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Jonathan Lear notes, in an offhand way, that 'the preponderant use which
Aristotle makes of the word katharsis is as a term for menstrual discharge.
As far as I know, no one in the extended debate about tragic katharsis has
suggested the model of menstruation. But why not? Is it not more com-
pelling to think of a natural process of discharge of the emotions than of
their purging?'2
But he leaves this question unanswered. Elizabeth Belfiore believes
this to suggest a lack of seriousness: 'Lear ... asks why no one has
suggested the model of menstruation for tragic katharsis. This idea
deserves more serious consideration than Lear gives it'.3 This idea will
be given serious consideration in this paper: a model of tragic catharsis
based on Aristotle's biological uses of the term will be proposed. First, I
will examine the use of the word katharsis in the de Generatione Animalium
and the Historia Animalium, to determine the meaning and connotations
of the word in a biological context. I will argue that Aristotle considers
catharsis to be a natural and normal biological process in women,
analogous to ejaculation in men. Second, I will consider Aristotle's use
of the term katharsis in Politics VIII 7.1 will argue that in this context, it
refers to a build-up and release of emotion, specifically the emotion
1 I would like to thank Andrew Ford for his kind reception of and useful comments
on early drafts of this paper, as well as Roger Shiner and Janet Sisson for their many
helpful suggestions on later drafts
2 J. Lear, 'Katharsis', in A. Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle's Poetics (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press 1992), 315
3 E Belfiore, Tragic Pleasures (Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press 1992), 292, n. 4
In his biological works, Aristotle uses the word katharsis fifty-one times
to refer to menstrual discharge — a word which occurs only twice in the
Poetics and five times in the Politics.4 In the face of these statistics, it seems
worthwhile to investigate the context of these fifty-one occurrences. First
and most strikingly, Aristotle views menstrual fluid as being the same
as semen, only not as pure. 'For the discharge of the menstrual fluids
(την καταμηνίων κάθαρσιν) is in females an emission of semen (σπέρματος
έξοδος), they being unconcocted semen (σπέρμα άπέπτον)'.5
What Aristotle means here by 'unconcocted semen' is best explained
by a definition of semen and how it is produced. Semen is left-over
nutritional residue, 'formed last' by the body.6 But it is a residue from
'useful nourishment', as opposed to a residue from 'useless nourish-
ment', which is associated with bad health (GA 725a8-10). In other crea-
4 There are fifty-one such occurrences in the de Generations Ammalium and Histona
Ammalium, according to a Thesaurus Linguae Graecae search.
5 GA 774al-3. Other statements of the same fact: GA 728a26-9, 737a28. Translations
from the de Generatione Ammalium are by A. Platt in J. Barnes, ed., The Complete Works
of Aristotle Vol. I (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1984). Translations from
the Histona Animalium are by d'A. Thompson in the same volume.
6 G/1725all-12
7 GA728bl8-20
8 Gv4728bl5-17
9 GA 717b23ff., cf. GA 718a7ff.
10 G/1728bl4-15
11 GA 738allff.; cf. GA 766b23-5
12 GA 737a27-9: "The female is as it were a deformed male, and the katamenia is impure
semen'. Cf. GA 72817aff.: 'it is through a certain incapacity that the female is female,
being incapable of concocting the nutriment in its last stage into semen (and this is
either blood or that which is analogous to it in animals which are bloodless) owing
to the coldness of her nature'.
underlying his explanation of why the semen of the human male is more
copious than that of any other animal (GA 728bl5-20); the human male
suffers from a lack of bodily outlets for the excess residue. Surely the
point is that the excess must come out from the male body somewhere.
Male ejaculation is necessary for a healthy adult male, as implied by a
comparison with those groups of males from which semen is absent:
children, the old, and the sick.13 The amount of semen emitted may vary
from individual to individual,14 but it is important for there to be some-
thing emitted.
