by their counsel
Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza, who served as the Solicitor General from 1972 to
1986 during the administration of former President Marcos.
The PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) a motion to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG
alleged that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General and counsel to the
Central Bank, "actively intervened" in the liquidation of General Bank and
Trust Company (GENBANK), which was subsequently acquired by
respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation. As shown
above, among the litigated properties are the sequestered shares of stocks
in Allied Banking Corp. (Civil Case No. 0096).
The acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. is outlined by the
PCGG as follows:
1. In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) got into financial
difficulties. The Central Bank then extended an emergency loan to
GENBANK reaching a total of ₱310 million. In extending this loan, the
Central Bank, however, took control of GENBANK with the execution of an
irrevocable proxy by 2/3 of GENBANK’s outstanding shares in favor of the
Central Bank and the election of seven (7) Central Bank nominees to the
11-member Board of Directors of GENBANK. Subsequently, on March 25,
1977, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank issued a Resolution
declaring GENBANK insolvent, forbidding it to do business and placing it
under receivership.
2. In the meantime, a public bidding for the sale of GENBANK assets and
liabilities was scheduled at 7:00 P.M. on March 28, 1977. Among the
conditions for the bidding were: (a) submission by the bidder of a letter of
credit issued by a bank acceptable to Central Bank to guaranty payment or
as collateral of the Central Bank emergency loan; and (b) a 2-year period
to repay the said Central Bank emergency loan. On March 29, 1977, the
Central Bank, through a Monetary Board Resolution, approved the bid of
the group of respondents Lucio Tan and Willy Co. This bid, among other
things, offered to pay only ₱500,000.00 for GENBANK assets estimated at
₱688,201,301.45; Capital Accounts of ₱103,984,477.55; Cash of
₱25,698,473.00; and the takeover of the GENBANK Head Office and branch
offices. The required letter of credit was also not attached to the bid. What
was attached to the bid was a letter of Panfilo O. Domingo, as PNB
President, promising to open an irrevocable letter of credit to secure the
advances of the Central Bank in the amount of ₱310 million. Without this
letter of commitment, the Lucio Tan bid would not have been approved.
But such letter of commitment was a fraud because it was not meant to be
fulfilled. Ferdinand E. Marcos, Gregorio Licaros and Panfilo O. Domingo
conspired together in giving the Lucio Tan group undue favors such as the
doing away with the required irrevocable letter of credit, the extension of
the term of payment from two years to five years, the approval of second
mortgage as collateral for the Central Bank advances which was deficient
by more than ₱90 Million, and many other concessions to the great
prejudice of the government and of the GENBANK stockholders.
3. GENBANK eventually became the Allied Banking Corporation in April
1977. Respondents Lucio Tan, Willy S. Co and Florencio T. Santos are not
only incorporators and directors but they are also the major shareholders
of this new bank.6
Atty. Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by
respondents Tan, et al. since Atty. Mendoza, in his capacity as the Solicitor
General, advised the Central Bank’s officials on the procedure to bring
about GENBANK’s liquidation. Further, he appeared as counsel for the
Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the
liquidation of GENBANK. He filed the said petition with the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and docketed therein as
Special Proceeding No. 107812.7
The PCGG opined that Atty. Mendoza’s present appearance as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. in the case involving the sequestered shares of
stock in Allied Banking Corp. runs afoul of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility proscribing former government lawyers from
accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in said service."
Acting on the said motion, the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) issued the
assailed Resolution dated July 11, 2001 stating:
Acting on the PCGG’s "MOTION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. ESTELITO P.
MENDOZA AS COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER" dated February 5, 1991 which
appears not to have been resolved by then Second Division of this Court,
and it appearing that (1) the motion is exactly the same in substance as
that motion filed in Civil Case No. 0005 as in fact, Atty. Mendoza in his Sandiganbayan (Second Division) Resolution dated April 22, 1991 under
"OPPOSITION" dated March 5, 1991 manifested that he was just adopting the doctrine of res judicata.
his opposition to the same motion filed by PCGG in Civil Case No. 0005 and
(2) in the Court’s Order dated March 7, 1991, the herein incident was
In contending that the PCGG availed itself of the wrong remedy in filing the
taken-up jointly with the said same incident in Civil Case No. 0005 (pp.
instant petition for certiorari, respondents Tan, et al. rely on Section 1,
134-135, Vol. I, Record of Civil Case No. 0096), this Division hereby
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which reads:
reiterates and adopts the Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No.
0005 of the Second Division (pp. 1418-1424, Vol. III, Record of Civil Case
No. 0005) denying the said motion as its Resolution in the case at bar. 8 Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal
by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts
The PCGG sought the reconsideration thereof but its motion was denied in
whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
the assailed Resolution dated December 5, 2001, which reads:
petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of
law which must be distinctly set forth.
Acting on respondent PCGG’s "MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION" dated
August 1, 2001 praying for the reconsideration of the Court’s Resolution
Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Section 3 of Rep.
dated July 12, 2001 denying its motion to disqualify Atty. Estelito P.
Act No. 7975, likewise, states:
Mendoza as counsel for petitioners, to which petitioners have filed an
"OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED AUGUST 1,
2001" dated August 29, 2001, as well as the respondent’s "REPLY (To Sec. 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. –
Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration) dated November 16, 2001, it
appearing that the main motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel in
…
these cases was exactly the same in substance as that motion to disqualify
Atty. Mendoza filed by the PCGG in Civil Case No. 0005 (re: Republic vs.
Lucio Tan, et al.) and the resolutions of this Court (Second Division) in Civil Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the
Case No. 0005 denying the main motion as well as of the motion for Supreme Court.
reconsideration thereof had become final and executory when PCGG failed
to elevate the said resolutions to the Supreme Court, the instant motion is
I am not persuaded by the arguments proffered by respondents Tan, et
hereby DENIED.9
al. The above-mentioned rules do not preclude the resort to this Court by
way of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court of orders
The Resolution10 dated April 22, 1991 of the Sandiganbayan (Second or resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. The special civil action
Division) in Civil Case No. 0005, which was adopted by the Fifth Division of certiorari may be availed of where there is no appeal or any plain,
in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099, denied the similar motion to disqualify Atty. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 13
Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. holding, in essence, that the
PCGG "has failed to prove that there exists an inconsistency between Atty.
In this case, the remedy of appeal is not available to the PCGG because the
Mendoza’s former function as Solicitor General and his present
denial of its motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents
employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group."11 The Sandiganbayan
Tan, et al. is an interlocutory order; hence, not appealable. The word
(Second Division) explained, thus:
"interlocutory" refers to "something intervening between the
commencement and the end of a suit which decides some point or matter,
... It has been said that the test of inconsistency in cases of the character but is not a final decision of the whole controversy."14 An interlocutory
under consideration is not whether the attorney has ever appeared for the order does not terminate nor does it finally dispose of the case; it does not
party against whom he proposes to appear, but whether his accepting the end the task of the court in adjudicating the parties’ contentions and
new retainer will require him, in forwarding the interests of his new client, determining their rights and liabilities as against each other but leaves
to do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter something yet to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on
in which he formerly represented against him, and whether he will be the merits.15
called upon, in his new relation, to use against his former client any
knowledge or information acquired through their former connection. Nor
Accordingly, this Court, in not a few cases, had taken cognizance of
does the rule imposing disability on the attorney mean that he, having once
petitions for certiorari of resolutions of the Sandiganbayan which were in
been employed by a client, shall never thereafter appear in any matter
the nature of interlocutory orders. For example, in Serapio v.
against him but merely forbids the attorney’s appearance or acting against
Sandiganbayan,16 we took cognizance of, albeit dismissed, the petition
the client where the attorney can use, to the detriment of such client, the
for certiorari which assailed the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan denying
information and confidences acquired during the existence of their
the petition for bail, motion for a reinvestigation and motion to quash filed
relation as attorney and client (7 C.J.S., Pp. 828-829, cited in Primavera
by accused Edward Serapio. Also, in San Miguel Corporation v.
Farms, Inc., et al. vs. PCGG, supra). Significantly, PCGG’s "Reply" does not
Sandiganbayan,17 we took cognizance of, albeit dismissed, the petitions
controvert Atty. Mendoza’s claim that in appearing in the instant case, he
for certiorari of several resolutions of the Sandiganbayan involving the
does not take a position adverse to that he had taken in behalf of the
sequestered shares of stock in the San Miguel Corp.
Central Bank of the Philippines in SP No. 107812. Neither did it challenge
Atty. Mendoza’s claim that the position he took as Solicitor General in
behalf of the Central Bank in 1977 when he filed the said case (SP No. To my mind, the PCGG properly filed the instant petition
107812) has been maintained by his successors in office. In fact, even for certiorari under Rule 65 to assail the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
incumbent Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia had interposed no objection (Fifth Division) denying its motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel
to Atty. Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for the Lucio Tan group for as for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099.
long as he maintains the same position he has taken on behalf of the Central
Bank of the Philippines as Solicitor General, which position refers to the
With respect to the second procedural issue raised by respondents Tan, et
various resolutions of the Monetary Board and actions of the Central Bank
al., i.e., the instant petition is already barred by the Sandiganbayan (Second
in regard General Bank and Trust Co. as being regular and in accordance
Division) Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 under the
with law (Annex "A", Rejoinder, Records, Pp. 1404-1405).12
doctrine of res judicata, I submit that the doctrine of res judicata finds no
application in this case.
The Sandiganbayan (Second Division) further observed that Atty.
Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was well
Section 47, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court reads in part:
beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act
No. 6713 since he ceased to be the Solicitor General in the year 1986. The
said provision prohibits a former public official or employee from Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final
practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the office order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
he used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
separation from public office.
…
As earlier stated, the April 22, 1991 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
(Second Division) was adopted by the Fifth Division in the resolutions now
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter
being assailed by the PCGG. Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG.
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-
Procedural Issues interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in
the same capacity; and
The following procedural issues are raised by respondents Tan, et al.: (1)
whether the assailed Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) Resolutions dated
July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 are final and executory; hence, the (c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors-in-
PCGG should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment
the Rules of Court and not the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or
thereof; and (2) whether the instant petition is already barred by the which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
The doctrine of res judicata comprehends two distinct concepts – (1) bar connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon
by former judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment.18 Paragraph (b) while in such office or employ.
embodies the doctrine of res judicata or res adjudicata or bar by prior
judgment, while paragraph (c) estoppel by judgment or conclusiveness of
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public
judgment.19 In Macahilig v. Heirs of Grace M. Magalit,20 Justice Artemio
position as a vehicle to promote or advance his private interests extends
Panganiban explained that the term "final" in the phrase judgments or final
beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as a public
orders in the above section has two accepted interpretations. In the first
official.29 Rule 6.03 makes this restriction specifically applicable to lawyers
sense, it is an order that one can no longer appeal because the period to do
who once held public office. A plain reading of the rule shows that the
so has expired, or because the order has been affirmed by the highest
interdiction (1) applies to a lawyer who once served in the government,
possible tribunal involved.21 The second sense connotes that it is an order
and (2) relates to his accepting "engagement or employment in connection
that leaves nothing else to be done, as distinguished from one that is
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service."
interlocutory.22 The phrase refers to a final determination as opposed to a
judgment or an order that settles only some incidental, subsidiary or
collateral matter arising in an action; for example, an order postponing a In the United States, an area of concern involving ethical considerations
trial, denying a motion to dismiss or allowing intervention. Orders that give applicable to former government lawyers is called the "revolving door" –
rise to res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment apply only to those the process by which lawyers temporarily enter government service from
falling under the second category.23 private life then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can
exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government
service.30 To address this, the disqualification of a former government
For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the
lawyer who has entered private practice may be sought based either on
following elements must concur: (1) there is a final judgment or order; (2)
"adverse-interest conflict" or "congruent-interest representation conflict."
the court rendering it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) the judgment is one on the merits; and (4) there is, between
the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and cause of In the "adverse-interest conflict," a former government lawyer is enjoined
action.24 When there is no identity of causes of action, but only an identity from representing a client in private practice if the matter is substantially
of issues, there exists res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the
judgment.25 government and if the interests of the current and former clients are
adverse.31 It must be observed that the "adverse-interest conflict" applies
to all lawyers in that they are generally disqualified from accepting
In any case, whether as a bar by prior judgment or in the concept of
employment in a subsequent representation if the interests of the former
conclusiveness of judgment, the doctrine of res judicata applies only when
client and the present client are adverse and the matters involved are the
there is a judgment or final order which, as earlier discussed, leaves
same or substantially related.32 On the other hand, in "congruent-interest
nothing else to be done. As explained by Justice Panganiban, a judgment or
representation conflict," the disqualification does not really involve a
an order on the merits is one rendered after a determination of which party
conflict at all, because it prohibits the lawyer from representing a private
is upheld, as distinguished from an order rendered upon some preliminary
practice client even if the interests of the former government client and the
or formal or merely technical point.26 To reiterate, the said judgment or
new client are entirely parallel.33 The "congruent-interest representation
order is not interlocutory and does not settle only some incidental,
conflict," unlike the "adverse-interest conflict," is unique to former
subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an action.
government lawyers.

The Resolution dated April 22, 1991 of the Sandiganbayan (Second

I believe that Atty. Mendoza’s present engagement as counsel for
Division) in Civil Case No. 0005 denying the PCGG’s similar motion to
respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0096, which involves the
disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. therein was
sequestered shares of stocks in Allied Banking Corp., violates the ethical
evidently an interlocutory order as it did not terminate or finally dispose
precept embodied in Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility,
of the said case. It merely settled an incidental or collateral matter arising
which is akin to the doctrine of "congruent-interest representation
therein. As such, it cannot operate to bar the filing of another motion to
conflict."
disqualify Atty. Mendoza in the other cases because, strictly speaking, the
doctrine of res judicata, whether to serve as a bar by prior judgment or in
the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, does not apply to decisions or Contrary to the majority opinion, the subject
orders adjudicating interlocutory motions.27
matter in Civil Case No. 0096 is connected with
Substantive Issue
or related to a "matter," i.e. the liquidation
The substantive issue in this case is whether the present engagement of
Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Cases Nos.
of GENBANK, in which Atty. Mendoza had
0096-0099 violates the interdiction embodied in Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
intervened as the Solicitor General
Canon 6 of our Code of Professional Responsibility reads:
The qualifying words or phrases that define the prohibition in Rule 6.03
are (1) "any matter" and (2) "he had intervened" thereon while he was in
CANON 6 – THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT
the government service.34
SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES.

The United States’ ABA Formal Opinion No. 324 recognized that it is
Rule 6.01 – The primary duty of a lawyer in public prosecution is not to
difficult to formulate a precise definition of "matter" as used in their
convict but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the
Disciplinary Rule (DR), nonetheless, it suggested that the term
concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the
"contemplates a discrete and isolatable transaction or set of transaction
accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.
between identifiable parties."35

Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in government service shall not use his public position
to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere
with his public duties.
Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,
accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in said service.
A good number of the Canons in our present Code of Professional
Responsibility were adopted from the Canons of Professional Ethics of the
American Bar Association (ABA).28 Rule 6.03, in particular, is a restatement
of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provided:
36. RETIREMENT FROM JUDICIAL POSITION OR PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT.
There is no dispute that Atty. Mendoza, as the Solicitor General, advised the
Central Bank on the procedure to bring about the liquidation of GENBANK.
It is, likewise, admitted by respondents Tan, et al. that Atty. Mendoza filed
with the then CFI of Manila, the petition for assistance in the liquidation of
GENBANK (Special Proceeding No. 107812).36 GENBANK was
subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied
Banking Corp., whose shares of stocks have been sequestered by the PCGG
and presently subject of Civil Case No. 0096.
The majority opinion downplays the role of Atty. Mendoza by stating that
he "merely advised the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate
GENBANK" which procedure is "given in black and white in R.A. No. 265,
section 29." This procedural advice, according to the majority opinion, "is
not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility."

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon

the merits of which he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public
employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in
On the contrary, the acts of Atty. Mendoza may be rightfully considered as
falling within the contemplation of the term "matter" within the meaning
of Rule 6.03. Specifically, Atty. Mendoza’s giving counsel to the Central
Bank on the procedure to go about GENBANK’s liquidation and the filing of
the petition therefor in Special Proceedings No. 107812 did not merely
involve the drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency By advising the Central Bank on the procedure to bring about the
procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of liquidation of GENBANK and, more significantly, by filing the petition for
law.37 These acts were discrete, isolatable as well as identifiable assistance in its liquidation, Atty. Mendoza had clearly intervened in the
transactions or conduct involving a particular situation and specific liquidation of GENBANK and its subsequent acquisition by respondents
party, i.e., the procedure for the liquidation of GENBANK. Consequently, Tan, et al.
the same can be properly considered "matter" within the contemplation of
Rule 6.03.
I disagree with the ponencia’s holding that Atty. Mendoza could not be
considered as having intervened as it describes the participation of Atty.
Moreover, contrary to the contention of respondents Tan, et al., the Mendoza by stating that he "had no iota of participation in the decision of
interdiction in Rule 6.03 does not only apply if precisely the same legal the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK."
issues are involved in each representation. 38 The Comments of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) that drafted our Code of
That the decision to declare GENBANK insolvent was made wholly by the
Professional Responsibility explained that the restriction covers
Central Bank, without the participation of Atty. Mendoza, is not in question.
"engagement or employment, which means that he cannot accept any work
Rather, it was his participation in the proceedings taken subsequent to
or employment from anyone that will involve or relate to the matter in
such declaration, i.e., his giving advise to the Central Bank on how to
which he intervened as a public official."39 The sequestration of the shares
proceed with GENBANK’s liquidation and his filing of the petition in Special
of stock in Allied Banking Corp. in the names of respondents Tan, et al.,
Proceeding No. 107812 pursuant to Section 2943 of Rep. Act No. 265, that
which is subject of Civil Case No. 0096, necessarily involves or relates to
constitutes "intervention" as to place him within the contemplation of Rule
their acquisition of GENBANK upon its liquidation, in which Atty. Mendoza
6.03. To intervene means –
had intervened as the Solicitor General.

1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or

It should be emphasized that Atty. Mendoza’s participation in GENBANK’s
circumstance; 2: to occur, fall or come between points of time or
liquidation is sufficient to place his present engagement as counsel for
events; 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or modification:
respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0096 within the ambit of Rule 6.03.
INTERPOSE; 4: to occur or lie between two things …44
His role was significant and substantial. The Memorandum dated March
29, 1977 prepared by certain key officials40 of the Central Bank, is
revealing: Further, "intervention" is defined as –

Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor 1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION;
General and he advised that the following procedure should be taken:
2: interference that may affect the interests of others …45
1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board
reporting that studies and evaluation had been made since the last
With the foregoing definitions, it is not difficult to see that by giving counsel
examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the
to the Central Bank on how to proceed with GENBANK’s liquidation and
bank can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may be
filing the necessary petition therefor with the court, Atty. Mendoza "had
permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors
intervened," "had come in," or "had interfered," in the liquidation of
and the general public.
GENBANK and the subsequent acquisition by respondents Tan, et al. of the
said banking institution. Moreover, his acts clearly affected the interests of
2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the GENBANK as well as its stockholders.
liquidation of the bank and indicate the manner of its liquidation and
approve a liquidation plan.
Contrary to the majority opinion, Rule 6.03 applies

3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of

even if Atty. Mendoza did not "switch sides" or did not
the foregoing decision to liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan
approved by the Monetary Board.
take inconsistent sides. Rule 6.03 applies even if
4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First
Instance reciting the proceedings which had been taken and praying the no conflict of interest exists between Atty. Mendoza’s
assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank. 41
former government client (Central Bank) and
The Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board likewise
shows that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents
his present private practice clients (respondents Tan, et al.)
relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the court the petition
for assistance in the bank’s liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said
minutes reads: As earlier intimated, Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the ABA’s
Canons of Professional Ethics, now superseded by the ABA’s Code of
Professional Responsibility. In lieu of the old Canon 36, Canon 9 of the
The Board decided as follows:
ABA’s Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:

…
A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.

E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy

Providing specificity to this general caveat, Disciplinary Rule (DR) 9–
of the subject memorandum of the Director, Department of
101(B) commands, thus:
Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977, together with
copies of:
A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had
substantial responsibility while he was a public employee.
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination
Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated March 25, 1977, containing a report
on the current situation of Genbank; The purpose of the interdiction, as stated in the ABA Committee on
Professional Ethics, Opinion No. 37, is –
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co.,
dated March 23, 1977; "[to avoid] the manifest possibility that … [a former Government lawyer’s]
action as a public legal official might be influenced (or open to the charge
that it had been influenced) by the hope of later being employed privately
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings
to uphold or upset what he had done.46
Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant
to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a report on the
state of insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments; and The old Canon 36, as well as the present Canon 9 and DR9-101(B), rest on
the policy consideration that an attorney must seek to avoid even the
appearance of evil.47
4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the
Solicitor General.
Being undoubtedly of American origin, the interpretation adopted by the
American courts and the ABA has persuasive effect on the interpretation
for his use in filing a petition in the Court of First Instance praying the
of Rule 6.03.48 Accordingly, I find the case of General Motors Corporation v.
assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank."42
City of New York,49 where the pertinent ethical precepts were applied by
the United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit), particularly instructive.
The said US court disqualified the privately retained counsel of the City of
New York in the antitrust case it filed against the General Motors Corp.
because the said counsel, a former lawyer of the US Department of Justice,
had not only participated in the latter’s case against General Motors Corp.
but signed the complaint in that action.
George D. Reycraft, the counsel whose disqualification was sought in that
case, served as a trial attorney assigned at the General Litigation Services
of the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice from 1952 to
1962. Sometime in 1954, he participated in the investigation of the alleged
monopolization by General Motors Corp. of the city and intercity bus
business. The investigation culminated with the filing of the antitrust
complaint against General Motors Corp. in 1956. Reycraft signed the said
complaint but alleged that after 1958 through the time that he left the
Department of Justice in 1962, he no longer had any participation in that
case.
In disqualifying Reycraft, the US Court gave short shrift to the argument
that Reycraft "has not changed sides" – i.e. "there is nothing antithetical in
the postures of the two governments in question," stating that, per Opinion
No. 37 of the ABA Commission on Professional Ethics, the ethical precepts
of Canon 9 and DR9-101(B) apply irrespective of the side chosen in private
practice. The said court believed that it "is as it should be for there lurks
great potential for lucrative returns in following into private practice the
course already charted with the aid of governmental resources."50
The US Court stressed that Reycraft not only participated in the
investigation, but he signed the complaint in that action and admittedly
had "substantial responsibility" in its investigatory and preparatory
stages. It thus concluded that "where the overlap of issues is so plain and
the involvement while in Government employ is so direct, the appearance
of impropriety must be avoided through disqualification."51
The General Motors case is illustrative of the "congruent-interest
representation conflict" doctrine. It bears stressing that this doctrine
applies uniquely to former government lawyers and has been
distinguished from the normal rule applicable for non-government
lawyers in this wise –
To illustrate the normal rule for non-government lawyers, imagine that the
lawyer has represented passenger A and has recovered substantial
damages in a suit against a driver. No conflict of interest principle or rule
restricts the lawyer from later representing passenger B against the driver
with respect to exactly the same accident. B may obtain the benefits of the
lawyer’s help regardless of the fact that the lawyer might be able to employ
to B’s advantage information and strategies developed in the
representation of A. The critical element is that the interest of A and B do
not conflict.
The analysis does not change if we move from an area that is entirely
private into one that is arguably more connected with the public interest.
Suppose a lawyer in private practice represents Small Soap Company in its
suit for damages under the federal antitrust laws against Giant Soap
Company. The lawyer would not be disqualified from representing
Medium Soap Company against Giant Soap in a succeeding suit for
damages based on precisely the same conspiracy. The congruence of
interests between Small Soap and Medium Soap would almost certainly
mean that the lawyer could represent both clients. In the absence of a
conflict – an opposing interest between the two clients – the existence of a
substantial relationship between the matters involved in both cases is
irrelevant.
Now, suppose the lawyer has filed suit in behalf of the government against
Giant Soap Company to force divestiture of an acquired company on a
theory that, because of the acquisition, Giant Soap has monopolized an
industry in conflict with antitrust laws. May the lawyer, after leaving
government service and while in private practice, represent Medium Soap
Company against Giant Soap in a suit for damages based on the same
antitrust conspiracy? Does the absence of opposing interests between
Medium Soap and the lawyer’s former government client similarly mean
that there should be no disqualification?
At this point, the rules for the former government lawyer diverge sharply
from the normal former-client conflict rules: the lawyer is disqualified
from representing the successive client in private practice, despite the fact
that the interests of the client and the lawyer’s former government client
are apparently aligned. All that is required for disqualification is the
relationship between the former and the succeeding representations.52
The rationale for the "congruent-interest representation conflict" doctrine
has been explained, thus:
The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern with the impact
that any other rule would have upon the decisions and actions taken by the
government lawyer during the course of the earlier representation of the
government. Both courts and commentators have expressed the fear that
permitting a lawyer to take action in behalf of a government client that
later could be to the advantage of private practice client would present
grave dangers that a government lawyer’s largely discretionary actions
would be wrongly influenced by the temptation to secure private practice
employment or to favor parties who might later become private practice
clients …
The fear that government lawyers will misuse government power in that
way is not idle. Lawyers who represent the government often exercise
enormous discretion unchecked by an actual client who oversees the
lawyer’s work. For that reason a special rule is needed to remove the
incentive for government lawyers to take discretionary decisions with an
eye cast toward advantages in future, nongovernmental employment. The
broad disqualification accomplishes that and, particularly under rubrics
that do not invariably require disqualification of the entire firm with which
the former government lawyer practices, does it without unnecessarily
discouraging lawyers from entering temporary public service. 53
The foregoing disquisition applies to the case of Atty. Mendoza. Indeed, a
textual reading of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility
reveals that no conflict of interests or adverse interests is required for the
interdiction to apply. If it were so, or if conflict of interests were an
element, then the general conflict of interests rule (Rule 15.03) 54 would
apply. Rather, the interdiction in Rule 6.03 broadly covers "engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened
while in the said service." To reiterate, the drafters of our Code of
Professional Responsibility had construed this to mean that a lawyer
"cannot accept any work or employment from anyone that will involve or
relate to the matter in which he intervened as a public official, except on
behalf of the body or authority which he served during his public
employment."55
In Civil Case No. 0096, Atty. Mendoza is certainly not representing the
Central Bank but respondents Tan, et al. Granting arguendo that the
interests of his present private practice clients (respondents Tan, et al.)
and former government client (Central Bank) are apparently aligned, the
interdiction in Rule 6.03 applies.
Rule 6.03 purposely does not contain an explicit
temporal limitation because cases have to be
resolved based on their peculiar circumstances
Unless the Code itself provides, the Court cannot set a prescriptive period
for any of the provisions therein. That Rule 6.03, in particular, contains no
explicit temporal limitation is deliberate. It recognizes that while passage
of time is a factor to consider in determining its applicability, the
peculiarities of each case have to be considered. For example, in Control
Data Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp.,56 the US District Court of
Minnesota held that the lawyer who, 15 years earlier, while an employee
of the Department of Justice had been in charge of negotiations in antitrust
case against a corporation, was not disqualified from acting as counsel for
the plaintiffs suing such corporation. On the other hand, the lawyer whose
conduct was the subject of the ABA Opinion No. 37, earlier cited, was
himself 10 years removed from the matter over which he had substantial
responsibility while in public employ at the time he accepted the private
engagement relating to the same matter.57 Clearly, it is the degree of
involvement or participation in the matter while in government service,
not the passage of time, which is the crucial element in Rule 6.03.
The Code of Professional Responsibility is a codification of legal ethics, that
"body of principles by which the conduct of members of the legal
profession is controlled. More specifically and practically considered, legal
ethics may be defined as that branch of moral science which treats of the
duties which the attorney-at-law owes to his clients, to the courts, to the
bar, and to the public."58 In this connection, the Court has consistently
characterized disciplinary proceedings, including disqualification cases,
against lawyers as sui generis, neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
thus:
[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely
civil nor pure criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but
are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu propio.
Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person be allowed
the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations
as an officer of the Court with the end view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice…59
For this reason, the civil law concept of prescription of actions finds no
application in disqualification cases against lawyers.
In this case, while the liquidation of GENBANK took place in 1977, the Conclusion
period that had lapsed is not sufficient to consider it far removed from the
present engagement of Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et
Let me just clarify that the record is free from any intimation that Atty.
al. in Civil Case No. 0096. In fact, the validity of the said liquidation is still
Mendoza was improperly influenced while in government service or that
pending with the Court.60 The validity of the sequestration of the shares in
he is guilty of any impropriety in agreeing to represent respondents Tan, et
Allied Banking Corp., which is the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0096, is
al. However, I am constrained to vote for his disqualification in Civil Case
necessarily intertwined with Special Proceeding No. 107812 involving the
No. 0096 in order to avoid any appearance of impropriety lest it taint both
liquidation of GENBANK and the acquisition thereof by respondents Tan, et
the public and private segments of the legal profession.
al. The issues presented in the two proceedings are so overlapping and the
involvement of Atty. Mendoza while in government employ is so plain,
direct and substantial, his disqualification as counsel for respondents ACCORDINGLY, I vote to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. The Motion to
Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0095 is warranted under Rule 6.03. Disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza is GRANTED insofar as Civil Case No.
0096 is concerned.
Contrary to the majority opinion, the peculiar

circumstances of this case justify the strict application

of Rule 6.03

The ponencia cautions against the strict application of Rule 6.03 because it
would have a "chilling effect on the right of government to recruit
competent counsel to defend its interests." This concern is similar to that
raised by the City of New York in the General Motors case where it argued
that if Reycraft was disqualified, the US court would "chill the ardor for
Government service by rendering worthless the experience gained in
Government employ."61 It appeared that the City of New York relied on the
pronouncement in the earlier case of United States v. Standard Oil
Co,62 known as the Esso Export Case, thus:

If the government service will tend to sterilize an attorney in too large an

area of law for too long a time, or will prevent him from engaging in the
practice of a technical specialty which he has devoted years in acquiring,
and if that sterilization will spread to the firm which he becomes
associated, the sacrifice of entering government service will be too great
for most men to make.63

Addressing this argument in General Motors, the same US court, through

Justice Irving F. Kaufman, also the ponente of the Esso Export Case,
distinguished the two cases. It noted that the said court denied the motion
to disqualify the former government lawyer in Esso Export Case because
the lawyer therein "never investigated or passed upon the subject matter
of the pending case … never rendered or had any specific duty to render
any legal advice in relation to the regulations involved in the
litigation."64 Hence, the accommodation between maintaining high ethical
standards for former Government employees, on the one hand, and
encouraging entry into Government service, on the other, was struck under
far different circumstances of the Esso Export Case.

In General Motors, the admonition voiced by Justice Kaufman in his

article The Former Government Attorney and the Canons of Professional
Ethics65 was considered more to the point:

If there was a likelihood that information pertaining to the pending matter

reached the attorney, although he did not "investigate" or "pass upon" it,
…, there would undoubtedly be an appearance of evil if he were not
disqualified.66

Thus, it was concluded that the Esso Export Case unquestionably presented
a case for the cautious application of the "appearance-of-evil doctrine"
because the former Government lawyer’s connection with the matter at
issue was the tenuous one of mere employment in the same Government
agency.

In contrast, in General Motors, Reycraft, not only participated in the

investigatory and preparatory stages, but also signed the complaint in the
action. Thus, according to the US court, where the overlap of issues is so
plain, and the involvement while in Government employ so direct, the
resulting appearance of impropriety must be avoided through
disqualification.

From the foregoing disquisition, it can be gleaned that disqualification

cases involving former government lawyers will have to be resolved on the
basis of peculiar circumstances attending each case. A balance between the
two seemingly conflicting policy considerations of maintaining high ethical
standards for former Government employees, on the one hand, and
encouraging entry into Government service, on the other, must be struck
based on, inter alia, the relationship between the former and the
succeeding representations of the former government lawyer. Likewise, as
already discussed, the degree of his involvement in the matter while in
Government employ is a crucial element in determining if his present
representation is within the purview of Rule 6.03.