The same point is made for the human female's menstrual discharge
as is made for the human male's semen: it is the most copious of any
animal, relative to size; and the human female lacks the feathers, fur, etc.,
which serve as outlets for the excess nutriment in other animals.15
Menstrual fluid, while being less pure than semen, is nevertheless basi-
cally the same thing: excess nutritional matter which must find its way
out of the human body. Riddance of this excess is simply a natural
function, not a quasi-medical 'treatment'. Aristotle refers to menstrua-
tion as a 'natural discharge', in explicit contrast to 'morbid ones': the
menstrual discharge 'has to be classed as a discharge of the blood, though
it is a natural (φύσικην) discharge, and the rest are morbid ones (δια
νόσον)'.16 Furthermore, Aristotle has a special term for diseased
katamenia: This blood if it has become diseased is known as flux
(ρους)'. 17 The clear indication is that normal katamenia is not dis-
eased. If its primary definition were as a disease-causing residue,
then surely Aristotle would not say that the same substance is
mother's milk (GA 777al3; HA 584a8, 587b30). While the katamenia
13 GA725bl9-20
14 GA 725b29ff. Aristotle states here that 'some individuals have much semen, some
little, some none at all; and this is not due to any bodily weakness'. The example of
those who emit no semen, however, runs counter to his general argument, and he
nowhere gives an illustration of such a case.
15 HA582b30ff.
16 GA 728a24-5. It should be noted that this affirmation of menstruation as a natural
process occurs immediately after the passage attributing diarrhea to lack of concoc-
tion, which Belfiore adduces as evidence (302) that 'lack of concoction causes
disease'
17 HA521a26ff.
For any affection that occurs strongly in some souls occurs to a lesser
or greater degree in all, such as pity, fear, or again religious ecstasy
(enthousiasmos). There are some people who are particularly susceptible
to this latter form of excitement and we see them, once they have
availed themselves of the melodies that thoroughly excite the soul, put
back on their feet again as a result of the sacred melodies just as if they
had obtained medical treatment and katharsis. People prone to pity or
fear or those who are generally emotional necessarily undergo the same
experience, as do others to the extent that they share in each of these
emotions, and for all there arises a certain katharsis and relief accompa-
nied by pleasure.™
δ γαρ περί ένίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχάς ισχυρώς, τοΰτο εν πάσαις υπάρχει,
τω δε ήττον διαφέρει και τω μάλλον, οίον έλεος καΐ φόβος, έτι δ" ενθουσι-
ασμός· και γαρ υπό ταύτης της κινήσεως κατοκώχιμοί τινές είσιν, εκ των
δ' Ιερών μελών όρώμεν τούτους, όταν χρήσωνται τοις έξοργιάζουσι την
ψυχήν μέλεσι, καθιστάμενους ώσπερ ιατρείας τυχόντος καϊ καθάρσεως-
ταϋτό δη τοΰτο άναγκαΐον πάσχειν και τους ελεήμονας και τους φοβητικ-
οϋς και τους όλως παθητικούς, τους δ' άλλους καθ' όσον επιβάλλει των
τοιούτων έκάστω, και πάσι γίγνεσθαι τίνα κάθαρσιν και κουφίζεσθαι μεθ'
ηδονής.
IIA Bernays
Jakob Bemays was the first scholar to bring out the relevance of Politics
VIII7 for understanding catharsis in the Poetics. His primary aim was to
propose a non-moral interpretation, to counter the prevailing view at the
time, which regarded catharsis as a moral education for the audience of
a tragedy. He has, however, come to be regarded as the father of the
medical interpretation of emotional catharsis. Bernays actually consid-
19 τί δε λέγομεν την κάθαρσιν, νυν μεν απλώς, πάλιν δ' εν περί ποιητικής έροϋμεν
σαφέστερον. (The 'treatise on poetry' is not usually identified with the Poetics as we
have it.)