In this case, not unlike in General Motors, the involvement of Atty. Mendoza
in the liquidation of GENBANK while he was the Solicitor General is so
direct that the appearance of impropriety must be avoided through
disqualification.
A.C. No. 4346 April 3, 2002
ERLINDA ABRAGAN, MILA GINA JAVIER, REYNALDO MERCADO,
PATERNO TORRES, BENIGNA ANTIBO, ELEISER SALVADOR, EDNA
SAPON, JULIANA CUENCA, ESPERANZA BUENAFE, VICENTE BARNAGA,
MARTHA SAPON, JOSEFINA OPEÑA, PUREZA WABE, RONULFO LOPEZ,
DOMINADOR HERNANDEZ, FELIPA EMBATE, ROQUE CATIIL, JERRY
SAPON, CONCEPCION MATANOG, and PABLO SALOMON, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. MAXIMO G. RODRIGUEZ, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
(which include the herein Petitioners) in Civil Case No. 11204, a
Motion to Withdraw Plaintiffs' Exhibits, [and] a certified true
and correct copy of said Motion by Mr. Gerardo Ucat of MTCC
Branch 3, Cagayan de Oro City is herewith attached to the
original of this Petition, while photocopies of the same are also
attached to the rest of the copies of this same Petition, and are
correspondingly marked as their Annex 'D'.
"10. That the illegal and unethical actions of Atty. Maximo
Rodriguez are most obnoxious, condemnable, and highly
immoral, to say the least, more so if we consider his social
standing and ascendancy in the community of Cagayan de Oro
City;

Lawyers violate their oath of office when they represent conflicting

interests. They taint not only their own professional practice, but the entire
legal profession itself.1âwphi1.nêt
The Case and the Facts
Before us is a verified Petition1 praying for the disbarment of Atty. Maximo
G. Rodriguez because of alleged illegal and unethical acts. The Petition
relevantly reads as follows:
"11. That the records of Civil Case No. 11204 which are
voluminous will bear the petitioners' allegations against the
herein respondent, who, after representing them initially, then
transferring allegiance and services to the adverse parties
(Lonchion, Palacio and NHA Manager), came back to represent
the herein petitioners without any regard [for] the rules of law
and the Canons of Professional Ethics, which is highly
contemptible and a clear violation of his oath as a lawyer and an
officer of the courts of law;

"12. That these acts are only those that records will bear,
"2. That sometime in 1986, the petitioners hired the services of
because outside of the court records, respondent, without
the respondent and the latter, represented the former in the
regard [for] delicadeza, fair play and the rule of law, has
case entitled PABLO SALOMON et al vs. RICARDO DACALUZ et
assigned, apportioned and sold parcels of land[,] subject matter
al., before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cagayan de Oro
in Civil Case No. 11204 which legally have been pronounced and
City, Branch 3 docketed as Civil Case No. 11204, for Forcible
decided to be in the possession of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
Entry with Petition for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
11204, who are partly the petitioners herein. Thus, they cannot
Damages, [and] a Certified True and Correct Copy of the
yet enjoy the fruits of the tedious and protracted legal battle
COMPLAINT by Clerk of Court III Gerardo B. Ucat of the said
because of respondent's illegal acts, which have instilled fear
Court, is herewith attached to the original of this PETITION,
among the plaintiffs and the petitioners herein;
while photocopies of the same are also attached to the duplicate
copies of this same Petition and marked as Annex 'A' hereof;
"13. That respondent lawyer even represented ERLINDA
ABRAGAN, one of the herein petitioners, in a later proceedings
"3. That after the Case No. 11204 was finally won, and a Writ of
in Civil Case No. 11204 wherein the apportionment of parcels of
Execution was issued by the Honorable Municipal Trial Court in
land was erroneously, unprocedurally and illegally submitted to
Cities of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 3, the same respondent
a commissioner, and that ERLINDA ABRAGAN, after winning in
lawyer represented the petitioners herein;
the said Civil Case was later on dispossessed of her rights by
respondent counsel's maneuver, after the decision (in Civil Case
"4. That when respondent counsel disturbed the association No. 11208) became final executory;
(Cagayan de Oro Landless Residents Association, Inc.), to which
all the complainants belong, by surreptitiously selling some
"14. That to make matters worse, respondent Atty. Rodriguez
rights to other persons without the consent of the petitioners
eventually fenced an area consisting of about 10, 200 square
herein, they decided to sever their client-lawyer relationship;
meters within Lot No. 1982[,] the subject matter in Civil Case
No. 11204 without the consent of the herein petitioners. He
"5. That in fact, the National Bureau of Investigation of Cagayan even openly and publicly proclaimed his possession and
de Oro City, is presently undertaking an investigation on the ownership thereof, which fact is again and also under NBI
illegal activities of Atty. Maximo Rodriguez pertaining to his investigation;
express involvement in the illegal and unauthorized
apportionment, assignment and sale of parcels of land subject to
"15. That all the foregoing acts of respondent lawyer plus his
the Case No. 11204, where he represented the poor landless
continuing and ongoing illegal and unethical maneuvers have
claimants of Cagayan de Oro City, which include your petitioners
deprived the herein petitioners of their vested rights to possess
in this case;
and eventually own the land they have for decades possessed,
and declared as such by final judgment in Civil Case No. 11204."
"6. That petitioners herein later filed an indirect contempt
charge under Civil Case No. 11204 against Sheriff Fernando
In his Comment,2 respondent flatly denied the accusations of petitioners.
Loncion et al., on August 2, 1991 engaging the services of Atty.
He explained that the withdrawal of the exhibits, having been approved by
LORETO O. SALVA, SR., an alleged former student of law of Atty.
the trial court, was not "illegal, obnoxious, undesirable and highly
Maximo Rodriguez, [and a] certified true and correct copy of the
immoral." He added that he took over the 8,000 square meters of land only
complaint thereat consisting of four (4) pages is herewith
after it had been given to him as attorney's fees. In his words:
attached and photocopies of which are also attached to the
duplicates hereof, and correspondingly marked as their Annex
'B'; "14. Respondent ADMITS that he fenced an area of about 8,000
sq. [m]. after the association had awarded the same as attorney's
fees in Civil Case Number 11204, the dismissal of the appeal by
"7. That respondent lawyer, Atty. Maximo Rodriguez, (in the
the NHA, the successful handling of three (3) cases in the
Indirect Contempt Case under the same Civil Case No. 11204,)
SUPREME COURT, the pending case of QUIETING OF TITLE filed
REPRESENTED and actively took up the defense of FERNANDO
by the NHA, and for the pending reconveyance case, Civil Case
LONCION et al. much to the dismay, damage and prejudice of the
No. 93-573, supra. These area of 8,000 sq. [m]., was awarded as
herein petitioners, [and] a copy of Atty. Rodriguez's Answer,
attorney's fees, which [were] supposed to be ten percent of the
which is also certified true and correct by Clerk of Court III
22 hectares, Lot No. 1982, the subject matter of Civil Case No.
Gerardo Ucat of Branch 3 of MTCC – Cagayan de Oro City,
11204, but the association and its members were able to take
consisting of three (3) pages, is attached to the original of this
actual possession by judgment of the courts only o[f] the twelve
Petition, while photocopies of the same are attached to the other
(12) hectares. [This] area consisting of 8,000 sq. [m]., and
copies hereof and accordingly marked as Annex 'C';
consisting of two (2) lots [was] fenced by the respondent to
prevent squatters from entering the area. The rights of
"8. That the records will bear the petitioners out that their possession and ownership o[f] this area by the respondent
counsel, Atty. SALVA SR. later on withdrew the case of Indirect depends upon the outcome of Civil Case No. 93-573, supra, for
Contempt upon the suggestion of Atty. Maximo Rodriguez; and reconveyance of title by the association and its members versus
instead, filed the Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of the NHA, et. al. If it is true that this is under investigation by the
Execution; NBI, then why, not wait and submit the investigation of the NHA,
instead of filing this unwarranted, false and fabricated charge
based on preposterous and ridiculous charges without any
"9. That on January 12, 1993, the herein respondent, without
proof whatsoever, except the vile [language] of an irresponsible
consulting the herein Petitioners who are all poor and ignorant
lawyer."3
of court procedures and the law, filed in behalf of the plaintiffs
Thereafter, petitioners filed a Reply4 in which they reiterated their
allegations against respondent and added that the latter likewise violated
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court referred
the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and/or decision.5
Report of the Investigating Commissioner
In her Report and Recommendation dated January 23, 2001, Investigating
IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months for violation of Rule
15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Her report
reads in part as follows:
"From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that respondent
represented conflicting interest considering that the
complainants were the same plaintiffs in both cases and were
duly specified in the pleadings particularly in the caption of the
cases. Under the said predicament even if complainants were
excluded as members of the Association represented by the
respondent; the latter should have first secured complainants'
written consent before representing defendants in the Indirect
Contempt case particularly Macario Palacio, president of the
Association, or inhibited himself.
"It is very unfortunate that in his desire to render service to his
client, respondent overlooked the fact that he already violated
Rule 15.03 of [C]anon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit:
'Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.'
"We have no alternative but to abide by the rules."6
IBP Board of Governors' Resolution
Upholding the above-quoted Report, the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended via its May 26, 2001
Resolution that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two
(2) months for violation of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
This Court's Ruling
We agree with the findings and the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors, but hold that the penalty should be six-month suspension as
recommended by the investigating commissioner.
"The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity
and not to divulge his secrets or confidence forbids also the
subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others
in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with
respect to which confidence has been reposed."9 (Italics in the
original)
In the case at bar, petitioners were the same complainants in the indirect
contempt case and in the Complaint for forcible entry in Civil Case No.
11204.10 Respondent should have evaluated the situation first before
agreeing to be counsel for the defendants in the indirect contempt
proceedings. Attorneys owe undivided allegiance to their clients, and
should at all times weigh their actions, especially in their dealings with the
latter and the public at large. They must conduct themselves beyond
reproach at all times.
The Court will not tolerate any departure from the "straight and narrow"
path demanded by the ethics of the legal profession.1âwphi1.nêt
In Hilado v. David,11 which we quote below, the Court advised lawyers to be
like Caesar's wife – to be pure and to appear to be so.
"This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest
practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well as to protect
the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional
practice. It is founded on principles of public policy, on good
taste. As has been said in another case, the question is not
necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the
attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With
these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar's wife,
not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only
thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
attorneys which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice."
Because of his divided allegiance, respondent has eroded, rather than
enhanced, the public perception of the legal profession. His divided loyalty
constitutes malpractice for which he may be suspended, following Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
"SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of Attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefor. – Any member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. x x
x."

Administrative Liability of Respondent Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. We find however that
suspension of six (6) months from the practice of law, as recommended by
Commissioner Navarro, is sufficient to discipline respondent.
At the outset, we agree with Commissioner Navarro's conclusion that apart
from their allegations in their various pleadings, petitioners did not proffer
any proof tending to show that respondent had sold to other persons A survey of cases involving conflicting interests on the part of counsel
several rights over the land in question; and that he had induced the former reveals that the Court has imposed on erring attorneys 12 either a
counsel for petitioners, Atty. Salva Jr., to withdraw the indirect contempt reprimand, or a suspension from the practice of law from five (5)
case that they had filed. Neither did the IBP find anything wrong as regards months13 to as high as two (2) years.14
the 8,000 square meters awarded to respondent as payment for his legal
services. Petitioners' bare assertions, without any proof to back them up,
WHEREFORE, Maximo G. Rodriguez is found guilty of violating Rule 15.03
would not justify the imposition of a penalty on respondent.
of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of law, effective
Having said that, we find, however, that respondent falls short of the upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same
integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers. They are or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.1âwphi1.nêt
expected to uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times. The trust
and confidence clients repose in them require a high standard and
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as
appreciation of the latter's duty to the former, the legal profession, the
attorney and served on the IBP, as well as on the Court Administrator who
courts and the public. Indeed, the bar must maintain a high standard of
shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.
legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealings. To this end,
lawyers should refrain from doing anything that might tend to lessen the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of their SO ORDERED.
profession.7

In the present case, respondent clearly violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer
shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after full disclosure of the facts."

The Court explained in Buted v. Hernando:8

"[A] lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one

client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client
requires him to oppose.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 11350 [Formerly CBD Case No. 14-4211], August 09, 2016
ADEGOKE R. PLUMPTRE, Complainant, v. ATTY. SOCRATES R.
RIVERA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This resolves a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Socrates R.
Rivera for absconding with money entrusted to him and soliciting money
to bribe a judge.
On May 13, 2014, complainant Adegoke R. Plumptre filed a complaint for
disbarment1 against respondent before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
Complainant alleges that on March 7, 2014, he called respondent and asked
for help in his application for a work permit from the Bureau of
Immigration.2 They met a few days later, and complainant paid respondent
P10,000.00 as professional fee.3chanrobleslaw
They met again, and complainant gave respondent another P10,000.00,
together with his passport. This was allegedly for the processing of his
work permit.4chanrobleslaw
They met for a third time since respondent asked complainant to submit
ID photos.5 Respondent asked complainant for another P10,000.00, but
complainant refused as they only agreed on the amount of
P20,000.00.6chanrobleslaw
Respondent also asked complainant for P8,000.00, allegedly for
complainant's other case, which respondent was also working on.7 He
explained that P5,000.00 would be given to a Las Piñas judge to reverse the
motion for reconsideration against complainant, while P3,000.00 would be
used to process the motion for reconsideration. Complainant gave him the
P8,000.00.8chanrobleslaw
Complainant claims that after respondent received the money, he never
received any updates on the status of his work permit and pending court
case.9 Further, whenever he called respondent to follow up on his work
permit, respondent hurled invectives at him and threatened him and his
wife.10chanrobleslaw
Complainant would retort by saying that he would file complaints against
respondent if he did not give back the money and passport. That was the
last time complainant heard from respondent.11chanrobleslaw
After inquiring and researching on respondent's
whereabouts,12 complainant was able to track down respondent and get
back his passport, which respondent coursed through complainant's
aunt.13 However, despite the return of complainant's passport, respondent
still refused to return the P28,000.00 earlier endorsed to
him.14chanrobleslaw
Complainant then decided to file a complaint against respondent before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.15chanrobleslaw
On May 14, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued the
Order16 directing respondent to file an answer to the complaint.
Respondent failed to show up at the September 17, 2014 mandatory
conference,17 as well as at the second mandatory conference set on October
22, 2014.18 The parties were directed to submit their verified position
papers, after which the case was submitted for resolution.19chanrobleslaw
On May 27, 2015, the Investigating Commissioner recommended
respondent's suspension for two (2) years from the practice of law and
return of P28,000.00 to complainant.20chanrobleslaw
On June 20, 2015, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors
adopted and approved21 the Investigating Commissioner's
recommendation, but modified it to disbar respondent from the practice of
law, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A ", for Respondent's violation of Canon 1, Canon 7,
Canon 16, Rule 16.01, Canon 17 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, aggravated by his failure to file Answer and to appear in the
Mandatory Conference. Thus, Atty. Socrates R. Rivera is hereby DISBARRED
from the practice of law and his name stricken off from the Roll of
Attorneys and Ordered to Return the Twenty Eight Thousand
(P28,000.00) Pesos to Complainant.22 (Emphasis in the original)
On April 20, 2016, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines transmitted the
case to this Court for final action under Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.23chanrobleslaw
This Court modifies the findings of the Board of Governors.
I
Respondent's repeated failure to comply with several Resolutions of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines requiring him to comment on the
complaint lends credence to complainant's allegations. It manifests his
tacit admission. Hence, we resolve this case on the basis of the complaint
and other documents submitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
In Macarilay v. Seriña,24 this Court held that "[t]he unjustified withholding
of funds belonging to the client warrants the imposition of disciplinary
action against the lawyer."25cralawred By absconding with the money
entrusted to him by his client and behaving in a manner not befitting a
member of the bar, respondent violated the following Canons of the Code
of Professional Responsibility:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
....
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession, and support the activities of the integrated bar.
....
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession.
Rule 16.01. - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
....
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
....
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
....
Rule 18.03. - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04. - A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for
information.
As his client's advocate, a lawyer is duty-bound to protect his client's
interests and the degree of service expected of him in this capacity is his
"entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability."26 The lawyer also has a fiduciary duty, with the lawyer-client
relationship imbued with utmost trust and confidence.27chanrobleslaw
Respondent failed to serve his client with fidelity, competence, and
diligence. He not only neglected the attorney-client relationship
established between them; he also acted in a reprehensible manner
towards complainant, i.e., cussing and threatening complainant and his
family with bodily harm, hiding from complainant, and refusing without
reason to return the money entrusted to him for the processing of the work
permit. Respondent's behavior demonstrates his lack of integrity and
moral soundness.
Del Mundo v. Capistrano28 has reiterated the exacting standards expected
of law practitioners:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
To stress, the practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the
high standards of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society,
the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the
values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Falling short of this standard, the Court will not
hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer by imposing an appropriate penalty
based on the exercise of sound judicial discretion in consideration of the
surrounding facts.29 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
A lawyer must, at no time, lack probity and moral fiber, which are not only
conditions precedent to his entrance to the bar but are likewise essential
demands for his continued membership.30chanrobleslaw
II
When complainant refused to give respondent any more money to process
his work permit, respondent persuaded complainant to give him an
additional P8,000.00 purportedly to ensure that a motion for
reconsideration pending before a Las Piñas judge would be decided in
complainant's favor.31 However, after receiving P28,000.00 from
complainant for the work permit and ensuring the success of
complainant's court case, respondent made himself scarce and could no
longer be contacted.
Although nothing in the records showed whether the court case was
indeed decided in complainant's favor, respondent's act of soliciting
money to bribe a judge served to malign the judge and the judiciary by
giving the impression that court cases are won by the party with the
deepest pockets and not on the merits.32chanrobleslaw

"A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system."33 Further, "a lawyer shall
not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or
legislative body."34chanrobleslaw

By implying that he can negotiate a favorable ruling for the sum of

P8,000.00, respondent trampled upon the integrity of the judicial system
and eroded confidence on the judiciary. This gross disrespect of the judicial
system shows that he is wanting in moral fiber and betrays the lack of
integrity in his character. The practice of law is a privilege, and respondent
has repeatedly shown that he is unfit to exercise it.