has artificially divided this process in two: there is one process which
'maddens' the subject; and a second process, identical to the first, to
'cure' the now-maddened subject. Bemays then applied this interpreta-
tion to the Poetics, believing the object of catharsis in both this and in
Politics VIII 7 to be 'the unbalanced man,' whether he is one of 'those in
ecstasy' or 'the pitiful and the fearful'.24
// B Lucas
D.W. Lucas pushes the medical analogy of Bemays a little further. He
utilizes the theory of the four humors, suggesting that a melancholic
person suffering from an excess of black bile could find relief through
an ecstatic ritual, or through witnessing a performance of a tragedy.25
Lucas regards this 'treatment' as homeopathic, though acknowledging
that for Aristotle 'medicines work naturally by means of opposites (EN
1104bl8)'.26 He acknowledges the weakness of applying this theory to
everyone, not just the unbalanced (though charging this weakness to
Aristotle himself).27 Lucas bases this homeopathic treatment largely on
two literary examples which refer to Corybantic ritual.28 He also adduces
a third item of evidence, from the reported Pythagorean use of music for
therapeutic purposes. He claims that 'the peculiarity of this kind of
treatment was that, instead of correcting excitement by calming it, a
further stimulus in the same direction was given; like was cured by
like'.29 He cites no passage to support this claim; moreover, there are in
24 Ibid., 160
25 See D.W. Lucas, Appendix Π: 'Pity, Fear, and Katharsis', in Aristotle: Poetics (Oxford:
Clarendon Press 1968). On the four humors, see pp. 284 ff.
26 Ibid., 283
27 'An obvious weakness of the theory in the form in which Aristotle proposed it is
that it applies to all men and presumably women a treatment which is appropriate
only to the unstable' (ibid.).
28 Namely, Wasps (120), the attempt by Philocleon's son to cure his father of a passion
for jury service by initiating him into the Corybantic rites; and the passage from
Plato's Laws (790D), where nurses calm restless infants, 'using the same principle
as those who are concerned with the healing performed by the Corybantes' (ibid.,
282-3).
29 Ibid.
// C 'Corybantiasm'
The Corybantic rites are important because some scholars suppose that
Politics VIII 7 refers to the ritualistic cure of a disease known as 'Cory-
bantiasm'. This is a more specific and elaborate version of Bemays' and
Lucas' theories of catharsis as a medical cure. Again, one has to imagine
that a few participants of ecstatic ritual get 'stuck' at a pitch of frenzy
and can't come down, but now there is a name for this condition. '[W]ith
the single exception of sufferers from the malady known as κορυβαντι-
ασμός, Corybantian or Bacchic frenzy, who are really insane with fanati-
cal excitement, Aristotle is not thinking of the cases where excess of
emotion has actually reached the pitch of madness, but only of emotional
subjects with a strong tendency to ecstasy, fear, pity, etc.'31 The subjects
whose emotions are in question are thought of as 'convalescents who in
time attain to perfect mental health'.32 Susemihl and Hicks go on to say
that 'the cure of morbid insanity is only of importance to him [sc.
30 lamblichus XXV 112 and 113, in which angered youths are calmed by either spon-
daic song or Homeric verses.
31 F. Susemihl and R.D. Hicks, Aristotle's Politics (London and New York: MacMillan
1884), 641
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., 641-2
34 I.M. Lirvforth, "The Corybantic Rites in Plato', University of California Publications in
Classical Philology 13 (1946) 148-9
35 He suggests this as the reason why the Corybantic rites were maintained in Athens·
'they supplied a means of alleviating emotional disturbances'. Ibid., 158.