III

As for the sufficiency of notice to respondent of the disbarment

proceedings against him, this Court notes that on May 14, 2014, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines directed respondent to answer the
complaint against him, but he failed to file his answer.35 The Integrated Bar
of the Philippines set two (2) separate dates for mandatory
conferences36 after respondent failed to attend the first setting, but he
failed to appear in both instances.37 All issuances from the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines had the requisite registry receipts attached to them.

Stemmerik v. Mas38 discussed the sufficiency of notice of disbarment

proceedings. This Court held that lawyers must update their records with
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines by informing it of any change in office
or residential address and contact details.39 Service of notice on the office
or residential address appearing in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
records shall constitute sufficient notice to a lawyer for administrative
proceedings against him or her.40chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Socrates R. Rivera is SUSPENDED from

the practice of law for three (3) years. He is ORDERED to return to
complainant Adegoke R. Plumptre the amount of P28,000.00 with interest
at 6% per annum from the date of promulgation of this Resolution until
fully paid. He is likewise DIRECTED to submit to this Court proof of
payment of the amount within 10 days from payment.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in respondent's personal record as

a member of the bar, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to
all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M.
GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman
under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.
G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-
Ombudsman ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
The following are the subjects of this Resolution:
1) a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by
petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar against public respondent Special
Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez, in connection
with G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578. and 2) a Resolution of
this Court dated 2 May 1988 requiring respondent Hon. Raul
Gonzalez to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt
and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for making certain
public statements.
I
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos.
12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act) pending before the Sandiganbayan. The Office
of the Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary investigation and filed
the criminal informations in those cases (originally TBP Case No. 86-
00778).
On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus (G.R. Nos. 79690-707) naming
as respondents both the Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez.
Among other things, petitioner assailed: (1) the 5 February 1987
Resolution 1 of the "Tanodbayan" recommending the filing of
criminal informations against petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused
in TBP Case No. 86-00778; and (2) the 1 September 1987
Resolution 2 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-
12161 and 1216312177 denying his Motion to Quash the criminal
informations filed in those cases by the "Tanodbayan." In this respect,
petitioner alleged that respondent Gonzalez, as Tanodbayan and
under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, was no longer vested
with power and authority independently to investigate and to
institute criminal cases for graft and corruption against public
officials and employees, and hence that the informations filed in
Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-12177 were all null and
void.
On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution, which read:
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The
Honorable Sandiganbayan and Honorable Raul
M. Gonzalez, Claiming To Be and Acting as
Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution ).—Acting on the special civil action
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with urgent motion
for preliminary elimination injunction, the Court
Resolved, without giving due course to the
petition, to require the respondents to COMMENT
thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.
The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective
immediately and continuing until further orders
from this Court, ordering respondent
Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from
hearing and trying Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to
12161 and 12163 to 12177 insofar as petitioner
Enrique Zaldivar is concerned and from hearing
and resolving the Special Prosecutor's motion to
suspend dated September 3, 1987.
The parties later filed their respective pleadings.
Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second Petition for
certiorari and Prohibition (G.R. No. 80578) on 19 November 1987,
initially naming only Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as respondent. That
Petition assailed the 24 September 1987 Resolution 3 of the
"Tanodbayan" in TBP Case No. 87- 01304 recommending that additional
criminal charges for graft and corruption be filed against petitioner
Zaldivar and five (5) other individuals. Once again, petitioner raised the
argument of the Tanodbayan's lack of authority under the 1987
Constitution to file such criminal cases and to investigate the same.
Petitioner also moved for the consolidation of that petition with G.R. No.
79690-707.
In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, 4 this Court, without giving due
course to the second petition: (1) required respondent Gonzalez to submit
a comment thereon: and (2) issued a temporary restraining order
"ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from
further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01394 ... and particularly, from filing the
criminal information consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary
investigation therein." In a separate resolution of the same date, 5 G.R. Nos.
79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578 were ordered consolidated by the Court.
In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4) days prior to
issuance by this Court of a temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 80578,
the Office of the Tanodbayan instituted Criminal Case No. 12570 6 with the
Sandiganbayan which issued on 23 November 1987 an Order of
Arrest 7 for petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in Criminal Case No.
12570. Upon Motion 8 of petitioner Zaldivar, this Court issued the
following Resolution on 8 December 1987:
G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M.
Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan). The motion filed by
the Solicitor General for respondents for an extension
of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original
period within which to file comment on the petition
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction or restraining order is
GRANTED.
Acting on the manifestation with motion to treat the
Sandiganbayan as party-respondent, the Court
Resolved to (a) Consider IMPLEADED the
Sandiganbayan as party respondent; and (b) In
pursuance of and supplementing the Temporary
Restraining Order of November 24, 1987 "ordering
respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and
DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01304
entitled, "Commission on Audit vs. Gov. Enrique
Zaldivar, et al." and particularly, from filing the
criminal information consequent thereof and from
conducting preliminary investigation therein" ISSUE
a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER effective
immediately and continuing until further orders from
this Court, ordering respondents Hon. Raul M.
Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST
from further acting in Criminal Case No. 12570,
entitled, "People of the Philippines vs. Enrique M.
Zaldivar, et al." and from enforcing the order of arrest
issued by the Sandiganbayan in said case.
The Solicitor General filed a Comment 9 on the petition in G.R. No. 80578,
and we required the petitioner to submit a Reply 10 thereto.
On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to
Cite in Contempt 11 directed at respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited as
bases the acts of respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the filing of the
information against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 12570 before the
Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous
statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in G.R. No. 80578.
In respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to his Motion a photocopy of a
news article, reproduced here in toto, which appeared in the 30 November
1987 issue of the "Philippine Daily Globe:"
Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case
TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said
yesterday the Supreme Court order stopping him
from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov.
Enrique Zaldivar can aggravate the thought that
affluent persons "an prevent the progress of a trial."
What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is
that it appears that while rich and influential persons
get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is
difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be
given due course. Gonzalez told the Daily Globe in an
exclusive interview.
Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order '"eightens the
people's apprehension over the justice system in this
country, especially because the people have been
 thinking that only the small fly can get it while big
fishes go scot-free."
Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the
tribunal last week after Zaldivar petitioned the court
to stop the Tanodbayan from investigating graft cases
filed against him.
Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his
investigations because the latter wanted to help
promote the political fortunes of a friend from
Antique, lawyer Bonifacio Alentajan.
Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped
Gonzalez from investigating a graft charge against the
governor, and from instituting any complaint with
the Sandiganbayan.
While President Aquino had been prodding me to
prosecute graft cases even if they involve the high and
mighty, the Supreme Court had been restraining
me. Gonzalez said.
In accordance with the President's order, Gonzalez
said he had filed graft cases against two "very
powerful" officials of the Aquino government-
Commissioner Quintin Doromal of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government and Secretary
Jiamil I.M. Dianlan of the Office of Muslim Affairs and
Cultural Communities.
While I don't wish to discuss the merits of the Zaldivar
petition before the Supreme Court, I am a little bit
disturbed that (the order) can aggravate the thinking
of some people that affluent persons can prevent the
progress of a trial, he said.
He disclosed that he had a talk with the Chief
Executive over the weekend and that while she
symphatizes with local officials who are charged in
court during election time, 'She said that it might be a
disservice to the people and the voters who are
entitled to know their candidates.
Gonzalez said that while some cases filed against
local officials during election time could be mere
harassment suits, the Constitution makes it a right of
every citizen to be informed of the character of tile
candidate, who should be subject to scrutiny.
(Emphasis supplied)
Acting on petitioner's Motion to Cite in Contempt, the Court on 16 February
1988 required respondent Gonzalez "to COMMENT on aforesaid Motion
within ten (10) days from notice." 12 On 27 April 1988, the Court rendered
its Decision 13 (per curiam) in the Consolidated Petitions. The dispositive
portion thereof read:
WHEREFORE, We hereby:
(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by
petitioner Zaldivar and hereby NULLIFY the criminal
informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan;
and
(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and
desist from conducting investigations and filing
criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise
exercising the powers and functions of the
Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.
A Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed by respondent Gonzalez the next
day, 28 April 1988. In his Motion, respondent Gonzalez, after having
argued the legal merits of his position, made the following statements
totally unrelated to any legal issue raised either in the Court's Decision or
in his own Motion:
1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading
member of the court ... and he was asked to 'go slow
on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him;' "
2. That he "was approached and asked to refrain from
investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements
in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the
Court;" and
3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned
respondent was called over the phone by a leading
member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the
cases against (two Members of the Court)."
Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten notes 15 which
he claimed were sent by "some members of this Honorable Court,
interceeding for cases pending before this office (i.e., the Tanodbayan)." He
either released his Motion for Reconsideration with facsimiles of said notes
to the press or repeated to the press the above extraneous statements: the
metropolitan papers for the next several days carried long reports on those
statements and variations and embellishments thereof On 2 May 1988, the
Court issued the following Resolution in the Consolidated Petitions:
G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The Hon.
Sandiganbayan, et al. G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A.
Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, etc).
1. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
respondent Gonzalez under date of April 28, 1988,
the Court Resolved to REQUIRE the petitioner to
COMMENT thereon within ten (10) days from notice
hereof.
2. It appearing that respondent Raul M. Gonzalez has
made public statements to the media which not only
deal with matters subjudice but also appear offensive
to and disrespectful of the Court and its individual
members and calculated, directly or indirectly, to
bring the Court into disrepute, discredit and ridicule
and to denigrate and degrade the administration of
justice, the Court Resolved to require respondent
Gonzalez to explain in writing within ten (10) days
from notice hereof, why he should not be punished
for contempt of court and/or subjected to
administrative sanctions for making such public
statements reported in the media, among others, in
the issues of the "Daily Inquirer," the "Journal," the
"Manila Times," the "Philippine Star," the "Manila
Chronicle" the "Daily Globe" and the "Manila
Standard" of April 29 and 30, and May 1, 1988, to wit:
(a) That the Court resolution in question is merely
"an offshoot of the position he had taken that the SC
Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or
investigation by government prosecutors or
motivated by a desire to stop him 'from investigating
cases against some of their proteges or friends;"
(b) That no less than six of the members of the Court
"interceded for and on behalf of persons with
pending cases before the Tanodbayan," or sought "to
pressure him to render decisions favorable to their
colleagues and friends;"
(c) That attempts were made to influence him to go
slow on Zaldivar and not to be too hard on him and to
refrain from investigating the Commission on Audit
report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court
because it will embarass the Court;
(d) That there were also attempts to cause the
dismissal of cases against two Associate Justices; and
(e) That the Court had dismissed judges' without
rhyme or reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without due
process.
3. It further appearing that three (3) affidavits
relative to the purpose of and circumstances
attendant upon the notes written to said public
respondent by three (3) members of the Court have
since been submitted to the Court and now form part
of its official records, the Court further Resolved to
require the Clerk of Court to ATTACH to this
Resolution copies of said sworn statements and the
annexes thereto appended, and to DIRECT
respondent Gonzalez also to comment thereon
within the same period of ten (10) days.
4. It finally appearing that notice of the Resolution of
February 16, 1988 addressed to respondent
Gonzalez was misdelivered and therefore not served
 on him, the Court Resolved to require the Clerk of
Court to CAUSE SERVICE of said Resolution on the
respondent and to REQUIRE the latter to comply
therewith.
Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court on 9 May 1988 an
Omnibus Motion for Extension and Inhibition 16 alleging, among other
things: that the above quoted 2 May 1988 Resolution of the Court "appears
to have overturned that presumption [of innocence] against him:" and that
"he gravely doubts whether that 'cold neutrality [of an impartial judge] is
still available to him" there being allegedly "at least 4 members of this
Tribunal who will not be able to sit in judgment with substantial sobriety
and neutrality." Respondent Gonzalez closed out his pleading with a prayer
that the four (4) Members of the Court Identified and referred to there by
him inhibit themselves in the deliberation and resolution of the Motion to
Cite in Contempt.
On 19 May 1988 17 after receipt of respondent's Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration. 18 this Court in an extended per
curiam Resolution 19 denied the Motion and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration. That denial was made "final and immediately executory.
Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following pleadings of
record:
1. Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to
Inhibition 20 dated 23 May 1988;
2. Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedures to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines 21 dated 20 May
1988
3. Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time to
File Explanation Ex Abundante Cautelam, 22 dated 26
May 1988;
4. Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion
(a) For Extension of Time
(b) For Inhibition and
(c) For Transfer of Administrative Proceedings to the
IBP, Under Rule 139-B 23 dated 4 June 1988 (with
Annex "A;" 24 an anonymous letter dated 27 May
1988 from the alleged Concerned Employees of the
Supreme Court and addressed to respondent):
5. Ex-Parte Manifestation 25 dated 7 June 1988;
6. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Reconsideration 26 1988; and
7. Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with
Motion 27 member 1988.
In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court quoted earlier,
respondent Gonzalez submitted on 17 June 1988 an Answer with
Explanation and Comment 28 offering respondent's legal arguments and
defenses against the contempt and disciplinary charges presently pending
before this Court. Attached to that pleading as Annex "A" thereof was
respondent's own personal Explanation/Compliance 29 second
explanation called "Compliance," 30 with annexes, was also submitted by
respondent on 22 July 1988.
II
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline
officers of the court and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as
regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary
authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from
the Court's constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of
law, which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of
law. 31 Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary
authority of the Supreme Court over members of the Bar is an inherent
power incidental to the proper administration of justice and essential to an
orderly discharge of judicial functions. 32 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of
justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers
and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the
Court. 33 The power to punish for contempt is "necessary for its own
protection against an improper interference with the due administration
of justice," "(it) is not dependent upon the complaint of any of the parties
litigant. 34
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in
cases like that before us here; the Court's inherent power to discipline
attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary authority of the Court
over members of the Bar is broader than the power to punish for contempt.
Contempt of court may be committee both by lawyers and non-lawyers,
both in and out of court. Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the
contumacious conduct also constitutes professional misconduct which
calls into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. 35 Where
the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme Court's disciplinary
authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not the misconduct
with which the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court.
The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of
disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. 36 The disciplinary
authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the
Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a
professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon
to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving
disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct,
pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes
both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action
against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the
contempt power.
It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to punish for
contempt or of the disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the
Bar, the Court is acting as offended party, prosecutor and arbiter at one and
the same time. Thus, in the present case, respondent Gonzalez first sought
to get some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution
of this case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in
effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the issues
involved in this proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent
cannot expect due process from this Court, that the Court has become
incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. Respondent Gonzalez
misconceives the nature of the proceeding at bar as well as the function of
the members of the Court in such proceeding.
Respondent's contention is scarcely an original one. In In Re
Almacen, 37 then Associate (later Chief) Justice Fred Fruiz Castro had
occasion to deal with this contention in the following lucid manner:
xxx xxx xxx
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the
exercise of our authority in the premises, that, as Atty.
Almacen would have it appear, the members of the
Court are the 'complainants, prosecutors and judges'
all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter
misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of
the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our
role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary
proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is
not—and does not involve—a trial of an action or a
suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the
conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court
motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective,
and the real question for determination is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a
member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the property and
honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have
proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be
no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain
degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court
as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so
against the individual members thereof But in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an
entity separate and distinct from the individual
personalities of its members. Consistently with the
intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual
members act not as such individuals but only as a
duly constituted court. The distinct individualities
are lost in the majesty of their office. So that, in a very
real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at
bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual
 members thereof—as well as the people
themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties,
nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard
should the administration of justice be threatened by
the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the
solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal
fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice
of law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit
persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this
power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it
cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally
renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. So that
even if it be conceded that the members collectively
are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone
does not and cannot disqualify them from the
exercise of the power because public policy demands
that they, acting as a Court, exercise the power in all
cases which call for disciplinary action. The present
is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the
merger in one entity of the personalities of
complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely
inexistent.
xxx xxx xxx. 38
It should not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to
disclaim any bias or prejudice against the respondent that would prevent
them from acting in accordance with the exacting requirements of their
oaths of office. It also appears to the Court that for all the members to
inhibit themselves from sitting on this case is to abdicate the responsibility
with which the Constitution has burdened them. Reference of complaints
against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the
Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court; such
reference to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General
is certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of
the Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge consists of acts
done before the Supreme Court. There is no need for further investigation
of facts in the present case for it is not substantially disputed by
respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements
attributed to him. In any case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity
to present his defense; his defense is not that he did not make the
statements ascribed to him but that those statements give rise to no
liability on his part, having been made in the exercise of his freedom of
speech. The issues which thus need to be resolved here are issues of law
and of basic policy and the Court, not any other agency, is compelled to
resolve such issues.
III
It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent Gonzalez was
saying in his statements set out above. Respondent has not denied making
the above statements; indeed, he acknowledges that the newspaper
reports of the statements attributed to him are substantially correct. 39
Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying, firstly, that the Supreme Court
deliberately rendered an erroneous or wrong decision when it rendered
its per curiam Decision dated 27 April 1988 in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and
80578. That decision according to respondent Gonzalez, was issued as an
act of retaliation by the Court against him for the position he had taken
"that the (Supreme Court) Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or
investigation by government prosecutors," and in order to stop
respondent from investigating against "some of (the) proteges or friends
(of some Supreme Court Justices)." The Court cannot, of course, and will
not debate the correctness of its Decision of 27 April 1988 and of its
Resolution dated 19 May 1988 (denying respondent Gonzalez Motion for
Reconsideration) in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. Respondent Gonzalez,
and anyone else for that matter, is free intellectually to accept or not to
accept the reasoning of the Court set out in its per curiam Decision and
Resolution in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. This should not, however,
obscure the seriousness of the assault thus undertaken by respondent
against the Court and the appalling implications of such assault for the
integrity of the system of administration of justice in our country.
Respondent has said that the Court rendered its Decision and Resolution
without regard to the legal merits of the Zaldivar cases and had used the
judicial process to impose private punishment upon respondent for
positions he had taken (unrelated to the Zaldivar cases) in carrying out his
duties. It is very difficult to imagine a more serious affront to, or a greater
outrage upon, the honour and dignity of this Court than this. Respondent's
statement is also totally baseless. Respondent's statements were made in
complete disregard of the fact that his continuing authority to act
as Tanodbayan or Ombudsman after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, had been questioned before this Court as early as 10
September 1987 in the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus
filed against him in these consolidated Petitions 40 that is, more than seven
(7) months before the Court rendered its Decision. Respondent also
ignores the fact that one day later, this Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order effective immediately ordering the Sandiganbayan to
cease and desist from hearing the criminal cases filed against petitioner
Zaldivar by respondent Gonzalez. Respondent also disregards the fact that
on 24 November 1987, upon the filing of a second Petition for certiorari for
Prohibition by Mr. Zaldivar, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order this time requiring the respondent to cease and desist from further
acting in TBP Case No. 87-0934. Thus, the decision finally reached by this
Court in April 1988 on the constitutional law issue pending before the
Court for the preceding eight (8) months, could scarcely have been
invented as a reprisal simply against respondent.
A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against members of the
Supreme Court is that they have improperly Id pressured" him to render
decisions favorable to their "colleagues and friends," including dismissal of
"cases" against two (2) members of the Court. This particularly deplorable
charge too is entirely baseless, as even a cursory examination of the
contents of the handwritten notes of three (3) members of this Court
addressed to respondent (which respondent attached to his Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision of this Court of 27 April 1988 in the
consolidated Petitions) win show. It is clear, and respondent Gonzalez does
not pretend otherwise, that the subject matters of the said notes had no
relation at all to the issues in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. This charge
appears to have been made in order to try to impart some substance (at
least in the mind of respondent) to the first accusation made by respondent
that the Court had deliberately rendered a wrong decision to get even with
respondent who had, with great fortitude, resisted "pressure" from some
members of the Court. Once again, in total effect, the statements made by
respondent appear designed to cast the Court into gross disrepute, and to
cause among the general public scorn for and distrust in the Supreme
Court and, more generally, the judicial institutions of the Republic.
Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him
from prosecuting "rich and powerful persons," that the Court was in effect
discrimination between the rich and powerful on the one hand and the
poor and defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich and powerful"
accused persons to go "scot-free" while presumably allowing or affirming
the conviction of poor and small offenders. This accusation can only be
regarded as calculated to present the Court in an extremely bad light. It
may be seen as intended to foment hatred against the Supreme Court; it is
also suggestive of the divisive tactics of revolutionary class war.
Respondent, finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly "dismissed
judges 'without rhyme or reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without due
process.'" The Court notes that this last attack is not without relation to the
other statements made by respondent against the Court. The total picture
that respondent clearly was trying to paint of the Court is that of an
"unjudicial" institution able and willing to render "clearly erroneous"
decisions by way of reprisal against its critics, as a body that acts arbitrarily
and capriciously denying judges and lawyers due process of law. Once
again, the purport of respondent's attack against the Court as an institution
unworthy of the people's faith and trust, is unmistakable. Had respondent
undertaken to examine the records 'of the two (2) judges and the attorney
he later Identified in one of his Explanations, he would have discovered
that the respondents in those administrative cases had ample opportunity
to explain their side and submit evidence in support thereof. 41 He would
have also found that there were both strong reasons for and an insistent
rhyme in the disciplinary measures there administered by the Court in the
continuing effort to strengthen the judiciary and upgrade the membership
of the Bar. It is appropriate to recall in this connection that due process as
a constitutional precept does not, always and in all situations, require the
trial-type proceeding, 42 that the essence of due process is to be found in
the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one
may have in support of one's defense. 43 "To be heard" does not only mean
verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings.
Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. 44
As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the Court to explain
why he should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to
administrative discipline for making the statements adverted to above. In
his subsequent pleadings where he asked the full Court to inhibit itself and
to transfer the administrative proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, respondent made, among others, the following allegations:
(a) That the Members of the Court "should inhibit
[themselves] in the contempt and administrative
charges against the respondent, in the light of the
manifest prejudice and anger they hold against
respondent as shown in the language of the
resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration;"
(b) That "the entire membership of the court has
already lost that 'cold neutrality of an impartial judge'
[to] be able to allow fairness and due process in the
contempt citation as well as in the possible
administrative charge;
(c) That "respondent honestly feels that this court as
angry and prejudiced as it is, respondent has no china
 man's chance to get fair hearing in the contempt and ... Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and
possible administrative charges;" outside of the Government. It is this state of things
that convinced me that all human efforts to correct
and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as
(d) That one must consider "the milieu before this
stated in my manifestation to you, I have already
Tribunal with, perhaps passion and obfuscation
decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of
running riot;"
seclusion, leaving to God the filling up deficiencies.
(60 SCRA at 242)
(e) That respondent, "after having been castigated
with such venom by the entire Court in its decision
The Court suspended Atty. del Mar, "until further orders," from the practice
denying the Motion for Reconsideration, does not
of law saying:
have confidence in the impartiality of the entire
Court" and that he "funds it extremely difficult to
believe that the members of this Tribunal can still act ... Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as
with unbiased demeanor towards him;" and state of graft, corruption and injustice allegedly
rampant in and outside of the government as
justification for his contemptuous statements. In
(f) That "the Tribunal is determined
other words, he already assumed by his own
to disbar [respondent] without due process" and that
contemptuous utterances that because there is an
a specified Member of the Court "has been tasked to
alleged existence of rampant corruption, graft and
be the ponente, or at least prepare the decision."
injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act
(Underscoring in the original)
in G.R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the
grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. We
Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his statements earlier are at a complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's
made, respondent sought to heap still more opprobrium upon the Court, logic ...
accusing it of being incapable of judging his acts and statements justly and
according to law. Once again, he paints this Court as a body not only
xxx xxx xxx
capable of acting without regard to due process but indeed determined so
to act. A grand design to hold up this Court to public scorn and disrespect
as an unworthy tribunal, one obfuscated by passion and anger at To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to
respondent, emerges once more. It is very difficult for members of this remind them that second only to the duty of
Court to understand how respondent Gonzalez could suppose that judges maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the
on the highest tribunal of the land would be ready and willing to violate Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey
their most solemn oath of office merely to gratify any imagined private the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys
feelings aroused by respondent. The universe of the Court revolves around to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
the daily demands of law and justice and duty, not around respondent nor of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138,
any other person or group of persons. Rules of Court). But We do remind them of said duty
to emphasize to their younger brethren its
paramount importance. A lawyer must always
Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez may
remember that he is an officer of the court exercising
reasonably be regarded by this Court as contumacious or as warranting
a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of
exercise of the disciplinary authority of this Court over members of the Bar,
administering justice.
may best be assayed by examining samples of the kinds of statements
which have been held in our jurisdiction as constituting contempt or
otherwise warranting the exercise of the Court's authority. xxx xxx xxx.

1. In Montecillo v. Gica, 45 Atty. Quirico del Mar as counsel for Montecillo, As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals
who was accused in a slander case, moved to reconsider a decision of the in C.A G.R. No. 46504-R was based on its evaluation of
Court of Appeals in favor of the complainant with a veiled threat that he the evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn
should interpose his next appeal to the President of the Philippines. In his denied in G.R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on
Motion for Reconsideration, he referred to the provisions of the Revised certiorari of the decision because We found no
Penal Code on "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment," and "judgment reason for disturbing the appellate court's finding
rendered through negligence" and implied that the Court of Appeals had and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of
allowed itself to be deceived. Atty. del Mar was held guilty of contempt of Appeals and this Court exercised judicial discretion
court by the Court of Appeals. He then sued the three (3) justices of the in a case under their respective jurisdiction. The
Court of Appeals for damages before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, intemperate and imprudent act of respondent del Mar
seeking to hold them liable for their decision in the appealed slander case. in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts
This suit was terminated, however, by compromise agreement after Atty. reconsider their respective stand in the decision and
del Mar apologized to the Court of Appeals and the justices concerned and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot
agreed to pay moral damages to the justices. Atty. del Mar some time later be anything but pure contumely for aid tribunals.
filed with this Court a Petition for Review on certiorari of a decision of the
Court of Appeals in a slander case. This Court denied the Petition for
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect
Review. Atty. del Mar then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
for the two highest Court of the land when on the flimsy
addressed a letter to the Clerk of the Supreme Court asking for the names
ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he
of the justices of this Court who had voted in favor of and those who had
proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by
voted against his Motion for Reconsideration. After his Motion for
claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust
Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit, Atty. del Mar filed a
judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted
Manifestation in this Court saying:
with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of
the law, in disposing of the case of his client.
I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of
Court furnished me with certified true copies of the
xxx xxx xxx
last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming
the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case
entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would ... To those who are in the practice of law and those
have filed against the Justices supporting the same, who in the future will choose to enter this profession,
civil and criminal suits as I did to the Justices of the We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to
Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney
falsification committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for him owes it to himself to respect the courts of justice and its
the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic
Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a institutions. (60 SCRA at 242-247: emphasis
favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of supplied)
exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our
Government, so that they may well know them and
2. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 46 four (4) members of
work for their extermination. (60 SCRA at
the bar, acting as counsel for MacArthur International Minerals Company
240;emphasis supplied)
were required by this Court to explain certain statements made in
MacArthur's third Motion for Reconsideration:
Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be administratively dealt
with for making the above statements. In his additional explanation, Atty.
d. ...; and I the Supreme Court I has overlooked the
del Mar made the following statements:
applicable law due to the mis-representation and
obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last
 sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration
dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized democratic tribunal ruled
that such a gimmick (referring to the "right to reject
any and all bids") can be used by vulturous executives
to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a
government agency or just plain fraud ... and it is thus
difficult, in the light of our upbringing and schooling,
even under many of the incumbent justices, that the
Honorable Supreme Court intends to create a
decision that in effect does precisely that in a most
absolute manner. (Second sentence, par. 7, Third
Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
(31 SCRA at 6)
They were also asked to explain the statements made in their Motion to
Inhibit filed on 21 September 1968 asking
Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice
Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from
considering, judging and resolving the case or any
issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11,
1967. The motion charges "It that the brother of the
Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president
of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the
false, erroneous and illegal decision dated January
31, 1968" and the ex-parte preliminary injunction
rendered in the above-entitled case, the latter in
effect prejudging and predetermining this case even
before the joining of an issue. As to the Chief Justice,
the motion states [t]hat the son of the Honorable
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a
significant appointment in the Philippine
Government by the President a short time before the
decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case.
The appointment referred to was as secretary of the
newly-created Board of Investments. The motion
presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and
makes a number of side comments projecting what is
claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31,
1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents" which,
according to the motion, brought about respondent
MacArthur's belief that unjudicial prejudice had been
caused it and that there was 'unjudicial favoritism' in
favor of 'petitioners, their appointing authority and a
favored party directly benefited by the said decision
(31 SCRA at 6-7)
Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel for MacArthur
and filed a fourth Motion for Reconsideration without leave of court, which
Motion contained the following paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned
by the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
when in fact he was outside the borders of the
Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral
Argument of the above-entitled case—which
condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court—
Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices; who may
take part—... . Only those members present when any
matter is submitted for oral argument will take part
in its consideration and adjudication ... ." This
requirement is especially significant in the present
instance because the member who penned the
decision was the very member who was absent for
approximately four months or more. This provision
also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio
Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International
Minerals Company abandons its quest for justice in
the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will
inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of
Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May
12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to determine
the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the
World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice and
confiscation of property and/or to the United States
Government, either its executive or judicial branches
or both, on the grounds of confiscation of
respondent's proprietary vested rights by the
Philippine Government without either compensation
or due process of law and invoking the Hickenlooper
Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and
benefits to the Philippine Government, including the
sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty
million dollars annually, until restitution or
compensation is made.
(31 SCRA at 10-11)
Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, the Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Sanchez, held three (3) attorneys guilty of contempt:
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago.
In his third motion for reconsideration, we, indeed,
find language that is not to be expected of an officer
of the courts. He pictures petitioners as 'vulturous
executives.' He speaks of this Court as a 'civilized,
democratic tribunal,' but by innuendo would suggest
that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph
categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as 'false,
erroneous and illegal' in a presumptuous manner. He
then charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction
we issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined
the case even before the joining of an issue. He
accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this
Court for being interested in the decision of this case:
Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his
brother is the vice president of the favored party who
is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was
appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of
Investments, 'a significant appointment in the
Philippine Government by the President, a short time
before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered.' In
this backdrop, he proceeds to state that 'it would
seem that the principles thus established [the moral
and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial
authority by the Honorable Supreme Court should
first apply to itself.' He puts forth the claim that lesser
and further removed conditions have been known to
create favoritism, only to conclude that there is no
reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the
case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro would be
less likely to engender favoritism and prejudice for or
against a particular cause or party.' Implicit in this at
least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are
insensible to delicadeza, which could make their
actuation suspect. He makes it plain in the motion
that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were
not free from the appearance of impropriety but did
arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect
their judgment. He points out that courts must be
above suspicion at all times like Ceasar's wife, warns
that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member
thereof should not be allowed to happen in our
country, 'although the process has already begun.
xxx xxx xxx
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's
accusations have no basis in fact and in law. The slur
made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole
court. For, inhibition is also asked if, we repeated any
other justices who have received favors or benefits
directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or
any members of any board-petitioner or their agents
or principals, including the president.' The absurdity
of this posture is at once apparent. For one thing, the
justices of this Court are appointed by the President
and in that sense may be considered to have each
received a favor from the President. Should these
justices inhibit themselves every time a case
involving the Administration crops up? Such a
thought may not certainly be entertained. The
consequence thereof would be to paralyze the
machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be
wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of
government operating in this country. Counsel is
presumed to know this. But why the unfounded
charge? There is the not too-well concealed effort on
the part of a losing litigant's attorney to downgrade
this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross
disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts
much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly
not an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended
to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief.
 xxx xxx xxx
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just
recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. and yet, this
Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style
that undermines and degrades the administration of
justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the
Rules against improper conduct tending to degrade
the administration of justice is thus transgressed. Atty.
Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.
xxx xxx xxx
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take
the case to the World Court and/or the United States
government. It must be remembered that respondent
MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn
the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so,
unnecessary statements were in ejected. More
specifically, the motion announced that McArthur
'will inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption of the
Philippine government officials in the bidding of May
12, 1965 ... to the World Court' and would invoke 'the
Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of
all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government,
including the sugar price premium, amount to more
than fifty million dollars annually ...
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the blind of
this Court to decide the case' in its favor. A notice of
appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in
Meads return. There is a gross inconsistency between
the appeal and the move to reconsider the decision.
An appeal from a decision presupposes that a party
has already abandoned any move to reconsider that
decision. And yet, it would appear that the appeal to
the World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a
change of the decision of this Court. Such act has no
aboveboard explanation.
xxx xxx xxx
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never
be protected where infraction of ethics meets with
complacency rather than punishment. The people
should not be given cause to break faith with the belief
that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To
preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield
to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we
prefer to think, is a standard of behavior so desirable
in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of justice.
(31 SCRA at 13-23; emphasis supplied)
3. In In re Almacen, supra, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, in protest against
what he asserted was "a great injustice committed against his client by the
Supreme Court," filed a Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title.
He alleged that his client was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust
judgment," and had become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar
of hypocrisy," saying that "justice as administered by the present members
of the Supreme Court [was) not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." Atty.
Almacen vowed to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum" so
that "the people may know of this silent injustice committed by this Court'
and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed
[may] never be repeated." Atty. Almacen released to the press the contents
of his Petition and on 26 September 1967, the "Manila Times" published
statements attributed to him as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition,
said he did not expose the tribunal's 'unconstitutional
and obnoxious' practice of arbitrarily denying
petitions or appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's 'short-cut justice.' Almacen
deplored, his client was condemned to pay
P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen
said in this petition, 'where our Supreme Court is
composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of
justice, who ignore without reason their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of
the Constitution with impunity.'
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his
title by which he earns his living, the present
members of the Supreme Court 'will become
responsible to all cases brought to its attention without
discrimination, and will purge itself of those
unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit' or
"denied resolutions. (31 SCRA at 565566; emphasis
supplied)
Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause why disciplinary
action should not be taken against him. His explanation, which in part read:
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolized in paintings
that can be found in all courts and government
offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it
is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no
members of this Court has ever heard our cries for
charity, generosity, fairness, understanding,
sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that
inspire of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings
to give us reasons why our appeals has been DENIED,
not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no
human defect or ailment in the above statement. We
only described the impersonal state of Things and
nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and
confidence in the members of this Court and for
which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's
certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been
lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer
was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we
alone may decide as to when we must end our self-
sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing
ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members
of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to
uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the
members of this Court, there is no choice, we must
uphold the latter. (31 SCRA at 572; emphasis
supplied)
was found by the Court to be "undignified and cynical" and rejected. The
Court indefinitely suspended Almacen from the practice of law holding,
through Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, that Almacen had exceeded the
boundaries of "fair criticism."
4. In Paragas V. Cruz, 47 Counsel, whose Petition for Ceriorari ran was
dismissed by this Court, made the following statements in his Motion for
Reconsideration:
The petitioner respectfully prays for a
reconsideration of the resolution of this Honorable
Court dated April 20,1966 on the ground that it
constitutes a violation of Section 14 of Rule 11 2 of
the Rules of Court promulgated by this very Hon.
Supreme Court, and on the further ground that it is
likewise a violation of the most important right in the
Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Philippines, a
culpable violation which is a ground for impeachment.
... The rule of law in a democracy should always be
upheld and protected by all means, because the rule
of law creates and preserves peace and order and
gives satisfaction and contentment to all
concerned. But when the laws and the rules are
violated, the victims resort, sometimes, to armed force
and to the ways of the cavemen We do not want
Verzosa and Reyes repeated again and again, killed in
the premises of the Supreme Court and in those of the
City Hall of Manila. Educated people should keep
their temper under control at all times! But justice
should be done to all concerned to perpetuate the
very life of Democracy on the face of the earth. (14
SCRA at 810; emphasis supplied)
The Court considered the above statements as derogatory to the dignity of
the Court and required counsel to show cause why administrative action
should not be taken against him. Counsel later explained that he had
merely related factual events (i.e., the killing of Verzosa and Reyes) and to
express his desire to avoid repetition of such acts. The Court, through Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, found these explanations unsatisfactory and the above
statements contumacious.
 ... The expressions contained in the motion for
reconsideration ... are plainly contemptuous and
disrespectful, and reference to the recent killing of
two employees is but a covert threat upon the
members of the Court. ... That such threats and
disrespectful language contained in a pleading filed in
courts are constitutive of direct contempt has been
repeatedly decided (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil.
724; People vs. Venturanza, 52 Off. Gaz. 769; Medina
vs. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; De Joya vs. Court of First
Instance of Rizal, 1, 9785, September 19,1956; Sison
vs. Sandejas L- 9270, April 29,1959; Lualhati vs.
Albert, 57 Phil. 86). What makes the present case more
deplorable is that the guilty party is a member of the
bar; for, as remarked in People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil.
6. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 49 Atty. Vicente Francisco filed a Motion before
580-
the Supreme Court which contained the following paragraph (in
translation):
Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges
who try his cases with that courtesy all have a right to
expect. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and
moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily
that high esteem and regard towards the courts so
essential to the proper administration of justice.
It in light and plausible that an attorney in defending
the cause and rights of his client, should do so with all
the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is
not, and never will be so, for him to exercise said right
by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the
propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts
require. (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, [In re Francisco], 61
Phil. 729)' (1 4 SCRA at 811-812; emphasis supplied)
5. In In re Sotto, 48 a newspaper reporter, Mr. Angel Parazo, invoking the
Press Freedom Law, refused to divulge the source of the news item which
carried his by-line and was sent to jail for so refusing. Atty. Vicente Sotto, a
senator and author of said law, caused the publication of the following item
in a number of daily newspapers in Manila:
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act
No. 53), interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case
of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now
When required by the Court to show cause why he should not be declared
has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to
in contempt, Atty. Francisco responded by saying that it was not contempt
divulge the source of a news published in his paper, I
to tell the truth. Examining the statements made above, the Court held:
regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only
erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once
more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow
mindedness of the majority of its members. In the wake
of so many blunders and injustices deliberately
committed during these last years, I believe that the
only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change
the members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I
announce that one of the first measures, which I will
introduce in the coming congressional sessions, will
have as its object the complete reorganization of the
Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, the Supreme
Court of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty
and democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so
that even the deaf may hear: The Supreme Court of
today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of
Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano
Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other
learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the
Philippine Judiciary. (82 Phil. at 597-598; emphasis
supplied)
In finding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his avowals
of good faith and his invocation of the constitutional
guarantee of free speech and in requiring him to
show cause why he should not be disbarred, the
Court, through Mr. Justice Feria, said-
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for
the last years committing deliberately so many
blunders and injustices that is to say, that it has been
deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law
and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not
on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in
many cases decided during the last years, would tend
necessarily to undermine the coincidence of the people
in the honesty and integrity of the members of this
Court, and consequently to lower and degrade the
administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme
Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the
last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair
to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of
their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the
people lose their confidence in the honesty and
integrity of the members of this Court and believe
that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might
be driven to take the law into their hands, and
disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a
member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty.
Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold
the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he
owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such
attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts
guarantees the stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting on a very
shaky foundation. (82 Phil. at 601-602; emphasis
supplied)
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of
record that the resolution of this court, denying our
motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous
and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular
will expressed at the polls in the municipality of
Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means
within our power in order that this error may be
corrected by the very court which has committed it,
because we should not want that some citizen,
particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong,
Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as
he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the
herein petitioner has been the victim, and because it
is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this
honorable court and of each and every member
thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same
time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous
decisions like these, which the affected party and his
thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust,
increase the proselytes of sakdalism and make the
public lose confidence in the administration of
justice. (61 Phil. at 726; emphasis supplied)
... [they] disclose, in the opinion of this court,
an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court
and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the
court is thereby charged with no less than having
proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights of
the parties, and of the untoward consequences, or with
having abused its power and mocked and flouted the
rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client,
because the acts of outraging and mocking from
which the words 'outrage' and mockery' used therein
are derived, means exactly the same as all these,
according to the Dictionary of the Spanish Language
published by the Spanish Academy (Dictionary of the
Spanish Language, 15th ed., pages 132-513).
The insertion of the phrases in question in said
motion of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, for many
years a member of the Philippine bar, was neither
justified nor in the least necessary, because in order
to call the attention of the court in a special way to the
essential points relied upon in his argument and to
emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated
in his said motion were sufficient and the phrases in
question were superfluous. In order to appeal to
reason and justice, it is highly improper and amiss to
make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente
J. Francisco has done, because both means are
annoying and good practice can ever sanction them by
reason of their natural tendency to disturb and hinder
the free exercise of a serene and impartial judgment,
particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of
questions submitted for resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a more or less
veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated
therein, after the author shows the course which the
voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his
attempt, that they will resort to the press for the
purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a
judicial outrage of which his client has been the
victim; and because he states in a threatening manner
with the intention of predisposing the mind of the
 reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere
of prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the
public eye, that decisions of the nature of that
referred to in his motion to promote distrust in the
administration of justice and increase the proselytes
of sakdalism a movement with seditious and
revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is
of public knowledge, occurred in this country a few
days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt
of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the
authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so
devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to
intimidation, it would maintain its error
notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with
good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court,
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty
bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to
defend its integrity, not only because it had conferred
upon him the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm,
Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is: a
priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St., Rep., 492,
669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates
nor promotes distrust in the administration of
justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and
encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the
source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation
upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power
to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection
and relief (61 Phil. at 727-728; emphasis supplied)
It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above discussed exhaust
our case law on this matter. In the following cases, among others, the
Supreme Court punished for contempt or administratively disciplined
lawyers who had made statements not very different from those made in
the cases discussed above:
1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987);
2) Borromeo v. Court of appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978);
3) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441
(1967);
4) Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961);
5) De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Pasay City Branch, 99 Phil. 907 (1956);
6) People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211 (1956);
7) In re Suzano A. Velasquez, per curiam Resolution
(unreported), Promulgated 29 April 1955;
8) Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950);
9) People v. Carillon, 77 Phil. 572 (1946);
10) Intestate Estate of Rosario 0lba; Contempt
Proceedings against Antonio Franco, 67 Phil. 312
(1939); and
11) Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932).
Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the
Court has in the past penalized as contemptuous or as warranting
application of disciplinary sanctions, this Court is compelled to hold that
the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute
contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the
Supreme Court. Respondent's statements, especially the charge that the
Court deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decision in the
Consolidated Petitions, necessarily implying that the justices of this Court
betrayed their oath of office, merely to wreak vengeance upon the
respondent here, constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Court.
Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and,
through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the
country. That respondent's baseless charges have had some impact outside
the internal world of subjective intent, is clearly demonstrated by the filing
of a complaint for impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the then fourteen
(14) incumbent members of this Court, a complaint the centerpiece of
which is a repetition of the appalling claim of respondent that this Court
deliberately rendered a wrong decision as an act of reprisal against the
respondent.
IV
The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely
exercising his constitutional right of free speech. He also invokes the
related doctrines of qualified privileged communications and fair criticism
in the public interest.
Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free
speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What
respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression,
like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of
expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with
the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these
fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and
orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy
between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering
justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself
can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system
of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable
independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the
general community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:
... A free press is not to be preferred to an
independent judiciary, nor an independent judiciary
to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other;
both are indispensable to a free society. The freedom
of the press in itself presupposes an independent
judiciary through which that freedom may, if
necessary be vindicated. And one of the potent means
for assuring judges their independence is a free
press. 50
Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the
following terms:
The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech
and press. This constitutional right must be protected
in its fullest extent. The Court has heretofore given
evidence of its tolerant regard for charges under the
Libel Law which come dangerously close to its
violation. We shall continue in this chosen path. The
liberty of the citizens must be preserved in all of its
completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of the
press and of the citizens should not be confused with
liberty ill its true sense. As important as is the
maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free
exercise of the rights of the citizens is the maintenance
of the independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the
Judiciary cannot be had if persons are privileged to
scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good
purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by
subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of
confidential proceedings to the embarassment of the
parties and the courts. 51 (Emphasis supplied)
Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity
of the Court effectively to prevent and control professional misconduct on
the part of lawyers who are, first and foremost, indispensable participants
in the task of rendering justice to every man. Some courts have held,
persuasively it appears to us, that a lawyer's right of free expression may
have to be more limited than that of a layman. 52
It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and
an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of
fidelity and respect to the Republic and to this Court as the embodiment
and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic.
The responsibility of the respondent "to uphold the dignity and authority
of this Court' and "not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice 53 is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.
Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to criticize
the rulings of this Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have
lapsed into error. Once more, however, the right of criticism is not
unlimited. Its limits were marked out by Mr. Justice Castro in In re Almacen
which are worth noting
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that
it shall be bonafide and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between
fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander
of courts and the judges thereof, on the
other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a
misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.
 The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination
to the courts is essential to the orderly administration
of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients'
rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior
intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