36 Ibid.
37 The hypothetical outline of the Corybantic ritual is found in Linforth, ibid., 156. It
is based partly on the 'chairing' reference of Euthydemus 227DE
38 Ibid., 159
39 Ibid.
// D Belfiore
Elizabeth Belfiore has breathed new life into the overtly medical inter-
pretations of tragic catharsis. Calling the homeopathic medical theory of
catharsis One of the unexamined prejudices of modem scholarship',40
she has advanced an allopathic model instead. Her description of the
emotional catharsis experienced in regard to tragedy is a medical, allo-
pathic one, though incorporating some of the biological aspects of ca-
tharsis: 'In emotional katharsis, a hot emotional extreme of shamelessness
is treated by the application of a cold "drug", tragic pity or fear, which
is too excessive to be "concocted", or made part of the soul. Instead, it
masters its opposite, shamelessness. It then passes out, carrying with it
the obstructions to a healthy, natural emotional state: preexisting, exces-
sive, hot shamelessness, and its own extreme of cold fear and pity'.41 This
model of catharsis is still medical, however, with all the problems of the
traditional medical model. 'Preexisting' shamelessness violates the self-
contained nature of the rite described in Politics VIII7, which is the basis
for the medical model in the first place. Belfiore's model also makes
'shamelessness' akin to a disease or pathological condition; hence, it will
apply only to a minority of the audience, not to all. Furthermore, if we
try to apply an allopathic model to the Politics passage, where enthousi-
asmos is roused and 'cured' by one type of melody alone, we can
definitely see that allopathy does not work; for the Politics, the 'cure' is
either homeopathy or nothing. And as Belfiore herself proves, Aristotle
does not espouse a homeopathic model of medical cure.
We may furthermore note how insidious the effect of the medical theory
has been, even upon scholars who do not espouse it for tragic catharsis.
As we have noted above (p. 40), the Poetics account must be interpreted
in light of the Politics. Some scholars, however, have accepted the medi-
cal theory to explain the ecstatic catharsis of the Politics, while offering a
quite different explanation of the tragic catharsis of the Poetics. Games
Lord, for example, while rejecting the idea of 'Corybantiasm', still avers
41 Ibid., 343
that 'the catharsis effected by the sacred tunes is very precisely the
healing of a disease or a pathological disorder'.42 His further insistence
on homeopathy forces Lord to propose different catharseis: one for
'normal' pity and fear, another for 'pathological' pity and fear.'13 Stephen
Halliwell, writing on Politics VIII 7, finds that '[i]n the extreme case of
orgiastic katharsis, the experience is one only for those who suffer from
severe emotional disequilibrium: for these, the homeopathic relief from
oppressive emotions by the frenzied expenditure of them fulfils the
function of medical treatment'.4'1 Leon Golden also accepts that the
melodies 'employed in medical katharsis are intensely emotional and
directed at relieving the malaise of people who are in throes of uncon-
trollable feelings or religious ecstasy',45 though he has quite a different
view of tragic catharsis.
The medical model affects the mere translation of the Politics passage,
as in Gulden's paraphrase: 'He [sc. Aristotle] gives the example of those
who are violently aroused by religious music and then cured, as it were,
when they listen to other orgiastic melodies'.46 There is no reason to
suppose that the same tunes are played twice, nor that the ιερών μελών
are different from the μέλεσι which arouse the soul (έξοργιάζουσι την
ψυχή ν). Indeed, the 'sacred runes' are often taken to be identical with 'the
tunes of Olympus',47 mentioned elsewhere in the Politics,46 the effect of
which is exactly that of arousing the soul. Similarly, κατοκώχιμοι is
usually translated as 'susceptible of being possessed by such emotions'/9
i.e., the sick or unbalanced; but the κατοκώχιμοι are possessed;50 they are
participants in ecstatic ritual driven by the sacred tunes which έξορ-
γιάζουσι την ψυχήν. If people feel emotions more or less intensely, if they
are ελεήμονες and φοβητικοί in varying degrees, this has nothing to do
with varying states of mental health; some variety is natural (as we saw
in the biological model), and Aristotle says nothing in this passage to
imply otherwise.