xxx xxx xxx 54

(Emphasis supplied)

The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has
criticized the Court; it is addressed rather to the nature of that criticism or
comment and the manner in which it was carried out.

Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court.

The subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far as
characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He will not,
however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain import of his words
and acts. 55 It is upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out that
respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations and exhibited
no repentance. 56

Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to the

judiciary has been shown, and points to the fact that this Court denied his
Motion for Reconsideration of its per curiam Decision of 27 April 1988 and
reiterated and amplified that Decision in its Resolution of 19 May 1988. In
the first place, proof of actual damage sustained by a court or the judiciary
in general is not essential for a finding of contempt or for the application
of the disciplinary authority of the Court. Insofar as the Consolidated
Petitions are concerned, this Court after careful review of the bases of its
27 April 1988 Decision, denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration
thereof and rejected the public pressures brought to bear upon this Court
by the respondent through his much publicized acts and statements for
which he is here being required to account. Obstructing the free and
undisturbed resolution of a particular case is not the only species of injury
that the Court has a right and a duty to prevent and redress. What is at
stake in cases of this kind is the integrity of the judicial institutions of the
country in general and of the Supreme Court in particular. Damage to such
institutions might not be quantifiable at a given moment in time but
damage there will surely be if acts like those of respondent Gonzalez are
not effectively stopped and countered. The level of trust and confidence of
the general public in the courts, including the court of last resort, is not
easily measured; but few will dispute that a high level of such trust and
confidence is critical for the stability of democratic government.

Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment for contempt is not

the proper remedy in this case and suggests that the members of this Court
have recourse to libel suits against him. While the remedy of libel suits by
individual members of this Court may well be available against respondent
Gonzalez, such is by no means an exclusive remedy. Moreover, where, as in
the instant case, it is not only the individual members of the Court but the
Court itself as an institution that has been falsely attacked, libel suits
cannot be an adequate remedy. 57

The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt

of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court
and member of the Bar.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez

from the practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from this
Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.
[A.C. NO. 5838 - January 17, 2005] personal knowledge as well as to who actually affixed the signature of
SPOUSES BENJAMIN SANTUYO AND EDITHA respondent on the deed.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
SANTUYO, Complainants, v. ATTY. EDWIN A. HIDALGO, Respondent.
Furthermore, complainants did not refute respondent's contention that he
RESOLUTION only met complainant Benjamin Santuyo six years after the alleged
notarization of the deed of sale. Respondent's assertion was corroborated
CORONA, J.: by one Mrs. Lyn Santy in an affidavit executed on November 17,
20019 wherein she stated that complainant Editha Santuyo had to invite
respondent to her house on November 5, 1997 to meet her husband since
In a verified complaint-affidavit dated September 18, 2001,1 spouses
the two had to be introduced to each other. The meeting between
Benjamin Santuyo and Editha Santuyo accused respondent Atty. Edwin A.
complainant Benjamin Santuyo and respondent was arranged after the
Hidalgo of serious misconduct and dishonesty for breach of his lawyer's
latter insisted that Mr. Santuyo personally acknowledge a deed of sale
oath and the notarial law.
concerning another property that the spouses bought.

Complainants stated that sometime in December 1991, they purchased a

In finding respondent negligent in performing his notarial functions, the
parcel of land covered by a deed of sale. The deed of sale was allegedly
IBP reasoned out:
notarized by respondent lawyer and was entered in his notarial register as
Doc. No. 94 on Page No. 19 in Book No. III, Series of 1991. Complainant
spouses averred that about six years after the date of notarization, they xxx xxx xxx. crvll
had a dispute with one Danilo German over the ownership of the land. The
case was estafa through falsification of a public document. Considering that the responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive
respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in the execution
During the trial of the case, German presented in court an affidavit of his duties as such and should not have wholly entrusted everything to
executed by respondent denying the authenticity of his signature on the the secretaries; otherwise he should not have been commissioned as
deed of sale. The spouses allegedly forged his notarial signature on said notary public.
deed.2
For having wholly entrusted the preparation and other mechanics of the
According to complainants, respondent overlooked the fact that the document for notarization to the secretary there can be a possibility that
disputed deed of sale contained all the legal formalities of a duly notarized even the respondent's signature which is the only one left for him to do can
document, including an impression of respondent's notarial dry seal. Not be done by the secretary or anybody for that matter as had been the case
being persons who were learned in the technicalities surrounding a herein.
notarial act, spouses contended that they could not have forged the
signature of herein respondent. They added that they had no access to his As it is respondent had been negligent not only in the supposed
notarial seal and notarial register, and could not have made any imprint of notarization but foremost in having allowed the office secretaries to make
respondent's seal or signature on the subject deed of sale or elsewhere.3 the necessary entries in his notarial registry which was supposed to be
done and kept by him alone; and should not have relied on somebody
In his answer4 to the complaint, respondent denied the allegations against else.10
him. He denied having notarized any deed of sale covering the disputed
property. According to respondent, he once worked as a junior lawyer at WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo is hereby found GUILTY
Carpio General and Jacob Law Office where he was asked to apply for a of negligence in the performance of his duties as notary public and is
notarial commission. While he admitted that he notarized several hereby SUSPENDED from his commission as a notary public for a period of
documents in that office, these, however, did not include the subject deed two years, if he is commissioned, or if he is not, he is disqualified from an
of sale. He explained that, as a matter of office procedure, documents appointment as a notary public for a period of two years from finality of
underwent scrutiny by the senior lawyers and it was only when they gave this resolution, with a warning that a repetition of similar negligent acts
their approval that notarization was done. He claimed that, in some would be dealt with more severely.
occasions, the secretaries in the law firm, by themselves, would affix the
dry seal of the junior associates on documents relating to cases handled by SO ORDERED.
the law firm. Respondent added that he normally required the parties to
exhibit their community tax certificates and made them personally
acknowledge the documents before him as notary public. He would have
remembered complainants had they actually appeared before him. While
he admitted knowing complainant Editha Santuyo, he said he met the
latter's husband and co-complainant only on November 5, 1997, or about
six years from the time that he purportedly notarized the deed of sale.
Moreover, respondent stressed that an examination of his alleged
signature on the deed of sale revealed that it was forged; the strokes were
smooth and mild.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

He suspected that a lady was responsible for forging his signature.

To further refute the accusations against him, respondent stated that, at

the time the subject deed of sale was supposedly notarized, on December
27, 1991, he was on vacation. He surmised that complainants must have
gone to the law office and enticed one of the secretaries, with the
concurrence of the senior lawyers, to notarize the document. He claimed
he was a victim of a criminal scheme motivated by greed.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation. In a report5 it submitted to
the Court, the IBP noted that the alleged forged signature of respondent on
the deed of sale was different from his signatures in other documents he
submitted during the investigation of the present case. 6 However, it ruled
that respondent was also negligent because he allowed the office
secretaries to perform his notarial functions, including the safekeeping of
his notarial dry seal and notarial register.7 It thus recommended:

WHEREFORE[,] in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended

that respondent's commission as notary public be revoked for two (2)
years if he is commissioned as such; or he should not be granted a
commission as notary public for two (2) years upon receipt hereof. 8

After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, complainants did
not categorically state that they appeared before respondent to have the
deed of sale notarized. Their appearance before him could have bolstered
this allegation that respondent signed the document and that it was not a
forgery as he claimed. The records show that complainants themselves
were not sure if respondent, indeed, signed the document; what they were
sure of was the fact that his signature appeared thereon. They had no
[A.C. NO. 5864 : April 15, 2005]
ARTURO L. SICAT, Complainant, v. ATTY. GREGORIO E. ARIOLA,
JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In an affidavit-complaint,1 complainant Arturo L. Sicat, a Board Member of
the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Rizal, charged respondent Atty.
Gregorio E. Ariola, the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, Rizal, with
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility by committing fraud,
deceit and falsehood in his dealings, particularly the notarization of a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed by a one Juanito C.
Benitez. According to complainant, respondent made it appear that Benitez
executed the said document on January 4, 2001 when in fact the latter had
already died on October 25, 2000.
He alleged that prior to the notarization, the Municipality of Cainta had
entered into a contract with J.C. Benitez Architect and Technical
Management, represented by Benitez, for the construction of low-cost
houses. The cost of the architectural and engineering designs amounted
to P11,000,000 and two consultants were engaged to supervise the
project. For the services of the consultants, the Municipality of Cainta
issued a check dated January 10, 2001 in the amount of P3,700,000,
payable to J.C. Benitez Architects and Technical Management and/or Cesar
Goco. The check was received and encashed by the latter by virtue of the
authority of the SPA notarized by respondent Ariola.
Complainant further charged respondent with the crime of falsification
penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code by making it appear
that certain persons participated in an act or proceeding when in fact they
did not.
In his Comment,2 respondent explained that, as early as May 12, 2000,
Benitez had already signed the SPA. He claimed that due to inadvertence,
it was only on January 4, 2001 that he was able to notarize it. Nevertheless,
the SPA notarized by him on January 4, 2001 was not at all necessary
because Benitez had signed a similar SPA in favor of Goco sometime before
his death, on May 12, 2000. Because it was no longer necessary, the SPA
was cancelled the same day he notarized it, hence, legally, there was no
public document that existed. Respondent prayed that the complaint be
dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping since similar charges had been
filed with the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon. According to him, the complaints were later
dismissed based on findings that the assailed act referred to violations of
the implementing rules and regulations of PD 1594,3 PD 1445,4 RA
71605 and other pertinent rules of the Commission on Audit (COA). He
stressed that no criminal and administrative charges were recommended
for filing against him.
In a Resolution dated March 12, 2003,6 the Court referred the complaint to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. On August 26, 2003, the IBP submitted its investigation
report:
In the recent case of Zaballero v. Atty. Mario J. Montalvan,11 where the
respondent notarized certain documents and made it appear that the
deceased father of complainant executed them, the Court declared the
respondent there guilty of violating Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.12 The Court was emphatic that lawyers
commissioned as notaries public should not authenticate documents
unless the persons who signed them are the very same persons who
executed them and personally appeared before them to attest to the
contents and truth of what are stated therein. The Court added that
notaries public must observe utmost fidelity, the basic requirement in the
performance of their duties, otherwise the confidence of the public in the
integrity of notarized deeds and documents will be undermined.
In the case at bar, the records show that Benitez died on October 25, 2000.
However, respondent notarized the SPA, purportedly bearing the
signature of Benitez, on January 4, 2001 or more than two months after the
latter's death. The notarial acknowledgement of respondent declared that
Benitez "appeared before him and acknowledged that the instrument was
his free and voluntary act." Clearly, respondent lied and intentionally
perpetuated an untruthful statement. Notarization is not an empty,
meaningless and routinary act.13 It converts a private document into a
public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity
of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution.14
Neither will respondent's defense that the SPA in question was superfluous
and unnecessary, and prejudiced no one, exonerate him of
accountability. His assertion of falsehood in a public document
contravened one of the most cherished tenets of the legal profession and
potentially cast suspicion on the truthfulness of every notarial act. As the
Municipal Administrator of Cainta, he should have been aware of his great
responsibility not only as a notary public but as a public officer as well. A
public office is a public trust. Respondent should not have caused
disservice to his constituents by consciously performing an act that would
deceive them and the Municipality of Cainta. Without the fraudulent SPA,
the erring parties in the construction project could not have encashed the
check amounting to P3,700,000 and could not have foisted on the public a
spurious contract ― all to the extreme prejudice of the very Municipality
of which he was the Administrator. According to the COA Special Task
Force:
Almost all acts of falsification of public documents as enumerated in Article
171 in relation to Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code were evident in the
transactions of the Municipality of Cainta with J.C. Benitez & Architects
Technical Management for the consultancy services in the conduct of
Detailed Feasibility Study and Detailed Engineering Design of the Proposed
Construction of Cainta Municipal Medium Rise Low Cost Housing, in the
contract amount of P11,000,000. The agent resorted to misrepresentation,
manufacture or fabrication of fictitious document, untruthful narration of
facts, misrepresentation, and counterfeiting or imitating signature for the
purpose of creating a fraudulent contract. All these were tainted with
deceit perpetrated against the government resulting to undue injury. The
first and partial payment, in the amount of P3,700,000.00 was made in the
absence of the required outputs. x x x15
We need not say more except that we are constrained to change the penalty
recommended by the IBP which we find too light.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, Jr., is found guilty of

x x x it is evident that respondent notarized the Special Power of Attorney
gross misconduct and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let
dated 4 January 2001 purportedly executed by Juanito C. Benitez long after
copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and
Mr. Benitez was dead. It is also evident that respondent cannot feign
entered in the records of respondent, and brought to the immediate
innocence and claim that he did not know Mr. Benitez was already dead at
attention of the Ombudsman.
the time because respondent, as member of the Prequalification and
Awards Committee of the Municipality of Cainta, personally knew Mr.
Benitez because the latter appeared before the Committee a number of SO ORDERED.
times. It is evident that the Special Power of Attorney dated 4 January 2001
was part of a scheme of individuals to defraud the Municipality of Cainta of
money which was allegedly due them, and that respondent by notarizing
said Special Power of Attorney helped said parties succeed in their plans. 7

The IBP recommended to the Court that respondent's notarial commission

be revoked and that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of one year.8