// F ώσπερ ιατρείας
This mention of iatreia in the Politics passage is not enough to justify a
medical explanation of ecstatic (or tragic) catharsis. Rather, the medical
nuance explains the nature of the pleasure resulting from ecstatic pos-
session. This accidental pleasure is akin to that resulting from a medical
cure; the relief from pain is a 'seeming' pleasure (EN 1154b9-20).51 The
emotions of pity52 and fear,53 and presumably enthousiasmos, contain an
element of pain. These painful emotions are first aroused, and then later,
upon their release, a feeling of pleasure is experienced. The relation
between medical treatment and accidental pleasure is that of near inter-
changeability in the Politics passage. First, the result of the sacred melo-
dies is said to be similar to 'medical treatment and katharsis (1342alO-ll)'.
In the next sentence, the result is said to be the same pair, arranged
chiastically: 'a certain katharsis and relief accompanied by pleasure'
(1342al4-15). This sort of pleasure explains how ecstatic possession can
50 Cf. Ion 536C2-4, where Ion is said to speak θείςι μοίρςι και κατοκωχτ), and the
Corybantes are possessed (κατέχωνται) by their god.
51 Aristotle says here that '[pleasures ... which are not related to prior pain ... belong
to the class of pleasures which are not accidentally pleasant', implying that acciden-
tal pleasures are related to prior pain. He continues: Ί mean by accidentally pleasant
those pleasures which serve as cures'. Passage translated and its importance noted
by Golden, Mimesis, 11-12
52 'Let pity then be a kind of pain (λύπη τις) excited by the sight of evil, deadly or
painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it'. Rhetoric II, 8 1385bl3-14,
translated by J.H. Freese in Aristotle: The Art of Rhetoric (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1926 [reprinted 1959]) 225.
53 'Let fear be defined as a painful (λύπη τις) or troubled feeling caused by the
impression of an imminent evil that causes destruction or pain'. Rhetoric II, 5
1382a21-2, translated by Freese, ibid., 201.
In spite of the relevance of Politics VIII7 (as noted on p. 40), some scholars
have discounted it and turned elsewhere for an explanation of the tragic
catharsis mentioned in Poetics 6. Those who posit an educational theory
of catharsis have also slighted the clear division in the Politics between
the music used for education and the music used for catharsis, 'the bone
in the throat' of all theories contending that tragic catharsis educates its
audience.55 In this section I will review and criticize the cognitivist line
of interpretation, which holds just such an educational view of tragic
catharsis. My focus will be the argument of Leon Golden, the most
famous proponent of a cognitivist approach.
As noted earlier (p. 46), Golden has felt the catharsis of Politics VIII 7
to be entirely different from that of the Poetics. He accepts the traditional
theory of medical purgation for Politics VIII7, but defines tragic katharsis
as 'first and foremost, a learning experience about the cause, nature, and
effect of pity and fear'.56 Gulden's theory that tragic catharsis is primarily
a learning experience is based largely on his interpretation of Poetics 4.
This chapter states (among other things) that humans derive their
μαθήσεις πρώτας from mimesis, and that humans take pleasure in mimesis.
Tragedy is a form of mimesis (see the definition at the beginning of this
section), so this description should be relevant to it. The crucial sentence
in Poetics 4, which refers to spectators viewing a painting, states that 'we
learn and infer what each thing is, for example that this is that.'57
Gulden's widely-shared understanding of this phrase, that it describes
55 'For the bone in the throat of all theories of katharsis as learning or moral improve-
ment generally is the passage from the Politics which clearly distinguishes the use
of music for katharsis from its possible uses in learning or ethical training' (Ford,
Katharsis, 113). The music for cathartic purposes is distinguished from the music for
educational purposes twice in the section of Politics VIII 7.4-6,1341b32-42a29.