After a careful review of the records, we find that respondent never

disputed complainant's accusation that he notarized the SPA purportedly
executed by Benitez on January 4, 2001. He likewise never took issue with
the fact that on said date, Benitez was already dead. His act was a serious
breach of the sacred obligation imposed upon him by the Code of
Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which
prohibited him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. As a lawyer and as an officer of the court, it was his duty to serve
the ends of justice,9 not to corrupt it. Oath-bound, he was expected to act
at all times in accordance with law and ethics, and if he did not, he would
not only injure himself and the public but also bring reproach upon an
honorable profession.10
A.C. No. 10231, August 10, 2016
OSCAR M. BAYSAC, Complainant, v. ATTY. ELOISA M. ACERON-
PAPA, Respondent.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
This refers to the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Board of Governors dated 13 February 2013 adopting and approving with
modification the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar
Discipline which found Atty. Eloisa M. Aceron-Papa (respondent)
administratively liable for notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. As
a consequence, the IBP Board of Governors revoked her commission as
notary public and disqualified her from being commissioned as notary
public for three years with a stern warning to be more circumspect in her
notarial dealings.
The Facts
Complainant Oscar M. Baysac (complainant) owns a property with an area
of 322 sq. m. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
581591 and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Trece Martires City.
The property was mortgaged by complainant to Spouses Emmanuel and
Rizalina Cruz (Spouses Cruz) on December 20, 2000. 2 The Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage3 was notarized by Atty. Renelie B. Mayuga-Donato on
December 20, 2000.
In February 2003, complainant went to the Registry of Deeds of Trece
Martires City to get a certified true copy of the certificate of title of the
property because the property had a prospective buyer. However,
complainant was surprised to find out that TCT No. T-58159 had already
been cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-670894 was issued in favor
of Spouses Cruz.5chanrobleslaw
After further investigation, complainant found out that the property was
transferred in the name of Spouses Cruz pursuant to a Deed of Absolute
Sale6 which was allegedly executed on January 13, 2003 for the
consideration of P100,000.00.7chanrobleslaw
The Deed of Absolute Sale which was allegedly signed by complainant, as
the owner of the property, was notarized by respondent on January 13,
2003.8 Complainant, however, vehemently denied having ever signed the
Deed of Absolute Sale and having ever appeared before a notary public on
January 13, 2003 to acknowledge the same. He claimed that he was in
Tanza, Cavite that entire day with Ms. Flocerfida A. Angeles (Ms. Angeles)
searching for a buyer of the property.9 Complainant further stated that the
Deed of Absolute Sale showed that what he allegedly presented to the
notary public when he acknowledged having executed the document was
his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) issued on May 26, 2000 or three years
prior to the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale. The same CTC was used
for the notarization of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage on December 20,
2000.10chanrobleslaw
To support this allegation, complainant submitted the affidavit 11 of Ms.
Angeles and Questioned Documents Report No. 515-70312 dated October
8, 2003 issued by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
In her affidavit, Ms. Angeles declared that she was with complainant in
Tanza, Cavite from 7:00 in the morning until 10:30 in the evening on
January 13, 2003. She further declared that complainant did not execute
the Deed of Absolute Sale and did not personally appear before a notary
public in Cavite City on January 13, 2003.13chanrobleslaw
In the Questioned Documents Report No. 515-703, the NBI confirmed that
the signature of complainant in the Deed of Absolute Sale and the
signatures in other sample documents which he actually signed were not
made by one and the same person.14chanrobleslaw
More, a few months after the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, and
subsequent to the transfer of the title to Spouses Cruz, Atty. Estrella O.
Laysa (Atty. Laysa) as counsel for Spouses Cruz, allegedly sent a letter to
complainant. The letter demanded him to vacate the property subject of
the alleged sale. According to complainant, Atty. Laysa is respondent's
partner in Laysa Aceron-Papa Sayarot Law Office. Thus, complainant
claimed that respondent's act of improperly notarizing the Deed of
Absolute Sale caused him injustice because he was ousted from his
property.15chanrobleslaw
In view of these circumstances, complainant filed a Complaint; for
Disbarment16 dated April 14, 2009 with the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline for violation of Section 1, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice.
Records show that respondent did not file any answer to the complaint.
The Order17 dated April 23, 2009 directing respondent to answer was
returned to the Commission on Bar Discipline with a notation "Moved Out,
Left No Address."18 During the mandatory conference on August 27, 2009,
only the counsel for complainant was present.19 Nevertheless, the
Commission on Bar Discipline, in its Order 20 dated August 27, 2009,
terminated the mandatory conference and directed the parties to submit
their verified position papers so as not to delay the early disposition of the
case. Despite the Order dated August 27, 2009 being received by
respondent as evidenced by the Registry Return Receipt 21 signed by a
certain Zyra N. Ningas, it was only complainant who filed a position
paper.22chanrobleslaw
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
Based on the documents submitted, Investigating Commissioner Atty.
Salvador B. Hababag (Atty. Hababag) of the IBP Commission on; Bar
Discipline (to whom the case was referred for investigation, report and
recommendation) submitted his Report and Recommendation23 dated
November 25, 2009. He found respondent administratively liable for
notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. Atty. Hababag also stated;
that respondent was notified of the Order dated August 27, 2009 requiring
the parties to submit their position papers.24 The order was sent to her new
address on September 14, 2009, as evidenced by the Registry Return
Receipt signed by Zyra N. Ningas. Despite due notice, respondent failed to
submit her position paper, and is therefore deemed to have waived her
right to present her position to the case. 25cralawred Atty. Hababag
recommended that respondent be suspended for two years as notary
public.26chanrobleslaw
On February 13, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No.
XX-2013-13627 which adopted the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner but modified the recommended penalty. Instead of
suspension for two years as notary public, the IBP Board of Governors
recommended the disqualification of respondent from being
commissioned as notary public for three years with a stern warning to be
more circumspect in her notarial dealings and that repetition of the same
or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
The Court's Ruling
We affirm the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors finding respondent
administratively liable, but we modify the penalty imposed.
We note that the complainant and the IBP Board of Governors cited Section
1, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice 28 as basis for the
complained acts of respondent. However, we find Section 1 of Public Act
No. 2103,29 otherwise known as the Notarial Law, to be the applicable law
at the time the complained acts took place. Nonetheless, as will be seen
below, both laws provide for a similar provision on acknowledgment.
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxx
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an
officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary
public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the
person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him
and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged
that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made
under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his
certificate shall so state. (Emphasis added.)
Section 1, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice emphasizes the
requirement of affiant's personal appearance in an
acknowledgment:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 1. Acknowledgment. - "Acknowledgment" refers to an act in which
an individual on a single occasion:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an
integrally complete instrument or document;
(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through competent evidence
of identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the
instrument or document was voluntarily affixed by him for the
purposes stated in the instrument or document, declares that he
has executed the instrument or document as his free and
voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular
representative capacity, that he has the authority to sign in that
capacity. (Emphasis added.)
In fact, the Acknowledgment in the Deed of Absolute Sale explicitly
states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the City of Cavite, this day of 13 JAN
[2003] in Cavite City, personally appeared OSCAR M. BAYSAC x x x who
made known to me to be the same person who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that the same is his own free
act and voluntary deed. x x x30 (Emphasis added.)
Based on the foregoing, the party acknowledging the document must his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no
appear before the notary public or any other person authorized to take falsehood or consent to the doing of any. The Code of Professional
acknowledgments of instruments or documents.31 In Agbulos v. Viray,32 we Responsibility also commands him not to engage in unlawful, dishonest,
held:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary immoral or deceitful conduct and to uphold at all times the integrity and
To be sure, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the dignity of the legal profession.46chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
person who signed the same is the very same person who executed and
Since such responsibility is incumbent upon her, she must now accept the
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of
commensurate consequences of her professional indiscretion. Her act of
what are stated therein. Without the appearance of the person who
certifying under oath an irregular Deed of Absolute Sale without
actually executed the document in question, the notary public would be
ascertaining the identities of the persons executing the same constitutes
unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging
gross negligence in the performance of duty as a notary
party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act or
public.47chanrobleslaw
deed.33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In this case, however, it would have been physically impossible for More, as a lawyer, respondent breached Canon 148 of the Code of
complainant to appear before respondent and sign the Deed of Absolute Professional Responsibility, particularly Canon 1.01.49 By notarizing the
Sale on January 13, 2003. On that same day, complainant was with Ms. Deed of Absolute Sale, she engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
Angeles in Tanza, Cavite the whole day. Ms. Angeles, in her affidavit, deceitful conduct.50chanrobleslaw
confirmed this fact. Further, the NBI's findings in its Questioned
Documents Report show that the signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale We modify, however, the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of
was not signed by complainant. These allegations remain unrebutted Governors in order to be in full accord with existing jurisprudence. Based
despite the opportunity given to complainant to do so. on existing jurisprudence, when a lawyer commissioned as a notary public
fails to discharge his duties as such, he is given the following penalties: (1)
Therefore, the affidavit of Ms. Angeles, and the findings of the NBI prove revocation of his notarial commission; (2) disqualification from being
that respondent violated the Notarial Law when she notarized the Deed of commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years; and (3)
Absolute Sale without the personal appearance of complainant. It was suspension from the practice of law for one year.51chanrobleslaw
respondent's duty as notary public to require the personal appearance of
the person executing the document to enable the former to verify the WHEREFORE, this Court hereby finds Atty. Eloisa M. Aceron-
genuineness of his signature.34 Doing away with the essential requirement Papa GUILTY of violating the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional
of physical presence of the affiant does not take into account the likelihood Responsibility. Accordingly, this Court REVOKES her incumbent
that the documents may be spurious or that the affiants may not be who commission, if any PROHIBITS her from being commissioned as a notary
they purport to be.35chanrobleslaw public for two (2) years; and SUSPENDS her from the practice of law for
one (1) year, effective immediately. She is further WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
This Court has consistently held the following principle in a number of
cases:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, to be appended to the respondent's personal record as attorney. Likewise,
it is invested with substantial public interest, such that only those who are copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization of a private courts in the country for their information and guidance.
document converts the document into a public one making it admissible in
court without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by SO ORDERED.
law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and, for this reason,
notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in
the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in
the integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Failing to comply with the Notarial Law, respondent was even very lenient
and negligent in accepting the outdated CTC of complainant as competent
evidence of identity. Although the Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized on
January 13, 2003, respondent allowed the presentation of a CTC issued on
May 26, 2000. Respondent should have been diligent enough to make sure
that the person appearing before her is the same person acknowledging
the document to be notarized. Respondent should have checked the
authenticity of the evidence of identity presented to her. Further, she
should not have relied on the CTC in view of the ease with which CTCs are
obtained these days.37 It should likewise be pointed out that the CTC is not
included in the list of competent evidence of identity that notaries public
should use in ascertaining the identity of persons appearing before them
to have their documents notarized.38chanrobleslaw

We have emphasized that among the functions of a notary public is to

guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements. 39 By affixing her
notarial seal on the instrument, she converted the Deed of Absolute Sale,
from a private document into a public document. As a consequence,
respondent, in effect, proclaimed to the world that: (1) all the parties
therein personally appeared before her; (2) they are all personally known
to her; (3) they were the same persons who executed the instrument; (4)
she inquired into the voluntariness of execution of the instrument; and (5)
they acknowledged personally before her that they voluntarily and freely
executed the same.40chanrobleslaw

By notarizing a spurious document, respondent has made a mockery of the

legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment.41 Respondent's failure
to perform her duty as a notary public resulted not only in the damage to
those directly affected by the notarized document, but also in undermining
the integrity of a notary public, and in degrading the function of
notarization.42 Precisely because of respondent's act, complainant was
unlawfully deprived of his property.

Respondent is reminded that as a lawyer commissioned as notary public,

she is required to uphold her sacred duties appertaining to her office, such
duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public
interest.43 In Ang v. Gupana,44 this Court held:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to
subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being
dictated by public policy impressed with public interest. Faithful
observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an
acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is
incumbent upon respondent and failing therein, he must now accept the
commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. As the Court
has held in Flores v. Chua,45chanrobleslaw

Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon

January 8, 2018
A.C. No. 10689
ROMEO A. ALMARIO, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. DOMINICA LLERA-AGNO, Respondent
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint1 filed by complainant
Romeo A. Almario (complainant) before the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking to disbar Atty.
Dominica L. Agno (respondent lawyer), for notarizing a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) without the personal appearance of one of the affiants
therein.
Factual Background
On July 5, 2006, a Complaint for Judicial Partition with Delivery of
Certificate of Title, docketed as Civil Case No. 061154162 (civil case), was
instituted before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila by the herein
complainant against therein defendants Angelita A. Barrameda and several
other persons. It was therein alleged that complainant is the sole surviving
registered owner of a parcel of land situated at No. 973 Del Pan Street, San
Antonio, Tondo, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
244909, and that the defendants therein are co-owners of that parcel of
land by virtue of intestate succession.
Relative to the said civil case, herein respondent lawyer, as counsel for
therein defendants, notarized and acknowledged a SPA3 which reads:
SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
WE, x x x the HEIRS OF THE LATE VICTORIA ALMARIO, to wit: RONALD A.
GA TD ULA, of legal age, Filipino, married, and a resident of 973 Del Pan St.,
Tondo, Manila and FRANCISCA A. MALLARI, of the same address, do
hereby appoint, name and constitute also MA. LOURDES ALMARIO P.
PEDIA, above named, to do the following acts and things:
1. To act as our representative and agent in administering our property x
x x located at District of Tondo, City of Manila consisting of SEVENTY
EIGHT SQUARE METERS AND SIXTY FIVE DECIMETERS (78.65) Square
meters, covered by TCT No. T-244909 of the [Register] of Deeds of the City
of Manila;
xxxx
HEREBY GIVING AND GRANTING unto our said attorney-in-fact full power
and authority, whatsoever requisite to be done in or about the premises,
as fully as we might or could lawfully do if personally present and hereby
ratifying and confirming all that our said attorney shall do or cause to be
done by virtue of these presents until revoked in writing by me.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have signed this instrument on the 26th day of
July 2006 at Muntinlupa City.
xxxx
HEIRS OF THE LATE VICTORIA A. ALMARIO:
(Signed)
RONALD A. GATDULA
(Signed)
FRANCISCA A. MALLARI
xxxx
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES) SS.
CITY OF MUNTINLUPA )
BEFORE ME, a notary public for the City of Muntinlupa, personally
appeared the following persons on the 26[th] day of July 2006:
xxxx
Ronald A. Gatdula with CTC No. 16785315 issued at Manila on 1-19-
06 Francisca Mallari with CTC No. 16785314 issued at Manila on 1-19-
06 known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed
the foregoing Special Power of Attorney, consisting of three (3) pages
including this page where the acknowledgement is written, signed by the
parties and their instrumental witnesses and they acknowledged to me
that the same is their own true act and deed.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL.
(Signed)
DOMINICA L. AGNO
Notary Public
Until 31 Dec 2006
PTR No. 0007769
Muntinlupa City
06 January 2006
IBP Life Roll 00577
Doc. No. 193
Page No. 55
Book No. 11
Series of 2006
It is complainant's contention: (l) that the said SP A was falsified because
one of the affiants therein, Francisca A. Mallari (Mallari), 4 could not
possibly have executed the same because she was in Japan at the time the
SP A was executed, as certified to5 by the Bureau of Immigration (BI); (2)
that this SP A was used in the said civil case to perpetrate fraud and
deception against complainant resulting in the filing of Criminal Case No.
452612-CR, for violation of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (Use of
Falsified Document) against Ma. Lourdes Almario Pedia, (Pedia), the
attorney-in-fact mentioned in the SPA; (3) that respondent lawyer
notarized the SP A although Mallari did not personally appear before her;
(4) that in the process of notarizing the SP A, respondent lawyer also
accepted a Community Tax Certificate (CTC), which is no longer considered
a competent evidence of identity pursuant to the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice; and (5) that, therefore, respondent lawyer violated Canons 1 and
10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which state -
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance
of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage
any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause.
xxxx
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 -A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
In her Answer,6 respondent lawyer prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint and offered the following arguments:
1) On July 12, 2006, Pedia sent the SPA to Mallari in Japan and it
was brought back to the Philippines on July 25, 2006 by Mallari's
son, Roman Mallari-Vestido;
2) The SPA was notarized on July 26, 2006 for reasons of
expediency, because therein defendants were pressed for time
in filing their Answer in the civil case, and that in any event,
Mallari undertook to have the SPA acknowledged before the
Philippine Consulate in Tokyo, Japan on August 28, 2006,
(thereby giving it retroactive effect). Respondent lawyer
claimed that the aforementioned circumstances showed that
she acted in good faith in notarizing the SPA;
3) Mallari was able to acknowledge the SP A with red
ribbon7 before the Philippine Consulate in Tokyo, Japan on
August 28, 2006;
4) Neither fraud nor deception was perpetrated as the parties in
the said civil case executed a Compromise Agreement,8 which
was approved by the RTC;9
 5) Contrary to complainant's claim, CTCs are still presently
accepted as proof of personal identification in cases where no
other proof of personal identification is available; and,
6) That, if at all, it was complainant himself who defrauded the
RTC when he stated in his verified complaint that Mallari is a
resident of No. 973 Del Pan St., San Antonio, Tondo, Manila, even
though he knew that Mallari was in Japan at the time of filing of
the civil case.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
In a Report and Recommendation,10 the Investigating Commissioner found
respondent lawyer liable for violation of Section 12 of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice and recommended that she be suspended for six months
as notary public.
According to the Investigating Commissioner, it was evident that
respondent lawyer notarized the SPA despite knowing that Mallari, one of
the affiants therein, did not personally appear before her.
Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
On April 16, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a
Resolution11 adopting the finding and approving the recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondent lawyer filed a verified Motion for Reconsideration, 12 which
was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in a Resolution13 dated May 3,
2014.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review.
Respondent lawyer admits the infraction imputed against her, and simply
pleads that the penalty recommended by the IBP be reduced or lowered.
She argues that: (1) this is her first offense since she was first
commissioned as a notary public in 1973; (2) the case involved only one
document; (3) the notarization was done in good faith; (4) the civil case
wherein the questioned SP A was used ended in a Compromise Agreement;
and finally (5) she is already 71 years old and is truly sorry for what she
had done, and promises to be more circumspect in the performance of her
duties as a notary public.14
In his Comment15 to the Petition, complainant insists that respondent
lawyer must be disciplined accordingly and that suspension is the
appropriate penalty for such infraction.
The sole issue that this Court must thus address is the appropriate penalty
to be meted out against respondent lawyer.
Our Ruling
The importance of the affiant's personal appearance when a document is
notarized is underscored by Section 1, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice which states:
SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - 'Acknowledgment' refers to an act in which
an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an integrally
complete instrument or document;
(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by
the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by
these Rules; and
(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or
document was voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the
instrument or document, declares that he has executed the instrument or
document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a
particular representative capacity, that he has the authority to sign in that
capacity. (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, Section 2(b), Rule 1V of the same Rules provides that:
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as
signatory to the instrument or document –
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the
notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise
identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules. (Emphasis supplied)
These provisions mandate the notary public to require the physical or
personal presence of the person/s who executed a document, before
notarizing the same. In other words, a document should not be notarized
unless the person/s who is/are executing it is/are personally or physically
present before the notary public. The personal and physical presence of
the parties to the deed is necessary to enable the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature/s of the affiant/s therein and the due
execution of the document.
Notaries public are absolutely prohibited or forbidden from notarizing a
fictitious or spurious document.1âwphi1 They are the law's vanguards and
sentinels against illegal deeds. The confidence of the public in the integrity
of notarial acts would be undermined and impaired if notaries public do
not observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance
of their duties spelled out in the notarial law.
This Court, in Ferguson v. Atty. Ramos, 16 held that "notarization is not an
empty, meaningless and routinary act[;i]t is imbued with public interest x
xx."
In cognate or similar cases,17 this Court likewise held that a notary public
must not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the
very same persons who executed the same, and personally appeared
before him to attest to the truth of the contents thereof. The purpose of this
requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the
signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document
is the party's free and voluntary act and deed.
In the present case, the SPA in question was notarized by respondent
lawyer despite the absence of Mallari, one of the affiants therein. Mallari
could not have personally appeared before respondent lawyer in
Muntinlupa City, Philippines where the SPA was notarized on July 26, 2006
because Mallari was in Japan at that time, as certified to by the Bureau of
Immigration.
It goes without saying that it was respondent lawyer's bounden duty, as a
lawyer and notary public, to obey the laws of the land and to promote
respect for legal processes. Respondent lawyer may only forsake this duty
at the risk of forfeiting her membership in the Philippine Bar and the
revocation of her license as a notary public. Considering however, the
circumstances attendant upon this case, we resolve to reduce or lower the
recommended penalty on respondent lawyer.
The Court opts to suspend respondent lawyer as a notary public for two
months, instead of six months as the IBP had recommended. We are
impelled by the following reasons for taking this course of action: first, the
apparent absence of bad faith in her notarizing the SP A in question;
second, the civil case wherein the flawed SP A was used ended up in a
judicial Compromise Agreement; and finally, this is her first administrative
case since she was commissioned as a Notary Public in 1973. In addition,
respondent lawyer invites our attention to the fact that she is already in
the twilight years of her life.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Dominica L. Agno is
hereby SUSPENDED as Notary Public for the aforesaid infraction for two
months and WARNED that the commission of a similar infraction will be
dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to
be appended to Atty. Agno's personal record. Further, let copies of this
Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office
of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts
in the country for their info1mation and guidance.
SO ORDERED.