56 Golden, Mimesis, 31
57 Poetics 4, 1448bl6-17. οτι συμβαίνει θεωροΰντας μανθάνειν και συλλογίζεσθαι τί
εκαστον, οίον ti ούτος εκείνος.
her identification with the protagonist in order to feel fear, and the
perception that the protagonist is suffering unjustly in order to feel pity.63
On the other hand, rhythm and melody are said in the Politics to have a
direct effect upon the soul (i.e., without an intermediate act of cognition),
and this must be particularly true of the enthousiasmos in ecstatic ritual.6'1
Furthermore, Politics VIII 7, in spite of the additional cognitive dimen-
sion to the emotions of pity and fear, closely connects them with simple
enthousiasmos. Hence the cognitive elements of these emotions are ig-
nored in favour of a conflicting model according to which music has a
direct impact upon the listener's soul.65 In this way, the ecstatic catharsis
of Politics VIII7 differs from the tragic catharsis of the Poetics, which fully
acknowledges the cognitive elements of pity and fear.
Tragic catharsis thus requires more intellectual participation than the
catharsis of ecstatic ritual. Golden makes a point to this effect: "The
reason why katharsis must address a mental activity and achieve an
intellectual or psychological effect is that the means by which it achieves
its effect is the word, spoken or read'.66 As Aristotle says, performance of
a tragedy may arouse pity and fear through spectacle alone;67 but to do
63 '[T]he first [i.e., pity] is felt for a person whose misfortune is undeserved and the
second [i.e., fear] for someone like ourselves' (Poetics 14, 1453a4-6, translated by
James Hutton in Aristotle's Poetics [New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982] 57).
64 Golden (10) translates Politics VIII 5, 1340al8-23: 'Representations, in rhythm and
melody, of anger and gentleness, of courage and temperance, and of all the opposite
characteristics to these, and of other kinds of character are especially effective in
terms of the true nature of these qualities; and this is clear from what actually
happens for when we hear such rhythms and melodies we alter our psychological
responses'. Ford also comments (117) that '[i]t was widely assumed by the Greeks
that certain kinds of melodies and rhythms actually "changed" the soul, and by their
sheer physical nature directly put it in various emotional states'.
65 Alexander Nehamas observes that while pity and fear may have cognitive elements,
they only become rational emotions when one has the proper reasons for experienc-
ing them. This may help account for the difference noted between the Politics and
the Poetics. See Nehamas' discussion in 'Pity and Fear in the Rhetoric and the Poetics',
m A Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle's Poetics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press 1992) 297-9
66 Golden, Mimesis, 26
67 Poetics 14,1453bl-3
this is considered vulgar, and not germane to the tragic art.68 Tragedy
does not need music or spectacle to achieve its effect;69 it can achieve it
through its most important component, the plot.70 This requires cogni-
tion and reasoning on the part of the audience; they must first work
through the Organizing of the events' (σύστασις των πραγμάτων), a
cognitive act, even before reaching that first cognitive component of the
emotions of pity and fear. This cognitive component involves an identi-
fication with the characters of tragedy, in the case of fear,71 and a
judgment that the tragic characters are suffering unjustly, in the case of
pity.72 Hence, the process of tragic catharsis, while basic enough to
appeal to all members in the audience, is more intricate than the catharsis
of ecstatic ritual. In ecstatic ritual, the music arouses in the soul the
emotion which it imitates, without an intermediary act of cognition. The
result is still the same in both cases: both tragedy and ecstatic ritual
arouse the emotions proper to each (pity and fear, enthousiasmos) to a
climax and catharsis, giving pleasure in the ensuing relief. They differ
only in that tragedy operates via cognition, supplemented by music,
whereas in ecstatic ritual music operates alone in a direct, literally
visceral way.
The organization of a tragedy reflects this natural process on a formal
level: cf. Poetics 18, which discusses the δέσις, μετάβασις, and λύσις which
every tragedy has. '[T]he complication (δέσις) extends from the begin-
ning up to the last moment before the change to good or bad fortune
occurs, and ... the denouement (λύσις) begins with that change
(μετάβασις) and extends to the end of the play.'73 The μετάβασις is not to
be confused with reversal (περιπέτεια) or recognition (άναγνωρισμός); all
68 Poetics 6,1450bl6-20
69 Poetics 14,1453b3-7
70 Poetics 6,1450a38
71 'In recognizing Oedipus or Medea in ourselves we recognize that what can happen
to that sort of person can happen to us as well, since we have come to recognize that
we ourselves are that sort of person, that we are, to that extent, Oedipus or Medea
ourselves' (A. Nehamas, 'Pity and Fear', 303).
72 As noted above (p 50), pity is the same emotion as fear, only with more distance;
we pity others, but we fear for ourselves.
73 Poetics 17,1455b24-9, translated by Hutton, ibid., 63-4
plots have a μετάβασις, but only complex plots have the latter two
additional elements.74 Nehamas, in believing the παθημάτων of the Poet-
ics' definition of tragedy to refer to 'the incidents of the drama itself
(306), suggests (307) that the proper definition of tragic catharsis is to be
found purely on the formal level: catharsis is 'a clarification of the pitiful
and fearful incidents of the drama itself ... I propose that we consider
catharsis as the "resolution", "denouement", or "solution" of the tragic
plot.'
IV Conclusion
After reviewing the Politics and Poetics passages on catharsis and the
major lines of interpretation based on them, we may establish certain
conditions which an account of tragic catharsis must fulfill. First, it must
be constructed in light of the Politics passage on catharsis; hence it must
fit within the dominant analogy of the passage, that of ecstatic posses-
sion. It must also explain the medical nuance in that description, as well
as why catharsis occurs 'for all'. Second, a correct account of tragic
catharsis must consider Aristotle's view of the emotions involved,
namely pity and fear. It is plain from Aristotle's definitions of these
emotions that they contain a cognitive element, though this element is
overlooked in the Politics. The correct account of tragic catharsis will
further gain in plausibility if it encompasses some aspect of biological
catharsis, since Aristotle's uses of the term fall overwhelmingly within
this context.
The proposed sexual model meets all these conditions. Based on the
use of the term katharsis in Aristotle's biological works, it finds that the
structure of catharsis is essentially the same in all cases, whether biologi-
cal, ecstatic (Politics), or tragic (Poetics). As applied to the latter two
works, this structure is a simple and self-contained one of arousal,
climax, and release of emotion. Being so simple, this model of catharsis
is readily applicable to all. On the biological level, catharsis is found in
both male and female as the discharge of excess nutrients. On the level
of ecstatic ritual, all participants experience an arousal and release of
enthousiasmos. At a performance of a tragedy, all spectators experience
mounting tear and pity which reaches a climax, then is resolved in the
denouement of the plot.
The medical nuance of the Politics description explains the nature of
the pleasure resulting from ecstatic possession. This accidental pleasure
is akin to that resulting from a medical cure; the relief from pain is a
'seeming' pleasure (see section II F). The painful emotions pity, fear, or
enthousiasmos are first aroused, and then later, upon their release, a
feeling of pleasure is experienced. This sort of pleasure explains how
ecstatic possession can be both terrifying and pleasant, and similarly
how witnessing a tragedy can be both terrible and pleasant. Such an
experience produces both pain, i.e., a painful emotion, and pleasure, i.e.,
the accidental pleasure arising from the release of the painful emotion.
The emotions of pity and fear, invoked in both the ecstatic catharsis
of the Politics and the tragic catharsis of the Poetics, involve a cognitive
element. This cognitive element is not native to the biological model of
catharsis, since the biological model does not deal with the emotions.
Even when the emotions do play a role, cognition is not applicable to
ecstatic catharsis, but only to tragic catharsis. The contradiction occurs
because Aristotle in the Politics privileges the power of cathartic music
over his own definitions of the emotions. Music, especially the music
proper for catharsis has a direct, overwhelming effect on the soul (see
pp. 51 above); its impact is nearly physical. The sound of the pipes
directly evokes the emotions of pity, fear, or enthousiasmos in the soul of
a ritual participant; music and emotional response are not buffered by a
cognitive act. In this aspect, tragedy marks an improvement over its
ritualistic predecessor. In accounting for tragic catharsis, Aristotle com-
pletely rules out music and its companion in seduction, spectacle; cathar-
sis can occur through the plot alone (p. 52). Hence, one need only read a
tragedy to experience tragic catharsis. Furthermore, the spectator must
make cognitive judgments concerning the protagonist in order to feel
pity or fear. These are the judgments described in the Rhetoric and the
Poetics (p. 50). The spectator judges that the protagonist is like himself in
order to feel fear; he judges that the protagonist is like someone close to
him in order to feel pity. Aristotle bears this in mind in determining the
characteristics of plot and protagonist required to elicit the proper tragic
emotions of pity and fear.75 The protagonist should be a good person
who has fallen upon his circumstances through error, not moral fault. A
base character or a happy ending will evoke neither pity nor fear. Too
much nobility in a character who suffers misfortune will evoke only
outrage. Hence the Poetics, while still retaining the essential structure of
the proposed sexual model of catharsis, adds an element of cognition in
order to transform it into tragic catharsis. Without this additional ele-
ment, tragic catharsis would not be unique and so not the effect which
properly belongs to tragedy;76 it would instead be the same thing as
ecstatic catharsis.
As applied to the Poetics, then, the proposed model is one in which all
spectators experience mounting fear and pity that reaches a climax, then
is resolved in the denouement of the plot. The acknowledged cognitive
elements of pity and fear make the plot the most important part of a
tragedy, as Aristotle says (p. 52); tragic catharsis must be achievable
through the plot alone, without the stimulus of music or spectacle. The
basic structure of the sexual model, i.e., a self-contained process of
arousal, climax, and resolution, is paralleled by the formal structure of
a tragedy: δεσις, μετάβασις, and λύσις (ρ. 52). Hence tragic catharsis takes
place in real time, as the plot of a tragedy unfolds. There is nothing which
exists outside of this process, certainly not a preexisting emotional
condition which is to be 'treated' by tragic catharsis. Furthermore, tragic
catharsis explained in this way applies to the entire audience, not just a
select few.
The proposed sexual model also fulfils the fundamentally Aristote-
lian criterion of 'saving the appearances'. That is, it answers to the
phenomena and to common opinion,77 in this case concerning a specta-
tor's experience in witnessing a tragedy. Such an appeal to the phenom-
ena is important in this case, since we are dealing in an area, i.e., human
76 The pleasure which 'properly belongs' to tragedy 'comes from pity and fear through
an imitation ... [t]his effect must be embodied in the events of the plot'. Poetics 14,
1453bll-14, translated by Hutton, ibid., 58-9.
77 'We must, as in all other cases, set the phenomena before us and, after first discussing
the difficulties, go on to prove, if possible, the truth of all the reputable opinions ...
or, failing this, of the greater number and the most authoritative; for if we both
resolve the difficulties and leave the reputable opinions undisturbed, we shall have
proved the case sufficiently' (EN VII1,1145bl-7, translated by J.L. Ackrill in A New
Aristotle Reader [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987], 431).
78 Cf. Aristotle's comments on conduct: 'the whole account of matters of conduct must
be given in outline and not precisely ... matters concerned with conduct and
questions of what is good for us have no fixity' (EN II 2, 1104a2-4, trans. Ackrill,
ibid., 377).
79 'It is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just
so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept
probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician de-
monstrative proofs' (EN 13,1094b24-7, trans. Ackrill, ibid., 364).
Department of Classics
103-104 East Pyne
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-5264
vlyates@princeton.edu
80 At Politics VIII6,1341b3-8, the inventor of the aulos eventually discards it. 'Athene
. invented the aulos and then threw it away ... she rejected it because the acquire-
ment of flu/os-playing contributes nothing to the mind'. Translated by B. Jowett in
J. Barnes, ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle Vol Π (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press 1984) 2128.